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JOHN-PAUL HIMKA AND JOANNA BEATA MICHLIC

Introduction

Engaging with the “Dark Past”

In the last two decades the subject of memory has become a compelling preoccupation of sociologists, historians, public intellectuals, and artists. The French scholar Henry Rousso has pointed out that “memory has become a value reflecting the spirit of our time.”¹ We live in the era of memory and delayed remembering of traumatic experiences, and it is accompanied by two interwoven developments—the cultures of apology and of repentance.² Jeffrey Olick, an American scholar of public memory, has referred to this phenomenon as an “increase of redress claims” and a “politics of victimisation and regret.”³ The “politics of regret” has emerged simultaneously with the rise of multiculturalism and the transformation, in the West, of the meaning of the Holocaust from a crime empirically committed by Germans, Austrians, and other Europeans against the Jews to a paradigm for innocent suffering and victimhood.⁴

A difficult but important aspect of the study of memory is that of “the dark past” of nations in relation to their ethnic, religious, and national minorities—the ways in which nations recollect and rework the memory of their “dark pasts” and how this memory shapes their collective identities and the social identity of ethnic and national minorities. Discussions about national identities cannot escape from an orientation toward the past, especially the uncomfortable past, which does not pass away.⁵ The memory of the Holocaust and the Jewish past in postcommunist Eastern Europe fits into this category of empirical problems. It is an exceptionally interesting case for the study of the painful process of coming to terms with “the dark past”

on the one hand, and on the other hand, of getting the past wrong, thus making both the past and present not only bearable but also predominantly positive and “bright.” It demonstrates that in mainstream historical consciousness and public memory the painstakingly “uncovered” accounts of the “dark” pasts are chiefly perceived in a category of “too much truth” that can hardly be accepted on a larger social scale. And it shows too that in public memory, remembering is not necessarily about getting the past right, but rather about maintaining the positive collective self-image and soothing national myths. Thus, “the dark past” is perceived as a spoiler.

The memory of the Holocaust and the Jewish past in postcommunist Europe also has manifold practical implications for the development of national cultures and international relationships in postcommunist Europe, as well as for international relationships between the postcommunist countries and Israel and the Jewish diaspora, and between the postcommunist countries and the United States.

We had each been working on the problematic memory of the dark past when we decided to put together this volume. Joanna had already coedited a book with Antony Polonsky about the debates over the massacre of Jews at Jedwabne on 10 July 1940 in Poland and had just finished her monograph *Poland's Threatening Other*, which dealt with Polish images of Jews from the 1880s until the early twenty-first century.⁶ John-Paul was near the beginning of a research project on Ukrainians and the Holocaust in history and memory and was working out some of his ideas about Ukrainian Holocaust memory at conferences. We realized that we were working on problems that exhibited many striking similarities. We also read with interest the work of other scholars on how the Holocaust was being remembered (or forgotten) in the Central and Eastern European countries making the transition out of communism. It would be very fruitful, we thought, to bring together a collection of interpretive surveys of the struggle with the memory of the Shoah in every postcommunist country in Europe, addressing a wide array of developments throughout the region.

The Memory of the Dark Past in West and East

The cohesiveness of the collection is based upon a certain unity of historical experience in postcommunist Europe. In Western Europe and

North America, the memory of the destruction of European Jewry has been alive since the late 1960s and early 1970s. There is no need to recapitulate all the moments in the development of the memory of the Holocaust in the noncommunist West, but they include the capture, trial, and execution of Adolph Eichmann (1960–62), the airing of the television miniseries *The Holocaust* in the United States and Germany (1978–79), the release of the blockbuster film *Schindler's List* directed by Steven Spielberg (1993), and the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in the center of Washington DC (also 1993). In fact, during the thirty years preceding the collapse of communism in Europe, the Holocaust had evolved in the West into the most potent, easily recognizable, and ubiquitous symbol of mass murder and genocide. It was regularly appropriated by groups other than Jews to make points about their own sufferings. It became a source of reflection for philosophers like Hannah Arendt, sociologists like Zygmunt Bauman, and historians like Raul Hilberg.⁷ It brought into question all the accomplishments of Western Enlightenment—how did such great evil emerge from a civilization so proud of its moral and intellectual achievements? The Holocaust came to occupy a centerstage position in ethical thinking about the modern world. It was to stand as an example of the dangerous consequences of racial and ethnic prejudice and hatred: “Never again!”

Oddly, or perhaps not so oddly, this intense focus on the Holocaust occurred in societies that were more removed from the actual historical event. No Holocaust occurred, of course, in the United States, Canada, or Britain. The Jews of Nazi-occupied Western Europe, even of Nazi Germany and Austria, were generally murdered outside Western Europe, in the death and concentrations camps in the East. Lucy Dawidowicz's widely used estimate of Jews killed in various countries in the Final Solution shows that victims from countries that entered the postwar era as capitalist numbered fewer than half a million; however, Jews killed in European countries that were communist after the war totaled almost five and a half million.⁸

It was certainly easier to think about the Holocaust in places where it was more abstract, though in Western Europe the Jewish victims were not publicly acknowledged either during the two decades after the war.⁹ But it was much harder to do so in societies where the mas-

sive machinery of genocide had actually been let loose, taking not only victims but also accomplices. The messiness of actual historical experience made it difficult to imagine clarity. For example, while the West could more easily distinguish among neat categories of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders, the East had difficulty making sense of the tangled complexities—victims forced to act as perpetrators (Jewish *Ordnungsdienst* were the largest manpower component in many ghetto roundups), perpetrators as rescuers (those who had the power to kill also had the power to save), selfless rescuers who exceeded the call of moral duty and rescuers who became perpetrators against their Jewish charges, and bystanders who had no sidelines to flee to.¹⁰

Another difference between the West and the East was the intensity of the experience of Nazi occupation. Occupied France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy did not experience anything like the terror that raged in occupied Poland, the Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia. In the latter region, the Germans mass murdered intelligentsia, burned innumerable villages to the ground, deported millions to Germany as forced labor, starved over three million Soviet POWs to death, and routinely shot large numbers of the population as hostages or suspected resisters. For the West, clearly, the Holocaust, once it reentered memory in the late 1960s, stood out more boldly from the background of wartime violence than it did in the East.¹¹

The Dark Past in the Communist Era

This more diffuse suffering from the Nazi occupation allowed the communist regimes—perhaps even *induced* the communist regimes, since their motivations remain uncertain—to downplay the specificity of Jewish suffering during the war. That is, the regimes did not acknowledge that the Jews as a nationality were singled out by the Germans for total extermination. Although the Soviet Union, the Eastern European satellite states, and Yugoslavia did not entirely prohibit discourse about the Holocaust, they muffled it and dissolved it into the narrative of how all the people of their state suffered from the fascist invaders. In the communist interpretation of the Second World War, there was no room for public mourning and empathy for the dead Jews and the destroyed world of Eastern European Jewish civilization with its various centers such as Vilnius, the “Jerusalem

of the North”; Lublin, the “Jerusalem of the East”; and Sarajevo, the “Jerusalem of the Balkans.” As a result, and also because of tight censorship of the press in these countries, there was insufficient thrashing out of locals’ complicity in the Holocaust. True, former policemen and camp guards in German service were arrested and sentenced to years of exile or the death penalty, but these trials were not the subject of public discourse, nor were the ramifications of political and social collaboration in the Holocaust articulated and incorporated into historical consciousness and social memory.¹² Also insufficiently aired was the legacy of interwar and wartime anti-Semitism; in fact, at various moments in postwar communism, the regimes themselves manipulated and reemployed the old anti-Semitic attitudes and tropes for their own purposes. Although, and indeed because, wartime collaborationist regimes—like those of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia—were anathematized by the communists, anticommunist and nationalist intellectuals privately viewed these regimes with less hostility, sometimes with favor. The same was true for wartime nationalists in places like Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Lithuania.

At the same time, Jewish communities in the communist countries experienced more alienation from the surrounding society as a result of their experience with the Holocaust in the first place and the absence of recognition of their special suffering in the second place. Whatever they felt, it was not possible for them to articulate it outside the family and immediate community. Within the remaining local Jewish communities, the Holocaust survivors acted as the chief organizers of low-key Holocaust commemorations and, at the same time, represented the only sympathetic audience for these commemorative events.¹³ In the spirit of bearing witness, they felt compelled to write—in a censored press of limited circulation and for a numerically limited audience—about the lost vibrant Jewish world and its destruction.

In 1994 the anthropologist Rubie S. Watson contended that the socialist states failed to convince society of their interpretation of the past, and as a result, alternative “underground memories” always existed and were kept alive.¹⁴ This contention holds true with respect to the public memory of the precommunist and communist pasts of the majority group, understood in an ethnic sense. However, in the

case of the troubling, painful relations with Jews and other minorities during the war, “underground memory” was not alive among the majority groups, except for a few individuals, as chapters in this book confirm. In fact, as argued by Michael Steinlauf in a pioneering study of the memory of the Holocaust in Poland, the official communist way of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust reflected, ultimately, a popular need.¹⁵ It was socially acceptable and accepted.

Only after the fall of communism did the deeply buried memories of the Holocaust resurface among eyewitnesses who as children and young adults had had a firsthand experience of the local killing fields and who had after the war kept these troubling memories from disturbing their everyday conscience. But by the early twenty-first century these individuals slowly began to speak out about the wartime horrors that they witnessed, as oral history projects and interviews conducted in the region in that period confirm.¹⁶ Correspondingly, Jewish survivors, who had previously drawn a veil of silence over their wartime experiences and their Jewish background, have begun to articulate their past traumas and trajectories of survival.

The Outburst of Competing and Discordant Memories

When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the Soviet Union in 1991, coming to terms with the Holocaust was one of the political, moral, and cultural challenges that encumbered postcommunist Europe’s “return” to Europe. If the citizens of the postcommunist bloc aspired to the new European values, then they were obliged to adopt the thinking about the Holocaust that prevailed in Stockholm and New York, London and Brussels. In the initial euphoria of the “end of history,” the difficulties with reconciling the two Europes’ understanding of the Holocaust did not seem to loom large. But as time passed, it became clearer that postcommunist Europe was not finding it so easy to accept the Western model of the Holocaust; in fact, there was considerable resistance, often taking on similar forms in different countries.

In Eastern Europe, the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s witnessed what the historian Padraic Kenney calls a “carnival of revolution.”¹⁷ Remarkably peaceful in Central Europe but violent in the Balkans, the carnival was marked by an explosion of memories

from both the precommunist and communist pasts. As a result, many skeletons from national closets have been exposed to daylight for the first time since 1945. The restoration of memory has not been a smooth, unifying, or unified process.¹⁸ And at present it is still undergoing many dynamic transformations of competing and discordant remembering.

So far we can differentiate two major stages of the process of restoration of memory. This is central to understanding how the national communities—the political and cultural elites as well as ordinary members of societies—have related to, remembered, and commemorated the Holocaust throughout the postcommunist period. It is also essential to understanding the continuities and discontinuities of the major narratives about the Holocaust and Jews that emerged prior to and during this time, and the continuing redesigning, refashioning, and reconceptualizing of these narratives.

The first phase, which occurred immediately after the fall of communism, took on an (ethno)nationalist form. A powerful dichotomy of “we” the nation and “they” the communist regime was strongly emphasized at the expense of a more nuanced representation of the past. The “ethnic vision” of the past, excluding the memory of the local Jewish communities and other minorities, was prevalent. Moreover, the memory of the Holocaust continued to be repressed in public discourse, and defensive attitudes toward the difficult past in relation to the destruction of the Jews played a more significant role in public discourse than the newly emerged narratives aiming at exposing the dark past. At the same time, a new wave of recycled and modified nationalistic and anti-Semitic narratives about the Jews as perpetrators during the communist period (Judeocommunism) have also (re)emerged. The theme of Judeocommunism, in its various versions, is the key narrative in the repertoire of the right-wing ethnonationalist politicians, journalists, and historians in the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine. It serves to justify and minimize any wrongdoing against the Jews during the Holocaust and to reinforce the narrative of one’s own victimhood during World War II and in the post-1945 communist period. A good illustration of the still-potent nature of Judeocommunism is that even some Eastern European historians and public intellectuals, such as Krzysztof Jasiewicz,

who had previously opposed the stereotype of Judeocommunism as a false anti-Semitic construct, have changed their tune in the course of the first decade of the twenty-first century and have begun to advocate Judeocommunism as a historical fact. Such individuals reside not only in their countries of origins but also in the West. As the chapters in this book confirm, commemorative sites such as the newly established museums of national suffering under communism in the Baltic states and Hungary have evoked Judeocommunism in their presentations of the past.

Arrival of “Dark Pasts” in Eastern Europe

The second phase of restoration of memory gradually crystallized by the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium. It can be called progressive, pluralistic, and civic because it aims at endorsing the complex, painful memory of the Holocaust. The key characteristic of this phase is the increasing awareness that national history is more complex than a black-and-white vision opposing the communist version of the past. During this phase, new information and new interpretations of the past, previously ignored both under communism and in émigré circles, have entered public discourse. And it is during this phase that the dark, discomfiting past of the majority nations’ treatment of Jewish communities during the Holocaust has become a subject of historical awareness, history writing, artistic performances, and public discourse. The impetus to the development of this phase springs from two different current cultural and political factors that intersect. The first is the emergence of the genuine culture of nostalgia for the multiethnic past in some sections of society, accompanied by interests in “all things Jewish” and the emergence of what the acclaimed writer Ruth Ellen Gruber has called “Virtual Jewish Culture.”¹⁹ On a smaller, local scale, this process has even led to the emergence of “the self-proclaimed carriers of the lost East-European Jewish civilisation.”²⁰ An example is Janusz Makuch, director of the highly successful annual international Jewish festival in Kraków.²¹

The second factor is the pragmatic realization that the Holocaust has become the contemporary European entry ticket, as discerningly observed by the late Tony Judt in *Postwar*.²² As a result, the countries that already joined the European Union in May 2004 and some of

those that are awaiting admission have discovered that it is far better politically to commemorate the Holocaust than to ignore it and that it is more profitable commercially to celebrate the multiethnic past than to deny it. Politicians of these countries recognize that endorsing multiculturalism is a means of gaining respectability and visible international status in the West. Therefore, their new, endorsed reconceptualizations of Jews and the Holocaust tend to perceive “the perished Jews as good citizens and Jewish survivors and their descendants living in the West as welcome visitors.”²³ On occasion, however, state officials utter pronouncements that contradict the new stance on Jews, as various speeches of Romanian and Baltic state representatives have demonstrated.

Contemporary Poland best illustrates a postcommunist country in which the second phase of restored memory has reached the most sophisticated level, as demonstrated during and after the Jedwabne debate, whereas Ukraine best illustrates a postcommunist country in which the first phase of restored memory still has the upper hand. Only with great difficulty is the second civic phase trying to establish itself in public discourse and history writing in Ukraine. As Anatolii Podolsky, director of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Research in Kyiv, sharply summarizes, “remembrance culture has reached a dead end,” since there is “no desire to accept the ‘other’ as well.”²⁴

Looking at the discourse about the Holocaust in most postcommunist countries, one is inclined to argue that all still await their respective “Jedwabne debates.” Such a debate would place the Holocaust and the most difficult aspects of the relations with the Jewish minority at the center of public discourse and would also pose salient questions about a contemporary national identity and the status of various ethnic and national minorities in the past and present. “Jedwabne debates” are necessary triggers of national conversations about the present and future of society, “who we are,” “who we want to be,” and “how we relate to the ‘Other.’” Yet they do not necessarily make the nation tell its past anew. In Poland of the post-Jedwabne era, groups of politicians, historians, public intellectuals, journalists, artists, and society at large are clearly split in how they understand and evaluate the dark aspects of Polish relations with the Jews during the Holocaust. The version of the dark past still acceptable for a broader pub-

lic claims that only a small minority of Polish society did wrong to the Jews. And social and cultural resistance to integrating the painful dark past into public memory and popular historical consciousness continues, despite impressive historical research by Polish historians in Poland and abroad and fact-based sophisticated Holocaust educational programs implemented in Polish high schools after 2000. This resistance indicates, then, that the split over the dark past could become a fixed landmark of the process of memorialization of Jews and the Holocaust in Poland as well as in other postcommunist countries.

Moreover, we can differentiate three key dimensions recurring in the landscape of memory of Jews and the Holocaust: remembering to remember, remembering to benefit, and remembering to forget. Remembering to remember is a process that underscores the void left after the genocide of local Jewish communities. The intention is to mourn, to commemorate the loss, and to come to terms with the dark aspects of relations with the Jewish minority by making this past an integral part of national history, historical consciousness, and public memory. The advocates of this dimension insist on not only integrating the history of Jews and other ethnic and national minorities into national history but also treating the Jews and members of other ethnic and cultural minorities as members of the nation in a civic sense. On a cultural level, their major goal is to create both a “community of identification” with and an empathic memory for the Other. And thus they are engaged in building a forward-looking, open, and inclusive society based on the civic model of national belonging and a respect for multiculturalism and for humanitarian values.

In remembering to benefit, the key intention behind recalling and commemorating the Jews and the Holocaust is to achieve tangible goals on the individual, regional, and national level. Here the focus is not so much on the past per se or on an identification with and empathic memory for the Other, but rather on utilizing the past in the pursuit of tangible benefits such as an elevated status and respectability in the international arena. With regard to the history of the Jews in their nation, they emphasize that the Jewish minority has long been present and that the descendants of this minority living abroad are today welcome to become part of and to invest in the new postcommunist entity. They posit that Israeli and Western Diaspora Jews

should view the country of their ancestors with a completely fresh eye. They insist on treating the present moment in history as a “zero point” in forging new and mutually beneficial relationships with the Jews in the West and in Israel. Though they acknowledge the dark past in the history of their nation, for them that past is a completely closed chapter on which one should not dwell, but instead look to the future. In the name of this “bright” future, they claim it is better to concentrate on those chapters in the history of the majority nation’s relations with the Jews that cast a good light, rather than on the dark history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.

In remembering to forget, the dark past is seen as an unjust insult on collective history, memory, and identity.²⁵ This perception provokes an upsurge of anti-Jewish prejudices expressed either overtly or covertly. Here, the interest in the Jewish past and the Holocaust is greeted with tension and is disdainfully referred to as “an imported fashion for Jews.” The advocates of “remembering to forget” view the painful dark past as an unjust insult on national history and memory and as a threat to the nation’s identity and future, and therefore they attack advocates of “remembering to remember.” In “remembering to forget,” the archeology of the dark and uncomfortable past provokes an upsurge of old anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes, carefully modified and repackaged to suit particular current political and social situations, and depending on the particular disseminators, the new/old anti-Jewish messages are delivered either overtly or covertly.

What remains certain is that by closely watching the developments of restored memory in postcommunist countries, especially contemporary encounters with the Holocaust, we can learn a great deal about the dynamics of public (collective) memory and national identity in the region. We learn the dynamics of the reconceptualization of the Jewish past and the Holocaust and the limits of recognition and integration of the dark past by broad, multigenerational sections of postcommunist societies.

The chapters in this book also confirm that the process of digging out and uncovering the “dark past” has raised fears of “critical (national) history” because it is a rather novel approach to history writing in Eastern Europe. Looking at the ways the dark past is integrated or not integrated illuminates the legacy of the formerly dom-

inant model of history writing, namely the “monumental (national) history” that underscores the “positive past” and its “heroes,” and the contemporary tensions between the “monumental history” and “critical history” models. We learn from these tensions how professional historians approach the problem of historical truth, and how they are being constrained, as members of a particular national community, by fears of so-called negative nationalism.

About This Book

Chapters are ordered alphabetically by country, representing every postcommunist country except Montenegro and Kosovo, which are discussed briefly in the article on Serbia. This is not a collection of conference or workshop papers, although early drafts of some of the papers were presented at meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

The relative unity of the situation of the postcommunist reception of the Holocaust contributes to the cohesiveness of this volume. Even so, we established a chapter structure for each contribution to follow, making it easy for readers to compare particular themes across countries. We asked contributors to provide a historical introduction that would briefly describe the general wartime situation and especially the relation of the majority nation to the Jews, including issues of collaboration and rescue, and then briefly discuss the memory of the Holocaust under communism. Main topics of *lieux de mémoire* to be covered are the memory of the Holocaust and “high politics”²⁶ and public debates over the event since 1989, the Holocaust in the educational system and scholarship, the Holocaust in various branches of culture (literature, cinema, music, theater), grassroots memorialization projects and commemorative sites, narratives of overseas diasporas, the thinking and activities of the Jewish communities of these countries, and Holocaust negationism and anti-Semitism. In the case of Hungary, we requested contributions from two authors, each with a different expertise.

Many of our contributors have roots in the countries about which they write and belong to the younger generations of scholars. Their age reflects the fact that the unbiased study of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and its memory, free of the earlier hegemonic commu-

nist narratives, is itself very young. These scholars do not shy away from writing frankly about emotionally charged and sensitive topics pertaining to national identity and the dark past. As editors, we had meaningful and enlightening discussions with our contributors and learned a great deal about the dynamics of the memory of the Holocaust in different countries of the region, but at the same time we cannot take responsibility for their particular approaches, interpretations, and arguments. This volume presents a variety of interdisciplinary approaches to the subject within a structured framework of inquiry.

Despite a growing body of literature dealing with the memory of the Holocaust, previous scholarly works on the topic have had certain shortcomings. Monographs have tended to look at a particular case and focus on official or public memory, while collections have presented an array of articles different in content, style, and methodology. Our collectively authored book, however, aims to overcome the weaknesses of both monographs and collections, and is original in its emphasis on the comparative perspective, its range of cases under discussion, and its analysis of the same specific themes in each case. Our book illustrates the common processes at play and the reasons why investigation of the role of local elements in the wartime abandonment, mistreatment, and mass murder of the Jews has proceeded so unevenly, and why memory of this painful past constitutes a continuing challenge difficult to overcome. The concluding chapter by Omer Bartov brings the recurrent themes into sharp perspective.

The main object of our book, having been partially inspired by István Rév's important study *Retroactive Justice*, is the *remake* of the Holocaust and Jews in political, cultural, and social realms in postcommunist countries since the fall of communism. The book focuses on the trajectories of this *remake* in light of the legacy of the dark past in relation to Jews; the earlier precommunist memories of Jews and communist memory (amnesia) of the dark past; current Western expectations and requirements for a full participation in European institutions, particularly the European Union; and cultural nostalgia, or its absence, for the multiethnic past. We concentrate on how this remake interplays with postcommunist discourse about national identity, democracy, the culture of pluralism, and civil, inclusive societies.

This book is intended as a reference for scholars and students of

the Holocaust, of Eastern European history, politics, and culture, of modern Jewish history, and of the sociology of memory.

We consider our book a potential departure point for comparative analysis of the ways in which memories of “the dark pasts” shape discourses on democracy and national identity in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Although memories of South America’s violent past have become the subject of intense inquiries, incorporating Latin America into the analysis is beyond the scope of the present study. Nor does our book directly discuss the (potential) encounters between current Western intellectual discourses and interpretations of the Holocaust presented by scholars such as Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Michael Rothberg, or Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, and discussions about the Holocaust generated in postcommunist Europe.²⁷ The ways in which Western thought influences postcommunist thinking about the Holocaust and the ways in which local traditions embedded in history and in the bestowed heritage dominate, and the interplay between the two, are a set of topics that deserves a separate study. Nor does this book compare Western and Eastern European trajectories of coming to terms with the dark past. We recognize that a study examining in systematic fashion Western and Eastern European models of emergence from postwar amnesia concerning the fate of Jews during the Second World War in a broader historical context over a *longue durée* would be of great importance because it would illuminate differences and commonalities between Western and postcommunist Europe.

Since every book has its physical limits, we also had to abstain from a direct and systematic analysis of recent pan-European initiatives to fight anti-Semitism and commemorate the Holocaust through various committees and organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, the EU-funded Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF). But chapters in our book do touch upon the impact of transnational EU agendas on specific modes of remembrance in Eastern Europe, such as the increased interest in rescuers of Jews, which is especially pronounced in Albania and Poland, and attitudes toward Holocaust denial prior to the EU’s legislation of 2008 penalizing Holocaust denial.

Finally, our book does not discuss contemporary encounters of Eastern Europeans with Israelis and Jews of the Western Diaspora and how these encounters influence these groups' memory of the Holocaust and the different roles the Holocaust plays in shaping contemporary Israeli identity. There is no doubt, as several chapters in this book show, that political transformation triggered a revival of Jewish life in Eastern Europe and that today the remaining, mostly numerically insignificant Jewish communities of the region have a more assertive sense of Jewish identity and are highly engaged in memory projects and commemorations of the Holocaust. However, their reactions to the trajectories of public debates about the dark past differ. They range from silence, disappointment, and fear, especially pronounced in older generations of Holocaust survivors, to social activism in younger generations.

In Israel, where almost every week the main daily newspapers *Haaretz*, *Yediyot Ahronot*, and *Maariv* still publish new wartime accounts of survivors from Eastern Europe, an emphasis is being placed on how the specific wartime events affect the lives of Israelis as Jews and individual human beings.²⁸ At the same time there is also a realization of the disappearance of living witnesses to the dark past and an accompanying sense of orphanhood in the next generations, and the fragility of what Marianne Hirsch calls the *postmemories* of the post-Holocaust generations.²⁹

Memory: Between Past and Future

The wealth of archival sources that have become available since the collapse of communism combined with new political, social, and cultural developments have provided crucial insight into the trajectories of the memory of the Holocaust in postcommunist societies. In particular, this has facilitated a more nuanced and complex understanding of the continuities and discontinuities of the representations of the Holocaust and the role it plays in contemporary national discourse in the region.

By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, most of the postcommunist states proclaimed an annual Holocaust Remembrance Day to observe as a national event. Some states, including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, and Poland chose the date 27

January, the anniversary of the Red Army's liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp complex, as their national Day of Holocaust Remembrance; other states, including Lithuania and Latvia, chose a different date for the memorial day, one related to historical events in their own country.³⁰ In general, decisions regarding how and where the Holocaust in a particular locality should be remembered were determined not only by recognition of the event as worthy of memorialization but also by practical and instrumental concerns. The changes of governments during the postcommunist period have revealed that ideology plays a crucial role in the attitudes toward commemorations of the Holocaust. Ideology affects the status of commemorations in the public sphere in both subtle and bold ways, as various chapters in our book attest. For example, in 2002 in Hungary, which today has the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe, the new right-wing government rushed to introduce a novel commemorative date, "Memorial Day of the Victims of Communism," to compensate and balance the "Holocaust Memorial Day."

The official commitment to educate about the Holocaust has not yet been sufficiently incorporated into local textbooks or adequately implemented in curricula. This is the situation despite the signing by many postcommunist states of the Stockholm Declaration at the International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000. And some countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Moldova, Slovakia, and Ukraine still lack sophisticated, unbiased educational programs about the genocide of European Jewry.

Michael Schudson, an American sociologist, convincingly contends that memory is essentially social "because it is located . . . in a whole set of cultural practices through which people recognize a debt to the past and in collectively created monuments and markers."³¹ Social memory always tells us more about the present than the past of the collective. The variegated postcommunist memories of the Holocaust confirm the correctness of this observation. For example, in both the Czech Republic and Albania, countries with different histories, cultures, economies, and demographic compositions, we find a striking commonality in the overarching theme of "innocence" pertaining to the memory of the Holocaust. The belief in "collective innocence" underpins the interpretation of collective behavior during the Sec-

ond World War and the current self-evaluation of society. Thus, Albanians and Czechs believe that since they did not participate in the Holocaust, they therefore constitute an example of a community of tolerance and democracy that does not need to look critically at its past. In Albania there is also a strong belief that Albanians and Jews share a common history as persecuted nations throughout the modern era. In popular historical consciousness in Slovenia, Slovenes cultivate a notion of *exceptionalism* not dissimilar from the concept of “innocence” with regard to the responsibilities of locals for the genocide of the tiny Slovene Jewish community.

In the Balkans, a region too often and unjustly excluded from comparative studies of Eastern European memories of the Holocaust, the bloody wars in post-Yugoslavia in 1992–95 generated specific images of the Holocaust that the nationalists on all sides of the conflict manipulated to advance their national, social, and political projects—most importantly, legitimized statehood. In this strategy, the Holocaust was completely divorced from its historical context and instead was turned into an effective tool in the propaganda war that accompanied the brutal conflict in the heart of Europe.

In contested territories such as Macedonia and Moldova, the accounts of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust have been manipulated in a similar fashion in order to fulfill the national aspirations of conflicting parties. They typically present their versions of World War II and the Holocaust so as to portray their opponent in an unfavorable light, especially by contrast to themselves. For example, Moldovans who oppose the claim of the Romanian character of Moldova insist that the persecution of the Bessarabian Jews was introduced by the forces of the “Romanian occupiers,” while the pro-Romanian Moldovans often view any discourse about the local Holocaust as a strategy to undermine what they believe is the true, Romanian identity of the majority population of Moldova.

The Dark Past and the Double Genocide Theory

The Holocaust has no doubt arrived in postcommunist countries, but the temptation to tell the past in a comforting way, as Tony Judt correctly predicted, is persistent in the region.³² Perhaps out of this temptation “the double genocide theory,” or the symmetry between Nazi

and communist crimes, was born and is most pronounced in the Baltic states. This theory makes a powerful tool in the hands of local right-wing ethnonationalists and might have a detrimental impact on the process of coming to terms with the dark past in those countries. Ethnonationalists employ this theory to minimize the wartime crimes against Jews and to undermine the discourse about legal, historical, and moral responsibilities for the Holocaust. In their eyes, the Holocaust is a purely “exaggerated” historical event that basically obfuscates the suffering of other people.³³ To reinforce their negative evaluation of the Holocaust, the radical ethnonationalists skillfully employ the above-mentioned potent theme of Judeocommunism. They also weave a refashioned theme of Israel as the present embodiment of the Nazi state into the narrative of what they consider to be their own unacknowledged and forgotten suffering vis-à-vis the well-known suffering of the Jews. Responsible criticisms of Israeli policies are valid, but the comparisons of Israel to the Nazi state are perverse, as noted most recently by Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist, Israeli statesman, and public intellectual, himself a critic of specific policies of the present Israeli government.³⁴

Putting on the mantle of martyrdom and mixing it with anti-Semitic themes of Judeocommunism and “Nazi Israel” in order to undermine the memory of the Holocaust creates a highly volatile mixture that could have a lasting effect not only on the integration of the dark past into mainstream historical consciousness but also on the memory of the Second World War in general.

The Senate of the Czech Republic endorsed the theory of double genocide in a resolution of 3 June 2008, and the European Parliament passed a similar resolution on 2 April 2009. The latter declared 23 August, the date on which in 1939 the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement was signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as a date of remembrance of victims of both regimes. Yehuda Bauer, the eminent Israeli historian of the Holocaust, protested against the comparisons between Nazi Germany and the Soviet regime, arguing that “World War II was started by Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, and the responsibility of the 35 million dead in Europe, 29 million of them non-Jews, is that of Nazi Germany, not Stalin. To commemorate victims equally is a distortion.”³⁵ As several chapters in this

book reveal, a minority of local public intellectuals also strongly protested this comparison. But perhaps one of the most adamant voices against political calls for the Soviet Union's crimes against Lithuania to be named an act of genocide is that of Lithuanian philosopher Leonidas Donskis. In his article "The Inflation of Genocide," published in June 2007 Donskis argues:

We are living in an era of not only monetary inflation, but also of the inflation—hence devaluation—of concepts and values. . . . After all, we cannot regard the history of all our civilisations as one ongoing crime and one endless genocide of some group or other. Whitewashing a concept benefits no one. . . . No matter how cruel the Soviet terror that was visited upon the Baltic states, a large segment of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian society, by going over to the other side, by becoming collaborators, was not only able to save itself, but also secure for itself successful careers in the administration of the occupying regime. This group was able to wreak havoc on and settle scores with its own people, doing so with impunity.³⁶

We differentiate here between the manipulation of comparison in order to downplay the significance of the Holocaust, which is usually embarked upon precisely as a way to distract from a dark past of collaboration in the murder of the Jews, and legitimate scholarly comparisons that explore the deep wounds of twentieth-century history. Furthermore, our insistence in this volume on the importance of the genocide of the Jews is not intended in any way to diminish empathy for the suffering of others at the hands of the Nazis or of the Soviets during these evil times. We agree with Michael Shafir, whose brilliant analysis of the forms of postcommunist historical denial is cited many times by the authors in this volume, that "for the trivialization of the Holocaust to lose its largely East European prevalence, we . . . might well stop and ask whether we do not sin ourselves in trivializing other genocides." And:

Comparisons, to be sure—including comparisons in the social sciences—may be a scientific instrument serving the purpose of widening the perspective of analysis. There is no reason why the Holocaust should not be compared with the Gulag, were it only for the fact that they both undeni-

ably belong to the genocide phenomena, and genocide studies, alas, are an emerging discipline in our world. However, when the comparison is made for the purpose of denying or belittling either of them, and/or for that of obliterating that which is inherently unique to either the Holocaust or to the Gulag, then one has ceased to look for similarities and has entered the odious minefield of historic negation. Such endeavors have nothing in common with science, “social” as they may still remain.³⁷

The Future of the Dark Past

In *Triumph and Trauma*, Bernhard Giesen observes that today in the West the Holocaust has acquired the position of “a free-floating myth or a cultural icon of horror and inhumanity.”³⁸ But in postcommunist Eastern Europe, the approaches to the meanings of the Holocaust still have a rather more specific local character, embedded in wartime history, though Western influences are also visible. Characteristically, as many chapters in our book confirm, an acceptance of new rituals of remembering and commemorating the dark past usually provokes counter-rituals, and the “critical history” writing about the dark past provokes counter-“monumental history” writing. Remembering to remember, remembering to benefit, and remembering to forget—the three dimensions of remembering Jews and the Holocaust—continue to manifest themselves in different versions and with varied influence. Thus, it is impossible to speak about a rupture between the past and the present. Instead, one can observe a fusion of the past and the present that also produces modifications of traditional narratives designed to suit current needs.

The multitude of approaches toward Jews and the Holocaust and the painful dynamic of the dark past in postcommunist countries suggest that cultural heritage and traditions exert enduring power on national identity, memory, and professional history. On the other hand, major selective transformations in the realm of national memory, identity, and history are possible under new global conditions, Western/international demands and pressures, multiculturalism, and nostalgia for a multiethnic past. What is therefore certain is that the project of the integration of the memory of the Holocaust with all its painful and uncomfortable aspects will require intense work on the

part of more than one generation of scholars, public intellectuals, educators, and local enthusiasts in the region and its diasporas.

Notes

1. Henry Rousso, *La bantise du passé: entetien avec Phillipe Petit* (Paris: Les Editions Textuels, 1998), 14. English translation: *The Haunting Past: History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).

2. On the importance of memory as a leading cultural term in history, see Alon Confino, "Remembering the Second World War, 1945–1965: Narratives of Victimhood and Genocide," *Cultural Analysis* 5 (2005): 1–23, with the response by Robert G. Moeller, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~caforum/volume4/vol4_article3.html (accessed 20 November 2007).

3. See Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility in the Age of Atrocity* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

4. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005). For a critical evaluation of the universalization of the Holocaust, see Dan Diner, *Gegenläufige Gedächtnisse: Über Geltung und Wirkung des Holocaust*, Toldot 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2007).

5. Bernhard Giesen, *Triumph and Trauma* (Boulder co: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 111.

6. Joanna Beata Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).

7. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of European Jews*, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

8. Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War against the Jews, 1933–45* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1975), 480.

9. On postwar national mythmaking and memories of World War II in Western Europe, and on a basic moral unwillingness to face up to the Holocaust, see the important study by Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

10. For the authoritative study of Jewish responses to Nazi discrimination and genocidal policies, see Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); and Isaiah Trunk, *Jewish Responses to Nazi Persecution: Collective and Individual Behavior in Extremis* (New York: Scarborough Books, 1982). Nina Paulovičova has explored the theme of perpetrators as rescuers in Slovakia in her doctoral dissertation at the University of Alberta, "Rescue of Jews in the Slovak State (1939–

1945)” (2012). Survivors have articulated accounts of betrayal by rescuers in a massive body of testimonies and memories since the end of the war, but scholars have only recently begun to investigate the subject.

11. Certain distortions also affected the standard Western understanding of the Holocaust. As Timothy Snyder remarked, “when an international collective memory of the Holocaust emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, it rested on the experiences of German and west European Jews, minor groups of victims, and on Auschwitz, where only about one in six of the total number of murdered Jews died.” *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 377.

12. On early postwar trials, see István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt, *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Tanja Pentec, “Local Collaborators on Trial: Soviet War Crimes Trials under Stalin (1943–1953),” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, no. 2–3 (April–September 2008): 1–24; Alexander Victor Prusin, “‘Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!’: The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 1945–February 1946,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 1–30.

13. See, for example, Rebecca L. Golbert, “Holocaust Sites in Ukraine: Pechora and the Politics of Memorialization,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 205–33. On the “memorial culture” in the American Jewish community during the first two postwar decades, see the study by Hasia R. Diner, *We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence after the Holocaust, 1945–1962* (New York: New York University Press, 2009).

14. Rubie S. Watson, ed., *Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism* (Houston: School of American Research Press, 1994), 4.

15. Michael Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 74.

16. See, for example, the documentary film *Einsatzgruppen: Les Commandos de la Mort* (The death brigade) by Michaël Prazan (France, 2009, 180 minutes); Father Patrick Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (New York: Macmillan, 2008); and Michael Scott Moore, “Reviving Memory in a Killing Field: Romania and the Holocaust,” *Spiegel Online International*, 12 March 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,594036,00.html> (accessed 12 October 2009).

17. Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe, 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

18. On memory as never unitary but continually changing in time and place, see the important comparative analysis in Jeffrey K. Olick, ed., *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformation in National Retrospection* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

19. On the concept of virtual Jewishness, see Ruth E. Gruber, *Virtually Jewish: Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and also by the same author, “Beyond Virtually Jewish: Balancing the

Real, the Surreal, and Real Imaginary Places,” in *Reclaiming Memory: Urban Regeneration in the Historic Jewish Quarters of Central European Cities*, ed. Monika Murzyn-Kupisz and Jacek Purchla (Kraków: International Cultural Centre, 2009), 63–79.

20. On specific unconventional ways of encountering and interpreting Jewish identity by non-Jewish Poles as an integral part of their own identity in a city such as Kraków, see Erica Lehrer, “Bearing False Witness: Vicarious Jewish Identity and the Politics of Affinity,” in *Imaginary Neighbors: Mediating Polish-Jewish Relations after the Holocaust*, ed. Dorota Glowacka and Joanna Zylińska (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 84–109.

21. Janusz Makuch’s interview with Magdalena Waligórska, 3 May 2007, “Fiddler as a Fig Leaf: The Politicisation of Klezmer in Poland,” *Osteuropa: Impulses for Europe*, 2008, 232.

22. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 803.

23. By comparison, on the recent reconceptualization of the Holocaust in Austria, see Charles S. Maier, “Whose Mitteleuropa? Central Europe between Memory and Obsolescence,” in *Austria in the New Europe*, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993), 8–18.

24. Anatolii Podol’s’kyi, “A Reluctant Look Back: Jewry and the Holocaust in Ukraine,” *Osteuropa: Impulses for Europe*, 2008, 278.

25. Barbie Zelizer was perhaps the first scholar to use the term “remembering to forget” in her study *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s Eye* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

26. For an in-depth analysis of the memory of the Holocaust and “high politics” in Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

27. Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Giesen, *Triumph and Trauma*; Levy and Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*; Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

28. On political, social, and cultural aspects of the memory of the Holocaust in Israel, see “Israel and the Holocaust,” ed. Tuvia Friling and Hanna Yablonka, special issue, *Israel Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003); and Dalia Ofer, “Israel,” in *The World Reacts to the Holocaust*, ed. David S. Wyman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 839–923.

29. On the sense of anxiety about the physical disappearance of those who remember and could make sense of the wartime accounts among members of the third generation, see the Israeli documentary film *The Green Dumpster Mystery* by Tal Haim Yoffe (2008). On postmemories of post-Holocaust generations, see the most recent study by Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home: The Afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish Memory* (Berkeley: University of Cal-

ifornia Press, 2010), and Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, “‘We Would Not Have Come without You’: Generations of Nostalgia,” *American Imago* 59, no. 3 (2002): 253–76.

30. In Europe, twelve countries, including Germany, chose 27 January as their Holocaust Memorial Day and eleven countries chose to adopt a different date linked to their own history.

31. Michael Schudson, “Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory,” in *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past*, ed. D. L. Schacter (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 346–47.

32. Tony Judt, “The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Post-war Europe,” in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 157–83. (This first appeared in Deák, Gross, and Judt, *Politics of Retribution*.)

33. In his keynote lecture titled “Genocide and the Holocaust: What Are We Arguing About?,” delivered at the Eleventh Biennial Lessons and Legacies Conference on the Holocaust, Omer Bartov convincingly argued that the notion that the Holocaust presents an obstacle to a larger understanding of genocide is not a uniquely Eastern European phenomenon, but is also evident in the writings of some mainstream scholars of comparative genocide in the West. We would like to thank Professor Bartov for sharing the lecture with us.

34. Shlomo Avineri, “Israel Is the Opposite of Fascist,” *Haaretz*, 15 November 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-is-the-opposite-of-fascist-1.324727> (accessed 15 November 2010).

35. Yehuda Bauer, “Memo to the ITF on Comparisons between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Regime.” We would like to thank Prof. Yehuda Bauer for sharing this article with us.

36. Leonidas Donskis, “The Inflation of Genocide,” *European Voice*, 24 July 24, 2009, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/07/the-inflation-of-genocide/65613.aspx> (accessed 23 August 2009).

37. Michael Shafir, *Between Denial and “Comparative Trivialization”: Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe*, Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism, 19 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 2002), 36.

38. Giesen, *Triumph and Trauma*, 142.