

THEOLOGY, CONTEMPLATION AND THE UNIVERSITY [1]

Andrew LOUTH

The giving of inaugural lectures is a rum business. Originally, I suppose, such a lecture was the first lecture of the new professor, in which he gave some indication of what he was bringing to his subject, what it was that he was going to profess. Nowadays, the inaugural lecture is rarely something so immediate: the professor has been around for some time, we know what he is up to, so the inaugural lecture becomes both less and more of an occasion: less, because it is not really the beginning, it does not inaugurate anything, but more, because it has been turned into a special occasion. All this is even more strikingly so in a case such as mine, when someone is promoted to a personal chair. I have been around for some time, nothing much is likely to change as I became a professor, which happened some time ago, anyway. But the fact that this inaugural lecture is not beginning, not inaugurating anything, does, I think, express a further truth, a more important truth: namely, that the appointment of a new professor does not so much initiate something, as continue something. Whatever we teach, whatever we explore in our research, we are all part of something much bigger, a collaborative exercise: the history of scholarship is a matter of continuity; the new beginnings are less important than the continuing development of the subject, and a lot of new beginnings are often, at least with hindsight, seen to be not so new after all. The acknowledgment of continuity has often been part of the inaugural lecture itself; in the case of established chairs, the new professor often pays tribute to his predecessors, sometimes, indeed, reflects on the history of his chair and what can be learnt from such reflection. In the case of personal chairs, there is no apparent opportunity for this: I have no immediate predecessor as professor of Patristic and Byzantine Theology, and shall, likely enough, have no successor. And yet, holding such a chair in Durham, I am conscious of the continuity of my subject here, conscious not just of the historic commitment of the University of Durham to the study of the Christian Fathers - something manifest in the library of the great Victorian scholar, Martin Routh, a library of, largely, patristic texts, which he bequeathed to the then new University of Durham - but also of the more immediate heritage into which I have entered. I would like, therefore, at the beginning of this lecture, to pay tribute to two patristic scholars who preceded me in Durham, both of an international scholarly eminence to which I would like to aspire, though neither of recognized fully by this university (both of them retired as readers): Tony Gelston and Gerald Bonner. The patristic interests of both these scholars flank my own - and their scholarly interests extend beyond what is often narrowly thought of as patristic in England, cut short at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the last recognized by the Church of England, in the case of Dr Gelston to the history of the text of the Scriptures, and in the case of Professor Bonner the history and scholarship of Christian Northumbria. But their work helps me to recall other meadows of patristic theology, adjacent to those I am familiar with. For Dr Gelston's

patristic interests have mainly been in the works, and especially the liturgy, preserved in Syriac, while Professor Bonner's renown is as a student of the Latin Fathers, especially the greatest of them, St Augustine of Hippo. My interests, in the Greek Fathers, lie in between, and their scholarship serves to remind me of the currents of devotion and scholarship that lie either side of my own particular interests.

And I need these reminders in tackling the subject I have chosen for this lecture. For the history of the Greek East has been significantly different from that of the Latin West. On the one hand, the Greek East did not see the irrecoverable collapse of the educational system of late antiquity, out of the ruins of which there first emerged the monastic and cathedral schools, and from them the mediæval university; and on the other, the Greek Fathers have always seemed somewhat exotic to the Latin tradition, their influence patchy and peripheral. Professor Bonner has a deeper knowledge than I do of the sources in the Latin tradition that shaped the curriculum of the mediæval university, and Dr Gelston far greater expertise in the matter of the history of the text of the Bible and its interpretation, which was central to the study of theology in the mediæval university, and has continued so where theology is still taken seriously. What I hope I can offer is some knowledge of the traditions, ultimately Greek, that shaped what it was to study and to come to knowledge in the mediæval university.

So: "Theology, Contemplation, and the University".

The mediæval university emerged in the twelfth century, as I have just mentioned, from the monastic and cathedral schools of the early Middle Ages. These schools, especially the monastic schools, had preserved elements of the education of classical Latin antiquity from the collapse of the educational system of late antiquity in the fifth and sixth centuries, when the region of what was to become Western Europe slipped from the public administration of the Roman Empire. Bede, in Northumbria, at the beginning of the eighth century was one concerned to equip such monastic schools for education, for alongside his exegetical and historical works, he wrote textbooks on grammar and rhetoric, two subjects which, together with dialectic, constituted the *trivium*, the elementary part of the mediæval curriculum, with which the monastic schools were mostly concerned. The *trivium* enabled one to read and write and think in Latin, providing thereby access to the Scriptures and the liturgy of the Church of the Latin West, and incidentally, also to the Latin classics. Beyond the *trivium* lay the *quadrivium* - music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy - which completed the so-called liberal arts, *artes liberales*. Teaching in monastic schools seems to have advanced this far only patchily; some of Bede's works advance into the *quadrivium*, with a work on metre (considered part of music) and on the computation of Easter, which involved some knowledge of astronomy. It was this pattern of learning that was inherited by the mediæval university.

What was the purpose of this learning? In the monastic school, the purpose seems clear enough: to provide monks, for monks had to sing the divine office, which involved reading, and be able to make further copies of the scriptures and liturgical books, and other works as required - they needed to read and write in Latin. The monastic schools existed to enable monks to fulfil their

vocation as monks: and fundamentally that meant to come to know God, who has revealed himself in Scripture and in the Incarnation, to praise him and to love him. That goal could be described as contemplation, *contemplatio*. The monastic life was often characterized as consisting of several steps, sometimes three or even five, but most commonly four: *lectio, meditatio, oratio, contemplatio* - reading, meditation, prayer and contemplation. The early stages were rooted in the disciplines learnt at school: reading and meditation, this latter meaning, not what it might mean nowadays in the context of Eastern meditation, but rather trying to grasp the significance of what one had read, by pondering over it, thinking about it, relating one passage from the Bible to another (for it was mostly with Scripture that monastic *lectio* was concerned). This reading, thinking, pondering, ultimately led the monk to contemplation: to looking at God, being aware of his presence. Such contemplation was not thought of as an achievement - the next step on the ladder, at which you arrived if you were sufficiently diligent-it was rather a gift, something received. The early stages of reading and meditating prepared the monk to receive this gift, it made him receptive. But beholding God, felt awareness of his presence, was a gift, not an attainment. The gift *could* be given without the preparation; God is not limited by human readiness, but such miraculous illumination was not normal. Augustine had faced this problem long ago, and remarked that the command to love both God and our neighbour entails that we shall want to pass on the fruits of contemplation to our fellow human beings, that is, we shall be inspired to teach, which would make little sense if we had never had to learn in the first place; as he put it, "for charity itself, which holds humans together in a knot of unity, would not have a means of infusing souls and almost mixing them together if humans could teach nothing to each other." [2]

The evolution of the university, preceded by that of the cathedral schools, took this pattern of learning out of the immediate practical context of the monastery, but did not fundamentally alter it. I would like now to explore with you a little what this understanding of learning entails. What we have looked at in its immediate monastic context has a history that goes back to the roots of Western culture, which perhaps gives another reason for heeding what it tells us about the nature of knowledge and learning.

Behind the pattern of monastic learning lies the distinction between the active life and the contemplative life, the *bios praktikos* and the *bios theoretikos*, a distinction expressed in this form as early as Aristotle, though much older: Plato was certainly aware of the distinction, too. [3] For Aristotle, this was the distinction between the life of worldly activity - the world of business and commerce, the world of farming and manufacture, the world of everyday life - and, in contrast, the world of thought. The active life is concerned with doing things, and the moral and political questions that this entails; the contemplative life is concerned with beholding things. The word *theoria* is derived from a verb meaning to look, or to see: for the Greeks, knowing was a kind of seeing, a sort of intellectual seeing. Contemplation is, then, knowledge, knowledge of reality itself, as opposed to knowing how: the kind of know-how involved in getting things done. To this contrast between the active life and contemplation there corresponds a distinction in our understanding of what it is to be human between reason conceived as puzzling things out, solving problems,

calculating and making decisions - referred to by the Greek words *phronesis* and *dianoia*, or in Latin by *ratio* - and reason conceived as receptive of truth, beholding, looking - referred to by the Greek words *theoria* or *sophia* (wisdom) or *nous* (intellect), or in Latin *intellectus*. Augustine expressed this distinction by using *scientia* for the kind of knowledge attained by *ratio*, and *sapientia*, wisdom, for the kind of knowledge received by *intellectus*. Human intelligence operates at two levels: a basic level concerned with doing things, and another level concerned with simply beholding, contemplating, knowing reality.

This contrast can be expressed in various ways. One distinction, which Aristotle discusses both at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and in book 10 of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, can be expressed by saying that in what concerns *ratio* we are doing things for a reason - what we are doing is not done for its own sake, but for some other purpose - while in what concerns *intellectus* we are doing things for their own sake: in religious terms, looking at God, gazing on him, is not done for any reason, there is no ulterior motive, it is done for its own sake; but similarly with knowing things created - contemplative knowing simply is concerned with what they are, rather than with the purposes to which we can put them. In a more modern idiom, this distinction is not unlike Heidegger's distinction between *Vorhandensein* - the being of things that we are simply concerned with for our own purposes, and *Dasein*, being for its own sake. There is another distinction, also explored by Aristotle in the places just mentioned: the realm of *ratio* is quite human; it is a perfectly proper human activity to engage in business, to make things, to set ourselves goals and try to achieve them; but the realm of *intellectus* can be said both to fulfil what it is to be human, for it is the exercise of what is highest in human nature, and also to transcend what it is to be human, for contemplation belongs to the gods. In contemplation what is highest in human nature finds its fulfilment, and that highest is what is divine in human beings: human nature finds its fulfilment in transcending itself.

But there is something missing in my attempts to summarize what Aristotle thought about the relationship between the active and the contemplative lives: an understanding that continued through until the times of the mediæval university. It is missing because the very terms I am using, terms in modern English, disguise the relationships implicit in Aristotle's Greek, or in the Schoolmen's Latin. We might start with the word school, as in monastic schools, also used to describe the separate divisions of the mediæval university. The Latin is *schola*, from the Greek *schole*, which means leisure. When Aristotle expresses the relationship between active and the contemplative lives, he says, 'for we engage in business in order to have leisure' (literally: we are unleisured in order to be leisured). Latin has the same idea: business, *negotium*, is the negation of *otium*, rest or leisure. Our modern use of language puts this quite the other way about: it is *work* that is the key term, leisure is an odd, slightly embarrassing, word: time not devoted to work, time left over. We need leisure, of course, but it is mostly conceived in the modern world as an opportunity for rest and entertainment, so that we may return to work *refreshed*. Again, our words betray us: refreshment is a means to an end, it is not the refreshment, the *refrigerium*, we hope for beyond this life of toil and effort, the *refrigerium* for which we pray may be granted to the departed, for

instance. At the beginning of the twenty-first century this is perhaps even more odd, given that technological advance has soaked up much of what human work once had to accomplish, and thus provided humans, at any rate in the technologically advanced West, with more time of leisure overall, than ever before.

But to pursue that would be to anticipate. Before I move on, let me make one further etymological point. The word *theoria*, we noticed, derives from the word to see, but we noticed that it has for Aristotle something of a religious aura, in that it is the exercise of the divine part of human nature, the occupation of the gods. The Latin word used to translate *theoria* is *contemplatio*, which must originally have meant something like 'what goes on in a temple', referring to the act of beholding the statue of the divinity enshrined in the temple. We shall return later to these religious overtones of contemplation.

How does all this bear on how human knowledge was understood by the mediæval university, and more pressingly what relevance has that to us today? The mediæval monastery, at least in its Benedictine manifestation, divided the day into three parts, roughly equal in duration, devoted to working, praying and sleeping. The monk was a man of flesh and blood; he needed to work and eat in order to live, he was certainly engaged in the life of *ratio*; he needed sleep in order to make that possible; but he also devoted time to prayer, which included contemplation. To that end the monastic school equipped him with enough of the liberal arts to enable him prepare himself to rise to the life of contemplation. The mediæval university focused on that latter part. As Sir Richard Southern was beginning to show us in his, alas unfinished, final work, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, the mediæval universities were engaged in a massive enterprise to recover all the human learning that had become fragmented as a result of the fall of human kind, and more immediately through the laying waste of the achievement of classical culture; but sought to recover this so that, as far as might be possible in the fallen world, the universe could once more be contemplated as a whole, and lead human minds up to contemplation of God. The same pattern can be seen here as had been explored in much greater depth in the Byzantine ascetic tradition: the achievement of such detachment that the universe could be contemplated for what it is, created by God - what the Greeks called natural contemplation - and thus lead the mind to contemplation of God himself. The book of nature and the book of creation were understood to be complementary, both capable of being understood in the light of the Incarnation of the Word of God through whom creation came to be, a light of which human beings began to be aware as they sought loving detachment in the following of the Crucified and Risen Christ.

The schoolmen devoted themselves to this amazing undertaking; the university, school, was a place of *scholè*, leisure, where men had time to think and ponder. The enterprise failed, no doubt. The world was still fallen, political and economic turmoil swept their efforts away, though perhaps not so quickly or lastingly as we moderns like to suppose. The endeavour of the schoolmen was also skewed, in that they were developing only one part - and not the richest part - of the Christian tradition; not that many of them were not aware of the intellectual riches of the Greeks,

but the Greeks who were their contemporaries were politically weak and anyway regarded by the West as heretics as a result of the Great Schism.

But the universities continued, and adapted to the times. It is some aspects of that process to which I want to turn my attention now. The mediæval university was a place for the study of the liberal arts that made possible a life of thought, of contemplation. Liberal arts: that is, free arts, as opposed to the servile arts to which a man is bound: the liberal arts made possible the exercise of freedom, they make possible the development of what is divine in humans, whereby human nature transcends itself. Contemplation, too, we have seen is a gift: not the result of labour, but something given and received.

Somewhere in the more recent history of the West, all that changed. We have already seen that in the way the words we use turn on its head the understanding that saw work as a temporary suspension of leisure in order to make leisure possible: leisure in which one can think and ponder, and disinterestedly receive knowledge and understanding as illumination. Immanuel Kant must, I think, have had something to do with it, though he was likely a symptom of wider changes rather than the cause of them. Let me cite two points that lead me to think thus. First, there are Kant's remarks in the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, where he speaks of reason "constraining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining", or as "an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions he has himself formulated". [4] Compelling, constraining - even torture is hinted at - in order to extort the truth in accordance with one's own categories. This is the exercise of *ratio* not *intellectus*, and there is no suggestion that there is any realm for the contemplative knowing of *intellectus*, indeed quite the contrary. Secondly, there is Kant's understanding of virtue where, to oversimplify, the difficulty of acting virtuously is seen as some measure of its authenticity: moral virtue is the product of *work*, or toil. No one doubts that virtue is sometimes, even often, difficult; we live in a fallen world, much conspires to hide the good from us. But the whole of the ancient Christian tradition saw virtue as something natural: for a human being to be virtuous is to act in accordance with his or her true nature, true created nature. This perception is one that the Christian tradition shares with much other ancient wisdom: cf. the principle of *wu-wei* in Taoism. Much toil may be required to reverse the effects of the fall - this is the realm of *ratio* - but the purpose of all this is to make possible the exercise of *intellectus*, devoting itself to contemplation of God and the created order. Another nail in the coffin of these traditional ideas of contemplation that go back, as we have seen, to the roots of Western culture, was provided by Karl Marx, in his famous comment from the *Theses on Feuerbach*: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to change it." [5] Philosophy is precisely not the contemplation of reality; it is to be participation in revolutionary struggle. It is certainly in the Marxist notion of the intellectual worker that the classical idea of thinking as contemplation, that lies at the root of the idea of the university, is finally overthrown. The world process is one of revolutionary struggle, in which all are called on to participate by working, including the intellectual who is to bring his gifts of analysis to elucidating

the progress towards the dawn of the final classless society - though what was to happen when that was achieved always remained rather vague; it was, however, hardly to be the life of contemplation.

It might seem strange, in the year 2001, to evoke the ideals of Marxism. Twenty, thirty years ago, perhaps, but not now, after the collapse of communism as an ideology in the former Soviet Union and most of its satellites. But it is odd how ideas linger in what might seem the strangest quarters. One would never have thought of the CVCP as a hotbed of Marxism, and yet it is in university management that the Trotskyist or Maoist doctrine of perpetual revolution seems to hold sway! It is also in such quarters that the idea of the academic as an intellectual worker seems tenacious. It is not perhaps the Marxist version of this that is embraced; it is rather what one might call the consumerist version. But the effect is much the same, so far as the undermining of the idea of the university as a place for the pursuit of the intellectual virtue of contemplation - an idea that lies at the roots of Western culture - is concerned. If we academics are workers, then there should be a product and it had better be saleable, or at least subject to quality control. This is the rationale of QAA and RAE: we produce education, which is consumed by students, and research, consumed by our peers, and these things can be quantified and assessed. If our departments are going to be 5 or 5*, then in an Arts department each member must produce, say, a book and three weighty articles in each assessment period. If, in the end, jobs are on the line, then university lecturers will end up as people who can produce that amount. In the case of teaching the next stage has already been reached: namely, not a direct assessment of the quality of teaching (too subjective), but an assessment of procedures, regardless of the fact that any set of procedures becomes a game to be played - and academics are quite good at playing games!

If it were simply a matter of the way in which turning universities into educational businesses, with appropriate management for fulfilling five-year plans, or whatever, is making the job of being an academic miserable, then perhaps we could batten down the hatches and wait for the madness to pass, or take early retirement. But I fear it is much more serious than that. Western culture, as we have known it from the time of classical Greece onwards, has always recognized that there is something more to human life than a productive, well-run society. If that were all human life meant, then, as Plato sourly suggests, we might just as well be communities of ants or bees. But there is something beyond that, a life in which the human mind glimpses something beyond what it can achieve. But this kind of human activity needs time, time in which to be undistracted and open to what lies beyond our planning and plotting and playing games with each other. Universities and academies make this possible: and what they make possible needs *no other justification*. Our justification as academics is not that we turn out students with transferable skills of comprehension, analysis, and an ability to communicate intelligibly (as the kind of Cambridge degree I went through was said to equip you with the skills to produce a paper on anything given insufficient time: quite a useful skill for Heads of Department required to give inaugural lectures in term-time!). We do that, and it may well be only universities that can do that, but if that is regarded as the reason for our existence, then I fear that we shall cease even to achieve that. Our justification must be that academics are people paid to have time to think. We do other things too, and do them well, but if

that principle is no longer conceded, then society has lost something essential; it is, I would argue, no longer civilized in the sense in which we speak of Western civilization (and the same principle of making it possible for some people to have leisure to think has been enshrined, it seems to me, to all, or most of, the forms of human civilization). But the situation now is, if anything, worse than I have suggested: the principle of leisure to contemplate is not only not conceded, it is no longer even understood. It has been eliminated by government policy that, first, industrializes universities (turning them into some sort of intellectual factory), and then seeks to employ the principle of supermarket: pile them high and sell them cheap. There have been too few voices from within the academy that have pointed out the fundamental threat posed by this policy.

And it is a fundamental threat, not only to the nearly 900-year tradition of the university, but to civilization itself. That might seem extreme, but let me complete my jeremiad. Right from Aristotle, and indeed earlier, the acknowledgment of the supreme value of contemplation, and the need that there be those who may devote their time to this, has been linked to acknowledgment that human beings are not simply earth-bound entities. In contemplation, for Aristotle, humans glimpsed what was divine in them, they realized a certain affinity with the gods. This insight was transposed into Christian terms by means of the doctrine of human creation in the image of God: in virtue of being in the image of God human beings could find a kinship with God, which was purely gift, something given, in which they genuinely transcended themselves, or what they could make of themselves, and that kinship was discovered in contemplation, not necessarily of God but most fully in prayer or contemplation of God. It is fascinating how the convergence of the Greek notion of contemplation and the biblical notion of creation in God's image leads to the doctrine that the true state of the intellect is prayer, so that true prayer is described in the Byzantine tradition as a noetic (or perhaps better noeral) activity: but we must leave that for the moment.

We might put this in a more modern idiom. Heidegger made a distinction, developed notably in his *The Origin of the Work of Art*, between the world, *die Welt*, and the earth, *die Erde*. The world was our environment, the world that we have increasingly shaped to our purposes, the world in which we are at home, which we have made our home. The earth was what lay behind all this, something beyond human fashioning, something that irrupts into the world, often with alarming consequences. The world is something we are familiar with, we know our way around it: it is the world explored by our reason in the sense of *ratio*. But if we are too much at home in the world, if we lose sight of the realm of the earth, then we have lost touch with reality. It was, for Heidegger, the role of the poet to preserve a sense of the realm of the earth, to break down our being lulled into a sense of security by our familiarity with the world. We might think of contemplation, the dispassionate beholding of reality, in a similar way: such patient attending to reality can prevent our mistaking the familiar tangle of assumption and custom for reality, a tangle that modern technology and the insistent demands of modern consumerist society can very easily bind into a tight web.

This whole tradition of contemplative leisure, *vacare in otio*, can be, and is, criticized as elitist, and to be elitist is a terrible thing nowadays. But it must, I think, be defended as elitist,

though we must be sure we know what we are defending. It must not be a social elitism: leisure to contemplate perhaps conjures up a leisured class, though the English leisured class, at least, often enough only had the leisure to be bored. Contemplation is, I think, free from such crude caricature. We should not be surprised if there is some correlation between being intellectually gifted and given to contemplation, though the kind of intellectual endowment that can be measured, the IQ, may have less to do with it than we might at first think. But only a minority are ever likely to come to exercise of the contemplative faculty to any degree, whether that degree is measured in what I would regard as the most fundamental terms - the contemplation attained by a St Silouan or the Romanian elder Cleopa, neither of whom would be likely to be found in an academy (though it would do the academy good to pay attention to them) - or what this lecture is mostly concerned with, the provision of time to think for those inclined to it. But if the fact that only a minority are likely to become adepts at exercise of the contemplative faculty is to be called 'elitist', then so be it: they have truly been chosen, which is what an elite is. For we need elites in that sense, in the same way as we need gifted pianists and singers, poets and artists, and even lutenists - who also constitute elites.

But there are other factors in our society that militate against acceptance of a contemplative elite, especially in an academy, the most important of which is the way in which non-productive time is no longer publicly valued. We have already noticed the way in which our notion of work and leisure inverts the way in which these are related in the classical languages of the West. The consequence of that inversion goes deep: non-productive time is what is left over from work, and is a time for rest so that we may return to work refreshed. More insidiously, non-productive time is when we become not producers, workers, but consumers, and the leisure industry and advertising conspire to make that leisure productive. The positive valuing of non-productive time was encouraged in the not-too-distant past by the provision of holidays - Sundays and other religious feast days. First, Protestantism reduced sharply the number of religious feast days, and then an odd alliance of consumerism and impatience with the tiresome variability of the feasts dependent on Easter sought to sever the link between holidays and the holy. But the principle of these feasts also goes back to the beginnings of what we know as civilization, and is a contemplative, religious principle. In the *Laws*, Plato tells us:

But the gods, in their compassion for the hardships incident to our human lot, have appointed the cycle of their festivals to provide relief from this fatigue, beside giving us the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus to share these festivals with us and keep them right, with all the spiritual sustenance these deities bring to the feast. [\[6\]](#)

The principle of public religious feasts involving freedom from work was contemplative, in that participation in the religious feasts gave to all a glimpse of the divine realm that transcends us. As that principle has been lost to our society, it is perhaps not surprising that other ways of valuing the contemplative, for instance the institution of universities, has ceased even to be understood.

Scholesate kai gnote hoti ego eimi ho theos: Have leisure and know that I am God-the translation in the Greek Bible, the Septuagint, of the psalm verse, rendered in the English translation of the Hebrew as: "Be still and know that I am God". Originally the University would have recognized its purpose in that psalm verse, while at the same time acknowledging that elsewhere - here on earth in prayer and worship, and in a life devoted to prayer and worship - that purpose was fulfilled. It would also have recognized that the ultimate fulfilment of that verse was only to be found in heaven, so that, in a way, the university itself was a preparation for heaven, rather than being, as we experience it nowadays, a rehearsal for purgatory. But let me end with the words with which St Augustine closed his great work, the City of God. He has just mentioned the final, seventh age of humanity, that will find its fulfilment in heaven:

This seventh - he says - will be our Sabbath, and its end will not be an evening, but the Lord's Day, an eighth eternal day, sanctified by the resurrection of Christ, which prefigures the eternal rest of both spirit and body. There we shall be still (*vacabimus*, the Latin equivalent of *scholesamen*) and see, shall see and love, shall love and praise. Behold what shall be in the end without end! For what else is our end, except to reach the kingdom which has no end? [\[7\]](#)

Or, in Augustine's wonderful Latin:

Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. Nam quis alius noster est finis nisi pervenire ad regnum cuius nullus est finis?

Notes

[\[1\]](#) Inaugural lecture at the University of Durham (March 2002).

[\[2\]](#) Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, prol. 6.

[\[3\]](#) In what follows, I am deeply in debt to a work I read long ago, the ideas of which have remained with me: Josef Pieper's *Leisure the Basis of Culture*, London: Faber and Faber, 1952.

[\[4\]](#) Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963 (originally printed 1929), p. 20

[\[5\]](#) Quoted from Karl Marx. *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*. ed. T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1963 (first published 1956), p. 84.

[\[6\]](#) Plato, *Laws II*. 653CD (trans. A.E. Taylor, London: J.M. Dent, 1934, p. 30).

[\[7\]](#) Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXII. 30. 5.