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Shum Kui-Kwong

UQP-Leaders of Asia Series

Zhu De
(Chu Teh)

University of Queensland Press
St. Lucia • London • New York

LEADERS OF ASIA

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(Chu Teh)**

Shum Kui-kwong

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Introduction

This book is one of a series of monographs entitled Leaders of Asia. Each book is a brief but stimulating study of a man or woman who has contributed to the shape of Asia. Through a study of his career will emerge a greater knowledge of his country's place in the contemporary scene.


It is vital for Australians to understand the region of their future. It has been neglected in our studies for too long. This book, as part of a series, is aimed at enriching our awareness of the multi-cultural, turbulent, dynamic nations of Asia which are now impinging ever more steadily on our national consciousness.

As a biography this book can be read by itself with enjoyment. History is not merely the story of great men, but there is hardly a better way of studying it than by reading of them. If you knew little of the man or the country, your interest in both will be increased by this biography. The pleasure of a good tale makes understanding easy.

But as well, a monograph as part of a series is the ideal way to enrich a formal course of study. Gradually aspects of Asia are being offered to secondary and tertiary students in Australia in many ways. Our myopic concentration on Europe is diminishing, and not before time Asian studies are reaching the classroom and lecture theatre. Their textbooks need buttressing. Student interest needs sustaining. These brief biographies, complete with bibliographies, are intended to supplement those undergraduate and secondary school courses and to stimulate such studies.

In response to that stimulation the individual student may feel encouraged to dispute with the author, delve deeper into the subject, perhaps develop a language skill and visit the land he has studied. By regarding Asia as foreign and unknowable we risk the future of our country. By appreciating its culture and by understanding the contribution of its leaders, we help forge bonds that will enrich us all.

My aim as general editor of the series has been to bring forward young scholars who are helping to give Asian Studies a sound base



Zhu De

Zhu De (Chu Teh), the famed commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army, whose name ranked second only to Mao Zedong in the Chinese Communist Party leadership before the Communists won control of China in 1949, is probably one of the most important revolutionary leaders of the twentieth century. Like other revolutionary leaders of twentieth-century China, Zhu De went through the stages of an early awakening to the national humiliation which China suffered at the hands of the foreign powers, followed by a zealous search for a political solution to the national and social problems existing at the time, and ended in an undaunted and selfless devotion to a revolutionary cause which he believed would cure China of all her ills. Zhu De distinguished himself, however, by his life-long association with military affairs, his expert knowledge of guerrilla warfare, and his many years of sustained campaigns as commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army from its inception in 1928. Zhu's military career is highlighted by his role as co-founder with Mao of the Jinggangshan (Chingkangshan) revolutionary base in 1928, his participation in the legendary Long March (1934–35), his leadership in the anti-Japanese guerrilla wars in north China from 1937 to 1945, and his supreme command of the Communist forces in the civil war of 1946–49, which brought the Communists to a sweeping victory over the Nationalists. Being primarily a military man, Zhu seldom involved himself in intra-party disputes, and after the establishment of the People's Republic of China he ceased to play a prominent role in party politics.

Born in 1886 in a village in northern Sichuan (Szechwan) into a poor tenant farmer's family, Zhu was raised in the home of his elder uncle, who was a small landlord. As a boy, Zhu was fascinated by the stories of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), which had survived in folk tales among the common people as a heroic struggle against the oppression of the Manchus and corrupt officials. Zhu's hero was the famous Taiping general Shi Dakai (Shih Ta-kai), who withdrew to Sichuan and defied the Manchu authorities there for some years until he was captured and died a folk hero in the eyes

of the Sichuanese people. It is possible that the stories of the Taiping movement rekindled in young Zhu De's mind the desire to rid China of the "evil" Manchus and the "feudal" land system in which land was concentrated in the hands of a privileged few.

At the age of six, Zhu began a classical Chinese education at a private school with the financial support of his parents and elder brothers, who had high hopes that one day Zhu would become a successful candidate for the civil service examination and enter officialdom. Zhu, however, was less interested in the study of the classics than current events in China and the world at large. He was particularly indignant at the weakness and corruption of the Manchu government and the unequal treaties that the Western powers imposed upon China, which had subjugated China to the status of a semi-colony. Worse still, the economic penetration of Western-manufactured goods was directly affecting the life of the common people. Zhu told Agnes Smedley in 1937:

I can remember that even small villages in Szechwan were flooded with British and Japanese cotton goods, with silks, knitted wares, sugar, umbrellas, kitchen and household goods. Even foreign nails were driving out Chinese nails, and foreign kerosene was cheaper than the seed oil which we produced on our own farms. Ancient handicraft, which had always been a part of village economy, began to disappear. The Old Weaver no longer came to our home to weave cloth each winter, and no one took his place. It was cheaper to buy British or foreign cloth in the market. People became poorer and bought cloth only when they had absolutely nothing left.¹

Moreover, "foreign missionaries in Szechwan are arrogant and proud, and they and their converts despised the Chinese people and called them by a word 'heathen' because they did not believe in the foreign gods."² It was under such circumstances, in a more intensified form in the north, that the Boxer Uprising occurred in 1898–1900 to drive away the foreigners and exterminate the Christian converts. Zhu De was sympathetic to the aims of the Boxers, but he disagreed with the methods used by the Boxers to achieve their purposes and resolved that he should study more Western science so that China would be able to use modern methods to resist the West.

In 1904, when Zhu was nineteen, he decided to enter a new middle school to learn modern subjects, such as natural science, foreign languages, and world history, because he realized that the old classics would not be able to solve China's problems. He nevertheless

felt obliged, when the time came, to enrol for the district examination to honour his commitments to his family. To his surprise, he passed and was awarded the *zui-cai* (*hsiu-ts'ai*) degree. Detesting the idea of becoming an official, he hid the truth from his family and went to Chengdu (Ch'eng-tu), the capital of Sichuan, in 1907 to study physical education at a higher normal school. He made the decision because he wished to relieve his family of the financial burden of supporting him by becoming a teacher of physical education after graduation. His modest hope was realized in 1908, when some of his friends invited him to join a higher primary school. But he was soon attracted to the newly established Yunnan Military Academy, which was under the direction of a modern educator and where students were also taught modern subjects. He decided to enrol in the academy and become a soldier. The news was heart-breaking to his family – especially as soldiering was traditionally considered a lowly profession in China. But Zhu was resolved that there was no better way of saving the nation than joining a modern army.

At the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu got in touch with students who were infected with the new revolutionary thinking, many of whom were members of Sun Yat-sen's Tong Meng Hui (United League) established in Japan in 1905 to unite all the revolutionary groups in China. The Tong Meng Hui was dedicated to the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, the establishment of a republican China, and the realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles for the People – Nationalism, Authority for the People, and Livelihood for the People. Zhu soon came under the influence of Sun's revolutionary ideas and joined the Tong Meng Hui. A year later he also joined the Gelao Hui (Elderly Brothers Society), the traditional anti-Manchu secret society which had a large following in south-west China. Zhu, like other revolutionaries, was helping both secret society organizations to infiltrate the army.

In mid-1911 Zhu graduated with the first class at the Yunnan Military Academy, after which he was assigned as a platoon commander in forces led by Cai E (Ts'ai O), the famous Hunanese military revolutionary who was at that time a brigadier in the Yunnanese provincial army. Cai, a former student of Liang Qichao (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the radical reformer of the Hundred Days Reform), and a returned student from a Japanese military academy, was a strong supporter of the Tong Meng Hui. His advanced ideas and expert knowledge of military affairs were a constant source of inspiration for Zhu De.

On 10 October 1911 the Wuchang Uprising took place, triggering off a chain of events that eventually brought down the Manchu government. Yunnan was one of the provinces that responded quickly to the Wuchang Uprising. On 30 October Cai E bravely raised the banner of revolt in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan. Zhu took part in the revolt as a company commander and succeeded in bringing down the Manchu authorities there. Zhu then joined Cai E's expeditionary force into Sichuan to reinforce the Revolutionary Army, but before they arrived the Revolutionary Army had already taken control of Chengdu and Chongqing (Chungking). Returning to Yunnan in 1912, Zhu was promoted to a detachment commander and was also appointed instructor at the Yunnan Military Academy. But he was soon disheartened by the events that were taking place in the nation at large. Sun Yat-sen, who had returned to assume the presidency of the provisional government in Nanjing (Nanking) in December 1911, was soon obliged to resign in favour of Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai), the "strong man" who commanded the New Army in north China, who had the backing of the foreign powers and conservative elements in the country.

In the autumn of 1912, Zhu joined the Nationalist party, the Guomindang (Kuomintang, or KMT), organized by Sun Yat-sen to oppose Yuan Shikai's dictatorial and anti-parliamentarian tendencies. Yuan, however, declared the KMT illegal and soon forcibly dissolved the parliament. Sun launched the so-called Second Revolution in July 1913, but was forced to flee the country after the revolt was crushed. Nevertheless, opposition to Yuan Shikai gathered momentum as he attempted to bring back the monarchy, and in 1915–16 Zhu took part as a regimental commander in the campaign, under the general command of Cai E, to thwart Yuan's attempt to restore the monarchy. Although the campaign did not succeed in toppling Yuan, it did force him to abandon the monarchical scheme. Zhu was promoted to brigade commander for his brave action in battle, and he became known as one of the "four fierce generals" of Cai E. He remained in Sichuan after Cai became the governor of that province following Yuan's death in June 1916.

Unfortunately for Zhu, Cai E died in November 1916, and Zhu lost his "spiritual mentor". In the same year his first wife, whom he had married in 1912, also died. In his distress, Zhu spent the next few years in southern Sichuan as a typical warlord army commander, leading an unproductive and licentious life, smoking opium and acquiring concubines. Zhu later remarked facetiously that he

had spent half his life as a warlord and the other half as a Red Army soldier.

Nevertheless, Zhu was aware of the earth-shaking events that took place between 1917 and 1921 known collectively as the May Fourth Movement. He had heard of the writings of Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) in *Xin Qing Nian* (New Youth) and was attracted to the ideas of science and democracy as solutions for China's problems. But the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia soon diverted his attention to communism and although he had read little Marxist literature, he was already attracted to the doctrine because of its successful application in a backward country similar to China.

In 1920 Zhu's troops were driven out of Sichuan by other warlord armies, and he returned to Yunnan, where he was appointed to the position of commissioner of public security in the provincial government. According to a recollection, Zhu, upon learning of the patriotic intentions of some student demonstrators who had been arrested by the police, immediately released them. However, because the forces he backed were soon defeated, Zhu was obliged to flee to the Sichuan-Tibet border area. Both Zhu's second wife and child, unfortunately, were murdered by warlord armies, and Zhu felt deeply the horrors of warlord politics. He decided to leave China and go abroad to study.

In early 1922, Zhu made his way to Shanghai and placed himself under medical care to break the opium habit before going overseas. In Shanghai he met the long-admired Sun Yat-sen, who advised him to return to Yunnan and promised him financial support for the purpose of reorganizing the army there. Zhu declined, however, because he was determined to go to Europe, where he would be able to study communism at its home base. By then Zhu had already decided that communism was the only solution for China. When he applied for membership to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the secretary-general, Chen Duxiu, rejected him because of his former connection with warlords.

In September 1922, Zhu, then in his mid-thirties, left China for Europe. The following month he arrived at Berlin. His hope of joining the CCP was soon realized when he met Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) who recognized in Zhu the revolutionary zeal and devotion to the cause of liberating China. In Germany, Zhu attended classes in the Political Science Department of Göttingen University and took private lessons in military subjects from a baron who had once

been a general in the Kaiser's army. It appears that Zhu did not learn much, because he was not fluent in the language and because he spent most of his time organizing student activities. In early 1924 he returned to Berlin and organized the German branch of the KMT, then in alliance with the CCP under the First United Front, and co-edited the *Zhengchi Zhoubao* (Political Weekly) with Zhou Enlai. During the first months of 1925 Zhu was twice arrested for political activities, but on both occasions he was soon released. In June, however, the German authorities finally deported him. He made his way to Moscow, where he stayed for a short while. According to one source, he entered briefly the Eastern Toilers' University and studied Marxism under Chinese tutors.³

In June 1926 Zhu returned to China, just when the Northern Expedition from Canton (Guangzhou) under Chiang Kai-shek's command had successfully entered Wuhan and headed the Political Department of the 25th Army, secretly plotting with other Communist members to expand Communist influence in the army. He was forced to flee when others were arrested in early 1927. Zhu went to Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi (Kiangsi) province, and joined another Nationalist army under the command of one of his old friends from the Yunnan Military Academy. But in April 1927 the KMT-CCP alliance was abruptly terminated by Chiang Kai-shek's coup purging the Communists in Shanghai.

By late July, several Communist leaders, including Zhou Enlai, Ye Tin, and He Long, came to believe that their only hope of survival lay in a coup which would bring together a significant military force from various Nationalist troops stationed around Nanchang, and Zhu De was instructed to make use of his connection with the army there. The Nanchang Uprising, which took place on 1 August, was a fiasco, because the local inhabitants in the city did not respond to the Communists' call for action. Nevertheless, the event is now remembered as marking the founding day of the Chinese Red Army. Following the defeat, Zhu attempted to lead the Red Army to Canton, but his forces were cut to pieces by Chiang Kai-shek's at Shantou (Swatow). He finally managed to flee to the Guangdong (Kwangtung)-Jiangxi-Hunan border area, with a remnant of about two thousand men. There Zhu established a base and carried out land reforms among the peasants, which greatly strengthened the ranks of his troops. But counter-revolutionary armies soon forced him to evacuate the base. Upon learning that Mao Zedong had successfully established a base in near-by

Jinggangshan, Zhu led his forces to join with Mao's in the spring of 1928. The historic union of the two leaders marked the beginning of a revolutionary partnership that lasted for many years to come. The two fought together for twenty-one years, until in 1949 the Red Army led by Zhu controlled all China and Mao had established the Peoples Republic.

Soon after the merger of the forces, which brought the troops to about ten thousand, a conference was held in May 1928 to officially designate the joint forces as the Fourth Red Army, with Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Mao the party representative. To signify the Red Army as the army of the workers and peasants, the flag of the Red Army adopted the hammer and sickle. At the conference, Mao advanced the theory that in China, a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country with a weak proletarian base, the Communists could only hope to win victory in the revolution by relying on the support of the overwhelming majority of the peasant population in a long-drawn-out war against the reactionary camp. Zhu De supplemented this analysis by adding that the correct military strategy had to be based on guerrilla warfare, relying on the support of the peasants, avoiding frontal clashes with the enemy troops, and launching surprise attacks on them under favourable conditions. These tactics were neatly summarized as follows:

- When the enemy advances, we retreat.
- When the enemy encamps, we harass them.
- When the enemy tires, we attack.
- When the enemy retreats, we pursue.

The conference also adopted the famous "three major disciplines" and "eight rules of the Red Army", emphasizing absolute discipline, responsible conduct, and kindness in the soldiers' dealing with the people. These should be stressed, as they contrast markedly to the pillage, brigandage, looting, and social irresponsibility of all other armies, be they KMT or warlord. They may be summed up in the following instructions:

1. Obey all orders.
2. Take not even a needle or thread from the people.
3. Turn in all goods confiscated from landlords.
4. Replace all doors and return all straw on which you sleep before leaving a house (Chinese peasant houses had doors that could be detached and used as improvised beds).
5. Speak courteously to the people and help them whenever possible.

6. Return all borrowed articles.
7. Pay for everything damaged.
8. Be honest in buying things.
9. Be sanitary; dig latrines a safe distance from homes and fill them up with earth before leaving.
10. Never molest women.
11. Do not mistreat prisoners.

The enforcement of these rules of conduct was a major factor in the Red Army under Zhu always being “fish in a friendly sea”.

Although Zhu-Mao forces had successfully defended the Jinggangshan base against several Nationalist attacks in early 1929 they were forced to retreat in face of an overwhelmingly superior force. They withdrew to an area in and around Ruijin (Juichin) in south-east Jiangxi, and established another base there which formed the nucleus of the subsequently enlarged Jiangxi Soviet. Through a programme of land reform, whereby the confiscated land and property of landlords were redistributed among the peasants, the Red Army again rapidly expanded its ranks. Under Mao's guidance, the Fourth Red Army convened a conference in December 1929 at Gutian (Ku-t'ien) which stressed the political indoctrination of the Red Army troops for the purpose of overcoming the lack of “proletariat consciousness” among the Red Army, since it was composed mainly of peasant elements. Specifically, Mao called for the eradication of such erroneous and dangerous ideas as the “purely military viewpoint”, “roaming bandit” behaviour, “extreme democratization”, and “absolute equalitarianism”, all of which were typical of traditional peasant rebels' conduct and petty bourgeois mentality. To achieve this, Mao proposed to “raise the level of political work in the army”, to intensify ideological indoctrination, and to argue closer unity between the soldiers and the masses. In such a way, Mao laid the foundation for a politicized peasant army to play the role of the main force in the Chinese Revolution, and this may be rightly regarded as the beginning of Mao's Sinification of Marxism-Leninism.

It was also at this conference that the principle of “the party commands the gun” and not the reverse was firmly established, by which it is implied that the army must always subordinate itself to politics. (Some accounts suggest that Mao adopted this principle in an attempt to bring Zhu De into subordination, but there is little evidence to suggest that Zhu was in conflict with Mao. Rather, the evidence available indicates that throughout his career

Zhu clearly recognized the importance of subordinating the army to political direction.) This meant that the army did not exist only for the purpose of fighting battles, but also for the purpose of agitating, organizing, and mobilizing the masses. Hence, the Red Army troops were subjected to intense political training in addition to the technical and professional training, so that they would acquire the proper political consciousness. In short, it was in an army with a clear sense of its purpose and historic mission: political conscious, literate, highly motivated, and thoroughly indoctrinated, and, above all, closely united with and actively supported by the masses. To lighten the burden of supporting the army, for example, the troops had to undertake manual labour in times of peace, so as to be economically self-supporting. In addition, the Red Army also established the tradition of social equality within the ranks of the armed forces. The officers did not beat or physically mistreat the soldiers; officers and men lived together, ate the same food, and dressed alike. No distinction of ranks was visible, and no special deference was paid an officer. As Zhu De stated in 1945, “At the very birth of the Red Army in 1927, we abolished the system of brutality against the soldiers. We regard officers and men alike as individual human beings on an equal footing. The only difference between them is in matters of duty. No officers are allowed to oppress the men, no senior officers to oppress the juniors.”⁴ All these features are still preserved today in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

In the meantime, the Central Committee of the CCP in Shanghai still adhered to the orthodox Marxist view that the urban workers were the only truly revolutionary force and that the party must concentrate its efforts in organizing the workers. Li Lisan, who emerged as the dominant figure in the CCP leadership in 1929–30, wished to take advantage of the civil strike among the warlords in early 1930 to launch a programme of urban insurrections with the aid of the Red Army forces. In the summer of 1930, Li ordered Peng Dehuai, commander of the Third Army, to attack Changsha, the capital of Hunan, while Mao and Zhu were ordered to coordinate their attacks by capturing Nanchang. Both Mao and Zhu were sceptical about the wisdom of the venture, but as they were rather ignorant of the national situation (because of poor communications) and did not wish to defy the order of the Central Committee, they proceeded cautiously to Nanchang. Peng's army succeeded briefly in capturing Changsha, but owing to a lack of support from

the populace, the attempt failed, and Mao and Zhu quickly withdrew their forces. In August, Li regrouped the two communist armies into the First Front Army and ordered it to attack Changsha for a second time, but Mao and Zhu defied his order and unilaterally withdrew their forces to their own base. This brought the so-called "Li Lisan Line" to an effective end.

The new leadership that emerged in Shanghai was dominated by doctrinaire group of returned students from the Soviet Union, generally referred to as the Russian Returned Students (RRS), or the "Twenty-eight Bolsheviks". For a while, Mao and Zhu did not come into direct contact with the RRS, as the RRS was busy consolidating their position in the urban areas. It is generally assumed that the RRS, soon after their ascendancy to the central party leadership at the CCP's Fourth Plenum of January 1931, condemned Mao for his excessive emphasis on the peasants and for his "guerrillaism". But Zhu recalled to Agnes Smedley, "In early March 1931, we received resolutions passed by the Fourth [Plenum] of our party which had met secretly in Shanghai. We had sent delegates to this congress, which finally repudiated the Li Lisan line and affirmed ours."⁵ According to my research,⁶ the RRS also opposed the Li Lisan Line on account of its adventurist nature and neglect for the consolidation of the soviet areas and the building-up of the Red Army forces before the seizure of cities, and they therefore had something in common with Mao. At this early stage, therefore, both the RRS and Mao recognized the necessity of soliciting each other's support for the elimination of Li Lisan's influence and for the tasks ahead.

In December 1930 anti-Mao forces in the Jiangxi Soviet attempted to gain the support of some army commanders, including Zhu, for a coup against Mao. The evidence of this attempted coup, known as the Futian Incident, is scanty, but it is possible that a majority of the rebels, whom Mao labelled the AB (Anti-Bolshevik) Group (allegedly a counter-revolutionary organization in the soviet area), were supporters of Li Lisan, who sought to unseat Mao from the soviet base. Zhu sided with Mao and mercilessly suppressed the rebellion. The net result of the coup was to consolidate Mao's unchallenged position within the Jiangxi Soviet.

Following the elimination of internal dissension, Mao and Zhu also successfully defended the soviet base from three consecutive Nationalist encirclement campaigns launched in December 1930 and March and June 1931. In all three campaigns Zhu personally

took command of the battles, although Mao reportedly devised the tactics of "luring the enemy deep into our territories". In the words of Zhu himself, the Communist tactics were "to draw the enemy out from behind their defences, entice them into Soviet territory where they would be at the mercy of our troops and the people, and in big sweeping flank movements attack their rear and destroy them".⁷ In other words, the Communist forces would refrain from direct confrontation with the enemy troops and allow them to march right into the Communist territories. Inside the Communist territories, the Red Army would be able to make maximum use of superior knowledge of the terrain, rely on the support of the local populace, and launch surprise attacks on the enemy troops to harass them or eliminate them. In this type of warfare the support of the local populace was essential; the Communist forces were provided with intelligence reports on the enemy's actual strength and movements, as well as shelters and secret hide-outs (hence the dictum "the guerrillas are the fish, the people are the water"). In such a way, the Red Army could make up for its numerical and military inferiority to the Nationalist troops.

Under the instigation of the central party leadership, the First National Soviet Congress was held in November 1931, in Ruijin, the capital of the Jiangxi Soviet. At the congress, Mao was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee, the highest executive body of the newly established Chinese Soviet Republic, to which Zhu was elected a member. Under the Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars was established (similar to a cabinet, again headed by Mao), and Zhu was appointed people's commissar for military affairs. In addition, he was also made chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, which was responsible for the actual conduct of military affairs. Thus, both Mao's and Zhu's respective positions as leader of the soviet government and the commander of the Red Army were confirmed. But before the convening of the congress, the RRS dispatched a series of draft land laws and labour laws for discussion and adoption by the congress. The proposed legislation called for the confiscation of the land and property of landlords and rich peasants, the allotment of land of inferior quality to the rich peasants, and struggle against the capitalists. Although of a more radical nature than the land policies that Mao and Zhu had been implementing in Jiangxi (i.e., an equal share of land to the rich peasants), the draft resolutions were adopted without change by the congress,⁸ perhaps because

they carried with them the powerful backing of the Comintern, which Mao was unable to resist. On the other hand, Mao may have been uncertain whether the new policies would work, and simply decided to put them into operation so as to examine their results.

The congress also adopted a “Final Decision Concerning the Red Army Problems”, which Zhu De must have been extremely pleased with. The resolution declared that the success or failure of the “historic class struggle will be decided by armed struggle” and called upon “the worker and peasant masses” to put forth all their efforts to strengthen the Red Army. It continued:

The Red Army is the most important defender of the Soviet political power; it is a class army, and in mission or in spirit, it is fundamentally dissimilar from the Guomindang army and warlord armies and imperialist armies . . . The imperialist armies and warlord armies are isolated from the masses, they are instruments to oppress the workers and peasants and to ravage colonies. But the Red Army is the army of the masses of workers and peasants themselves; it is the armed power of liberation of the masses of workers and peasants and moreover, it is the army which has a great international mission.⁹

The decision called for the further strengthening of the fighting capacity of the Red Army, greater organizational discipline, and the raising of the political education of Red Army soldiers. It strictly confined recruitments to the Red Army to workers and peasants and members of their families, and drew up a set of special privileges for Red Army men, including grants of land, exemption from tax, and aid to their families, for the purpose of attracting more recruits.

The Long March

In the years that followed, Zhu’s actual relationship with the central party leadership is unclear. As is well known, Mao’s authority in both the party and army suffered a decline as a result of a dispute over military strategy in which the RRS, supported by Zhou Enlai, advocated the adoption of mobile-positional warfare for the defence of the soviet area around its perimeter. Whether Zhu privately supported Mao or the RRS is not known (there are conflicting

accounts claiming that Zhu both opposed and supported Mao), but there is little evidence that he openly challenged the decision of the RRS leadership regarding military strategy. Perhaps, like Mao, Zhu was not yet prepared to clash head-on with the RRS, who enjoyed the backing of Moscow; but it may have been that, because the new strategy had not yet been tried out, he was uncertain whether it would work. As it turned out, the counter-offensive against the Nationalists’ fourth encirclement campaign, which started in January 1933 and ended in June, was a success. This further encouraged the new leadership to base the defence of the soviet area on a number of well-fortified strongholds guarding the entrance into the soviet region for the counter-offensive against the Nationalists’ fifth encirclement campaign, which started in July 1933.

In the final campaign against the Communists, the Nationalist command adopted the strategy proposed by two German military advisers – von Seeckt and von Falkenhausen – which was based on the construction of a ring of blockhouses along the periphery of the soviet area. Learning from the mistakes of the past campaigns, the Nationalist troops avoided marching straight into the Communist territories but proceeded with extreme caution, advancing slowly for a short distance each time while new blockhouses were being constructed. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek applied the principle of “70 per cent political and 30 per cent military”, whereby the Nationalist army also reformed the local administration, rehabilitated the rural villages, and strengthened local militia forces in the areas recovered. In such a way, the Communists were not only deprived of their mobility and flexibility in action but were also prevented from recapturing the support of the masses in areas overrun by the Nationalists. Moreover, as the ring of blockhouses tightened, the Communists were increasingly drained of their human and material resources.

In the face of the new KMT strategy, the Communist leadership relied on the advice of Otto Braun (Li Te), the Comintern’s German military adviser to the CCP, who insisted on building blockhouses against blockhouses so as to strengthen the fortification of the Communist region on certain strategic points. In May 1934, Zhu was instructed to engage five divisions of his troops for the defence of Guangchang (Kuang-ch’ang) in a desperate effort to safeguard the soviet capital. The battle cost the Communists over six thousand casualties, to no avail. At this critical juncture, Mao advocated the

splitting up of the remaining Communist forces into four divisions which could break through the enemy's encirclement to wage guerrilla warfare in the neighbouring provinces before recapturing the Jiangxi base. His advice was not taken, and the Communists were finally forced to withdraw from the base in October 1934, which marked the beginning of the Long March.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Mao, following the Battle of Guangchang, had begun to canvas support from the Red Army commanders, including Zhu De, for a concerted challenge to the RRS leadership. When the Red Army reached Zunyi, in Guizhou (Kweichow) province, Mao and the military commanders demanded that the Politburo convene an enlarged conference for a review of the counter-offensive against the Nationalists' fifth encirclement campaign. This famous Zunyi Conference, which condemned the RRS leadership for its mistaken military strategy (there was, however, no direct criticism of the RRS's political line during the Jiangxi period), established Mao as the top party leader. Because of the military exigencies of the situation, Mao took over complete control of military affairs by replacing Zhou Enlai as chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, with Zhu as one of the vice-chairman and concurrently commander-in-chief of the Red Army.

From Zunyi the Red Army moved in a northward direction to the Sichuan-Zikang border area. The journey cut across some of the most difficult terrains, including snow-capped mountains and steep river gorges, and the Communist forces were constantly pursued by Nationalist troops or hostile regional armies. In June 1935 they rendezvoused with the Fourth Front Army, led by Zhang Guotao (Chang Kuo-tao), who had earlier fled the Hubei-Henan-Anhui (Eyuwan) Soviet in late 1932. There a dispute over the direction of the Red Army's movement broke out between Mao and Zhang. While Mao wished to pursue the Long March to the north to Shaanxi (Shansi) province, where the Red Army would be strategically poised for resistance against Japan, Zhang wanted to remain in the Sichuan-Zikang area and establish a new base there. Probably because Nationalist troops were closing in and Zhang's stubborn opposition would waste valuable time, Mao decided to proceed to the north without waiting for Zhang's approval. As Zhu De was with Zhang when Mao decided to make the move, Zhu was left behind and for the next fifteen months served as military commander of the Fourth Front Army. Zhu's role in the dispute and his relations with Zhang are again hard to ascertain. Orthodox Maoist

historians assert that Zhu was "forcibly" detained by Zhang. According to Zhang, however, Zhu was not unsympathetic to his position, while never openly criticizing Mao and always trying to prevail upon Zhang not to deepen the conflict with Mao. The latter seems to be a more plausible explanation, as it fits well with Zhu's personality and his usual role of being a "compromiser" in party disputes.

The Long March was a true epic. The Chinese today regard it as a watershed, marking a coming of age through heroism and bloodshed. The passage of the army in its year-long ordeal brought news to millions of illiterate peasants of a national answer to the age-old political, economic, and social problems suffered by them. The correct and disciplined demeanour of the troops, so utterly different from all other armies in this ravaged countryside, was a magnificent public relations exercise. The success of exploits such as the crossing of the Tatu River, in which Zhu De participated, forged a fearless and tightly knit army. Its avowed intention, to fight the Japanese, secured the support of the young nationalistically inclined intelligentsia in the cities. The final establishment of a secure sanctuary reinforced Mao's undisputed position in the party and army. That he had done this without the help or encouragement of Russia strengthened Chinese independence.

The American journalist Edgar Snow was in Yanan when Zhu De finished his part of the Long March with the Fourth Front Army. Snow wrote of Zhu, "It must be admitted that for tactical ingenuity, spectacular mobility, and richness of versatility in manoeuvre, he repeatedly proved his superiority to every general sent against him, and established beyond any doubt the formidable fighting power of revolutionized Chinese troops." He then stressed the sheer personal magnetism of this craggy, stocky, man, the human quality that inspired faith and devotion, of his own affection for the men in his army and the reciprocation of that. A simple man, he lived with them, shared their hardships, cared for them and gave them a goal to fight for, as the devoted ally of Mao. "He has become that rare general, a great leader deeply loved."¹⁰

After a long and arduous journey, the First Front Army under Mao's leadership finally reached northern Shaanxi, which was relatively free from Nationalist harassment. Altogether, from Jiangxi the Communists had travelled, on foot, a total distance of over ten thousand kilometres — more than three times the distance from Sydney to Perth — in a little over a year's time. It was undoubtedly

one of the most remarkable feats of human endeavour in the history of the world. Yet one must not ascribe to the Long March alone the reasons for the future success of the CCP, for at the end of the journey the Communists were in a pretty bad shape. Out of a hundred thousand men who had started the march, only several thousand survived. The new base that they established in northern Shaanxi was limited in both human and material resources. Had the Nationalist government pushed ahead with its sixth encirclement campaign, the Communists might have been exterminated or driven to further exile to Xinjiang (Sinkiang) or to Inner Mongolia. What saved the Chinese Communist Party at this critical juncture was the Anti-Japanese United Front.

In the summer of 1935 the Comintern in Russia held its seventh congress, which deliberated on the question of an "anti-fascist united front" in Europe — that is, Communist and allied groups combining with bourgeois reformist elements in a common struggle against the emerging threat of fascism. On 1 August the CCP's representative in Moscow, Chen Shaoyu (Ch'en Shao-yu, alias Wang Ming, leader of the RRS), issued, in the name of the Central Committee of the CCP, the famous August First Declaration, which called for the formation of a similar policy in China — the Anti-Japanese United Front. The Communist Party would offer to form an alliance with all anti-Japanese forces or groups or parties in a common struggle against Japanese imperialism. The news was relayed to the CCP's headquarters in northern Shaanxi by a Comintern delegate. Upon receiving the news, Mao convened a Politburo meeting on 25 December and decided to adopt the tactics of the Anti-Japanese United Front. The message was sent to Zhang Guotao with the Fourth Red Army in the Sichuan-Zikang area. Zhang agreed to abandon his separatist movement and join with Mao, in the expectation that his larger force would put him in a strong position in the combined leadership. His troops, however, were soon disastrously defeated in a Nationalist ambush, and only a remnant of the Fourth Front Army led by Zhu was able to make its way to Mao's base in the autumn of 1936. Zhu was received warmly and immediately reinstated as the overall commander of the Red Army, but Zhang's influence in the party was virtually eclipsed (he defected to the KMT in 1938).

In spite of repeated overtures to the KMT from the CCP to end the civil strife and unite in a common struggle against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek remained adamantly unresponsive to the CCP's proposals.

Instead, he pushed for the launching of the final encirclement campaign against the Communists and arrived at Xian (Sian) in December 1936 to supervise the operation. There he was captured by his deputy military commander, Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang), who had been moved by the CCP's propaganda for united national resistance. Through the intervention of the Communist delegates, notably Zhou Enlai, Chiang finally gave his verbal consent to the cessation of the civil war and the formation of the united front against Japan. Negotiation between the two parties began in early 1937, and basic agreement was reached in regard to the form of the united front shortly before the 7 July Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which triggered off the Sino-Japanese War. In September, the Communist region was renamed the Shaan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia) Border Region, and the Red Army was renamed the Eighth Route Army with Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Peng Dehuai as deputy, both area and army being placed under the nominal direction of the Nationalist government. In return, the CCP suspended the class struggle against landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists and pledged not to conduct any subversive activities against the Nationalist government.

As soon as the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek announced its intention to wage a war of resistance against Japan, Zhu declared his support for the Nationalist government and called upon all classes of people to join together in a sacred resistance war. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army won its first victory against the Japanese at Pingxing Guan (P'ingsingkuan), a strategic pass in Shaanxi. The battle was a classic victory of the Communist application of surprise attack and mobile-guerrilla warfare, and was commanded by Lin Biao (Lin Piao), who put into practice the strategy worked out by Mao and Zhu. As Zhu later described the battle, "two regiments struck the enemy's flank and two battalions enveloped his rear. The Japanese were caught in a trap."¹¹ It was not a large-scale battle, and it did not succeed in annihilating the enemy troops, but it did win a lot of publicity for the CCP because the Japanese troops that were humiliated were the much-feared Itagaki Division, which had a record of invincibility in the battlefield. This victory helped to establish an early claim for the Communists as active defenders of Chinese territory.

In January 1938 Zhu and Peng Dehuai went to Loyang to confer on war strategy with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Supreme Military Council. Later, Zhu also went to Hankou (Hankow) and

acted as CCP's spokesman on the united front. But his greatest contribution was in expounding and promoting the adoption of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. In 1938 he published a number of important treatises on guerrilla warfare, including "The War Experience of the Eighth Route Army", "On Guerrilla Warfare", "The Strategy and Tactics of the Eighth Route Army", and "The Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" (1939). In these works Zhu elaborated Mao's theory of the "protracted war", which held that in a vast country like China the Japanese troops could only have enough manpower to occupy the major cities and communications lines, and that China could win by concentrating its forces in building up rural guerrilla bases which would harass and wear down the enemy troops until the time was ripe for an all-out counter-offensive. Such a strategy, however, was looked upon with suspicion by the Nationalist government as a means of avoiding frontal battle with the Japanese and expanding Communist power.

In 1939–40, KMT-CCP relations rapidly deteriorated as the Nationalist fears and suspicions of increased Communist strength were confirmed. As a result, the KMT suspended the military stipends allowed to the Communist forces, set up blockades against the Communist regions, and openly clashed with Communist forces in a number of places. By the end of 1939 Zhu was recalled by Mao to Yanan, as were a number of top-ranking Communist functionaries serving as liaison officers at Hankou. This marked the end of effective co-operation between the CCP and the KMT, but it should be noted that the CCP under Mao continued to attach considerable importance to the united front, for the purposes of winning over the support of the national bourgeoisie and the landlords who still supported the war of resistance, isolating the anti-Communist "die-hards" in the KMT, and forestalling the Nationalist government's premeditated attacks on the Communists. (These tactics were known as "isolating the die-hards, winning over the intermediaries, and developing the progressive force").

In August 1940, without prior consultation with Mao (as revealed during the Cultural Revolution), Zhu and Peng Dehuai launched the so-called Hundred Regiments Offensive. Zhu was probably prompted into action by the fact that the Japanese were regrouping for a counter-offensive against the Communist guerrillas, so that it was necessary to conduct a pre-emptive campaign to dislodge the enemy forces and disrupt their communication lines. Moreover, he was concerned that inaction on the battlefield would add to the

pessimistic atmosphere in the nation following the defection of Wang Jingwei (Wang China-wei) to Japan in January 1940. Thus, with Peng Dehuai's support and collaboration, Zhu ordered a total of 115 regiments, numbering around four hundred thousand men, into action. For several months Communist guerrillas made hundreds of raids on enemy communication lines, derailed trains, blew up small bridges and viaducts, attacked and burned stations, destroyed water-towers and enemy equipment, which succeeded in immobilizing the Japanese armies in north China for an extended period. As a result, the Japanese troops were unable to move into the countryside to confiscate the autumn harvest. The battle won nation-wide acclaim for the damage it inflicted on the Japanese troops and did much to promote the Communist image as the champion of national resistance. But the large-scale offensive drew the attention of the Japanese troops away from the Nationalist forces, and in reprisal the Japanese launched a series of ruthless attacks on the Communist base areas, burning villages, shooting inhabitants, and slaughtering livestock. (This was the so-called "three-all" policy of General Okamura Yasuji — "kill all, burn all, loot all".) As a result, the size of the Communist-controlled territories shrank by approximately one-sixth and the population of the Communist base areas fell from approximately forty million to twenty-five million. Mao's earlier scepticism about direct confrontation with enemy forces was vindicated. There is no evidence, however, that Zhu was reprimanded for his action, presumably because the Hundred Regiments Offensive was on the whole a successful operation.

At the same time, the threat of civil war was heightened in January 1941 when the main bulk of the New Fourth Army (numbering nine thousand men) in central China was attacked and destroyed by Nationalist forces for having allegedly violated the Nationalist government's order to move north to join the Eighth Route Army. Confronted with both the Japanese onslaught and the Nationalist blockade of the Communist base regions, the CCP was forced to turn its attention to internal consolidation of the Communist base areas. In the early months of 1942, the CCP under Mao initiated the so-called *Zhengfeng* (Rectification) Campaign to eliminate past erroneous tendencies in the party and to politicize and mobilize the masses. Zhu did not play a prominent role in the *Zhengfeng* Campaign, presumably because he was relatively uninvolved with theories and politics. But he was active in promoting

the production campaigns to achieve economic self-sufficiency for the Communist base areas, personally engaging in agricultural work to set the example for all to follow. During the period 1944–45, when a stream of foreign visitors and journalists came to visit the Communist headquarters, Zhu also busily received them. As a rule, he projected an extremely favourable image to all who met him; Harrison Forman, Stuart Gelder, Gunther Stein, Maurice Volaw, Claire and William Band, Michael Lindsay, Brooks Atkinson, Theodore H. White, and others were all impressed by his affable and unassuming manners and his close ties with the troops he led.

At the CCP's seventh party congress of April–June 1945, which marked the ascendancy of Mao to supreme ideological leadership in the party, Zhu delivered one of the keynote speeches on the growth of the Red Army and its role in the Anti-Japanese War. In his report, entitled "On the Battlefield of the Liberated Areas", Zhu praised the performance of the 910,000 officers and men in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, as well as the militias in north-east China, which comprised almost two and a quarter million fighting men. These "great people's armies", he declared, "had waged a war of unparalleled heroism, fought bitter, magnificent and triumphant battles, and become the backbone of China's War of Resistance". The Communist troops were able to score such victories, according to Zhu, because they had closely integrated themselves with the masses, in accordance with Chairman Mao's "correct political line and correct military policy". In contrast, Zhu criticized the KMT for adopting a "defeatist strategy" of not relying on the masses. This resulted in its loss of many key points in north, central, and south China.¹²

In August 1945, immediately after Japan's surrender, Zhu issued a series of orders to the Red Army to occupy areas held by the Japanese and Chinese puppet troops and to receive their surrendered weapons. This was in direct contradiction to the Nationalist government's order that the Nationalist troops alone were to do so, an order considered unjust in the eyes of the Communists because it blatantly disregarded their contribution to the anti-Japanese war. Dispute soon erupted in mid-1946, following the breakdown of negotiations, and civil war ensued. The Communist forces were renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with Zhu De as commander-in-chief. Under Mao's and Zhu's overall direction, the PLA won a series of brilliant campaigns in one of the biggest if little-known wars of modern times. At first Zhu had something

more than a million men under his command opposing Chiang Kai-shek's three million. But by June 1948 there was numerical equality, while the morale and mobility of Zhu's armies constantly increased. Men who had joined the Nationalists merely for a bowl of rice defected in their thousands, and Zhu was able to inspire his recruits with zeal. Nevertheless, some fierce battles were fought.

By October 1948 Zhu's men had forced the surrender of Manchuria. Peking, long isolated, surrendered in January 1949, after a mammoth two-month battle fought by millions of troops on the plains to the south. In April the PLA crossed the Yangtze River. In May Zhu entered Shanghai. In October one of his armies entered Ghangzhou (Canton), and drove the remnants of the Nationalist forces to Taiwan. On 1 October, before completion of the military take-over, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was officially proclaimed by Mao with his old comrade Zhu De beside him at the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing (Peking).

After the establishment of the PRC, Zhu continued to play an active role in public functions for about a decade, holding such senior posts as vice-chairman of the Central Politburo, a member of its Standing Committee, vice-chairman of the Central Committee, and vice-chairman of the PRC (in mid-1954), the highest position besides Chairman Mao himself. He led delegations to Moscow, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He continued to serve as commander-in-chief of the PLA until mid-1964, when aged sixty-eight, he relinquished that position to Peng Dehuai, who had commanded the Chinese 'volunteer' forces in the Korean War (1950–53) and who had gradually assumed a more direct control over the PLA. Nevertheless, Zhu continued to serve as a member of the Military Affairs Committee, and in September 1955 he was created senior marshal of the "ten great marshals", so that he still exercised a preponderant influence over the development of the Chinese armed forces. Zhu was in favour of the transformation and modernization of the PLA under Peng's direction, and he spoke on various occasions in support of the PLA acquiring a more workmanlike and professional orientation than in the Anti-Japanese and Civil War years. In 1963, for example, on the anniversary of the foundation of the PLA, Zhu noted that the past three years had witness the resolute implementation of Chairman Mao's directive in the modernization and regularization of the armed forces such as the construction of a "powerful air force, a powerful navy, and various technical units". Simultaneously, the army had unified

its command, organization, and training system and had strengthened its discipline. "The great historic transition of the PLA from a lower stage to a higher stage has begun," he declared.¹³ This does not mean, however, that Zhu was of the opinion that the army could afford to ignore the overriding importance of politics. He stated in 1958:

In the past ten years or more military technique has developed rapidly. Is it possible to say, owing to the rapid development of military technique, that it is no longer of primary importance for politics to lead and that technique should be relied on instead? No. No matter how military technique develops, the experience that politics must lead will never be outdated. Of course, in future wars great emphasis must be given to the significance of modern technical equipment. But we are not advocates of the sole importance of arms. We are of the opinion that politics, political systems, and the inclination or disinclination of people's hearts, not technique, finally decide victory or defeat.¹⁴

Nevertheless, it was becoming clear that the modernization and regularization of the Chinese armed forces was increasingly looked upon with disfavour by Chairman Mao and his supporters, especially Lin Biao, who considered the new orientation of the PLA departing too much from the tradition of the "people's war" of relying principally on men rather than weapons. The debate on military issues was closely related to the current ideological and policy disputes over the proper economic strategies for China's development, with Mao emphasizing political motivation and Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-chi) pursuing policies that were later accused of having followed "the capitalist road". Zhu De was relatively uninvolved in both disputes. Presumably because of this, and because of Mao's memory of his long-standing partnership and great contribution to the success of the party, Zhu survived the Cultural Revolution largely untarnished, despite reports of Red Guard attacks on him as a "great warlord". He died in July 1976, at the age of ninety.

In conclusion, Zhu is to be remembered as the father of the Chinese Red Army, which was instrumental in bringing about victory for the Communist Party in China. Although as a military strategist he was somewhat overshadowed by Mao, whose widely publicized writings on guerrilla warfare and strategies in the revolutionary war had long established him as a superb and masterful military thinker, it is inconceivable that Mao's tactics could have worked to such a degree of perfection without Zhu's direct

command and actual leadership in the conduct of guerrilla wars. Besides this, Zhu should also be remembered for his self-effacing and inspiring efforts, his down-to-earth work style, his simple way of living, his affable and unassuming manners, and his love, care, and respect for his troops (he reportedly ate, dressed, marched, slept, and undertook manual labour in the same way as his troops). These human qualities are hard to find in a revolutionary leader of Zhu's stature.

Notes

1. Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road*, p. 53.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
3. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, p. 358.
4. Zhu De, *The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas*, p. 52.
5. Smedley, *The Great Road*, p. 294.
6. Shum Kui-kwong, "The Role of the 'Russian Returned Students' in the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1935", pp. 4-35.
7. Smedley, *The Great Road*, p. 296.
8. Shum, "The 'Russian Returned Students' ", pp. 54-64.
9. Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934*, Vol. 2, *The Chinese Documents*. pp. 445-49.
10. Snow, *Red Star over China*, p. 361.
11. Evan F. Carlson, *Twin Stars of China*, pp. 70-71.
12. Zhu De, *The Battle Front of the Liberated Areas*, p. 53.
13. Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army*, p. 4.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army from its inception in 1927 and a long-time revolutionary partner of Mao Zedong, Zhu De was for many years the second most important figure in the Chinese Communist Party. Although he was overshadowed by Mao as a military strategist, his leadership of the Red Army and his conduct of guerrilla warfare were instrumental in achieving ultimate victory for the Communists in China.

This short biography recounts the important events in Zhu's life and the part he played in the evolution of modern China. Born in 1886, he attended the Yunnan Military Academy and in 1911 took part in the revolution that overthrew the Manchus. He joined the Guomindang but was later attracted to communism; in 1922, while in Berlin, where he met Zhou Enlai, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He participated in the Nanchang revolt, which led to the formation of the Red Army, and accompanied Mao on the Long March. Subsequently in north China he led the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces from 1937 to 1945, and after World War II was supreme commander of the Communist forces in the civil war against the Nationalists under Jiang Jie-shi.

Zhu was essentially a military man and was not involved in party disputes. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he did not play a prominent part in party politics, although he continued to occupy a high position in both the Communist Party and the army. Consequently, when he died in 1976 at the age of ninety he had survived the Cultural Revolution with his reputation largely untarnished. He is remembered as the father of the Red Army, which he moulded into an army with an unusual degree of social equality, and for his self-effacing and down-to-earth style of leadership and his care and respect for his troops.

Zhu De is one in a series of monographs entitled *Leaders of Asia*. Each monograph is a brief but stimulating study of a man or woman who has contributed to the shape of Asia. Through knowledge of each leader's life and career will emerge a better understanding of that country's place in contemporary Asia.

Dr Shum Kui-Kwong received his B.A. and M.Phil. degrees from the Australian National University in 1979. At present he is lecturing on Modern Chinese History at the University of New South Wales. His specialized field of research is the history and politics of the Chinese Communist Party. Dr Shum has published a number of articles in the *China Quarterly*, *Journal of Oriental Studies*, *Papers of Far Eastern History* and other periodicals. He is currently revising his Ph.D. thesis on the politics of the anti-Japanese united front (1935-45) for publication.

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