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A Region of Necessity? Regional Profile of Southern Africa

2. Political Developments

Overall political developments in the region appear to be satisfactory. As Table one highlights most member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have successively held Presidential and/or Parliamentary elections with the Democratic Republic of Congo being the latest regional member to undergo a transitional reform. Yet, at an individual state level Table One illustrates that there are inherent threats to the consolidation of democracy. Zimbabwe and Swaziland are perhaps the more explicit examples of where democracy remains undermined by the worsening political and economic crises and the authoritarian monarchy of King Msawti III respectively.

Table 1: A General Overview of Democracy in the Region

Country	Government type	Last election	Political Status *	Threats to Democracy
Angola	Republic, Multiparty presidential regime	2008	Restricted democratic practice. Presidential election hosted in 2008, after getting postponed in 2006 and 2007. MPLA dominated at the polls and completely weakening UNITA's electoral hopes of making any strategic dent on the MPLA's electoral hegemony.	1. Demobilizing soldiers. 2. Internal and externally displaced people. 3. High levels of corruption. 4. Controlled Media. 5. Fear of a one party state confirmed
Botswana	Parliamentary Republic	2008	Presidential election. Smooth transition of power from Festus Mogae to Seretse Ian Khama. Danger of dynastic politics with BDP dominating the electoral landscape	1. HIV/AIDS Levels. 2. Refugee inflows from Zimbabwe.
DRC	Transitional Government	2006	After succeeding his father, the current President Kabila was elected in 2006. The elections were largely free and fair although hampered by problems pertaining to tensions with opposition members and infrastructure.	1. Weak political institutions. 2. Ethnic and factional conflict. 3. Lack of media independence. 4. No civil society structures. 5. Instability in the Eastern part of the country with Rebel activity marked by overflows of the Rwanda Hutu-Tutsi conflict
Lesotho	Parliamentary, Constitutional Monarchy	2007	Multiparty, democratic elections. Well contested.	1. Dependent on exports to the US market (AGOA). 2. Economy reliant on migrant remittances.
Madagascar	Republic	2006	President re-elected in 2006, after coming into power in 2001.	1. Dominant reigning party with very little opposition in elections threatens political stability
Malawi	Multiparty Democracy	2004	Functioning multiparty democracy with largely free and fair elections	1. Levels of poverty exacerbated by drought and famine
Mauritius	Parliamentary Democracy	2005	Seen as a stable and moving towards democratic maturity.	No visible threats, although there are internal differences in the Ruling coalition over economic policy. In addition tensions exist within the coalition of the opposition

				following the collapse of their parliamentary alliance in April 2006.
Mozambique	Republic	2005	Partly fair elections with a strong ruling party, but sound democratic frameworks.	1. High levels of corruption. 2. Tensions between RENAMO-controlled provinces and central government over delegation of powers. 3. Independence of political and institutional structures as the judiciary compromised by influence from FRELIMO. 4. Asymmetrical levels of development between regions.
Namibia	Republic	2004	Free and fair elections with a sound democratic framework.	1. Weak opposition 2. Centralising tendency within SWAPO and increasing hostility to dissent
Seychelles	Republic	2006	Partly fair elections	1. Some concentration of powers in the Electoral Commission and concerns over impartiality
South Africa	Republic	2004	Functioning multiparty democracy with largely free and fair elections	1. Weak opposition and single party domination with a tendency to centralization. 2. Extreme levels of socioeconomic inequality.
Swaziland	Monarchy	2008	Held Assembly Elections in September. Political parties are banned, elections held through direct and indirect processes.	1. Extreme levels of poverty. 2. Collapse of independent judiciary. 3. Restrictions on the media.
Tanzania	Republic	2005	Functioning democracy	1. Separatist movement on the island of Zanzibar
Zambia	Republic	2008	Presidential election following the death of President Levy Mnawasa, Rupiah Banda is the current President.	1. High levels of poverty and unemployment. 2. Weak economy and excessive dependency on global terms of trade.
Zimbabwe	Parliamentary	2008	Restricted Democratic Practice	1. Economic stagnation and recession

	Democracy (Newly formed Government of National government)	(contested)		2. High levels of political repression 3. Opposition marginalized from normal political activities 4. Restricted media commentary
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* Based on Freedom House Rating 2007 Source: <http://africanelections.tripod.com>; www.eisa.org.za. Compiled by Arno Negpen, Research Analyst, Centre for Chinese Studies

But there are other member-states where the political outlook remains muted.

Angola

In September 2008 Angola held its legislative election, the first in 16 years. The result was an overwhelming victory for the MPLA at the polls with UNITA's electoral base completely weakened. In the run up to the elections and mindful of the 2002 post electoral crisis, the newly elected leader of UNITA called for a formal pact to be signed between the ruling MPLA and opposition parties that will guarantee the safety of the voters and their property. But there were indications that the MPLA had further marginalised opposition parties, especially those that were seen to be more radical and have a small but growing popular electoral support base. This poses critical considerations for the role of opposition parties as well as their viability in the forthcoming Presidential elections to be held in 2009. The resounding victory in the Parliamentary elections will definitely give President Dos Santos the confidence of retaining the Presidency and the MPLA consolidating its power across the country, thereby confirming Angola as a one party dominant state.

With the tenuous results in Zimbabwe's March and June Presidential elections, President Dos Santos could not afford to stall on hosting the overdue Parliamentary elections. This was for a variety of reasons, in particular that Angola has become a strategic regional economy due to its phenomenal growth performance as result of its energy output and therefore needed to demonstrate a shift towards democratic maturity. And perhaps not wanting to fuel the region's fragile political landscape, the Angolan election was conducted relatively free of any major dispute over the electoral result or for that matter voter intimidation as evidenced in the 1992 elections. There have been unsubstantiated reports of propaganda campaigns and intimidation tactics leveled against the opposition party, UNITA. Moreover it has been asserted that the ruling MPLA had used state information services to strengthen its electoral campaign while co-opting the traditional authorities to further consolidate their support base.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming victory by the MPLA where it captured 82% of the vote while UNITA only managed to garner 10% of the vote means that the MPLA will enjoy a greater majority in the 223 seat legislative assembly. The observer missions, from the region and internationally, had indicated that the election had been free and fair and were generally satisfied with the electoral outcome. With the Parliamentary election having a positive outcome, it looks like the forthcoming Presidential election (likely to take place next year) will also be conducted go off without any major incident. As much as it looks certain that President Dos Santos will remain the candidate for the MPLA and retain the

¹ A decision by the government not to allocate any further funding to the umbrella organization of opposition parties (each received about US\$40 000 last year) in 2008 had caused consternation amongst the body with claims of unfair and biased treatment. The Executive Secretary of the organization has threatened to stage a series of protests that will be led by those opposition parties, which do not have any seats in the National Assembly. The sensitivity surrounding the status quo of the opposition was put under further strain by the announcement made by the head of the Supreme Court on state radio that opposition parties with acute internal divisions will not be allowed to contest the elections. This is seen as a further attempt by the ruling MPLA to exclude the opposition from the electoral processes.

Presidency, one possible area where the opposition could strategically makes it impact around is the socio-economic plight of ordinary Angolans, especially now with the current global financial crisis and depressed oil prices which has impinged on the ruling MPLA's budgetary commitments.

Whereas Angola is perhaps the best performing economy within Sub-Saharan Africa, its development indicators still reflect a skewed development trajectory. The high growth performance is not being accompanied by complementary improvements in socioeconomic livelihoods. While it is must be borne in mind that Angola still remains a fragile society, recovering from the remnants of the civil war, it must not be trivialized that the economic performance that the country is currently enjoying is stymied by what has become a trend for most economies in the region and perhaps globally of growth without development.

High unemployment, poverty and inequality still remain critical issues that face ordinary Angolans. Therefore, despite the revenues from oil receipts, the ruling MPLA needs to address a growing trend of widening inequalities which is made more difficult with the current global financial crisis and the stabilization of the global oil price. This could pose significant set backs for Angola's development prospects, particularly if the revenue from the oil receipts are not properly channeled to address the country's fragile development infrastructure and diversification of industries. Already the global financial crisis and Angola's dependency on donor assistance and oil to finance their development has forced President Dos Santos to visit China in late December 2008 to secure an additional US\$1 billion loan to assist in the country's reconstruction.

Angola, however, is not the only example where threats to or stalling of internal democratic processes are evident.

Lesotho

Lesotho is another member state where democracy appears to be under some threat. While Maseru seems to be consolidating its electoral process following the 1998 debacle, it has not altogether been able to move beyond the residual effects of it.

In the run up to the 2007 election the country faced a series of politically motivated assassination attempts that created conditions of insecurity. The prospect of a hung parliament and the disruption of government business led to pressure to dissolve the parliament and pre-empt floor crossing which exacerbated the political situation.

The 2007 elections marked the second time that Lesotho used the Mixed Member Proportional electoral and indicated the sustainability of the system. With the distribution of the 40 seats under the PR system being disputed, it would appear that the Mixed System which was imposed to create a more inclusive system of consensual politics and nation building following the disputed 1998 elections and attempted military coup is being undermined. Moreover, with the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy government imposing a curfew in the capital, the situation in the tiny mountain kingdom became tense. Even though officials from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security flew to Maseru to resolve the situation, political observers say the situation in the country has reached crisis proportions and warned that the political crisis and its pending implications must be monitored to avoid the 1998 debacle re-emerging.

Madagascar

Considered to be the region's star economy given its attractive economic growth as a result of FDI inflows is being marred by anti-government protests. Driven by the former mayor of Antananarivo and characterized as power struggle with the President, the political violence has seen more than 100 people dead. While SADC is preparing to send a mission to be led by Angola to the island state to seek a settlement to the political crisis, it seems that the power struggle is just a catalyst to a more endemic predicament that confronts ordinary Madagascans i.e. growing inequality¹. The situation remains dire and while all efforts are being explored to bring calm and stability to the country, it would appear that finding a political solution is not enough. The real crisis of the state is delivery of viable social policy, which the SADC mediation must take into consideration when mediating between the antagonists.

Thus in so far as the Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 democracy index below shows a set of moderate democratic conditions prevailing in the region these still remain limited and aligned more closely to the procedural aspects of democracy, especially the advancement of electoral politics.

Table 2: EIU Democracy Index 2006

Country	Rank	Overall Score	Electoral Process and Pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Political Culture	Civil Liberties
Angola	151	2.41	0.50	2.14	1.11	5.63	2.65
Botswana	36	7.60	9.17	7.86	5.00	6.88	9.12
Lesotho	63	6.48	7.92	6.43	4.44	6.25	7.35
Madagascar	85	5.82	5.67	5.71	5.56	6.88	5.29
Malawi	103	4.97	6.00	5.00	3.89	4.38	5.59
Mauritius	25	8.04	9.17	8.21	5.00	8.13	9.71
Mozambique	96	5.28	5.25	5.71	4.44	6.88	4.12
Namibia	59	6.54	4.75	4.00	6.67	8.75	8.53
South Africa	29	7.91	8.75	7.86	7.22	6.88	8.82
Swaziland	139	2.93	1.75	2.86	2.22	3.13	4.71
Tanzania	99	5.18	6.00	3.93	5.06	5.63	5.29
Zambia	97	5.25	5.25	4.64	3.33	6.25	6.76
Zimbabwe	147	2.62	0.17	0.79	3.89	5.63	2.65

Source: http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf

Note: Scores closer to ten indicate countries being more democratic.

Even Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa whose scores are indicative of being more stable democratically have recently experienced some tensions that, in turn, raise critical considerations for the strengthening of democracy within these societies. The South African situation warrants special mention not least because it is considered as a de facto regional hegemon.

South Africa

Since the last regional briefing, South African politics has been characterised by several factors that have brought into question the Presidency of Thabo Mbeki. In 2005 President Mbeki took an onerous decision to dismiss, Mr. Jacob Zuma, from his post as Deputy President of the Republic. This was in response to a corruption case involving Mr. Schabir Shaik that implicated Mr. Zuma as receiving a bribe in an arms deal involving the procurement of state contracts. While the international community and more progressive elements in South African society saw this as one of the defining moments in Mbeki's Presidency, this fuelled internal divisions within the ruling African Nation Congress (ANC). For some time these internal differences centred on the centralisation of power by the Mbeki Administration and the marginalisation of the leftist leaning Alliance Partners: the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). But the dispute within the ANC was also characterised by what some commentators believed to be tenuous links to ethnic divisions within the Party between the Xhosa dominated faction led by Mbeki and the Zulu camp of Jacob Zuma.

As much as the divisions were ideological and ethnic, there were other concerns emerging which had direct correlations to the brewing succession battle that pitted Mbeki against Zuma over the Presidency of the Party. And the Mbeki Presidency was not without its criticisms. Over this period, detractors in the ANC saw Mbeki's style of politics as divisive, especially with the formation of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) Unit which was to root out organised crime. In time some saw this as a political witch-hunt against Mbeki's antagonists like Zuma while in other aspects the Unit acted independent of political interference and investigated high ranking officials that received President Mbeki's endorsement. This reached a stalemate when the head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was suspended over allegations that the DSO had investigated the Chief of Police, Jackie Selebi, over corruption and alleged links with a well-known Mafia boss.

This discrepancy in President Mbeki's involvement in the Police Commissioner's case, the role of the DSO, and Mbeki's style of politics became a subject of much controversy and reached a head at the Party's National Conference in December 2007 where the power struggle between the two antagonists saw the popularism of Zuma being elected as President of the Party.

While the corruption charges against Zuma are still pending, the outcome of the National Conference is indicative of the popular support that Zuma appeals to within the Party as well as the frustrations that were creeping into the Party over divisions that the Mbeki Presidency had created. Zuma's victory was seen as an indictment of Mbeki's control over the Party but in other respects it was interpreted as a successful outcome of competitive internal party politics, which was noted as a consolidation of democracy in South Africa since the low intensity tensions that were simmering in the run-up to the National Conference was averted from erupting into a highly politicised conflict between the factions. Nevertheless, the situation still remains fragile because of the uncertainty a Zuma Presidency will bring if he is elected as President of the Republic in the 2009 National elections. Zuma faces a challenging task especially around unifying the different fragments within the Party and seeking a rapprochement with the Alliance Partners. Perhaps a more significant issue is how Zuma will be able to reconcile the current macroeconomic strategy with a more interventionist approach around pro-poor policy initiatives in dealing with the growing development inequities that has come to bedevil the twilight years of the Mbeki Presidency. This is something that the Alliance Partners will monitor carefully as this was the lever they used to rally support around Zuma in the run-up to the ANC's National Conference in 2007.

In so far as some observers point out that things are still far from over as Zuma's corruption trial could still unhinge the political landscape of South Africa, it should be emphasised that the election of Kgalema Motlanthe as Deputy President of the ANC is very much the compromise candidate that could step into the fold as the ANC's Presidential candidate for the 2009 general elections. In most circles he is seen as the person that could very well defuse some of the doomsday predictions. Since President Mbeki's departure from the Presidency, the ANC faces raft of other challenges, not least the formation of a new political party, the Congress of the People (COPE), which was launched by the former defence minister, Mosiuoa Lekota and, former Gauteng Premier, Mbhazima Shilowa. Becoming an umbrella for disillusioned ANC MPs and councilors, members from the alliance partners, COSATU and SACP as well as apathetic voters, COPE is seen as challenging the ANC's electoral hegemony in the forthcoming 2009 national elections. While it is early to predict how COPE will fair at the polls, much of the hype around COPE is that it will deny the ANC's two-thirds majority that it enjoyed in the 2004 elections². There is also hope that COPE can become a viable opposition to the ANC and therefore South Africa's democratic landscape.

But the real challenge for the ANC is now whether Zuma's corruption trial date set for August 25, 2009, will force the Party to consider a back-up candidate to replace Zuma if he is found guilty. More so now with President Motlanthe, as the caretaker President, seen in certain quarters as being the preferred ANC Presidential candidate. And in all of this the ANC still has to ensure that is able to deliver a pro poor policy, especially in terms of a socially inclusive service delivery programme that has become a symbol of its current electoral manifesto, especially in the current global financial crisis.

The regional political and economic powerhouse and current chair of SADC, South Africa, is at a significant juncture in its young democracy. While proponents construe this as a reflection of South Africa's strengthened democratic institutions and vibrancy of democratic electoral competition, this should be viewed cautiously. On the one hand it demonstrates the fault lines of a dominant one party state wherein it sets a precedence, which in the future may not necessarily be underpinned by peaceful power transitions. On the other hand, the dominance and power of the ANC within the legislative assembly overshadows the constitution in that the two-thirds majority that the ruling Party enjoys within the legislature in practice

means that the principles enshrined in the constitution which governs and protects the democratic state are merely formalities and technical processes serving the interests of the ruling Party i.e. no separation between the Party and the State

Given this state of affairs, South Africa's democratic process remains fragile and depending on the performance of the caretaker government over the next several months will determine South Africa's political and economic stability. In addition, there is no guarantee a Zuma Presidency is a likely outcome following the 2009 general elections. Therefore for the moment South Africa's political and economic landscape remains fluid and the deepening socio-economic crises and widening inequalities continue to be the most pressing issues that the current caretaker government and subsequent administration must resolve.

Swaziland

This landlocked country remains the last bastion of autocratic monarchical rule in the region. While attempts are being made to democratize the state, it is being done through a prism of authoritarian rule where opposition parties still remain banned. Two weeks after the Angolan Parliamentary election was held, Swaziland held a farcical election, which received mixed views following the 2008 House of Assembly Elections. As much as the Pan-African Parliament mission overall observed that election was free and fair, the Commonwealth Observer was less enthusiastic about the outcome, especially over the fact that election was contested to the exclusion of opposition political parties. While incidents of voter intimidation were cited, the general assessment of the electoral process in Swaziland could be interpreted as entrenching the monarchy in Swaziland and weakening the prospects of a viable opposition and vibrant parliamentary system from emerging.

It remains clear that Swaziland's democratic transition can only succeed if the dictatorial powers of the King and state institutions are dismantled. Perhaps the irony of situation is that Swaziland is the current Chair of the Organ on Defense Politics and Security - OPDS (as noted above). This organ is critical in upholding the principles of the electoral code and democracy within the region. Therefore, SADC members need to recognize that Swaziland blights regional attempts at engendering a democratic culture and must hold Mbabane accountable to the code of conduct and principles of the OPDS. South Africa

Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean crisis, which has been a regional faux pas in finding a solution, has seen a power sharing deal negotiated in June-July 2008 by SADC's appointed envoy, President Thabo Mbeki, to resolve the political impasse. The deal, which remained fragile with Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the MDC- Tsvangirai faction trying to panel beat the agreement around political power, decision-making issues and cabinet positions, was finally signed by the MDC in January 2009. With the economic situation dire, the wranglings over how much power the political actors will wield in a government of national unity makes the economic reconstruction of the country an arduous process.

Even though the international community has in principle endorsed the negotiated power sharing deal, and have promised reconstruction aid packages to assist in the recovery of Zimbabwe's post conflict economy, it would seem that they are not satisfied unless Mugabe and the ZANU-PF relinquish all control over the Zimbabwean state. In addition they want a firm commitment that there will be an immediate cessation of all intimidation and violence. As such despite the agreement, sanctions against Zimbabwe still remain enforced which continues to exacerbate the economic recovery of Zimbabwe. Therefore, in the interim, while the political actors, try to work together, they will have to ensure that they also satisfy the concerns of the international development partners, not least because any economic reform will be dependent on

massive aid packages from the international partners.

An indication from international donors is that an austere package that deals with hyperinflation and economic stabilization is the first step towards a post conflict recovery in Zimbabwe. It has been indicated that any donor support would require a co-ordinated effort aligned to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness. Nevertheless it is imperative that each donor play to their strength in their development assistance and budgetary support programmes in Zimbabwe. But more importantly donor support, including that from new development partners from the South (like China and India) must complement each other in their assistance packages as the greater need is for social stability.

In the meanwhile, Zimbabwe also faces the issue of reintegration of the economic refugees, particularly from neighbouring countries. The Zimbabwean Diaspora has important role to play in the economic reconstruction of the state given their broad ranging skills that will be critical to the socio-economic development of the country. So too is South Africa and its public and private sector. The role that South Africa will play in Zimbabwe's recovery is significant, particularly as it has both vested political and economic significance for Pretoria's domestic and regional stability. At the other end of the spectrum, South African corporates are well placed and ideally poised to invest in Zimbabwe's economic stabilization as most of these corporates have not completely disinvested from the country. Instead they have ring-fenced their investments and are lying low waiting for the situation to rectify itself. The political settlement is seen as means to this end and most corporate analysts believe that this agreement will indeed create the necessary conditions for Zimbabwe's recovery. But Zimbabwe's political and economic reconstruction is only one aspect of the region's political and economic stability.

Nevertheless, the adoption of the current political settlement that sees Morgan Tsvangirai as the newly installed Prime Minister and Mugabe retaining the Presidency is being hailed by SADC as a solution to the protracted crisis in Zimbabwe, Detractors have been quick to point out that the inclusion of the MDC into the government is merely a cooption as junior partners and not address the plight of ordinary Zimbabweans, which has been made more complicated with some party cadres of the MDC still being detained by state authorities. This seems to indicate that there are certain factions in Zanu-PF that still oppose any power-sharing with MDC. But the real issue is whether MDC and Zanu-PF can work together to restore Zimbabwe's political and economic credibility.

2.1 The Capable State in the Region

But political developments in the region have not reached alarmist proportions. Here it is worth noting that more than half of those members of the African Union signing up for the Peer Review mechanism are in fact members of SADC, making the region the "most peer-review-aligned region on the continent". This should serve as a positive indicator of regional convergence in the direction of good governance. As the table below indicates South Africa is the only country to have completed the process and is currently in the implementation phase.

Table 3: Signatories to the APRM Process

Country	Date of Signature of MoU	Process Started	Current Stage of process
Angola	8-Jul-04	Yes	Preparatory Phase
Botswana			

D.R. Congo	9-Mar-03	Yes	Preparatory Phase
Lesotho	8-Jul-04		
Madagascar			
Malawi	8-Jul-04	Yes	Preparatory Phase
Mauritius	9-Mar-04	Yes	Stage One
Mozambique	9-Mar-04	Yes	Stage One
Namibia			
Seychelles			
South Africa	9-Mar-04	Yes	Stage Five (May 2007)
Swaziland			
Tanzania	8-Jul-04	Yes	Stage One
Zambia	22-Jan-06	Yes	Preparatory Phase
Zimbabwe			

The APRM process must be seen in the context of the World Bank's Capable State Index (CSI). The definition of a capable state is one which ideally 'makes choices and policies' in 'response to public needs' and set[s] up appropriate institutional mechanism[s] within its society, ... bureaucracy and ... polity..' which identifies 'and correct[s] dysfunctionalities that may arise over the manner national aspirations are fulfilled and disputes over its choices'³.

According to Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan⁴ the ten functions of a modern capable state are: ¾ Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence

¾ Administrative control

¾ Management of public finances

¾ Investment in human capital

¾ Delineation of citizenship rights and duties

¾ Provision of infrastructure services

¾ Formation of the market

¾ Management of the state's assets (including environment, natural resources, and cultural assets)

¾ International Relations

¾ Rule of law

This represents for Ghani et al a 'constellation of interrelated functions' which define the capacity of the state to address a cross current of issues relating to poverty reduction, human security and overall development. For them the state's responsibilities are multidimensional in nature, which needs to mitigate against the risks of a low intensity intra-state conflict from emerging. In short for these authors the 19th Century definition of security, which was essentially seen as an external threat, no longer applies to the current setting of the international order. In fact they argue that the more inherent threats to the state are from within its borders, especially after 9/11 where pockets of underdevelopment and acute poverty are considered as becoming seeds for fueling socioeconomic tensions between the governments and its citizens, which could have extra territorial impacts like becoming breeding grounds for terrorist activity. Therefore, as these authors caution 'the failure to perform one or many of these functions leads to the creation and acceleration of a vicious circle which results in the creation of contending centres of power, the multiplication of increasingly contradictory and ineffective decision-making processes, the loss of trust between citizens and state, the de-legitimization of institutions, the disenfranchisement of the citizenry and ultimately the resort to violence'⁵.

But they also advise that the 'building of capable states with substantive institutional reform and

democratization of decision-making, rather than concentrating efforts on rewriting the formal rules of democracy as embodied in elections and constitutions, could actually increase the trust of the citizenry in the practice of democracy. This focus on clearly delineated state functions and achievable, assessable outcomes thus averts the danger of promoting flawed democratic structures without substantive democratization of government institutions and processes⁶.

Based on Ghani et al's assessment of capable states and how they should function, we provide an overview of the capable states' indicators in the region. This is according to the World Bank data which is disaggregated into the following categories: aid and debt relief, business climate, governance and anticorruption, country policy and institutional assessment ratings.

Table 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: Comparison of 2002 and 2006

Country	Overall Rank 2002	Score 2002	Overall Rank 2006	Score 2006
Angola	98	1.7	147	2.2
Botswana	24	6.4	38	5.4
D.R. Congo	168	1.9
Lesotho	84	3.3
Madagascar	98	1.7	94	3.2
Malawi	68	2.9	118	2.7
Mauritius	40	4.5	53	4.7
Mozambique	111	2.8
Namibia	28	5.7	57	4.5
Seychelles	57	4.5
South Africa	36	4.8	43	5.1
Swaziland	84	3.3
Tanzania	71	2.7	94	3.2
Zambia	80	2.6	123	2.6
Zimbabwe	71	2.7	150	2.1

Source: Transparency Corruption Index 2002 and 2007 Note: CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Botswana which is ranked as the least corrupt country regionally and within the continent, has improved on its 2002 score of 6.4. South Africa's also improved on its rating in spite of the internal wranglings surrounding the involvement of high profiled officials in the arms deal scandal. Namibia, however, shows signs of a surprising slip in its performance, which must be monitored carefully for any further declines in the future. Although Mauritius improved marginally on its 2006 score, the pledges it made to pursue rapid ratification of the African Union Convention against corruption at a TI organised event in 2005 have yet to be realised.

The 2007 index also included new comers like the DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles and Swaziland. In as much as most of the overall rankings of member states have increased this is because of the inclusion of more states into the perception survey index.

Overall it would be seem from the above table that the adoption of an anticorruption protocol by the heads of state and governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 2001 has made some significant shifts regionally towards combating corruption amongst member states. Indeed the code of conduct in bringing corrupt officials at border posts or within ministries remains a persistent problem for the region.

Table 5: Overview of Aid to the Region

Country	Net Aid (2004 US\$ millions)			Net Aid				
	From all donors 2005	From DAC Donors 2005	From Multilateral Donors 2005	Share of GDP (%) 2005	Per Capita (%) 2005	Share of Gross Capital formation (%) 2005	Share of imports of goods and services (%) 2005	Share of Central Government Expenditures (%) 2005
Angola	442	258	183	1.3	27.7	17.9	1.1	..
Botswana	71	52	19	0.7	40.2	2.2	0.8	3.2
D.R. Congo	1828	1034	793	25.7	31.8	181.2	34.9	310.3
Lesotho	69	39	30	4.7	38.3	13.4	3.5	27.8
Madagascar	929	322	251	18.4	49.9	81.8	27.2	219.2
Malawi	575	322	251	27.7	44.7	181.3	35	166.2
Mauritius	32	22	10	0.5	25.7	2.2	0.4	3.5
Mozambique	1286	771	513	18.8	65	86.8	25.7	188.8
Namibia	123	99	23	2	60.7	7.3	2.1	8.5
Seychelles	19	8	11	2.6	222.6	21.2	1.2	10.8
South Africa	700	486	213	0.3	14.9	1.6	0.5	1.4
Swaziland	46	20	26	1.8	40.7	9.8	1.1	6.6
Tanzania	1505	871	622	12	39.3	65.8	22	70.2
Zambia	945	836	109	13	81	50.3	31.2	96.8
Zimbabwe	368	179	189	10.8	28.3	64	8.3	39.6

Source: African Development Indicators 2007

On the aid front it would appear that member states of the region remain dependent on donor money. While for countries like Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa aid does not constitute a major share of GDP, for others like the DRC, Malawi, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zambia aid remains a significant proportion of government expenditure. In so far as donors have shifted their financial aid towards budgetary support programmes, most of the economies in the region are handicapped by the following structural weaknesses: small economic bases, which are not diversified; poor tax regimes; lethargic legal and regulatory environment; and an overburdened and overextended bureaucracy. But indications are that with debt relief some member states, like the DRC, would be able to use the money freed from debt service for greater investment in their social spending programmes.

Table 6: Debt Relief in the SADC Region

Country	Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative		Debt Service Relief Committed (US\$ millions) 2006	Completion Point 2006
	Decision Point 2006			
Angola	
Botswana	
D.R. Congo	July 2003	Floating	10,389	
Lesotho	
Madagascar	December 2000	October 2004	1,900	
Malawi	December 2000	Floating	1,000	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	April 2000	September 2001	4,300	
Namibia	
Seychelles	
South Africa	
Swaziland	
Tanzania	April 2000	November 2001	3,000	
Zambia	December 2000	April 2005	3,950	
Zimbabwe	

Source: African Development Indicators 2007

Table 7 below assesses the overall institutional capacity of member states in reference to policies that determine social inclusion and equity. While the table does not provide a fair assessment of how member states are performing with regard to social integration and equity, for those states that are measured it seems that most have improved on their 2005 rating. Angola and the DRC are perhaps two countries where improvements will be noted in the future considering that revenue from Angola's oil receipts could be a stimulus for more investment in its social capital base and with the DRC increasing shifts towards some form of stability after the national elections in 2007. Zimbabwe still remains confronted by the deepening political and economic crises, which has exacerbated the situation through the imposition of sanctions.

Table 7: Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity

Country	Gender Equity	Equity of Public Resource use 2006	Building Human Resources 2006	Social Protection and Labour 2006	Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability	Average ^a 2006
Angola	3	2.5	2.5	2.5	3	2.4
Botswana ^b
D.R. Congo	3	3	3	3	2.5	2.3
Lesotho	4	3	3.5	3	3.5	3.4
Madagascar	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	3.4
Malawi	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4
Mauritius ^b
Mozambique	3.5	3.5	3.5	3	3	3.1

Namibia ^{ab}
Seychelles ^b
South Africa ^{ab}
Swaziland ^b
Tanzania	4	4	4	3.5	3.5	3.8
Zambia	3.5	3.5	3.5	3	3.5	3.8
Zimbabwe	2.5	1.5	2	1.5	2.5	1.9

Source: African Development Indicators 2007 ^a All criteria are weighted equally The rating scale for each indicator ranges from 1(low) to 6 (high) ^b Not an IDA Member

On the economic management side similar trends can be observed. With the exception of Zimbabwe most countries in the region, even those not included in the IDA's capable state assessment have demonstrated progressive economic management. From these measurements it is clear that the institutional capacity of member states have improved towards creating a capable environment for carrying out their macro-economic processes. This is also evident in the structural policies as it relates to trade but in the financial sector and business regulatory environment some member states fair better than others. Even Zimbabwe, in spite of the economic calamity, demonstrates that its structural policies are conducive for doing business. Perhaps this should be interpreted as a positive indication for when political normalcy returns to the country that there will be institutional structures in place to resurrect the ailing economy.

Table 8: Economic Management in the SADC Region

Country	Average ^a 2006	Macroeconomic Management 2006	Fiscal Policy 2006	Debt Policy 2006
Angola	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.0
Botswana ^{ab}
D.R. Congo	3.2	3.5	3.5	2.5
Lesotho	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Madagascar	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.5
Malawi	3.2	3.5	3.0	3.0
Mauritius ^b
Mozambique	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0
Namibia ^{ab}
Seychelles ^b
South Africa ^{ab}
Swaziland ^b
Tanzania	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.0
Zambia	3.7	4.0	3.5	3.5
Zimbabwe	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Source: African Development Indicators 2007 Note: The rating scale for each indicator ranges from 1(low) to 6 (high). ^a All criteria are weighted equally ^b Not an IDA Member

Table 9: Structural Policies in the SADC Region

Country	Average ^a 2006	Trade 2006	Financial Sector 2006	Business regulatory environment 2006
Angola	2.8	4.0	2.5	2.0
Botswana ^b
D.R. Congo	3.0	4.0	2.0	3.0
Lesotho	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.0
Madagascar	3.8	4.0	3.5	4.0
Malawi	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.5
Mauritius ^b
Mozambique	3.5	4.5	3.0	3.0
Namibia ^b
Seychelles ^b
South Africa ^b
Swaziland ^b				..
Tanzania	3.7	4.0	3.5	3.5
Zambia	3.3	4.0	3.0	3.0
Zimbabwe	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.5

Source: African Development Indicators 2007 Note: The rating scale for each indicator ranges from 1(low) to 6 (high).^a
All criteria are weighted equally ^b Not an IDA Member

From the aforementioned tables it becomes apparent that the capacities of most states in the region are not as dire as it is sometimes believed to be. Most member states represent an average assessment which demonstrates that their capacity to advance a capable state is not outside of their reach. As table 10 shows the overall policy and institutional assessment rating for member states taking into consideration economic management, social inclusion and equity, and public sector policy management shows favourable intra state conditions prevailing that can be utilised towards further harnessing and fulfilling the capacity of individual states in enhancing their development programme mandates. In fact it could be argued that such patterns indicate encouraging signs for democratic processes to be strengthened in the region.

Table 10: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Ratings in the SADC Region

Country	CPIA Overall Rating (IDA Resource Allocation Index) ^a 2006
Angola	2.7
Botswana ^b	..
D.R. Congo	2.8
Lesotho	3.5
Madagascar	3.6
Malawi	3.4
Mauritius ^b	..
Mozambique	3.5
Namibia ^b	..
Seychelles ^b	..
South Africa ^b	..
Swaziland ^b	..
Tanzania	3.9

Zambia	3.4
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Source: African Development Indicators 2007 The rating scale for each indicator ranges from 1(low) to 6 (high) ^a All criteria are weighted equally

^b Not an IDA Member

But a caveat should be issued here. While the indicators above provide a satisfactory and positive outlook around the prospects of a capable state emerging in the SADC region, it must not be overlooked that indicators only provide a guide to the trends and should not be interpreted as providing a holistic picture. If the above tables are cross referenced against the effectiveness of governments in member states towards building capability within regional member-states then a much more sobering and dapper overview emerges. This raises significant issues around the capacity and capability of states in delivering on their socio-economic and development programmes. The latter is a moot point but one that remains a hiccup to the consolidation of democracy in the region.

Table 11: Government effectiveness in the SADC Region

Country	Income Category	Government Effectiveness	
		1996	2006
Angola	Low	-1.3	-1.2
Botswana	Upper middle	0.5	0.7
Democratic Republic of Congo	Low	-1.7	-1.6
Lesotho	Low	0.1	-0.3
Madagascar	Low	-1.0	-0.2
Malawi	Low	-0.7	-0.9
Mauritius	Upper Middle	0.6	0.6
Mozambique	Low	-0.7	-0.3
Namibia	Lower Middle	0.3	0.1
Seychelles	Upper Middle	-0.7	-0.1
South Africa	Lower Middle	0.5	0.8
Swaziland	Lower Middle	-0.4	-0.7
Tanzania	Low	-1.2	-0.3
Zambia	Low	-0.8	-0.7
Zimbabwe	Low	0.0	-1.5

Source: African Development Indicators 2007 Rating scale for each criterion ranges from -2.5 (weak performance) to 2.5 (very high performance)

As we move to the next section of this profile, which will provide an in depth analysis around the state of the region we will identify where the threats to regional developments lay and how these can be managed by a more pragmatic development assistance approach.