

UNHEEDED WARNINGS

THE LOST REPORTS
OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE
ON TERRORISM
AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

VOLUME 2
THE PERPETRATORS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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VOLUME 2
THE PERPETRATORS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Edited by

Richard J. Leitner

and

Peter M. Leitner

Crossbow Books
Washington

Unheeded Warnings: The Lost Reports on the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare

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First Edition

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Endorsements

“Richard and Peter Leitner have presented a wealth of information about the long evolution of the Islamic terror threat to the United States that culminated in the attacks of September 11, 2001. *Unheeded Warnings* fills in a large missing piece of the historical record concerning what we knew and when we knew it. They have also preserved the brilliant work of a small group of civil servants and elected officials who saw the gathering storm and sounded the alarm but were routinely ignored by governmental institutions and their leaders.” *Dr. William A. Saxton, Chairman of Citizens for National Security and Chairman of the National Intelligence Conference.*

“When the hand was pointed to the moon some people were looking at the finger! This is what *Unheeded Warnings* wants to emphasize. The collection, presentation, and analysis of important documents from the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare represent a fine example of how intelligence analysis should be performed. As Greek historian Plutarch said, to make no mistakes is not in the power of man, but from their errors and mistakes the wise and good learn wisdom for the future!” *Col. Ioannis Galatas, MD, MC (Army) Head, Department of Asymmetric Threats, Joint Military Intelligence Directorate, Hellenic National Defense General Staff.*

“In *Unheeded Warnings* the Leitners provide us with an invaluable compilation of the Lost Reports of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Readers will no longer be able to dismiss the ubiquitous threat of Islamists and their followers in the United States and abroad. We will only be able to defeat and protect ourselves from the clear and present danger of domestic and foreign Islamist movements when we take the time to study and understand their history, methods, goals, and ideologies. *Unheeded Warnings* provides just that insight without which we remain vulnerable from our ignorance.” *M. Zuhdi Jasser, President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Phoenix, Arizona*

**I must study politics and war that my sons may have
liberty to study mathematics and philosophy.**

**My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy,
geography, natural history, naval architecture,
navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give
their children a right to study painting, poetry, music,
architecture, statuary, tapestry, and porcelain.**

John Adams

In John Adams by David McCullough

“Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing.

It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost.

It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it.

It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. . .

“It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of.

It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement.

It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion – which is usually too late.”

Thomas C. Schelling

Dedication

This book series is dedicated to the selfless, courageous Americans who perished in the service of their nation at the hands of terrorists who dishonored both politics and religion in their pursuit of power.

In particular, we would like to recognize five men who embodied a remarkable spirit and devotion to their fellow countrymen by repeatedly putting themselves in harm's way to defend justice, national security, peace, and the safety of their comrades under the most dangerous circumstances imaginable.

They are Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem, Marine Col. William R. Higgins, the CIA's William F. Buckley, FBI Agent John P. O'Neill, and the State Department's Leamon R. Hunt. All were beloved by their families and respected by their peers. Their deeds, character, and heroism stand as a beacon and inspiration for us all.

Until now, most Americans have been unaware of the efforts of the visionaries and statesmen who worked for over 18 years to document the growing terrorist threat and to alert the nation and the world to the dangers it posed. Those who are most responsible for this vast body of research are the Task Force's longtime director, Yossef Bodansky and its Chief of Staff Vaughn S. Forrest. Rep. Jim Saxton of New Jersey and former Rep. Bill McCollum of Florida played the most instrumental role in ensuring the financial support and endurance of the Task Force.

To these men, we owe a deep debt of gratitude

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OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE
ON TERRORISM
AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Volume 1 – Islamic Terrorism and the West

Volume 2 – The Perpetrators and the Middle East

Volume 3 – The Countries that Harbor

Volume 4 – Outward Expansion: East Asia, the
Balkans, and North Africa

Volume 5 – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following people without whom these volumes might never have found their way into the light of public attention. First and foremost is Dr. J. Michael Waller, whose steadfast intellectual support and material backing were vital to the success of this project. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Miss Erin Carrington for her keen expert eye and tireless spirit, which brought about a well-formatted and technically accurate document. The artistic creativity of Miss Bridget Sweetin found wonderful expression in the cover she skillfully designed.

Unheeded Warnings

Introduction to the Series

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, released a 585-page report chronicling the infamous 2001 attacks and offering 41 recommendations. The Commission listened to the testimony of 160 witnesses during its 12 public hearings, reviewed over 2.5 million pages of documents, and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in 10 countries. The list included senior officials from the Bush and Clinton administrations as well as eight U.S. senators and five U.S. representatives to Congress. The Commission's work was preceded in December 2002 by an 858-page report of a congressional investigation jointly written by the House and Senate Intelligence committees entitled "Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001." These two official documents are viewed as the most comprehensive examinations of the events of 9/11 and the security and intelligence failures that allowed Islamic terrorists to kill over 3,000 innocent Americans.

This book series has been created to supplement the reporting of these two official inquiries. The series contains some 18 years of warning and analysis published within the U.S. Congress by an organization known as the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. During its remarkably long life, the Task Force issued hundreds of reports comprising thousands of pages of warnings and analyses of the growing specter of the Islamist movement, its increasingly violent nature, and its selection of the Western world as its ultimate target. The depth and breadth of the Task Force's analytical efforts were unparalleled, as were its productive capacity and broad product distribution efforts. The Task Force's astonishing knowledge of the gathering storm that finally broke over New York City and Washington on that fateful September morning is represented in these pages.

This is the first time all of these reports have been published in their entirety, and their content helps fill in some of the remaining blanks in the historical record. This collection should aid analysts in

grasping the various ways intelligence collection and policymaking can be performed and combined, as well as in understanding the gradual development of a strategic national security threat. This book series presents the work of the Task Force in its original form. All the available reports relating to the topics covered in the books are included. Nothing has been omitted because of controversial content or incorrect predictions. These reports are not perfect. The staff members were not prophets; their predictions were based on the intelligence they were able to collect themselves and their analysis of that information. They had no preternatural knowledge of what would happen in the future; they simply wrote what they knew and believed and gave recommendations with that understanding. Of course, not everything they predicted unfolded as they imagined. This is the very nature of prediction. The goal is not to prove that the Task Force was always right or that all recent terrorist attacks could have been avoided if only more people had paid attention to the work of the Task Force. The goal of this series is rather to compile this body of primary-source material to give a more complete public record of what information was available concerning terrorism in the years before September 11. The material generated by the Task Force can help increase understanding of terrorism and the culture that motivates it.

The origins of the Task Force extend back to 1981 when activists within the legislative branch formed the Task Force to focus upon combating communist expansion and the cancerous Islamic militancy growing on six continents. At this time, congressmen and their staff members, often drawing from personal experiences in the Vietnam War, drew up innovative approaches to humanitarian and counterinsurgency programs. These pioneering legislative efforts began in El Salvador and included airlifting medical supplies in 1983, 1988, 1989, 1992, and 1993 and supplying prosthetic devices to over 1,600 children crippled by land mines. Programs were also created to equip, train, and deploy field medics with ambulances and helicopters, and police training and administration of justice programs were instituted throughout the country. Following the successes in Central America, humanitarian aid programs for Afghanistan, the Thai/Cambodian border, Chad, and Angola were created. These efforts resulted in the rescue of more than 8,000 Vietnamese refugees from the lingering aftermath of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in 1985 and 1986 and the instituting of economic sanctions against Angola in 1986.

In addition to conducting humanitarian work, the Task Force members were active in passing defense legislation. In 1986, they

authored key parts of the Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, which allowed the FBI to investigate overseas. They amended the definition of terrorism in 1989 to include members and recruiters of terrorist organizations. In 1994, they played a major role in modifying the Defense Authorization Act and the Intelligence Authorization Act. These laws established the National Task Force and Federal Counterterrorism Program. They also allowed for the CIA, the State Department, and the Justice Department to operate jointly on U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and authorized sharing and coordination of counterterrorism information.

It is important to note that this series is a compilation of primary-source material. A primary source is any piece of information that is used for constructing history as an artifact of its time. Primary sources can be works created by someone who witnessed firsthand or was part of the historical events that are being described, such as the Task Force reports. A primary source is not, by definition, more authoritative or accurate than a secondary source. Secondary sources can be subjected to peer review, are well documented, and are often produced through institutions where methodological accuracy is important to the future of the author. A primary source, like a journal entry, may only reflect one person's take on events, which may or may not be truthful, accurate, or complete. The Task Force did pay a great deal of attention to accuracy, and these reports were not journal entries or idle speculation on the issues, but they did not have to pass through any outside editing. However, the nature of the information contained in these reports required a vetting process that was very rigorous on the part of the chairman as well as the staff. The high standards set by the leadership demanded that the staff be able to defend, in detail, the work. These reports were sent to the intelligence community prior to release to committee members for any comment from a national security perspective or critique in any form.

This compilation of reports is perhaps the finest example of open-source intelligence ever assembled, and its accuracy, while not perfect, was far better than the information being disseminated by many others. The Task Force was not an official part of the intelligence community, and its products did not qualify for characterization as finished intelligence. The chairman and the staff readily made that distinction when they stated about their reports: "This is much more than research but less than finished intelligence." While the Task Force did author many classified reports, the vast majority were unclassified, including all those included in this series.

The Task Force helped Congress serve its oversight function over the executive branch of the government. Typically, the executive branch produces all the intelligence that Congress receives to aid in decision-making, and the case of the Task Force was unusual in that it was a legislative branch organization performing intelligence collection and reporting. This allowed Congress to have its own intelligence to compare with what was received from the executive branch and bolstered the amount of intelligence available to the executive branch by offering work done from a different perspective from the typical intelligence community.

From a methodological perspective, the Task Force's style of reporting is remarkable in several ways. First, the analysts actually moved from behind their desks into the real world for intimate observation. They made repeated visits to the areas they were studying and had face-to-face relationships with their sources. They established something known as ground truth in their reporting cycles. Ground truth is the firsthand verification of theory, conjecture, surmise, and hypothesis being applied the situation being viewed. The Task Force did not just filter through intelligence reports and try to pull theories out of the air. Task Force staff members went into Afghanistan and rode with the mujahideen as they fought against the Soviets. They helped the fighters secure the weapons and humanitarian aid they needed and evacuate the seriously wounded. Their emphasis on ground truth was part of the philosophy of focusing not just on what was currently happening in the Islamic world but also on what the underlying motives were for the activity. They put a massive emphasis on root causes rather than the figurative final straw that touched off a conflict. The Task Force focused on the ideologies behind the actions of the cultures it studied, and understanding the potential enemies in such a manner allowed it to predict their actions with some measure of success.

Another interesting aspect of the Task Force's philosophy was the determination to approach every problem with a clear concept of a beginning, middle, and end. This meant adhering to a distinct methodology, consisting of problem definition, analysis and reporting, legislative action, and follow-up – in that order. This holistic approach toward problem solving is noteworthy in government. The legislation passed through subcommittees, committees, the House, the Senate, and executive branch systems on the way to the president's desk. Another critical factor was continuity of personnel and mission focus. While the Task Force experienced some personnel and sponsorship turnover, the

core remained remarkably stable over its 18-year life, as only two chairmen were ever at the helm. That stability and continuity of focus resulted in this prolific body of work. The information contained in this volume represents only a portion of the accomplishments of the little-known organization. Many of the Task Force's greatest achievements are embodied in the aforementioned public laws, including appropriation acts, which enabled and empowered military and civil action in the war on terrorism long before 9/11.

The Task Force did not divulge the identity of its sources unless it was judged to be an absolute necessity. The Task Force staff members were intent on protecting identities because they maintained long-term relationships with their sources and did not want to see them endangered or compromised. Their insistence on protecting their sources caused controversy because they did not include footnotes in the reports. However, the inclusion of such details could readily enable a foreign intelligence service to track down a likely source and neutralize it. They did produce fully referenced versions of their documents, which the chairman reviewed in detail, but these were not released even to other members of Congress on the Task Force.

In creating this primary-source material the Task Force engaged in a sort of intellectual and political-risk taking that is extremely rare in Washington. The members and staff decided early on to allow their information to speak for itself, to provide their reports to the analytical and decision-making communities throughout government and the military, and to do so primarily in an unclassified format. Their reporting was intended to assist decision-makers wherever possible. Their February 10, 1998, report, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge – Myths and Reality," revealed the location of Iraqi-supplied Sudanese chemical weapons production facilities six months before the August 20, 1998, U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile attack on the civilian El-Shifa Pharmaceuticals factory in North Khartoum, Sudan. The same 1998 report described Saddam Hussein's alleged surreptitious transfer of his WMD facilities and materials from Iraq to locations in Sudan, Yemen, and Algeria.

But even as the reports were struggling to find their way to the target audience of executive branch policymakers, the Task Force members were garnering attention in some other circles. It seemed the demographic that followed the work of the Task Force members and staff with the most fervor was precisely the same group that they were following themselves. Islamists involved in terrorist activity took a great deal of interest in the activities of the Task Force and were quick

to counter anything that was issued. Congressmen whose names appeared on the letterhead of the Task Force were barraged with complaints from Islamists in their districts, and accusations flew regarding the staff. Enemies of the Task Force began attempting to make their reports seem illegitimate.

It is important to note who the enemies of the Task Force were. When looking at the history of the group, there are so many accusations and attempts to discredit the people involved, it is vital to examine the attacks within the context of their source. The stir created by the report on Bosnia entitled “Iran’s European Springboard?” was instigated by a letter to the congressional members from Abdurahman Alamoudi, then the executive director of the American Muslim Council (AMC). Alamoudi was hailed as a “moderate” Muslim who had strong connections within Washington. He was embedded in political culture to the point that the AMC once provided talking points for a syndicated newspaper column authored by then first lady Hillary Clinton. After the tragedy of September 11, Alamoudi sat with George W. Bush at a prayer service. The first of four members to resign from the Task Force over this issue, a former co-chairman of the committee, wrote a letter to Alamoudi with the intent of distancing himself from the Task Force and essentially apologizing to Alamoudi. Now, the problem with this blight upon the record of the Task Force is the character of the person who caused the uproar in the first place, Alamoudi. While at the time he was a respected Islamic leader in Washington, he is no longer so widely esteemed.

During the summer of 2004, Alamoudi signed a plea agreement in which he admitted that he engaged in illegal monetary transactions, filed false tax returns, lied about his involvement with numerous radical and terrorist organizations, helped organize the attempted assassination of Saudi crown prince Abdullah, and lied about his connection to Hamas leader and Specially Designated Terrorist Mousa Abu Marzook, as well as various other crimes. Alamoudi stands to receive up to 23 years in prison for his crimes, in addition to forfeiting \$1.25 million he illicitly received from the Libyan government, paying six years’ worth of back taxes and penalties, losing his U.S. citizenship, and possibly being deported and not allowed back into America. The Task Force lost four congressional members and endured a great deal of negative publicity over the Bosnia report. This incident damaged its credibility and made other congressmen less likely to want to join, thus weakening it. Thinking back on the Task Force, many who were familiar with it will remember the trouble it faced over this issue and that some

respected congressmen abandoned the Task Force because of it, but it is important that they remember who brought on the wave of controversy. Many will most likely remember only that the Task Force lost credibility, forgetting who discredited it and what his logical motivations would have been to do so.

A related group that assaulted the integrity of the Task Force and its members was the United Association of Studies and Research (UASR). On the UASR website, a book review page attacks specific Task Force members, claims that the Task Force has been the agency most “ferocious in its attacks on Islamism,” and questions the objectivity of the men who authored the reports. But it might be more important to question the objectivity of UASR, a think tank currently based just outside Washington, D.C., in Springfield, Virginia. The organization was founded in 1989 by Marzook and has been accused in government documents of being a covert branch of Hamas. Mohammad Salah, an early member of UASR, was arrested in Israel on charges of belonging to Hamas and illegally passing money to Hamas. When he was being questioned by Israeli authorities, he named UASR as the political headquarters of Hamas in the United States and stated that Ahmed Yousef, the current head of the institute, was the leader of Hamas in America. Information found on Salah’s laptop revealed links between Hamas and al Qaeda.

The most direct retaliation against a staff member, Yossef Bodansky, occurred after the 1993 publication of his book entitled *Target America: Terrorism in the U.S. Today*. The book warned that the World Trade Center bombing was only the beginning of a rash of terrorist activity against the United States and the West. Although comments on the back cover of the book stated, “This is a book no one can afford to ignore,” many did just that, but not the terrorists. In May of 1994, a book was published by Quranic Open University Inc. and Pakistan Foundation for Strategic Studies in direct response to *Target America*. This tome was entitled *Target Islam: Exposing the Malicious Conspiracy of the Zionists Against the World of Islam and Prominent Muslim Leaders*. *Target Islam* describes Task Force members as part of a villainous Zionist conspiracy “to enslave the world.” It accuses the staff member who authored the first book of being an Israeli Mossad agent. The entire book is essentially a contrived diatribe that attempts to divert negative attention from Islamists to Jews.

The first sign of the illegitimacy of the “university” is the fact that one of the authors of this book, Dr. Mrs. Suhir A. Ahmad, as she is listed on the cover, was awarded the “Dr.” in front of her name from

Quranic Open University, and her thesis was this very book. The presence of two other authors suggests that some material was added to her thesis before it was published as it is, but the validity of any university that would accept a work described by the author herself as “an exposé of “Zionist-Israeli conspiracies” to “maliciously link American Muslim organizations and individuals” with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 as a doctoral thesis has to be questioned. But the legitimacy of the education provided is only the beginning of the problems with accepting Quranic Open University as a legitimate source of information. The man behind the university is Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Jilani. He is also the leader of the known terrorist organization Jamaat-al-Fuqra. Fuqra members have been suspected, charged, and convicted of many crimes. including bombings, murders, assassinations, and theft. During one investigation, a storage locker was raided in Colorado Springs, and evidence linked to Fuqra was discovered. All manner of guns and explosives and bomb parts were found, but the weapons are not the most telling discovery. In the same locker, police found blank birth certificates, Social Security cards, and sets of driver’s licenses that had the same pictures but multiple names. And most important in terms of differentiating the supplies as terrorist equipment rather than the tools of any other type of criminal organization, they found a large picture of Sheikh Umar Abd-al Rahman, also known as “the blind Sheikh” who was later convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and target practice silhouettes labeled “Zionist Pig,” “Delta Team,” “SAS,” and “FBI Anti-Terrorist Team.” They also found a four-page handwritten plan to murder a rival imam, Rashad Khalifah, in Tucson, Arizona. Khalifah was stabbed 19 times a week later, murdered in the exact fashion described in the plan. Two Fuqra members were charged with conspiracy to commit murder, but both men jumped bail and fled, to be caught again years later.

For any who doubt that there is any positive connection that Jilani used the university as a Fuqra front, a recruitment video was seized in 1992 in which Jilani pronounces, “We give highly specialized training in guerrilla warfare... We are at present establishing training camps... You can easily reach us at Quranic Open University offices in upstate New York or in Canada or in Michigan or in South Carolina or in Pakistan.” There are several rural communes around America that serve as outposts to this organization. They are created under the auspices of Quranic Open University and the Muslims of the Americas. It was at two such compounds, in Virginia and South Carolina, that the two men convicted in the murder of the Tucson imam were eventually found.

And the list of “distinguished” enemies goes on. Even in the 1980s, the Task Force was already under attack. Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a University of South Florida computer science professor and Islamic activist, demanded to see the Task Force chairman. He told the congressman that his chief of staff was a danger to his career, and he was perhaps the first to accuse another staffer of being a Mossad agent. Al-Arian recommended that it was in the congressman’s best interest to fire these “dangerous” staff members. In the years since this incident, Al-Arian has been in the news quite a bit. There was a big controversy when USF attempted to fire Al-Arian after a September 2001 appearance on *The O’Reilly Factor* generated much public backlash, as the school cited questionable reasons for firing him, and a battle over freedom of speech and academic freedom ensued. Many interest groups have defended Al-Arian, claiming that firing him sets a dangerous precedent for professors, inhibiting them from speaking their minds openly. He ended up being placed on paid leave until he was finally fired in 2003, following his indictment on 50 counts of conspiracy, racketeering, and material support for terrorism. He is allegedly the leader of the American arm of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The worldwide leader of the terrorist organization, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, worked with Al-Arian in two of the organizations the former computer science professor started, the World and Islam Studies Enterprise and the Islamic Committee for Palestine, during his time as an adjunct Middle East studies professor at USF before he was put in charge of the jihad and became a specially designated terrorist.

Despite all the adversity it faced, the Task Force was able to endure for 18 years, and in that time it produced a veritable mountain of information. This book series contains the available portion of that information relating specifically to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. There is much overlap in terms of which category could have been included, but decisions had to be made. The series is composed of five volumes. The first book contains somewhat general information about Islamic terrorism and material relating to the Western world. The second focuses on terrorist groups and individuals and activity in the Middle East. The third relates to the major countries that harbor or once harbored terrorists: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The fourth book is the final volume on terrorism and deals with terrorist activity in East Asia, the Balkans, and North Africa. The fifth centers on weapons of mass destruction. Together they provide a wealth of material on the subjects they cover, as well as an accurate

demonstration of the type of work that the Task Force produced during its long existence.

A note on spelling

When these reports were created, they underwent numerous edits from a variety of different people. Many of the names of people and organizations mentioned in these reports are originally in Arabic and thus have no single correct spelling in English. Some of the different editors used varying spellings of the same names throughout the reports, and while some have been corrected, inconsistencies still exist. Bear in mind that the names are simply transliterated, so two names that appear to be pronounced similarly are probably the same. For example, *HizbAllah* and *Hezbollah* refer to the same organization, and *Sheikh* and *Shaikh* are the same title.

Ordering of the reports

Within their respective categories, the reports are generally arranged chronologically. It is only generally because a number of the reports were undated. Some of these were inserted into the chronology when they were clearly from a period between two other reports, but most simply follow the dated reports at the end of the section.

These papers may not necessarily reflect the views of all the members of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. They are intended to provoke discussion and debate.

Richard J. Leitner and Peter M. Leitner, September 2008

Introduction to Volume 2

The Perpetrators and the Middle East

This volume contains information on terrorist groups and individuals that was reported by the Task Force, as well as information on terrorist activity in the Middle East that is not necessarily country-specific. Most of the information that deals particularly with a major terrorist harboring nation is included in the third book. This book includes information on specific terrorists, and terrorist groups based outside the United States. If a report is more focused on an individual than the country in which he operates, it is found in this book. The section on the Middle East contains reports that cover the entire region, as well as reports relating to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Lebanon and other countries that did not have enough work done about them to merit a full section to describe them.

“A Brief Dramatis Personae of Prominent Figures in Islamist Terrorism” is, as its title suggests a list of notable individuals who were deeply involved in terrorist activity when the report was released in 1993. There is also a report from the late-nineties, which describes Usama bin Laden’s call to jihad and how it could endanger U.S. soldiers and citizens in the Middle East and elsewhere. It states that the bombing of the al-Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia was barely the beginning of bin Laden’s jihad against America. There is also a series of reports included about the Bank of Commerce and Credit International and the corruption and terrorist involvement of that organization.

“The Long Fuse – One Year After the Gulf War” talks about the lingering effects of Operation Desert Storm and how the war was not a total victory for the United States, because of the precedents it set and the culture it helped create. The later reports in this section focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the issues surrounding it. One report describes Yassir Arafat’s under-the-table support of terrorist activities.

SECTION 1

TERRORIST GROUPS AND LEADERS



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Sheikh Obeid's Ideology

Before his capture by Israel, Sheikh Abdel Karim Obeid was the religious-military commander of the Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. He is one of the young militant clergymen who were sent to southern Lebanon in early-1985 in order to organize the local militant Shi'ite forces into a major power in the wake of the anticipated and imminent Israeli withdrawal. At first, Sheikh Obeid took over the Hezbollah force in Jibshit, the most important of three local centers in the south. The position there had been vacated in February 1984 following the assassination of Sheikh Raghieb Harb. Since then, Sheikh Obeid has established himself as the Hezbollah's religious-military authority and senior commander in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's violent quest for power in southern Lebanon, characterized by terrorism and indiscriminate violence against Israelis, Palestinians and Lebanese of all religions, is conducted in accordance with a well-defined doctrine. On February 16, 1985, the international headquarters of Hezbollah in Tehran published an Open Letter Addressed by Hezbollah to the Oppressed/Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World, which constitutes their declared doctrine and outlines the organization's objective.

Hezbollah considers the U.S. to be the force behind all the catastrophes of the Islamic World and therefore their primary enemy

saying, “We are moving in the direction of fighting the roots of vice and the first root of vice is America. All the endeavors to drag us into marginal action will be futile when compared with the confrontation with the United States.”

The immediate objective of Hezbollah in Lebanon is the establishment of an Islamic state that will spearhead the struggle for Islamic justice throughout the Middle East and the world as a whole. Towards this end, the most important results that the ongoing confrontation and Holy War in Lebanon should deliver are:

- “Israel's final departure from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.
- “The final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country.”

Although Hezbollah advocates the establishment of an Islamic state in which the practice of all religions will be permitted, they insist on carrying out a severe revenge against the Maronite Christians because of their cooperation with Israel and the U.S.

The intensity of the struggle against Israel is a derivative of the Hezbollah's commitment to confronting the U.S. Hezbollah considers Israel to be “the American spearhead in our Islamic world,” and that this relationship determines the uncompromising attitude toward a decisive final solution to the Zionist problem.

Our struggle with usurping Israel emanates from an ideological and historical awareness that this Zionist entity is aggressive in its origins and structure and is built on usurped land and at the expense of the rights of a Muslim people. Therefore, our confrontation of this entity must end with its obliteration from existence. This is why we do not recognize any ceasefire agreement, any truce, or any separate or nonseparate peace treaty with it.

Negotiations with Israel and the U.S., even those on the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, are considered sacrilegious and treacherous by Hezbollah:

We add that the Islamic resistance, which declared its refusal to abide by any results emanating from the negotiations, reaffirms that the struggle will continue until the Zionists withdraw from the occupied territories as a prelude to their obliteration from existence.

Hezbollah emphasizes that their struggle in southern Lebanon is an integral component of a wider struggle of global proportions against the U.S. For this struggle to succeed, there should be a cooperation of all the anti-imperialist forces based on the unity of objectives and the commonality of their enemy.

We strongly urge on all the oppressed of the world the need to form an international front that encompasses all their liberation movements so that they may establish full and comprehensive coordination among these movements in order to achieve effectiveness in their activity and to focus on their enemies' weak points.

This approach opened the door for the growing cooperation between Hezbollah and the USSR and its allies and proxies. Hezbollah braces for a long and arduous struggle in which “we will endure until Allah issues his Judgment on us and on the oppressors.” In such a divine struggle – a Jihad – there can be no compromises. Moreover, in Jihad, the lives of individuals, both Hezbollah and especially their victims, are meaningless.

Yossef Bodansky



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
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A Question of Trust

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One leader – Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar – symbolizes the complexity and Byzantine subterfuges of the situation in Southwest Asia. For the CIA and the ISI, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar has been and is the Jihad and his organization, Hezb-i-Islami, has been and is the mujahideen. Since 1980, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hezb-i-Islami has received most of the U.S. military, financial and humanitarian assistance given to the entire Afghan resistance. While Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, might have had its own reasons for backing this policy toward Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, the CIA had no reason other than ISI's insistence. Moreover, the flow of U.S. support for Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar continued even after more shadowy aspects of his life and career became known. This, combined with the growing involvement of Hezb-i-Islami in fratricidal fighting against other resistance groups, its close and growing cooperation with both Teheran and Kabul, and its active participation in anti-U.S. international terrorism, all seemed to have had little or no effect on the delivery of CIA assistance.

In order to fully comprehend the implications of this case, one needs to be familiar with the record of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and his Hezb-i-Islami. Gulbaddin's personal history on its own should have

raised doubts as to his claim for legitimacy and leadership. The operational record of Hezb-i-Islami, and especially the accumulating evidence of attacks on other mujahideen forces and innocent civilians, should have raised the alarm. Gulbaddin's personal involvement with the highest echelons of the Khomeini regime and the ensuing cooperation of Gulbaddin's men in anti-U.S. international terrorism should have made him ineligible for any U.S. assistance, let alone the bulk of it. Yet, ISI and the CIA steadfastly shielded, promoted and propped their man.

With these facts at hand, one is left with some disturbing questions as to the provision of U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance. Some answers, no less disturbing, are provided below. Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's biography and the combat record of his Hezb-i-Islami, the factors most directly affecting the war in Afghanistan, are provided first.

Then his relations with Khomeini's Iran and the USSR are described next, and finally, some observations and possible explanations as to why the CIA has persisted in its support for Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar are provided.

Favorite Son

Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was born around 1948-1950. He is a Kharruti Pushtun from Baghlan Province in northern Afghanistan, where the Pushtuns are a discriminated minority. The activists from these regions sought to compensate for their Pushtunness by being politically extremist, a phenomenon not unlike the rise of Christian Arabs, like the PFLP's George Habbash, in Middle East extremist politics.

Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar arrived in Kabul in the late-1960s as one of the young activists sent from the countryside for advance secular studies. He considered a military career as the most expedient way to the top. Soon afterwards, he was accepted to the Military Academy in Kabul. It was not long before he became actively involved in radical leftist politics and conspiratorial activities. At this point, he was associated with a group of communist officers and cadets who would eventually emerge as the military wing of the Parcham. Shortly afterwards, Gulbaddin was expelled from the Military Academy for alleged homosexual behavior after he had been caught having relations with another male in the dorms.

Gulbaddin then transferred to the Kabul Technical University. As an engineering student, his academic success was minimal. However, while there, he remained an active member of the PDPA-Parcham, and on their behalf, he became involved in conspiratorial politics, including the violent disruption of meetings of Islamist fundamentalists and the Moslem Brotherhood. As a result of his increasingly violent and conspiratorial activities, Gulbaddin was finally expelled from the Kabul Technical University. All during this time, the Parcham had maintained an intimate relationship with the KGB rezidentura operating out of the Soviet Embassy and consequently the young radical did not escape notice.

During 1969-70, as a clear reflection of the PDPA's trust in him, Gulbaddin was ordered to penetrate a cell of the Moslem Brotherhood in Kabul. Many of the young zealots of the day moved from one extreme political movement to another, and Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was a prime candidate to make just such a move. Indeed, he apparently became convinced of the righteousness of the Moslem Brotherhood school of Islam during this period, and when he surfaced as a militant refugee in Pakistan in 1973, he claimed to have become a devout Muslim.

Prior to that, however, in 1972, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was arrested in Afghanistan for the assassination of a Maoist activist. The initial investigation by AGSA, the Afghan secret police, attributed the assassination to PDPA activists. However, subsequent criminal investigation led to Hekmatiyar, at that time already an Ikhwan activist. In the end, there was nothing in the results of the investigation to indicate that the assassination was not motivated by the PDPA as it fit closely with the growing volume of political violence conducted by the communists. Indeed, former Afghan security and intelligence officers emphasize that in the early-1970s, the entire Islamist movement had already been infiltrated by the communists' deep-penetration agents for the last 15-20 years. A former AGSA colonel believes that Gulbaddin assassinated for Parcham and then pretended the killing was an act of the Moslem Brotherhood in order to deflect attention and suspicion away from the communists.

In 1974, already in Pakistan, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was selected by ISI, under the orders of the then Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to train for a planned insurrection against Afghan President Daud. Hekmatiyar was trained by the Pakistani security services in 1975-76. At that time, Pakistani officials described him as a cunning, ruthless and power hungry man who would do anything to remain at

the top. In the event, he was imposed upon the emerging insurgent groups in the Panjsher Valley as the only source for Pakistani weapons and financial support. In point of fact, ISI considered him their man, a totally controlled agent. However, in the end, insurrection collapsed in 1976 for lack of popular support.

It was not until the late-1970s then, that Gulbaddin established his leadership over the Hezb-i-Islami. Although young and lacking formal Islamic credentials, he became leader following a series of unexplained deaths of the elders and veteran commanders of the organization. Many of the resistance commanders still believe that a number of the elders were assassinated in order to pave the way for the rise of Gulbaddin.

When Pakistan resumed its support for the Afghan Jihad following the 1978 communist revolution in Kabul, ISI recommended that they back Gulbaddin because he was completely under their control, or so they thought. All during this time, Gulbaddin maintained close relations with the Afghan intelligence including the Soviet advisers. In the meantime, in 1978-1979, many Afghan army officers repeatedly tried to organize military coups to topple the PDPA-Khalq regime. The most important of these was an attempt in the summer of 1978 to capitalize on the chaos of the anticipated KGB-supported Eid Conspiracy, and the preparations for an all-out rebellion of Muslim army officers in Kabul, Qandahar and Herat in the spring of 1979. Both attempts were crushed early on because the communists had excellent advance information. Many participants in those events who are currently with the resistance still continue to insist that whenever their representatives contacted Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar for coordination, assistance or supply of weapons, they were immediately betrayed to the Kabul security authorities. There are at least 3 independent sources, including a senior KhAD case officer who defected in 1979, who confirm that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was indeed the source that provided the data about the coups and the identities of the conspirators.

Gulbaddin, in the meantime, continued to enjoy special treatment from the Soviets. During 1980-1982, the KGB-KhAD initiated major efforts to assassinate the leaders of the various resistance organizations. A KhAD senior officer, who would eventually defect, was ordered to arrange the assassination of all the resistance leaders except for Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. The KGB advisers ordered him explicitly not to touch Gulbaddin. Another KhAD officer not only confirmed this event, but added at least two additional cases in which raids against, or assassinations of, the resistance leaders were discussed in the presence of Soviet KGB advisors and Gulbaddin was ruled out as an objective.

However, during this time, Soviet-DRA propaganda continued to portray Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar as the archenemy of Afghanistan. This relentless public relations campaign contributed significantly to publicizing him throughout the region, and particularly emphasized his anti-Communist credentials.

Since the escalation of the fighting inside Afghanistan in 1979, the main fighting carried out by Hezb-i-Islami was against other resistance groups. Indeed, as Commander Addul-Haq observed, "Gulbaddin's problem is that he kills more mujahideen than Soviets." By 1989, some 80% of the resistance infighting inside Afghanistan involved Gulbaddin's men. This infighting was not only for local domination and access to resources, but also in order to contain developing resistance forces that could have caused trouble to local DRA forces later on.

Beginning in 1980, resistance forces in the Maidan area (northern Wardak province, west of Kabul) were unable to ambush convoys because of fear of retribution by Gulbaddin's forces. When internal fighting exploded in Maidan in 1982-83, Gulbaddin's forces received ammunition trucks, artillery and air support from DRA forces, and DRA fire control officers operated with Hezb-i-Islami and directed air and artillery strikes against other mujahideen groups by radio. The Maidan fighting remains among the heaviest inter-resistance clashes to have taken place in Afghanistan to-date.

Similarly, during the 1982 fighting in the Hazarajat, Gulbaddin concentrated the largest resistance force assembled to that time. He then used them to crush the Shiite resistance groups hostile to Khomeini's representatives and in the fierce battles that followed, there were thousands of casualties primarily among the civilians. Since 1983, Hezb-i-Islami forces operated as the local DRA militia in Maidan, the Herat area and the Hazarajat.

Hezb-i-Islami forces also participated in the siege on Panjsher. Indeed, the role of Hezb-i-Islami in the 1984 Panjsher Valley fighting was a further indication of the true loyalties of its leadership. Following an agreement between Massud and a local Hezb-i-Islami commander in the Shomali area, Gulbaddin sent a new commander, Niazi, to take over the local forces. Soon afterwards, Niazi was seen entering and leaving Baghran Air Base. Only after the Soviets bombed Gulbaddin's forces north of the Panjsher Valley, did some of the local commanders decided unilaterally to side with Massud. Faced with the possibility of a massive defection of his forces in northeastern Afghanistan, Gulbaddin announced his intention to join the fight, and later claimed grossly inflated achievements.

In reality, forces loyal to Gulbaddin continued to fight Massud and prevent the free movement of his forces from the Panjsher to adjoining valleys. Throughout the Soviet-DRA offensives, Hezb-i-Islami forces blocked the only resupply road "in the hands of the resistance" through the Paghman valley and refused to allow Jamiat-i-Islami to transfer supplies to the Panjsher.

In the meantime, in the winter of 1987-88, a coalition of Islamist mujahideen led by a Hezb-i-Islami commander fought to isolate the northern provinces. As a result, in the fall of 1987, the local commanders, including Ahmad Shah Massud, found themselves isolated from Pakistan and Peshawar and declared their independence. The reaction and retribution of the Peshawar establishment in reaction to these events was swift. Having declared their independence, these commanders found their support in Peshawar and their access to their Party leaders vanishing rapidly. Moreover, because of the closing of the Northern Route by snow until the end of June 1988, the Peshawar based Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan found it expedient to use it as an excuse for retributions against commanders inside.

Later, a joint force of local mujahideen forces led by Mulawi Yanous of Sayyaf's Etehad Islami and Commander Saidanni of Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatiyar) and the WAD commander in Fayzabad was established to destabilize the genuine resistance forces in the area. Whenever possible, raids were conducted by WAD-troops and mujahideen against local resistance strongholds. Special effort was made to push the independent commanders to depend on Iran for outside support. Pro-Iranian organizations, especially Hekmatiyar's own Jundullah (see below), Mustafazin, the Afghan Pasdaran and various Shiite-Maoist groups were willing to act as go-between and channel supplies and support for the commanders inside the valleys in return for a share of power. Most of these supplies were either betrayed to the KGB-WAD, or arrived with a demand for a localized cease-fire. Consequently, by the spring of 1988, the resistance in northern Afghanistan was largely paralyzed.

For a long time, Hezb-i-Islami's forces seemed to be the only resistance forces that could travel freely and unmolested when in close proximity to Soviet and DRA positions. They also seemed able to camp, with open fires burning, for the night in close proximity to Soviet outposts without being attacked. In fact since 1986, Hezb-i-Islami forces in northeast Afghanistan, and especially in Badakhshan Province, openly cooperated with the local KhAD forces. That same year, Gulbaddin forces, in close cooperation with the KhAD, raided and

attacked other resistance forces and Western doctors and humanitarian aid workers, effectively destroying the medical infrastructure in the area. Supply caravans full of medical equipment were seized by Hezb-i-Islami and stored in the KhAD encampments in Fayzabad before it was distributed between the KhAD and Gulbaddin's commanders.

In late-August 1988, the resistance attacked Qunduz two weeks after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from the area. A hidden Soviet force, which had been concealed in the area, then spearheaded the swift counter-attack for the recapture of the city from the resistance. Hezb-i-Islami's local forces actively participated in this Soviet-led assault and re-established the presence of the Soviet-DRA garrison in Kunduz. Since then, Hezb-i-Islami attacks on other resistance forces in the area, including the betraying of commanders and weapon caches to the KhAD/WAD, still continue.

In mid-1988, under direct and specific order from Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, Hezb-i-Islami forces in northeast Afghanistan launched a massive purge and terror campaign against other resistance forces. Ahmad Shah Massud and his Nazar Surah were the primary objectives of this campaign. The first wave of purges culminated in September 1988, with the assassination of Ismail Taraq, the Nazar Surah's senior commander for Laghman Province, during what was supposed to be a preparatory meeting with Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. Assassinations and infighting continued into the harsh winter, stopped briefly, and were resumed in early 1989. In many cases, mujahideen commanders captured by Hezb-i-Islami were handed over to local WAD officers. In other cases, Gulbaddin's men led raids on sanctuaries and caravans of other resistance forces in the area.

The carnage reached an unprecedented peak right after Massud tried to negotiate a truce in late June 1989. In early-July, returning from a meeting, eight of Massud's leading senior commanders, including such notables as Sayed Hussein, Mullah Woodud and Sayed Daoud, and 28 of their senior officers were brutally assassinated by a group of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hezb-i-Islami. Only 4-5 of these mujahideen were killed in the Hezb-i-Islami ambush. The rest were captured alive. After radio consultation between Basherai Chaiob, Hezb-i-Islami's commander for Takhar Province, and Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, (communications monitored by, and known to, Pakistan's ISI,) the rest of the captured mujahideen commanders were assassinated in cold blood. Some of them were first tortured, having their eyes gouged with knives and their sex organs cut, while others were shot in the back after being told that they could go. Heavy fighting between Nazar Shurah

and Hezb-i-Islami forces flared up immediately after this and continued until the fall.

If ISI only tacitly approved the initial assassinations, the next escalatory phase in the fight between Ahmad Shah Massud and Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was actively supported by it. In early-1988, Massud refused to submit to the tight supervision and control exercised by ISI. He also refused to recognize the local Hezb-i-Islami commanders as his equals. Consequently, the ISI completely stopped the supply of military assistance Massud's forces had been getting both directly and through Jamiat-i-Islami. Having received no weapons and ammunition for more than a year, Massud used Nazar Shurah money (derived from taxing convoy traffic and the export of gems and precious stones) to purchase a year's worth of supplies, weapons and ammunition in the Pakistani black market.

In early-November 1989, the supplies were loaded on five heavy trucks and driven to Garam-Chashma near the Afghan-Pakistani border and were then shipped into Afghanistan. The trucks arrived on the evening of the 14th and parked next to two major Jamiat-i-Islami dumps. All five trucks exploded simultaneously a short time afterward, touching off a series of secondary explosions that continued for several hours. At least 40 mujahideen were killed in the blast and several hundred more were wounded. By the time the fires were put out, both dumps were completely destroyed. An initial investigation by the resistance and Pakistani security authorities subsequently pointed to collusion between the local Hezb-i-Islami commander and WAD operatives. Indeed, the neutralization of Massud as a local power, it had been well known, was and remained a common goal of both organizations and that both had cooperated in this area.

In any event, Nazar Shurah had planned to push the supplies into Afghanistan at the last possible moment, right after the first snows had fallen. Under such conditions, subsequent snowfall would have severely hampered the DRA's ability to react to the move. As a result of the destruction of the ammunition, the resistance was rendered incapable of supplying the northern provinces anytime before May 1990. By that time, the offensive will be vulnerable to interdiction, and moreover, by the time the ammunition is properly distributed, the fighting season will almost be over.

In the meantime, as the resistance's political activities in Peshawar increased toward the formation of the Afghan Interim Government (in itself meaningless paper entity), Hezb-i-Islami forces intensified their assassination campaign of potential and alleged contenders to

Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's leadership. Some of these assassinations were carried out in cooperation with the KGB-WAD.

One of the most significant of these assassinations was that of Professor Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh. Majrooh was one of the leading Afghan intellectuals in exile in Peshawar, whose Afghan Information Center meticulously collected data on the conduct of the war.

Moreover, he was a strong advocate of moderate Afghan nationalism who could have played a major role in any resistance-dominated secular government in Afghanistan. He was assassinated on 11 February 1988 by Hezb-i-Islami and a SPETSNAZ agent operating in their midst. A group of "professional killers," known to be part of Hekmatiyar's own personal guard force, opened fire on Majrooh with their AK-47s. When he collapsed on the street, their commander stepped forward and assured the kill with a single bullet to the head from a 9mm handgun. The assassins then melted into the city never to reappear. Majrooh's assassination was the first in a wave of ongoing murders against other secular intellectuals in which members of Afghanistan's exiled elite were systematically killed.

Killed also were key commanders perceived to be challenging Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. Sometimes, the motive was simple revenge. This was the case of Commander Haji Abdul Latief, a prominent NIFA commander in the Qandahar area, who was poisoned on 7 August 1989 by two of his lieutenants acting on behalf of Hekmatiyar. After the collapse of the resistance in the Qandahar area, Haji Baba, as he was known to his men, was the only commander to remain in the area and continue the fight. He barely survived the Soviet-Baluchi offensive in 1987, but in late-1988 he was close to liberating Qandahar by building a Pushtun tribal coalition and negotiating surrender with the city's governor. Once these negotiations became known in Islamabad, ISI rushed Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and a force of 1,500 Islamists under ISI's direct control of the city, in order to install Hezb-i-Islami as the winner. Fearing the Islamists, both the governor and the local Pushtun tribes, rallied by Ismat Muslim, returned to the fold of the DRA and defeated the ISI force. Gulbaddin could not forgive or forget this and subsequently ordered the assassination. After the assassination, the resistance in the Qandahar area virtually ceased to exist.

Former allies suspected of having doubts about Hekmatiyar's leadership have also been eliminated in growing numbers. One of these was Commander Kochi Sangardost, the leader of a Kochi Maidani tribal force associated with the Sayyaf Etehad Islami. He was assassinated by commander Abdul Ahmad of Hezb-i-Islami, on 8

September 1989, in an ambush during a meeting to discuss common strategy. The immediate excuse for the assassination was a dispute over the control over roads leading from Maidan to the Qandahar area. Back in 1983, Kochi Sangardost had been a close ally of the local Hezb-i-Islami forces and had fought on their side to take the Province from the Harakat Mohammadi forces. DRA forces actively assisted the Hezb-i-Islami and, after the fighting was over, the Hezb-i-Islami forces became the province's militia on behalf of Kabul. In 1989, Sangardost tried to establish connection with Peshawar in order to balance the extent of Hezb-i-Islami's cooperation with Kabul. He was subsequently killed on specific orders from Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar.

It should also be noted that the assassination of resistance commanders and attacks on resistance forces and encampments both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan by Hezb-i-Islami forces still continues.

Between Teheran and Moscow

While enjoying massive CIA support, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar developed close cooperation with Khomeini's Iran. Consequently, his forces played a central role in the development of anti-U.S. international terrorism led from Iran and actively supported by the USSR.

In the meantime, the KGB's ability to influence and manipulate the Afghan Islamist resistance received a major boost in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The cooperation between Afghan Islamists and the Iranians became extremely close in 1980 when Abbas Zamani became the Iranian ambassador to Islamabad. Under the name, Abu-Sharief, Zamani had been involved in overseas terrorist operations for Yassir Arafat's al-Fath' and especially Black September during the 1970s. Later, he supervised PLO support for the organization, and arranged the training and equipping of the Pasdaran commandoes, the most extremist wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. After that, he returned to Teheran via Afghanistan in late-1978 with several Palestinian terrorists, many of his students and a large quantity of weapons. Zamani's forces, in due course, were to play a major role in fomenting upheaval in Teheran.

Abbas Zamani had been recruited by the KGB while serving with Black September and had remained a dedicated agent. When in Islamabad, Zamani spent most of his time organizing a close cooperation between Iranian and Afghan Islamist radicals. He also coordinated the transfer of funds, weapons and trainees between Iran

and the mujahideen camps in Pakistan. Some of these transfers were conducted across Afghanistan with the full knowledge and cooperation of the KGB-KhAD. Eventually, Zamani was quietly recalled after his role in the fomenting of Afghan-Pakistani Islamist terrorism and Sunni-Shiite rivalries was exposed. Back in Teheran, he became Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence and also senior Soviet agent in Teheran. Nevertheless, Zamani was eventually betrayed by the KGB after 1983 as part of the opening of a new era in Soviet-Iranian strategic cooperation that ultimately lead to the signing of the new Soviet-Iranian Treaty in 1989.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Zamani's legacy still endures. In the early-1980s, as a direct result of Zamani's efforts, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar reached a special agreement with Ayatollah Khomeini on close cooperation in the spread of radical Islam. Consequently, Gulbaddin's followers in the refugee camps in Iran and the western provinces of Afghanistan were organized into a new Sunni organization called Jundullah. A Soviet agent named Mohammad Mussavi-Khoiniha organized training facilities in IRGC camps near Mashhad. The Afghan graduates of these facilities were then sent to acquire combat experience at the Iraqi front, particularly in Kurdistan, where they gained valuable experience in mountain fighting. The most promising Jundullahi were then sent to several Hizballah terrorist training centers in Iran for advanced training.

The aforementioned Mohammad Mussavi-Khoiniha is a graduate of the KGB-controlled Patrice Lumumba University and has extensive training in intelligence and subversive work. He is a radical mullah committed to close cooperation with the USSR. During the Islamic Revolution, he was a prominent member of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and was the leader of Teheran University's komiteh (revolutionary committee). As the spiritual leader of the DAPKHA (Students Following the Line of the Imam), Mussavi-Khoiniha was the co-commander of the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. In 1980-81, Mussavi-Khoiniha was nominated by Khomeini as the commander of the campaign to subvert Saudi Arabia. In that capacity he lead the 1982 Iranian delegation to the Haj' in Mecca that included some 500 Hizballah terrorists. Mussavi-Khoiniha and 140 of his men were subsequently expelled from Saudi Arabia after they were caught planning a widespread sabotage campaign. (The quality of his training and close cooperation with the KGB are apparent from his current successes as the prosecutor general in the suppression of the Iranian opposition.)

In 1984, Iran organized an international terrorist brigade under the command of Mirhashem, aimed primarily at the U.S. Soon afterward, on the specific instructions of Mirhashem, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was asked to participate in a terrorist campaign against the West. At first, the Iranians wanted to use Afghan mujahideen with combat experience in both Afghanistan and the Iraqi front as instructors for the Brigade. They also wanted to deploy some of the Iranian terrorists in the ranks of Hizb-i-islami and Jundullah so that they could acquire combat experience in irregular warfare and urban guerrilla. Hekmatiyar ultimately agreed to both requests and their implementation started within a short time. Soon afterwards, Afghans volunteered, and in some cases were invited, to join Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards commando. As their experience and expertise were invaluable to the Iranians, and their commitment to Islam was beyond reproach, the Afghans were accepted.

As Iran's involvement in, and support for, international terrorism became known, it became more effective and expedient for the HizbAllahi to travel to the Arab World and the West through Pakistan, using the make-shift travel documents of the Afghan refugees and resistance fighters. The KGB was kept fully informed on these arrangements. (Little wonder that Izvestiya was the first to report, on 1 June 1987, at which, "agreement was reached between IPA leader G. Hekmatiyar and the Iranian authorities, where by Teheran will help to establish an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan.) In turn, the IPA pledged to include Iranians in its missions in Arab and Muslim countries and in its delegations to Persian Gulf countries. Indeed, resistance sources later confirmed that such an agreement was signed only in late-June or early-July and that the agreement also applied to Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

Probably the most important development achieved as a result of the Afghan-Iranian cooperation was the integration of Afghan mujahideen into the network of Islamic Jihad and Hizballah in Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada. A 1985 Hizballah manifesto published in Teheran emphasized that the struggle against the U.S. should take precedence over any other objective of the Islamic World: "We are moving in the direction of fighting the roots of vice and the first root of vice is America. All the endeavors to drag us into marginal action will be futile when compared with the confrontation against the United States."

Because of Western support of the Afghan resistance, and its strong anti-Soviet position, Afghan mujahideen were accepted and supported

in Western countries in places where their Egyptian or Iranian counterparts could not reach. Therefore, Afghans became the key to the establishment of new cells of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad in the West, and especially in the U.S. and Canada. Afghan “refugees and émigrés” resettled in the U.S., organized and assumed command over new cells of Hizballah under the guise of solidarity committees with the Jihad in Afghanistan. The KGB supported and encouraged this undertaking from the background. They also assisted with the support of intelligence and professional operations, as well as provided Soviet-controlled assets. In many cases, the KhAD provided escort for the trips of Afghan-Iranian detachments between Iran and Pakistan.

Currently, the U.S.-Canada operation is under the command of Ayatollah Muhammad Nassiri. He is an Iraqi-born Shiite who was trained in Palestinian camps near Tyr, in Lebanon, in the 1970s. He belonged to a radicalized group of al-Fath' that participated in Black September operations and had special relations with Soviet and East European trainers. (Nassiri enjoyed the special trust of Ayatollah Khomeini because of his close relationship with Khomeini's dead son Mustafa.) Between 1984 and 1986, Nassiri visited the U.S. and Canada at least half-a-dozen times, staying two to three months at a time, traveling all over both countries, and addressing Islamic student organizations (including Egyptians, Saudis, North Africans, Iranians, Afghans, South East Asians, and Black Muslims). His actual mission was to organize and supervise the functioning of the Islamic Jihad and Hizballah cells in the U.S. and Canada. Some of the cells organized by Nassiri intended to become the skeleton of Islamic Revolutionary movements in the home countries. Beginning in the summer of 1987, there was a marked increase in the activities of these cells, as Sheikh Sayed Mohammad Hosein Fadlallah promised that the Hizballah would “rid the countries of the World of the cancerous U.S. gland.” Incidentally, the timing of this sudden incitement coincided with the Iranian agreement with Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. (Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar also played a central role in the Iranian penetration and subversion of segments of the Afghan resistance.)

Consequently, by 1984, there were already about a dozen mini-organizations operating under direct Iranian guidance and support. Currently, all but one is Shiite. They operate in the western provinces, along the Kabul-Herat road and in central Afghanistan all the way into the Hazarajat. The Iranians, to support this, established two training centers in Mashhad and Tayyebat, which are run by the IRGC. Afghan mujahideen who are trained at the centers must serve for a period in the

IRGC in Iran, sometimes at the Iraqi front, before they receive their personal weapons and are sent back to Afghanistan.

The largest group of these Iranian trained Afghans was organized into the group called Hizballah Afghanistan, which answered, at one point, to Khomeini himself. It currently operates both from Iran and in the Herat area. There are several splinter Hizballah organizations along the Iranian border, especially in the Herat area. The most active force is under the command of Qari Yakdast.

The HizbAllahi are well trained, organized and equipped. They operate directly under the command of the IRGC regional commanders, and they also serve as mediators between the locally dominant Jamiat-i-Islami and the Iranian authorities. The main function of Hizballah Afghanistan, in particular, is the securing of the lines of communications from Herat into the Hazarajat, where they fight together with an offspring of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-islami, the Jundullah. Although a Sunni party, the Iranian Government provides significant support to Hizb-i-islami. (In order to enhance their control over Gulbaddin, the Iranians reorganized his forces in Iran and the western provinces of Afghanistan as the separate organization Jundullah.)

In the meantime, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, in pursuit of his fundamentalist beliefs, has proven to be agreeable to reaching compromises, including with the DRA and the Soviet Union. The KGB, for its part, has exploited this tactical flexibility in order to create circumstances under which cooperation with the Soviet Union gives Gulbaddin an expedient way to purge the "apostates." KGB agents from among the Soviet Muslims remind the Afghan Islamists that since Islam is eternal, while Communism is transient and doomed, temporary cooperation between the two opposing ideologies for the pursuit of a common goal is of no consequence whatsoever over the long term. In order to expedite his merciless pursuit of the "apostates", Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar then purges the resistance and destroys their popular support. The fact that the ultimate motivation for his assassination spree is a campaign for the eventual destruction of Communism is of no relevance to the pragmatic Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, in order to make sure that Gulbaddin does not get out of control, the KGB-KhAD surrounded him with loyal agents acting as some of Hezb-i-Islami's key commanders. Further, veteran resistance commanders who wish to change sides are convinced by the KGB-KhAD to remain in their positions and continue to lead their respective mujahideen forces on the KGB's behalf. As a rule, these commanders

then concentrate on fighting other resistance forces and on general disruption of resistance operations. However, in order to enhance the position of the more promising agent-commanders, the KGB-KhAD assists them in successfully attacking and destroying DRA posts and convoys.

One of the more successful agent-commanders was Shirgol. Known as Dervish, in 1984-1987 he was a senior commander of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar in Parvan Province. During this time he was a spy for the KhAD. Dervish volunteered his services after he became disillusioned with the course of the war and Hizb-i-Islami. On orders from KhAD, Dervish fought other resistance forces in his area, and justified this to his party as a campaign to consolidate Gulbaddin's control over the entire province. In order to expedite his campaign, he received extra weapons, including surface-to-surface rockets and surface-to-air missiles. Over the next two years he operated on behalf of the KhAD, and built a core force of some 50 mujahideen commanders loyal to him personally. They eventually followed him to Kabul in early-1987. Shirgol was so trusted by Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar that he was entrusted with one of Hizb-i-Islami's most crucial projects – preparing for the liberation of Bokhara and the whole of Soviet Central Asia. Hekmatiyar's representatives in Afghanistan's northernmost provinces convinced local inhabitants, many of whom came from Basmachi families that had escaped from the USSR in the 1920s-30s, to join Hizb-i-Islami in order to organize an Islamic Liberation Army. Gulbaddin even nominated a cousin of the last Emir of Bokhara, who had been dethroned by the Soviets in 1922, as the new Emir of Bokhara. Several Arab governments and foundations donated huge sums of money and weapons for this initiative.

The training of the Bokhara Islamic Liberation Army started in late-1984 in the Parvan Province under the direct command of Commander Dervish. Many Muslim defectors and refugees from Soviet Central Asia who had reached Pakistan were duly sent to join the Bokhara forces. The KGB-KhAD was kept fully informed on the progress of the training. In early-1987 then, less than a week after Shirgol's return to Kabul, the Soviet Air Force bombed the Bokhara Army's facilities, destroying its forces beyond recovery.

In the meantime, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-Islami continues to serve Soviet interests because the KGB created the circumstances in which cooperating with them seemed to be the most prudent way for Gulbaddin to pursue his most radical Islamist goals. In his commitment to achieving a utopian Muslim state, he appealed to the conservative

Arab world. As he put it, Hizb-i-islami “will not have achieved its goal with the fall of the Karmal regime. Even with a full Soviet withdrawal, Hizb-i-islami will continue the Jihad until an Islamic State is established.” Thus, the failures of the resistance pushed Hekmatiyar into adopting even more extremist Islamist views, which, although fiercely anti-Soviet, serve the Soviet interest. Back in Kabul, Shirgol explained:

Gulbaddin is a religious fanatic. He declared that he will continue the war until the entire Muslim world is united under the Green banner of Islam. No matter about Kabul! Recently he even appointed a person close to him as the Emir of Bokhara: seizing Soviet Central Asia, he says, is not far away...

Gulbaddin's designs for Central Asia make his extremist Islamic mujahideen, or some WAD-controlled units in his name, a direct and explicit threat to the USSR, which can be capitalized on to justify a Soviet intervention to stay in Afghanistan.

In his quest for power, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar is willing to assume leadership wherever it is offered to him, even at the behest of a Soviet-dominated “independent” Afghanistan. Maj.Gen. Farouq Zarif disclosed that Najibullah made arrangements in early-1989 to meet with Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar in Saudi Arabia. The meeting was organized by the Soviets through negotiations with the Saudis. Although this meeting ultimately did not take place, two PDPA cabinet ministers negotiated some political solutions with a senior delegation of Hizb-i-islami in Libya in a meeting mediated by Col. Qaddafi. Several concrete steps on a common struggle against the rest of the resistance were reportedly agreed upon in the Libya meetings.

In mid-1989, senior Soviet officials implied that the USSR was capable of reaching a compromise with Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. In a meeting with senior exiled Afghans (non-DRA), Yu. Vorontsov stated that while in Taif, Saudi Arabia, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and he “met, shook hands and smiled at each other.” He described his conversations with Hekmatiyar as extremely fruitful and reiterated that it was possible to reach a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem based on a deal between Najibullah and Hekmatiyar. Indeed, in a speech on 18 November 1989 Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar endorsed the Soviet approach to a political settlement and described U.S. policy as “immoral.” “The two superpowers must cease their interferences and intervention in

Afghanistan,” Gulbaddin declared. “They should cease supplying arms and let the Afghans go their own way.”

Innocents in the Wilderness of Mirrors

Gulbaddin's background should have sufficed for denying him all U.S. help. The subsequent activities of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and his Hizb-i-islami and Jundullah, both in Afghanistan and in Iran, should have resulted in the cutting of whatever aid he was getting. Yet, since 1980, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-islami has received the bulk of U.S. assistance and almost all Arab assistance channeled through the Pakistanis. Gulbaddin's own spokesmen, including a radio station and Pakistani ISI officials, continue to portray him as the central factor in the fighting. “Western Diplomats” faithfully echoed these claims, further building the Hekmatiyar myth.

From 1984-5, with U.S. assistance significantly increasing, so did the flow of data from reliable sources that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was an active KGB-KhAD operative. The mounting success of Soviet-DRA caravan interdiction suggested deep intelligence penetration. Yet, many of Hizb-i-islami's caravans were not hit. Gulbaddin's commanders repeatedly betrayed the location of several weapon depots, including Stingers and artillery pieces, on the eve of major operations. Hizb-i-islami commanders led and directed some of the Soviet-DRA raiding parties. A senior commander of Hizb-i-islami, and according to one account, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar himself, betrayed to the KGB-KhAD one of the most important resistance intelligence nets in Kabul in the spring of 1985. The result was, the cutting of an irreplaceable flow of crucial data and the loss of several lives. Gulbaddin's cooperation with the Iranians and the DRA in the suppression of the resistance in the Hazarajat led to the total collapse of the resistance in central Afghanistan.

Many resistance leaders and commanders believe that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar “is working for the Soviets.” Many of his enemies within the ranks of the mujahideen deny that Hekmatiyar is a Soviet agent, but they do not rule out the possibility that in his quest for personal power and an Islamic state, he makes deals, establishes working relations and cooperates with the KGB-KhAD against the rest of the resistance. They not only will not deny that Hekmatiyar fights relentlessly against other mujahideen, but point to the fact that the Islamist mujahideen are his primary victims in fighting and in betrayal of assets and men (including spies in the DRA) to Kabul. However, these enemies emphasize that it

is incomprehensible that a pious, religious, praying Muslim, as Hekmatiyar is, would be working for the Infidel-Communists.

Yet, despite the flow of evidence such as the above, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-islami has continued to enjoy the vast majority of foreign military aid. This preferential treatment still continued in late-1989 despite the confirming of Gulbaddin's personal involvement in several killings of mujahideen commanders and deals with both Teheran and Kabul. When the U.S. finally cut its military support for Gulbaddin in mid-November 1989, Saudi Arabia transferred all of its financial support to Hizb-i-islami, enabling Gulbaddin to purchase huge quantities of weapons on the black market. Moreover, ISI officials continued to ignore the illicit transfer of equipment earmarked to other Parties to Gulbaddin's men.

In point of fact, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar enjoys the unwavering support of Pakistan's ISI because he serves Pakistan's own interests. The Pakistani's cynical playing with the lives and future of Afghan mujahideen are in tune with the Byzantine-Machiavellian character of traditional Islamic power politics in Central and South Asia. Islamabad is committed to the establishment of a centralized, ideologically based regime in Kabul at all cost. Preferably, Kabul is to be ruled under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's creation – Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. Alternately, Islamabad would willingly accept Benazir Bhutto's ideological twin – Dr. Najib.

Any acceptance by Islamabad of a genuine localized leadership, that is regionally or ethnically based, would immediately open a Pandora's Box of demands for similar solutions by the already volatile and agitated population of Pakistan. Therefore, as long as there are no genuine democratic and domestic socio-political reforms in Pakistan, Islamabad will continue to consider any other solution to the Afghan problem as political suicide.

In the meantime, the ISI is eager to conceal the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan, for despite the mujahideen's total dependence on foreign aid supplied through the ISI, there has been a near collapse of the resistance's logistical support system. This unreliability of weapon supplies can be attributed both to incompetence and political conspiracies of the Pakistani Government and its primary instrument, the ISI. The enduring outcome of the ongoing exploitation of the weapon supplies for Pakistani political and personal gains is the rapid erosion of the resistance.

Indeed, encouraged by the ISI and the U.S., the mujahideen were committed to a series of disastrous battles for which they were neither

prepared nor equipped. Moreover, Pakistani petty-politics, power struggles, corruption and incompetence resulted in the subversion and starving of these mujahideen efforts. Consequently, it was after the Soviet 'withdrawal' that the mujahideen suffered their greatest defeats and highest casualties since the beginning of the resistance in Afghanistan more than a decade ago.

A Web in Red and Green

The above data clearly suggests that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and his key commanders work for the USSR to a certain degree. Gulbaddin is definitely devoted to fighting the U.S. and is cooperating with Iran and other Islamists toward that end. Thus, there are, needless to say, far-reaching ramifications to this fact that go beyond the immediate issue of the major contribution to the destruction of the Afghan resistance. Since the flow of U.S. aid continued despite the increasing evidence against Hekmatiyar, there must have been some underlying logic behind it. One possible explanation is that the upper echelons of Hizb-i-islami, knowingly led by Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, constitute a crucial component in a Soviet master deception operation against the U.S. This operation exploits the fact that there is a one-way flow of data to Washington: From resistance sources, primarily Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's, to the ISI and from them to the CIA and official Washington. There is little or no official independent cross-checking on the ground. Thus, there arises a question: What if Gulbaddin's falsified and inflated claims for victory were purposely spread by Moscow? After all, Hizb-i-islami's reports of success included several lies and omissions. Some battlefield "successes" were facilitated by the KGB-KhAD. The KGB could have assisted in other cases, especially since the victims in those instances were DRA forces. The propaganda machine, tightly controlled by the KGB-KhAD, repeatedly exaggerated the might and significance of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and the importance of Hizb-i-islami. Taken together, all of these actions amounted to artificial image building.

Needless to say, this general picture created by the KGB-KhAD closely fits the biases of Zia ul-Haq and his ISI. Consequently, in late-1989, the Islamabad-Islamist connection was far too intertwined to be disrupted by logic alone. The radical-revivalist Islamist leadership and, especially Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, are an artificial entity created by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a part of his forward-depth strategy and as an answer to Daud's support for the Pushtunistan issue. This Islamist

leadership was subsequently adopted by Zia ul-Haq because of the ISI's claims of tight control over the radical-revivalist Muslims as well as the ensuing ideological endorsement from Pakistan's Jamiat-i-Islami and the Saudi Arabian leadership, the support of both Zia needed in order to rebuild Pakistan from the calamities of the Bhutto regime.

Eventually, carried away in his own Islamicization campaign, Zia ul-Haq saw in Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar both a political- religious figure capable of carrying out a comparable campaign in Afghanistan and as a non-entity lacking all indigenous credentials for national leadership who would therefore always remain dependent on Islamabad for survival and power in Kabul. Even now, Benazir Bhutto cannot afford to disavow and disassociate herself from the Afghan leadership built by her father, let alone confront the ISI on the conduct of its Afghan operations.

Given this, the reports of Hizb-i-islami victories served the ISI's intrinsic interests so well that it had no desire to doubt them and indeed, politically could not afford to. With the Zia regime wholeheartedly committed to Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, any attempt to challenge or verify his claims for victory was swiftly crushed by Islamabad's highest echelons. Moreover, it was the personal interest of numerous ISI senior officers and operatives who were embezzling the ever-growing flow of U.S. and Saudi military and financial assistance to ensure that the process would continue. They were not going to threaten their illicit profiteering by casting doubts or deflating Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's success stories. Thus, as long as the KGB-KhAD disinformation continued to reinforce Hekmatiyar's claims for success, the ISI labeled the reports credible and fed them to the CIA.

The CIA, lacking any independent verification capabilities on the ground, had to accept the ISI's reports at face value. Like all organizations, the CIA preferred to be part of a great victory and that was exactly what the ISI had been reporting all along. Again, there was no motivation to challenge or doubt one's own success story. Within time, there emerged a vicious cycle where the CIA exacerbated its self-deception by its willingness to wholeheartedly believe in inflated claims of its own success. It was in the name of protecting the CIA's record that emerging warnings and disturbing reports were brushed aside as unreliable. Resistance commanders who persisted too much in contradicting the success story, were severely punished by the ISI, usually by cutting their funds and weapons supplies. In Washington, the CIA, whose mandate is to collect facts, became the staunchest infighter for the defense of its own conclusions, refusing to

acknowledge, let alone professionally examine, accumulating evidence that all was not as it seemed.

As a consequence of the one-direction flow of data from Afghanistan through the ISI to the CIA and official Washington, the U.S. and Pakistan kept channeling military support away from credible resistance groups and into the hands of an artificial anti-Western entity whose actions only contributed to the further fracturing of the resistance and the pushing of the Afghan population either into the hands of Kabul or into exile in Iran and Pakistan. Regardless of the evidence about a possible KGB-KhAD deception effort, the net outcome of the U.S.-Pakistani military assistance for the Afghan resistance ended up serving the long-term interests of Moscow.

A glaring example of the far-reaching ramifications of such self-delusions was the U.S. belief that the Najib regime would collapse of its own weight within days after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. The CIA's belief in its assessment, based on ISI reports and consultations with Soviet officials, was so strong that U.S. arms supplies to the resistance were unilaterally cut in early-1989. After that, at the urging of the ISI and the U.S., the mujahideen launched the siege of Jalalabad and subsequently suffered their worst defeat and highest casualties ever.

The extent of the ISI's and CIA's commitment to the triumphant image of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar can best be illustrated by the case of the mujahideen's Kabul based intelligence net. In the spring of 1985, a senior resistance commander recruited a major source in the very heart of the KhAD where KGB advisers worked. This agent was in a position to know who in the resistance was actually working for the KGB-KhAD. However, the agent insisted that he would not provide any information until after his children were smuggled out of Kabul. At great personal risk, the senior resistance commander organized a council with the other senior commanders for the Kabul area in order to work out the safe exit of his children from the country.

Within hours, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar himself, and his Kabul commander, on explicit orders from Gulbaddin, betrayed the entire net to the KGB-KhAD. In short order, Resistance commanders and mujahideen, as well as a few resistance agents who had been for years providing valuable information, were rounded up. The major agent, who had not reported anything yet, was among the very first to be arrested. The KGB was so alarmed by the net that it sent a special Aeroflot Il-62M to collect the key prisoners and take them within 24 hours for special interrogation in Tashkent. None were seen again.

Other resistance commanders had to be pulled away from operations inside and around Kabul, some being compelled to seek refuge overseas. The resistance network in Kabul was dealt a severe blow from which it has not even begun to recover.

A very logical explanation for this incident is that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar was afraid that a credible source in this KGB-KhAD department would expose him as a Soviet agent, or at least the extent of his cooperation with the KGB-KhAD. Given this, Gulbaddin had no alternative but to betray the entire net before the high level source started supplying incriminating data. For the ISI, recognizing the gravity of the betrayal meant doubting the reliability of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and the self-serving empire they had built around his myth. Therefore, the ISI decided to suppress the incident even though two of its own operatives were among those arrested and transferred to Tashkent. It is clear that the perception and reality of just who the United States is working with in this region are far apart. If we fail to recognize and address this problem, we will allow the Soviets to achieve their historic goals: the domination and control of South Asia and the subcontinent. This need not happen. The United States can go on the offensive in Afghanistan particularly and the region in general, but first it must decide whether to lead or to follow.

Vaughn Forrest &
Yossef Bodansky



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

**A Question of Trust:
Was There Soviet Disinformation?**

March 6, 1990

As discussed in a previous paper, one leader – Hizb-i-islami's Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar – symbolizes the complexity and Byzantine subterfuges of the situation in Southwest Asia. For the CIA and the ISI, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar has been and still is the Jihad, and his Hizb-i-islami has been the Mujahideen. Since 1980, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i-islami received most of the U.S. military, financial and humanitarian assistance given to the entire Afghan resistance. While Pakistan's ISI might have had its own reasons for backing Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, the CIA had no reason other than ISI's insistence. Moreover, the flow of U.S. support for Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar continued even after the more sinister aspects of his biography became known. This, combined with the growing involvement of Hizb-i-islami in fratricidal fighting against other resistance groups, its close cooperation with both Teheran and Kabul, and its active participation in anti-U.S. international terrorism, seems to have had little or no effect on the delivery of CIA assistance.

Therefore, there emerges a question as to why U.S. aid continued to flow in the direction of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar once his record became

known. Several aspects of the CIA's persistent belief in, and protection of, Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's image, suggest the possibility that Soviet strategic disinformation played a part in the formulation of the U.S. South Asian policy. If this was indeed the case, it would not have been the first time Soviet intelligence had manipulated their staunchest enemies into self-destruction, while deceiving Western intelligence services into supporting the Soviet effort while believing to be in their own best interest.

The Historical Record

The possibility of a Soviet strategic deception, influencing U.S. support for the Afghan resistance to the point of directly contributing to its destruction, becomes a frighteningly real probability when one considers the Soviet's historic record in this kind of operation. In fact, between 1917 and the mid-1950s the USSR was confronted by internal armed resistance and popular opposition. To deal with this, the Soviets pursued a strategy of creating and/or subverting liberation movements and insurgencies via the penetration and deception of supporting Western intelligence services. By this strategy, Soviet intelligence, from the Cheka to the KGB, succeeded in shifting Western assistance and support from legitimate anti-Communist freedom fighters and liberation movements to fabricated organizations and fronts groups that the Soviets created. In almost every case, the West's misguided operations gained momentum from a self-perception of success that led to a refusal to face facts and see warning signs. In all cases, disaster came as a result of self-fed deception born of Western intelligence's desire to believe in its own success.

In fact, the Soviet record is impressive. Soon after the 1917 Revolution, the Cheka set out to neutralize the vast network of its opponents that had been built up around Russian émigrés and was supported by European secret services by diverting their attention to an artificial entity – the Trust – as the genuine opposition to the Bolshevik rule. By the time Moscow decided to call off the deception, the Cheka had completely destroyed all indigenous opposition. Key leaders and operatives, including General Savinkov and the British SIS's Sidney Reilly, were lured into the USSR, betrayed and ultimately faced death at the hands of the Cheka. Further, through Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), the economic component of the Trust operation, the West even ended up financing the recovery of Russia and the Bolsheviks' consolidation of power.

No less significant was the use of deception in suppressing the Basmachi revolt in Central Asia and the Caucasus revolt that had been led by the heirs of Shamil (a legendary rebel of the mid-19 century). In this case, the OGPU established special ChON detachments that masqueraded as Basmachi forces. Operating near border areas and attracting massive Red Army reaction, these detachments made contacts with British and Turkish intelligence services and eventually received the bulk of their support. Moving throughout Central Asia, the ChON detachments maneuvered the main Basmachi forces into raiding units of the Red Army. This ultimately led to the assassination of the Turkish General, Enver Pasha, whose assassination on 4 August 1922 marked the collapse of the movement. Between 1925 and 1930, the remaining fragments of the Basmachi forces were raided by Soviet soldiers operating in Afghan army uniforms and were destroyed, ending all organized resistance inside the USSR.

Later, after World War II, a wave of nationalist sentiment spread throughout Eastern Europe. Various nationalities, such as the Baltic peoples, the Ukrainians, the Poles, and even the Albanians rose up in arms to resist Communist occupation. A coalition of Western intelligence services, led by the CIA and the SIS, moved to provide extensive military and financial assistance to these peoples, with special attention paid to the training of émigrés as commanders and leaders for these forces and to the para-dropping of them into their home countries to lead the rapidly escalating national revolts. Needless to say the NKVD moved quickly to suppress these movements.

An important component in this Soviet counteroffensive was an effort to divert Western assistance away from the real liberation movements. Several NKVD agents and co-opted or extorted nationalist leaders were sent to join and penetrate the nationalist movements both in Europe and in their home countries. Many rebel forces were created by the NKVD, which were then permitted to attack local Soviet militia units and other government objectives to allow them to gain credibility, and to have their commanders, that is senior NKVD agents, be exfiltrated to the West for thorough debriefing of the situation in their native countries. Further, Western military support and intelligence gathering equipment were even delivered to these commanders. Thus, there emerged a vicious cycle in which the NKVD supplied the SIS and the CIA with false data on imaginary liberation groups and received extensive military and financial support in return.

In due course, the West became committed to the NKVD's puppet forces and consequently the genuine resistance forces were betrayed to

the Soviets by NKVD penetrating agents and by the CIA and SIS urging them to make contact with the NKVD's sponsored resistance forces. Further, resistance forces that would not participate in the West's grand designs, even sometimes including the NKVD's own plants, were denied all help. Thus, their ultimate destruction by the Soviets was only a question of time. By the mid-1950s, the NKVD had thoroughly subverted all internal opposition and had destroyed all the effective armed groups. They then swiftly ended the operation, clearly demonstrating how shallow and artificial were the "forces of liberation" the CIA and the SIS had been supporting. Indeed, in Red Web, his milestone study of the KGB's compromising and controlling of SIS support for the Baltic resistance between 1944 and 1955, Tom Bower identifies the primary source for the disastrous failure of both the SIS and the Baltic patriots it supported: "SIS fed its own deception by its willingness to believe in its own success."

A Web in Red and Green

In the first part of A Question of Trust, the thesis was put forward that Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and his key commanders worked for the USSR to a certain degree. Evidence was put forward that he was deeply devoted to fighting the U.S. and that he cooperated with Iran and other radical Muslims to that end. Since the flow of U.S. aid continued all the same, there must have been some underlining logic behind its continuation. One possible explanation is that the upper echelons of Hizb-i-islami, knowingly led by Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, constituted a crucial component in a Soviet master deception operation against the U.S.

When the U.S. became involved in the war in Afghanistan, there developed a one-way flow of data from the resistance sources, primarily Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's, to the ISI and from them to the CIA and official Washington. There was little or no official independent cross-checking on the ground by the CIA. Thus the possibility arises that Gulbaddin's falsified and inflated claims for victory were purposely induced by Moscow. After all, Hizb-i-islami's reports of success did include several lies and omissions, and some battlefield "successes" were facilitated by the KGB-KhAD. Thus, it is possible that the propaganda machine, tightly controlled by the KGB-KhAD, repeatedly exaggerated the might and significance of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar and the importance of Hizb-i-islami. Taken together then,

all the trumpeting of Gulbaddin's successes may have been nothing more than an image building campaign aimed at a Western audience.

In fact, the reports of Hizb-i-Islami victories served the ISI's intrinsic interests so well that the organization had no desire to doubt them and politically could not afford to. With the Zia regime wholeheartedly committed to Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, any attempt to challenge or verify his claims for victory was swiftly crushed by Islamabad's highest echelons. Further, it was the personal interest of the numerous ISI senior officers and operatives who were embezzling the ever-growing flow of U.S. and Saudi military and financial assistance to ensure that the process would continue. They were not about to threaten their illicit profiteering by casting doubts or deflating Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's success stories. Thus, as long as the KGB-KhAD disinformation continued to reinforce Hekmatiyar's claims for success, the ISI label led the reports credible and fed them to the CIA.

The CIA, lacking any independent verification capabilities on the ground, had to accept the ISI's reports at face value. Like all organizations, the CIA preferred to be a part of a great victory and that was exactly what the ISI had been reporting all along. Again, there was no motive to challenge or doubt one's own success story. Within time there emerged a vicious cycle where the CIA exacerbated its self-deception by its willingness to wholeheartedly believe in its own success. It was in the name of protecting the CIA's record that emerging warnings and disturbing reports were brushed aside as unreliable, and Resistance commanders who persisted too much in contradicting Gulbaddin's success story were severely punished by the ISI, usually by cutting their funds and weapon supplies. In Washington, the CIA, whose mandate is to collect facts, became the staunchest infighter for the defense of its conclusions, refusing to acknowledge, let alone professionally examine, accumulating danger signals.

Thus, as a consequence of the one-direction flow of data from Afghanistan through the ISI to the CIA and official Washington, the U.S. and Pakistan kept channeling most of the military support away from credible resistance groups and into the hands of an artificial anti-Western entity whose actions only contributed to the further fracturing of the resistance and the pushing of the Afghan population either into the hands of Kabul or into exile in Iran and Pakistan. Regardless of the evidence about a possible KGB-KhAD deception effort, the net outcome of the U.S.-Pakistani military assistance for the Afghan resistance served the long-term interest of Moscow.

A glaring example of the far-reaching ramifications of such self-delusions was the U.S. belief that the Najib regime would collapse of its own weight within days after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. The CIA's belief in its assessment, based on ISI reports and consultations with Soviet officials, was so strong that U.S. arms supplies to the resistance were unilaterally cut in early-1989. At the urging of the ISI and the U.S., the mujahideen were then committed to the siege of Jalalabad where they suffered their worst defeat and highest casualties ever.

In light of all of this, it is important to remember that deceptions are built on more than one-way data flow and image-building campaigns. Effective deception depends on a multitude of diversified yet almost overlapping sources as well as on a myriad of distinct feedback channels. Only then is the deceiver able to provide answers to questions or divert attention from emerging problems and doubts among the deceived. Ever since the Cheka's Trust Operation in the 1920s, Soviet deceptions have been characterized by their audacity and by the extensive and comprehensive use of sources and feedbacks.

A close examination of the institutionalized flow of information concerning Afghanistan suggests that the USSR was in possession of all the required components for a highly successful strategic deception. The Soviet Union had reliable access to a myriad of feedbacks and the ability to monitor both events in South Asia and the flow of information to and from official Washington. Moreover, in order to facilitate their great deception effort, the Soviets built a comprehensive web of circumstantial sources, supporting sources and feedbacks. These additional assets were present in all the facets of the Afghan operation.

Indeed, even Iranian KGB spies played a major role in facilitating the Soviet subversion and deception campaign. Key agents like Zamani helped push Islamist resistance commanders into closer cooperation with the KGB-KhAD. They used their impeccable Islamic credentials to endorse Soviet initiatives, and they also used their on going relations with both the resistance in Pakistan and Iran and the government of Pakistan to plant data and create impressions. It was Zamani, ostensibly reflecting the SAVAMA's analysis, which strongly confirmed ISI's observations of the winners in Afghanistan and thus helped reinforce the Gulbaddin myth.

Indeed, many of Hekmatiyar's friends and aids came from Libya, the PLO, Syria, Egypt, etc. Many of them had previously been connected with Soviet-controlled intelligence and terrorist activities, and they were in a position to influence cooperation with the KGB-

KhAD, as well as to control and disseminate disinformation through their national superiors and other contacts. Such floating data served as “independent confirmation” of disinformation passed directly from Hizb-i-islami to the ISI.

Also, Soviet and Indian agents in Islamabad provided Moscow with feedback data on Afghanistan. They pinpointed which sources and what types of “events” would make the best impact on the ISI and the CIA, and helped to confirm and reinforce ISI's policies as part of the cover assignments. Similar roles, and at times with greater impact, was played by leftist journalists many of whom were KGB active measures agents. The impressions of West European journalists, especially those from the virulent anti-American periodicals, on such issues as Gulbaddin's military success and popularity were sought by many officials and diplomats in Islamabad. Purposely tainted or innocently manipulated stories, therefore, had major impact on these officials and diplomats, and in turn the Soviets learned from these journalists the opinions and perceptions of the officials and diplomats.

Furthermore, when M.S. Gorbachev rose to power, and especially after his July 1986 Vladivostok speech, Afghanistan became a major theme in Soviet disinformation. Hints about Moscow's analysis of the situation and its desire to withdraw from Afghanistan, properly emphasizing such issues as Kabul's and Moscow's dread of Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, were passed by a myriad of Soviet and East European diplomats and “experts”, in formal and informal meetings to Western agencies. Soviet and DRA propaganda continued to highlight Gulbaddin as the enemy of the Saur Revolution, and thus further reinforced the ISI's and CIA's view of the situation without addressing questions or facts.

Further, specialists on U.S.-Soviet relations and Arms Control, such as G. Arbatov and his colleagues, bombarded visiting Americans with reports on Afghanistan the obstacle to an improvement in East-West relations. U.S. support for Gulbaddin was particularly presented as the main destabilizing factor. The Americans who were told this were usually already committed to arms control and were therefore susceptible to the Soviet perspective on this point. Indeed, none were experts on, or knowledgeable about, Afghanistan or South Asia. However, most had a vested interest in highlighting their visits and meetings as a great success and as having helped the world peace process. Therefore, they tended to repeat the message they were given concerning Afghanistan, while providing personal emphasis on the legitimacy and importance of the data they were reporting.

Back in Washington, such impressions from Moscow were seen as further confirmation of Hekmatiyar's success. However, the data arriving from Moscow was extremely general and, considering the compartmentalization of information in the USSR, from dubious sources. Nevertheless, an already biased official Washington relied on this information because it fit so nicely with its own preconceived ideas.

Whenever the KGB-KhAD feared a crack in the Gulbaddin myth, they planted defectors from the DRA, including senior KhAD officers. All of them defected to Hizb-i-islami because, they would explain later, in Kabul Hizb-i-islami was a synonymous to mujahideen. Regardless of what these defectors would tell later, the immediate impact of their defection was a major boost to the Gulbaddin myth. In point of fact, at least one senior KhAD defector confessed, after he had reached safe haven, that his "defection" was "somewhat eased" after he promised to contact Hizb-i-islami and further enhance his image and success.

False defectors and double agents, then, were repeatedly used by the KGB against the U.S. and, at times, with great success. In some cases, the disinformation they delivered and ended up having a great impact on U.S. policy and strategy. It is therefore, highly conceivable that the KGB-KhAD would use such proven methods especially when the victim's biases were so clear.

The key to any strategic disinformation and deception campaign is having sources for feedback at the center of the target's decision-making institutions. Thus, a disturbing question arises: Did the KGB have a network of agents in Washington D.C. intimately familiar with U.S. strategic decisions concerning South Asia? In his book, Breaking the Ring, John Barron suggests that such a net existed. He points to the apparent Soviet advance knowledge of U.S. preparations for a rescue mission in Iran as an indication of such a penetration. He concludes that, "the Soviets obviously had considerable advance warning of highly secret American plans." In addition, you have the most recent remarks of Soviet defector Victor Ivanovich Sheymov regarding his allegations that while working in the KGB he had highly placed sources within the State Department. And, there is currently an investigation as to the leaking of the information regarding our military intervention in Panama.

Needless to say, such a source could also have reported on U.S. policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The existence of such a network would have enabled Moscow to plant key data in Afghanistan, which would, in turn, then be relayed to Washington to ease its doubts and concern.

It has been argued that space-based NTMs would have provided independent and untainted intelligence data to the U.S., and there is no doubt that these NTMs are excellent in tracking some Soviet military activities. However, their value would have been dubious in a struggle where most communication was done by individuals carrying notes in pouches and the key to long term victory was the molding of socio-political trends and an awareness of an under developed rural population. While such issues as Soviet deployment and losses would have been important, and NTMs could have provide extensive data on them, the war was ultimately decided in nocturnal special operations and lengthy deliberations by elders and mujahideen in dark caves and around small fires where NTM's would have had no access.

The logical conclusion from the above material is that it is highly likely that there was an element of Soviet deception and disinformation in the U.S. support for Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar. Since the role of Hizb-i-Islami in fomenting and expediting the destruction of the Afghan resistance was significantly more important and crucial to the KGB-KhAD, the KGB probably planned the Hekmatiyar deception effort as a diversion. Indeed, at the outset, the USSR probably could not believe that the U.S. would commit itself to such dependence on Pakistan's ISI. After all, a major reason for the U.S.'s failure in Iran was the CIA's dependence on the local SAVAK for data. Having had access to all the documents captured in the U.S. Embassy, the Soviets were well aware of that. A logical assumption would have been that having just been burned with the SAVAK, the CIA would be extremely cautious with the ISI. However, in 1983, as the CIA-ISI relationship became stronger and the one-way flow of information from Afghanistan to Washington became clear, the KGB probably felt that the U.S. was indeed vulnerable to deception. By then, Soviet victory was inevitable and Moscow became more audacious, finally escalating the deception campaign to its current level of success.

The apparent KGB deceiving of the CIA into a profound misreading of the situation in South Asia and into, in effect, transforming the massive assistance program for the Afghan resistance into the instrument of its destruction, contributed to the ultimate Soviet victory if only by neutralizing the potential effect of U.S. military aid. The impact that such Soviet strategic deception might have had on policy formulation in Washington remains unclear. Too far-fetched? Perhaps, perhaps not.



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

BCCI – An Introduction

September 4, 1991

The Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) was to be a prototype of the “big business” that would reassert the prominence of the Muslim and Third Worlds in the international community and contribute to the solution of the profound crisis facing them. Consequently, a strong anti-imperialist profile was an important part of BCCI's identity, while inwardly BCCI was to establish Islamic Banking as the financial system for the Third World.

Thus, although BCCI operated in the West, (indeed its main financial “irregularities” were committed in the UK and the U.S.), it was always a quintessential Muslim Third World institution. As such, it was driven and motivated by a certain ideological commitment and a religious sense of purpose. This ideological background provides the key to understanding the logic behind the criminal activities of BCCI, its principals and its main clients.

The source of the philosophy of BCCI was the ideology of its founder, Agha Hassan Abedi and many of his close associates, including the Gokal brothers. All are Indian-born Shi'ites and believers in Sufi mysticism. The roots of their families are in the same tight Shi'ite community as Khomeyni's forefathers. In addition, Abu-Dhabi's

ruler, Sheikh Zayid al-Nahyan, an illiterate but devout Muslim, is also a believer in mysticism as well as in the divine destiny of his family. In the 1960s, Al-Nayhan used to hunt in Pakistani Baluchistan under the protection of a senior official of Pakistan's intelligence named A.B. Awan, who also took him to several darwishes and mystics in Pakistan. It was through these contacts that Abedi met Sheikh al-Nahyan and established the friendship and ultimately the partnership that became BCCI. (Abedi and al-Nahyan later reciprocated A.B. Awan's services by nominating his son, Amjad Awan, to a lucrative and sensitive position in BCCI – Noriega's banker.) Indeed, all the principals of BCCI operated, at least initially, within the culture of the Near East elite. [Material provided by Pakistani sources.]

As of the early-1980s, when BCCI's "specialized operations" expanded and became the bank's primary source of revenues, it was structured more like Near Eastern intelligence and security services than the international banking conglomerate it claimed to be. This was not by accident in view of the distinct and strong presence of former and active senior intelligence-security and terrorist officials in leading positions of BCCI. One of these officials was the Saudi Sheikh Kamal Adham, "the godfather of Middle Eastern intelligence," (officially) a small investor in BCCI, who made a lot of money from bringing in other investors, mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and commissions from lucrative deals. Adham was instrumental in the structuring of BCCI as it was spreading into the Third World and allowed BCCI to maintain a very close relationship with the intelligence and security institutions of most of the Third World states where it operated.

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When Abedi established BCCI, he was consumed with a commitment to the reassertion and reawakening of the Third World under the banner of revivalist Islam. His goal was not only to demonstrate that the Third World could create businesses comparable to the best the West had to offer but to pursue "a mission to build the world's biggest bank by the turn of the century." Moreover, he wanted the bank and its related financial empire to serve as the cornerstone for the "de-linking" of the Third World from the Western economic system and to help facilitate the "rejection" of the Western value system. He saw in the return to an economy based on the morality of revivalist Islam the only key to the salvation of the Third World.

In the meantime, the Iranian Revolution rejuvenated the Muslim World and incited both leaders and the masses to consider the politicized revival of Islam as a practical goal. The ideological blend of Third Worldism and revivalist Islam that Abedi believed in was becoming more popular as a result of the reverberations of the Iranian Revolution and Abedi was beginning to see himself as the champion and savior of the cause. A family friend of Abedi explained: "He wanted to be bigger than the bank, he wanted to control countries and heads of state, obliging them with jobs for relations, balances of payment help, gifts." Abedi became preoccupied with establishing relationships with Third World leaders and soon developed a solid and intricate network with the elite of the Near East and Africa. "They knew how to get to the top in Third World countries," explained a former customer.

Later, Abedi would explain that he established the BCCI's financial empire on the basis of a belief in "goodness" and "that all religions and peoples are basically the same."

"I created the philosophy and the bank grew by itself," he recently rationalized. However, for this empire to function and accumulate profits and power, it was totally dependent on the will and whim of the Third World's absolute leaders and strongmen. Abedi was all too aware of this reality and quickly transformed the BCCI into an instrument optimized to serve them. This meant establishing a financial system based on striving, corruption, and coercion.

"Force and favors, as determined among individuals through corruption," are the fundamentals of Arab and inter-Arab politics, explained David Price-Jones. "Corruption among Arabs is nothing more nor less than a daily functioning among everyone of the power-challenge dialectic, and it is registering individual advances and retreats everywhere and at all times. Corruption plays a role approximating to competition in a democracy. At the top of the social scale, corruption represents the power of the strong over the weak; at the bottom, however, it may soften the caprices of power and so promote tolerance." The financial empire built by Abedi and financed by Sheikh al-Nahyan was correspondingly structured to accommodate this reality. Thus, in the early-1980s, BCCI began expanding into the Third World as the need for the unique services it was willing to offer to leaders and strongmen grew.

In the meantime, since the mid-1970s, rampant corruption had been intensified by the oil glut that created the Golden Triangle: The West sought to make profits from "recycling" petro-dollars by selling

everything possible to the Third World. Meanwhile, Third World leaders sought to keep national and personal funds in the West. Consequently, the drive to ensure the mere flow of cash to the West developed a life of its own. Western governments, notably Washington, encouraged banks to assist this financial process by pumping additional money into the Third World in the form of additional loans not to further development, but simply to assure their liquidity as the flow of funds to the West was rapidly accelerating. Ultimately, the real role of the Western banks was “to save the funds that the Third World leaders had stolen from their governments and reloan them anew in order to make profits from both sides simultaneously.”

In this situation, it did not take long for the Third World economy to begin collapsing. With the beginning of the debt crisis, Western, mainly U.S., banks hastily withdrew, but corruption remained. Consequently, a void was created at a time of growing need, (stimulated in part because of IMF supervision of Third World economies in return for new loans), for “special financial services” for Third World leaders to shelter and smuggle their fortunes. In this atmosphere, BCCI was born with services optimized for the leaders' needs. As a direct result of the simplification of the smuggling of money, the rates of skimming off the top reached new heights. BCCI also offered new sources of personal fortunes such as easier methods to steal from Western humanitarian and international assistance funds channeled via BCCI.

Little wonder that Third World corruption continued to expand to the point of political rationalization. African leaders blamed the industrialized West for the phenomena. They argued that in its desire to sell, the West purposefully refused to develop indigenous industries in the Third World. Lacking proper industrial and economic systems, explained a Nigerian intellectual, local educated elites “are essentially pushed into the role of intermediaries between the foreign industrialists and investors and their governments. The 10% or 20% taken in the process are the salaries demanded by the bourgeois elite at the expense of the industrialized states” that continue to exploit the South. By the time the deal completes its transfer through the layers of officials and intermediaries, the bulk of the money has been skimmed off.

For example, in early-1988, Mabi Milumba, then the new Prime Minister of Zaire, pointed to the true extent of corruption: A foreign industrialization project was expected to make 200m francs in 1987 of which the Zairian Government was to get 100m francs. Ultimately, the government collected only 5m francs! The rest was skimmed off by

several layers of officials, President Mobuto included, and smuggled out of the country.

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Since the early-1980s, in his drive to expand and consolidate his power position in the Third World, Abedi has become more and more infatuated with local leaders and the establishment of some form of hold over them. Consequently, by the late-1980s, BCCI provided the following financial “services” for leaders (and their countries/businesses):

- Access to easy development loans for favorite projects the financing of which was organized and documented so that it would be easy and safe to skim off the top at the source.
- Place of hiding for excess cash, for both personal and for funds skimmed from IMF allocations.
- “Imaginative accounting” of Western assistance money to conceal bribery, over-pricing, etc.
- Simplified smuggling of excess cash from the Third World to the West for shelters (“rainy day funds”) especially from countries where such transactions are illegal.
- Production of deniable and/or false financial reports for international bodies such as the IMF on budget management, especially via local banks and institutions BCCI partially owned.
- Deniable and concealed transfer of funds for major national transactions, especially weapons and intelligence deals, in return for massive profits.
- Laundering funds for personal use of leaders (from drugs, stealing, bribery, etc.) and their transfer to legal shelters in the West.

- The “protection” of leaders from the CIA through good relations with notables in Washington such as former President Carter. (In a society where everything is arranged through informal contacts with the all-powerful, just being seen in the company of President Carter signaled to the Third World leaders that Abedi could “deliver” Washington.)

The pattern of the corruption that would lead to the bank's collapse was to exploit the unique nature of the source of deposits available to BCCI to virtually empty the bank's holdings. BCCI operated off of major large-sum dirty deals that involved the quiet shifting of large sums around the world so that delays were acceptable. Consequently, BCCI could shift the funds in transition through the bank at any given time through an elaborate web of “shell game transactions” instead of cashing no-longer-existing deposits or holdings. By taking over, directly and through front-men, banks in various Third World countries, BCCI could then not only use them to expedite the smuggling of funds, but also use funds from legitimate deposits as a source of money for the shell game rotation.

Abedi fully exploited the illegality of the vast majority of the bank's businesses to further push his audacious schemes. He knew that most of his clients and victims could not afford to complain openly and/or were incapable of doing so. The local banks partially owned, but totally controlled, by BCCI held large segments of various Third World state's foreign reserves, which were deposited and then used as collateral for the “behavior” of governments and leaders. Moreover, these leaders were in no position to threaten BCCI because of its access to, and use of, terrorism and the Black Network.

Meanwhile, the early-1980s saw a growing intimate relationship between international terrorism, especially Syrian controlled Lebanon-based networks, and the main channels for the handling of petro-dollars from the Persian Gulf. Former French internal security officer Daniel Burdan considers the mixture of money and politics, characterized by corruption and convoluted business deals, as “the engine of terrorism.” This relationship grew particularly out of the ability of Lebanese businesses to adapt to the needs of different clients without losing their identity.

For example, for quite some time a single French banker in Beirut was handling and overseeing the bank accounts of most of Lebanon's diversified and rival groups (Maronites, PLO, Druze, etc.). These groups knew that trust and good management of money was essential

and therefore preferred to work with a trusted individual of proven quality irrespective of his politics. “Money is the nerve center of the war,” explained the French banker.

Daniel Burdan explains the symbiotic relationship between radical terrorists and conservative Gulf Sheikhs as a common financial interest. The unbelievable income of the terrorist leaders and their supporting governments (mainly Syrian leaders) are laundered by businessmen in circuitous deals where the dirty money is mixed-up with petro-dollars and then invested in Western Europe and the U.S. in legitimate businesses and frequently in real estate. This cooperation is sustained despite Syria's known involvement in, and support for, various radical subversive groups seeking to overthrow the regimes in the Persian Gulf.

Thus, BCCI stepped into the “booming” business of handling and laundering terrorist and drug money because of its close and unique relations with the Gulf Sheikhs and Emirs. BCCI had a special advantage over European banks that served as a special attraction to the terrorists, namely its impeccable Islamic credentials and relations with Iran. Sheikh Zayid al-Nahyan sought to consolidate these relations by establishing ADIA (Abu-Dhabi Investment Authority), as a joint company with the Libyan Treasury Secretariat and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance. Libya soon assumed financial prominence, being a major source of both terrorist and petro-dollar funds.

The management of ADIA was handled as a partially owned subsidiary of BCCI. This aspect is extremely important, as Iran, Syria, and Libya have been tightly controlling the emerging new system of international terrorism while several terrorist leaders are claiming and insisting on Islamic legitimacy.

Thus, despite the seeming diversity of its world-wide operations, as well as those of BCCI's subsidiary and “related” organizations, the truly important operations were conducted in a highly centralized manner under the tight control of Abedi, Naqvi and a few close friends, the vast majority of them Shi'ites based in Pakistan. Moreover, although the bulk of the capital came from Abu-Dhabi and other Gulf sources, the BCCI center in Pakistan was the dominant center of the entire BCCI network.

Thus, underneath the tight centralized control hub, the BCCI web of operations was organized in 5 main arms:

- BCC(E) – relatively clean bank and financial institution established primarily to shield money of Sheikh Zayid al-

Nahyan and his important friends in the Persian Gulf states, as well as the financial instrument to transfer to them the money stolen and/or skimmed off on their behalf from the holdings and assets of the BCCI.

- A myriad of investment companies in the Netherlands and Dutch Antilles to be used by, and in cooperation with, several Arab “investors” (many of them only fronting for BCCI’s capital) as an instrument of “legal” penetration into the U.S. banking system. Initially, the BCCI “legal” banking activities in the U.S., and especially Washington, DC, were aimed at generating political relationships and powerful contacts with leaders and dignitaries to be exploited in the Third World. (Other Abedi designs such as the channeling of laundered money into the U.S. were at a very early stage of implementation, if at all, at the time of scandal.)
- BCCI (Holdings) S.A. registered in Luxembourg with headquarters in London – a relatively respectable international banking institution with companies and branches in New York, London, and other European financial centers as well as the Third World. It served as a formal front for BCCI as well as the primary outlet, and instrument for extraction, dispersal, and investment of already laundered money.
- BCCI(O) registered in the Cayman Islands – the “dirty bank” component of BCCI. It was a functional myriad of banking institutions primarily in the Third World (and Florida) as well as the instrument of control over foreign banks partially owned by BCCI. BCCI(O) was optimized for dealing with the “dirty money” and other special financial needs of its primary clients, leaders and notables. The financial relations with foreign intelligence services, including the CIA, were conducted through BCCI(O).
- BCCI(P), a.k.a. the Black Network – the heart of Abedi’s empire building drive. It was the center of coordination with terrorists, companies with specialized services (such as the Gokal shipping empire, the Chinese weapons industries, etc.), companies co-owned with other countries (such as Iran, Libya, etc.), weapons and technology suppliers and buyers, the

supplies of drugs, alcohol and prostitutes to favorite clients and objects of extortion (Rifat Assad and the Bhutto brothers provided these services to BCCI), and other illegal activities. The meaningful relations with foreign intelligence services, mainly Arab and in the Third World, were conducted via BCCI(P).

The importance and centrality of the special services (ranging from embezzlement, to money smuggling, to weapons delivery, and to the supply of special requests) to Abedi can be deduced from the extent to which the BCCI financial empire was organized to meet the needs of its "special activities." Thus, relations between BCCI branches were organized to fit the primary flow of funds. For example, in the case of handling drug money, the Florida branch was made subservient to the Panama branch, and the Bahamas branch was subservient to the Colombia branch.

Similarly, for the BCCI-owned banks in Third World countries, BCCI(O) has a functional organization where the flow of authority (and funds) is determined by Islamic political considerations and not mere economic realities. In Nigeria, for example, the channeling of funds was handled in an indirect way to assist the Muslim north of the country to increase its power by enabling it to artificially control large amounts of foreign currency and the major flow of illegal funds. The local BCCI(N) was established in 1979 by Hajj Ibrahim Dasuki, a Muslim leader who has since become the Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of Nigeria's Muslim community. BCCI(H) S.A. owned 40% of BCCI(N).

The underlining objective was to elevate the economic power and influence of the Muslim community in the backward and discriminated against northern provinces. All means were justified. Thus, a few years later, using connections provided by BCCI(O), BCCI(N) was serving as the financial and organizational center for Nigeria's booming smuggling and drug-trafficking business that soon became one of the world's largest. The safety of the illegal funds and the ease of their laundering with petro-dollars, services provided largely by BCCI, were among the primary factors in the rise of Nigeria as a center for drug smuggling.

Meanwhile, BCCI(O), directly and through BCCI(N), intensified its relentless campaign to Islamicize Nigeria. In 1989, BCCI poured \$1.0b into Nigeria, ostensibly as a "development loan," in order to bolster the economic and political power of the Muslims after anti-

Muslim riots. However, a closer examination of the BCCI-supported projects shows that they were politically dominated rather than aimed at the betterment of the dire conditions of the local Muslims. The majority of the funds (not spent on bribery etc.) were spent on the building of Nigeria's National Mosque, one of Africa's largest and richest, and a host of Islamic Centers in Abuja, Nigeria's new federal capital. The completion of the mosque was celebrated in a huge conference on Islam in Africa in late-November 1989 where tens of thousands of participants were brought in from all over Africa to demand power and recognition.

The impact of this on Nigeria's politics and power distribution was immense. Nigerian Muslim activist Bilkisu Yusuf emphasized that as a result of this effort, "the Northernization and Islamization of Abuja have been apparent" throughout Nigeria. She pointed out that, as a consequence, "Islamic influence may erode... the 'secular' capital city," and transform the character of Nigeria.

The leaders of Nigeria, largely Christian Yorubas from the southwest, know very well what is happening. However, in return for allowing these Muslim activities, BCCI(O), directly and via BCCI(N), has assisted them in transferring illegal funds to safe accounts in London. The funds smuggled from Nigeria were both the fruit of personal corruption and of national funds, taken in violation of IMF guidelines, to be used to buy weapons and other forbidden goods, many with the help of BCCI(P). Little wonder, therefore, that despite the BCCI crisis, BCCI(N) continues to function in Nigeria, but now under the name of the African International Bank. BCCI(N) general manager Abdullahi Mahmud, a Dasuki loyalist, retains his position with the AIB. Money is collected from other Nigerian banks and from fund raising among Muslims in order to replace the BCCI funds.

Thus, the key to the success and durability of the BCCI financial empire (actually amazing considering that the bank's principals alone embezzled some \$15.0b from its assets) can be attributed to the workings of its inner core of "special services." Although these special services constituted the vast majority of the business of BCCI, they were concealed in a myriad of seemingly legal and proper financial activities. The level of inter-relationship between the various arms of BCCI and the extent of compartmentalization of the special activities of BCCI(P) protected the bank for a long time. Most, if not all, of the managers and high level officials in the various branches did not really know much about what was going on, especially about the nature of the

relationship with the “special” accounts, “creative paperwork”, the Black Network, etc.

Throughout the BCCI empire there were a few representatives of BCCI(P) concealed in each major bank branch who dealt with major and special clients. A knowledgeable Pakistani compared these BCCI(P) representatives to the brain, skeleton and nerve system of the body combined. These representatives were authorized to deal with “real business,” but not to make decisions. Their primary tasks were to keep in touch with the clients, promptly report to Karachi and London any request or development, and subsequently promptly participate in the implementation of the decisions from above. Key decisions were reached in personal meetings between the client (his representatives/agents) and key BCCI officials, all of them Pakistanis and Arabs, that took place in London, Geneva and other West European centers. Meetings rarely took place in the client's home country for safety reasons. Additional steps were handled and/or facilitated and expedited by the BCCI(P) representatives in the countries in question as needed and as agreed upon in high level meetings.

Abedi personally supervised the workings of his network and saw to the satisfaction of his special clients in his frequent trips throughout the Third World. In order to remove suspicion and add to the respectability and honor of BCCI, and its local clients, Abedi brought with him VIPs such as former President Carter and several Gulf Sheikhs on almost all his trips.

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At the heart of Abedi's empire building effort was the so-called “Black Network,” a cover name for a myriad of illegal activities on behalf of BCCI's most favorite regimes and rulers ranging from illegal arms acquisition and transfer to support for, and use of, international terrorism. As Abedi was developing closer relations with many Third World leaders, he learned of their “special needs” beyond flexible financing. These primary customers had other activities that involved large sums of money such as arms deals, recovery and handling of drug money, handling and transfer of cash and valuables overseas, personal need for drugs and prostitutes, etc. Many leaders were eager and willing to pay handsomely for the satisfaction of these needs.

Meanwhile, Abedi was making his first contacts with radical Palestinian terrorists. Gulf rulers who were supporting terrorists urged BCCI to help finance the terrorists in the name of Muslim solidarity.

Needless to say, it did not take Abedi long to learn of the other, profitable, side of radical Palestinian terrorism. By the early-1980s, Sabri Al-Banna (Abu-Nidal) was extorting money from rich Arabs in Europe, and many diplomats, especially representatives of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, had bought his “protection.” BCCI enjoyed the fruits of these operations by handling Abu-Nidal's extortion money.

As the scope of “services” BCCI was providing its clients expanded, it asked terrorists for assistance in operating against “uncooperative clients” or the enemies of good clients in such issues as blackmail, the “settling of accounts” for leaders, the collection of financial debts, etc. BCCI(P)'s relations with terrorist organizations were institutionalized in the early-1980s when Abedi established relations with Sabri al-Banna through the mediation and recommendation of Libya and Pakistan. Abu-Nidal was essentially “contracted” to provide specific services. Atif Abu-Bakr, Abu-Nidal's ex-deputy, explained that the Fatah Revolutionary Council got a major boost in 1982 and soon began recruiting candidates for its expert-terrorist cadres (intended to work in the West) in several countries, primarily Pakistan. Simultaneously, the organization was becoming a for-hire enterprise.

From this, there expanded cooperation between BCCI(P) and Abu-Nidal, who was now contracted to be available for special tasks for BCCI's key customers on a regular basis as an integral part of the favors and special services provided by Abedi in return for business, access, contacts, etc. These favors were also used as a reminder to the clients of BCCI's long reach. Before long, these activities became a major activity of the Fatah Revolutionary council. “Behind the soldier there is a businessman,” explained Atif Abu-Bakr. “Abu-Nidal opened up commercial branches in London, Athens, and Cyprus.” Atif Abu-Bakr explained that as of the mid-1980s, Abu-Nidal “just works for the highest bidder.”

Meanwhile, BCCI assisted the terrorists with their financial needs. Ghassam Ahmad Qassim, the manager of BCCI's Sloan Street branch in London, explained that, “the terrorist accounts had been set up with the knowledge of senior officials within BCCI.” Abu-Nidal had several accounts used to retrieve extortion funds, transfer funds as well as manage various arms procurement and transfer projects with radical Arab countries. Significantly, in November 1989, Abu-Nidal's rivals accused him of taking on “contracts” for non-Palestinian issues at the expense of their struggle.

With the effectiveness of BCCI's "special services" growing, regimes and leaders wanted their own operatives to take part in these operations to ensure that their vested interests were being protected. Not having operatives of their own, Gulf Sheikhs and Emirs asked the Government of Pakistan, with whom they already had security arrangements, to send representatives to BCCI. Abedi, long a confidant and admirer of Zia ul-Haq, was overjoyed with this development. Consequently, operatives and experts from Pakistan's ISI (both seconded active service and recently retired) as well as other Arab experts contracted by Sheikh Adham, joined the special activities of BCCI(P) and vastly expanded the scope of expertise available to its special clients. From this, the Black Network emerged.

Thus, in the mid-1980s, BCCI became an important instrument for facilitating major arms deals throughout the Third World. Again, BCCI's leading role has grown from a series of favors Abedi did for some of his favorite clients and friends into a major enterprise. BCCI shielded the transfer of funds from countries to sources of weapons in order to conceal certain deals and acquisitions. Abu-Dhabi provided false end user certificates to many of Abedi's clients to facilitate otherwise forbidden sales, and Abedi arranged for the Gokal brothers to provide discrete shipping. Clients were very happy with the BCCI(P) handling of these deals, even though the bank was officially charging a large overhead fee in addition to special payments extracted from the producers and sellers as well as the usual in-house skimming off the top accomplished through "creative documentation" during the deniable handling of the money.

For example, BCCI(P) established itself as a "representative" of several Italian weapons manufacturers in the Third World. With the help of ISI and Saudi Intelligence, BCCI(P) established relations with Italian arms manufacturers to facilitate the financial aspects of the supply of land mines and other military equipment to the Afghan mujahideen via Pakistan. [45] BCCI(P) exploited this exposure to build a wider arrangement whereupon BCCI(P) was representing Italian companies in several Third World countries, including facilitating deniable "forbidden" transactions (for example with Iran and Libya), as well as "roughing up" competitors to clear the way for "official" deals for the Italian companies that would then be financed via BCCI.

Similarly, by providing tempting financial conditions, BCCI was instrumental in enabling Abedi's close friend Asaf Ali to establish a firm hold over the Third World market for Dassault Mirages (both new and used) and other aircraft. BCCI made exorbitant profits from

overhead on overpriced spares and munitions, refurbishment and upgrading of used Mirages in Pakistan, and, in Arab and African countries, the providing of ex-Pakistani Air Force personnel as advisers.

The involvement of BCCI in weapons deals peaked with its comprehensive service for the covert delivery of strategic weapons. For example, BCCI(P) was responsible for the secret delivery of ballistic and anti-shiping missiles from the PRC to key clients such as Saudi Arabia. In this case, the deal was reached between senior Saudi and Chinese officials through the mediation of Pakistan. After that, the Saudis “buried” the required funds in a host of accounts in BCC(E) and BCCI-related companies that were ultimately delivered to the PRC through several BCCI accounts in Hong Kong.

Soon afterward, BCCI(P) arranged for the delivery of the missiles along with several Chinese and Pakistani experts in indirect ways on several ships owned by the Gokal brothers. BCCI(P) made huge profits through high overhead, as well as unofficial skimming, in each and every step of the transaction. The PRC preferred to conduct its export arms deals via BCCI(P) because the bank looked the other way when, according to some Pakistanis, the Chinese over-priced their weapons. Thus, the BCCI(P) involvement in discrete weapons acquisition had evolved by the mid-1980s into a major role in the financing and handling of the acquisition of nuclear technology by Pakistan and later also by Iran.

Although BCCI kept the specifics of most of its weapons deals highly confidential, Abedi established an aura as the guardian of the Third World. He spread rumors and hints about his key contribution to such issues as the “Islamic bomb” or the overcoming of the Western refusal to provide high quality weapons to the developing world. This image of Abedi and BCCI as the champions of Third World revival and honor, and not the dire economic implication of BCCI's collapse, dominated the reaction in the Third World to the BCCI scandal.

The drive on BCCI is part of “a fierce campaign gaining momentum these days and aiming to besiege elements of Islamic potential,” according to Hassan Turabi, the Sudanese secretary general of the Arab and Islamic Peoples' Conference. “The bank had been flourishing and, from the view of the superpowers, had surpassed the limits they have set” for Muslim institutions, Turabi said. “It is a huge Jewish conspiracy,” argued a Pakistani official. “The Jews backed by Americans don't want to see a Muslim bank flourish.”

For the U.S., and the West, the ramifications of this reaction in the Third World are grave because not only is imperialism (the U.S.) being blamed for a major economic crisis in an already devastated part of the world, but BCCI's association with Islam as the motive for Third World revivalism would serve to further enhance the influence of activist anti-Western Islam as the dominant ideology of the Third World and, consequently, would incite more youth to join the anti-U.S. terrorist organizations that openly identified with BCCI.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

BCCI: Between Peru & Washington, D.C.

September 10, 1991

Beginning in the late 1970s, it became imperative for Agha Hassan Abedi, BCCI's head and founder, to have a banking system and financial infrastructure through which he could rotate money inside the U.S. for the support of his clients, allies and protégés. In this situation, the acquisition of 1st American, the 1st American of Georgia (National Bank of Georgia), the Independence Bank (Encino CA), and the rapid rush to buy interest in additional banks was intended primarily to expand the financial support network of the BCCI global empire. Moreover, the availability of secure local sources of money, it was expected, would significantly help in expediting major terrorist operations inside the U.S. by providing easy access to cash, the sources of which would be well concealed by BCCI's convoluted paperwork.

In this context, Peru has rapidly become a major springboard for the infiltration of key terrorist personnel and equipment into the U.S. Consequently, a terrorist infrastructure has been joined onto a rapidly growing narcoterrorist system. In fact, since the mid-1980s, BCCI has played a crucial role, albeit a supportive one, in the consolidation and expansion of Peruvian narcoterrorism and in its cooperation with international terrorist operations, particularly those of the Abu-Nidal

Organization. In the process, BCCI has contributed to the subversion of Peru as a fledgling democracy.

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The role and involvement of BCCI in Peruvian narcoterrorism was most significant in several distinct areas ranging from Presidential policies to the training of terrorists. Indeed, BCCI's banking procedures constituted an integral factor in the economic policies of President Alan Garcia (1985-1990) during his term of office. In return, President Garcia was able to maintain a standard of living way beyond what his official annual salary of \$18,000 would normally have permitted. Indeed, on 16 August 1991, the Peruvian House of Representatives officially accused President Garcia of "looting the country of as much as \$50 million and moving that money through Bank of Credit offices into foreign bank accounts."

This sum is cited merely because, to-date, the transfer of some \$50m in personal funds from Lima to an assortment of Panamanian bank accounts in the name of the President's wife via BCCI has been traced. The full extent of Garcia's personal fortune is still unclear, but the source of his wealth is mainly plundered assets of the national treasury, especially skimmed off funds deposited in BCCI, pay-back interest on Peruvian official deposits, and payment for "special services" rendered to BCCI and its special customers.

The most overt involvement of BCCI in the Peruvian economy centered on the deposit of around 25% of the national hard currency reserves in BCCI during 1985-87. In order to expedite the execution of the deal, BCCI paid \$3m to two officials to carry out the transfer, (ignoring legal prohibitions on the depositing of more than 10% of those reserves in one bank,) as well as to overlook the shipping of these funds to BCCI's Panama branches. Garcia knew about both the illegal deposits and the bribe paid to his senior officials.

Using these funds as collateral, BCCI then assisted Garcia in "taking on" the IMF with "favorable loans" totaling about half the deposits. In reality, these loans were made at extremely high rates (average of 1.5% above standing rates), especially in view of the huge collateral. Moreover, when Garcia announced that Peru would not abide by the debt repayment schedule mandated by the IMF, BCCI concealed Peruvian assets overseas in a web of artificial and bogus companies and accounts to prevent their seizure by creditors. Reportedly, Garcia received a share of all of these transactions.

Subsequently, in 1987, Peru withdrew its national reserves from BCCI accounts after a political storm resulted from public accusations of pay-offs to high officials.

Also of significance were the “special services” provided by Peru to BCCI, which were crucial to the success of BCCI's involvement in international arms deals. For example, Peru provided the arms brokers of BCCI(P) with false end user certificates for several major weapons deals. In one case, Asaf Ali, a friend of Abedi and a major arms dealer in the Third World, used Peruvian end user certificates in his acquisition of Dassault Mirage combat aircraft and related equipment for his major customers, including the Gulf States, Libya and Pakistan.

* * *

Most important and indicative of BCCI's impact on Peru's state policies was its facilitation of the subversion from above of Peru's national anti-drug policy. Indeed, the primary reason that Peru is rapidly becoming the world's primary source of cocaine is that the narcoterrorists have been able to, since the Garcia Presidency in the mid-1980's, transform the country's coca growing regions into a state within a state.

Former Peruvian official Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano argues that Peru's ability to prevent the expansion of the narcoterrorists' power was “further aggravated by the state's refusal to acknowledge and address narcoterrorism as a single social, military, and political entity.” In 1988, she points out, government officials “realized that the fight against narcoterrorism was being lost, largely because there was no comprehensive program to counter it.” These observations are highly significant because the formulation of Peru's drug policy, the declaration of a state of emergency in certain regions, and the allocation of forces and assets to the war on narcoterrorism were all concentrated in, and handled from, the office of the president. Thus, Garcia was instrumental, if not decisive, in preventing the consolidation of a cohesive and effective anti-drug policy and anti-terrorist strategy in the crucial years of the consolidation and entrenchment of the narcoterrorist infrastructure.

Thus, the magnitude of Peruvian drug exports has significantly increased since the late-1980s as a direct result of the close alliance between the drug lords and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL; full name Partido Comunista del Peru por el Sendero Luminoso del Pensamiento de Jose Carlos Mariategui – Communist Part of Peru on

the Shining Path of the Thought of Jose Carlos Mariategui), a quasi-Maoist terrorist organization under the absolute control and ideological guidance of Abimael Guzman (a.k.a. President Gonzalo). In the mid-1980s, Guzman justified to his followers the close alliance with Peru's drug mafia on the basis of support for Peru's oppressed peasants. The result has been that Peru's drug industry has expanded tremendously, via the combination of a criminal network underpinned by ideological commitment.

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With this criminal-ideological basis in place, Guzman's closest aide, Osman Morote, began opening Sendero Luminoso (SL) operations into northeastern Peru, and especially the drug heartland of the Upper Huallaga Valley, in 1984. In 1985, the SL established a permanent armed presence on the fringes of other populated areas. Soon afterward the SL assaulted the government presence in these areas and began winning over the hearts and minds of the impoverished peasant population. Subsequently, in 1986-87, Guzman declared the valley a "liberated area," having expelled the police, army, and other government facilities.

In due course, the Upper Huallaga Valley became the heart of Peru's cocaine-paste manufacturing and drug trafficking operations. Upon penetrating the valley, SL established a close alliance with the local drug lords. Juan Pablo Rosas Mesias, a mid-level electronics expert who defected from SL in mid-1989, highlighted the centrality of the alliance between the drug mafia and the SL: "One of Sendero's principal centers of operation is the Huallaga area where it receives the narco-traffickers' orders," he said. "While narco-trafficking exists, Sendero will not disappear."

Although the SL's ideology insists on a Spartan puritanical life style, the SL leaders were convinced, to some extent by foreign ideological influences, that their support for the drug lords would significantly contribute to "the corrosion and demoralization of the Yankee imperialists." By the late-1980s, Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano points out, "the Upper Huallaga Valley, in effect, had virtually become a state-within-a-state, governed by Sendero and supported economically by the cocaine producers."

Thus, at present, SL provides the drug mafia with vital services. As part of their anti-establishment struggle, SL forces repeatedly attacked and virtually disarmed the local security and law enforcement forces.

Consequently, the SL revolutionary assault on the Peruvian government has been transformed into direct assistance to the drug mafia through relentless attacks on police and other authority installations involved in anti-drug operations, as well as through the assassination of government officials, the blowing up of bridges and the blocking of roads, thus isolating the mafia “liberated zones” from the threat of attacks by government security forces while regulating commercial traffic into and out of those zones.

Meanwhile, the Sendero Luminoso, having started as protectors of the peasants, that is the coca growers, from the abuses of the drug mafia's strong men and gangs, as well as from the occasional anti-drug campaigns of the government, evolved into the representative of the population vis-à-vis the drug lords themselves. Indeed, SL leaders have reached agreements on cooperation with the drug mafia that include assuring higher prices for the peasant's produce and facilitating the removal of most gangs.

In return, SL became responsible for the uninterrupted and growing flow of coca leaves. Indeed, as an integral part of SL's education and agitation campaign to win over the peasants, the SL organized the peasants and imposed a strict work regime and puritanical life style, more than doubling the production rates of coca leaves the Upper Huallaga Valley in the process. The massive education and indoctrination effort also reduced migration, crime rates and indiscipline among the peasants.

Indeed, once a liberated area was established, it became imperative for the SL to ensure itself sole access to the local population, which in turn made the organization responsible for its welfare and for its crop. In fact, SL forces now provide guards for coca processing facilities and local airstrips, safety from police raids, and assistance in all phases of coca processing and delivery. Consequently, by 1989, the Upper Huallaga Valley had become the world's primary coca cultivation area and simultaneously it has also become the Sendero Luminoso's greatest base of popular support.

Thus, at present, the drug trade is at the heart of the SL's activities. “Narcotics trafficking has become the financier of the so-called 'armed struggle,' which the Sendero Luminoso movement is carrying on,” wrote *El Comercio* on 28 June 1990. Toward that end, “Sendero Luminoso has practically established total control of this 'business' in the Upper Huallaga Valley.” The SL has also increased their cooperation and trade with “international drug mafias and hired assassins.” The drug money and the safe havens have enabled the SL to

increase the size of its armed force from 2,000-3,000 in 1983-4 to close to 10,000 by mid-1987, as well as to improve the training of its professional units, and support expensive urban operations.

Its growing fortunes have also enabled Sendero Luminoso to expand its hold over the drug trade in Peru. The SL has acquired sophisticated radio equipment for communications, monitoring and jamming of government communications and SL spies have provided access to government codes and used the data they have obtained to warn the drug mafias of impending government raids. Further, in 1991, there has been an expansion of SL involvement in support of drug trafficking in that the SL now provides Colombian and local planes guidance to isolated jungle strips. (Evidence of this became available when Peruvian security authorities recently exposed a network of mobile high-powered beacons used to guide planes to sites of choice.)

The SL has also introduced fixed payments for services provided to the drug planes. Each plane is charged \$10,000 per landing with security provided by SL detachments. Permits for purchase of drugs from local facilities costs an additional \$15,000, with the SL providing guidance and security to the drug trafficking crews. The money collected is used to further expand the drug trafficking support system, with it estimated that 50% of the money goes to the SL's national budget, 40% to expand local SL infrastructure, and another 10% to local forces and the population.

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It is within the context of the emerging "liberated areas" in the Upper Huallaga Valley that the SL, BCCI and the drug lords have established a tripartite alliance. The estimated distribution of gains in 1988, for example, in itself explains BCCI's interest in Peru and its willingness to subvert the Garcia government to, in effect, self-paralyze its anti-drug policy.

In 1988, total income of the Peruvian drug lords was around \$28b. Of this, the growers were paid \$0.24b (0.86%), the local traffickers \$7.236b (25.84%), and the international traffickers \$20.524b (73.30%). BCCI handled most of these funds and SL was paid by the traffickers at least 1% of their gross income, thus totaling at least \$0.25-0.30b a year. The money collected by the SL itself in the Upper Huallaga Valley comes atop this sum.

The vast majority of the money paid to locals, in excess of \$7.0b a year, is returned to Peru. In order to fully exploit this asset, SL entered

into money handling operations in Peru on behalf of the drug lords and in cooperation with BCCI in 1986-87. To handle these funds, Guzman established a separate "Department of Economic Works in the Armed Struggle" which was "in charge of all money transactions for the various areas of subversive activity." SL insists that, "all business must be conducted in U.S. dollars or in Intis [the Peruvian currency], but must be calculated at the daily exchange rate."

To facilitate this, SL forces first drove the legitimate national banks virtually out of the Upper Huallaga Valley and assumed responsibility for the financial services of the local population, and ultimately, the drug mafias. In the town of Xion, for example, SL is in charge of currency exchange. SL militants supervise the arrival of intermediaries with U.S. Dollars in cash and the "fairness" of exchanges to Peruvian Intis. SL also supervises the payment, mainly in Intis, of the peasants and the bulk of the local traffickers (reportedly, except for their leaders) and then designates the moneychangers and agents with whom business can be done.

Consequently, SL has in effect assumed control over the bulk of the hard currency fuelling the local economy and commerce inside Peru. Because foreign exchange earnings from normal exports largely disappeared in Peru by the late-1980s, the bulk of Lima's economic establishment must rely on "narco-dollars" (Ocona dollars) to sustain operations, ensure imports, etc. These "narco-dollars" are acquired via SL and its agents. Currently, it is estimated that the "narco-dollars" constitute around 20% of Peru's legitimate GNP, compared to the 1.4% of the GNP that constitute legal exports.

From its center in Panama, BCCI handled the other side of these financial arrangements beyond the mere laundering of drug money in the U.S. BCCI regulated the out-of-country flow of currency, the laundering and arrangements of "narco-dollar" accounts in Peru, etc., all for sizable fees. As these SL-BCCI arrangements were further institutionalized, the cash factor was reduced, with Sendero Luminoso's agents collecting Intis from interested parties in Lima and using them to pay the peasants and the local traffickers. BCCI then unfroze dollars from the drug lords' accounts in Panama for the purchase of imported goods. The exchange rates in these deals were extreme, thus maximizing the profits of the tripartite alliance. Needless to say, these arrangements have had a growing impact on Peru's economy since the national reserves were frozen as collateral for a BCCI loan and the local economy was starved for hard currency.

BCCI also contributed to the increase in the quality of weapons available to the SL by its handling of money transfers between Brazil and Peru. At first, these arrangements were used to ship chemicals and other equipment. For example, in early-1990, for the first time, police captured imported weapons, most notably Brazilian made Uru M-1 submachine guns, from the SL's urban units. The police believe that 300 Uru M-1s had already been smuggled into Peru by the spring of 1990.

Further, intelligence data from Brazil suggests that some 3,000 machine guns were sold to the SL and drug barons. There are fundamental ideological ramifications to this development since the importation of weapons contradicts a revolutionary tenet of Mao and Guzman that guerrillas only seize and capture their weapons from their enemies. Thus, the imports of the Brazilian submachine guns are a clear indication that the availability of easy drug money has caused cracks in the ideological purity of the SL.

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The major impact of BCCI on the SL's military capabilities was in expediting the SL's adoption of urban warfare tactics and terrorism as of 1987. Indeed, urban operations have become so important to the SL that it has established an urban command. Further, in mid-1990, Peruvian police discovered that in 1989/1990, Guzman divided the SL into two equal branches: the Revolutionary Movement of the People's Defense, responsible for all terrorist activities in urban areas, and the veteran Revolutionary Front of the People's Defense, which is responsible for all activities in the rural area.

In any case, urban operations could not have taken place without a massive infusion of terrorist expertise and knowledge from veteran international terrorist organizations. Indeed, in early-1988, BCCI arranged for the Abu-Nidal Organization to begin assisting the SL to consolidate its urban operations as well as provide training in advanced sabotage techniques. BCCI remained the connecting agency and handled the funds for Abu-Nidal. Atif Abu-Bakr, Abu-Nidal's ex-deputy, explained: "In 1989, for example, he [Abu-Nidal] made more than \$4 million in Peru. Cocaine money, to be sure." This money was shipped via the London branches of BCCI. In all of this, the Abu-Nidal touch was immediately apparent with the SL's urban assassination techniques and tactics being virtually identical to those used by Palestinians and the West European terrorists trained by them.

The Abu-Nidal Organization was also involved in terrorist operations in Peru. A senior Abu-Nidal operative, Hussein Bouzidi, and two aides were arrested in Lima in the summer of 1988 following a bombing attempt on the U.S. embassy. In April 1990, they were released after an intense campaign by the local PLO office and allowed to remain in country. Then, on 24 July 1990, there was an assassination attempt on Yaacov Hasson Ichab, the executive director of human relations for the Jewish community in Peru. The evidence collected, and the examination of method, tactics, and weapons used, suggested that the attack was carried out by "a Shining Path death squad" with the "participation of a clandestine cell of the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal group." Indeed, when arrested, Bouzidi had a hit list in his possession that included Hasson's name.

Urban operations have thus become integral to the SL strategy. The SL terrorist campaign in Lima and other towns in connection with the 1990 elections, while straining the organization's assets nearly to the breaking point, and while ultimately incapable of preventing the elections, did expose a solid and fairly well organized urban infrastructure with a growth potential given the allocation of the right assets.

This infrastructure was revitalized, on behalf of Arab causes, in connection with the Gulf Crisis. As of mid-January 1991, the SL led anti-U.S. pro-Saddam Hussein demonstrations, complete with the burning in effigy of President Bush. In the following months, there were several bombing attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities, but no specific perpetrator among Peru's several urban communist terrorist movements emerged. On the basis of bomb technologies and techniques, SL operatives are nevertheless believed to have been responsible for some of these bombings.

In the meantime, under Alberto Fujimori, there has been a rejuvenation of the Peruvian war on the SL, but despite some localized initial success, the effort is still far from breaking the backbone of the narcoterrorism alliance, especially in the countryside. Indeed, in September 1990, there was a marked escalation in SL attacks on security forces. The SL did have some military problems during these strikes because the organization seems to have overstretched its assets. Nevertheless, the SL is rapidly expanding its hold over the drug producing valleys and is intensifying its intimate alliance with the drug mafia.

It is in the valleys that the interests of international terrorism, such as those of the Abu-Nidal Organization, are concentrated. This stems,

in part, from their modus operandi. In Islamist international terrorism, sophisticated operations are conducted by expert terrorists who infiltrate into a target country for the execution of specific operations. If needed, they also smuggle in the specialized equipment they might require.

However, by the mid 1980's, there was apprehension among the key terrorist states, mainly Libya, Syria, and Iran, that the United States might launch massive retaliatory action if they were discovered by American intelligence to have been involved in any act of terrorism on U.S. soil. These states therefore began to assist their terrorist clients in an effort to establish access routes into the U.S. outside of the normal diplomatic channels. Of these, Peru became a favorite access route, particularly for Abu-Nidal's group.

Thus, the "liberated areas" in Peru constitute safe havens with proven means of illegal transportation into the U.S. They serve all of BCCI's main interests; not just as instruments of vast financial gain but also as places for anti-imperialist activism. In this context, BCCI provides the narcoterrorists with vital services such as the laundering and handling of funds overseas.

Moreover, ideologically at least, even the Sendero Luminoso has a commitment to terrorism in the U.S. because it is a member in the International Revolutionary Movement, a union of 19 radical-Maoist revolutionary organizations that includes the U.S. Revolutionary Communist Party. The IRM's charter calls for mutual assistance in the pursuit of world revolution. Thus, with the SL's increasing funds and power, it seems increasingly likely that Guzman might now be tempted to assist those who are committed to the cause of America's destruction.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

BCCI and the Financing of Terrorism

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The collapse of BCCI has exposed a relatively obscure facet of international terrorism, namely the financing of terrorism. Since the early-1970s, it has been clear to terrorist sponsoring states that the conduct of international terrorism, particularly spectacular operations against and in the West, are an extremely expensive undertaking. Thus, the financing of terrorism is one of the main, though definitely not the most important, reasons for international terrorism being subservient to, not just supported by, states. However, in order to establish a curtain of plausible deniability, the sponsoring states have used a web of supporting international financial institutions to facilitate direct contacts with terrorist networks. BCCI and its sub-companies have featured prominently in this financial network.

The origins of this interrelationship go back to the late 1970's. By that time, Islamist thinkers could see no other way out of the perceived crisis of Islam other than to pursue an all out confrontation with the West: "We are at war. And our battle has only just begun. Our first victory will be one tract of land somewhere in the world that is under the complete rule of Islam... Islam is moving across the earth... Nothing can stop [it] from spreading in Europe and America." For

Islamic fundamentalists, the Iranian revolution represented the initial victory in that struggle.

Khomeyni brought with him unprecedented Islamic zeal and an unwavering commitment to the launching of a Jihad against the West. Ayatollah Khomeyni emphasized Iran's commitment to the spread of the Islamic Revolution in his New Year Message on 21 March 1980: "We must strive to export our revolution throughout the world, and must abandon all idea of not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to recognize any difference between Muslim countries, it is the champion of all oppressed people." Teheran was anticipating an aggressive Jihad because, explained Sheikh Mortaza Motahari, such is the essence of Islam: "Islam is the religion of agitation, revolution, blood, liberation and martyrdom." Little wonder that the mullahs of Teheran were expecting a major confrontation with the West. "Exporting the revolution is for them [the mullahs] an ideal means of inciting war," explained Bani-Sadr.

Thus, from the very beginning, the Islamist movement was determined to export the Islamic Revolution to Western Europe. This drive was further instituted in Teheran in September 1981 when the newly established Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution was given the mission to coordinate terrorist operations in Western Europe. However, in the early-1980s the masters of Islamist terrorism were already confronted with the contradiction between ideological commitment and practical limitations. Islamist leaders, and especially European based leaders, were urging Teheran to export the Islamic Revolution to Western Europe. "In the sphere of theology, there is no giving up the battle," warned one British Muslim leader.

At the same time, however, Teheran was fully aware of the complexities and costs involving the conduct of terrorist operations in Western Europe. Therefore, out of pragmatic considerations, the HizbAllah decided to consider the early-1980s as "an era of sowing the seeds of tomorrow," namely, as a time to establish a major terrorist infrastructure in Western Europe.

Indeed, the current Islamist terrorist networks in Western Europe are the product of Teheran's long-term investment. In 1979-80, Iran concentrated on the establishment of "dormant networks" that could be kept in place for years until the arrival of "executors" with specific targeting information and their own ammunition and explosives for the carrying out specific missions. After the completion of the operation, another "dormant" net was to take over the exfiltration of the executors

of the operation while the original net went back underground until the next operation.

For example, a network of 1 Lebanese and 7 Tunisians inserted into France in 1979 was not exposed until March 1987. Similarly, a Lebanese net inserted into Spain in 1980 was not exposed until November 1989. In addition, Iran began inserting into Europe HizbAllah terrorists and operatives that were members of specialized so-called Strike Units.

In order to insert large quantities of explosives and related equipment into target countries, the HizbAllah established a web of import-export companies in Western Europe as part of its dormant network. Lebanon's leading Shi'ite businessmen, including Muhammad Hammud, who would later become a key financier of BCCI, provided crucial expertise, organizational and financial assistance without which projects could not have been undertaken. Consequently, at the present time, virtually all Iranian/Shi'ite international organizations, officials, bankers, and international transportation companies (shipping, airlines, etc.) receive formal instructions from Teheran and participate in this campaign. For example, the network in Spain established the Alissar (Al-Yassar) Importing and Exporting Company, which imported the shipment of explosives concealed in food cans from the Qirtas Conserve Company in Shtura (owned by the HizbAllah and a group of supportive wealthy Lebanese), and distributed it throughout Western Europe.

Meanwhile, as these terrorist infrastructures were being created, the hostile anti-Western policies of Khomeyni's Iran alienated the West, and once the American embassy was seized in November, Iran became a pariah state. All this time, Teheran was escalating its military preparations for a Jihad. Thus, by mid-1979 (even before the Iraqi invasion in September), Iran was already busy establishing financial networks in Western Europe for both the support of terrorism and the acquisition of military equipment.

At first, the financing of the Iranian activities and acquisitions was conducted through the official Iranian international banks – Bank Sepah Iran and Bank Melli – as well as through Swiss banks. However, the intensifying embargo and the growing isolation of Iran largely neutralized these banks as instruments for clandestine financial transactions. Moreover, Teheran was facing crises that were threatening to paralyze the Iranian ability to operate in the West irrespective of the Republic's “outlaw” standing in the international community. The majority of Iran's banking and financial elite, especially those operating

overseas, were Shah loyalists and were hated and mistrusted by the Khomeynists. Therefore, after the Revolution, Iran was in a dire need of experts who could help it operate in the international financial community. Thus, international bankers were to be drawn from the Lebanese and Indo-Pak Shi'ite communities already involved in international business and financing. Enter BCCI.

One of the high level bankers Teheran approached for assistance was Agha Hassan Abedi, known for his commitment to Islamic revivalism, whose BCCI had the reputation of a rising bank in London in the late-1970s. Agha Hassan Abedi and many of his close associates, including the Gokal brothers, were Indian-born Shi'ites and believers in Sufi mysticism. Their families traced their roots to the same tight Shi'ite community as Khomeyni's forefathers and shared many of its values. From early-1980, Mehdi Hashemi, then head of the Department of Islamic Liberation Movements and the HizbAllah launched an intense effort to resume a relationship with, and gain wholehearted cooperation from, the Indian Shi'ite clans. The Gokals already had a proven record of fierce commitment to Iran, as the elder brother, Hussein Gokal, had been hanged in Baghdad in 1969 as an Iranian spy, compelling the three surviving brothers – Mustafa, Abbas, and Murtaza – to leave Iraq and rally to Teheran's banner. Thus, during the 1980s, the Gokal companies would emerge as the primary facilitators of the transportation of strategic goods to Iran. "We did everything for Iran," explained a former high company high official.

Teheran was right in its approach. By late-1979, an ad-hoc company, commonly called "The International Metro" and dedicated to the clandestine acquisition and delivery of weapons and other military equipment to Iran, was created with headquarters in London [Abedi's headquarters] and a major office in Geneva as the center of transportation operations. Although illegal, "The International Metro" had a strict financial arrangement with the Iranian government whereby the SAVAMA (Iranian intelligence), owned 51% of the company and a group of Pakistani and Arab financiers led by Abedi owned 49%. Within 6 months of its creation, the company had established a web of shell companies all over Western Europe, which were to be used to conceal the source of the millions of dollars that were to be disbursed for the acquisition of large quantities of weapons and equipment.

In the meantime, the gravity of the situation of the Iranian banking system had become apparent as Teheran had repeatedly failed to provide proper letters of credit and had made blunders in financial transactions between Teheran and the covering bank in London.

Nevertheless, by late-1980, as the need for military supplies began to dramatically increase, Teheran and its supporters managed to establish an effective support mechanism for the military acquisition network. "The International Metro," as an instrument of minute and direct management of clandestine weapons acquisition, quietly faded into the background.

Concurrently, as mentioned above, Khomeyni had ordered in mid-1979 the establishment of specialized Strike Units [Goruh Zarbat] in order to take revenge against the enemies of the revolution. Ayatollah Sheikh Sadiq Khalkhali was put in charge of the operation that, on Khomeyni's orders, was to include a worldwide assassination campaign. An initial phase of the operation was to insert terrorists and operatives into the West. On 8 August 1981, the Council of Minister appropriated about 1 billion rials to finance operations of "the HizbAllah members who are dispatched to foreign countries as students" against the enemies of the regime. The distribution of these funds, supervised from London, was to be a milestone in the development of the Iranian – Hizballah financial system.

In 1981, Aziz Nizafatkah, a very close confidant of Khalkhali and a protégé of Khomeyni, was sent to London under the auspices of the commercial attaché in the Iranian embassy. His original mission was to oversee the distribution of the funds for the Strike Units' operatives. However, by 1981, London was the nerve center of Iran's weapon acquisition efforts in Western Europe. In view of his authority and the large sums of money involved, Nizafatkah was soon the determining authority on all financial issues in Europe and thus became responsible for the oversight of the finances of the weapons acquisition. He soon began to overcharge suppliers, demanding bribes, which he used for both financing Khalkhali's operations and for personal gain for himself and his superiors. He bragged that his "signature costs 10% of the deal's value/worth..." His opponents called him "Mister 10%."

Nizafatkah's right hand man was Hojjat ol-Islam Muhammad Ali Ansari. A bearded young operative that looked very much like a HizbAllah student and not the senior official that he really was. He established a separate office in London near Hyde Park from where he supervised all Iranian subversive activities in London, from checking on and organizing the incitement of young Islamists, to ensuring their financial status, to detailed accounting of the diplomatic community's activities on behalf of Khomeyni's revolution. Ansari was destined to rise to prominence.

Indeed, by the late-1980s Ansari had become a confidant on the personal staff of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamene'i, and took charge of such major matters as correspondence with Ayatollah Khomeyni. Meanwhile, in the early-1980s, both Nizafatkah and Ansari had already consolidated control and oversight over the Iranian financial activities in the UK, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, France and Greece. Consequently, the financing of terrorism and weapons acquisitions were now run through a single system.

The close cooperation with the Iranians and the exposure to their sense of mission and ideological-religious zeal had an accumulating impact on the Lebanese Shi'ites working with them. Until the mid-1970s, the Lebanese Shi'ite elite had considered itself an integral part of Lebanon's international commercial elite. They were proud of their "Europe-ness" and did their best to widen the gap between themselves and the impoverished Shi'ite masses. The efforts of Imam Mussa al-Sadr to reawaken a sense of Shi'ite identity were successful only in prompting the elite to contribute funds to the Imam's Shi'ite charities. Their political activism was muted and largely confined to rallying behind Shi'ite members of Parliament within the established elite.

However, after the consolidation of the Khomeyni revolution, there was a sudden reawakening and rediscovery of communal identity, which led to a willingness to do more for the Shi'ite cause. The subsequent close contacts with the Iranians, primarily in Western Europe, influenced the Lebanese Shi'ite elite to become active in the furthering of Shi'ite causes in Lebanon.

The clan of Muhammad Hamud underwent such a transformation. The Hammud clan was, and indeed remains, one of the richest Lebanese Shi'ite clans and was known in the 1960s-70s for its cosmopolitan character. The true ideological affiliation of the Hammuds and their commitment to the cause of the HizbAllah were clarified only in 1982-83 in the course of the consolidation of the radical-militant leadership over the Shi'ite community in Lebanon.

Indeed, since the late-1970s, there had been two trends vying for the leadership of the Shi'ite community. The traditional Amal movement, led by Nabbi Birri, had advocated that the community concentrate on the betterment of its social and economic stature within the context of Lebanon. By contrast, Islamist leaders, led by Sheikh Muhammad Shams al-Din and Sheikh Sayyid Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah, (who would ultimately organize the HizbAllah), argued that the future and fortunes of the Shi'ites were as an integral part of a global Islamic revolutionary jihad led by Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The actual power struggle for the leadership of the Shi'ite community between Birri and Shams al-Din, the results of which would determine the community's character and future, began in early-1982. [27] The chaos in Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli invasion and the arrival in Lebanon of several Iranian SAVAMA and Pasdaran [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps] experts to organize the international terrorist system further exacerbated the situation. By early-1983, the balance of power had clearly shifted in favor of Khomeyni's supporters. Consequently, Shams al-Din broke off all relations with the leaders of the Harakat Amal, thus in effect recognizing and consolidating the HizbAllah's supremacy in the Lebanese Shi'ite community.

Consequently, the Lebanese Shi'ite community was now led by a radical partnership of Shams al-Din and Fadlallah. During this process, Muhammad Hammud put the entire weight of the clan behind the successful struggle of the militant elite, especially Sheikh Muhammad Shams al-Din, for the dominance of the Lebanese Shi'ite community.

Subsequently, the Shi'ite community underwent a cataclysmic transformation during 1983 as a result of the spectacular suicide bombings in Beirut (carried out by Syria and Iran but attributed to the Lebanese Islamic Jihad) and a sudden escalation of the armed resistance against the Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. The essence of the transformation as it was manifested in the Hammud clan was best reflected in the activities of their "black sheep" offspring relatives in rural southern Lebanon, most notably their nephew, Muhammad Hammud of Kafr Milki.

The nephew Hammud was a commander of a local Harakat Amal militia unit that had been extremely active in pursuing a nationalist program, including fighting against PLO and other Palestinian forces to keep them from operating in Shi'ite areas because their presence provoked Israeli Defense Force attacks that only hurt the Shi'ites. However, in the summer of 1983, nephew Hammud shifted the focus of his operations and began leading his militia in attacks against the Israeli forces until he was arrested. There was nothing in the prevailing situation in southern Lebanon to warrant Hammud's drastic change. Instead, his change of position was the result of a "diktat" from the heads of the main Hammud clan in Beirut.

In the meantime, by the fall of 1983, as already noted, Birri had conceded defeat and stated that there were no differences between his position and that of Shams al-Din. Simultaneously, Shi'ite hostility toward Israel hardened following the Nabatiya incident (where an

Army convoy stumbled into an Ashura procession, resulting in riots and armed clashes). Subsequently, in his Ashura sermon, Shams al-Din called for “comprehensive civil resistance against Israel,” and on the next day he issued a formal fatwa demanding resistance against Israel and decreeing that those cooperating or even having contacts with Israel would go to hell. The extent of the urbane Shi'ite elite's support for this position was to be reflected in more calculated follow-up measures. Thus, in late-November Shams al-Din conducted a sit-in protest in the Al-Safa Mosque in Al-'Amiliyah (Beirut) that was attended by many of the notables of the Shi'ite community, including the Hammuds, who were, to say no more about it, conspicuous in their western suits.

Eventually, the prestige of the HizbAllah reached new heights in the mid-1980s in the wake of the spectacular suicide bombings, hijackings and other acts of terrorism in which militant Shi'ites were seen to be attacking the greatest powers on earth and to be succeeding. At the same time, however, the West began to organize its reaction to the emerging terrorist threat with security forces in Western Europe closely watching known militant Islamists and institutions affiliated with the HizbAllah. These challenges did not reduce the determination of Teheran and its protégés to consolidate and strengthen their dormant networks all over Western Europe, but support for their operations could no longer be accomplished through direct Iranian financing or even through the vast network of Shi'ite and Islamist religious centers.

Instead, the Iranians began establishing a web of companies and small businesses to support members and components of their dormant networks. With the assistance of the KGB, East European and Libyan intelligence agencies, a myriad of commercial, financial, media, cultural, educational, religious and diplomatic fronts were created. Lebanese Shi'ites featured prominently in this network.

Meanwhile, the early Iranian success with terrorism in Europe quickly caught the eye of Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. Consequently, Qaddafi decided in July 1984 to expand his European operations beyond simply eliminating his opposition in Europe, and began building an Islamic constituency that would influence Western policies vis-à-vis Libya. Through the Shi'ite financial elite, Libya offered Iran unlimited access to Libyan backed financial fronts in return for access to the Iranian terrorist infrastructure.

Thus, it was not long before Libya constituted an integral part of the Islamist campaign against Western Europe. In order to satisfy Teheran, key operatives in Western Europe, and especially France,

were to be Lebanese Shi'ites. For example, a Shi'ite called Mustafa Hemad coordinated Libyan covert operations in Europe. At the same time, the Shi'ite dominated Islamic Call Association established a series of front branches and Islamic associations throughout Western Europe in such countries as France, Italy, Belgium and Germany for the support of dormant terrorist networks. The Libyans joined this Iranian-led campaign with money and access to local assets and agents.

Meanwhile, beginning in 1983-85, there developed a growing integration of the two types of Shi'ite commercial elites operating in Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa: (1) the traditional cosmopolitan Lebanese, like the Hammuds, who were sliding to a greater identification with their roots and background; and (2) members of the Shi'ite traditional regional elite that has branches in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, and who used to have commercial affiliations in Europe. Back in the late-1970s, the "Westernized" members of the traditional families had rallied around Khomeyni, especially during his stay in Paris. By the early-1980s, these clans were given advantages in the lucrative commercial-smuggling business with Iran and the Iranian-dominated networks in such places as West Africa. Simultaneously, the "Cosmopolitan" Shi'ite commercial elite, already increasingly committed to the Shi'ite cause, sought ever-closer ties and cooperation with Khomeyni's allies.

At the same time, the Islamist infrastructure in Western Europe markedly expanded, reflecting the radicalization of the Muslim émigré community. By the mid-1980s, the Shi'ites were everywhere in Western Europe, quietly infiltrating the local Muslim communities in order to penetrate them, gain control and subvert them from the inside. A myriad of legal and quasi-legal institutions, including religious, cultural, social and economic support services, sprang up all over the continent. This web also concealed and sheltered the HizbAllah dormant networks and served as a source of manpower for further recruitment of Europe-based terrorists.

Islamist organizations and states poured, and indeed continue to pour, money into these institutions. The conservative Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, pumped millions into the Islamist institutions mainly through two establishment banks: the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI). Currently, the bulk of Sunni activities are under the supervision of Salem Azzam, the general secretary of the London-based Islamic Conference, ostensibly Riyadh's closest ally. However he has been part of Iranian-controlled network since 1986.

Meanwhile, under the dynamic leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) significantly expanded its international operations. By the late-1980s, the MB had gained control and influence over several major Islamic financial institutions operating in the West such as the Islamic Holding Company, the Jordanian Islamic Bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank, and the Faysal Islamic Bank. Subsequently, by early-1991, the MB saw in the establishment of the Taqwa Bank in Algeria the beginning of “a world bank for fundamentalists” designed to compete with Western financial institutions. Indeed, Salem Azzam had been working on such a scheme since the mid-1980s. In addition, virtually all Iranian-related institutions such as student associations, humanitarian foundations, scholarships, international organizations and officials, bankers, and international transportation companies received formal instructions from Teheran and support for the various legal and quasi-legal institutions.

Under the cloak of its various front groups, Iran and its allies established a solid network for the conduct and sustaining of international terrorism all over Western Europe. Currently, the Iranian headquarters in charge of European operations, as well as the key organizational and transit bases, are situated in France. The pure terrorist functions are sustained financially via international companies established by the Shi'ite international commercial elite, but are actually controlled by key HizbAllah leaders who recycle funds received from Iran through “legitimate” import-export transactions and shift them to the dormant networks via Western-based banks. These funds are used to support individuals and organizations, as well as serve as venture capital for the establishment of small local businesses, like shops and restaurants, within the émigré community that sustain the dormant networks.

In turn, the organizations created with these funds act as recruitment centers for terrorists. For example, the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic cultural center in France serves as a meeting and recruitment place for the Iranian-HizbAllah networks. Muhammad Bakir Sayid Fadlallah, the brother of Ayatollah Mohammad Hussayn Fadlallah, is one of the main organizers of the Ahl al-Bayt centers and is in charge of its Paris branch. He also operates a religious bookstore used for the conduct and coordination of HizbAllah clandestine communications. These activities are financed via international import/export companies tightly controlled from Beirut by Ayatollah Fadlallah, but managed and run in France by a few loyalists, all of them Lebanese Shi'ites from the cosmopolitan clans who frequently used pseudonyms.

For example, one of the main businesses controlled by Fadlallah is a monopoly on the importation of grain to Iran, which is also used for the transfer of large funds to the networks in France. A precondition for the success of these financial activities are banks with “flexible” services permitting laundering and the shifting of cash. The Hammuds were directly involved in these activities. Moreover, one of the main “contribution generating” Ahl al-Bayt of Fadlallah's brother was in Evian, where, according to BCCI documents, M. Hammud had a major real estate holding (estimated by BCCI at \$752,000 in 1986) with a mortgage to BCP.

It is also important to note that some of the initial organization of the Iranian intelligence and terrorist networks in the UK was conducted by Mohammad Reza Narachan, the Ambassador to London. [46] By the early-1980s, the Iranians had succeeded in establishing a network in London and when the HizbAllah threatened British government buildings in early November 1984, a HizbAllah member explained: “We have people in place. They are just waiting for orders.”

Subsequently, by 1985, London had become the SAVAMA's primary center for intelligence collection and the oversight of clandestine activities. Currently, Ayatollah Shahabadi, of the Islamic University, runs from London an Iranian espionage network and personally “determines the missions and the operations in Europe in the name of Teheran.” At the same time, the London branches of BCCI have become ever more secretive. Indeed, the Arab Bankers' Association complained that, “trying to get any information out of it [BCCI] is almost impossible.” In this context, the Hammuds are responsible for the handling and oversight of the overseas funds of the HizbAllah (Islamic Jihad) networks through their bank accounts in Western Europe, including in BCCI's Sloan Street and Park Lane branches in London.

The Hammuds and their colleagues were also instrumental in the consolidation of the myriad of Shi'ite-controlled international businesses and import/export companies that operate between Europe and the Middle East via Francophone West Africa, and which are used as a cover for the smuggling of weapons, explosives and funds for the Iranian-HizbAllah networks in Western Europe. It should be added that once the effectiveness and success of these networks was proven, Iran and Libya began using them to assist their allies, that is, the KGB and the East European intelligence services.

As of the early-1980s, Iran began rapidly penetrating the Muslim communities of Africa with the operation directed from Sierra Leone

and its large Lebanese Shi'ite community. In 1983, Mehdi Hashemi established the center of SAVAMA operations for all of sub-Saharan Africa in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where Hassan Shoshtarizadeh, a veteran of HizbAllah subversion in Bahrain, was nominated the Iranian Ambassador. Vast Iranian and Shi'ite Lebanese financial assistance and investment contributed to the quick consolidation of Iran's position. The Lebanon-born Sheikh Hussayn Shihadin became the leader of the Shi'ites of, and Khomeyni's representative to, West Africa with headquarters in Freetown. Consequently, Sierra Leone became "a hub of Shi'ite terrorism."

Just how important is West Africa to the new system of international terrorism and the intelligence services sponsoring them can be learned from the recent events in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was, in the 1980's, one of the most corrupt states in the world, with an illegal smuggling and financing system safely in the hands of its 25,000 strong Lebanese community. Sierra Leone was also a key front for the acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems and electronic equipment for Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and East European intelligence services cooperating with them. Most of these acquisition and supply operations were organized and financed by Abu-Nidal's people, led by Samir Najmeddin via the Park Lane branch of BBCI.

For Sierra Leone, its transformation into a terrorist center began when President Joseph Momoh took power in November 1985, promising a swift eradication of the prevalent corruption. While still maintaining close relations with the Lebanese community and Iran in order to ensure the flow of cheap oil, Momoh approached Israel for help to stabilize the country and the economy. In Israel, Shabtai Kalmanovich, a Soviet émigré very close to the Labor Party leadership, immediately launched an intense lobbying effort to win a monopoly on assistance to Sierra Leone. Soon afterward, Kalmanovich's LIAT Co. established a vast network of activities in Sierra Leone ranging from providing security to Momoh and his aides to a variety of public sector development programs.

Despite a promising beginning and Momoh's resolve in the face of rising political violence from pro-Lebanese factions, the situation worsened. LIAT's campaign to reclaim the transportation (smuggling) system was clandestinely transformed into support for the Lebanese network so that by late-1987 some 90% of Sierra Leone's gold and diamond production and exports were controlled by the illegal networks.

The reason for LIAT's dismal failures became clear in January 1988 when the Israeli security forces announced the arrest of Kalmanovich as a Soviet spy on 23 December 1987. (He was convicted in September.) When he was originally sent to Israel in 1971 after a lengthy "struggle" to emigrate, Kalmanovich was to be the KGB's primary deep penetration agent, who would reach the top of the Israeli establishment. Hugh Hambleton, the top KGB Canadian agent had been sent to Israel twice to study economic and emigration conditions in preparation for the insertion of an important KGB agent as a Soviet immigrant.

Indeed, within a little over 10 years, Kalmanovich was near success. He was well established in the upper echelons of the Labor Party and on friendly terms with a wide variety of senior government and military officials. Although by the late-1980s he had still been unable to penetrate key military-technological facilities, he was climbing fast in political circles and might have achieved his objectives within some 5-10 years.

Then suddenly Kalmanovich utilized his political capital to win the Sierra Leone contract. (Reportedly, he had even assisted and financed Momoh's rise to power.) Soon after LIAT won the contract, Kalmanovich's traveling to the USSR and other contacts with KGB operatives all over the world became so intense that he was exposed as a spy in due course.

The ever prudent KGB would not have endangered an illegal of Kalmanovich's caliber had it not been for a higher priority. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that the control of the Sierra Leone system must have been so important to Moscow, not to mention its Iranian and Syrian allies, that the KGB was willing to sacrifice one of its best illegals in Israel in order to prevent and destroy the emergence of Sierra Leone's economy from the Iranian-Shi'ite hold. Indeed, by 1990, the Shi'ite hold over Sierra Leone was stronger than ever.

The unfolding of the BCCI scandal and the exposure of its unique role in supporting the myriad of Iranian clandestine activities, ranging from illegal weapon acquisition to the sponsoring of international terrorism, points to the magnitude of the Iranian threat to the West. "The Iranian threat is not expressed only in terrorism, but also in the decay caused by the pursuit of profits and double dealing that undermines and destroys the political life of the Western democracies."

However, it was the Lebanese Shi'ite cosmopolitan elite, led by the Hammud clan, which rallied to the HizbAllah's flag and actually established and ran the financial infrastructure that made it all happen.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

BCCI and The Nuclear Question

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On 21 October 1991, Pakistan, for long a known yet not acknowledged nuclear power, crossed the line and created a precedent. In a Karachi meeting, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb, officially acknowledged that Pakistan was a nuclear power. "It is a fact that Pakistan has become a nuclear power and is at present concentrating on manufacturing sophisticated arms to fulfill its requirements," Dr. Khan stated.

The Pakistani nuclear program is but the first of several Third World nuclear programs in an advanced stage of development. Several radical terrorist sponsoring states – notably North Korea and Iran – are themselves close to completing the construction of their own nuclear weapons. Further, Iraq, despite the damage it sustained in the coalition bombings and UN inspection, might still be able to quickly resurrect its program. This surge in nuclear weapons acquisition is the culmination of a process begun in the 1970s when several radical states committed to ambitious military nuclear programs.

The conditions in the Third World were uniquely suitable for such a commitment. The socio-political climate in the Third World was dominated by a growing radicalism, mainly Third Worldism that would

soon be augmented by revivalist radical Islam, and that was commonly expressed through hostility toward the West. Simultaneously, there was a sudden rise in the financial capabilities of a few Third World countries primarily due to oil revenues, and, later, to the flow of humanitarian and economic assistance from the West.

Ironically, although all the current Third World nuclear weapons programs are supposed to symbolize and demonstrate the rise of the "South" to an equal footing with the West, virtually all of these projects are totally dependent on the flow of technologies, expertise, and specialized equipment from Western sources, mainly Europe. Indeed, none of the emerging Third World nuclear powers in Asia and Africa, perhaps with the exception of India, has the educational, scientific and technological infrastructure capable of sustaining such ambitious undertakings. Their national programs are totally dependent on imports. Thus, the rise of the radical nuclear effort was impossible without a vast financial and transportation system that channeled funds to the West and saw to the safe and discrete transportation of the goods to their ultimate destinations.

BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, was instrumental in the acquisition and transfer of these military nuclear technologies and equipment from Western Europe to several Third World countries. In fact, Agha Hassan Abedi, BCCI's founder, was openly committed to the creation of an "Islamic Bomb," and in his intimate talks with Third World leaders he indicated strongly his desire to contribute to such issues as the "Islamic Bomb" and the overcoming of the West's refusal to provide high quality weapons to the Third World. Thus, he, and BCCI, assisted the military nuclear effort of the radical Third World as part of their commitment to the South v. North struggle. Indeed, Abedi's support for the Pakistani nuclear effort continues. In his October 22 speech, Dr. Khan announced the establishment of the new Gulam Ishaq Research Institute in Topi for a cost of 1.25 billion rupees and that "500 million rupees had been given by Agha Hassan Abedi of BCCI."

In fact, the Pakistani and the North Korean military nuclear efforts are the most conspicuous examples of the services that were provided by BCCI. Both countries were assisted in the name of the "Islamic Bomb," and BCCI joined the North Korean effort on behalf of Libya and the support for Islamic, that is Libyan and Iranian, efforts. Indeed, the Iranian bomb is, with the help of BCCI, emerging as the ultimate "Islamic Bomb."

Thus, in the nuclear context, the importance of BCCI should be examined in terms of the radical Third World's access to Western expertise and equipment. The main challenge facing the aspirant nuclear powers was not the availability of the required Western technology. Rather, the main problem was one of overcoming state and international restrictions and regulations. This could be solved by concealing the origin and destination of the products and technologies purchased and involved two technical challenges: Bringing in the money in a way that the deal would appear legitimate and then transporting the goods out of country again in a legitimate way to a bogus destination.

It was in overcoming these challenges that BCCI and its myriad of related companies proved instrumental. Another challenge with some of the potential suppliers, both in dual-use technologies, but especially in the highly specific technologies with only military applications, was to convince them to cross the line into the “gray” market. At times, BCCI arranged to put pressure on these suppliers, even sometimes calling upon the services of Abu-Nidal's and/or Pakistani thugs to do its “dirty work.”

* * *

The best example of this relationship is seen in the Pakistani effort to acquire nuclear weapons beginning in the 1960's. After Pakistan's defeat in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vowed to retain a strategic balance with India at any cost. “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative,” he said in 1965. However, it took the humiliating defeat of 1971, when Indian forces occupied Eastern Pakistan and transformed it into an independent Bangladesh, to get Pakistan to become fully committed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, Bhutto assembled Pakistan's leading scientists in a tent in Mutlan in January 1972 where he delivered a passionate speech about the shame of defeat and how imperative it was for Pakistan to have nuclear weapons. He then asked the scientists if they could develop a bomb and they responded with enthusiasm. Bringing up what seemed a note of caution, Bhutto pointed to a higher objective when he explained that, “this is a very serious political decision, which Pakistan must take, and perhaps all Third World countries must take one day...”

Pakistan was thus committed to a national crash program to have an "Islamic Bomb." [5]

Ultimately, it would be under the 11-year rule of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq that Pakistan would become a nuclear power and define a coherent nuclear strategy. Ironically, the military that seized power under Zia in 1977 was opposed to the nuclear weapons program, fearing the impact of the drainage of financial resources that such a project would represent. However, there was a widespread recognition that nuclear weapons were Pakistan's only viable deterrent against an Indian conventional onslaught. Indeed, some strategists even urged the recapture of Kashmir under a nuclear umbrella.

Consequently, Zia became committed to the nuclear option as a last resort instrument to save Pakistan "with the whole world against him." Moreover, Zia saw in the acquisition of nuclear weapons a key instrument to break Pakistan's isolation and transform it into the leader of a reinvigorated Muslim world. Thus, in July 1978 he outlined his perception: "China, India, the USSR, and Israel in the Middle East possess the atomic arm. No Muslim country has any. If Pakistan had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world."

Unfolding events, and especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, brought Pakistan's fledgling nuclear doctrine back to basics. In early-1980, President Zia ul-Haq learned from America's National Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski, that the U.S. had no intention of committing forces to defend Pakistan in case of a Soviet invasion. As Islamabad's involvement in the war in Afghanistan escalated, Islamabad's doubts as to the validity of an alliance with the U.S. began to grow. The primary strategic role of the Pakistani nuclear weapon thus became one of creating a weapon of last resort, a symbolic trip wire against massive assaults by the USSR and India.

Consequently, it therefore became imperative for Pakistan to establish an independent nuclear deterrent. As alluded to above, an important aspect of the value of nuclear weapons is the deterrent factor, which is possible through public knowledge of a nation's nuclear capability. In this context, BCCI played an important and crucial role in making known the existence of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Khalid Khan, one of Abedi's closest aides who was then in charge of the various publications advocating Third Worldism was the primary source for the initial expose of the Pakistani bomb. (Claims that he was fired for leaking the story proved unfounded.) This disclosure would have a profound impact on the extent of the direct involvement of Abedi and BCCI in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

In any event, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program really began in earnest in 1974 when Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan returned to Pakistan and convinced Bhutto that he could build Pakistan a bomb within 6-7 years. It was Dr. Khan who selected Kahuta as the site for the main reactor and defined the various technological processes to be used for building the bomb. That said, the Pakistani program was plagued by the non-existence of a genuine scientific-technological infrastructure in Pakistan. Virtually all the components and equipment needed for the Kahuta project had to be imported. Toward the end of securing those imports, Islamabad organized a comprehensive procurement system with the help of expatriate Pakistanis.

This system was based on “Pakistani buyers who are willing to organize and finance clandestine but not necessarily illegal purchasing channels; Western commercial sellers... who are motivated by commercial, not non-proliferation, aims; and the Western national authorities who are supposed to enforce nuclear exports regulations in conformity with their commitment to the nuclear treaty but whose record in this regard is on the whole poor.” In the mid-1970s, most imports were acquired quite openly under the guise of peaceful energy-related nuclear research. Thus, the Pakistanis were able to import major components from Western Europe and complete a “pilot project.”

However, beginning in the late-1970s, there developed a growing awareness of the military character of the Pakistani nuclear effort, and several states began limiting Pakistan's access to technology and equipment. With the 1980 discovery of the Pakistani commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons, a near total clamp down on any applicable export to Pakistan was imposed. Consequently, in the early-1980s Islamabad felt a growing urgency to expand its nuclear program in order to complete the production of a few nuclear weapons before the situation in southern Asia reached crisis proportions. The combination of Pakistan's fear for its national survival and the changing climate in the West thus lead to the establishment of Pakistan's clandestine network for the acquisition of nuclear technology and production equipment.

In the meantime, in the early 1970's, Dr. Khan dispatched Dr. S.A. Butt, one of the very first principal participants in the Pakistani nuclear effort, to establish and organize “Pakistan's surreptitious purchasing network” with headquarters on the outskirts of Paris. The actual procurement effort was conducted by people not directly associated with the Pakistani nuclear program. Known as the “unofficial people,” they were mostly Pakistani businessmen with overseas connections.

Most prominent among these businessmen were Mian Faruq, a Karachi businessman, and three individuals working under the assumed names, Mr. Arshad, Mr. Amjad and Mr. Abid, who conducted the procurement efforts in the U.S., Canada, UK, Switzerland, West Germany, Italy, France, and Holland. They concentrated on equipment and materials on export-control lists and sent the equipment first through Turkey, and later through more complex routes. For non-listed yet sensitive equipment, such as specialized machine tools for production of re-engineered equipment already in Pakistan, the Pakistanis established several front companies in Pakistan. The most important material was purchased in the name of the Karachi Textiles Mills and the Machinery Coils Factory. BCCI Holdings of Luxembourg provided the required letters of credit directly and through several front institutions.

Thus, as world attention began focusing on Pakistani procurement efforts, the more sensitive purchases were conducted via bogus companies registered in different countries. ISI (Pakistani intelligence) officers and middlemen were sent abroad to approach expatriate Arabs and Pakistanis, preferably with local citizenship, and convince them to purchase dual-use key components in the name of bogus companies that were actually fronts for the Pakistani government.

For example, a 3-man team – Anwar Ali, I.A. Bhatti and Eng. Abdul Azziz Khan – worked in Canada trying to purchase diversified electronic equipment both in Canada and in the U.S. They asked their local front men to purchase the equipment for the Khalid Jassam General Trading Co. of Abu-Dhabi. This “company” was little more than one small office in the Arab Bank Building in Toronto, then BCC(E)'s headquarters, registered to Abdus Salam, a Pakistani purchaser of specialized electronic equipment.

As this acquisition spree kept expanding, each of the Pakistani fronts specialized in specific technologies. For example, the Khalid Jassam General Trading Co. of Abu-Dhabi specialized in electronic components, the Source Reliance International of London specialized in centrifuge components, and the Weargate Limited of Swansea specialized in inverters.

By the early-1980s, the Pakistani procurement network was quite efficient, and was particularly effective in West Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland. For example, Pakistani agents approached the Leybold-Heraus electronics firm in Cologne, then performing engineering and service work for the West German Government's uranium enrichment plant in Gronau, with a request for key parts of

uranium enrichment centrifuges. In order to avoid government inspections, two executives of Leybold-Heraus approached in June 1983 the Swiss company Metallwerke Buchs with a proposal to build autoclaves – highly specialized equipment for enrichment plants – on the basis of blueprints from Gronau, although Leybold-Heraus had a production line of its own near Frankfurt. The produced autoclaves were then transferred to a French company that in turn delivered small quantities to a series of electronic companies in Dubai and Kuwait. From there, they were shipped clandestinely to Pakistan. This arrangement worked quite effectively until early-1987 when the West Germans exposed the Pakistani connection.

Meanwhile, the Pakistanis continued their operations in Canada and the U.S. using proven methods. For example, Brig. Inam ul-Haq arrived in Canada in 1985-86 as a senior buyer. Among the businessmen he approached and convinced to assist Pakistan was Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian. On ul-Haq's instructions, Pervez established a company in Willodale, Ontario, and began purchasing diversified equipment, including such dedicated items as beryllium and tens of tons of specialized maraging steel on behalf of obscure Pakistani companies. In these deals, Pervez always had excellent letters of credit from several branches of BCCI in Luxembourg, London and Toronto. He promptly paid high prices with money delivered to the Toronto BCCI branch from BCCI London through a cut out in the Isle of Man branch of the Habib European Bank.

However, ultimately, Pervez was exposed and arrested on 11 July 1987 when he panicked during a licensing session and tried to bribe a U.S. Customs undercover agent. Not surprisingly, Brig. ul-Haq vanished immediately afterward. Undoubtedly, Pervez was not the only purchaser employed by Brig. ul-Haq. Nor was ul-Haq the only Pakistani purchasing agent operating in the U.S. and Canada. Indeed, a second network was exposed in California in late-July 1987.

Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to expand its procurement efforts in Western Europe and especially West Germany. Several of West Germany's key firms established dedicated subsidiaries that bought and exported militarily applicable nuclear technology to Pakistan. Such exports were conducted both directly to fronts in Pakistan and to several overseas clearing sites. In early-1989, Bonn estimated that between 1982 and 1988 some 70 West German companies were active in the export of nuclear technology and equipment to Pakistan. Little wonder that some of Pakistan's best buyers were reassigned to Western

Europe. One of them was Brig. ul-Haq who traveled repeatedly between Pakistan and West Germany, but who was subsequently arrested on 11 July 1991, after trying to enter the country with a false passport.

In any event, Pakistan had demonstrated nuclear weapons potential since 1987, and was known to have “hastily assembled at least one nuclear weapon during the nose-to-nose confrontation with India in late 1990.” Thus, Pakistan stuck with Zia ul-Haq's doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons as the last resort for insuring Pakistan's survival against India and the USSR. However, Zia ul-Haq's pan-Islamic worldview has also been expressed in the willingness of the Pakistani government to facilitate and expedite other Islamic, primarily Iran's, nuclear weapons programs, but not at the expense of, or as part of, Pakistan's own strategic weapons programs.

In fact, it is through its close cooperation with Iran that Pakistan indirectly assists other radical states, including Libya and North Korea. Furthermore, Pakistan's assistance to Libya closes a circle of cooperation in military nuclear issues that began in the 1970s when Libya committed itself to all-out support for the fledgling Pakistani program. Although lacking scientific and technological infrastructure of its own, Libya has provided distinct and important services to its allies.

* * *

Among the radical leaders, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi is the most overtly committed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Being fully aware of Libya's technological and scientific backwardness, he began seeking shortcuts to the acquisition of a nuclear bomb. With an abundance of petro-dollars at hand, Qaddafi was eager to buy what he could not develop. “A few years ago, we could hardly manage to procure a squadron of fighter planes. Tomorrow, we shall be able to buy an atom bomb and all its component parts,” he explained.

At first, Qaddafi tried to help Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's nuclear program. In February 1974, Qaddafi and Bhutto shook hands on an agreement for massive Libyan support for the Pakistani military nuclear effort in return for what Qaddafi expected to be “full access” to an “Islamic Bomb.” Soon afterward, Libya began pouring money into Pakistan. Indeed, at one point, a plane loaded with \$100m in cash for sensitive procurements “for the nuclear program” arrived in Islamabad to sustain a major illegal deal overseas. Qaddafi also arranged for Niger

and other African countries to supply Pakistan with large quantities of uranium through Libya in return for Libyan oil and cash. However, in 1978, as Zia ul-Haq's Islamabad began transforming the objective of its military nuclear program from the creation of an "Islamic Bomb" to a more narrow "Pakistani Bomb," Qaddafi was cut out of the process.

Nevertheless, the determined and indefatigable Qaddafi pursued a multitude of other daring schemes to acquire nuclear weapons. One of the more daring, and almost successful, initiatives involved, if not BCCI as an institution, then the clandestine transportation and covert action networks associated with and often used by BCCI and was intimately connected with Libya's relationship to the island nations of the South Pacific.

In this connection, Libyan clandestine activities in the South Pacific took on a peculiar significance. Thus, in 1984, Libya began a policy of support for the liberation struggle in the region and began a corresponding increase in its activities. Thus, Libya sought and established contacts with the most radical elements in the islands, at first, with the New Caledonia rebels and then with the Vanuatu government. In mid-1984, Qaddafi provided travel costs, training and indoctrination in Libya for several groups of militants from the National Kanak Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS) of New Caledonia. Simultaneously, Eloi Machoro and Yann-Celene Uregei, the leaders of the United Front for the Liberation of the Kanak (FULK), visited Libya clandestinely in July-August 1984 to seek help and coordinate military assistance against the French. FULK is a small radical militant faction within the FLNKS that, like many other revolutionary organizations, takes responsibility for armed actions, which the father organization can deny and disavow.

In September 1984, Yann-Celene Uregei and Eloi Machoro led a group of 17 young militants on a month-long military training effort in a Tripoli complex. The militants were trained in the use of firearms, explosives and protective security, that is, in the organization of a guerrilla struggle. Returning from Libya, Eloi Machoro declared that the FLNKS would use "every means" toward independence. Another FLNKS leader, Nidoish Naisseline, threatened that New Caledonia was moving in the direction of becoming another Lebanon. He warned that the Kanaks were determined to get "independence with cooperation [from France] or by guerrilla struggle." Despite this, the initial contacts did not greatly enhance the Kanak struggle.

This fact notwithstanding, the Kanak revolutionaries nevertheless provided Libya with a variety of vital services. In late-1984, the Kanaks

provided a diversion and a starting point for one of Qaddafi's most audacious covert operations – the stealing of nuclear weapons or key parts from the French test site in Moruroa.

Beginning in mid-1984, there had been reports of “about 150 foreign soldiers led by white officers” operating in support of the Kanaks in remote parts of New Caledonia. These officers could not speak French, but some of their troops were local Melanesians. They were all well armed and equipped. There were also reports of a mysterious ship supporting the Kanak revolt and other island movements by landing additional forces. Consequently, reinforcements of French paratroopers were brought to Nouemea from other parts of the Pacific. This force did not arrive to assist the Kanaks, however, and with French forces in the south Pacific preoccupied with the apparent escalation of the Kanak revolt, the “mercenaries” and local militant islanders succeeded in stealing key spare parts sufficient for the construction of 3 atomic bombs from the French test sites. These parts were loaded into 3 containers that were subsequently shipped to Europe. One source suggested that the presence of Arabs, Pakistanis and Europeans in that group of mercenaries points to the possibility that Libya was aided by BCCI's Black Network.

The containers were then shipped to Switzerland via a myriad of front foreign-registered companies, mainly in Western Europe, as well as individuals, many of them Lebanese Shi'ites, who handle the more sensitive front and finance operations for Qaddafi. This specific operation was under the oversight of a Lebanese named Jibril Thanuri/Tanuri, who had already been involved in various illegal arms procurement and smuggling for Qaddafi and other Middle Eastern clients. Thanuri/Tanuri transferred the containers to an Italian insurance company owned by the Libyans that hid them in the vaults of Swiss banks for nearly two years. In July 1986, Thanuri/Tanuri tried to ship the containers to Libya via Genoa, Italy, but the local police, investigating some of his other arms smuggling deals, stumbled onto the 3 containers and seized them.

Meanwhile, the close cooperation between Libya and the Kanaks continued. A high-level Kanak delegation took part, along with other radical groups in the South Pacific, in the Tripoli International Conference of the International Center for Combating Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction and Fascism in mid-March 1986. Most important was the FULK's role in the conference. In early-1986, Yann-Celene Uregei pointed out that the West “might regard Libya as the

devil, but for the people of New Caledonia it is France that is the real devil.”

Subsequently, in March, Uregei led a group of 8 Kanak militants to the conference and then stayed for additional training. Upon returning from Tripoli, Uregei declared the establishment of the Melanesian Revolutionary Alliance in order to coordinate and improve the struggle of the FULK, OPM and the Vanua'aku Party. FULK and the FLNKS would serve as the vanguard militant movement for escalating the armed liberation struggle.

In the meantime, since the mid-1980s, North Korea (DPRK) has become Libya's most promising source for acquiring nuclear weapons. The ensuing cooperation between Libya and the DPRK involves the same clandestine acquisition and transportation networks used by BCCI and its affiliated organizations such as the HizbAllah and Iranian intelligence. (These were discussed in a previous Task Force report.)

That said, the North Korean military nuclear program can be traced back to the 1950s, when Kim Il Song sought to balance the impact of the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. At first, the DPRK's program was only a minor part of the regional socialist nuclear umbrella provided by the USSR and ultimately also by the PRC. Indeed, both countries provided North Korea with its nuclear facilities and the training of its scientists and experts. In addition, the PRC provided the DPRK with military nuclear technologies in the mid-1970s while insisting on the DPRK's remaining within the Chinese nuclear umbrella. Still, Pyongyang's commitment to the development of nuclear weapons grew markedly in the mid- to late-1970s.

Subsequently, a crash program of building diversified nuclear facilities optimized for military use, especially in the Yongbyon area, began in 1980. The emphasis was on indigenous capabilities and self-sufficiency in both nuclear raw materials and basic technologies. Significantly, the new reactor was based on proven Soviet and British technologies of the 1950s and not on an expansion of the Soviet-Chinese reactor technologies already available to the DPRK. Thus, in September 1980, the DPRK began construction on a 30mw gas cooled reactor; a configuration extremely efficient for producing Plutonium, completed most construction in 1984, and activated the reactor in February 1987.

Meanwhile, the strategic cooperation between the DPRK, Libya, Syria, and Iran was strengthening. It was the combination of Pyongyang's rejuvenated and increased commitment to an anti-U.S. confrontational strategy, and its access to both Iranian Western-

educated scientists and the Libyan clandestine procurement infrastructure that convinced Pyongyang to significantly expand its military nuclear program even before the initial phase of its plans were complete.

In fact, the DPRK had an excellent relationship with the Iranians and Libyans. By the mid-1980s, Western-educated Iranian experts and North Korean military experts and technicians designed and built Libya's chemical weapons' factory on the basis of Western off-the-shelf technology procured semi-clandestinely. (The comprehensive strategic, military-technological cooperation between Iran and the DPRK is outside the scope of this report.) Ko Yong Hwan, a recent high level defector, explained the highest levels in Pyongyang concluded in 1985-86 (or thereabout) that they "cannot cope with the situation with conventional (classic) weapons; therefore nuclear weapons must be developed... [as] the last means for preserving their political system."

Thus, in 1984, the DPRK began the construction of a major new military nuclear complex in the Yongbyon area built around a new reactor at the 50-200mw range dedicated for weapons production. Construction was near completion in 1989 and the reactor is expected to be activated in 1992. Similarly, a prototype reprocessing facility was completed in the late-1980s and it is believed to be producing some plutonium. The work on a reprocessing facility for nuclear fuels began around 1988 and it is expected to become operational around 1994. Moreover, the DPRK also built highly secret underground facilities in Paekchon. Since underground facilities are extremely difficult to reconstruct, the mere fact the DPRK has committed itself to an underground military nuclear facility reflects its confidence in its technological capabilities.

One reason for the DPRK's confidence is the sudden access to Western nuclear technology, mainly West German, it gained in the mid-1980s. The DPRK was able to use the illegal procurement network established by Libya and later expanded by Iran in order to acquire technologies needed for their diversified military projects.

For example, the Hisham Barbuti, a Libyan notorious for his efforts in aiding Libya's chemical/biological warfare programs, had a close relationship with the H & H Company that was supplying nuclear technologies to Iraq. Barbuti bought additional systems applicable for nuclear uses for another client fronted by Libya. In another case, a small quantity of U.S.-manufactured Zirconium (used to improve the enrichment process of fissionable material in nuclear devices) was transferred by the West German company Degussa AG to the DPRK in

1986-87. This very small quantity was vital in providing the North Koreans with a standard of purity to work against in developing their own purification production process using the locally available major deposits. The same Degussa AG was among the primary suppliers of nuclear-related equipment and technologies to Pakistan through intermediaries and fronts affiliated with BCCI.

Indeed, Ko Yong Hwan confirmed that the North Korean nuclear program utilized diversified technology from West European sources, mostly France, Austria, and West Germany, and that the systems purchased were transshipped via central and west Africa. As discussed in a previous Task Force report, these are clandestine lines of communications controlled by Iran and Libya and frequently used by BCCI and its special clients. Some of these were financed through BCCI-affiliated front companies. Also, BCCI had already established clandestine financial links between Pyongyang and Dubai when it facilitated the acquisition of North Korean S-23 180mm artillery by Dubai. As already discussed above, Dubai is the site of front companies used by Pakistan in its nuclear purchasing efforts.

Another indication of the sudden acceleration and expansion of the North Korean military nuclear program was the corresponding yet sudden increase in the need for nuclear materials. In response to this need, the North Koreans launched a concentrated effort for a speedy acquisition of uranium and cobalt via Africa. Most of the materials were purchased from Libya's traditional suppliers in central and west Africa. [Material provided by sources in Europe.] Shipment was done by the African Transportation Company, a front company for Libyan intelligence that is managed and financed in Africa by Muhammad 'Ali Hijazi, a Lebanese Shi'ite, and that operates out of the Central African Republic.

Consequently, the DPRK was able to accelerate its military nuclear development programs. In fact, South Korean intelligence changed its estimates of North Korea's operational nuclear capabilities, going from an expected completion date for an operational nuclear weapon of 1995-1996, the 1989 estimate, to 1992-93 in 1991. This revised estimate was reinforced by the discovery that the DPRK had already built "a nuclear detonation device testing site," and had accelerated the development of its new mobile SCUD-derivative, the primary nuclear SSM. A successful test launch was completed in early-October 1991.

All of this has taken place at a time when the Third World, especially the Muslim world, but also such radicals as the DPRK and Cuba, see themselves as besieged by a U.S.-led West and as being on

the road to a fateful confrontation with the U.S. This sense of inevitable confrontation has become especially strong in the wake of the Gulf Crisis because it is interpreted as the beginning of a U.S. effort to disarm the Muslim world. "Since the Gulf War, the United States is making sure that no Muslim country in the Middle East obtains destructive nuclear or chemical weapons."

Pakistan is the most prominent exponent of this view, presenting itself as a representative of the entire Muslim world, now united against the West. Islamabad is pointing to the nuclear issue as one of the symbols of confrontation with the U.S. and has declared that it was one of the primary objectives of the Americans in the Gulf War was to destroy Iraq's nuclear program. "Now that they are finished with Iraq, Pakistan is the next Islamic country against which they are putting the whole pressure to end its peaceful Atomic program... Pakistan has two options. One is to compromise its military independence and depend on other nations. The other is to become free from political and economic clutches of the U.S. and other nations."

This is the essence of the Third World ideology advocated by Agha Hassan Abedi, and, according to the Pakistanis, the reason why the West suppressed his bank, BCCI. They insist that the "murder" of BCCI by the U.S. was also an integral part of a worldwide plot to suppress the Muslim world. Pakistani Islamists see in these confrontations the beginning of the struggle for the very existence of Islam. They point out that "the United States and its allies were afraid of the increasing power of Islam. They want to mislead the Islamic youths while implementing the "new world order," and to destroy the new generation of Muslim youth so that an Islamic government can no longer be established."

Islamabad sees in the New World Order advocated by the U.S., and especially in the call for nuclear nonproliferation, a strategic threat to its independence. "The New World Order does not allow any country in the Third World except the American surrogates to possess nuclear weapons." Fully aware that no single country can confront the U.S. on its own, Pakistan highlights the growing significance of nuclear and military cooperation with other radicals as a critical weapon in the confrontation with the U.S. Islamabad acknowledges that "the People's Republic of China and North Korea have been... supplying Iran, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries with medium-range missiles and nuclear technology for peaceful purpose." This cooperation should serve as the source of strength for Islamabad's defiance against U.S. pressures, for any alternative would be detrimental to the future of

Islam. “If Pakistan surrenders before the Americans now with respect to the nuclear program, there will be no limit for such a surrender; because the Americans endeavor to demolish Pakistan's military power and make her a banana republic so that the Muslim World should be enslaved by the U.S.-imposed world order.”

Thus, it is the acquisition of nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems by Pakistan, the DPRK, and other Muslim and radical states, accomplished with substantial assistance from BCCI and its affiliates, that enables the radicals and Islamists to challenge the U.S. while pursuing the policy of confrontational de-linking long advocated by such as Abedi, Kim Il Song and Qaddafi.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The HizbAllah After Abbas Mussawi

February 24, 1992

Sheikh Sayyid Abbas al-Mussawi, the Secretary General of the HizbAllah, was killed along with his wife, child, and several bodyguards, on 16 February 1992, when Israeli helicopter gunships ambushed his convoy in Lebanon. This strike dealt a severe blow to the plans of Iran and Syria to escalate the crisis in the Middle East and invigorate the terrorist campaign against the U.S. and the West.

In order to understand the significance of this event, it is first necessary to understand Mussawi's crucial role in the world of international terrorism. Mussawi (b. 1952) came from one of the most important Shi'ite clans in the Ba'albakk area of the Bekkaa, but was affiliated through marriage and migration with the key centers of Shi'ism in Iraq and Iran. He was a student of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the founder of Al-Da'awa, in Najaf, Iraq, where he also became committed to Ayatollah Khomeyni and the cause of international Shi'ism. In 1982, Abbas al-Mussawi became one of the founding fathers of the HizbAllah, and was among the most pro-Iranian leaders of the clans and organizations within its framework. Indeed, when Hojjat-ol-Islam Mohtashemi was visiting Lebanon, he dealt

primarily with the HizbAllah commanders Abbas al-Mussawi and Subhi al-Tufayli.

In the late-1980s, Subhi al-Tufayli was the Secretary General of HizbAllah, and Abbas al-Mussawi, Ibrahim al-Amin and Hasan Nasrallah served as his closest aides. During this time, Abbas al-Mussawi was the chairman of the HizbAllah's Military Council and worked closely with the representatives of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Syrian Intelligence. Subsequently, for his efforts in this role, in late-May 1991, Abbas Mussawi replaced Tufayli as the Secretary General of HizbAllah.

Later, beginning in the fall of 1991, Sheikh Mussawi and the HizbAllah began to assume a unique role in the Iranian-Syrian grand strategy. By the end of the year, the importance of HizbAllah's contribution further increased when the strategy anticipating a war with Israel by the summer of 1992 was adopted in Damascus and Teheran.

Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi's role in the emerging grand design was that of a trusted emissary and coordinator who would make sure that the HizbAllah was ready to perform the tasks assigned to it. The original mission-roles for the HizbAllah were defined in a terrorist conference in Teheran in mid-October 1991, and soon after the conference, Mussawi returned to Beirut with instructions from Teheran to activate the HizbAllah's Special Operations Command. In the first phase, they were told to concentrate on launching operations in Western Europe.

Toward this end, Special Operations Command planted cells in Western Europe and prepared for the launching of various terrorist operations. In mid-November, as it became imperative to accelerate preparations for war, the bulk of the HizbAllah's Special Security Command was transferred to Iran where they were provided with new identities and documents pending activation. A main objective of these HizbAllah cells was to attack the flow of Soviet Jews into Israel by striking "transit points in Europe" where they are relatively vulnerable. Indeed, a car bomb exploded near a bus carrying Soviet Jews in Budapest, Hungary, on December 23. The bomb was the work of "professional terrorists" and closely resembled bombs used by the HizbAllah.

Meanwhile, in mid-December, Damascus concluded that war between Syria and Israel would break out between June and September 1992. Consequently, the Syrian High Command developed a coherent strategy for the opening phase of this war based on deterring a preemptive strike by the Israeli Air Force and on hindering any deep

strikes by a series of attacks with SS-21 and M-9 ballistic missiles in the opening phase of the war, the combat effectiveness and destructiveness of which, it was supposed, would surprise Israel. In this scenario, Iran would provide the “ultimate umbrella,” deterring a preemptive strike by Israel by threatening to use the nuclear weapons it recently acquired from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Republics.

According to this plan, the HizbAllah in Lebanon would be assigned such a crucially important role in the grand strategy of Damascus and Teheran that a temporary halt to the terrorist offensive in Europe is envisaged. In charting this strategy, Damascus was faced with a major political challenge, namely, how would it be possible to launch the surprise attack against Israel while retaining the indulgence of Washington and the image of a commitment to the peace process.

The HizbAllah was the answer to this quandary. The new and added role of the HizbAllah was to provoke Israel into launching a retaliatory action in southern Lebanon so that the Syrian attack could then be presented as a reaction to an unacceptable Israeli threat on Syrian vital interests in Lebanon and as being in accordance with the Brotherhood Treaty between Damascus and Beirut.

Indeed, Beirut had already recognized, by early-January 1992, that the HizbAllah was “a useful radical ally” of Syria even during the peace process. “That master-strategist, President Hafiz Assad of Syria, as well as using HizbAllah to keep pressure on the Israelis in south Lebanon, is also allowing the Islamic fundamentalists in Lebanon to voice their strong objections to the peace talks, in order to keep his options open in case the negotiations should ultimately fail. If the peace talks do eventually fail, Assad could once more take up the potent card of radical Shi'ite wrath to face the new challenges that arose in the region. And the Islamic extremism of HizbAllah, with its simple appealing message to the downtrodden of a glorious Islamic state and the eradication of Israel, could yet prove more enticing for an even greater number of Lebanon's Shi'a community.” In this context, Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi was responsible for preparing the HizbAllah also for its new role, coordinating its activities in southern Lebanon and, ultimately, for “delivering” Israel when ordered by Teheran and Damascus.

Meanwhile, the Middle East war anticipated by Teheran and Damascus is seen as but one component of the major confrontation with the West for the future of the Muslim world. The rejuvenated terrorist offensive constitutes a crucial element of this global war due to its ability to project the Jihad into the West's heartland in a way that

more conventional warfare techniques would not be able to. Little wonder, therefore, that Teheran has already begun preparing for this campaign.

Thus, in early-February 1992, Teheran convened an international terrorist conference involving 80 senior participants from 20 organizations. In a speech on the eve of the conference, President Hashemi-Rafsanjani announced “Iran's readiness to put its experience at the disposal of any liberation movement” and reiterated that, “the Islamic revolution was not confined to Iran but rather is a base which must be preserved.” The terrorist conference was held under the guise of the commemoration of the Ten Days of Dawn (the victory of the Iranian Revolution). An indication of the importance of the conference was that Ahmad Khomeini personally took the participants to the tomb of his father.

The participating organizations were:

- HizbAllah Lebanon
- Islamic Amal Movement
- Organization of Islamic Ulama
- Organization of Islamic Tawhid
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad
- HizbAllah Palestine
- Islamic Jihad Organization – Bayt al-Muqadis
- Tunisian Islamic Movement
- Islamic Front of Algeria
- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- HizbAllah Kuwait
- Liberation Front of Bahrain
- Islamic Revolutionary Organization of the Arabian Peninsula
- Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan
- HizbAllah Kurdistan
- Organization for the Advancement of Shi'ite Ideology in Pakistan
- Radical Muslim Organization of Philippines
- Patani Front of Thailand
- Revolutionary Muslim Movement of South Africa.

The terrorist leaders met with senior officials of Iranian intelligence, security services, the IRGC, Islamic propaganda organizations, the Shahid foundation, the Imam's foundation, and others. Together, they formulated a joint doctrine for the future conduct of the Jihad, and decided on the means of its implementation. Teheran asked the participating organizations to temporarily refrain from attacking Western objectives in order not to attract attention to the Iranian-supported build-up. The organizations responded by promising not to do anything without prior authorization from Teheran. They also agreed on the forms of reorganization and the improvement of their organizations. These steps were to be taken immediately with full and generous Iranian financing.

The conference's resolutions clearly reflected Teheran's perception of the situation in the world and the challenges facing Islam. Iran believes that the immediate future presents both threats and unique opportunities for the Muslim world. "A great tempest has overtaken Islam. Nations are trying to find their 'Islamic identity' and are counting the minutes until they hoist its flag. They are anticipating the day when Islamic rule's glorious banner will fly over their countries... Today the Islamic nations feel the need to revive the lost grandeur of Islam and the Muslims. This is a human feeling, which the world should understand. The world should conform to Islam's new conditions and should know that there is little it can do to alter the situation to harm Islam and that whatever it does will only harm itself."

Thus, in Iran's view, the United States constitutes the greatest threat to the revival of Islam. Delivering a Friday Sermon in Teheran, Ayatollah Fadlallah stressed that "world arrogance, especially America, continues to confront the Islamic revolution and pan-Islamism/all-Islamism in the world, because it considers this movement to be against its interests." Teheran's perception was reinforced and reaffirmed during Secretary Baker's visit to ex-Soviet Central Asia.

Thus, the Conference resolutions dealt explicitly with the ramifications of this visit as a milestone in the impending confrontation with the West. "U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's remarks and warning of 'a new era of Islamic power' in this country [Iran] are extremely revealing. Islam should not take them lightly. This is a declaration of war against it, a blatant effort to interfere in the Islamic countries' internal affairs and one that should be answered with a strong slap in the face by the Islamic nations. How each nation solves its problems and deals with its enemies is something that concerns the

nations and their cultures. And this is a terrifying thought for the United States and its henchmen.”

Returning from the Teheran conference, Mussawi immediately began to incite and agitate the HizbAllah fighters in preparation for a major confrontation with Israel and the U.S. The theme of a major military clash requiring sacrifices and martyrdom until the final triumph of Islam dominated Mussawi's last sermons and speeches. On February 14, Mussawi delivered a Friday sermon in Beirut, extolling the virtues of martyrdom. “Our greatest appeal to Allah is: God bless us with martyrdom and honor us with it,” he told the gathered HizbAllahi. “We will carry on, we will sacrifice souls, children and everything. We will divorce life with all its beauty and glory for your eyes our leader, Imam Khomeyni.”

Later, on 16 February, Mussawi traveled to Jibshit, the location of the HizbAllah Headquarters for southern Lebanon, to consult with local commanders and inform them of the resolutions of the Teheran Conference and their role in the anticipated clash with Israel. Mussawi then delivered a fiery speech to the local HizbAllahi and Iranian Pasdaran in which he denounced the peace talks as yet another expression of the U.S. “mad” drive for power over, and dominance of, the Muslim world, as already demonstrated in the Gulf Crisis. “America wants to control the fountains of water, exactly like it controlled the oil fountains,” he explained. “America wants to dominate everything.” Mussawi declared that, “we shall shoulder our responsibilities and uphold the banner of jihad and confrontation until this state [Israel] falls, comes what may, because our nobility and dignity are above all else.” The excited crowd vowed to carry out their sacred duties, shouting “Death to America!” and “Death to Israel!”

The sudden killing of Abbas al-Mussawi at such a crucial point in the preparations for a major strategic initiative shocked the HizbAllah leadership and official Teheran more than the rank and file HizbAllahi. Long conditioned to embrace and aspire for martyrdom, the HizbAllahi accepted the death of their revered leader as the noblest way to die and vowed to continue and intensify the Jihad. For the leadership, on the other hand, there was a quick transformation from an emotional gut-reaction of shock to one of grim resolve in pursuing the grand strategy despite any setbacks.

Once Mussawi's death was confirmed in Beirut, Ayatollah Fadlallah issued a statement in which he called the strike a “barbaric crime” and urged revenge: “I call upon all resistance fighters to escalate their Jihad against Israel,” Fadlallah decreed. “Israel understands no

language other than that of arms; the children of Islamic resistance who are on the front line of the struggle against the Zionist regime must continue their sacred and liberating battle against the enemies of Islam and humanity with much greater resolve.” “The Israelis should brace themselves for our response,” declared Hussayn al-Mussawi, the leader of Islamic Amal and a member of the Mussawi clan.

However, even as the emotional tone surrounding Mussawi's funeral was intensifying, Teheran was already busy assessing the ramifications of Mussawi's death. Both Teheran and Damascus decided that the assassination should not distract them from pursuing their strategic objectives. For both countries it was imperative not to endanger their great objectives by succumbing to the temptations of revenge. Indeed, on 17 February, Hashemi-Rafsanjani anticipated that Islamic Jihad would react “logically and reasonably” to the crisis. “Theirs will not be a reflex reaction. They are going to be logical and reasonable.”

Ayatollah Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah articulated the emerging strategy of the HizbAllah in his speech during the funeral. He anticipated that the HizbAllah would take time to decide on a proper response. “We have received the message. It is not necessary to answer it emotionally. The answer will come in a while,” Fadlallah assured the crowd. “The conflict is a long, long one,” he explained.

Although it was an Israeli attack that killed Mussawi, Fadlallah identified the U.S. as the guilty party. “We hold first the United States, and second Israel, responsible for this massacre... The United States will remain the principal enemy of the ummah and the Great Satan.” He clarified that Israel “continues to act in this way in a strategic alliance with U.S. arrogance, which has tried to silence every voice raised for freedom, and to eliminate every movement in the Arab and Islamic world that seeks justice on earth.” Fadlallah told the crowd that the HizbAllah must stick to their plans, and stressed that, “it is not necessary to retaliate immediately because some messages take time to answer. We will not react but will act and plan for this action.”

Indeed, during Mussawi's funeral procession, Fadlallah led the crowd in a vow to escalate the Jihad at all costs. “We also pledge to our people, the Islamic leadership, and all honorable men, that we will remain a spear, pointed first at the Americans, and second at their protégé Israel. We will continue to defend Islam indefinitely. We know that we will not triumph in one or even several years, but we are prepared for a battle of centuries and are up to this task, InshAllah. It is true that the equipment and material resources of the resistance cannot

compete with the enemy's resources, but the will to resist cannot be overcome.”

However, there was a definite feeling that resolve and commitment should not come at the expense of prudence and effectiveness. Fadlallah declared that therefore, in the upcoming struggle, “Mujahideen weapons will stay strong and will be hoisted high each time a martyr falls or resistance fighter attacks... The issue is not one of steel or emotional outbursts... The issue is one of thinking and planning. That is why we should move towards creating our own might,” he told the agitated crowd.

Fadlallah concluded with a passionate call for a resolute Jihad: “Continue along the path of jihad. Martyrdom is the ummah's glory and honor. The road is long and the battle difficult, but the goals are great, the greatest being the blessing of Almighty Allah. Only the steadfast mujahideen leaders and members who have sacrificed themselves to Allah will reach the end of the road that you and Muslims everywhere are taking for the sake of freedom.”

The call for prudence and careful planning was not idle talk aimed at concealing inaction or a pretence for a newly found moderation. Indeed, within a day, Iran and the HizbAllah engaged in high-level consultations in Ba'albakk on damage assessment and future operations. At first, the HizbAllah elected Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah as secretary-general to succeed Mussawi. Then, several senior officials engaged in a thorough examination of their future course.

The HizbAllah was represented by its entire leadership: Ayatollah Fadlallah, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sheikh Muhammad Yazbik, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Sheikh Na'im Qassim, and Hajj Hussayn Khalil [Chairman of the HizbAllah Political Bureau]. In addition, a delegation of Palestinian terrorist commanders led by Ahmad Jibril attended. The Iranians included Ayatollah Janati [Khamene'i's representative], Hojjat-ol-Islam Mohajeri [Hashemi-Rafsanjani's representative], Hussayn Islam-ol-Islam, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Akhtari [Iran's Ambassador to Damascus], and “a major political and military delegation” that arrived from Iran for the occasion. Unnamed “Syrian brethren,” a term usually used for members of Syrian intelligence, also attended these meetings.

The decision of the Ba'albakk conferees was to concentrate on implementing their master plan rather than get carried away by a quest for revenge. They did agree, however, to escalate their struggle against, and confrontation with, the West, and especially the U.S. and Israel, to include measures that would be seen as retribution for Mussawi's death.

However, there was to be no doubt that the upcoming confrontation between Islam and the U.S.-led West is the most important challenge facing Islam and that nothing can justify deviation from the pursuit of this cause.

These decisions have been reflected in the ongoing insertion of Iranian intelligence and terrorist operatives into Western Europe, via Turkey, under the direct command of Muhsin Reza'i. These insertion efforts are an integral part of the deployment of high quality assets in preparation for the "grand confrontation."

Indeed, even in the aftermath of the Mussawi's killing, infiltration operations continue unabated, and the initial elements of this insertion effort are already capable of conducting terrorist strikes in Turkey, Cyprus, Germany, and, to a lesser degree, other parts of Western Europe. At present, all indications suggest that the Iranian operatives, like the new HizbAllah cells already in Europe, are under orders to continue their preparations for the implementation of existing operational plans rather than divert efforts to a campaign for revenge.

Assessment

Despite the shock caused by the killing of Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi, Iran, Syria and the terrorist organizations they sponsor and control, including the HizbAllah, seem to be determined to pursue their joint strategy and not divert important assets and efforts to avenge Mussawi's death. If fully unleashed, the campaign of international terrorism the radicals are currently planning will prove far more lethal than any wave of international terrorism the West has ever experienced.

In assessing the impact of any assassination of a central figure, it is important to remember that no single individual is irreplaceable. Organizations and groups have their own dynamics and the elimination of a few individuals – no matter how critical, senior, or unique – is not likely to change the course of history. However, in highly secretive organizations, where the decision-making process, information sharing and communications are highly centralized and confined to a very few, the sudden elimination of key personalities can and does create major difficulties, if only temporarily.

The killing of Mussawi is an example of just such a case. Since the early-1980s, Syria, Iran, and the HizbAllah (as well as other terrorist organizations), have communicated primarily by word of mouth and, to a lesser extent, by hand written and hand delivered messages. The secrecy and deniability of the terrorism apparatus are preserved by the

persistent elimination of any mechanical or electronic method of communication that can then be intercepted or tapped. Moreover, tight compartmentalization is maintained as key clan members communicate for their underlings, thus further shielding them from outside exposure. Therefore, the role of the trusted senior go-between is of crucial importance to the efficient and smooth running of such complex operations as international terrorism.

Sheikh Mussawi was one of the very senior go-betweens of and for the HizbAllah. He was among the very few not only privy to the deliberations and decisions in Teheran and Damascus but also then entrusted with briefing and instructing the key terrorist commanders about their roles and missions, as well as overseeing and inspecting the progress of these preparations. Much of these activities were done by personal inspection and discussions, leading to oral reporting in person. Under such circumstances, much remains in memory and is used as reference for determining progress and assessment of the situation. This human database is eliminated once the key messenger is killed.

This is the main impact of Mussawi's assassination by Israel. At the time of his death, Mussawi was responsible for inspecting and overseeing both the preparations of the HizbAllah's special operations command for the anticipated terrorist offensive in Western Europe and possibly the U.S., as well as for the reorganization of the HizbAllah and Pasdaran forces in southern Lebanon for their new role as instigators of an Israeli "provocation" to justify Syria's war should the need arise.

To be sure, Mussawi was not the only high-level messenger. Yet he was the most important Lebanese Shi'ite in this role, the others being Iranian and Syrian officials. In the world of clan and family loyalties, much was entrusted to him by local HizbAllah notables that would not be shared with outsiders. This distinct material is forever lost.

Thus, the killing of Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi in such a crucial phase in the HizbAllah's mobilization may have a major impact on the anticipated terrorist campaign. It will take time for both Teheran and Damascus to sort things out, investigate possible intelligence leaks, resurrect communications and connections, as well as establish alternate and trusted links of go-between and oversight. The new messenger will have to learn about, and commit to memory, all the intricacies of the missions and operations he serves and oversees. This by itself takes time. Moreover, personal trust must be established between the key individuals before a meaningful flow of information is revived. The lack of background knowledge, accumulated over years of exposure, will taint and affect the quality, veracity, and accuracy of the

messenger's data. In a crucial period of preparations, as the HizbAllah now is in, such deficiencies can lead to major failures.

Ultimately, only time will tell the true impact of the assassination of Mussawi. Any decision of substance concerning whether and when to launch the terrorist campaign, or any part thereof, will be made by a very few senior officials in Teheran and Damascus. What impact or deterrence will the Israeli operation have on their decision making process is not, and cannot be, known. The HizbAllah, or any other terrorist organization for that matter, is not involved in this stage. The ability of the controlling states and the terrorist organizations to replace Mussawi will have an impact on the execution of the terrorist operations. Thus, at the very least, the absence of Mussawi's knowledge, experience, and expertise, is bound to cause delays and other difficulties.

Alert and prepared security forces in the West have an opportunity to capitalize on these reverberations, confront and neutralize the terrorist apparatus of Syria and Iran. If such a counter-terrorist campaign is launched, the assassination of Mussawi will have a long-term effect on the HizbAllah and Islamist terrorism in and against the West.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Islambuli and the Threat of Terrorism: A Briefing

August 27, 1993

On August 26, various Islamist groups throughout the Middle East issued communiqués threatening to hit U.S. citizens and targets all over the world, particularly in the United States itself, if any harm came to Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman who was indicted for conspiracy to commit terrorism in the United States.

Most noteworthy of these threats was one released in Lebanon by a previously unknown organization demanding freedom for the Sheikh and ordering terrorist acts in the United States if their demand was not met. "We warn America against extraditing Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman to Egypt and demand that he be freed at once... Otherwise, every American citizen and all U.S. interests around the world will be in danger."

The group calls itself the "Partisans of Khalid al-Istambuli," the proper name referring to the individual who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The communiqué was issued in Sidon through channels usually used by HizbAllah, Islamic Jihad, and other Iranian controlled organizations. The office that delivered the message belongs to a southern Lebanese Sunni Islamist organization.

The “Partisans of Khalid al-Istambuli” is an elite force of Egyptian Islamists drawn from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other groups who are under the command of Muhammad Shawqi al-Istambuli, the brother of Khalid. (Al-Istambuli's group is affiliated with Abd-al-Rahman's Jamaat Islami.) The integration of the Istambuli group into the Iranian-led Islamist international was considered by Iran and Sudan to be a major achievement and a key milestone in the consolidation of the network involved in the World Trade Center bombing.

In the spring of 1992, Tehran was making special efforts to align the leading Sunni organizations, primarily those with ideological standing and popular support, with Iran's own terrorist infrastructure. The turning point in this effort took place in July, 1992, when Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad based in Peshawar, Pakistan, arrived in Tehran for a meeting arranged through the offices of Sudanese spiritual leader, Hassan al-Turabi.

At the meeting, Iranian officials agreed to assist the Istambuli group with advanced training in Iran, mainly in the city of Mashhad, for about 800 Egyptian members of Islamic Jihad who were at that time in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition, these Egyptians would be provided transportation to Sudan, and would receive training from agents of HizbAllah and the Pasdaran in the Shandi and UmmDurmann camps. They would also receive financing and weapons for carrying out the jihad against the Cairo government. The only condition Tehran put on this support was that Egyptian Islamic Jihad would be required to join the Arab Liberation Battalions of IRGC Intelligence. Simultaneously, the Egyptian assets in the U.S. were put under Iran's control.

In the late summer, at Tehran's invitation, Muhammad Shawqi al-Istambuli traveled to the Biqaa Valley in Lebanon to inspect the HizbAllah facilities and discuss their assistance in training Egyptian “Afghans” who were already in Sudan and who would constitute the first “Egyptian Liberation Battalion.” In addition to the Egyptians sent to Iran, some 500 terrorist operatives were sent to Sudan to participate in the HizbAllah training program.

Thus, by the fall of 1992, the main Egyptian Islamist groups were being integrated into the Iranian-HizbAllah terrorist system. It is therefore not by accident that the Egyptian Islamic Jihad began issuing its communiqués from Tehran in December 1992. Specifically, it is the Lebanese detachment of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad that issued the threat regarding Sheikh Rahman under the nomenclature of the “Partisans of Khalid al-Istambuli.” Although Sunni, they are fully

integrated into the worldwide HizbAllah network. Further, and more worrisome, as the New York bombing demonstrated, the “Partisans” have followers in the United States ready and willing to conduct terrorist strikes.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Note On Terrorism Roster

September 14, 1993

One of the complaints that we have often received from our readers is that they have difficulty in keeping track of the various figures who are involved in international terrorism. From the outset, I was aware that this would be a problem, not only because of the sheer number of players in the terrorist game, but also because many readers would find the names so foreign to anything normally seen in the English language that they, quite frankly, would all look alike.

Thus, the following is a roster of prominent figures involved in Islamist terrorism in the Middle East, arranged where appropriate by country or group, that is designed to help the reader keep track of the "rouges gallery" of Mideast terrorism. It is, by no means, a complete list. Rather, what I've attempted to do is provide the names of some of the more key recurring figures in our Task Force reports on the Middle East, as well as a brief description of their roles.

I hope that this will be of some value, although I am cognizant of the fact that for every name included on the list, there were probably a dozen that space forced me to exclude. Of course, readers are free, when they have questions, to contact the Task Force. Beyond that drastic step, however, I hope that this list will be of some benefit to our weary bleary-eyed readers.



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

**A Brief Dramatis Personae of
Prominent Figures in Islamic Terrorism**

September 15, 1993

Iran

- Ayatollah Khomeini: Led Iranian Revolution and deposed Shah; developed radical Islamic ideology; made Iran supporter of radical Islamist terrorist groups; his teachings are the ideological wellspring for much of radical Islam, died June 1989.
- Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: Spiritual Leader of Iran upon Khomeini's death, highly influential amongst radical Islamist groups.
- Muhammad Montazeri: Commander of the Department for Islamic Liberation Organization; died June 1981.
- Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri: Organized terrorist empire, was to be Khomeini successor, but was passed over.

- Hojat ol-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani: President of Iran.
- Mustafa Chamran: “Father” of Islamic terrorism in North America; Commander, Islamic Revolutionary Guards, died in 1981.
- Javad Mansuri: Ambassador to Pakistan from Iran; responsible for transforming the Iranian diplomatic service into terrorist support operation.
- Sheikh Abbas Golru: Terrorist training camp commander.
- Nasser Kohladuz: Terrorist training camp commander.
- Zahra Rahnevard: Female terrorist training camp commander.
- Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri: Commander of Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security.
- Mussavi-Khoiniha: Iranian official responsible for long-range terrorist planning, co-leader of 1979 seizure of U.S. Embassy.
- Mustafa Mirsalim: Commander of terrorist training camps.
- Dr. Akbar Torkan: Minister of Defense, Iran.
- Ali Akbar Velayati: Foreign Minister, Iran.
- Ali Fallahian: C.O. of Intelligence for military affairs, Iran.
- Abdol Hussein Vahaji: Minister of Commerce, Iran.
- Hamid Reza Narachan: Former Ambassador to Vienna who initially organized Iranian terrorist networks.
- Mohammad Reza Narachan: Former Ambassador to London who initially organized Iranian terrorist networks.

- Muhammad Shamkh'ani: A leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
- Wahid Gorji: A leader of the Paris Network in 1986.
- Fuad Ali Salah: A leader of the Paris terrorist network in 1986.
- Muhammad al-Muhajir: A leader of the Paris terrorist network in 1986.
- Kamal Kharrazi: Representative to the United Nations Organization.
- Abbas Zamani: Ambassador to Pakistan who brought Afghan *mujahideen* into the fold of Islamic Jihad.
- Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Jilani: Pakistani leader of terrorist preparations in North America.
- Hojjat ol-Islam al-Muslemin Sayyid Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi: Former Ambassador to Damascus, founder of HizbAllah, major figure in Iranian terrorism.
- Maj. Gen. Mohsen Reza'i: IRGC commander.
- Rakim Safavi: IRGC Deputy Commander.
- Col. Ahmand Akhundi: Member of IRGC; coordinator of operations in Western Europe.
- Col. Muhammad Awa'i: Established Special Operations division.
- Hussein Nikam: Controls Special Operations in Beirut.
- Ahromi Zadeh: Military attaché to Lebanon.
- Zulradr': Chief of staff for IRGC.
- Haitam al-Ami: Senior intelligence officer.

- Ali Rushdi: Commander of clandestine activities.
- Ayatollah Muhammad Nassiri: In charge of North American terrorist operations in the 1980s.
- Hojatolislam Hadi Khosroshari: Chief of Intelligence of the embassy to the Vatican now operates throughout Europe.
- Naseri Cyrus: Terrorist leader during the Gulf War.

HizbAllah

- Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah: Secretary-General.
- Hojjat ol-Islam Hussein Mussawi: A key leader.
- Sheikh Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah: Spiritual leader.
- Sheikh Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin: A key leader and spokesman.
- Imad Mughaniyah: Commander of special operations.
- Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli: Former Secretary General and senior commander.
- Abd al-Hadi Hammadi: Main intelligence official.
- Khalid Assaf: Information official.
- Salah Nun: Internal security official.
- Muhammad Hammud: Internal security official.
- Sheikh Hussein Khalil: Security and intelligence contact man.
- Sheikh Abbas Mussawi: The “maestro” of HizbAllah operations in Beirut; died February 1992.
- Muhammad Harafdini: A senior HizbAllah operative arrested in New York in December 1987.

Egypt

- Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman: Spiritual leader implicated in Sadat assassination, found innocent, and later World Trade Center bombing, leader of New Jersey mosque, currently being held in United States for trial.
- Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
- Abbud al-Zumur: Leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, jailed for Sadat assassination.
- Mohhamed Salameh: Awaiting trial for World Trade Center bombing.

Syria

- Hafiz al-Assad: President of Syria.
- Lt. Col. Abdul Diab: Military intelligence officer.
- Rif'at Assad: Head of intelligence branch, which controlled Arab terrorist movements in France 1981-1982, Major figure in narcoterrorism and counterfeiting.
- Gen. Mohammad al-Khouly: A director of terrorist operations.
- General Ali Duba: Head of intelligence.
- Ahmad Nasif: Head of foreign operations.
- Sami Mahmud al-Hajji: Terrorist organizer.
- Hasan Salih Harb: Terrorist operative.
- Muhammad Najif Jabir: Terrorist operative.

Sudan

- Brig. Gen. Bakri Hassan Salih: Chief of Security for RCC.
- Dr. Ali al-Haj: Director of Islamic Front training corps.
- Gen. Omar Bashir: President of Sudan.

Hamas

- Imad al-Falufi: A commander.
- Muhammad Qassim Rashid Maaruf Suwalha: A senior military commander.
- Ahmed Yousef: A leader in the U.S.
- Mohammad Abdel-Hamid Salah: U.S. supporter arrested January 1992.
- Muhammad Joma Hilmi Jarad: U.S. supporter arrested January 1992.
- Jabr Ammar: Trains Palestinian members of HAMAS.

Palestinian Leaders

- George Habash: Commander of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
- George Ibrahim Abdallah: Leader of Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF).
- Nayif Hawatimah: Leader of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
- Yassar Arafat: Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

- Abu Iyad: Second in command to Arafat in the PLO, died in 1991.
- Abu Nidal: Leader of a terrorist organization.
- Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi: Leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Iraq

- Saddam Hussein: President of Iraq.
- Barazan al-Takriti: Terrorist leader during the Gulf War, half brother of Saddam Hussein.

Libya

- Muammar Qaddafi: The dictator of Libya, he holds no official title but retains his military rank of Colonel.
- Col. Saleh: Member of Libyan intelligence.
- Qaddaf ad-Dam: Oversees covert operations.

Other Islamist Leaders

- Dr. Abd-al-Latif Arabiyat: Leader of the Islamic Movement.
- Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri: Opened Jihad Movement Bureau.
- Abbas Madani: Leader of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).
- Mushin Rabbani: Leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Argentina.
- Yussuf Nadah: Leader of the International Muslim Brotherhood.
- Salem Azzam: Leader of the Islamic Council of Europe.
- Sheikh Zallum: Leader of the Islamic Liberation Party (PLI).

- Sheikh Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi: Leader of the International Muslim Brotherhood.

Mahmud Abd-ul-Aziz: Leader of Armed Islamic Movement forces in Bosnia.



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The HizbAllah In Mogadishu

October 26, 1993

As has been noted in previous Task Force reports, the current escalation of the fighting in Somalia is the outgrowth of efforts by Iran and Sudan to employ the forces of the "Islamic International" in a major operation to transform Mogadishu into a "second Beirut" for the United States. Furthermore, this escalation is also the first manifestation of a strategic alliance between Iran, Iraq, and Sudan.

As a consequence of this alliance, in early 1993, Iraq embarked on a revitalization of its terrorist campaign under the Islamist banner with active support from Iran and Sudan. In this connection, Baghdad is using "Afghans" that have been retrained in camps operated by Iraqi intelligence and the special forces near Baghdad. These Iraqi-controlled Islamist terrorists operate in close cooperation with the Iranian-controlled Islamist international terrorist system. However, of greatest concern are various HizbAllah detachments which Tehran and Khartoum plan to use against the U.S. forces in Mogadishu in fashion similar to that employed by Syria and Iran against the U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut.

In the aftermath of the October 3rd incident involving U.S. Army Ranger units near Mogadishu, Tehran has decided that the time is ripe

“to turn Somalia into a new Vietnam and Mogadishu [into] a new Beirut.” Consequently, Tehran, in concert with commanders of several Islamist terrorist movements, most notably the Lebanese HizbAllah and selected Arab “Afghans,” has prepared a plan, the aim of which is to tie down American forces in the Horn of Africa. This plan is now being implemented under the command of Ali Manshawi in his current capacity as the IRGC senior officer for the Horn of Africa.

The operational plan is based on the instigation of popular demonstrations and street fighting in Mogadishu as a cover for high quality terrorist strikes by HizbAllah squads. Somali fighters have already been specifically prepared in training camps in central and northern Somalia to carry out such preparatory operations. These Somali fighters are organized in recently established composite units led by highly professional Iranian Pasdaran, Lebanese HizbAllah and Arab “Afghan” terrorists. These terrorists have been recently smuggled into Somalia via Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti with active assistance from the Organization of the Islamic Republic in Kenya, the Islamic Front for Ethiopia, and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad.

Under the Islamist plan, once chaos and street fighting returns to Mogadishu, the elite terrorists will go into action, kidnapping Americans (civilians and soldiers) and then launching suicide bombing-attacks on the U.S./UN facilities. HizbAllah suicide terrorist squads, which had been deployed in Mogadishu to hunt the U.S. Rangers, will conduct the planned bombing attacks against the U.S. objectives.

The senior HizbAllah commander on-site for this operation is Hajj Ridah 'Asakir from Beirut. He is a veteran of the suicide bombing operations in Beirut in the early 1980s, including the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing. 'Asakir answers directly to Muhsin Reza'i in Tehran.

In order to increase the likelihood of success, the HizbAllah currently maintains in Mogadishu two main forces completely separated from each other. The first HizbAllah force arrived via Ethiopia and the other via Kenya. Each force relies on a completely independent support system (made of Somalis, Iranians, and Arab “Afghans”) and on supplies obtained via Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. Tehran is convinced that these HizbAllah suicide strikes will have the same impact as the Beirut strikes of the early 1980s.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Mujahideen Units

April 8, 1996

In early April 1996, the majority of Mujahideen scheduled to have left Bosnia in January still serve in the ranks of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are increasingly being transformed into an elite corps. The Mujahideen are divided among three clusters of operational units and a fourth cluster of units directly engaged in terrorism and other covert special operations. This distribution is not rigid. Particularly, some of the main units including Mujahideen are also used to conceal and provide cover for Islamist terrorist elements. The four unit clusters are:

- Quality core of the Muslim Liberation Brigades;
- Operational units in central Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- Operational units in the Bihac Pocket; and
- Special units connected to terrorism and covert operations.

Among them, these units have between 12,000 and 15,000 foreign Mujahideen in their ranks.

In addition to these Mujahideen forces, there are numerous Islamist terrorist facilities – ranging from schools to operational forward bases – under the tight control of the Sarajevo Government, particularly of AID (the new intelligence service of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and under the cover of myriad humanitarian organizations.

Quality Core of the Muslim Liberation Brigades

The three Muslim Liberation Brigades are the main organized elements to have emerged from the disbanded Armija Republike BH 3, Korpus Odred 'El-Mudzahidin' – the main Mujahideen unit during the war. Until the fall of 1995, the 3rd Mujahideen Corps was comprised of three Brigades. Starting late 1995, these Brigades were subordinated to other Corps. Their size has been increased from about 1,500 troops each to over 2,000. Presently, these brigades are built around a hard core of foreign Mujahideen while the rest of the troops are Bosnian Islamists. These brigades are:

- The 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd Corps with HQ in Zenica,
- The 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 2nd Corps with HQ in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is Tuzla-based), and
- The 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps with HQ in Konjic.

Official Sarajevo is stressing the crucial importance of these Brigades to the overall military capabilities of the Bosnian Muslim forces.

In early March 1996, the Sarajevo weekly Ljiljan, which is considered by most to be Izetbegovic's media outlet, published an article stressing the importance of the Muslim units and threatening the U.S. if it interferes with their activities. Sarajevo points to growing tension between U.S. Army and Bosnian Army over the prevalence of Muslim units, and particularly over Sarajevo's insistence to keep the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade, which is subordinate to the Tuzla-based 2nd Corps, garrisoned in the immediate vicinity of U.S. Army bases in Tuzla. In this context, the Ljiljan article stresses that the 9th

Bde “was established according to the model of the 7th”, which means that “the unit consists exclusively of Muslim youngsters, who transferred to the unit voluntarily from other 2nd Corps units because they embraced the Islamic code of life offered in the brigade, its only ‘sin’ – an outward resemblance with the mujahideen from Islamic countries – produced in the U.S. base near Tuzla the fear two months ago that they might be “Bosnian terrorists.” The article stresses that “these famous Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina units – the 7th, 4th and 9th – will form the core of the future professional contingent of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Considering the terrorist factor, the article ridicules “the irrational fear that the U.S. troops have from Iran.” This irrationality, the Ljiljan article concludes, is behind the repeated anti-Islamic provocations and harassment carried out by the U.S. Army against the 9th Brigade. The article concludes with a veiled threat to the U.S. Army: “No one even thinks of what could happen if the ‘Bosnian terrorists’ really responded!”

Operational Units in Central Bosnia-Herzegovina

Back in late December 1995, the Bosnian Muslim Forces began establishing and activating additional Mujahideen units, comprised of cadres of foreign volunteers and Bosnian Muslims trained by them, in order to spread and conceal the foreign Mujahideen throughout the entire armed forces. One example is the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade, which was established and sworn in Gorazde on December 20, 1995. By early March 1996, there were seven such units in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

- The 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 81st Division with HQ in Gorazde.
- The 117th Brigade – the “Dzemisetki Golubovi” – with HQ in Lukovac.
- The 119th Special Forces Mujahideen Brigade with HQ in Banovici. This Brigade is divided into two task forces known as “Tigiici” and “Zelena Strela.”
- The 203rd Brigade with HQ in Tesanj. This Brigade is divided into three “Independent Mujahideen Special” task forces known as “Kritce,” “Vitezovi,” and “Tigrovi.”

- The 204th Light Brigade – the “Citloviki Vukovi” – with HQ in Citluk.
- One Operational Group known as “Zivinicke Ose” with HQ in Zivinice.

One Operational Group with HQ in Tuzla. It is divided into two special task forces known as “Janicari” and “Taut.” (This Operational Group is independent of the Tuzla-based 2nd Corps.)

The exact number of foreign Mujahideen in each of these brigades is difficult to ascertain. All reliable estimates put the average size of the foreign elements at about 750- 1,000 Mujahideen per Brigade.

Operational Units in the Bihac Pocket

The Bihac-based 5th Corps has recently become a haven of Mujahideen units. The first Mujahideen special forces deployed to the area clandestinely via Croatia (many of them smuggled in by the UN and international relief organizations, while others were flown in with illegal weapons supplies) in order to bolster the local units loyal to the Sarajevo regime in their clash with the forces loyal to Firket Abdic, the local popular Muslim leader. Sarajevo needed non-local Muslims as the hard core of its own forces in the Bihac Pocket to withstand the mass defection of its troops to Abdic’s camp.

Starting in the fall of 1995, a large number of the Mujahideen expelled from central Bosnia and expected to travel back to their home countries via Croatia have actually been smuggled back into the Bihac Pocket. Indeed, in late January 1996, General Zivko Budimir, the HVO Chief of General Staff, warned that a large Mujahideen force was being organized in the Bihac area. Mujahideen expelled by IFOR to Croatia for further travel to their home countries or the Middle East quietly returned to the Pocket and have been integrated into these units.

The emergence of a Mujahideen-dominated Islamist core in the 5th Corps is not surprising but extremely troubling considering the identity of the Corps commander, General Atif Dudakovic. General Dudakovic is a devotee of Izetbegovic and a member of the Executive Committee of SDA. He is also a staunchly pro-Iranian Islamist. For example, in mid-February 1996, General Atif Dudakovic, in his capacity as the Commander of the 5th Corps, organized a celebration of the anniversary of Khomeyni’s Revolution in Bihac. Iranian and Arab Islamists from all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, including intelligence

officers and terrorist commanders, were invited to these celebrations. Many attended.

The key Mujahideen units of the 5th Corps are:

- The 501st Mountain Brigade IDG known as “Tigrovi”
- The 503rd Mountain Brigade IDG known as “Caruge”;
- The 505th Mountain Brigade IDG known as “Tajfun,” “Hamze,” and “Balije”
- The 511th Light Brigade DC known as “Apaci”

By designation, all of the Mujahideen units of the 5th Corps are elite reconnaissance, sabotage, and airborne/heliborne groups. The exact number of foreign Mujahideen in each of these brigades is difficult to ascertain. All reliable estimates put the average size of the foreign elements at about 1,200-1,500 Mujahideen per Brigade.

Special Units Connected to Terrorism and Covert Operations

Both Croatian and Serbian intelligence stress that the Mujahideen remain the “backbone” of the elite reconnaissance-saboteur units as well as the SDA’s own Muslim Defense Force. The latter force now incorporates over 1,000 Bosnian Islamists, many of them with overseas military and religious training. Foreign Mujahideen are also the key instructors for “special actions” [special operations and terrorism], intelligence officers, as well as religious commissars and operational commanders of tactical special units. Both the foreign Mujahideen and Bosnian Islamists involved in special operations and terrorism are divided between two main “units” of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an assortment of clandestine terrorist bases – both training facilities and operational sites.

The main “units” are:

- The I Bosniak Brigade “Nocne Ptice” [Night Birds]. This is a highly specialized “mother unit” that includes an assortment of specialists and experts from Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon. The I Brigade provides cover for numerous Islamist terrorist elements such as “Allah’s

Combatants” and other small relatively autonomous terrorist units. Among the experts serving with the I Brigade are car-bomb experts from Lebanon, some of them veterans of the suicide attacks against the U.S. Marine barracks and other installations in Beirut in the early 1980s. The I Brigade is the unit that will sponsor, operationally support and assist in terrorist operations against IFOR.

- The III Corps. As discussed above, the direct Mujahideen component of the 3rd Corps is presently a training unit for Bosnian and foreign Islamists, both for service with other elite units and for the terrorists. However, the 3rd Corps provides shield and cover for special operational units known by the code “U” or the “U” Force. This is a training force with operational capabilities that has absorbed some of the more sensitive elements of the original 3rd Corps. For example, the “Martyrs’ Detachment” and the training camps of the Ansar Force have been integrated into the “Ci” Force. There are unconfirmed reports that Abu-Ma’ali is now the commander of the “U” Force.

Yossef Bodansky
Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Bin-Laden: An Introduction

Although originally issued in the summer of 1996, the Task Force Report on the bombing of the al-Khubar towers in Dahrhan, Saudi Arabia, is even more pertinent. The bombing is of great importance in that it was one of the first terrorist strikes conducted under the banner of the then new HizbAllah International. At the time, Saudi billionaire Usama bin Laden was nominated one of the senior commanders of the HizbAllah International and directly in charge of operations in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf area. He has since made it abundantly clear that the Dahrhan bombing was only the beginning of a relentless terroristic Jihad against the United States.

Recently, Usama bin Laden and his allies have accelerated their preparations for the resumption of terrorist strikes against U.S. forces in the Middle East and elsewhere.

In late January 1997, Usama bin Laden participated in a meeting in Tehran along with senior officials of VEVAK (Iranian Intelligence) and other terrorist officials. The primary objective of this summit was to establish the mechanism for the organization and preparing of a new generation of "clean" Islamists, particularly Arabs from the Persian Gulf States, a new support and intelligence system, as well as other related activities. In view of the growing attention paid by Western intelligence services to the existing Islamist system of international

terrorism, the high command of Iranian Intelligence and HizbAllah International decided to establish a follow-on system whose operatives and terrorists will be completely unknown to the West and thus more likely to succeed in infiltrating and operating in enemy states.

Usama bin Laden is now emerging as the chief of these preparatory activities. The new system is multi-layered. Initial and basic training for large numbers of potential terrorists is provided in the training camps in eastern Afghanistan. The more promising Mujahideen are then transferred to advance training in Iran, mainly Mashhad. The Mashhad center will also oversee the training activities in a series of new camps for Arab 'Afghans' in southwestern Afghanistan near the Iranian border. Indeed, after the Tehran summit, bin Laden established a new Headquarters in Mashhad, and he is expected to move there soon. He also acquired a house in Qom in an area where a new school of higher religious learning and indoctrination for Sunny Islamists is being established.

In early February 1997 the new training system was already operational. In eastern Afghanistan, bin Laden and the Taliban were running the Badr I and Badr II camps in Khasteh near Khowst. Khasteh is near the Pakistani border, and the ISI is actively involved in the training program. Indeed, the two Badr camps use a new all-weather road, built in 1996, which links Khasteh with Miranshahr in Pakistan. There were about 600 foreign volunteers in the Badr I & II camps many of them Arabs, and the rest mainly from Pakistan, Indian Kashmir, the Philippines, and increasingly Central Asia and the Caucasus. In southwestern Afghanistan, bin Laden and the Taliban oversee a three clusters of training camps in the districts of Shindand, Wahran, and Farah. There are about 1,000 Arab 'Afghans' in these new camps.

A recent report of Egyptian Intelligence about the growing Islamist subversive threat notes that, "Usama Bin-Laden is working behind closed doors preparing a new group of Arab Afghans under the cover of the Afghan Taliban Movement, with the aim of creating fundamentalist organizations in a number of Arab and Islamic countries." The report stresses the international character of this effort as far as the Islamist subversion of Egypt is concerned. "The heart of this conspicuous activity [against Egypt] runs through Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan, but centers in the mountainous area of Khorassan in Afghanistan, home to training camps of the new wave of Arab 'Afghans'." Comparable training programs are being run for potential Mujahideen from other Muslim countries as well. The ultimate objective of this effort, Cairo warns, is to "prepare a second generation

of Arab 'Afghans' charged with installing fundamentalist regimes in several Arab and Islamic countries.”

In addition, bin Laden maintains a few fortified bases and headquarters in the mountains of Khorassan that include a major headquarters hidden in deep caves. According to a recent Arab visitor, Abd-al-Bari Atwan of Al-Quds al-Arabi, “the 'eagles' nest' or the Arab 'Afghans' base” is located in caves, 2,500 meters up in the snow-covered mountains. There are numerous armed guards. “The base enjoys good protection,” Atwan reports. “There are anti-aircraft guns, tanks, armored vehicles take control of the road, and there are checkpoints for the Mujahideen everywhere. There are also rocket launchers and I am told that there are Stinger missiles to confront any air raids.” Despite its isolation, bin Laden’s base has good and modern communications with the rest of the world. Atwan explains that “the base has a small generator, computers, modern reception equipment, a huge data base on computer disks, and other information kept in the traditional way. There are also press cuttings from all Arab and foreign newspapers. The sheikh receives press reports from London and the [Persian] Gulf daily.”

Atwan is most impressed by the quality of bin Laden’s key aids and commanders “The Mujahideen around the man belong to most Arab states, and are of different ages, but most of them are young. They hold high scientific degrees: doctors, engineers, and teachers. They left their families and jobs and joined the Afghan jihad. There is an open front and there are always volunteers seeking martyrdom. The Arab Mujahideen respect their leader although he does not show any firmness or leading gestures. They all told me that they are ready to die in his defense and that they would take revenge against any quarter that harms him.” Many a Mujahideen told Atwan that each and every one of them “was ready to face the bullets at any time in defense of the man.” Atwan has no doubt they mean every word.

Despite pressure from key Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt for his extradition, Usama bin Laden remains well protected by the Taliban and their Pakistani masters. In early March, Kabul formally announced its support and protection (in religious terms) for Usama bin Laden. “He is my guest,” Taliban Information Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said. Muttaqi acknowledged that bin Laden was living near Jalalabad, in the Tora Bora military base of Nangarhar province. With bin Laden are 50 of his assistants (40 of them has their families with them), numerous bodyguards and his own family members. There, bin Laden has recently established a forward base in a stone building,

protected by look-out posts and even a few tanks, as well as ground and air defense facilities. This “Tora Bora Arab base” is used as a point of contact with the Pakistani authorities and the flow of Arab and other Muslim visitors who arrive and depart via Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Usama bin Laden is making sure there is no doubt about the objectives of the Jihad he is advocating. In mid February 1997, a very self-confident and assertive Usama bin Laden anticipated the escalation of the Jihad, particularly against the U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. “The prophet has said that the people of the peninsula are duty bound to expel the unbelievers from their country when they come from abroad with their man and weapons in number and power that exceeds that of the people of the area,” bin Laden explained. The U.S. should have realized by now that the previous terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia were only the beginning of a fierce Jihad. Bin Laden stressed that “the bombing of Riyadh and Al-Khubar were a clear indication for the crusading forces to correct this grave mistake and for them to depart before it is too late, and before the battle begins in earnest. People will treat the Americans as they were treated by them. They will not only hit American military but also demand the expulsion of civilians.”

For bin Laden, the Jihad on the Arabian Peninsula is but a component of a global struggle between the U.S.-led West and the Muslim World. “Moreover, I emphasize that this war will not only be between the two people of the sacred mosques and the Americans, but it will be between the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies, because this war is a new crusade led by America against the Islamic nations.” Bin Laden uses the eviction of the American and UN forces from Somalia as a precedent for their ultimate fate in Saudi Arabia. He claims that his Islamist forces played a major role in the Mogadishu fighting against the U.S., and promises to repeat this feat in Arabia.

Indeed, Usama bin Laden issued a call to arms in mid February: “I confirm that all the youth and the whole nation should concentrate their efforts on the Americans and the Zionists because they are the head of the spear that has been pointed at the nation and delivered into the nation's heart, and that every effort concentrated on the Americans and the Zionists will bring good, direct, and positive results. Therefore, if someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting his energy on other matters.”

This was the first in a series of messages urging the escalation of the Jihad. In early March 1997, an assertive bin Laden escalated his threats. He announced the escalation of the armed struggle against U.S.

forces in the Persian Gulf area and Israeli forces wherever they might be. He explained that the U.S. refusal to withdraw from the Middle East and the reaffirmation of U.S. support for Israel keep bolstering anti-American Islamist militancy. "After American foolishness, we are expecting an intensification of resistance against the American occupation of Saudi holy places and the Zionist occupation of the land of Palestine," bin Laden said in a statement released in London.

And the threat is not limited to the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf area. Back in July 1996, in the terrorist summit in Konli, Pakistan, bin Laden and Egyptian terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri resolved to strike at the U.S. forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By then, both terrorist leaders had already had quality forces in Bosnia suitable for a brief, spectacular strike. In early 1997, Usama bin Laden has completed the construction of training camps and support installations in Albania. The camps in Albania provide the Islamists with a regional safe-haven allowing the conduct of sustained operations even in case the Sarajevo authorities turn their back on their Islamist allies. Well over a hundred expert terrorists, mainly Arabs, were sent from Pakistan and Sudan to the Albanian camps, but only about 50 have been identified by the local security authorities. The remaining terrorists are already operating inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, using a host of Islamic charity and religious organizations as their cover. Indeed, there is a marked increase in the activities of Islamist charity and humanitarian organizations in central Bosnia, particularly in areas associated with Mujahideen activities such as Zenica and Zavidovici. The Islamist terrorists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like their brethren in the Persian Gulf, are waiting for bin Laden to issue the order.



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
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Muhammad Amien Rais

Muhammad Amien Rais, 54, is the leader of the Muhammadiyah movement/group with between 25 and 28 million followers. Currently, Rais is the leading candidate for the Presidency and the favorite candidate of acting President B.J. Habibie. Amien Rais is a “modernist” Islamist leader who knows how to coat his beliefs in Westernized and seemingly moderate rhetoric. His command of the English language, having completed a PhD at the University of Chicago, helps him propagate his ‘cause’ to Western audience. Significantly, in recent years he has stopped using his first name – Muhammad.

Indicative of the extent of his ties to the Muhammadiyah movement is the following passage from his official biography: “Amien was raised in a Muhammadiyah family. His father, the late Suhud Rais, a graduate of Mualimin Muhammadiyah, was an employee of the Department of Religious Affairs. His mother, Mrs. Sudalmiyah, served for about 20 years as chairperson of the Surakarta Aisiyyah, a Muhammadiyah women’s organization. His grandfather, Wiryo Soedarmo, was a Muhammadiyah founder in Gombang, Central Java. The second of six children, he was educated in Muhammadiyah schools in Solo from kindergarten through high school... It is not surprising that Amien Rais and his five brothers and sisters are active in Muhammadiyah.”

In a discussion on ‘Muhammadiyah in the Past, Now, and Tomorrow’ in Jakarta on June 1, 1995, H. Projokusumo, a functionary on the Muhammadiyah Executive Council made the following statement on the organization’s objectives: “It is more important to select appropriate people who truly understand that Muhammadiyah is an organization for the Islamic cause.” He also stated: “Muhammadiyah leaders must fully realize that this is an organization with a cause, which requires a high level of dedication, sacrifice, and struggle.”

Rais is considered a key leader in the movement to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia by Fazel ur-Rahman, the Pakistani Islamist leader and Professor of Islamic studies at the University of Chicago (where Amien Rais studied). Fazel ur-Rahman referred to the significance of “a Muslim organization, the Muhammadiyah, with the slogan Koran and Sunna” as the center of Islamist movement in Indonesia.

Rais got a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago. His 1981 dissertation was on “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – Its Rise, Demise, and Resurgence.” At the height of the Egyptian crackdown on the Islamists, he supported their policies and predicted their revival and ultimate victory. Prior to the completion of his PhD, Rais spent a year in Egypt where was very close to the Ikhwan and al-Azhar crowd.

Rais has always been well connected politically. He was one of the 49 founders of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) in Malang in December 1990. His position in ICMI leadership is that of first assistant to the general chairman. The ICMI is Habibie’s organization and political base. In January 1997, Islamist leaders predicted that a “coalition” of interest groups within the Armed Forces (ABRI) and “political Muslims” would influence the outcome of the 1998 presidential election. The ICMI was identified as the one most befitting the category of “political Muslims.”

In early 1998, as crisis mounted in Jakarta, Rais was the driving force behind the establishment of a very pragmatic coalition aimed to ensure the Islamists’ rise to power. He established an alliance called AWAM (from the initials of Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the Muslim mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama; Amien Rais, leader of the other major Muslim mass organization, Muhammadiyah; and Megawati, the daughter of former President Sukarno and a formidable conservative political force – three figures of considerable influence in Indonesian society). Using both militant Islamists and conservatives on

both his flanks makes Rais look “moderate” and centrist. Meanwhile, Lukman Harun, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board, conceded that Megawati “has never supported the Islamic cause.” The AWAM coalition, he stressed, is nothing but an instrument to get more power to overthrow the existing Suharto regime and establish an Islamic state in its stead. Rais himself stressed the pragmatic considerations in building AWAM. In a speech to the Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board, he noted that, “Indonesians do not belong to only Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah has only 30 million members or only about 15 per cent of the 200 million people, while the remaining 170 million belong to the Indonesian Democratic Party, the Functional Group, or other organizations. He added Indonesia belongs to all Indonesians. If other people offer to develop the nation jointly on the basis of similarities, Muhammadiyah must therefore accept their offer.”

In his first de-facto election speeches, Rais delivered contradictory message that stresses the Islamic aspect. Although in its quest for early elections Indonesia has entered “a new era of democracy,” he told a crowd at a Jakarta Mosque, ultimately “Power belongs to Allah.” National leaders implement policies but theirs’ is not the ultimate power to decide. This is a classic Islamist opinion.

Rais is a member of Qadhafi’s World Islamic People’s Leadership – an organization dedicated to the propagation of revolutionary Islam and Islamist liberation movements (including terrorist organizations). On May 22, Qadhafi referred to Rais as “brother Muhammad Amien Rais, president of the Islamic Muhammadiyah Society in Indonesia and member of the World Islamic People’s Leadership.” According to JANA (the Libyan News agency) Qadhafi “congratulated him [Rais] on the fall of America’s Fascist agent and inquired about the situation in Indonesia. The brother leader of the revolution and leader of the World Islamic People’s Leadership asked brother Rais, given his influence among the Indonesian people, to work for ending the violence, avoiding bloodshed, and establishing the people’s power in response to the Indonesian masses’ will, and to hand power over to the Indonesian people to exercise it through people’s Congresses which decide and people’s committees which implement, and usher in the establishment of the state of the masses.”

Over the years, Rais has repeatedly expressed support for various Islamist movements – from the Palestinians to the Moro in the Philippines. At the same time, he has repeatedly urged the suppression of the Christian insurgency in East Timor.

Rais is a follower of Hassan al-Turabi, the spiritual leader of Sudan and a leading sponsor of Islamist terrorism. Rais and Turabi share the vision of establishing an Islamic state while providing palatable image to the West. Both Turabi and Rais are Western educated Islamists.

Opinion of conservative, economic circles in Hong Kong:

Doubts also surround Muslim leader Amien Rais. He has played his cards skillfully over the last week, courting international media attention, and being portrayed as a driving force behind Mr. Suharto's downfall. But inside Indonesia his reputation is more mixed with several members of his recently formed People's Council swiftly declaring they had nothing to do with it.

Nor has he hesitated to court support in the past by pandering to popular prejudices against the ethnic Chinese and he has also made unkind remarks about the country's Christians. Mr. Rais insists he has changed since then and now recognizes the important role both communities have to play. Nevertheless, it is hard to see the Chinese, upon whom Indonesia's economy depends, being encouraged to return should he assume power. Nor would it be right for a nation, which also includes more than 200 other minorities to be ruled by such an overtly Muslim leader.

Opinion of the pro-Beijing circles in Hong Kong: "Amien Rais rose to be the most important opposition leader." Beijing notes that, "Rais' violent talk is also worrisome. He threatened that if Suharto does not step down, he will turn Jakarta into a 'ghost city'." Beijing is most apprehensive about what it defines as Rais' 'American Experiences':

The Islamic organization [Rais] heads reportedly comprises of 28 million followers, ranking the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. Due to his outspoken attitude, he has almost become the most popular Islamic leader. He is even more influential in grassroots. In addition to disseminating Islamic doctrine, he also advocates democracy and encourages people to learn modern knowledge and develop

modern undertakings. This probably results from his pursuance of a doctoral degree in political science at the University of Chicago in the United States.

However, his American experiences also acquainted him with the tremendous economic and political power the Jewish people possess in the United States. After that, he never concealed his hatred towards the Jews. Furthermore, he is also unfriendly to Christians and Chinese. He even wagged his vicious tongue, saying it is imperative not to let the Christians and Chinese suppress Muslims like the Jews in the United States do. While some people support him for president, there are some people that worry about this. In the recent riot, some people were attacked. People cannot help but wonder if it is an outcome of Rais' influence.

SECTION 2

MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES AS TERROR SPONSORS AND TARGETS



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Terrorist Progress in Lebanon

Since the fall of 1989, a loose coalition of Islamist terrorists based in the Beqaa Valley has escalated its war of terror against the West.

This group has been supplied with fighters and other weapons from Iran, Syria as well as other Islamic countries. Iran has readied itself for this escalation with new “cells,” or terrorist squads, in Africa, Europe and America. These cells are also being reinforced and supplied in anticipation of the escalation. The use of terrorism was endorsed by Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah in late-1980s as a legitimate form of war against the West:

The weak peoples lack the technology and lethal weapons available to the United States and European countries. Therefore, they must fight with the means available to them. Why is it that what Muslims do in self-defense is seen as terror?! As oppressed peoples, we are entitled to consider all unconventional means to combat these tyrants. We see no terror in what weak Muslims are doing in the world with the primitive, unconventional means at their disposal. This is a legitimate war.

In recent years, Hizballah and its supporters conducted a constant struggle throughout the Islamic World, particularly in Lebanon, in order to consolidate a solid basis for the inevitable escalation. A Hizballah statement given to Al-'Ahd on 22 April 1988 reiterated that the organization's struggle and operations throughout the Middle East are "not a contest over particularist gains or control or reforms, but a conflict between the defiant Islamic movement and Western and American interests."

The terrorist infrastructure and support system were developed in mid-1989. On 6 June 1989, in a speech to the Beirut HizbAllahi in a procession commemorating Khomeyni's death, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah declared the HizbAllah's commitment was to "satisfy our imam's desire by announcing the beginning of a real war against the United States."

A summit between the Iranian juriconsuls and the leadership of the Lebanese Shi'ite community, which was convened in Tehran in March 1986, launched a build-up phase that brought the Iranian-Hizballah deployment to fruition. Already in the early summer of 1986 Iran Air Boeing 747s flew 3 weekly flights to Damascus bringing Revolutionary Guards cadres and weapons to Lebanon. Additional equipment began arriving by boat, from Iran and from Bulgaria, and routed to Latakia. All of these shipments were then further routed to the rapidly expanding Labadani camp of the Syrian Military Intelligence, which was turned into an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters and a shipment station for the Iranian and Shi'ite build-up in Lebanon.

In return, the IRGC and Hizballah agreed to transfer the control over their best Shahid detachments (suicide terrorists) to the Syrian military intelligence. "I have hundreds of men and women volunteers for suicide-missions," exclaimed Col. Ghazi Kanaan in 1986. Moreover, it was agreed that Hizballah and its myriad of sub-groups would claim responsibility for any action endorsed by the Syrian intelligence. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, the current military commander of Hizballah forces, explained in a 15 November 1986 interview with Magazine: "The Islamic Jihad groups in its ranks all these wishing to hide behind its name without divulging their identity."

The IRGC-Hizballah deployment stabilized in the summer of 1989 with the completion of the first phase of the build-up. It is based around a quality core of 2,600 Iranian elite IRGC troops and 6,000 Lebanese Hizballah Commando of Allah troops. Some 1,400 of the IRGC troops are based in the Beqaa with their headquarters in the Sheikh 'Abdallah barracks near Ba'albakk. Some 240-300 IRGC

intelligence and commandos are based in southern Lebanon. About 180-200 IRGC specialists and trainers are in Beirut training local HizbAllahi. The rest are training and supervising Shi'ite forces in the various Husseinnia (training facilities and barracks for HizbAllahi throughout rural Lebanon) as well as training foreigners and volunteers. The Lebanese Hizballah has 6,000 Commandos of Allah who are active duty, well-trained troops. Some 3,000 commandos are based in the Beqaa, 2,500 are in Beirut and some 500 are deployed throughout southern Lebanon. In addition, The IRGC-Hizballah command maintains close relations with Shi'ite clans that are quasi-independent ideologically but tightly controlled operationally, such as the Musawi and the Mughaniyah clans. Several regional forces led by local juriconsuls and ulamm are under tight operational command of locally based HizbAllahi and Iranian trainers.

The Iranians also maintain a vast socio-economic infrastructure that reinforces the military hold over the Shi'ite population. The city of Ba'albakk is under IRGC control. IRGC and Syrian intelligence cooperate in the economic exploitation of the Beqaa by the locally grown poppies and Hashish, which are used after harvest to finance overseas operations. Diversified Iranian financial, educational and welfare organizations tightens the control over the poor population of Lebanon, especially the Shi'ites.

A major milestone toward the further expansion of this terrorist campaign was reached in the summer of 1989 in a series of high-level conferences in the Beqaa, Damascus and Tehran. These meetings included Syrian and Iranian senior officials as well as leaders and commanders of Hizballah and key Palestinian terrorist organizations including the PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP and the Al-Fath rebels. Writing in the 11 September 1989 issue of *Al-Dustur*, Dr. 'Ali Nurizadeh explained that these meetings decided to consider "the Lebanese theater as a base for spreading Khomeyni's ideas to Arab and Islamic countries." In a key strategy-formulating meeting in Tehran, "Syria gave her partner [Iran] authorization to move in the Lebanese arena without any reservation. In other words, there are no longer any red lines blocking Tehran's movement in Lebanon. Damascus' marriage with Tehran, once a temporary liaison, has been transformed by the recent alliance between the two sides into a solid marriage on the part of the official apparatus." These decisions determine the intensity and character of the Iranian-Shi'ite build up in and operations from Lebanon.

In October 1989, Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi led a major delegation inspecting garrisons and training of Hizballah and Islamic Resistance forces in eastern Lebanon. The visit amounts to an inspection from Tehran prior to the launching the Islamist offensive against the West. On 22 October, Mohtashemi met with Hizballah leader Sheikh Muhammad Yazbik to discuss their increased cooperation with Iran. According to Al-Diyar, Mohtashemi reiterated Tehran's support for the Hizballah struggle: "The Iranian brothers will preserve in the path forged by the Ayatollah Khomeyni and in their support for the Hizballah in Lebanon." In a concluding speech, printed in Al-'Ahd on 27 October 1989, he outlined their objectives vis-à-vis Israel:

We must remove the roots of America and Israel from our countries. We must strike them in their very home because it is our legal mission to cancel Israel's existence, liberate Palestine, and recover the al-Aqsa Mosque. Israel must know that the intifadah will continue until this illegal entity in Palestine crumbles. The Islamic resistance in Lebanon and the world will carry on the Jihad until Palestine is liberated from the filth of Zionism and Israel is eliminated. Our Jihad will continue until the oppressed people rule themselves all over the world.

Mohtashemi supervised a reorganization of the Hizballah high command. Husayn Khalil, a security official, and 'Abd-al-Hadi Hammadi, responsible for operations in Europe, were removed after their nets were found to have been penetrated. Husayn al-Musawi was sent back to rejuvenate Islamic Amal. The Hizballah information spokesman, Ibrahim al-Amin, was sacked for letting the image of the organization be tarnished. The position of the militant commanders, most notably Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sheikh Na'im Qasim and Hasan Nasrallah, were significantly bolstered. These elevated have strong ties with both Iranian and Syrian intelligence.

In a secret high-level meeting in Zifta, Mohtashemi mediated a new agreement between Amal and Hizballah. Consequently, massive new shipments of weapons have begun reaching the Beqaa from Iran through Syria in mid-November 1989. On the 27th, both Amal and Hizballah "received truckloads of ammunition and light weapons." Most of the weapons are used for the marked increase of

Hizballah units under the command of Subhi al-Tufayli and 'Abbas al-Musawi.

In order to expedite the attacks on Israel and the West, Tehran and Hizballah reached new major agreements of cooperation with some of the leading Palestinian terrorist leaders. Under Mohtashami's guidance, Hizballah and officials of the PFLP-GC of Ahmad Jibril reached an agreement for joint training and operations against Israel from southern Lebanon as well as worldwide. The operations against Israel will be conducted under the banner of the newly established Hizballah of Palestine. Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi, the leader of Islamic Jihad in Palestine, is the commander of Hizballah of Palestine. The organization includes both Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist fighters.

Mohtashemi anticipates the escalation of Islamist struggle throughout the world. Toward that end, he explained in his concluding speech, as printed in *Al-'Ahd* on 27 October 1989, Hizballah now has nuclei in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, even in the heart of America, instilling fear in the ranks of the enemies of Islam." The highly committed and trained Hizballahi in Lebanon are the Islamist revolution's main weapon. "With this weapon we can accomplish great achievements in the future," concluded Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi.

Hizballah also recruited several highly experienced terrorists to contribute their expertise. Most important is the expert bomb-maker Muhammad al-'Umari Abu-Ibrahim, who, according to French sources in Africa, in late-October 1989 was "operating under the flag of Hizballah, or at least under one of its factions." From his Beirut headquarters, Abu Ibrahim organized for Hizballah "a real network of complicity in Europe, mainly in France, England and Germany, and also among the Lebanese Shi'ite community established in Africa." This net has already proven its effectiveness.

The bombing of the UTA DC-10 on 19 September 1989 should be considered as a test run for the rejuvenated Hizballah international net. The French sources believe that the DC-10 was bombed in order to assassinate Chadian minister Mahamat Soumaila and a French middleman on their way to Paris to complete a deal to transfer the captured Libyan stockpiles to Aoun's forces in Lebanon's with France's blessings and Iraq's financial support.

Qaddafi as a revenge against both France and Chad financed the operation. The bomb was a Samsonite attaché case with double depth lining in which a total of 150-300 grams of thin layers of Pentryl (most likely SEMTEX-H) were laid and activated by a time-altitude

electronic detonator. The materials and approach used were similar to the Pan-Am 103 bomb. The French believe that UTA bomb was designed by Abu-Ibrahim.

The build-up of Hizballah infrastructure in Western Europe steadily increases. An indication of the magnitude of this effort serves the capture of 8 Hizballah terrorists in Madrid on 25 November 1989. Spanish police announced that it "broke up a gang of Shi'ite Moslem terrorists who imported at least a ton of plastic explosives for planned attacks on U.S. targets in

Europe." The explosives were concealed in a 19-ton shipment of canned goods from Sidon, Lebanon. The police found 265 pounds of plastic explosives when they had examined only 8 percent of the shipment and expected to find between 1 ton and 1.5 tons of explosives when they opened all of the 25,000 cans.

The eight suspects carried a variety of passports, and four had Iraqi documents. Three of those arrested were already identified as HizbAllahi: Abbas Mohamed Hallan, 23, of Kuwait, Hassan Hassan Rahd, 24, of Brazil, and Ali Mohamed Sbaiti, 31, of Lebanon. The other detainees were identified by their passports as Mohamed Mehussen Saber, 27; Abdul Khadum Sbaiti Abdul Muhsain, 31; Abbas Ali Hussein, 34; and Maki Mohamed, 34, all of Iraq, and Yassin Elamin Alhan, 27, of Sudan.

Yossef Bodansky



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Saudi Arabia

February 28, 1990

As Guardians/Custodians of the Two Holy Places (khadim al-haramayan), the House of Saud, and therefore the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has responsibility toward the entire Muslim world (umma). This unique role and the responsibilities that come with it are the result of being entrusted with the protection of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Indeed, the great scholar, Shehab al-Din Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Rabi'a codified this role in his seminal work, *Suluk al-Malik fi Tadbir al-Manalik*: "God has bestowed upon the kings His blessing and made it possible for them to control His lands. He entrusted them with his followers." Indeed, the House of Saud has recognized this unique responsibility as was made clear when King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz adopted the term khadim al-haramayan as the official title of the Ruler of Saudi Arabia.

In light of that fact, U.S. support and assistance to Saudi Arabia has been, to a great extent, an expression of Washington's recognition of the unique position of the House of Saud within the Islamic world. Saudi Arabian preoccupation with the welfare of Muslims, wherever they may be, has thus been accepted as an expression of the legacy of the House of Saud. Military aid, therefore, was accorded to Saudi

Arabia, in part, in respect of the traditional Islamic view that “the Army is the guardian of the morals of the nation.”

However, a dark shadow is being cast on the name of the House of Saud. Certain Afghan mujahideen and Arab Wahhabi activists, financed by Saudi money, have attempted to enforce their way of life and interpretation of the right way to worship on rural populations in Afghanistan. This coercion is frequently violent, including numerous cases of atrocities committed against defenseless women and children. The extremism of these Wahhabis in Afghanistan has, in fact, driven many who had endured unspeakable atrocities in defending their Islamic identity, back into the hands of the Soviet-installed regime in Kabul.

Further, such a situation is striking in that oppression and enforcement of codes of behavior in this manner would not seem to be consistent with the basic tenets of the Muslim faith as is made clear by the Holy Koran, in which was written:

Whenever two factions of believers fall out with one another, then try to reconcile them. If one of them should oppress the other, then fight against the one who acts oppressively until they comply with the command of God. If they comply, then set things right between them in all justice. (Sura 49, The Chambers)

Therefore, this practice, which has intensified markedly in the last year, would seem to be incompatible with the traditional Islamic responsibilities of the House of Saud.

Friends of the Guardian/Custodian of the Two Holy Places are especially concerned by the fanaticism of the Wahhabis in Afghanistan, for many of them are members of the ahl al-hal wa'l-'aqd (ruling elite) or their relations. Knowing how close knit are relations inside the House of Saud, the continued oppression of Afghans by these Wahhabis cannot but reflect on the entire House of Saud, the ahl al-hal wa'l-'aqd and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, as King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz reminded his entire family: “I beg of you brothers to look upon me as both brother and guardian/custodian.” Given this, there can be no doubt that the House of Saud, in its role as Guardian/Custodian of the Two Holy Places, has a unique obligation to live up to its responsibility.

The essence of Islamic political culture was defined some six hundred years ago by the great thinker Ibn Khaldun in his study of the

Khalifah [kingdom]. Ibn Khaldun emphasized the crucial significance of the *asabiyya*, (group feeling of mutual responsibility and solidarity), for the strength and endurance of the kingdom and the dynasty that rules it. The fortunes and future of the kingdom are in danger when the dynasty's younger generation becomes “dominated by [lust for] force. Luxury reaches its peak among them, because they are so much given to a life of prosperity and ease... Group feeling [responsibility] disappears completely.” It is in this stage, warned Ibn Khaldun, that the decline of both the dynasty and the kingdom begins “until God permits it to be destroyed, and it goes with everything it stands for.”

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

A Common Threat

August 8, 1990

The surge of radical Islam throughout the Middle East has reached such intensity that it threatens to engulf the region with terrorism and violence. Most vulnerable are the moderate Arab countries where the intensification of Islamist militant radicalism might lead to socio-political destabilization and possibly attempts to launch Khomeini-style Islamic populist revolutions. This profound process is a socio-political uprising of the local population that reflects indigenous grievances. Capitalizing on repeated efforts since 1984, Iran is becoming a truly effective player in the radicalization of the Sunni Arab World.

The results of the November 1989 elections in Jordan clearly demonstrate how widespread and popular are the radical Islamists. Islamist candidates openly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and won 32 out of the 80 seats in Lower House of Parliament, making them the strongest coherent block of votes. The call for the liberation of entire Palestine was a major factor in the Islamists' success. Their slogan was: "Palestine is not only Arab but also Muslim land!"

Muslim Brotherhood leaders consider the Jordanian elections a referendum on their position throughout the Middle East. The moral collapse of Arab regimes brought the masses into rediscovering the

power and hope in Islam. "The failure of other political parties and ideologies in the Arab world as a whole has also contributed to the success of the Islamists in Jordan," explained Al-'Anani, a Muslim Brotherhood activist in Amman. The people of Jordan have given up on secular form of governments and strive for a truly Islamic government. "No solution has worked, and the people drew their lesson from these examples," he concluded. In a manifesto published in the Amman *Al-Dustur* on 14 November 1989, the Muslim Brotherhood expressed its hopes that its electoral victory "will be strengthened and repeated so that it can become the vanguard experience in the region."

In essence, the Muslim Brotherhood has propelled the population to challenge the validity of the Hashemite monarchy. However, the Islamists do not feel strong enough to directly challenge and topple Hussein. Therefore, their initial objective is to mobilize and incite the masses not for a revolt but for an uncompromising Jihad against Israel. An immediate byproduct of this campaign is the widening of an irreconcilable gap between Hussein and Jordan's Palestinian citizens who constitute a vast majority of the population. Because Hussein is committed to the peace process, and a de-facto peace exists between Jordan and Israel, his inevitable objection to the destruction of Israel by military means would lead to a major alienation of the Islamist and Palestinian citizens.

Moreover, even Amman's support for the establishment of a PLO-dominated state in the West Bank and Gaza only exacerbates the situation. Jordan's Palestinians consider such a support a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Veteran Jordanian diplomat Musa al-Kilani explained in the *Jordan Times*, 13 November 1989, that "people in Jordan have openly showed their preference for Islamists who are anti-corruption and call for the liberation of all of Palestine." The significance of this call should be examined against the current political activities surrounding the Palestinian question. Al-Kilani emphasized that the PLO's position that "a Palestinian state could be set on the West Bank and Gaza has little appeal for those whose homes are in mandate Palestine from which the state of Israel was carved out in 1948." Therefore, Hussein's support for a Palestinian state in the territories is interpreted as his giving up on their chances to return to their homes in pre-1967 Israel.

These sentiments are even more prevalent in the Palestinian street in the West Bank and Gaza, ostensibly the prime beneficiaries from the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories. This is clearly reflected in the significant rise of popular support for HAMAS as the

representative of the Palestinians in the territories from 40% in late-August 1989 to over 55% in early-November 1989. The Islamic Resistance Movement, known as HAMAS, is the religious leadership of the intifadah that represents the entire scope of Islamist activism. HAMAS is closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood who conducts the movement's religious educational programs and also maintains close contacts with the clandestine terrorist cells of the Islamic Jihad Organization. The position of HAMAS is therefore the most accurate reflection of the popular sentiments in the West Bank and Gaza.

HAMAS views the intifadah as a spearhead of a pan-Islamic struggle. "Israel is a cancer spreading over the Islamic world in its entirety," HAMAS stated. Basam A'id, a Palestinian journalist from Shuafat, points that the Islamist majority "considers the establishment of a Palestinian state in the 1967 boundaries a temporary solution. They will take over the leadership in the state and will continue to struggle in order to liberate Acre and Jaffa." Under the banner of HAMAS, the Islamists "accumulate power" to such a degree, that they "will have decisive influence on the Palestinian state," and regardless of political agreements, "will continue to fight Israel. If the state is established in the '67 boundaries, the religious front will unite with the communists and together they will continue the struggle. Terror will continue, all will continue until they realize their goal," warns Basam A'id. HAMAS does not recognize the validity of political agreements or the possibility of a compromise: "Only Islam will break the Jews and destroy their dreams," meaning, Israel.

Rhetoric aside, the PLO leadership has never been the representative of the West Bank and Gaza population. The PLO was established in 1964 by an external leadership made of exiled refugees foreign to the only Palestinian population that might gain independence, those living in the territories. This establishment leadership is not acceptable to the population because of its lack of genuine interest in the intifada. Although the economic struggle imposed by the radicalized youth cause more suffering than Israel's curfews, it is hailed by the PLO from abroad while the plight of the population is ignored. Most of the PLO's senior leaders come from pre-1967 Israel. Theirs is a drive for vengeance for they know that not only will they never recover their lands, but the establishment of a Palestinian State in the territories will virtually doom their ability to fight for a return.

The PLO's leadership not only recognizes the Islamists' power but sees in HAMAS a unique way to reconcile its declared policies with its genuine aspirations. Little wonder that the PLO rushes to claim part in the Islamist revival. On 23 July 1989, the PLO affiliated Filastin al-Thawarah published a major survey on the internal politics of the intifadah. HAMAS was identified as a religious movement "working for the establishment of a state based on the canonical laws of Islam in all of Palestine." While not disavowing a Palestinian State in the territories, the PLO endorsed the HAMAS covenant of August 1988 which committed the Islamists to "working so that the flag of Palestine can be flown over every part of Palestine."

HAMAS, however, wants nothing to do with the PLO. In reality, the text of August 1988 covenant read that HAMAS "is working for the flying of the Banner of Allah over every bit of the land of Palestine." The gap between the PLO and the Palestinian religious leadership, including HAMAS, is profound and irreconcilable. The Islamists cannot compromise with the PLO, let alone accept it as their leadership and representative, because of the PLO's support for Iraq against the Islamic religious leadership of Iran. This is a fundamental issue among Islamists who see in an Islamic theocracy, even if Shi'ite, a divine regime and consider an attack on it even if by Sunni Arabs, a radda (sinful apostasy). Having become jahiliyya (barbarity), the PLO cannot lead the Believers. This increased preoccupation with Islamic regimes is the key to Iran's growing influence and involvement in the Arab World. Having seized the opportunity, Tehran has launched a drive to shift the surge of Islamic frustration and radicalism from pan-Arabism to Pan-Islamism. A key to Shi'ite Iran's success is attaining legitimacy as the leader of the predominantly Sunni Islamic World. This is done by destabilizing the mainstream Arab states. In a Top Secret meeting in Tehran on 26 May 1984 devoted to the "creation of an independent brigade for carrying out unconventional warfare in enemy territory," Mirhashem, the Brigade Commander, outlined Tehran's objectives: "The target countries are as follows. The first tier is Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The second tier is Hashemite Jordan." The U.S., France and other countries that confront Islam and Iran would be subsequent targets. Thus, with events throughout the Arab World, especially in Jordan as well as West Bank and Gaza, clearly reflecting a surge of Islamist radicalism, states.

An indication of Iran's objectives and methods came in the summer of 1989 when Egyptian security authorities uncovered a major Islamist organization actively supported by Iran whose aim was "to influence

the public opinion tendencies in preparation for pouncing on power and proclaiming an Islamic state in Egypt.”

Writing in Al-Dustur, 22 August 1989, Salim Ibrahim reported that this organization was actually a “large-scale Iranian intelligence activity inside and outside Egypt to recruit agents, infiltrate the domestic front, and establish loyal organizations as a prelude to spreading the Khomeynist call.” Salim Ibrahim points that although these were religious cultural organization, several members of “these elements have been trained so that they may carry out sabotage acts, stage explosions, and assassinate public figures.”

More significant, however, is the ideological profile of the exposed Khomeynist organizations. They were Sunni Islamist radicals following the tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir wa-Hijra. Iran is supporting movements that strive to implement the utopian (Sunni) Islamic State developed by scholars and juriconsults in the Cairo al-Azhar University. Tehran supports these Islamist activities as part of its quest to transform Egypt's pan-Arab legacy into pan-Islamism. Little wonder, therefore, that the subversive activities exposed by the Egyptian security authorities were a part of “plots” aimed at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Arab Maghreb in addition to Egypt itself.

Tehran's paying greater attention to the Arab World is essentially part of the cleansing of the Islamic World prior to the launching the Islamist offensive on the West. In October 1989, Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi led a major delegation inspecting garrisons and training of Hizballah and Islamic Resistance forces in eastern Lebanon. In a concluding speech, printed in Al-'Ahd on 27 October 1989, he outlined the Islamists' objectives:

We must remove the roots of America and Israel from our countries. We must strike them in their very home because it is our legal mission to cancel Israel's existence, liberate Palestine, and recover the al-Aqsa Mosque. Israel must know that the intifadah will continue until this illegal entity in Palestine crumbles. The Islamic resistance in Lebanon and the world will carry on the Jihad until Palestine is liberated from the filth of Zionism and Israel is eliminated. Our Jihad will continue until the oppressed people rule themselves all over the world.

These terms are not too different from the objectives of HAMAS. Mohtashemi anticipates the escalation of Islamist struggle throughout the world. Toward that end, he explained, "Hizballah now has nuclei in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, even in the heart of America, instilling fear in the ranks of the enemies of Islam." The highly committed and trained HizbAllahi in Lebanon are the Islamist revolution's main weapon. "With this weapon we can accomplish great achievements in the future," concluded Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi.

Iran's renewed threats to Saudi Arabia, reinforced by acts of terrorism in Beirut and Ankara, are but a component of this campaign. However, it should be emphasized that Iran could not have made these major strides toward the escalation of the terrorist campaign had it not for the indigenous surge of radical Islamism, including the popular rejections of traditional states and leaderships, throughout the Arab World as clearly demonstrated in popular surges in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. Tehran is eager to ruthlessly manipulate and exploit the revival of Islamism throughout the Middle East primarily against the moderate Arab states it considers a threat to its Islamic legitimacy.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

King Hussein of Jordan: Walking the Tight Rope

August 8, 1990

In recent months, the regime of King Hussein of Jordan has become increasingly extremely unstable, and now seems to be in its most precarious position since the 1970 civil war. Hussein fears the "Lebanonization" of Jordan. Moreover, unlike the situation of 1970, the Jordanian Legion (Army) is fragmented and thoroughly penetrated by Islamist elements, and thus it can no longer serve as the guarantor and savior of the regime. Thus, in the event of civil unrest, Hussein might now find himself compelled to call on Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Armed Forces to save his throne. Thus, at present, Jordan and Iraq have begun to establish a growing number of combined military units and have engaged in active preparations for a war with Israel. Hussein seems to consider these steps an insurance policy for his survival. However, far from saving him, it may turn out that Hussein's "survival policies" have already accelerated the demise of his regime to the point of no return.

In early-1990, King Hussein finds himself in the middle of three major trends in the Arab world. Of these, the most significant is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism that in Jordan has taken on a distinctly anti-

monarchical tone. Indeed, Islamism in Jordan is getting more and more militant and assertive as it is fueled and agitated by the Hamas movement in the West Bank and Gaza in which agitated Jordanian soldiers have launched personal jihads against Israel and might yet well direct their rage against the monarch they consider apostate.

In the meantime, to the East, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein is rapidly intensifying his drive for the leadership of the Arab world. At the same time, President Hussein is also looking for something to do with his huge army now that the Iranian front is silent, as demobilization would create an economic crisis and a major confrontation with Egypt (on account of that country's guest workers) that Iraq cannot afford. While to the north, there is a rejuvenation of Syria's, and especially Hafez Assad's, drive for regional supremacy and the realization of Sham – Greater Syria – that would include Jordan and Israel. Indeed, Assad has already expanded the use of terrorism and subversion in order to expedite the quest for Sham.

Just how insecure Hussein is can be deduced from the recent thorough reorganization of Jordanian internal security forces. The sudden reorganization, conducted personally by Hussein, included the purge of the high command of the intelligence services, including the commander of general intelligence. These purges indicated profound problems in the intelligence and security areas. Furthermore, Jordanian sources warn that the king and his immediate aides and confidants are isolated from the people and domestic sentiments and that this isolation is, in part, attributable to intelligence failures.

For example, Hussein and his confidants were surprised by the results of the parliamentary elections and especially by the dramatic rise of the Muslim Brotherhood all over the country, even in the most loyal Bedouin regions. Hussein was also shocked by the inability of the internal security forces to stop mounting defections from the army and skirmishes on the Israeli border. Jordanian sources insist that these phenomena are indications not just of a major intelligence failure, but also of the isolation of official Amman from the Jordanian population.

As for military intelligence failures, they insist that Hussein was equally surprised by the speed of the Iraqi military recovery, and by Saddam Hussein's subsequent intense quest for leadership in the Arab world. Thus, at present, King Hussein is attempting a delicate balancing act between internal political extremism and external pressures that is being further upset by Jordan's acute economic crisis.

That crisis, with high unemployment even among the better-educated classes, was needlessly exacerbated and radicalized by

Jordan's Prime Minister, Mudhar Badraan. Fearing disloyalty to Hussein, Badraan ordered the firing from government service of more than 1,000 engineers, teachers and other academics associated with the opposition. In late-February, Jordanian unemployed, who are predominantly Palestinians, conducted violent demonstrations in front of the National Assembly, demanding that Jordan stop issuing work permits to foreign companies. These riots coincided with protests against the government's refusal to employ radical (Islamist and leftist) engineers and experts in education and other national works. Despite a decision in early-March to expel un-licensed workers, little was actually done.

Violent confrontations with the police nevertheless continued. On 14 March, there was a major escalation in the riots when over 100 demonstrators, participating in a sit-in demonstration near the prime minister's office, were attacked by the police. The demonstrators were demanding that Mudhar Badraan permit the return to government service of academicians fired for their Islamist and anti-monarchical opinions. The purge of Islamists from government reached such proportions that around 20 March, the Jordanian parliament, at the insistence of its Islamist members, debated behind closed doors the rampant corruption in, and anti-Islamic behavior of, the civil service and state institutions. Hussein reacted to this pressure by reiterating his commitment to the Arab-Islamic cause. As he had done so many times before, Hussein elected to concentrate on external issues in order to avoid a domestic crisis.

One reason for the radicalization and exacerbation of the Jordanian population, and especially the better-educated Palestinian majority, is that Jordan is quietly returning to be the center of Palestinian violence against Israel. Amman is the capital of the intifadah. The bulk of the organized Palestinian violence is planned in, and directed from, Amman. The PLO maintains its second most important and forward headquarters in Amman. Moreover, the PLO's cooperation and coordination with Islamist organizations is conducted not in Tunisia, the PLO's primary headquarters, but in Amman.

Amman is the most important center of Sunni Islamist organizations, popularly known under the banner of Islamic Jihad. In 1989, Islamic Jihad, including all of its major factions and sub-organizations, was the most active terrorist organization inside Israel and the territories, with most of its operations guided and directed from Jordan. It was in Amman that the "Beit al-Muqadas" faction of Islamic Jihad, under the command of Sheik As'aad Tamimi, planned and

prepared for the 4 February, 1990, attack on the Israeli tourist bus near Ismailia, Egypt. The organization's military commander, Ibrahim Sarbal, operates out of secured installations in Amman. Other factions of the Islamic Jihad have their headquarters in Amman, as well as HAMAS, the militant fundamentalist organization most active in the West Bank and Gaza, which maintains its main military and financial headquarters in Amman. Further, in mid-February, HAMAS moved its center of operations from Gaza to the Tul-Karem – Nablus area in order to expedite cooperation and contacts with Jordan.

Most Palestinian terrorist organizations with official connections to the PLO, and those operating with Iraqi support, opened their forward headquarters in Amman in early-1990. The recruitment and training of local Palestinians for operations inside Israel started shortly thereafter. Among the most currently active of these groups are al-Fatah's "security organizations" (Arafat's intelligence and special operations units); Force 17, and an ad-hoc group assembled for terrorist activities inside Israel and the coordination of assassination of moderate Palestinians in the territories. In addition, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine has a forward headquarters under the veteran commander Ahmad Dakhil in Jordan and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has established its Amman headquarters as a base to support "Red Eagle" operations inside the territories.

Iraq has also increased its active assistance to several terrorist organizations associated with the PLO (Arafat branch) in recent months. Most active are the PLO's Intelligence and Security Apparatus under Abdel Latief Abu Hijlah (Abu-Tariq); the PLO's Special Operations Group under Col. Hawari; the Organization of May 15 under Mohammad Amri (Abu-Ibrahim); the Organization of the Survivors of Hammah, a Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization associated with Islamic Jihad; and HAMAS, which is conducting operations in both Syria and Israel; and the Palestinian Liberation Front of Mohammad Zaidan Abbas (Abu-Abbas) which also operates under Arafat's control. These organizations all established forward headquarters and facilities in Amman and in Palestinian camps in Jordan.

This sudden increase in radical activities in the Palestinian community has also spread to the youth. Armed clashes erupted between supporters of nationalist and Islamist groups. In early March, fearing an outburst of violence, the Jordanian security services intensified their efforts to mediate between the PLO and the Islamic Jihad – HAMAS in Amman. About that time, Yassir Arafat asked King

Hussein to help him regain a foothold in the expanding terrorist activities in the territories so that he, Arafat, could retain some recognition in the local population. Consequently, both al-Fatah and the Jordanian security services encouraged the escalation of revolutionary violence in the territories, although the population itself was exhausted by the continuous purges and senseless killings by the “veiled faces” gangs. In these operations, the al-Fatah terrorists (usually under pseudo organizational identities such as the “Eagles of the Revolution”) operated in close cooperation with the locally dominant Islamists. Further, this cooperation intensified in the wake of Secretary Baker's statement that the PLO was no longer involved in terrorism, with PLO commanders in Amman working to join in operations under assumed names or by taking the identity of other organizations, especially those associated with Islamic Jihad's sub-factions.

When Hussein agreed to the return of Palestinian terrorists to Amman, his security services insisted that their activities would be limited to support and coordination of activities inside Israel and Israeli held territories. By February, however, the Jordanians had lost control of events as armed attacks from Jordanian territories increased. March 30th saw a new peak in the ongoing escalation of skirmishes along the Israeli-Jordanian border, with the Islamic Jihad launching several 107mm Rockets from Jordan into the Jordan Valley. At first, the Jordanians claimed that these attacks were conducted by groups that had penetrated from Syria. However, Islamist sources insist that their bases were in Jordan. Moreover, most of the skirmishes along the Jordanian border were performed by one or a few Islamist soldiers of the Jordanian Army taking their personal weapons and going on a personal Jihad against Israel. So far, the Jordanian Army and the internal security forces have failed to block this trend, and their attempts to do so are being interfered with by the Jordanian parliament, where a large Islamist bloc exist.

As the pervasiveness of Islamist penetration has become clear, Jordanian intelligence has urged a fundamental shift in policy. Consequently, Hussein and the Jordanian security forces have decided to encourage personal Jihad operations against Israel. In doing so, their goal is to divert extremist Islamists and militant Palestinians away from political activities in Jordan and into confrontation with Israel. Moreover, Amman, under pressure from Baghdad, has begun to permit Iraqi-supported terrorists to operate from Jordanian territory.

It is important to note that King Hussein is fully aware of the risks he is taking in permitting and encouraging terrorist operations in

Jordan. Jordanian sources explain that Hussein believes that Jerusalem and Washington will understand his plight and will tolerate the escalation along the border, or will at least restrain the reaction. Thus, it seems that Hussein is convinced that he will get away with this escalation.

Recent changes in Jordan's foreign and defense policy again made in order to accommodate outside pressure, all but encourage anti-Israeli violence. Hussein's wavering between a de-facto peace with Israel and joining a unified Arab camp has begun tilting toward the latter option. This trend was accelerated when prominent Egyptians started talking about the imminence and inevitability of a war with Israel. 'Osma al-Baaz, a confidant of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, predicted in late-January that war with Israel was virtually inevitable unless Israel agreed to all of the PLO's requirements for compromise. Mohammad Hasnin Heikal was even more explicit: "A war between Israel and the Arabs will happen soon, there should be no doubt about it." He predicted that Israeli demands on Jordan and the entire Arab world in the course of foreseeable peace negotiations would be so outrageous that the Arab world will refuse to accept them. Soon afterward, a war of revenge for the restoration of Arab honor will erupt, explained Heikal. Other Arab commentators and government officials have echoed this analysis.

Yassir Arafat and the PLO are most active in predicting an Arab War involving Jordan. On 17 February, Arafat's close confidant, Hanni al-Hassan, demanded the immediate revival of the Eastern Front as an active command in order to confront the growing Israeli threat to the Arab world. Al-Hassan called for the unification of the armed forces of Jordan, Iraq, the PLO, and ultimately, with Syria, and their deployment along the Israeli border. Arafat himself, in a meeting with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, also called for "actual Arab steps" to be taken against Israel. Arafat predicted that Syria would eventually rejoin the Eastern Front and contribute to a decisive confrontation with Israel.

The militant mood dominated the 23-25 February Summit of Four (leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and North Yemen) in Amman. King Hussein hosted the Summit of Four wearing his Legion's red kaffiye, a highly significant militarist symbol in the Arab world. At the conference, Hussein transferred the baton of Arab leadership from Egypt to Iraq. He called Saddam Hussein the "big Brother" of the Arab world and clearly recognized Iraq's dominant throughout the entire Middle East.

Indeed, at the summit, Saddam Hussein introduced a call for the resumption of war against Israel, and Egypt's faint call for an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation was drowned out by the war-like statements of the other participants. Encouraged, Saddam Hussein insisted that the current situation in the Middle East could no longer be tolerated. He stated that in principle it is already possible for the Arabs "to destroy Israel and defeat the U.S." Given the right preparations, he added, the Arabs will be invincible in 5 years. Saddam Hussein further called the close military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq as a major step in that direction and emphasized that such cooperation would continue and intensify. King Hussein echoed Saddam Hussein's support of the intensifying military cooperation between the two countries.

Saddam Hussein believes that the Soviet withdrawal from daily supervision of Arab affairs provides a unique opportunity for a decisive confrontation with Israel. Saddam Hussein explains that the "Arab Stone" [the intifadah] has already turned into an abrasive and harassing instrument. Therefore, other and stronger means are needed in order to turn the "stone" into a killing instrument and to evolve the intifadah into the final solution of the Palestinian problem. Saddam Hussein reiterated his commitment to "defend the honor of the Arab Nation along the longest confrontation line with the enemy," i.e., the Israeli-Jordanian border. Iraq, Hussein added, is committed to further intensifying military cooperation with Jordan. Such cooperation is also the key to Iraq's becoming the dominant factor in a revived Eastern Front in which Syria would join.

Prior to this, during 1989, King Hussein had begun conducting an intensive rapprochement with Syria's Hafez Assad. When, in early-1990, Hussein committed himself to Iraq, Saddam Hussein started his current campaign for the leadership of the Arab world, and urged King Hussein to use his good offices to organize a Summit of Reconciliation with Assad. The Iraqi leader also suggested an Assad-Arafat summit. Hafez Assad seems to have been receptive to the call of militant unity, for in his speech on 8 March, the 27th anniversary of the Ba'ath rise to power, Assad declared that the Arabs "must unify and march on the liberation way – the jihad way." In this, he echoed closely the tenets of the anti-Israeli strategy formulated by Saddam Hussein. Assad warned that the Arab commitment to the Jihad must be staunch because "the struggle with Zionism" will be "long and protracted" until the inevitable victory – the destruction of Israel.

Hussein thus finds himself in the midst of political-military activities he can no longer effectively control. Every step that he takes

is examined against expectations for a move to war. Thus, on 4 March, Hussein went to Baghdad to continue discussions on the specifics of the implementation of the next phase of Jordanian-Iraqi military cooperation. Saddam Hussein presented this military cooperation as the core of the revived Eastern Front and the spearhead of an Arab assault on Israel. Unable to break away from the dynamic of his own policy of military cooperation, Hussein was forced to agree with Saddam's interpretation.

Thus, in early-March, Saddam Hussein began introducing a strong anti-U.S. theme to his Arab grand design. He warned the U.S., officially and in speeches, to evacuate its forces from the Persian Gulf, the Arab Sheikdoms and the Emirates. Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy foreign minister insisted that in its determination to keep the Navy in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. was participating in an anti-Arab war. He described the U.S. as an active participant in a Zionist conspiracy with Israel. Within a week of these pronouncements, the Iraqi media launched an anti-U.S. campaign under the theme: "the U.S. has begun damaging the interests of the Arab Nation by threatening their national security, rights and interests." Recent U.S. accusations concerning Iraq's build-up of missiles and unconventional weapons have further exacerbated the anti-American frenzy in the Arab world.

Jordan, and especially official Amman, is thus being drawn into a militant mood. Officials and government confidants talk of a future war in terms of fatalistic inevitability. Virtually everybody accepts the notion that a dramatic breakout from the current impasse in the Middle East is inevitable. Indeed, several senior government officials have urged the King to undertake specific steps in anticipation of an Arab-Israeli war. One of the more eloquent spokesmen for this body of opinion is Dr. Ahmad 'Awidy al-'Abadi, a member of Parliament and a retired senior defense and intelligence official. On 1 April, Dr. Ahmad 'Awidy al-'Abadi warned that an Israeli aggression against Jordan and Saudi Arabia should be anticipated at any moment. He thus urged the completion of the Eastern Front, including the preemptive deployment of Iraqi Armed Forces in Jordan. Dr. Ahmad 'Awidy al-'Abadi stopped short of urging an Arab preemptive strike, but others, mainly Islamists, have urged an Arab offensive initiative.

Thus, the rapidly intensifying Jordanian-Iraqi military cooperation might soon make such an Iraqi deployment inevitable. Although Jordan was Iraq's closest ally during the war with Iran, with a Jordanian brigade fighting at the front and Aqaba being the primary port for Iraq's importation of sensitive military equipment, Amman did not read Iraq's

capabilities correctly. Jordan was surprised by the speed of Iraq's recovery from the war with Iran and its ability to redeploy and redirect the bulk of its military potential from its eastern to its western boundaries. In that light, specific military cooperation between Iraq and Jordan against Israel began in mid-1989.

Operating from Jordanian air bases, Iraqi reconnaissance aircraft flew along the Israeli border for target identification deep inside Israel in July 1989. During the fall of that same year, intensive combined training and doctrinal development activities began in earnest, and several Chieftain tanks and other equipment captured from Iran were transferred to Jordan, facilitating the establishment of a new Jordanian armored division. Saddam Hussein explained to King Hussein that in contributing so much to Jordan's military strength, Iraq convincingly demonstrated that it had no designs on Jordan.

Consequently, in early-1990, Jordan and Iraq began discussions on specific deployment sites for Iraqi forces "should the need arise." Despite Iraqi urging, it is not clear at the moment whether King Hussein would allow the Iraqi army to deploy in Jordan prior to a crisis. Nevertheless, Iraqi forces allocated for Jordan's defense have already been deployed near airbases in the western parts of Iraq, just across the border from Jordan.

In the meantime, the close military cooperation between Iraq and Jordan continues to intensify. In mid-February, Iraq and Jordan established a common Mirage F.1 squadron and began advanced joint training. This squadron is the first step in more elaborate preparations for the activation of a common Mirage wing, as well as for the creation of combined air force units for the absorption of new Mirage 2000 aircraft that have recently been acquired by both countries. Jordan and Iraq have also discussed the deployment of Iraqi radar stations in Jordan, and as a short term measure have called for the integration of an upgraded Jordanian early warning system into an Iraqi dominated comprehensive C3I system. In addition to all of this, an Iraqi-Jordanian Brigade is also being established. As one alarmed Jordanian royalist put it, these developments represent "Iraqization" of the Jordanian Legion.

Although King Hussein allowed himself be dragged into participating in Iraq's quest for power, as well as into the revived support for terrorism against Israel, he is now in too deep to be able extricate himself. The rise of Islamism in Jordan prevents any compromise with Israel short of its complete destruction. Hussein cannot contain Islamist rage and therefore must redirect it outwardly,

against Israel, if he is to survive. Furthermore, the Saudis, fearing for their own safety and eager to placate Saddam Hussein, have encouraged Jordan's militant moves and deepening involvement in intifadah terrorism.

Thus, the momentum of events seems to be overtaking Hussein. Domestic instability makes him virtually dependent on the Iraqi Army and Saddam Hussein's good will for the survival of his regime in case of a civil war or Islamist upheaval. More significantly, Saddam Hussein recognizes that the only way to the leadership of the Arab world is through a military confrontation with Israel where he can use, or threaten to use, his vast military machine. Peace is a threat to Iraq's quest for power and pan-Arab leadership. Therefore, as long as King Hussein is dependent on Iraq, he cannot accept peace or even a reduction in tension, for this would be tantamount to suicide.

Despite all of his desperate maneuvering, Hussein's retention of the Jordanian throne is no longer a certainty. More ominously, even if King Hussein survives in Amman, the question of who actually runs Jordan remains open. Under extreme pressure at home and aggressive neighbors abroad, Hussein may not be able to resist radical demands, and therefore will probably not be able to deliver the guarantees and promises required to move the peace process forward. Indeed, at present, Hussein is incapable of withstanding, let alone reversing, the Islamist anti-Israel militant frenzy in Jordan. Nor can he resist Saddam Hussein's quest for pan-Arab leadership. All that can be hoped is that in his tangled maneuvers for self-preservation, King Hussein will not actually hasten the process that will ultimately lead to his downfall.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Next Step in the Persian Gulf

August 8, 1990

By accomplishing the realization of Iraq's long-standing goal of annexing Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has made a major step that could determine the character and outcome of the current conflict in the Persian Gulf. President Hussein defined the essence of the conflict in terms that are both legitimate in, and acceptable to, the Arab World. Thus he has, in effect, already declared a pan-Arab Jihad against the U.S. and those who cooperate with it. President Hussein has drawn a line not in the sand but across the board. The Islamic definitions he used are very specific: Only those who side with him (actively or passively) are Muslims fighting for Jihad and the honor of the Arab World. All others are resisting him and, because of U.S. involvement, are apostates and thus deserving of the only punishment decreed by the Koran – total annihilation. Thus, Saddam Hussein has cast his lot for a total war with no possibility of compromise for peaceful resolution.

In reacting to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia in the form of deploying forces to protect U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf, Washington unfortunately provided the Arab World with a legitimate excuse to declare such a Jihad against the United States and its allies.

Thus, many future complications will be avoided only if the U.S. intervention and its ultimate objectives are “re-packaged” in terms palatable to the Arab and Muslim World. Moreover, the U.S. must redefine its objectives and address the emerging realities in the Persian Gulf and the Muslim World before anti-U.S. sentiment based on the utilization of sacred pan-Arab and pan-Islamic themes gets out of hand. Once the anti-U.S. Jihad has become an accepted reality in the Arab World, and this may happen without a single shot being fired, there is no escape from a decisive resolution of the crisis.

Thus, the U.S. must liberate Kuwait by force and continue all the way to Baghdad in order to install and impose a regime of its choosing. The entire Arab World, Washington's friends and enemies alike, can no longer tolerate half-measures and compromises for any show of “Western” politics or logic will immediately be interpreted as a sign of weakness and proof of betrayal and therefore would incite Islamist calls for vengeance and further escalation of the violence against our allies and vital interests.

The plight of Egypt serves as an example of the intensity of the crisis in the Arab World. President Husni Mubarak was pushed into having to make a choice between Egypt's self-interest (which clearly lies with the West) and Egypt's Islamic honor and position in the Arab World (that at present can be defined only by siding with Saddam Hussein). As Mubarak has repeatedly stated since late-1989, all other factors being equal, Egypt's return to the Arab World is an unchallengeable priority.

Therefore, ultimately and predictably, Mubarak elected not to risk his Islamic credentials and declared that he would not dispatch Egyptian forces to Saudi Arabia. In his speech, Mubarak explained that he had warned “our brothers in Iraq... that Iraq will be struck by a harsh strike from the outside,” that is, the infidel world. Mubarak also presented the question of Egyptian deployment of forces in an Islamic terms: On the basis of a U.S. request, Egypt is “not preparing troops and there is no talk about this.” However, should Arabs ask Egypt “to participate with Arab troops, I do not think Egypt would refuse,” Mubarak said.

The only way for the U.S. to retain legitimate leadership of the Persian Gulf crisis and enable its allies to actively support and participate without risking their Islamic credentials and loyalties is by assuming the role of Supreme Arbiter. It is not too late for Washington to impose the U.S. as the Supreme Arbiter of the Persian Gulf – a role it is entitled to in the Arab World – and to act like one.

Thus, the U.S. must redefine the declared objective of its intervention and deployment of forces to the palatable “protection of the vital interests of the industrialized West, that is, the sources of oil, and the determination to do whatever it takes to ensure these interests for the foreseeable future.” Such a definition legitimizes the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

A mission definition based on the role of the Supreme Arbiter implies that the U.S. does not care about the local Arab regimes that just happen to reside above the all-important oil. This definition will absolve the friendly Arab rulers of the impression of cooperating with the infidel American against the Arab brethren. These Arab rulers would then be in a position to justify their cooperation with the U.S. as being under duress, and their Islamic honor would remain intact. It is a crucial distinction of relations with the House of Al-Saud if Washington cares about their longevity, stability and unique Islamic posture as the Guardians of the Holy Shrines.

As a Supreme Arbiter, the U.S. is expected to build an alliance of Western industrialized nations to carry out its whims and wishes in the Persian Gulf. NATO is an ideal foundation to start from, for it includes the British, who have extensive dealing with Arabs and enjoy a healthy respect in the Persian Gulf, as well as the Turks who are both part of NATO and Muslim. If there is a need for ground forces to protect Saudi Arabia, they must be Turkish and not Egyptians or other Arab forces where the personnel might succumb to the Iraqi declaration of an Arab Jihad.

The Muslim and Arab World has already cornered itself in a Dar ul-Islam versus Dar ul-Harb mentality where honor and commitment to extremist uncompromising solutions are the determining factors. It is inconceivable for the Leader of the Arab World – currently Saddam Hussein – not to define the Jihad he is leading but in absolutist and maximalist terms.

However, being a fatalistic religion, Islam recognizes the limitations of power and the inability to realize one's intentions, noble and just as they might be. The infidel West cannot reason with the Believers to alter their noble Islamic intentions. The infidel West can, and should, bring power to bear to compel the Arabs to comply, and, ultimately, defend their own lands and interests. However, it is imperative that the convoluted issue of Islamic honor and legitimacy is maintained and taken into consideration in every step of the way.

In an over-simplified way: The ultimate objective of the U.S. is to secure the oil fields and the long-term stability of the local conservative

regimes. For this to have a fighting chance, it is imperative that these leaders are not forced to look as if they are willingly accepting, let alone calling for, U.S. military intervention. Instead of stating “Thank you President Bush for helping us,” these leaders should be in a position to state, in the privacy of their own sanctuaries, “Thank you, Allah, for imposing President Bush upon us!”

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Near East After the Invasion of Kuwait

August 9, 1990

Having completed the occupation of Kuwait within a day, Saddam Hussein's Army is now completing a military build-up on the Saudi border. Regardless of whether Saddam Hussein orders his army to march in Riyadh or not, new realities have already been created in the Persian Gulf and the entire Arab world. Indeed, the significance of the Iraqi's swift invasion and occupation of Kuwait goes far beyond the seizure of Kuwait's oil fields or even its strategic location. For in point of fact, Saddam Hussein's audacious move is a major milestone in the consolidation of the power structure of the Near East, and ultimately of the Muslim world.

Indeed, for about a year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was a constant evolution of power blocs in the Near East based on traditionalist Islamic identities. Moreover, military power and Islamic militancy have increasingly come to constitute the foundations of legitimacy for aspiring Arab leaders. (Indeed, it should be emphasized that Islamic identities were always present under the surface even when secular revolutionary regimes and leaders, most notably Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, justified their moves in terms of political-military expediency and progressive revolutionary doctrines.)

Given this, the rejuvenated militaristic mood of the Arab world dominated the February 23 – 25, 1990, Summit of Four (leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Yemen) in Amman, Jordan. King Hussein hosted the Summit of Four wearing his Legion's red kaffiye; a highly significant militarist symbol in the Arab world, and the Summit was used to transfer the baton of Arab leadership from Egypt to Iraq. Indeed, King Hussein called Saddam Hussein the “Big Brother” of the Arab world and clearly recognized Iraq's hegemonic claims throughout the Middle East. This regional process further politicized and brought to the surface the process of Islamic rejuvenation.

Thus, by occupying Kuwait and imposing a puppet regime there, Saddam Hussein was able to prove the omnipotence of his leadership over the Arab world. Thus, Arab reaction to the invasion was so mute because as much as Arab leaders feared Saddam Hussein, and despite his overthrowing the Al-Sabah family, they also recognized that such action was legitimate for a “Supreme Arab” leader.

In this context, the issues of boundaries and sovereignty are not that important in the contemporary Middle East because virtually all Arab states have irredentist claims, dormant or actively pursued, against the other Arab states. Iraq's actions therefore, if consolidated, will constitute a license for some of these Arab countries to realize their own aspirations, and they are therefore disinclined to speak out against it.

Similarly, although the tarnished honor of the deposed Al-Sabah family is a major issue in Arab politics, it should be remembered that royalty and ruling elites have been repeatedly overthrown in the Middle East. Moreover, the only Arab royal house that has the legitimate credentials to stand up for the house Al-Sabah – the house of Al-Saud in Riyadh – is in a precarious position when it comes to protesting the overthrow of Arab royalty. After all, the house of Al-Saud rose to power in the 1920's and 1930's by overthrowing the house of Al-Hashim and banishing it from the Hejaz to Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Indeed, King Hussein of Jordan is the only surviving Hashemite ruler and he is painfully aware of that fact. Needless to say, the record of the most traditionalist segments of the Arab world have a far from spotless record when it comes to overthrowing other dynasty's and are therefore reluctant to speak up when one of their own are toppled.

In this context, Saddam Hussein is a shrewd, power hungry, despot. He is no Islamic scholar, but he has very effectively exploited Islam for his own purposes. Irrespective of divisions in Islam itself, the Muslim world has presented itself as a unified entity – the Dar ul-Islam (the

abode of Islam) – facing and confronting a single hostile world – the Dar ul-Islam (the abode of war.) This struggle always takes precedence over internal squabbles. Thus, in Kuwait and on the Saudi Arabian border, Saddam Hussein drew the battle lines of the struggle for the control of the Muslim world, and in so doing deftly exploited the trends in the Arab world and the consequences of his invasion of Kuwait, to consolidate a subservient Dar ul-Islam behind him. This reformulation of Iraq's quest for regional power and hegemony on Islamic terms is of crucial importance because of the revival of Islam among the masses of the Arab world and large segments of the Third World.

Further, Iraq had in the 1980's already exploited successfully such Islamic theological subjects as the purity of Islam and its "Arabness" (uruba.) Indeed, Saddam Hussein rejuvenated and emphasized the significance of "Arabness" in order to mobilize the Arab world to recognize his leadership and dominance, as well as to gain support for the Iraqi effort against Iran. Over the years then, the Iran-Iraq War was increasingly portrayed to the Arab world as an Arab struggle aimed at stopping the spread of mawali (non-Arab) Shi'ism. Throughout the region, other Arab leaders clearly recognized the dominance of Islamic trends and assumed traditional Islamic forms of legitimization. For example, the Saudi royal family changed its title to "Guardians of the Holy Shrines," while the Moroccan king adopted the title of "Emir of the Believers." Even Saddam Hussein himself is spread a false biography of his family claiming that the Taqrities are Savvids, that is, direct decedents of the Prophets.

Given these factors, at the Amman summit, Saddam Hussein clearly stated his intention to unify the Arab world and lead it into resuming the war against Israel. Egypt's timid call for an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation was drowned out in war-like statements from the other participants at the conference and Saddam Hussein, encouraged by this, insisted that the situation in the Middle East could not be allowed to continue. He further went on to stat that, in principle, it is already possible for the Arabs "to destroy Israel and defeat the United States." Hussein also noted that given the right preparation and unity, the Arabs would be invincible within 5 years. Additionally, Saddam Hussein portrayed the close military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq as a major step in the direction of that unity and emphasized that such cooperation would continue and intensify. King Hussein echoed President Hussein's sentiments in this matter, and the conference, as a whole, called on all other Arab nations to improve their military cooperation against Israel and the United States.

In moving into Kuwait then, President Hussein not only realized a traditional territorial aspiration of Iraq, he also demonstrated his leadership position and thereby added an “incentive” for the Arab world to close ranks behind him. For example, Hafez al-Assad of Syria began his reconciliation with the rest of the Arab world several months ago. However, President Assad now sees the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as legitimization of the principle of resolving irredentist claims by force of arms and is therefore inclined to follow Iraq's lead in that regard. Indeed, Assad has several such claims of his own, most notably against Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Israel and may now be encouraged to press them. Further, by deploying forces on the Saudi Arabian border with impunity, President Hussein also demonstrated Iraq's influence and overwhelming military strength, and thereby compelled the rest of the Arab world to accept his leadership. Simultaneously, he demonstrated the impotence of the United States and the rest of the Western world.

This defiant steadfastness against, and blatant challenging of, the superpowers and the rest of the world is yet another symbol in Arab eyes of Saddam Hussein's taking on the rest of the world. In so doing, President Hussein is making a clear distinction between the modern day Dar ul-Islam and Dar ul-Harb that no Arab nation will be able to ignore. Leading the infidel world in condemning Iraq, while attempting to impose military and economic countermeasures that even the most affected Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia would not go along with, the United States has already placed itself in the position of the arch-enemy that Saddam Hussein allocated to it. Further, it should be remembered that both France and the Soviet Union supported Iraq under the table, striking deals that included preserving Saddam Hussein's, as well as their own, political honor by feigning a rift and indignation while not changing their underlying relationships to Iraq. Thus, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is being manipulated into becoming a major milestone in the process of the unification of the Arab world and the revival of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism as the guiding principle of regional policy against the rest of the world.

President Hussein's next step in this situation will be a clear challenge to the Dar ul-Harb, namely the United States. Indeed, President Hussein is hoping for a United States retaliatory action that will have the effect of tarnishing Saudi Arabia's Islamic legitimacy, in turn unleashing a process that will rally the entire Arab world against the invading or interfering infidels. To date, President Hussein has obtained exactly that situation as the United States is leading a very

vocal and somewhat threatening campaign against Iraq which it cannot execute because the Arab world that the United States is supposed to be saving from Iraq is adamantly refusing to cooperate. Indeed, this is the very same Arab world the United States is claiming to protect that will not even block the flow of Iraq's oil in the Trans-Arabian pipeline, let alone allow United States' forces on its soil. In the meantime, Jordan continues to intensify its comprehensive military cooperation with Iraq, while making some quiet protestations of its invasion of Kuwait.

Further, even if the United States does not enter Saudi Arabia and provoke Arab unity, President Hussein will ultimately turn against Israel to obtain the same result; the creation of a common enemy to unite the Arab world under his banner. Indeed, on July 25, 1990, President Hussein delegitimized Kuwait's right to exist by defining it an instrument of the "Zionist-American conspiracy, thus sealing its fate and setting the tone for Iraq's rallying cry to the Arab world.

The United States and Israel are thus virtually alone in confronting Iraq and its drive for power. France and the Soviet Union will lead Europe into non-compliance with any sanctions the moment they are able to point to Arab acceptance, not even legitimization or recognition, of the new Kuwaiti regime. Indeed, Japan and the People's Republic of China will not even wait for such a development. Further, Iraq's traditional adversaries, Iran and Pakistan, will not dare to oppose President Hussein for fear of challenging Muslim unity against the United States, not to mention their fear of challenging Soviet non-interference in, or even active support for, Iraq's strategic surge.

That said, and despite the clear and hostile distinction between Dar ul-Islam and Dar ul-Harb, the modern Muslim world also recognizes the role of the Supreme Arbiter. The Supreme Arbiter is an external foreign power that by its sheer superior power is capable of compelling the Arabs, individually or as a group, into action without the Arabs losing face. For example, during the colonial era, France and Britain were considered Supreme Arbiter's and consequently local Arab leaders were able to openly cooperate with them. The USSR and Israel are still recognized as Supreme Arbiter's. Similarly, the United States can assume the role of Supreme Arbiter if it so chooses. With Islamic honor at stake, the Arab world will never cooperate with, or invite in, the United States. The conservative Arab states will, however, eagerly acquiesce to United States' pressure imposed under conditions that can be portrayed as relations between Muslims and the Supreme Arbiter.

The United States and Israel are the declared objectives of President Hussein's drive for a pan-Arab Jihad that would ultimately

consolidate his position as the undisputed leader of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Thus, there can be no compromise with Saddam Hussein because he is determined to pursue policies that will allow him to portray himself as fighting the historic enemies. Therefore, the United States and Israel must seize the initiative and impose the United States as the Supreme Arbiter of the Persian Gulf. In this context, there is no escape from a fierce and decisive military action. There can be no half measures, trip-wires or signals, for they will not be understood in the Middle East.

A clash between the Dar ul-Islam and Dar ul-Harb is quite inevitable, if not imminent. Such a clash is the only way to release the pressures building in the region, where large segments of the population are celebrating Iraq's victory over a royal family that too closely associated with the West. Thus, every day that passes increases Saddam Hussein's popularity as an Arab leader who defies and insults the United States in a region that Washington has defined as being within its "vital interests." As this persists, the other Arab and Islamic regimes will gradually gravitate into subservience to an Arab cause dominated by a militant pan-Islamism with all that will entail for the security of the West.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Emerging Trends in the Persian Gulf Crisis

August 20, 1990

Saddam Hussein is systematically raising the ante toward the major confrontation with the U.S. to which he aspires. Moreover, Saddam's manner, blatant and flagrant, is loaded with Arab symbolism aimed primarily at inciting and agitating the Arab masses into supporting his next few steps rather than bringing them to encourage a U.S. response. Thus, Baghdad's declaration on August 18, 1990, that it considered the economic embargo against Iraq as "an act of war," was a dare aimed at the U.S. to respond. The subsequent U.S. inaction is being interpreted then by the Arab masses as an indication of Washington's fear of Saddam Hussein.

Similarly, Saddam Hussein's cynical manipulation of Western civilians is fuel to spark the Arab masses. Ludicrous semantic acrobatics concerning the definition of the Westerners – detainees, restrictees, hostages, etc. – are being performed for the Arab World as a demonstration of repeated affronts and insults to a seemingly passive and inactive West. The placement of the Western hostages in potential targets, so far achieved with impunity, and the threat they will suffer along with Iraqis if shortages of food and medicine develop, are all

symbolic gestures demonstrating Saddam Hussein's audacity and confidence in his leading role in Arab history.

In a struggle with a profound ideological ingredient, as the current confrontation in the Arabian Desert unquestionably is, time plays a critical role. It is imperative for the U.S. to comprehend the time factor when contemplating the next steps in the Persian Gulf. Thus, when planning any military action, there must be a proper balance between the time needed to deploy and organize the forces required for the anticipated contingencies and the impact of the accumulating ideological effects and socio-political evolutions in the Middle East. The current phony war contributes to the stabilization of a status quo that gradually becomes acceptable to many in the region. The communal shock of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is being rapidly transformed into a communal shame of infidel [U.S.] forces occupying Holy Arab land, of the Arab inability to solve their own problems within the umma, of the Arab need to ask the infidels to deploy forces for the protection of Holy Muslim lands. The rage and frustration that already exists in the Arab World is being further exacerbated by the current crisis and will ultimately burst against the U.S.

The ultimate objective of Saddam Hussein's grand strategy is to become the undisputed leader of the Arab World and the champion of revived pan-Arabism – the new Gammal 'Abd-ul Nassir. Under current conditions, Saddam Hussein seems to believe that he can realize his objective in only two ways: If...

- He shames the U.S. and deligitimizes its regional supporters by bringing about a U.S. withdrawal from the Persian Gulf without a major clash with Iraq. Such a U.S. unilateral disengagement can be induced by terrorism and shortages that would serve to transform the public support in the U.S. for involvement in the Persian Gulf into an outcry for withdrawal.
- He manipulates and provokes the U.S. and Israel to attack Iraq and its allies, thus drawing a clear distinction between the imperialist-Zionist camp and its sworn enemies led, of course, by Saddam Hussein. The explicit objective of such a war is to impose recognition of Saddam Hussein as the leader of the Arab World.

The Mobilization of the Arab World

Saddam Hussein has already begun to undertake credible steps toward the realization of his grand design. His primary thrust has been a consolidated effort to unite the Islamic and Arab legitimacy of the confrontation with, and the Jihad against, the U.S. and its allies. It is a sophisticated and persistent struggle for the hearts and minds of the region's masses and, to date, it has succeeded. Militant religious leaders support the Iraqi line and sanction the call for Jihad. Saddam Hussein capitalizes on the intensifying rage, despair and anti-Western xenophobia of the Arab World, and especially the impoverished, uprooted urban masses. It provides an outlet for their frustration, an external justification for their misery (U.S.-Israeli conspiracy), and a way to regain their tarnished honor (pan-Arab Jihad).

The majority of the excited and incited mobs – the shabab – merely express their frustration by identifying with this simplistic division of good versus evil. However, the political motivation of the shabab is a very powerful instrument in the Muslim World and has already determined major events. For example, agitated shabab compelled King Hussein into the Six Day War in 1967 despite Israeli pleas that he refrain, while in 1978-79 massive street demonstrations convinced the Shah of Iran of his hopeless situation although his Armed Forces were still intact. Faced with masses of enraged shabab in the streets, Arab leaders may often act against their long held beliefs rather than confront.

The Arab World, its leaders, and especially those Arabs in the street, are recovering from the shock of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Islamic propaganda that pours out of Baghdad addresses basic palatable themes. The Iraqi call for a pan-Arab Jihad is supported and endorsed by a growing number of religious leaders who, while not authorities on a national level, do motivate and mobilize their respective constituencies. Little wonder that the Arab media is already full of “horror stories” about atrocities and crimes committed against Arabs in Saudi Arabia by U.S. soldiers. For example, the Jordanian paper *Swat al-Sha'ab* ran a front-page story on August 13, 1990 reporting that U.S. soldiers were robbing the local Arabs and that “at least 10 Saudi citizens were martyred and others wounded when U.S. soldiers fired at them after hundreds of Saudi citizens demonstrated in front of a U.S. military base.”

There are also reports, mainly originated by PLO-affiliated sources, about the presence of Israeli troops under the U.S. flag as part of the

deployment to Saudi Arabia. The Friday Sermons on August 17, 1990 were extremely fiery and urged hostile action against the U.S. and its allies. At present, the building rage in the Arab street is such that only a small catalyst is needed to push the incited shabab into action. A major, though symbolic, shaming of the U.S., for example through a major terrorist act in the Persian Gulf, the Arab World, Western Europe, let alone in the U.S. itself, would suffice to bring the shabab into action.

The Arab rulers and governments who converse with the U.S. and who agreed to send in troops – be it Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Egypt and Syria – are all minority authoritarian regimes that do not rule on behalf of their populations. In most cases, the roots of the royal families (ruling clans) are foreign to the countries they call their own. There has always been a wide gap between the policies of the ruling elites and the sentiments of the masses, even when the elite family was perhaps the best choice for the country in question. However, nobody had ever sought popular support for national policies until a few cases caused governments to make sharp changes in their policies due to mob pressure.

This Middle Eastern power structure currently finds itself in dire straits as a result of the Cairo Summit. There are only two ways in which political decisions can be accepted in the Arab World:

- A decree by a dominant and recognized pan-Arab great leader;
- By *ijma'*, that is, reaching a unanimous consensus on the basis of lengthy consultations and discussions.

Voting and majority ruling is alien and dangerous to the Arab World because the adoption of any majority decision automatically shames those leaders who oppose it. Thus, the decision by several Arab leaders to actively oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the decision to endorse and support the U.S. deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia, while in the best interests of the Middle East states, was also un-Islamic.

This legitimacy gap is already being exploited by Iraqi agitation. For example, on August 9th, Dr.Col. Nadir al-Tamimi, the deputy mufti of the Palestine National Liberation Army, issued a religious edict in Amman ruling that “he who supports the Americans and Westerners, enemies of God, and takes part in combat against Muslims of Iraq will be apostate and the shedding of his blood will be

sanctioned.” This edict is in effect an Islamic call for the assassination of pro-U.S. Arab leaders and active opposition to the deployment of Arab forces to Saudi Arabia. Under such conditions it would only take a symbolic “victory,” most likely in the form of an anti-U.S. terrorist attack, to push the shabab into explosion.

Iraq's Access to International Terrorism

Saddam Hussein is fully aware of the potential power of international terrorism, as Iraq has been one of the primary supporters of Palestinian terrorism. In the last few years, Iraq has significantly increased its active support for radical terrorism, providing them with unprecedented capabilities – such as chemical weapons. Abu-Tayyib, the commander of the PLO's Force 17, disclosed in January of 1988 that his forces had already acquired chemical weapons. “The chemical weapons are necessary for the war we are waging and we won't hesitate to use them in future battles in the appropriate way and time against military installations of our enemy,” Abu-Tayyib warned in an interview with Al-Nasr.

By 1989, Iraq already harbored the largest training center, equipping and staging a site for PLO-affiliated terrorists. Consequently, there was a major increase in the size of the radical-leftist Palestinian terrorist forces deployed in Iraq, including a major headquarters of Yassir Arafat's PLO and the bulk of his forces. Iraq can also capitalize on the diversified terrorist facilities and headquarters currently rejuvenated in Amman, Jordan. Most active are the PLO's Intelligence and Security Apparatus under Abdul Latief Abu Hijlah (Abu-Tariq); the PLO's Force 17 under Muhammad Ahmad Natur (Abu-Tayyib); the PLO's Special Operations Group under Abd al-Hamid Labib (Col. Hawari); the Organization of May 15th under Hussayn Amri (Abu-Ibrahim) despite his recent cooperation with the HizbAllah in African operations; and the Palestinian Liberation Front of Mohammad Zaidan Abbas (Abu-Abbas) that also operates under Arafat's control. Moreover, Abu-Nidal transplanted his headquarters and the bulk of his best trained terrorists from Tripoli to Baghdad in early June of 1990. Other radical terrorist organizations such as the DFLP, the PFLP and the PFLP-GC have forwarded their headquarters in Amman in order to cooperate closely with Baghdad.

All of these organizations have extensive and proven networks and operational capabilities in the West. Since early August, the vast majority of the leaders of the Palestinian terrorist organizations

reiterated their support for Saddam Hussein and their commitment to the anti-U.S. Jihad he declared. For example, Abu Abbas's PLF issued a communiqué in Beirut, on August 8th, in which the PLF stated: "We, in performance of our national and pan-Arab role, declare to our Palestinian people and nation that we will strike at U.S. and colonial interests once a foreign soldier sets foot on Arab lands." George Habbash of the PFLP issued "a call on Arab masses to resist the U.S. invasion of the Arab Gulf by all means and methods," and urged "confronting U.S. aggression on Iraq and Kuwait." Other Palestinian terrorist organizations and leaders expressed similar sentiments and made comparable commitments.

Muammar Qaddafi has already expressed his support for any anti-U.S. operation in defense of Arab land. As recent events in Trinidad and Colombia demonstrated, there is a diversified, Libyan-supported terrorist infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. Both Abu-Abbas and Abu-Ibrahim closely cooperate with Libya and have large facilities there. (For example, Abu-Abbas's recent attempt at a seaborne attack into Israel was launched from Libya with the active participation of the Libyan Fleet.)

Another point of potential escalation is Yemen. Iraq has a formal alliance and very close military cooperation with Yemen. Iraq is provided with naval facilities, in essence a naval base, in Hodeida and a free access to Aden. These arrangements were practiced as late as August 5th and there is no indication that they have been changed since then. Moreover, Yemen is also the base of the PLO's Force 14, the organization's high performance combat wing. Some of the PLO's dedicated commando units and the PLO's Air Force (trained to operate MiG-21s, MiG-23s and diversified helicopters) are based on the PLO's controlled Kamaran Island in the middle of the Red Sea off the Yemenite coast, and the PLO's Navy, which includes raiding fast boats and coastal artillery and missiles (such as SSC-1b & Silk Worms), is located in the Salief harbor in Yemen. Most of the Force 14 officers were trained in Iraq and Libya. Considering the support of Yemen and the PLO for Iraq, it is likely that Iraq and its allies would attempt to block the Bab el-Mandab straits and impede access to the Suez Canal as a counter-measure to the U.S.-led blockade.

Moreover, there is a large, politically radicalized Palestinian population in Kuwait and other Gulf Sheikhdoms. Iraq and Yemen have provided shelter and protection for diversified anti-Saudi and Gulf Liberation organizations, most notably for the FLOAG that has genuine membership among Western-educated youth throughout the Gulf, as

well as for a highly professional cadre trained in the USSR, East Germany and Cuba as well as by expert trainers from these countries in south Yemen. Although most of these liberation organizations are little more than miniscule terrorist groups, their operatives are highly trained and all have genuine, albeit small, groups of dedicated supporters in their homelands. This combination would enable the conduct of a few, possibly devastating, terrorist attacks that can be presented as indigenous popular resistance to U.S. intervention.

Further more, these Saudi, Kuwaiti and Bahraini groups, and possibly others, have many active supporters (mainly financial, logistical, propaganda and intelligence services) among the expatriate student communities in the U.S. and Western Europe. In the current time of crisis, these student networks could serve as a base of operation for professional terrorists of their respective nationalities arriving from the Middle East. (It should be emphasized that these student supporters have always been a source of active help, often doing much more than was asked of them.)

A further complication of the situation in the Persian Gulf with the passing of time is that wide segments of the Kuwaiti population are getting used to its new posture – equal citizenship and potential for progress through the Ba'ath mechanism – and consequently many vested interests have already been created that would bring Kuwaitis to fight for their preservation against the Amir or U.S.-supported forces. Moreover, the population of Kuwait has already been transformed and it is doubtful that a majority would welcome the Amir even if the Iraqis withdrew unconditionally. At the current standoff, these Kuwaitis, including radicalized Palestinian exiles, constitute the core of an indigenous irregular (terrorist) force that can be used against Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries.

Thus, Saddam Hussein can unleash a large-scale and diversified wave of terrorism against both the conservative Gulf States as a punishment for cooperating with the U.S., as well as against choice targets in the U.S. itself and in the Western world as a whole. Indeed, Radio Baghdad announced on August 15th that, “Arab and Palestinian suicidal groups arrived in the Gulf area and said that they are ready to launch suicidal attacks against American ships which are imposing a blockade against Iraq.” About that time, Israeli intelligence also learned that several Palestinian terrorist organizations were already actively planning and preparing for attacks on U.S. and Arab targets in the Persian Gulf area on behalf of Iraq.

The Regional Strategic Posture

No less important is Saddam Hussein's posturing vis-à-vis other regional powers in which he outlines the future strategic relations in the Near East. Not only is it highly important that Baghdad states its objectives clearly, but they should define the power-sharing principles that Saddam Hussein would acquiesce to with the regional contenders. One should also realize that Saddam Hussein wishes to be the leader of the Arab World. Therefore, he can afford to compromise with Iran and the USSR on the strategic plan in the Persian Gulf and South-West Asia. If allowed to be consolidated, the emerging regional realities are bound to have a lasting impact on the Persian Gulf and the Near East.

The most important development is the emerging Iraq-Iran strategic relationship. In late July, Tehran decided not to exploit the crisis in the Persian Gulf to renew its conflict with Iraq. Tehran notified Baghdad of its decision and, indeed, many of the Iraqi forces concentrated on Kuwait's border came from deployments in the Basra area. After the invasion of Kuwait, Hashemi-Rafsanjani ordered the Iranian army to limit its routine activities in order to avoid any move that might be interpreted as a threat to Iraq. At the same time, Tehran stated that it had a well-defined "red line of Iran's vital interests in the Persian Gulf area" and warned of "dangerous consequences" for those crossing these lines.

It was after the clarification of Iran's position, on August 15, 1990, that Saddam Hussein made his conciliatory offer to Iran. By recognizing Iran's sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab and in agreeing to withdraw from the 722 square-miles of border territory claimed by Iran, Baghdad in essence acknowledged Tehran's victory in the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad also announced the beginning of a unilateral release and repatriation of Iranian POWs.

Little wonder that in Tehran, a spokesman for the Supreme National Security Council said that, "Iran will review the latest Iraqi proposal with optimism."

The significance of the Iraqi initiative should be examined in the context of Iran's, and especially Hashemi-Rafsanjani's commitment to restoring Iran's hegemony over the Persian Gulf. The expansion of Iran's "security umbrella" all over the Persian Gulf has been Hashemi-Rafsanjani's declared objective since October of 1983. He stated then that the security of the entire region had always been "the responsibility of our valiant and courageous Navy," and emphasized that, "the security of the Persian Gulf is more important to us than any other

party, and we will strive to maintain the Gulf's [security] as much as we can."

These strategic priorities were reflected in Tehran's assessment of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. While Iran made it clear that it vehemently objected to the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait, Tehran considered the deployment of U.S. forces to be a far greater threat to all countries in the region. Iran stated that under such conditions, the solution of the Kuwaiti problem would have to wait until the confrontation and defeat of the U.S. and apostate forces.

By handing Iran a victory in the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad in effect notified Iran that it was not going to challenge the overall strategic realities in the Persian Gulf in the context of its occupation of Kuwait and the ensuing confrontation with the U.S. and its regional allies. This clarification of Iraq's recognition of Iran's regional hegemony cleared the way to putting the confrontation with the U.S. in the context of the regional strategic power structure and thus encouraged Iran to join in the struggle against the U.S.

Iran can provide Iraq with vital support. Most important to Iraq is the Iranian assistance and access to its international terrorism infrastructure. The alliance of Iran, Syria and Libya is currently in control of an extensive well-organized support infrastructure in Western Europe and even the U.S. This support network was organized for the operations of such terrorist organizations as Ahmad Jibril's, Abu-Nidal's, the HizbAllah, as well many of the PLO affiliated organizations now flocking to Baghdad. It is virtually impossible to conduct major terrorist attacks in the West in the immediate future without this support system.

Iran can also enable Iraq to overcome the U.S. embargo. There are two major pipelines stretching between Iraq and Iran – one between Baghdad and Kermanshah, and the second between Abu-Ghuraib and the Dehluran oil fields. They are in dire condition because of more than 10 years of neglect, but can still be reactivated. This would enable Iraq to renew its oil exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Diversified supplies, ranging from food to weapons, can be transferred to Iraq via Iran. Tehran's complicity would destroy the embargo. With Tehran's declared commitment to getting the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf region and in view of Iraq's acknowledgement of Iran's victory and strategic hegemony, there is little to convince Iran to side with the West.

Baghdad's recognition of Iran's hegemony is a major strategic victory for the USSR. Since the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Union

has been committed to consolidating strategic hegemony over Iran while retaining as much influence over Iraq as possible. However, Iran has always been Moscow's choice objective. Since 1985, and especially since late-1987, Moscow urged Tehran to be cautious and restrained in escalating the Iran-Iraq War, predicting that Iran would ultimately win the war if it remained patient. Now, in mid-August 1990, Moscow was proven to be correct and highly accurate. If Tehran had any reservations about the wisdom in close strategic cooperation with the USSR concerning Pakistan, Afghanistan and especially the Persian Gulf – relations advocated by both Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Khamene'i – these obstacles must have been brushed aside. The proposed Soviet-Iranian “strategic condominium” would make the USSR and its allies the strategically dominant force in South-West Asia and the Near East.

Saddam Hussein definitely recognizes the Soviet strategic dominance and is aware of the extent of the Soviet commitment to Iraq. Since mid-July, Iraq has enjoyed extensive military assistance and expertise from the specially dispatched Gen.Col. A.M. Makashov, an expert in lightening armored warfare, and the numerous Soviet advisors already in place. Moreover, the USSR increased its weapon supply to Iraq in the spring, and this surge continued at least until August 7, 1990. Moscow refused to participate in imposing the embargo and blockade. Therefore, there is no reason for Saddam Hussein to be affected by the “abuses” of Iraq in the “now-free” Soviet media.

Moreover, the self-interest of Iraq, USSR and Eastern Europe are too intertwined to be disrupted by local crisis. Large quantities of weapons, ammunition and military equipment made superfluous by the unilateral reductions in Eastern Europe have been also shipped to Iraq by the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries that were all paid with hard currency and cheap oil.

The USSR sold the Iraqi oil to Western Europe, mainly West Germany, for hard currency and advance technology. There is no conceivable way that the East European countries would be able to purchase oil from other sources for they lack the required hard currency and are economically incapable of meeting market prices. Therefore, they would have to continue their barter arrangements with Iraq, directly or through the USSR and Iran, or face bankruptcy.

The vital strategic interests of the USSR are being effectively served by the rise of Iran while Saddam Hussein is in effect exacerbating and unifying the Arab World against the U.S., while conceding Iranian and Soviet hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Under

such conditions, there is no reason why Moscow should not relax and watch from the sidelines the unfolding crisis in the Gulf, that is, the further consolidation of its strategic dominance.

Indeed, there is already a joke in Moscow concerning the Gulf crisis: Hearing about the U.S. declarations and deployment of forces, aides rush to Gorbachev asking what he was going to do about the crisis. "Oh, I've already sent Saddam a FAX with instructions [sic!]," answers Gorbachev calmly. "The others will do the rest of the work for us."

The Israeli Factor

Israel is already implicated in the Persian Gulf crisis by Arab propaganda. The allegations of deployment of Israeli units and aircraft constitute a major component in Iraq's legitimization of the Jihad. However, the threat of the Israeli factor, and thus the risk of an Israeli preemptive strike, is crucial for the Iraqi contingency planning against the U.S. and its allies.

When completed, the U.S.-led deployment in Saudi Arabia will be sufficient to block an Iraqi thrust on a narrow, well-defined axis, namely from Kuwait along the Persian Gulf coastal highways to the Saudi oil fields. Just the possibility of an Iraqi envelopment on the road to Rafha' and a dash along the road parallel to the Trans-Arabian Pipeline means a deployment of defending forces along some 500 miles of desert road. However, the key to the Iraqi deep envelopment option against Saudi Arabia is deep envelopment and thrusts via Jordan against the entire Trans-Arabian highway, the destruction of three major airbases, and a thrust toward Mecca and Medina. Even if small in size, the confrontation would become the ultimate priority of all Muslim forces. However, any crossing of Iraqi forces into Jordan would cross Israel's red lines and will result in Israeli strikes. Amman is fully aware of these Iraqi designs. Since August 17-18, Jordan put its Armed Forces in wartime readiness without any provocation from Israel or the U.S.-led forces.

Getting Israel into the war is also extremely important as far as Syria's position is concerned. Although Hafiz al-Assad, Saddam Hussein's nemesis, sharply criticized the invasion of Kuwait and agreed to send a symbolic force to the defense of Saudi Arabia, both leaders know where the true priorities of Damascus lie. On August 1, 1990, in a speech commemorating the 45th Anniversary of the Syrian Armed Forces, Hafiz al-Assad outlined Syria's strategy. Assad warned that

“Israel is the enemy of peace and is committed to expanding its territory from the Nile to the Euphrates,” and that only an Arab unified effort would be able to destroy Israel. “We continue in our effort to fulfill our national and all-Arab obligation, in accordance with Syria’s well known objectives. The loyalty to the national and all-Arab obligation and the willingness for sacrifice toward the fulfillment of this obligation have already proven in the brilliant battles conducted by our armed forces, by the national-Arab missions these forces fulfilled since the establishment of our Armed Forces.” Assad anticipated a major confrontation in which “victory will be attained through the liberation of the occupied lands and the restoration of the robbed rights.” (That is the rights of the Palestinians to establish an independent Palestinian state instead of Israel.) Both Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Hussein know that Syria will immediately join any pan-Arab war involving Israel even if led by Saddam Hussein.

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Short of an immediate and unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein’s quest for the leadership of the Arab World can only be served by a major war involving American and Israeli forces. The conditioning of the Arab shabab and their mobilization to delivering states and leaders play an important part in Saddam Hussein’s organization of a pan-Arab Jihad. Any passing day improves his position and self-confidence while making the West more vulnerable to Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.

It should be emphasized that as long as Saddam Hussein remains the leader of Iraq, the outcome of the Middle Eastern war he is trying to incite is quite irrelevant to the realization of his grand objective. Thus, the continued build-up of U.S. forces has a deterrence effect that might restrain Saddam Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia. Having his way, Saddam Hussein would not attack Saudi Arabia. Instead he would provoke an Israeli preemptive strike by deploying into Jordan, for example, and then rapidly escalate the crisis into a regional war by surging into Saudi Arabia as a defensive measure against a Zionist-imperialist conspiracy. Such a contingency will be most effective from an Arab perspective when the U.S. and its allies will have already been shamed and challenged by terrorist attacks and the Arab masses are incited and excited.

Moreover, although Saddam Hussein strives for triumph, the possibility of defeat does not serve as a deterrence. The fortunes of

Gammal 'Abd-ul Nassir after the Arab defeat in the Six Days War in 1967, serve as a precedent for Saddam Hussein. Once the magnitude of the Egyptian defeat became known, Nassir, with tears in his eyes offered to resign and take the shame upon himself, whereupon the Egyptian masses poured to streets demanding his return to power and celebrating his quick agreement. The great Egyptian writer Tawfiq al-Hakim described in 1974 the evolution of Egypt's communal awareness after the shock of the Six Days War: "It was impossible, intellectually or logically, easily to believe that our armies could be routed in a few days." Then, after Nassir's offer to resign and his appeal to the masses, all Egyptians discovered the magic in the dreams and aspirations of the leader's personality. "We forgot the defeat and began to dance, even in parliament, because of the simple existence of his person among us." Thus, a military defeat and humiliation can be turned by Saddam Hussein, as long as he is ruling Baghdad, into a major victory in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the ummah.

Thus, it is imperative for the U.S. to immediately seize the initiative and move not only to defeat Saddam Hussein's Armed Forces, but ultimately to install a pro-Western regime in Baghdad. Moreover, the U.S. allies in the Arab World expect such decisive solutions from a dominant superpower that claims to have vital interests in the Persian Gulf.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Role of Iran and Syria in the Persian Gulf Crisis

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For the U.S., the crisis in the Persian Gulf is entering its most dangerous phase, one of instability, volatility and unpredictability by the main regional players. Most significant, in this context, is the consolidation of Islam, and especially of traditional Islamic values, as the yardstick for determining the legitimacy of the actions taken by the various governments in the region. Some 6 weeks into the crisis, the shock of Iraq's occupation and annexation of Kuwait has already waned, while the various regimes and populations have begun exploiting the crisis environment to further their own interests. While on the surface there is a growing polarization of the Muslim world into distinct camps of pro- and anti- Iraq, in reality, the maneuvering for strategic realignment and specialized arrangements is growing.

The machinations of Iran and Syria are most important in the emerging power structure in the Middle East. Although these key players seem to be on opposing sides in the current Gulf crisis, both countries were very close allies during the entire Iran-Iraq War. Still, Iran is actively assisting Iraq in violating the UN embargo, while Syria is dispatching forces to defend Saudi Arabia. However, in the byzantine world of the Middle East, such actions are misleading. In fact, a closer

examination of the situation suggests that the alliance between Teheran and Damascus is as strong as ever and that the two countries are pursuing a coherent unified regional policy. The rise of Islamic awareness throughout the Muslim World is the key to comprehending the significance and durability of this Iranian-Syrian alliance.

Any examination of Syrian-Iranian relations must take into consideration the fatwa [religious decree] issued by Imam Musa al-Sadr on 24 February 1973. At present, with the growing Islamic fervor against the infidel occupation of the Holy Shrines and the predominant Islamic character of regional popular sentiments and policies, no regime in the Arab world, especially one based on an ethnic minority such as the Assad regime in Damascus, can afford to be declared infidel. Ba'athist Syria, ruled by an Alawite military elite, discovered the political significance of militant Islam in the early-1970s. In 1973, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leader of Lebanon's Shi'ite community, signed a highly publicized fatwa that recognized the Alawites as an integral part of Shi'ite Islam. This was a highly significant service to Hafiz al-Assad, who badly needed Islamic credentials in his quest for pan-Arab leadership and legitimacy.

However, since the Iranian Revolution, the higher Shi'ite councils capable of endorsing or cancelling this fatwa are in Qom, Iran. Thus, Iran holds the key to the Islamic legitimacy of the Alawite minority, that is, the Syrian regime. Consequently, both Damascus and Teheran consider the 1973 fatwa the beginning of a "brotherhood of blood" between the two countries.

With this in view, soon after he made his final decision to invade Kuwait, in late-June or early-July, Saddam Hussein sought to ensure Iran's support. Baghdad secretly informed the Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, about the impending crisis and offered Teheran a non-intervention pact. In late-July, Teheran decided not to exploit the crisis in the Persian Gulf with a renewal of its conflict with Iraq. Teheran notified Baghdad of its decision, and indeed, many of the Iraqi forces concentrated on Kuwait's border came from deployments in the Basra area. After the invasion of Kuwait, Hashemi Rafsanjani ordered the Iranian army to limit its routine activities in order to avoid any move that might be interpreted as a threat to Iraq. At the same time, Teheran stated that it had a well-defined "red line of Iran's vital interests in the Persian Gulf area" and warned of "dangerous consequences" for those who crossed that line. Having thereby clarified its own position, Teheran decided to capitalize on the crisis in order to develop new strategic relationship throughout the region.

Once the initial reaction to the Iraqi invasion became clear, Iran made a thorough examination of the situation in the Persian Gulf and reached a fundamental decision on its strategic objectives. The main points were outlined by Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani in *Ettela'at* on 4 August 1990. Significantly, Teheran concluded that “the Soviet Union stands to gain” from the Gulf crisis because overall developments in the region, and especially the deployment of U.S. forces “now placed the Soviet Union in a position to do some serious bargaining with the United States and Great Britain,” extracting concessions in Europe. Therefore, Teheran would formulate its own strategic objectives, namely to regain its hegemony over the Persian Gulf, in accordance with the USSR’s quest for regional dominance. Iran would like to sign a “defense pact” with the Gulf Sheikdoms and Emirates whereby Teheran “should pledge its responsibility to protect them in case of any eventuality.” Consequently, Iran is committed to “collective and regional security” involving all local powers.

At the same time, Teheran reiterated that “the vital interests of Iran in the Persian Gulf constitute a red demarcation line and any attempts to approach it would be expensive and dangerous.” Teheran had doubts as to the ultimate outcome of the process: “Iran’s defense strategy should be based on these principles so that the Islamic Republic of Iran may establish the most heavily armed and greatest Armed Forces in the region, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s navy should, especially, guarantee the vital interests of the system in the Persian Gulf waters.”

While the Gulf Sheikdoms and Emirates turned immediately to the U.S. for protection from Iraq, Baghdad immediately grasped Teheran’s objectives. Thus, on 15 August 1990, Saddam Hussein made his conciliatory offer to Iran in which Iraq, in essence, acknowledged Teheran’s victory in the Iran-Iraq War. By handing Iran strategic victory in the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad, in effect, notified Teheran that it was not going to challenge the overall strategic realities in the Persian Gulf in the context of the current crisis, that is, in the context of the stand-off with the U.S. and its regional allies.

This clarification of Iraq’s recognition of Iran’s regional interests cleared the way for putting the confrontation with the U.S. in the context of the regional strategic power structure and thus helped to encourage Iran to join in the struggle against the U.S. Subsequent diplomatic negotiations between Iran and Iraq determined the specifics of the strategic cooperation against their common enemies – the U.S. and Israel.

Little wonder, therefore, that on 12 September 1990, Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that, "Moslem nations will not allow America to set up its security and defense system in the region." Moreover, he decreed that "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies in the Persian Gulf will be counted as Jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr." This religious decree is extremely important because it sanctions resisting the U.S. not only for Iraq's large Shi'ite population, which represents over 60% of the total, but also to the al-Hassa Shi'ite community in Saudi Arabia and to the Shi'ite majority (or near majority) in most Gulf states, all of whom are followers of Teheran religious guidance, and all of whom, additionally, reside in the oil producing littorals of the Persian Gulf.

In a statement aimed at the Shi'ite population of the Sheikdoms and Emirates, Khamenei invoked the impact of Shi'ite terrorism of the kind practiced in Beirut. "It's surprising how the Americans don't take lessons. They saw how vulnerable their presence could be. Have they forgotten how a bunch of pious Muslim youth... swept them away and evicted them from Lebanon?" Khamenei also reiterated Iran's desire for "cooperation with Persian Gulf countries" against all aggressors, but especially the U.S., because reaching a solution "is the duty of regional countries," and not the U.S.

Similarly, although Syria sent troops to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its overall strategic assessment of the situation in the Middle East is not different from Iran's. Damascus, in fact, would have been indifferent to the fate of Kuwait had it not been for the Western reaction the Iraqi invasion had incited. An editorial on Damascus Radio on 26 August 1990 stated the reason for Syria's opposition to Iraq. Having invaded Kuwait, "Iraq is dragging the [Arab] nation to a side conflict, thus detaching itself from the crucial conflict, which is the Arab-Zionist conflict." Damascus called on the Arab world "to save our Arab homeland, and specifically Iraq, from a grand, very grand conspiracy," namely, the deployment of U.S. forces. The urgency of solving the Gulf crisis before it interfered with a pan-Arab handling of the Zionist problem was stated in an editorial on Damascus Radio on 28 August 1990 analyzing the Mubarak-Assad summit in Alexandria:

The Syrian and Egyptian sides found that their pan-Arab responsibility toward the Arab nation in general, and fraternal Iraq in particular, and their concern about the security and stability of the Arab nation, make it

necessary for them to declare their denunciation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its announcement that it annexed the country... The two presidents believe that the swallowing up of an Arab country by another by the use of force has grave consequences, the least of which is to justify the expansionist schemes of the Zionist enemy. Moreover, it poses a threat to the general Arab situation and the pan-Arab cause, deals a blow to the unified Arab action and to our people's intifadah, and diverts Arab and world attention from the pan-Arab issue.

Syria's view is that Iraq broke the strategic equilibrium in the Middle East and diverted attention from the confrontation with Israel, the evolution of pan-Arab unity, and gave the imperialists an excuse to deploy huge forces to the region.

Thus, on 5 September 1990, Syria's Socialist Unionist Movement stated that, "the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created a pretext and justification for U.S. military presence, leading to control over international politics and hegemony over the peoples of the world." Damascus further urged Baghdad to accept a pan-Arab solution before it was too late. "Iraq's stubbornness and lack of response to Arab and international unanimity will lead to a catastrophe that will afflict the whole Arab nation and reinstate imperialist hegemony over the region." Indeed, Assad subsequently displayed his disdain for the U.S. by sending Syria's internal security commando force (under Rif'at Assad) – the very same forces that actively assisted the Iranians and the HizbAllah to blow up the U.S. Embassy and Marines Barracks in Beirut – as his contribution to the pro-U.S. military build-up.

Thus, Hafiz al-Assad decided to join the anti-Iraq camp for symbolic reasons. Hafiz al-Assad has had a love-hate relationship with Saddam Hussein over ideological supremacy of their respective Ba'ath factions, but both of them know that any military challenge to Israel, let alone the "liberation" of Jerusalem by the new Saladin from Baghdad, must involve Syria as the military leader of the Eastern Front if only because Iraq has no border with Israel and Jordan is too small and exposed to be the only front against Israel. By deploying limited forces to the Persian Gulf, Assad is signaling Saddam Hussein that Baghdad is preventing the pan-Arab unity required for a war of liberation. In addition, Syria ideologically balances Egypt and ensures an anti-Israel dimension to the Arab effort, for Damascus will not agree to anything

that remotely suggests cooperation with Israel. Further, Syria remains opposed to the U.S. presence and is ready to side with Iraq in the event of a regional war involving Israel.

Thus, Iran, Iraq and Syria have common strategic interests: getting rid of U.S. presence and influence in the region, clarification of a pro-Soviet hegemony, and consolidating pan-Arab unity aimed at confronting Israel. Toward these goals, Iran is keeping Iraq alive while Syria is subverting the U.S.-led effort from within.

Iran's declaration of a Jihad is extremely important both because of Teheran's Islamic credentials, which Saddam Hussein lacks, and because of the Shi'ite population in the region. In addition, Iran is providing Iraq with extensive assistance. Major convoys loaded with food and other vital supplies already travel to Iraq via the old Kurdistan supply routes. These convoys also carry much of the Iraqi imports of food and chemicals usually sent through Turkey. Indeed, Jordanian sources confirmed that the first large Iranian convoy arrived in Baghdad on the night of 8/9 September. Iran also provides clearing for Iraqi oil, primarily for export via Iran and the USSR. Should the need arise, it would be possible to ship Soviet weapons and spare parts through Iran.

Indeed, the USSR has conducted a quasi-clandestine supply of weapons to Iran since 1981. Thus, Iran currently has the latest Soviet weapons in accordance with the Soviet-Iranian Defense Pact under which Teheran has been provided with the hardware necessary for maintaining Iran's regional military superiority. Teheran received, in mid-July 1990, its first T-72s and MiG-29s in addition several other weapons systems. Iran also has the latest Chinese and North Korean weapons used by Iraq. Therefore, it would be possible for the USSR and the PRC to conceal some of their weapons shipments to Iraq as "unauthorized deliveries" of weapons sold to Iran or Afghanistan. Indeed, in the 1980s, during the height of Soviet support for Iraq, the supply of Soviet weapons to Iran was conducted similarly via North Korea, Libya and Syria.

So far, Syria is acting as a restraining factor in the anti-Iraq alliance the U.S. is trying to construct. In order to satisfy the Syrian standing as a progressive Arab power, the pan-Arab force is creating an ever-widening gap with the Western forces deployed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Further, Syria is the most vocal in demanding the linking of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the events in the Persian Gulf, thus, in effect, legitimizing Saddam Hussein's "peace proposal." Thus, politically and militarily, Damascus serves as the primary factor for the

restraint and moderation of the Arab position against Iraq, thus buying Baghdad more time. Further, ostensibly because of the pro-Iraqi riots in eastern Syria, Damascus is reluctant to block localized smuggling of supplies to Iraq. Even the Syrian proposal to deploy an armored division was conditioned on the Soviet Navy providing logistical support, so far refused by the USSR. The possibility of a major Syrian deployment would delay any reaction to an Iraqi provocation because of the fear, among moderate Arab states, of alienating Damascus.

To date, the Syrian record is that of actively struggling against U.S. interests in the Middle East including widespread support for anti-U.S. terrorism. Thus, the presence of Syrian forces in the Saudi rear in the event of an active Jihad may ultimately not serve the interests of the U.S. and its allies. The Syrian commando force could turn out to be a fifth column. After all, these special forces have provided assistance to several terrorist organizations and directly controlled some of the more daring terrorist attacks. It should be remembered that radical terrorists continue to train and prepare in bases in Syria and in the Syrian-controlled Bekkaa Valley in Lebanon, under the supervision of and assistance of the very same internal security commandos currently deployed to Saudi Arabia. Thus, ironically, the deployment of the Syrian division will alter the military balance in the region and will put a potentially hostile force in the American rear.

The common strategic interests of Teheran and Damascus is to establish a unified pan-Islamic military bloc that dominates the region, is vehemently anti-Western and is capable of neutralizing Israel. Together with Iraq, these countries constitute the core of a pan-Arab alliance that no other Arab regime can challenge militarily or, as a result of the Iranian and Iraqi Islamic propaganda, even dispute its Islamic legitimacy. Indeed, they all have a vested interest in redirecting the crisis westward, into a confrontation of Muslims against infidels (Israel and the U.S.) in order to save Islam's holiest Shrines. Although Iran, Iraq and Syria each have their own intrinsic empire-building aspirations, there is little disagreement over their principal objective. They all aspire to the dismemberment of Saudi Arabia and Jordan along tribal-ethnic lines and to dominate the land (infrastructure) and the population as well as to exploit the local resources. So far, the occupation and annexation of Kuwait has created a precedent for the changing of boundaries and swallowing of territories all three countries ultimately desire.

In this context, the essence of the Arab political compromise advocated by Jordan, Libya and the PLO (in slight variations) is for the

U.S. to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in return for some Iraqi compromises that would ultimately leave Saddam Hussein's military power intact and would turn the Syria-Iraq-Iran tier into the dominant power in the region, thus compelling the Gulf states and Egypt to acquiesce to their strategic priorities. Once the Syria-Iraq-Iran bloc is consolidated, the USSR and its local allies would have completed the tight strategic encirclement of the Arabian Peninsula, Israel and Egypt. The existing web of alliances already ties together Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen. It should be emphasized that Egypt signed a treaty with Iraq, Jordan and Yemen and had already acquiesced to Iraq's dominance in the Amman Summit in February 1990. Confronted with an economic collapse and widespread mob riots, Cairo may return to the alliance with Iraq once a pretext of a compromise accepted by the Arab world exists.

The recent developments in the Middle East, and especially the emerging positions of Iran and Syria, clearly demonstrate that Iraq has already succeeded in its drive to transform the crisis from a reaction to its invasion of Kuwait to a largely hostile Arab and Muslim reaction to the presence of U.S. forces in the region. The Arab masses are largely in agreement that the expulsion of the U.S. from the holy lands of Arabia is of greater importance than the solution of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. The growing popular Islamic pressure on local governments restrains them, and the U.S., from undertaking drastic military steps against Iraq, thus, in effect, providing the anti-U.S. bloc, including Baghdad, with the time needed to further consolidate their strategic position.

Meanwhile, the crisis has contributed directly to the emergence of a Soviet-supported anti-U.S. strategic bloc. Riyadh's rush to renew diplomatic relations with Moscow clearly reflects a recognition of the USSR's dominant position in the Middle East. Thus, Iran, Iraq and Syria are well on their way to establishing new strategic realities in the Middle East based on their common interests: getting rid of the U.S. and Western influence, the consolidation of pro-Soviet hegemony and pan-Arab unity aimed at confronting Israel.

Because of its initial miscalculations concerning Kuwait, Iraq will not emerge as the dominant power of this strategic bloc. Rather, Baghdad will remain a central component in a bloc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and completing the strategic encirclement that Moscow has always favored.



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Jerusalem: The Iraqi Connection

October 10, 1990

The recent bloody riots in Jerusalem may turn out to be the event Saddam Hussein was looking for in order to inflame the entire Middle East by provoking the Arab world into establishing an uncompromising anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist policy. Indeed, the Al-Aqsa riots, as they have been called, have the potential to evolve into the spark that will transform the “mob politics” of the Arab world into support for Saddam Hussein's pan-Arab “message,” thus impelling Arab governments toward an anti-U.S. stand. Indeed, the official paper of the Iraqi Ba'ath party, Al-Thawarah, in an October 9 editorial, called the riots “a massacre that has been made possible with American aid and support to Israel.” Thus, Baghdad believes that the widespread Arab reaction “will turn into a massive wave of indignation, which will take the pan-Arab struggle a step toward the liberation of Jerusalem and all other holy places and claim the Arab homeland from treachery and occupation.”

At this juncture, the indications are that the Al-Aqsa riots were pre-planned and aimed at instigating a massive Arab reaction. They took place on a Jewish holiday, which was, for Muslims, an ordinary work day. Nevertheless, thousands of Arabs were urged by Sheik

Mohammed Jamal, deputy mufti to Jerusalem, to attend a special prayer and sermon on an inflammatory topic – a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the mosques on the Temple Mount and build the temple in their place – that was sure to attract a massive following even though there was no empirical evidence to support it. (Indeed, a week earlier, the members of the Jewish organization, Faithful of the Temple Mount, had been forbidden to enter the mount by a court order and Israeli police made sure that the order was not violated. In fact, there were no Jews inside the Haram as-Sharif itself when the riots broke out.) Stones, rocks, glass bottles and iron rods had already been stockpiled above the Western Wall and were in place for use by an excited mob of a few thousand who showered the Jewish worshipers some 50-60 feet below with stones and other debris. The Arabs also attacked and burned the local police station. In return, the Israeli security forces reacted with full force and some 20 Arabs were killed and over 150 were wounded before they were able to contain the riot.

Although the excuse for this special and irregular gathering of Arab youth was the Jewish conspiracy against their mosques, the themes of the incitement itself were Muslim and pan-Arab. This was reflected in the Palestinian's cries of Allah Akbar (God is Great) and Itbakh al-Yahud (Slaughter the Jews) during the riots. Furthermore, the political intonation of the first reaction by Arab spokesmen in Jerusalem was anti-American. Sheik Jamal Alami, holding a blood-stained cloth atop the Temple Mount, blamed the United States for the casualties because it “is giving the Israelis bullets.”

In addition, the presence of Faisal al-Hussaini, Yassir Arafat's most senior representative in the territories, clearly points to the political significance and advanced planning of these riots. Indeed, Hussaini's presence suggests that the riots had the prior approval of Arafat and, in view of the PLO's close cooperation with Iraq, probably also of Saddam Hussein. Moreover, last week, even before the Friday sermons of October 5th, there were strong indications and warnings from a variety of Arab sources that important and inflammatory and politically loaded sermons were to be simultaneously delivered all over the Muslim world.

Indeed, as could have been anticipated, a wave of anti-U.S. protests and riots has erupted throughout the Arab world. This wave of anti-U.S. riots continues to grow, with the masses increasingly repeating the propaganda themes coming out of Baghdad. Coincidentally, Iraq continues to emphasize the pan-Arab character of the riots and has called for retribution against the West. “This vicious crime will not go

without retaliation, and the Arab nation is certainly able to retaliate – and it will,” explained an Al-Thawarah newspaper editorial. Moreover, Baghdad has used the riots to highlight the principal issues of its positions within the context of Arab reaction to events in Jerusalem.

In an argument that is more applicable to the occupation and annexation of Kuwait, Baghdad has challenged the validity of the nation-states in the Arab world by portraying the issue as an argument used by the United States to defend Israel. As Baghdad put it, “The racist massacre in Al-Aqsa mosque reveals that national legality has always been an instrument by the United States to impose its hegemony and not to be used in defense of people who fight racism and fascism.” Iraq’s perception of what constitutes proper retaliation is also regional and Baghdad declared that it would lead Arabs to “the liberation of Jerusalem and all other Holy Places,” that is, Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Al-Thawarah threatened the Arab leaders siding with the United States, explaining that the indignation in the Arab world over Palestinian deaths “will sweep them away, even if they issue verbal condemnations of the crime.”

(In a highly unusual move, the next day’s Al-Thawarah editorial reacting to the Jerusalem crisis was provided to AP in Baghdad on October 8th, almost immediately after the riots erupted, strongly suggesting that the editorial had been prepared in advance of the riots.)

On October 9th, President Hussein further linked his war effort against the United States and the events in Jerusalem, and especially the rejuvenation of the intifadah, which brings Israel “closer to the abyss.” He stated that Iraq developed a new long-range ballistic missile capable of striking U.S. troop concentrations deep inside Saudi Arabia. The new missile is called the al-Hijara (the Stone) – the symbol of the intifadah. “Al-Hijara became capable of reaching targets that are hundreds of kilometers from where it is launched,” the Iraqi statement said. This statement has a double meaning, for it alludes both to the Iraqi ballistic missile and the effect of the intifadah and the recent riots in Jerusalem.

In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak also warned of regional ramifications, considering riots in Jerusalem a spark that will engulf the region. In his statement, President Mubarak warned that the shootings in Jerusalem could lead to “grave consequences in the present critical circumstances engulfing the area.” In a further escalation of the crisis, Cairo television interrupted its regular programming to deliver President Mubarak’s statement. The PLO also anticipated the rejuvenation of the intifadah. “The massacre heralds a new stage in the

intifadah,” the PLO's Muhammad Milhem exclaimed. In the meantime, Abu-Abbas and other Palestinian terrorist leaders, all sitting in Baghdad, vowed to avenge the bloodshed in Jerusalem.

* * *

This theme – a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the mosques inside the Haram as-Sharif and build the Temple in their place – is not without precedent. It has been used in the past to incite the riots in Jerusalem, and is a provocation that is not just sure to outrage the Muslim world from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also a theme closely associated and interlinked with the myth of the Arab leaders that Saddam Hussein is trying to build and attribute to himself. Therefore, the current crisis in the Arab world in the wake of the casualties in Jerusalem enhances the validity and popular acceptance of the pan-Arab themes that President Hussein has been advocating.

In point of fact, the place and holiness of Jerusalem, and especially Haram as-Sharif, in Islam are complex and rooted in the mists of a very obscure history. The sanctification of Jerusalem in Islam was originally a political move that has no mention in Islam's sacred writings. (The Koran, in Sura 17, mentions a mystical trip of Mohammed to “an external mosque” (Al-Misqad Al-Aqsa) that only later in oral traditions was identified with the Temple Mount and the local Byzantine Church, which, in turn, was converted to a mosque, thus sanctifying Jerusalem.) It was only later that Jerusalem became truly important in Arab political-military heritage in the wake of the struggle against the Crusaders. In particular, Jerusalem is especially associated with Saladdin, whose title in Arab folklore is the “custodian of Jerusalem.” Because of this vagueness, it has been very easy for populist Islamic leaders to exploit the now genuine Muslim commitment to a Holy Jerusalem by attaching to it contemporary political considerations validated by obscure historical rationales.

In the 20th century, the sanctity of the Haram as-Sharif has been utilized repeatedly in order to galvanize the Arab world for anti-Western struggles. The threat of a Jewish conspiracy to destroy Al-Missad Al-Aqsa and rebuild the Temple in its place – was first introduced as a Palestinian political theme by Hajj Amin al-Hussaini in the spring of 1929 to incite the first Arab revolt against Jewish settlers and British rule. (Hajj Amin al-Hussaini is one of Saddam Hussein's most important childhood heroes.) It is also interesting to note that, for the Palestinians, the continuity between the 1929 revolt and the

October, 1990 riots is also expressed in the person of Faisal al-Hussaini, who is the son of 'Abul Qadir al-Hussaini, one of the first and most prominent military leaders of the 1929 Arab revolt.

The alleged Jewish threat to the mosques in Jerusalem was next revived by the Baghdad based Higher Palestinian Council. On January 31, 1962, Al-Thawarah urged the Arab world to unite in a war against Israel in order to save Jerusalem from “the conspiracies of the Zionist entity to establish a Jewish synagogue in place of Al-Aqsa.” This proclamation was published when Jordan ruled East Jerusalem, more than 5 years before the Six-Day War, thus indicating the emotional strength of the threat, irrespective of the realities of the time.

In the last 3 years, during the intifadah, both allegations of a current threat to Al-Aqsa and the commemoration of the 1929 revolt are used mainly by groups like the Islamist HAMAS and Islamic Jihad movements, to incite the average Palestinian on the street against Israeli rule. For example, the June 15, 1988 manifesto of HAMAS urged the escalation of the intifadah as a way “to renew the union-testament with Allah till victory or death” in commemoration of the martyrs of the 1929-1930 struggle to avert “the conspiracy to turn Al-Aqsa into a Jewish synagogue.” HAMAS emphasized the enduring validity of both the threat to the mosques and the need for an Arab revolt to counter it. As Dr Ziyad Abu-'Amru concluded in his July, 1989 book, The Islamic Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, “the Islamic Movement in the occupied territories continues to be an indivisible part of the world Islamic movement, affecting it and being affected by it,” and that the current trend indicates that “the importance of the Islamic movement has increased.”

Thus, it is not by accident that Baghdad and the PLO chose the Al-Aqsa theme to describe the events in Jerusalem, although historically it has been associated more with the Islamists movement than with the Unified Leadership affiliated with the PLO. Both HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, for their parts, are essentially pan-Arab and their message influences the Arab man in the street, especially the Islamist circles. Indeed, Halah Mustafa emphasized in an article on the Islamist Trend in the intifadah in the July, 1988 issue of Al-Mustagbal Al-'Arabi: “The political steadfastness of this trend is a part of a general phenomenon that the entire Arab region is witnessing; it is not confined to the occupied territories.” Thus, by invoking and identifying with themes currently associated with the Islamist Trend, Baghdad reinforces pan-Arab sentiments that can also be exploited to gain

support for Saddam Hussein's call for a pan-Arab struggle against the U.S. and its allies.

By provoking the riots and consequent bloodshed in Jerusalem, Saddam Hussein and Yassir Arafat have been able to rejuvenate the rage of the average Arab and to glue the pan-Arab movement associated with the Palestinian problem to the Gulf crisis. The regional ramifications of the incident are therefore far-reaching and the swift Arab reaction to the Jerusalem riots constitutes yet another demonstration of Saddam Hussein's influence on, and exploitation of, the tone of the political environment in the Arab world.

Thus, Saddam Hussein is capitalizing on the aggregate impact of current pan-Arab discontent and the incitement of tensions and hostility toward the United States and Israel. In his October 9 message, President Saddam Hussein emphasized the unity of the defiance of the Believers against all-powerful foreign forces by shifting the use of the word Hijara from stones thrown by Palestinians to the name of a ballistic missile. "The faithful Palestinians faced up to you (Israel)," Saddam Hussein declared, "with stones which no power on Earth can withhold from those who wish to use them. They are the Stones of the new missile, which the Iraqis have invented with the help of Almighty God and which can be launched from somewhere in the land of Iraq to reach the targets of evil when the day of reckoning comes." He then repeated his demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Israeli, U.S., etc.) from Arab lands. "There is no way out for you (Israelis) except to leave the land of Palestine and the sanctities of the Arabs, just as there is no way out for the armies of America and its allies except to leave the holy land of the Arabs and Moslems," Saddam Hussein warned. "There is room only for this, otherwise you will get what you will get."

These are words that are ringing through the streets of Jerusalem – and far beyond.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

**The Persian Gulf Crisis:
The Shape of Wars**

November 19, 1990

The probability of a major war in the Persian Gulf is looming large. President Bush has ordered massive U.S. reinforcements to the Persian Gulf in order to acquire offensive capabilities should the need arise, while Secretary Baker is shuttling around the world to secure the support or acquiescence of allies to the use of force. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to holding Kuwait at all costs. In the meantime, the stream of Western dignitaries arriving at the Baghdad hostage bazaar reinforces Saddam Hussein's perception that given the right pressure – psychological, diplomatic, and military – the Western alliance would capitulate and withdraw from confrontation with Iraq, even though supported by the ongoing U.S. military buildup.

All of this demonstrates that there is a fundamental error in Washington's political-military approach to the crisis, namely, the reliance on the value of deterrence as an inducement for Saddam Hussein to avoid war. The current U.S. policy is: if Saddam Hussein does not withdraw from Kuwait and restore the status quo ante (if possible in the wake of the forced “Iraqization”), then Iraq will suffer

tremendously from a wide array of punishments, from political isolation to economic devastation to a destructive military confrontation. In other words, the knowledge of the implications of his actions should compel Saddam Hussein not to pursue his current policies.

However, Saddam Hussein is an Arab leader who conducts the current crisis as part of his quest for the realization of what he believes to be a divine historical destiny to rejuvenate the entire Arab world, restoring its long overdue might, honor, and glory. Saddam Hussein's is the quintessential Arab-Islamic drive for honor, but U.S. policy does not conform to the fundamentals of Islam. Islam is fatalistic. Everything is in the hands of Allah. The course of events is determined by Allah. There is no concept of consequences and results in Islam. Indeed, there is not even a future tense in the Arabic language. The prophet Mohammed stated this principle clearly: "Truly, actions are judged according to their intentions, and everyone is rewarded on the basis of his intentions."

Thus, the threat of bombing and destruction has little or no deterring influence over Saddam Hussein. The decision making process the West expects him to follow is incomprehensible and alien to Islam. The growing military threat to Iraq, the potential destructiveness of which Saddam Hussein is fully aware, is examined in the concept of Allah's testing. Allah is testing both the individual and community all of the time in order to determine their fate in the afterlife. Great challenges and disasters serve as tests for one's commitment to one's faith and one's resolve to stick by one's intentions. Thus, the U.S. military build-up and the economic blockade are, according to Saddam Hussein's messianic world view, divine tests aimed at determining Saddam Hussein's own resolve to realize his and the Arab World's unified historical manifest destiny.

The same principle also applies to the Iraqi people who are expected to be scared by the potential destruction into overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Death and destruction, while not sought after, are determined by Allah alone. However, irrespective of one's earthly life, death while in combat with infidels is considered martyrdom and a sure ticket to heaven. This concept of martyrdom is extremely strong among the Shi'a, and even more so among the oppressed Shi'a of Iraq for who unbounded fatalism is the only conceivable way of dealing with the oppression and discrimination of the Saddam Hussein regime. Thus, the U.S. cannot meaningfully threaten the population with death and destruction because it is Allah, and not President Bush, who

determines the individual's time of death, while President Bush is Allah's instrument of ensuring that this dead individual will go straight to heaven.

Another major aspect of the U.S. policy is its anti-Iraq alliance with several Arab and Muslim states. The objectives of this alliance in the Arabian Peninsula are to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression and to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that the vast majority of the Muslim world is against him and his occupation of Kuwait.

The lingering impasse has the opposite effect on Saddam Hussein. From Saddam Hussein's point of view, he is implementing the Arab world's quest for glory and the realizing of a divine, historical destiny. Since he is on the side of Islam, the others are on the wrong side. It should be remembered that Islam divides the world into two distinct camps – Dar ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and Dar ul-Harb (the Abode of War) – and no matter how committed the U.S. might be to the Arab cause, it is still part of the Dar ul-Harb, and is thus the enemy of Islam.

Therefore, Saddam Hussein “knows” that, deep in their hearts, all Arabs, leaders and paupers alike, support him and are on his side. The ultimate objective of the West is to ensure that the glory and the might of the Arab world are not realized. Toward that end, the West has corrupted, brainwashed, or extorted segments of the Arab world to turn on Saddam Hussein, the sole legitimate leader of the entire Arab World.

It is clearly written in the Koran: “Sedition is more grievous than killing.” Therefore, there is a clear tenet in Islam determining that Saddam Hussein must turn on the apostates, that is, the Arabs allied with the U.S., and restore the principles of Islam “by the sword.” Saddam Hussein's understanding of this dynamic in the Arab world is reinforced daily by the voices of dissent and the repeated calls for a pan-Arab solution to the crisis. Arab leaders and senior commanders reiterate their determination not to participate in a U.S.-led offensive against Iraq.

When President Mubarak stated that Egyptian soldiers would not enter Iraq, even if the U.S. attacked, and that Egyptians “have nothing to do with Iraq,” he reinforced Saddam Hussein's worldview. In the Arab street, popular sentiments are almost unanimous in their support for the restoration of Arab glory and for Saddam Hussein as the only leader capable of standing up to the West with the good intention to accomplish this noble task. Thus, all of these developments confirm to Saddam Hussein that the Arab leaders were manipulated by the

Americans and are participants in the sedition of the Arab world against their historical pan-Arab leader – Saddam Hussein. (Just how serious the issue of sedition is in the Arab world can be judged from the countless public beheadings in Saudi Arabia of rebels, saboteurs, oppositionists, conspirators, etc., all of whom are sentenced to death for sedition against the royal family.)

To date, the U.S. has ignored completely Saddam Hussein's perception of the crisis. U.S. policy and strategy, including the military buildup and discussions about a possible future war, are based on the assumption that the war would be confined to the liberation of Kuwait by force and whatever subsequent hostilities President Bush will decide. Even the possibility of Iraq drawing Israel into the war by missile attack, for example, is examined within the context of its impact on the U.S.-led alliance and the liberation of Kuwait. Thus, the possibility of Israeli restraint in order not to risk the alliance in the Persian Gulf is considered a desirable option. Indeed, the current deployment of the U.S. and allied forces, as understood by Baghdad, is geared toward the liberation of Kuwait if and when President Bush gives the order. Thus, the U.S. is handling the crisis as if there is a guarantee from Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the scenario drawn in Washington.

Thus, Saddam Hussein's manifest destiny and primary nemesis are in the Arab world and Saddam Hussein is managing a Muslim crisis. Having failed to take this principle into consideration, the U.S. seems to have ignored major points of military significance:

- The Possibility of an Iraqi Preemption: Now that the U.S. has declared its commitment to a possible offensive solution and massive U.S. forces are deployed to the Middle East, what will Saddam Hussein do? Militarily, Baghdad **always** prefers to initiate hostilities because of the centralized rigidity and lack of reaction-capability of the Iraqi command structure and armed forces.
- The Possibility of a Regional War: If and when war erupts, irrespective of who fires the first shot, the war will immediately escalate into a regional war involving all of Iraq's allies and the likely collapse of the U.S.-led alliance. Baghdad will use every bit of anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment in the Arab world to damage the U.S. war effort.

The current situation in the Middle East provides ample evidence to suggest that both possibilities are highly likely. Moreover, the regional dynamics and Soviet military expertise strongly suggest such developments. The U.S. can be surprised by Iraq. The U.S. and its allies were already surprised in the Yom Kippur War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the invasion of Kuwait, to name but a few of the most recent examples. In all of these cases, Washington had detailed data on the deployment of forces, the building tension and the vital objectives of the potential attackers. Yet, the U.S. was still surprised by the decision to use force and by the timing of the attack or invasion. This surprise was primarily the result of misreading and misunderstanding the attacker.

Saddam Hussein's cause is pan-Arabic and therefore, practical considerations aside, his war will be pan-Arab. Iraq repeatedly brings up the Palestinian issue as a political linkage to Kuwait, including the recent exercises in the United Nations. It is therefore inconceivable that Baghdad will ignore this sure subject when it may be fighting for its very existence against the U.S.-led offensive. Yassir Arafat quoted Saddam Hussein vowing that "Iraq will aim its first missile against Israel and will use chemical and biological weapons if war breaks out in the Persian Gulf." (*As-Sabah*, 5 November 1990).

Indeed, Iraq makes no secret of its determination to expand any future war as much as possible. Iraq declared officially that it would attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia in retaliation against any U.S. (Western) use of force against it. "If war breaks out, our counter-attack will be destructive and will not be limited to the securing of our country's sovereignty. We shall expand the war and strike the attacker-aggressors and the dens of evil everywhere," Baghdad warned. Thus, Baghdad will escalate the war all over the Middle East and use every bit of anti-American and anti-Israel sentiment in the Arab world to damage the U.S. war effort.

The dynamics in the Arab and Muslim world favor a resolute show of force by Saddam Hussein. There is growing popular sentiment against the U.S. dominance and presence in the Middle East. Even the higher levels of Arab governments are not immune to these opinions. The Syrian government reiterated its opposition to war with Iraq and urged that instead "there should be a pan-Arab confrontation of that Zionist entity and its supporters (the U.S.), and any battle apart from that pan-Arab confrontation will serve the Zionist entity and its colonialist protectors in the region."

Arab military elites and high commands, especially in Egypt and Syria, declared explicitly that they would not take part in a U.S.-led offensive on Iraq or other Arab states. In Cairo, several senior officers led by the Commander of the Air Force told Mubarak privately that Egypt should support Saddam Hussein against the U.S. They warned that after the inevitable U.S. defeat, Mubarak would be left out as the hated pariah of a unified Arab world led by Saddam Hussein if he is not, in fact, assassinated.

Even before President Bush's November 7th decision to dispatch more troops to the Persian Gulf, Iraq was already making noises suggesting the inevitability and imminence of war. In all likelihood, Iraq's war will be offensive. That is why Saddam Hussein replaced his Chief of Staff on November 8, 1990. Lt. Gen. al-Khazraji (C.o.S. 1985-1990) was the architect and a senior commander of the great Iraqi defenses against the Iranian onslaughts. The new Chief of Staff, General Hussein Rashid (al-Takriti), is the Commander of the offensive oriented Republican Guards and was in charge of the Iraqi decisive counter-offensives in 1988, and since then has supervised the implementation of the Soviet-designed military reforms aimed at significantly improving the offensive capabilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces. General Hussein Rasid is also a relative of Takriti and is personally loyal to Saddam Hussein and thus is more likely to keep the Armed Forces loyal to Saddam Hussein despite any setbacks and casualties in a confrontation with the U.S. (The rumors about Nizar al-Khazraji's disloyalty are groundless because his "cousin," Lt. Gen. Hamid Sha'aban al-Khazraji remains the commander of the Air Force.)

The visit of General Saad al-Din al-Shazli to Baghdad on 10 – 13 November 1990 constituted a major boost in the capabilities of the Iraqi High Command. As the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed forces during the Yom Kippur War, General al-Shazli was in command of the crossing of the Suez Canal, the breaching of the Bar-Lev Line and the attrition of the IDF's first major counteroffensive till it ground to a halt. In addition, he is the only Arab general to have defeated an Israeli armored force. Al-Shazli achieved success by the reorganization and training of the Egyptian Armed Forces into a myriad of centrally controlled specialized small subunits. Battlefield flexibility and effectiveness were achieved through the rigid control over these subunits, albeit at extremely high losses.

The military principles that General al-Shazli has used in the past apply to the needs of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the first line of defense in Kuwait, and especially the Popular Army deployed in the Soviet

style fortified defense lines. While in Baghdad, General al-Shazli, who declared that he had arrived to help “the high combat capabilities of Iraq for defeating the Zionist-imperialist aggression,” could provide valuable advice to the Iraqi’s on the improvement of their defenses against high quality armored forces as well as the coordination of regional strategic operations.

Also of significance is the fact that Gen. Shazli is a graduate of several Soviet military schools and is a close ally of the USSR, especially of one of its brightest generals, 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Arm. M.A. Gareyev. As General Shazli wrote in his 1986 book, The Arab Military Option, “the mere presence of the Soviet union on the international stage is an unqualified blessing for the Arabs.”

At the same time, Shazli is also one of the leaders of the Sunni Islamist trend and a firm believer that the only salvation of the Arab world is in Islamist revivalism. “The resurgence of Islamic militancy has further still to rise. It will be a major factor in shaping the future of the region.” Indeed, since the late 1970’s, Shazli has been advocating the unification and mobilization of the entire Arab world for a decisive confrontation of with Israel and the United States’ “imperialist” presence and influence in the Middle East. Indeed, Shazli stressed that “the Arabs must begin to prepare themselves physically, materially and spiritually to that end.” Despite setbacks in the mid-1980’s, “the Arabs must not despair, and in despairing, abandon their dreams, settling for a false peace and continued humiliation. The Arabs must not discard the military option. The future is on their side.” Saddam Hussein’s vision of the unfolding pan-Arab struggle fits closely with Shazli’s plans.

The growing and deepening support for Iraq among major segments of the Arab world, exemplified by things like General Shalizi’s endorsement of Saddam Hussein, has profound strategic and political ramifications, even without the outbreak of hostilities. For example, Riyadh, Cairo and other Arab regimes may panic in fear of the consequences of an Iraqi surprise attack and initial success, especially if U.S. forces are expected to suffer heavy casualties. In their quest for self-preservation, the Saudi royal family may plead with Saddam Hussein for a peaceful compromise by turning on the United States. The mere threat of political instability, the potential loss of honor and power, may push the Saudis into seeking a compromise with Iraq at the expense of the United States.

Such a possibility is ignored in Washington but not in Baghdad: What will the U.S. do if the Saudis declare that they changed their

minds, decided to reach accommodation with Iraq, and ask us to leave the Persian Gulf and their territory? The possibility of a pan-Arab solution might include such a withdrawal as a precondition to the support of such key players as Saddam Hussein, Hafiz as-Assad, Muammar al-Qaddafi, Yassir Arafat and King Hussein.

The Strategic Imperatives – Baghdad’s Point of View

By closely examining the political-military activities of Iraq and its allies, it is possible to discern three specific possible variants of the development of events, or the three most likely ways in which the crisis will unfold. Baghdad has actively prepared the Iraqi Armed Forces and its regional alliance to deal with these options. From the Iraqi point of view, these are the three most likely courses of events:

- Iraq’s best case: The U.S.-led coalition collapses because of a combination of popular uprisings and pressures and is shaken by a series of terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Europe and even the U.S. The U.S. is asked to leave the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the U.S. is humiliated as the Arabs demonstrate their contempt for the West. The Arab world is rejuvenated, yearning for a strong leader that would lead them to the historic liberation of Palestine. Saddam Hussein is the only viable leader available.
- Iraq’s preferable contingency in case of war: Iraq launches a region-wide anti-U.S. and anti-Israel preemptive war during Christmas. Forces in the Gulf are contained and defeated piecemeal. The U.S. commitment is eroded by a series of terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Western Europe and the U.S. itself. The regional character of the war also hampers U.S. mobilization and reaction. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein leads a pan-Arab campaign to liberate Islam’s Holiest Shrines, starting with the Hijaz and then continuing on to Jerusalem. Nobody in the Arab (Muslim) world is capable of resisting the outcry of the masses to rally and join this historic revival of Arab Glory.
- Iraq’s worst case: The U.S.-led alliance launches a major offensive for the liberation of Kuwait. However, Iraq is determined to immediately expand the conflict and escalate the

war to include Israel and Islam's Holy Shrines in western Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces can be bled white while breaching Iraqi defensive fortifications. The U.S. commitment is further eroded by a series of terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Western Europe and the U.S. itself. Even if the U.S. levels Iraq with bombs and missiles, as is likely to happen, as long as Saddam Hussein prevails and remains in command in Baghdad, he would have won the war for the leadership of an anti-U.S. Arab world. As the war progresses, the Arab masses will rally to the defense of a Muslim country from the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy and ultimately unite behind Saddam Hussein for a counter-offensive all the way to Jerusalem.

The following are scenarios of the primary military and terrorist operations during the two wars envisioned from the Iraqi perspective. All the military operations of Iraqi and allied forces as described below are in accordance with levels of force performance calculated in Soviet military textbooks. Iraq's strategy closely follows, as it had done in past wars, the tenets of Soviet strategic doctrine. From both Arab and Soviet military points of view, both contingencies are logical and likely to succeed.

Iraq's Preferable Contingency In Case of War

Day 1

Several terrorist attacks take place in the U.S., Western Europe, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The terrorist attacks in the West are directed at civilian and Jewish targets, causing terrifying carnage. They are claimed by Palestinian organizations and justified as a revenge for the Intifada, the violence in Jerusalem, etc. The attacks in Western Europe take place in the early afternoon hours to coincide with a nighttime alarm in Washington, thus, further complicating reaction. Meanwhile, the attacks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are aimed at strategic military objectives, mainly C3I related objectives, assassination attempts of senior commanders and officials. All of these attacks are aimed at "blinding" the U.S. and diverting Washington's attention. Soviet manuals on surprise attacks recommend Christmas as a highly suitable date for a maximum surprise. During important holy days, Western forces will be at a reduced readiness because of mental longing for

home, the government in Washington will be paralyzed, and there will be popular emotional vulnerability.

For political reasons, namely, justification by world opinion, Iraq can point out that the U.S. “offensive” buildup is almost completed, with a growing threatening “saber rattling” in the Western media, so that Saddam Hussein can claim that his attack was a preemption and the only viable option open to him as a responsible leader fearing the horrendous consequences of a U.S. attack.

Day 2

In the evening of Day 1 (Middle East time) Baghdad warns Israel not to retaliate against Jordan and declares readiness in the Iraqi Armed Forces, including the loading of SSM's. In the early morning hours of Day 2 (Middle East Time), Iraqi forces move into Jordan at Amman's “request” to defend the Palestinian camps from the anticipated Israeli retribution to the terrorist attacks. Baghdad repeats its warning to Israel not to attack these forces. Baghdad urges the other Arab countries and armed forces to join in a Jihad to liberate Jerusalem, and asks these countries not to interfere with the Iraqi initiative. Iraq also threatens to destroy the Ataturk Dam if Turkey intervenes. Immediately, widespread “spontaneous” riots erupt in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (especially Mecca and Medina) with the masses demanding U.S. withdrawal and participation in JIHAD.

The Israeli Air Force bombs the Iraqi forces near the Jordanian border as well as SSM installations and airbases threatening Israel. Libya mobilizes all of its forces for the Jihad and demands that Egypt permit the Libyan, Algerian terrorist and other forces pass through its territory on the way to attack Israel. The riots in Cairo intensify as the masses volunteer to join the Jihad against Israel and also would not allow Holy Arab territory (Saudi Arabia) to be used by the U.S. to prevent an Arab Jihad against the Zionist entity. The Saudis, frightened by the turn of events, demand “low profile” from the U.S. and refrain from any action that would confirm the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy claimed by Saddam Hussein.

In the meantime, Iraqi Republican Guards units in the Baghdad area mobilize and begin to move westward, ostensibly toward Israel.

Day 3

In the pre-dawn hours, SSM's and artillery suddenly open on Saudi Arabia, hitting airbases, oil installations, especially in Eastern provinces. At first light, these attacks are joined by Iraqi Air Force aircraft. Simultaneously, Libyan bombers attack the U.S. Carrier Task Force in the Mediterranean, and Iraqi-Libyan aircraft and missiles attack the U.S. Carrier Task Force in the Red Sea. A few cargo ships suddenly explode in the middle of the Suez Canal, sinking and blocking it. Yemeni and Palestinian forces bloc Baab al-Mandab.

Sharief Hussein declares his legitimate historic rights to all the Holy Shrines and send forces to liberate Holy sites from the Saudi apostates who would not join the Jihad. Forces from the Sudan land on the Hijazi coast to help. Yemeni forces invade, avenging the cruel expulsion of all Yemenites from Saudi Arabia. The main Iraqi Republican Guard forces suddenly swing southward and advance onto the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Road. Iraqi heliborne forces capture all the key crossroads, lay ambushes on axes likely to be used in reaction to the Iraqi advance. Iraqi and Yemeni parachutists jump into key airbases and key installations all over Saudi Arabia. Terrorists from various Gulf liberation movements also continue to sabotage objectives all over the Arabian Peninsula.

Meanwhile, Iraqi artillery and small armored and mechanized units of 2nd Defense Tier in Kuwait, as well as components of the international forces already in Saudi Arabia, attack Western forces near the Persian Gulf and compel them into defensive actions. The situation of the Western forces is compounded by widespread terrorist actions, the landing of Iranian volunteers from across the Persian Gulf, as well as attacks on Western navies in the Persian Gulf from Iran by suicide boats, Silkworms, etc. Out of Islamic solidarity, Iran blocks the Straits of Hormuz.

Throughout the day, the widespread riots in the Arab world intensify with the masses calling for an all-out Jihad against the imperialist-Zionist infidels. The population in the U.S. and Western Europe is still shocked by the widespread carnage against civilians and a few voices (aided by "active measures") are raised, questioning if events in the Middle East justify so many civilian casualties.

Day 4

Overnight, between Day 3 and Day 4, the Iraqi Republican Guards on and near the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Road, suddenly turn back and start racing eastward toward key concentrations of Western forces. In the early morning, the Iraqi tank and mechanized Corps in Kuwait surge into Saudi Arabia in order to complete a multiple pincer deep offensive. The Iraqi forces are aided by “international” forces, mainly Syrians and other organized and un-organized elements. Syria attacks Israel on the Golan Heights and from Lebanon. (Baghdad also believes that Israel may preempt and attack Syria at the last minute.) Fearing a Qaddafi-incited coup, Egypt rushes forces to the Libyan and Sudanese borders to block the advancing “volunteers” as Islamist riots in Cairo and other cities intensify. Terrorists strike in Paris again, demanding that France withdraw its forces from the region. Libyan, Algerian and Syrian air defense forces, air forces, and navies interdict U.S. (allied) quick-reaction resupplies over the Mediterranean.

Day 5 & Beyond

Although suffering heavy casualties, both the U.S. (Western) and the Israeli forces blunt the Arab offensives and stabilize defensible lines. The Iraqis believe that Israel would hold Arab territories while the U.S. (Western) forces will consolidate a secure pocket, including major airbases that would permit subsequent reinforcements. Western air forces will bomb Iraq and its allies, causing tremendous levels of destruction.

However, the political developments all over the Arab world would make these military achievements irrelevant. Arab forces will link up in Mecca and Medina within days and the triumphant Sharief Hussein will then demand that the Western infidels withdraw from the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf immediately. Mubarak will be overthrown (or threatened to the point of conceding to the Islamist's demands). The Persian Gulf Sheiks will ask Iran to defend them against rioting Shi'ite radicals. Forces and masses from all over the Arab (Muslim) world continue to gather for the decisive Jihad with the U.S. and Israeli forces under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

Through the good offices of the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein will offer to allow the U.S. forces to withdraw peacefully from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. promises not to intervene in the region. The Iraqis and the Soviets believe that most West European contingents, led

by the French, will begin evacuating the Gulf once ordered by Sharief Hussein. In the U.S., the cumulative impact of the shocks of terrorist carnage and military setbacks and heavy casualties in the Persian Gulf, combined with the chaos of the Christmas crisis management, will result in U.S. acquiescence. Alternately, the U.S. will commit itself to a lengthy buildup before returning to the Persian Gulf, which buys Saddam Hussein all the time he needs to solidify his pan-Arab position.

Iraq's Worst Case Contingency

Iraq believes that it will have only a few hours of forewarning prior to a surprise attack by U.S.-led forces. Only U.S. and British forces will participate in the offensive while some of the Arab forces will assist the Iraqis with information and even some military action.

Day 1

During the night prior to Day 1, Iraq will be subjected to a massive air campaign lasting some 6-9 hours. All the valuable objectives in Iraq, ranging from air defense installations to the most strategic defense industries will be hit and at least partially damaged. However, these overnight offensives will at least spare the main force concentrations. The air campaign will transform in the pre-dawn hours into a massive ground and amphibious assault into Kuwait. (The Iraqi military analysis of such an assault is discussed in greater detail below.) (See Maps 1-6.) Simultaneously, Turkish-U.S. forces invade Iraq, concentrating their advance on the main road toward Mosul. Egypt and other non-Gulf Muslim states declare their opposition to the "unprovoked needless attack" on brotherly Iraq and decide to pull their forces out of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Iraqi reaction begins once the forewarning is available. Under the cover of darkness, the main elements of the Republican Guards move from the Baghdad area into a web of holding positions in the Western desert. Simultaneously, during the night, before the U.S. bombers hit them, Iraqi SSM's are launched on the heart of Israel, the Ataturk Dam in Turkey, and Saudi oil installations and strategic sites. Operating from a large number of concealed forward sites, the surviving Iraqi aircraft attack Saudi oil installations at first light. Iraqi heliborne forces capture all the key crossroads, lay ambushes on an axes likely to be used by the Western forces. Iraqi and Yemeni parachutists jump into key airbases and key installations all over Saudi

Arabia. Terrorists from various Gulf liberation movements sabotage C3I objectives all over the Arabian Peninsula.

At the first light, Israel retaliates by bombing several key objectives in western Iraq as well as a concentration of Iraqi forces. Syria announces that it will join the war against Israel and attacks the Golan Heights.

Sharief Hussein demands his historic rights in the Holy Sites because of sins of the House al-Saud – allowing infidels to attack another Arab state from their territory – making them illegitimate Guardians of the Holy Shrines. Jordanian forces cross into Saudi Arabia, advancing southward. Forces from the Sudan land on the Hijazi coast to join in the liberation of the Holy Shrines. Yemeni forces invade, being reminded of the cruel expulsion of all Yemenites from Saudi Arabia. All these forces converge on Mecca and Medina. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia rushes as many forces as it can to the defense of the Western provinces.

Meanwhile, Libyan bombers attack the U.S. Carrier Task Force in the Mediterranean, Iraqi-Libyan aircraft and missiles attack the U.S. Carrier Task Force in the Red Sea. A cargo ship explodes in the middle of the Suez Canal, sinking and blocking it. Yemeni and Palestinian forces block Baab al-Mandab. Iranian “volunteers” land on the Saudi coast from across the Persian Gulf to help defend Arab soil. The Iranians launch attacks on the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, using items such as suicide boats and Silkworms, and blocked the straits of Hormuz.

Vowing revenge, terrorists attack civilian objectives in Western Europe and the U.S., causing heavy carnage. Massive “spontaneous” demonstrations in Egypt, Mecca and Medina, etc., evolve into riots calling for an all out Jihad against the imperialist-Zionist infidels.

Day 2 & Beyond

The main forces of the Republican Guards concentrate on and near the Trans-Arabian Pipeline road and start racing eastward toward the concentration of the U.S. forces once the Iraqi counter-offensive from Kuwait shows potential. Alternately, these forces can reinforce the Jordanian drive into the Hijaz, engaging the main Saudi forces.

Syria attacks Israel on the Golan Heights and from Lebanon (Israel may preempt). Syria also attacks Turkey to retrieve the Iskenderun area for which Syria has irredentist claims. Iraqi forces also penetrate Turkey in Kurdistan. Libya mobilizes all its forces for the Jihad and

demands that Egypt permit the Libyan, Algerian terrorist and other forces pass through its territory on the way to attack Israel. Egypt rushes forces to Libyan and Sudanese borders to block this advancing "volunteers" as Islamist riots in Cairo and other cities intensify. Libyan, Algerian, and Syrian air defense forces and navies interdict U.S. resupplies over the Mediterranean.

The tempo of the war will be determined by the success of the Iraqi counter-offensives in Kuwait and the Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi war against Israel. The Iraqis and their allies will do their utmost to introduce as many sub-fronts as possible in order to fracture the U.S.-Israeli forces and in order to reduce the number of allies siding with the U.S. by compelling them to deal with high priority conflicts involving their own vital interests or self-survival.

In both Kuwait and Israel, the Iraqi objective is to consolidate a fairly stationary front line where both the U.S. and Israel cannot point to outright achievements. A no less important objective is to inflict massive casualties to the point of causing terror in the American heartland. It is in this context that Iraq is most likely to introduce chemical and biological weapons. Both Baghdad and Moscow believe that a massive stream of body bags and stretchers with disfigured wounded will quickly and drastically change Washington's stand on any subject to the point of sacrificing vital strategic interests.

Baghdad has no illusions that although suffering heavy casualties, both the U.S. (Western) and the Israeli forces will ultimately blunt the Arab offensives and stabilize defensible lines. The Iraqis believe that Israel would hold Arab territories while the U.S. (Western) forces hold portions of Kuwait and will consolidate a secure pocket, including major airbases that would permit subsequent reinforcements. Western air forces will continue to bomb Iraq and its allies, causing tremendous levels of destruction.

Taken together, the political developments all over the Arab world would make any U.S.-Israeli military achievements irrelevant. Arab forces will link-up in Mecca and Medina within three days and the triumphant Sharief Hussein will demand that the Western infidels withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf immediately. Mubarak will be threatened to the point of bowing to the Islamist's demands if he is not actually overthrown or even assassinated. The Persian Gulf Sheiks will ask Iran to defend them against rioting Shi'ite radicals. Forces and masses from all over the Arab (Muslim world will continue to gather for the decisive Jihad with the U.S. and Israeli forces under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

Through the good offices of the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein will offer to allow the U.S. forces to withdraw peacefully from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. promises not to intervene in the region. Saddam Hussein may even offer to hold “elections” throughout Iraq (or the Arab world) on the future of Kuwait if comparable “elections” are simultaneously held on the future of Palestine. The Iraqis and the Soviets believe that most Western European contingents, led by the French, will begin evacuating the Gulf once ordered by Sharief Hussein. In the U.S., the cumulative impact of the shocks of terrorist carnage and military setbacks and heavy casualties in the Persian Gulf will result in U.S. acquiescence to a compromise. Alternately, the U.S. will commit itself to a lengthy build-up before returning to the Persian Gulf, which buys Saddam Hussein all the time he needs to solidify his pan-Arab position.

The Iraqi Armed Forces

General Structure and Organization

The Iraqi Armed Forces are a massive, diversified yet highly centralized force. They are optimized for the conduct of large-scale strategic warfare on the basis of grand designs made in Baghdad. They are capable of withstanding enormous losses, casualties and damage for as long as unfolding events do not exceed the losses anticipated in Baghdad's grand design. Despite the continuous growth of the Iraqi Armed Forces in size and improvement of performance in recent years, the central high command – Saddam Hussein and a small close staff – has not relinquished its hold over operations and battlefield activities. This tight centralized control is the key to the combat effectiveness and inherent vulnerability of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

When working, the structure of the Iraqi Armed Forces is highly suitable for the unique character of Arab armed forces. Centralization and battlefield rigidity compensate for low quality manpower and especially its lack of motivation and technical aptitude. Baghdad's direct control over theater forces is optimal for maximum utilization of the Quality Edge principle, namely, the expertise of the Soviet advisers. Thus, the structure of the Iraqi high command enables it to direct the armed forces to carry out complex, large scale military operations and persist in their implementation, irrespective of setbacks or casualties on the battlefield. The High Command can thereby impose the execution

and completion of its master plan on the local commanders even if at a high and excessive cost to local units.

Thus, the Iraqi military system can execute strategic theater wide offensives at strategic and operational levels on the aggregate and accumulating effect of a series of relatively simple yet demanding combat actions at the tactical level by a myriad of units all operating in accordance with a master plan they do not control, have no input into, but must obey rigidly and on time. Furthermore, this centralized system is generally far more resilient to casualties and battlefield setbacks than a "normal" army. (A "normal" army is an army where commanders in the field can decide that their units have suffered unacceptable losses, or have lost their combat effectiveness, and order a withdrawal or repositioning in order to save their remaining troops or conserve their forces.)

The political dominance of the Iraqi Armed Forces, their total dependence on and subservience to Saddam Hussein and his tight group of loyalists, is simultaneously a great vulnerability. The Iraqi C3 system was organized as much on the basis of Saddam Hussein's constant fear of conspiracy as on the objective needs of the rigid control of the High Command. Consequently, the Iraqi communication system is relatively limited and channeled through a few central choke points to enable constant monitoring by the Ba'ath security forces. However, since 1988, there has been a profound improvement in Iraq's secure radio and line communications, which has permitted senior and mid-level command echelons greater operational flexibility, albeit within the confines of the "master plan."

The rigid centrality of the Iraqi command structure makes it difficult to use tactical and battlefield intelligence. With a few well-defined exceptions, collected data must be transmitted to Baghdad for interpretation and processing. However, the Iraqi high command is aware of this rigidity and has found ways to compensate for these deficiencies. Most important is the resulting greater tendency in Baghdad to insist on the implementation of existing plans irrespective of the situation on the battlefield. The other procedure is to allow mid-level commanders to react to unfolding events under clear circumstances, such as reorganizing their defensive forces to allow them to meet specific enemy concentrations and attacks. Altogether, accumulated battlefield and theater experience in both the Yom Kippur War and the Iraqi maneuver operations in the Iran-Iraq War confirm a poor reading of tactical intelligence by the local commanders and even poorer utilization of whatever material that exists.

Thus, in conclusion, the Iraqi Armed Forces are a formidable opponent for as long as the high command can impose the effective execution of its master plan.

Force Structure

The Iraqi Armed Forces are divided into 5 main commands, each of which is responsible for a specific theater. As a rule, the force structure is relatively flexible, with most formations being mission-oriented. There is, however, rigid distribution of mid-level command centers. Each division must have at least three regiments and an artillery force. At the opening of hostilities there must be a corps headquarters for every four divisions. As the operation continues, the number of divisions per corps fluctuates between 3 and 6. The following is the early November, 1990 distribution of Iraqi forces:

- High Command Reserves and Decisive Force: + 6 – 8 divisions
- Western Command: + 4 – 6 divisions

(The two commands above constitute +3 Cps optimized for war against Israel. The build-up of new units/divisions continues with activation of national/Soviet weapons held in reserves.)

- Eastern Command (Iranian Border): 16 divisions 4 Cps
- Northern Command (Turkish Border): 24 divisions in 6 Cps
- Southern Command (Saudi Border): 28 divisions in 7 Cps

Thus, the Iraqi Armed Forces deploys a total of at least 80 divisions in 20 corps. Of these, 9 Corps headquarters were operationally tested – 7 in the Iran-Iraq War and 2 in exercises and operational deployment on the Jordanian (anti-Israel) border.

Tank, Armored and Mechanized divisions are all at least 12,000 men strong. Infantry divisions can reach 15,000 men but are usually limited to 8,000 – 10,000 regulars and reservists as a core for command and control problems. They may be reinforced by People's Army subunits.

The above force structure does not include the 14 – 20 commando and special forces Independent Brigades controlled directly by Saddam

Hussein and sent to delicate and sensitive areas (both domestic and foreign). Iraq has at least 14 IB's and was building several additional units (of both Iraqi and Palestinian volunteers), but some of them might have been reinforced and turned into divisions.

On November 19, 1990, Iraq announced that it would send some 250,000 more troops to Kuwait. Saddam Hussein and his senior military commanders met and decided to send seven additional divisions of the regular army immediately, and that another 150,000 reservists would be called to duty. "This means the United States will need to mobilize a 3 million strong force with similar equipment and armament to our forces" if it is to attack Kuwait, the Iraqi News Agency said. The regular divisions will probably be drawn from the forces facing Iran and from the new units being organized in the Baghdad area. The additional reservists can be used both to form new divisions (possibly based on a core of regular brigades) and/or augment existing infantry divisions. These reservists might be sent to replace regular units on the Iranian border, thus freeing them to redeploy to the southern border.

The Iraqi Armed Forces are well equipped with medium and long-range fire weapons: combat aircraft, missiles, rockets and tube artillery. These are used in centralized forces and deployed by the high command on its own, or are assigned to field armies in accordance with the master plan or the military situation. Saddam Hussein is a firm believer in massive and concentrated firepower and the attrition of the enemy.

For combat, the Iraqi Armed Forces are organized in Field Armies, which do not have a fixed organization. Each Field Army consists of several Corps Headquarters and additional centrally controlled fire units. Field Armies are deployed either by echelon, sector or strategically important task. As a rule, Corps can be highly mobile, armored and maneuverable, or virtually static, saturated by infantry.

The above force structure excludes the Infantry and People's Army units detailed for static guarding of key installations, quasi-police activities and agricultural work.

Since the beginning of the current crisis, Iraq has completed a strategic overseas deployment in order to enhance and solidify its alliance system. The main ground components of the Iraqi overseas deployment are 1 brigade in Yemen, 3 brigades in Sudan (1 training with Libyan forces in amphibious operations); and 1 Jordanian-Iraqi mixed brigade moving in and out of Jordan. There are also several

Palestinian forces, including the regularly trained Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and various terrorist-volunteer forces.

The Iraqi Soldier

It is impossible to speak about the “typical” Iraqi soldier. The population of Iraq is diverse and each segment is significantly different from the rest. Ethnically, Iraq is fairly homogeneous: 73.5% Arabs, 21.6% Kurds, 2.4% Turkmen and 2.5% others. However, at least 80-85% of the Arab population (+60-65% of the total population) is Shi'ite and hostile to Baghdad. Only some 15% of the total population is Sunni Arab, the ruling strata, and only the upper 10% (1.5% of the total population) can be considered candidates for the ruling elite.

This religious diversity, needless to say, affects the loyalty and performance of the bulk of the Iraqi troops. These can be comprehended in the context of the general character of Arab soldiers in a military structure. Arab soldiers operate within the framework of the group mentality or “security in numbers.” Because of Arab fatalism, the soldiers do not conspire or challenge authority by creating an alternate leadership cadre. Instead, there is a communal “grumbling” reinforced by mutual complaining and discussions until some pretext sets off a reaction. Thus, given the right “external” pretext, the Arab soldier tends to, and can be made to, shift from one extreme to another by overcoming his fear of his leadership. Until this point is reached, discontent builds inside the army without any outside indication that there is trouble. Militarily, this manifests itself in sudden shifts from fanatical bravery in combat to sudden abandonment of the battlefield. The legend of the “Summer Soldier” is certainly appropriate in this context.

Iraq's regular soldiers, mainly infantry and predominantly Shi'ite, are motivated by fear. These units are locally recruited and the recruit's families and communities are held hostage to the performance of units and even of individuals. For all Arab soldiers, the fear of their commanders (the embodiment of the state's authoritarian system) is the primary incentive for fighting since a soldier's failure in the field can mean retribution by his government against his home. Additionally loyalty to comrades in combat also develops as most soldiers have family or clan connections to their comrades in their subunits and are driven by a sense of unity against a common enemy.

The Iraqi Republican Guards are predominantly Sunni professional soldiers committed to long-term service that includes the betterment of

family conditions. Their loyalty is aided by the instilling of personal loyalty to Saddam Hussein and Sunni Islam as well as a Prussian-like militarism. Still, like all Arab soldiers, their performance under fire is determined by their fear of their commanders. Their loyalty to Saddam Hussein and “patriotism” helps and seems to contribute significantly to their performance as long as the unit is winning and Saddam Hussein, as represented by his field commanders, is “happy” with them. Of course, loyalty to comrades under fire is also a factor.

Fire Operations and Weapons

The importance of the massive use of land based firepower – that is tube and rocket artillery as well as diversified guided missiles, was one of the primary lessons of the Iran-Iraq War. During the later stages of the war, the Iraqi Armed Forces learned to concentrate and integrate massive quantities of artillery fire from a variety of weapons on specific kill zones. The Iraqis also learned to integrate the effect of various types of ammunition, such as high explosives, cluster, incendiary, mines, and chemical weapons into a single suppressing fire strike. Consequently, Iraq has significantly increased both the quantity and quality of its artillery and missile forces since 1988 by massive procurement and local production.

The principle of Iraqi fire operations is “Denial by Fire,” mainly in pre-set static conditions but also relative to, and as a part of, mobile warfare initiated by the Iraqi Armed Forces. “Denial by Fire” operations achieve results by threatening the enemy with unbearable losses and damage if he enters predetermined kill zones (fire, minefields and possibly contamination barriers), and preoccupies the enemy with the conduct of countermeasures (counter-battery fire and minefield breaching, for example), the evacuation of casualties and damaged weapons, as well as other reactions to Iraqi artillery fire. Even if the attrition caused by the Iraqi fire is not debilitating, it should be sufficient to deprive the enemy of the initiative, cause the loss of momentum to the attack, and deny the enemy the use of certain terrain features favorable for mobile operations, at least temporarily.

Moreover, this type of fire operation is most effective under centralized control and in accordance with an existing plan, in military conditions preferred by Baghdad. Even when the initiative on the battlefield is in the hands of an attacking enemy, the control over reaction fire can remain in the hands of the defender and therefore can be conducted in accordance with pre-planned procedures. Thus, the

fire plan for “denial by fire” operations can compensate in advance so that these arrangements could be activated quickly and inflict heavy casualties on, and deny presence on the battlefield to, the attacking Iranian forces, despite their tactical determination and sophistication. The Iraqis prefer to deploy their artillery in fixed positions as part of the defense perimeters and then channel the attacking forces into pre-arranged kill zones. Thus, artillery is the crucial element of the Iraqi defense line.

In the late 1980's, the principle of “denial by fire” was expanded to include the use of artillery in mobile warfare. The subsequent thorough modernization of Iraq's fire weapons is a part of the Soviet assisted modernization program and offensive reorientation of the Iraqi Armed Forces. According to Soviet style offensive tactics, whenever possible, the fire operations during mobile warfare should escalate into “maneuver by fire.” Maneuver by fire means not just denying certain areas to the enemy, but also compelling the enemy to engage in counter-maneuvers driven by a sequence of dynamic rolling fire strikes. As indicated above, Iraqi tactics call for a pause for fairly static defense if engaged by an enemy mobile force that has the initiative and to concentrate on stalling the enemy's advance. In this case, the self-propelled and towed artillery with the Iraqi mobile forces deploy in accordance with a fixed plan, all relative to the presence of the mobile forces, and establishes kill zones around the Iraqi forces.

In mobile warfare, the Iraqi artillery deploys in the rear of the attacking forces in two tiers, up to 20 and 40 kilometers from the point of contact, and engage the enemy with saturated fire, while shielded by mechanized and armored units. This tactic is especially effective in cases where the enemy maneuver forces have battlefield initiative and superiority in weapons, maneuverability and tactics. The tactical objective of the Iraqi operations is to induce confusion, cause a “tactical pause” that would buy the Iraqi armored forces the time needed to reorganize, approach, attack swiftly, or disengage and withdraw to avoid losses.

The first stage of the Iraqi fire operation is “denial by fire,” namely preventing the enemy from reaching and engaging the stalled Iraqi mobile forces. If successful, the fire operation can then be transformed into “maneuver by fire,” or the compelling of the enemy force to maneuver, ostensibly in order to avoid a battle of attrition, into vulnerable terrain or even entrapment where the Iraqi mobile forces can attack under favorable conditions.

Thus, the Iraqi's preferred use of artillery is optimized toward the denial of enemy activities rather than simple attrition. The essence of the denial by fire is that if the Iraqis have tactical intelligence, so much the better. However, even if they do not, the "denial by fire" tactics ensure that the enemy, wherever he may be, is incapable of reaching the flanks and rear of the Iraqi forces whether they are defending or attacking and advancing.

The magnitude and diversity of the Iraqi procurement of fire weapons from all over the world reflects their importance in the Iraqi military. Baghdad emphasizes the acquisition of long range and high rates of fire, as well as, more recently, enhanced mobility. Specialized high performance guns, rockets and mortars were procured from France, Austria, Brazil and South Africa via Chile. Moreover, there is a growing and diversifying production of local fire weapons systems as well as increasing of the maneuverability of existing weapons system. Special attention is paid to heavy caliber artillery, (mainly the 155mm majnoon and the Al-Fao 210mm SPG's), many types of mortars for overhead fire, (such as the 160mm mortar on t-54/T-55 chassis, the 4 x 120mm MT-LB), the mobilization of existing guns, (such as the installation of 120mm D-30(Y), 130mm M-46 and 155mm M-46(I) on T-54/T-55 chassis) as well as the enhancement of highly mobile and semi-mobile warfare. Moreover, Iraq is modifying virtually all available weapons to serve as fire weapons should the need arise. For example, Soviet made SAM's are converted for dual-use as SAM's and SSM's for use with mobile and stationary launchers. (The SA-3 is converted to the Barq SSM/SAM and the SA-6 is converted to the Kser SSM/SAM.)

In addition, the Iraqi Air Defense Operations constitute an integral part of the fire operation. Consequently, the emphasis here is also on denial and prevention of all aerial operations, hostile and friendly alike) in a certain zone rather than shooting down specific aircraft. The Iraqis believe that the localized saturation of a certain zone during combat operations will compel the superior enemy air forces to allocate most of their sorties for, and give high priority to, the suppression of the air defense before airpower can be directed back toward use in the land war. Under such conditions, the Iraqi ground forces can buy time and are capable of advancing or maneuvering with relative freedom from aerial threat. For their own close air support, the Iraqis count only on fire provided by combat helicopters. These helicopters fly under the air defense denial envelope and in close coordination with the artillery.

Moreover, the helicopters are also centrally controlled as an integral part of the fire plan.

Iraqi fixed wing aviation is used only for strategic and operational level missions outside the SAM belts, either for deep strikes and bombing raids or the air defense of Baghdad and other important objectives.

Static Fortified Defense Lines

The Iraqis constructed an elaborate fortified defense line on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border and the Kuwaiti shore defenses. The static defenses are the first layer in a tri-layer comprehensive defensive/offensive deployment. The other two layers are largely mobile and built around mechanized and tank divisions and corps.

The Iraqi fortified defenses are about 15 kilometers deep and manned primarily by infantry divisions reinforced by artillery, air defense and coastal artillery units. The principle formations are triangle defense dispositions based on battalion, regiment, and division integrated dispositions. Each of the triangle formations is divided into sub-triangles and auxiliary quality forces. Thus, the battalion triangle is divided into three company positions. Then three battalion dispositions, organized in a triangle, constitute a regiment position. Finally, three regiment dispositions, also deployed in a triangle, constitute the core of a division disposition. The dedicated artillery and armor subunits of the regiments and divisions are deployed in clusters in between the respective triangles, overlooking and covering pre-planned kill zones.

A wide strip of diversified obstacles stretches in front of the first layer of defense. In Kuwait, the obstacle layer is 15-20kms deep and includes minefields, anti-tank ditches, wire meshes, smoke and fire entrapments and ambush sites. The objective of the obstacle layer is for more than just slowing down enemy forces. By engaging and breaching these obstacles, the enemy forces give away their starting positions and avenues of approach, thus expediting the organization of the Iraqi defense. The preoccupation with obstacles, even if successful, compels the enemy forces to lose their offensive momentum.

The basic defense unit is the infantry battalion. It is divided into three companies deployed in the corners of a triangle disposition. The battalion's combat vehicles are concentrated in the middle. The battalion's dispositions are surrounded by high sand walls from where

dismounted infantry with man-portable weapons can engage armored and mechanized forces.

When enemy forces approach such a triangle, the companies react in a pre-determined manner. The first company, the closest to the attacking force, engages the enemy in a frontal defense. Its objective is to pin the enemy force in position, or at least attract its attention. This is achieved by ambushing the enemy with fire from behind the sand wall. Such an ambush can include the use of small arms fire, RPG's, ATGM's, as well as sniper rifles for killing enemy officers. Then, the second company either joins the ambush, or if possible, closes in and wears down the enemy in order to further spread the reaction effort by the enemy. When it is clear that a segment of the enemy force has been allocated to deal with the Iraqi defense, the third Iraqi company and the light vehicles counterattack the enemy's flank or rear, thus ensuring that the enemy force is so preoccupied with the defending Iraqi battalions as to cease to be a part of the overall enemy offensive.

This type of engagement is repeated along the entire defense line so that the total impact of these skirmishes significantly depletes the enemy's overall momentum. Then, once the series of such defensive engagements with specific battalion triangles stabilizes, the as yet unengaged battalion triangle attacks the remaining enemy forces. Each triangle commits two companies to the attack. These are small mobile skirmishes, none of which is expected to defeat a major enemy offensive. Rather, the overall objective of these engagements is to further draw and/or push the enemy forces ultimately in the direction of the pre-arranged regimental kill zones. Then, irrespective of the position of friendly companies, the artillery begins suppressing barrages. Special attention is paid to using artillery delivered mines to block specific retreat routes that could otherwise be used by the enemy for reorganization maneuvers.

The Iraqis anticipate that the enemy units and subunits will ultimately fight their way through the first regimental layer of defense. However, it is expected that the enemy units will be divided and diminished in their momentum and will emerge in the divisional kill zones. There, they will be subjected to heavy fire aimed primarily at denying the enemy forces the ability to advance further or maintain their cohesion. If possible, the artillery will also be used to inflict heavy manpower losses on the enemy. At this point, the Iraqi's divisional mobile reserves will then to take on the most appropriate enemy units and push them back into the artillery covered kill zones.

After all of this, the dispersed enemy units that have overcome the kill zones and mobile engagements will still face a layer of regimental triangles. The principle objective of these triangles is to push the enemy back into the kill zones. They are also to attack additional segments of the enemy units that have survived intact onto the Iraqi battalion-level triangles, thus further fracturing and slowing down the enemy units.

Taken together, the primary objective of this series of skirmishes and kill zone fire is the splitting up and slowing down, as well as the attrition of, the attacking enemy forces so that they become more vulnerable to further engagements in the subsequent, largely mobile, lines of defense. As for the enemy reserves, artillery kill zones and renewed dispersible minefields will complicate their advance as the surviving enemy infantry companies, or their segments, are reorganized into ad-hoc dispersed battalion triangles, and continue to present some resistance. Altogether, the momentum of subsequent enemy echelons will be depleted to the point where they disintegrate.

The Iraqi defense along the Kuwaiti shoreline is largely identical to that along the Saudi Arabian border except for forward anti-missile positions (Hay-Ying 2 Silkworm, Faw 200, Faw 150 and Faw 70 – Iraqi made derivatives of the SS-N-2, etc.) hidden on the sand walls. These missiles are designed to hit the enemy naval vessels approaching the shores and landing forces. There are also anti-helicopter defenses, mainly automatic guns and shoulder-fired SAM's, concentrated in the second layer of battalion triangles for dealing with enemy helicopters that are attempting to land forces on both the beaches and to the rear of the Iraqi defense lines. Moreover, approaches to the most likely beaches are covered by diversified water obstacles, ranging from burning oil to several large underwater mines designed to cause subsurface blasts and sudden waves.

The Kuwait Theater

In this context, it can be seen that the Iraqi deployment in Kuwait and southern Iraq is a classic Soviet-style strategic defense aimed at ending the war with a decisive victory in which the Iraqi forces are on the offensive deep in the Saudi rear. Available data clearly points to the adoption of recent innovations in the Soviet “Art of War” corresponding to the emergence of the defensive doctrine, thus strongly suggesting the continuation of Soviet military assistance and advice at the highest levels of the Iraqi High Command. In the Kuwait theater,

the Soviet-style defensive dispositions and deployment are adapted to meet the special conditions of the desert theater on the basis of Egyptian experience in engaging high-quality mobile forces acquired in past wars. The Iraqi's proven formations used to contain the Iranian human waves are not employed and for a good reason.

The Soviet-style strategic defense is divided into 3 layers, each with a specific operational-level mission-role in the overall strategic-level master plan. Operating together, the defense line should transform the fighting in the theater from an all out enemy attack to a decisive counter-offensive by friendly forces. This fundamental shift of conditions is achieved through a cumulative effect of a multitude of relatively simple and non-decisive combat engagements so that the demands from each and every subunit are minimal and thus could be expected to be met. Moreover, the defense system is overloaded with redundancies and fallback solutions so that the anticipated large number of tactical setbacks and defeats will not be transformed into an operational-level setback. (See Maps 1 and 2.)

In early November 1990, the Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater deployed as follows:

- 1st Line Peripheral Defense
 - 12 IDs in 3 Cps in frontal and shore defense
 - 4 IDs in 1 Cps for rear area defense in marshes
 - 4 IDs in 1 Cps for defense of western approaches

- 2nd Line Mobile Defense
 - 2 TDs and 2 MDs in 1 Cps

- 3rd Line Counter-Offensive Force
 - 3 TDs and 1 MD in 1 Cps in the west
 - 1 TD and 3 MDs in 1 Cps in the center-east

The 1st defense line, known as the main defense, is 15 kms deep. This line is preceded by a 15-25 kms deep layer of observation outposts, roving anti-tank ambush forces, mine fields, and dispensable obstacles. This layer is dispersed and deployed into the enemy's territory if required. Within the 1st defense line, division-level forces deployed in two layers, 2:1 forward, with mobile forces and static point

defenses filling the gaps. Each layer is made of a web of battalion triangle dispositions integrated into regiment triangle dispositions and saturated with mine fields, man-made obstacles, ambush sites and pre-planned killing zones.

The objective of the 1st defense line is to stall the enemy advance, break momentum through a series of delaying actions on the tactical level, fix and identify the enemy's location and direction of attack. As the battle develops, the defending forces channel advancing enemy forces into pre-arranged kill zones where they are subjected to artillery, anti-tank fire, etc. The defending forces also contain and restrain enemy maneuvering for reorganization and counter-attacks or disengagement through massive use of real-time dispensable mine fields by rockets and helicopters.

Each level of fighting – from battalion to division – follows an identical principle: One-third of the force is allocated for frontal defense to fix the enemy forces; one-third of the force commits a flanking attack in order to stall and attrition the enemy on a localized basis; and one-third of the force, along with an armored/mechanized element if such is available, launches a localized counter-attack in order to further delay the enemy's advance and then channel it to the kill zone. All of these defensive maneuvers are conducted under conditions of an elaborate fire plan that is being rigidly implemented irrespective of any other factor, i.e., friendly losses.

In case of a major offensive – such as the anticipated U.S.-British offensive into Kuwait (See Map 3,) – the 1st line of defense is not expected to completely destroy the attacking forces but rather to divert them to kill and combat zones, preferably between the two layers of the 1st line or just behind the 1st line. The 1st defense line is extremely rigid and lacks tactical flexibility. Its sole objective is just stand and die in place so that it may erode the enemy into loss of momentum and fracturing of effort. The accumulating effect of such a defense will condition the enemy forces into the spirited reaction of the forces of the 2nd defense line. (See Map 4.)

The 2nd defense line is 10 kms deep and is made of mechanized and tank divisions deployed in clusters that enable them to stretch and establish static defense under the worse case conditions (1st line collapsed or destroyed) but, primarily, to launch a series of localized counter-attacks and push the enemy back into the kill zones within the 15 kms of the 1st line and, most critically, away from the axes of the main counter-offensive. When they attack, the forces of the 2nd

defense line bring into use heavy artillery, rockets, missiles, helicopters and combat aircraft.

The overall objective of these activities is to fracture the attacking forces into a large number of smaller units with reduced momentum, mobility and speed, small units that are gradually worn down. On the operational-level, a stated objective of this slow pace attrition is to exploit the plight of the attacking forces in order to induce a misuse of friendly high quality fire assets (aircraft and helicopters) by compelling the enemy commander to divert as many sorties as possible to the support of his forces that are entangled in the defense lines. That the "calling in" will cause heavy casualties among the friendly defending forces is acknowledged but accepted as worth the overall impact. The mobile forces of the 2nd defense line will conduct a series of swift pass-through or bounce attacks, all in quick succession.

The desirable aggregate impact of these attacks is to push the enemy forces away from possible counter-offensive corridors and back into the killing zones with their pre-planned elaborate fire system. On the defense during the war with Iran, Iraq proved capable of bringing together intensive fire barrages from diversified artillery and rocket sources within the context of pre-planned kill zones and fire-plans. Most important, Iraq proved capable of conducting large scale and decisive maneuvers and denial by fire operations integrating self-propelled and towed artillery (both tube and rocket) as well as anti-tank units (mobile and dismounted). (See Map 4.)

Until the strategic-level counter-offensive, the decisive tanks and mechanized forces constitute a 3rd defense line. This line is also 10 kms deep, but mobile units are deployed for a surge forward rather than the stretching of a defense line. When the senior commander is satisfied that the defense is manageable, he releases a counter-offensive.

The first phase is the surge of a heavy mobile group, tank-dominated and saturated with SPGs, commando forces and combat/assault helicopters, into the deep rear of the enemy. (See Map 5.) The preferable maneuver is a deep envelopment around the flanks of the main enemy offensive, in order to avoid clashes, and a concentration on strategic objectives in the deep rear of the enemy such as airfields, C31 sites (including radar sites, headquarters, etc.) and oil installations. This offensive surge is constantly mobile and is not expected to hold terrain until a very late stage in the counter-offensive.

Since 1988, in the last engagements with Iran, and especially in subsequent exercises, Iraq finally learned to execute fast combined-

arms offensives at Corps-level as was demonstrated in the invasion of Kuwait. The all-important cooperation of tanks with artillery and combat helicopters is effective and timely as long as the main ground forces are operating within the general speed and axis prescribed in the master plan. However, the Iraqis still fail to resurrect combined-arms formations once the coordination is severely disrupted.

It is assumed that with the enemy forces preoccupied with overcoming the saturated defense lines, they will be slow to identify the surge of the mobile group and even slower to react to it. A meaningful encounter with a Corps-level mobile group moving with full momentum will consume more armored forces than a commander can afford without sacrificing the main offensive through the Iraqi defense lines and into Kuwait.

Furthermore, the moment the enemy offensive was contained, though not necessarily defeated or repelled, in the two defense lines, the counter-offensive is escalated into an operational-level offensive where a second mobile force, this time mechanized and capable of holding terrain, is committed to a counter-attack. Together with the tank mobile force, this mechanized force joins in a pincer operation, with massive air power, and missile strikes in order to decide the war in the theater by threatening and destroying (damaging) the enemy's vital assets and without really defeating or destroying the enemy's main forces, which may still be advancing slowly through the defense lines. (See Map 6.)

Although high speed and building momentum are principles of armored warfare, the Iraqis emphasize that the key lesson of mobile armored combat in past Arab-Israeli wars has been to engage in such fights only when the Arab forces initiate them. Once the enemy seizes the initiative, the mobile force has to establish a hasty static defense line and attrition and stall the enemy's advance until disengagement, only then resuming movement. In order to improve the capabilities of Iraqi mobile forces to perform such a transition to defense, they are provided with extensive, dedicated anti-tank forces.

The Iraqis intend to decide static engagements by attrition with the anti-tank reserve, using ATGMs and other anti-tank weapons on vehicles. They will also immediately disperse enemy formations by self-propelled mortars, which are especially effective against enemy infantry and mechanized forces that the Iraqis expect to be used against their anti-tank reserves. Whenever possible, the Iraqis intend to stall and contain the enemy's ability to counter-manuever by dispersal of mines.

It should be emphasized that the emerging Iraqi strategy in the Kuwait theater constitutes an integral part of a larger regional multi-theater warfare strategy with a profound Islamic character aimed at causing schisms throughout the U.S. led Alliance. Examined within this context, the Iraqi strategic objectives, which contain a U.S. led offensive and cause heavy casualties to the attacking forces, as well as heavy damage to the Saudi oil installations, is sufficient to deliver Saddam Hussein a total victory in the pan-Arab context. By drawing Israel into a war and by demonstrating the U.S. inability to deliver a swift decisive victory, Saddam Hussein would have proved his claim of being a victim of a Zionist-imperialist conspiracy against the Arab World and could thereby reassert his claim for a pan-Arab leadership by demonstrating his ability to take on the world's and the region's leading powers and prevail.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Yemeni Theater

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The Saudi-Yemeni border constitutes a key sector of the Western Theater of Iraq and its principal allies and will be the most decisive in the transformation of any war in the region into a pan-Arab and pan-Islamic surge because of the ability of Iraq and its allies to threaten Islam's Holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. Toward that end, Iraq has a formal alliance and very close military relationship with Yemen. Iraq is provided with naval facilities, in essence a naval base, in Hodeida and free access to Aden. In addition, since August, Iraq has deployed forces to Yemen – fighter squadrons and a commando unit – that augment the capable local forces as well as the large Palestinian forces already in Yemen.

The Saudi-Yemeni border is divided into three main sectors:

- The northern border – from the Red Sea to eastern Najran – is a rugged mountainous country with few axes of transportation capable of supporting offensive mechanized and armored operations, including amphibious landings.

- Two rare accessibility axes on the fringes of the Rub' al-Khali – east of Ma'rib and north of Say'un – based on old smuggling roads and especially the old incense trails. One trail still used for smuggling is the Shabwa Ma'rib Main [originally] Medina. More recently, this trail was used by the PDRY and its allies for the smuggling of weapons to Saudi Islamist militants. It is possible to insert special forces along this extremely difficult route.
- The rest of the desert, that is the edges of the Rub' al-Khali – a combination of deep sands and rugged mountains that lead nowhere.

The forces in the area constitute a mixture of diverse good and bad units. The organization of the new Yemeni Armed Forces following the unification of the Republic of Yemen has not been completed yet. Thus, so far, the bulk of the forces remain in their old unit formations with the forces deployed along the previous inter-Yemen border redeployed along the Saudi and Omani borders. There is no evidence of any changes in the deployment of Cuban, North Korean, former East German and Palestinian elite forces.

Moreover, an Iraqi Commando unit (regiment or even a brigade) deployed to northern Yemen in mid-August 1990. Yemen-based forces deployed for operations along the northern border include both regular and elite formations.

The main ground forces are derived from the former North Yemen army and are comprised of mixed recruits. The main units are 6 Armored Brigades (AB) and 3 Mechanized Brigades (MB) usually organized in 3 task forces of 2 ABs and 1 MB each. The units' organization is based on Soviet-style battalions, but is not rigid. The brigades are equipped with Soviet weapons such as older MBTs (T-62, T-55 and T-54), mainly wheeled BTR-40 and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. They have plenty of MBRLs (mainly 122mm BM-21s) and towed artillery (mainly 122mm and 130mm). These brigades proved highly capable of engaging very rugged mountain roads.

There are also a variety of special and elite forces in the area. Most important are the parachute trained Commando Brigade, the Special Force Brigade, which is little more than a highly trained light infantry unit, and the Guards Brigade, which is equipped with U.S.-made weapons such as M-60s and M-113s and is deployed for the security of the Yemeni capital of Sana'a and is not likely to be moved from there.

Additional forces include an Iraqi Commando/Special Forces unit that, in all likelihood, will take over command of the Yemeni forces in case they are required to make deep penetrations and raids.

Also present in Salif, Yemen, is the PLO's Force 14 that includes highly trained commando formations and naval assault components (small landing boats, fast attack craft, and under-water specialists). In addition, fairly large terrorist-diversionary forces comprised of diversified units of Yemeni, Palestinian, Cuban, North Korean and former East German elite forces are available in the Aden area. Also available are several terrorist detachments from all Persian Gulf countries and regions, including the Hijaz (western Saudi Arabia). The latter can be used for guidance as well as for "legitimization" of operations. Their military value is limited.

Local forces are 6 Infantry Brigades (IB), each comprised of regular skeletons augmented by locally drafted irregulars, all of whom are Zeidi Shi'ites. The tribal population in northern and central (ex-North) Yemen is divided between the Bakil and the Hashid confederations of tribes. The Bakils outnumber the Hashids by about 2:1. As far as the IBs are concerned, 4 IBs are Bakil and all are in the northern and western sectors. The 2 Hashid IBs are in the eastern axis and the central-southern sector. [There are 3 more IBs in the country, 1 Bakil, 1 Hashid and 1 unattached southern tribal unit, all based in the Sana'a area and to the south.]

In assessing the current capabilities of the Yemeni forces, one should note that during the Yemeni Civil war in the 1960s, the Zeidi, and especially the Bakil, were severely hit by Egyptian forces, including heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombing as well as the use of chemical weapons. Villages were destroyed by Egyptian ground forces who then mutilated the civilian population. There is therefore bad blood and countless blood feuds between all the local tribes and the Egyptian army. Moreover, the tribal population affected by the war migrated into southwestern Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the presence of Egyptian forces near the Yemeni border would probably encourage the tribes on both sides of the border to seek revenge and the settling of scores, even by invading Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Saudi forces deployed in the area are from the central tribes that are Wahhabi Sunnis and ethnically different from the local Saudi population, in itself a source of constant tension.

On their own, the Yemeni forces are incapable of deep penetrations. It is highly likely, therefore, that the best trained Yemeni, Iraqi, Palestinian and other foreign special forces/commando

detachments escorted by loyal tribes will be dispatched for small scale deep penetrations aimed at sabotage, diversion and terrorism. Units of local origin can be infiltrated via this route in order to incite “popular rebellion” in central and western Saudi Arabia. These routes cannot support or sustain an invasion by regular forces. Because of the unification of Yemen, the ex-PDRY special forces – highly-trained by Cuban, Soviet and East German experts and with extensive combat experience in Oman and Ethiopia since the mid-1970s – are now available for operations against Saudi Arabia.

Similarly, other Yemeni forces that can be used for operations in the region are ex-PDRY. Yemen's central reserve is a mobile intervention force based on 1 AB and 3 MBs, all Soviet-Cuban trained and equipped. They are far better than their northern counterparts. However, these units are closer to Oman than to the northern Yemeni-Saudi border and there is no indication that they have moved since the beginning of the current crisis.

Yemeni air power is also Soviet-dominated. The primary helicopter forces are based around 55-60 HIPs, mainly older Mi-8 HIP Cs, and 20-25 HIND Ds. There are also about a dozen Bells all converted for VIP transports but which are in bad mechanical shape. Strike Aircraft include 25 MiG-23s, 90-95 MiG-21s, 60 Su-20/22s fully operational (including quality foreign pilots) as well as 15 F-5Es in average shape. At least one Iraqi Mirage F.1 squadron (12-15 aircraft) and possibly also one Su-20/22 squadron deployed to Yemen in mid-August. These aircraft are equipped for aerial refueling. It is also possible that Iraqi pilots were sent to take over some of the local combat aircraft and helicopters for better use in combat.

Irrespective of the intensity of the regional fighting, the first point of potential escalation in Yemen is away from the Saudi border. Iraq and its PLO and Yemeni allies will attempt to block the Bab al-Mandab straits and access to the Suez Canal as a counter-measure to the U.S.-led blockade. Iraqi naval forces will operate from their naval facilities in Hodeida and Aden.

As detailed above, Iraq deployed combat aircraft and a commando special forces unit to Yemen. Moreover, Yemen is also the base of the PLO's Force 14. Some of the PLO's dedicated commando units and the PLO's Air Force (trained to operate MiG-21s, MiG-23s and diversified helicopters) are based on the PLO's controlled Kamaran Island in the middle of the Red Sea off the Yemenite coast, and the PLO's Navy, which includes raiding fast boats and coastal artillery and missiles (such as SSC-1b and Silkworms), is located in the Salief harbor in

Yemen. Most of the Force 14 officers were trained in Iraq and Libya. A PFLP force is based on the Perim Island in the mouth of the Bab al-Mandeb and the Cubans and Soviets installed an SSC-1b cruise missile and artillery positions inside caves overlooking Perim Island.

On land, potentially the most threatening contingency for Saudi Arabia is deep infiltration by terrorists and special forces in order to hit strategic objectives. Strategic objectives include both military installations and symbolic Muslim holy places. Evidence concerning training in the ex-PDRY and Libya over the last decade or so, and indications of planned operations, suggest that the threat of special operations is high. Most dangerous are small detachments of 10-30 fighters comprised of local individuals coming to free their brethren, and volunteers who are highly trained professional special forces operatives who are mainly Palestinians but also Iraqi, Syrians, and even Cubans. These groups can travel along desolate back roads off the old incense trails, enjoying the hospitality of local Bedouins, until they link-up with their intended area of operations. There are enough forces in Yemen to swamp the region with such detachments. Moreover, the PLO Force 14 was trained in sea borne landing of detachments in shallow waters including the reef areas. These can also be used for the insertion of sabotage teams.

These special operations can cripple Saudi Arabia, for they have a strong potential of inciting an indigenous popular uprising. Segments of the population in the Hijaz are hostile to Riyadh and one indication is the safety of operatives and large stockpiles already in place since the mid-1980s. One should not forget that the anti-Wahhabi and anti-al-Saud message of the November 1979 seizure of the Great Mosque enjoyed wide support in Saudi Arabia and that many "hostages" joined the rebels in Mecca and that there were at least half-a-dozen small uprisings all over Saudi Arabia in support of the Mecca event. Moreover, there have been many repeated smaller-scale uprisings since 1979 and Riyadh's accusations against Iran should not conceal the fact that the vast majority of the rebels were Sunni Bedouins from very good Saudi families. Significantly, the traditional themes of the Saudi rebels are currently aired by the clandestine, highly effective and popular Holy Mecca Radio that agitates for an uprising along the traditional lines and promises help.

Back in November 1979, and since then, the Saudis have had qualms about asking foreign forces to save them from terrorist attacks that have gotten out of control, and have allowed such help only at the very last minute. At present, when the issue of the legitimacy of the

House of al-Saud as Guardians of the Holy Shrines is raised throughout the Middle East, and when the presence of foreigners in Saudi Arabia is one of the primary reasons for the called-for uprising, the Saudis will probably try to contain a rebellion alone with potentially disastrous military ramifications. Simultaneously, infiltrations might be concealed as, and covered by, tribal unrest along the northern border, thus further limiting Riyadh's ability to react on time.

Ultimately, large-scale war will take place as a part of a Western Theatre aimed at drawing Israel into the war, thus establishing a clear U.S.-Israeli anti-Islamic camp. This development would enable Baghdad to accuse the Saudis and their Arab allies of being apostates, and change the essence of the war to a Saddam-Saladin led liberation of Islam's Holy Sites (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem). This type of confrontation will draw very clear lines of pro- and anti- Islam and Arabism in the Middle East.

Strategically, the war in such a western theater will include ground forces advancing from Jordan and Yemen simultaneously, and additional fire support in the form of aerial bombing and SCUD launchings and first strikes from Sudan. (An Iraqi Mirage F.1 Squadron and possibly SCUDs are already deployed at Wadi Sayyidana air base north of Khartoum. Iraqi SAMs and "other missiles" are deployed along the Red Sea across from Yanbu and Jeddah.)

Baghdad can coordinate and control the military operations in the Western Theater through the pan-Arab command and communications network originally established by the USSR in the 1970s. During the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian High command used this still fledgling network in order to successfully control a Yemen-Red Sea Theater when they blocked the Baab al-Mandab Straits. Regional C3I capabilities have markedly improved since then with the establishment in 1978 of a Soviet-Cuban strategic C3I center in the Khormaksar airbase near Aden. This center controlled several region-wide and global exercises (including participation of Soviet forces) as well as emergency military actions in Libya (the rescue of Qaddafi) and Ethiopia. In the early-1980s, an expanded regional coordination network was installed by the USSR to connect Libya, Syria and Yemen (then PDRY) as well as other allies from India to Mauritania. The regional allies have access to this C3I network. For example, Libya activated and utilized the network in an attempt to coordinate anti-U.S. activities in 1986.

Even in reduced capabilities, this C3I network is sufficient for the requirements of Soviet-style regional warfare. Moreover, because of

the nature of the power structure in the Arab world – that the national leaders are actually functioning as the commanders in chief – coordination between theaters is conducted on leader-level and only in principle. Thus, the Iraqi (Arab) concept of military operations on the strategic level does not require detailed and real-time coordination. The dominant principle of regional warfare is an all out effort to stick to existing contingency and operational plans at all costs. When properly implemented, primarily in offensive operations, this centralization ensures a cumulative impact on a strategic regional level. To date, there is no record of actual coordination of military actions on the battlefield, even in the multiple front operations in the Middle East. Thus, this rigidity enables a variety of forces to achieve an accumulating strategic impact, even if they operate in relative isolation, and, at the same time, makes all these theater forces vulnerable to loss of initiative.

In the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, there are two main invasion routes that are high quality roads capable of supporting rapid advance of armored forces: (1) the coastal road from Maydi (Yemen) along the Red Sea coast to the Jizan military complex and all the way to Aqaba (Jordan). (2) The mountain road from Sadah (Yemen) to Zahran (Saudi Arabia) and on to the Abha-Khamis Mushayt military complex. There are two auxiliary caravan routes that can support light mechanized forces below battalion level (at one time) and large scale walking infantry: (1) The mountain road from Sadah (Yemen) to Jizan (Saudi Arabia), which can be used for encirclement or pincer attack. (2) The mountain road from Sadah (Yemen) to Aba-as-Suud (Saudi Arabia) and the Nijran air base. In addition, there are many sites for amphibious landings. Along the Yemeni border there are also many rugged trails highly suitable for small force infiltration tactics but mainly on foot and with pack animals. Such light forces can lay quite effective ambushes for reaction forces trying to contain and engage the main force penetrations.

In any possible escalation in this region, the initial operations are the most crucial. In this specific case, the top priority would be to capture airbases near the Yemeni border (at least Najran and Jizan) in order to increase significantly the availability of runway space and quadruple the number of tactical aircraft available for combat operations. These complexes can be attacked by a combination of air drops on the airport complexes by Iraqi and Yemeni commando forces as well as a link-up with infantry forces infiltrated along the caravan routes, and, in Jizan, also amphibious landings. Another early objective might be the Zahran oasis and crossroads.

It should be emphasized that these installations are located within or on the boundary of the Zeidi Shi'ite population of Saudi Arabia, mainly Bakils, that has a long history of Saudi (Wahhabi Sunni) oppression and a close relationship with their ethnic brethren across the border. Therefore, local popular support and assistance to the Yemeni forces should be anticipated. Only when this initial line is secured, can an armored – mechanized thrust toward the military complexes in southwestern Saudi Arabia really develop.

There are three south-north roads that can sustain mechanized forces. The real danger in Yemeni-Iraqi forces reaching as far as the Abha-Khamis Mushayt military complex in Saudi Arabia is not military. From a purely military point of view, airpower and light raiding forces can block the advance of heavy forces along narrow mountainous roads. However, the loyalty and behavior of the local Asiri population is debatable.

The major Yemeni forces are organized in old-fashioned Egyptian (Soviet) style companies. Most prevalent are tank companies of 10 tanks and mechanized companies of 15 BTRs or 4 BTRs and some 12 trucks. Artillery is at battalion and brigade level. Battalions are comprised of 1-2 artillery batteries (tubes and MBRLs), some light air defense and mortars, and either three mechanized companies (mainly with trucks), two mechanized companies and a tank company, or two tank companies and a single mechanized, BTR-equipped company. Armored brigades are comprised of 2-3 tank-heavy battalions and mechanized battalions. A mechanized brigade is comprised of 1-2 trucked battalions, a mixed mechanized battalion and a tank-heavy battalion. Additional artillery, mainly high caliber tubes, and air defense are also assigned to the brigade. Helicopter, heliborne and air support operations are all centrally controlled.

The major force tactics are simple and rarely go beyond battalion operations. Brigade operations are in essence several battalion events simultaneously or in quick succession. Most tactics are offensive oriented. The only defensive tactics contemplated are to dig in, preferably in high advantageous terrain, and take punishment.

In enclosed areas, such as mountainous terrain, the infantry advances on foot in front of the tanks and assaults the objectives as they come. On the large unit-level (company and battalion), most assaults are frontal. In the low level (soldiers, squads and platoons), there is a lot of tactical flexibility and audacity that is a reflection of tribal fighting traditions rather than commanders' skills.

In open spaces, forces are committed to an extremely fast assault. Usually, everybody storms forward from as many directions as possible with all soldiers firing every possible weapon from tanks, armored vehicles and trucks, and with the stationary artillery firing above and into everybody. This is traditional Arab shock tactics with camels and horses being replaced by tanks and BTRs.

Finally, the Yemeni soldiers themselves are fierce, ruthless and fearless. They are simple men who operate effectively when in their own environment where traditional instincts can substitute for lack of formal military skills. The officers from the north are very low quality; they follow rigidly very basic, simple, and straight forward tactics. They lack initiative and insight. However, they are extremely brave and will hold their ground against overwhelming odds and crippling losses.

There are also ex-PDRY elite units that were trained by the Soviets and the Cubans. They are saturated with Syrian and Palestinian cadres. These forces are very good, highly professional and resourceful. They usually operate in battalion and company size forces to stiffen up local forces and decide engagements. Their equipment is modern and suitable for desert-mountain warfare. They are equipped with highly maneuverable BMPs, T-62s modified for rugged operations Afghan-style, self-propelled artillery (tube and MBRLs) and know how to cooperate with helicopters and SA-6s and SA-9s SAMs. By late-August 1990 there was no credible evidence of transfer of these elite Yemeni forces to the Saudi border. However, in October-November there were several vague reports of troop movements in the area suggesting the arrival of quality forces. Moreover, these ex-PDRY forces can engage forces on the caravan routes at great speed and thus alter the equation of an initial strike. A combination of these ex-PDRY forces and the Iraqi commando/special forces, especially in the first strike scenario, can alter the entire balance of forces in the area.

This then is the balance of power in a remote, seemingly innocuous region, which could have pivotal and decisive importance.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

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The Middle East After Operation Desert Storm

March 11, 1991

The Middle East is at a historical crossroads that might turn out to be the most critical time in its history since the aftermath of the First World War when Britain and France dismembered the Ottoman Empire and carved several Arab “states” out of its domains. The contemporary Arab world is the outcome of the Western mishandling and insensitivities of that period coupled with Soviet intervention. Consequently, the Arab world tends to be characterized by instability, widespread popular radicalism and leaders' grandiose aspirations, all in the name of a progressive socialism or a purified Islam. Ultimately, in the absence of traditional legitimacy and self-rule, statehood has been transformed into the institutionalized oppression of the population by authoritarian regimes.

Thus, the Arab Middle East after the Gulf crisis is experiencing a transformation comparable to that of the First World War because of the magnitude and profundity of the internal dynamics that were galvanized by that crisis. In its inability to come up with an Arab consensus [ijma], the Arab League, itself a modernized and westernized expression of pan-Arabism, failed to meet the expectations of a predominantly pan-Arabist population. Saddam Hussein not only failed

to realize the dream of revival of past-due Islamic Glory, but the crisis he instigated ultimately compelled all Arab regimes to admit their dependence on the West, and especially the U.S., for their survival. Subsequently, the U.S.-led coalition defeated Iraq, and with it frustrated the popular aspirations of the Arab public. Consequently, the Arab public is in a state of collective shock, wavering between resignation, on the one hand, and an active acceptance of Western supremacy, on the other hand. These sentiments may increasingly become sentiments of shame and rage and result in a wave of avenging terrorism.

The crisis inside Iraq is even more acute as the widespread Shiite and Kurdish revolts aptly demonstrate. The Iraqi population has undergone a severe trauma as a result of the Persian Gulf War. Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath leadership failed to consolidate a unified pan-Arab front and legitimize Iraq's quest for the leadership of the Arab world. Thus, the entire concept of a Ba'athist centralized regime was discredited.

In this context, it can be seen that the essential source of instability throughout the Arab world is mounting internal tensions. Therefore, it is impossible and impractical to strive to defuse regional tensions and establish a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East when all the Arab countries are exploding from within. All Arab countries are currently ruled by minority autocratic regimes that consolidate their hold over their subjects by force of arms and/or economic predominance. These governments' continued oppression of ethnic and religious groups, groups that often constitute a majority of the population, and their inability and unwillingness to deal with internal and welfare issues, has resulted in a profound popular mistrust of governments in the region. Consequently, the oppressed publics of the Arab world are being pushed into the fold of Islam as the only salvation from the misery and oppression that they live under. Unfortunately, the Islam in which the masses seek solace and comfort is extremist and radical (fundamentalist), that is, intolerant of non-Believers and vehemently anti-Western.

The Arab people demand Islamic values from their governments. Consequently, Arab leaders are increasingly being forced into defining their legitimacy in Islamic terms. However, the essence of Islamic legitimization for any ruler or government lies in the demand to implement the teaching of Islam that is universal, expansionist, and does not recognize the principle of the inviolability of geographic borders and the sovereignty of states. Moreover, because of the expansionist character of Islam, many leaders and regimes in the

Middle East exploit Islam to justify their own territorial aspirations. Thus, by striving to establish their Islamic legitimacy in the eyes of their people, Arab rulers adopt an ideological commitment to internal insecurity and external aggression against other leaders, thus, in effect, perpetuating regional instability.

Thus, Saddam Hussein's apparent demise did not diminish the pan-Arab/Pan-Islamic aspirations of the Arabs and their leaders. As the extent of the Iraqi defeat sinks in, the Arab community's attitude may increasingly become one of rage both in the Arab world, and ultimately in the entire Muslim world. If the growing role of Islam in Middle Eastern politics was not yet apparent to Arab leaders before, the intensity and magnitude of the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq, irrespective of their ultimate outcome, serves as an important lesson. No Arab leader, regardless of the might of his police state, can hold onto power without paying attention to, and showing consideration for, the rise of Islam.

However, Teheran, Damascus and their protégés, see in the profound crisis of the Arab and Muslim world a golden opportunity to redirect a building sense of resentment into a campaign of revenge against the West and a chance to establish “a new Muslim world order” under their hegemony. The leaders of Iran and the HizbAllah advocate the exploitation of the current Gulf crisis to establish by force a new Islamic world order in place of the “new world order” advocated by the U.S. In an interview with Kayhan International on 22 December 1990, HizbAllah leader Hussayn al-Mussawi stated:

We hope that the Islamic Republic [of Iran] with the cooperation of Syria and Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine, as well as all Muslims throughout the world, will be able to establish an Islamic world order. This can prevent the U.S. from imposing its power and order on Muslims. In this regard we hope that all Muslims cooperate with Iran, because Imam Khomeini's path is still continuing. This path is being continued by the leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini. We hope the Muslims will be able to stand up against their enemies.

Thus, the simultaneous rise of widespread pan-Arab/pan-Islamic sentiments and the possible collapse of Saddam Hussein as the leader of pan-Arabism are being exploited by Damascus and Teheran to

implement and further a bold strategic move, namely, the consolidation of an anti-American Muslim bloc stretching from Lebanon to Pakistan, and dominated by a Shiite-Allawite leadership.

Indeed, credible steps are already being taken to organize this bloc. The Syrian-Iranian alliance was formalized on 7 March 1991 in a 2-hour meeting between Syrian President Hafiz Assad and visiting Iranian Vice-President Hassan Habibi. Syria and Iran agreed to work together to achieve stability in the entire region. Indeed, Syrian presidential spokesman Jibrán Kourieh explained that Assad and Habibi agreed to closely cooperate in order to “cope with the new developments in a way that ensures the interest, security and stability of all the peoples in the area.

The new policy was reflected in a fundamental change in Iran's stated policy toward the popular uprising in Iraq. On 8 March, Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani delivered the key Friday Sermon in Teheran. Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned Baghdad of far-reaching ramifications in response to any attempt to crush the rebellion and hold on to power in Iraq. Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that Iran would cooperate with Iraq only if the Ba'ath regime surrenders “to the will of the people... If the Ba'athists do not listen to the voice of the people, it will be their last mistake.” He reiterated that, “Saddam is making a mistake while suppressing the people. This is the worst mistake,” Baghdad could make.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani also, however, held out an olive branch saying, “If the Ba'athists surrender to the will of the people, we in Iran are ready for cooperation,” he said. It was the first time Iran openly backed the revolt in Iraq. This sermon came only two days after Saadoun Hammadi, a member of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, was in Teheran where he met with Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and delivered a special message from Saddam Hussein to Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Baghdad then claimed that Teheran promised not to interfere in Iraq's upheaval.

In Damascus, Syrian Vice President Abdul-Halim Khaddam also delivered a speech on 8 March 1991, attacking Iraq's suppression of the popular uprising. Khaddam accused Saddam Hussein of waging war on his own people using warplanes he did not dare to use against the coalition. “We wondered why the Iraqi warplanes were banned from defending the Iraqi airspace and were sent outside Iraq during the war... They are now bombarding Iraq and the Iraqis.” Khaddam ridiculed Saddam Hussein's boast about the mother of all battles. “And where is the mother of all battles now? Where is the great duel? This

tyrant, who turned into a meek, peaceful lamb and stopped the fighting and made all those concessions... has once again turned into a tyrant to achieve the mother of all battles... in Iraq and against the Iraqi people,” Khaddam concluded.

Meanwhile, Damascus and Teheran moved quickly to implement their strategic designs. On 7-8 March, the two countries consolidated the 17 anti-Saddam factions they were supporting – Shiites, Kurds, communists and nationalists – into a single coalition to “coordinate and begin action immediately” under their tight control. Senior Syrian and Iranian delegations met with the opposition leaders in Damascus to discuss the conduct of the struggle against Saddam Hussein. According to an Iraqi opposition source in Damascus, Saudi officials also attended a meeting with the Iranians, Syrians and aspiring Iraqi leaders. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati also met with Hussayn al-Mussawi and other senior members of the HizbAllah to discuss their role in the emerging regional order.

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The dangerous potential of these recent developments lies in the unity of strategic interests and genuine mutual benefits that exist between the Soviet Union, for whom the Third World is now the main strategic theater, and the Syrian-Iranian led alliance that is striving to consolidate its pan-Arab/pan-Islamic leadership by waging an anti-U.S./anti-West struggle throughout and from the Third World. International terrorism will be the primary weapon of this bloc. Further, the bloc's cooperation with the USSR will facilitate the matching of the highly sophisticated skills and equipment developed by the USSR with an increasingly radicalized Third World, especially the rapidly expanding Muslim world, whose festering resentments are the perfect breeding ground for “trigger men” with the will to kill and die as martyrs. Furthermore, any confrontation with the West, even if by acts of terrorism that cannot be traced back to their source, will further push the bloc into growing dependence on Moscow because of the need for weapons and protection. Thus, the Syrian-Iranian led bloc would not only come under a strong Soviet orbit, but would evolve into an instrument for furthering Moscow's anti-Western interests.

In fact, Moscow began consolidating its hegemony over the fledgling Syrian-Iranian bloc in early-February, in tandem with its active support for Saddam Hussein's audacious political moves to realize his grand design. The final phase started with the visit to

Moscow of the Syrian Defense Minister, Gen. Mustafa Tlas. He met with the senior members of the Soviet High Command to discuss the anticipated escalation in the Middle East beyond the Gulf crisis. "An accord was reached on the need to maintain the combat might of the Syrian Armed Forces and the need to modernize the Syrian Army to enable Syria to weather the storms that are raging in our region," Gen. Tlas told Krasnaya Zvezda [8 February 1991]. Damascus was promised a massive supply of weapons in order to retain and improve Syria's strategic parity with Israel in the wake of the emergency U.S. assistance, mainly new ballistic missiles capable of breaching the Patriots provided to Israel and the USSR's latest aircraft and aerial munitions such as smart bombs and aerial missiles. While in Moscow, Gen. Tlas also provided the Soviet High Command with a detailed assessment of the Western deployment in Saudi Arabia, and of the capabilities and performance of the Western weapons systems being used there.

The acceptance of this Soviet strategic hegemony is also reflected in the reorganization of the Iranian Armed Forces. On 20 February 1991, Iran completed a major phase in the rebuilding of its Armed Forces. Teheran tied these reforms directly to its determination to become a post-war major player in the region. President Hashemi-Rafsanjani declared that Iran's neighbors should be "well aware that the Islamic republic is the anchor of stability in the region." The essence of the Iranian military program was the integration of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – which has its own naval and air wings – with the regular armed forces, initially at command level and in logistics support. The Guards will be the dominant element in Iran's new military system.

This was determined on 18 February, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei promoted 28 senior IRGC commanders to the ranks of brigadier or major general and placed them in posts previously reserved to army personnel, thus formalizing the merger and their seniority. Acknowledging friction within the military, Khamenei warned the commanders: "The armed forces are not allowed to get involved in factionalism and political divisionism... This is a very dangerous phenomenon."

The institutionalization of the IRGC's predominance is of crucial significance to Iran's strategic posture. The primary weapons systems and expertise facilitating Iran's military and restructuring were Soviet-made, including T-72s, MiG-29s and SA-6s, to name but a few. All these new weapons were absorbed by IRGC units while the army was

striving to preserve its old Western weapons systems. Further, Teheran announced its intention to acquire additional high performance combat aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, armored fighting vehicles and a comprehensive air defense system. Further, the army's unification came in the wake of a comparable unification of the navy in December 1990, when the IRGC naval division merged with the regular navy under the command of former Revolutionary Guards Minister Ali Shamkh'ani. Shamkh'ani also anticipates a major naval build-up, including the acquisition of submarines, new aircraft and anti-ship missiles "from both Eastern and Western countries." Thus, the strategic ramifications of Iran's military reforms are that the Soviet equipped and trained elements will dominate the Iranian defense establishment.

For all intents and purposes, Iraq is the only missing link in the emerging regional bloc dominated by Iran and Syria. In the west, Lebanon is under Syrian occupation in every aspect short of a formal declaration. Having committed Jordan to all out support for Saddam Hussein, King Hussein alienated the Saudi royal family on honor and Islamic legitimacy issues to a degree that will not permit a near term reconciliation. Thus, for both political and economic reasons, Jordan has no alternative but to slide under Syrian hegemony and, if possible, revive its close economic ties with the new Iraq, itself dominated by Syria and Iran.

Simultaneously, in the east, Teheran has exploited the Gulf crisis to complete the consolidation of its new bloc. Since late-February, Iran and Pakistan have held a series of major military consultations and agreed on a significant upgrading of their strategic military cooperation. An Iranian high level delegation led by Speaker of the Majlis, Mehdi Karrubi, visited Islamabad to finalize the implementation of the agreed upon strengthening of their mutual military and defense policy relations, economic and technological cooperation on the strategic level, as well as coordinated foreign policy. Special attention was paid to the formulation of a joint strategy toward the pursuit of "long-term security for the Gulf region." Meanwhile, Teheran went out of its way to praise the "Islamicness" (sic) of the Pakistani government, thus providing Islamabad with crucial legitimization in the face of a growing Islamist challenge in the wake of the Gulf crisis.

In the meantime, under Moscow's guidance, Afghanistan has been quietly improving its military and intelligence cooperation with Iran for several months. Moreover, Najibullah sees in Afghanistan's integration into a regional security arrangement under Soviet hegemony the most

expedient way to consolidate the regional legitimacy of his regime. Kabul believes that only a regional cooperation arrangement imposed and blessed by Iran and the USSR can influence Islamabad to tacitly contain the remnants of the Afghan resistance to a manageable, largely symbolic, insurrection.

India also actively yet tacitly supports the emerging bloc, primarily as an instrument to restrain Pakistan's Kashmir and Sikh adventures. Moreover, the emergence of any such regional bloc would further consolidate Soviet regional hegemony, which is in India's strategic interest because Moscow recognizes India as the local superpower of the Indian Ocean.

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Meanwhile, a popular uprising erupted in the predominantly Shiite parts of southern Iraq in early March and began spreading northwards. Friday, March 8, was a turning point in the escalation of the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings. The Friday sermons by notable Shiite leaders were very bold and assertive, calling for a popular uprising, and crossing the threshold into a struggle for control of Iraq.

This rebellious defiance came in the wake of a marked escalation of the Iraqi attempts to suppress the revolt. On 6 March, sporadic riots, demonstrations and civil disorder began spreading from the southern Shiite cities into Baghdad. Jawad al-Maliki, of ad-Dawa, claimed that on the 7th, gunships and artillery were used against the rioters in Baghdad's predominantly Shiite al-Thawarah and al-Shu'la slums. Fighting between Republican Guard units and civilians, joined by rebellious army forces, also escalated in Basra and the surrounding province. Meanwhile, Kurdish guerrillas began fighting in the north and claimed to have taken three towns on the main road to Baghdad. In Baghdad, al-Thawarah warned on 7 March: "Everybody who tries to undermine the security of the revolution is a traitor and a mercenary. All of them shall regret it. They will pay."

Meanwhile, rioting in Baghdad itself began on Friday just after noon prayers when Shiite mullahs delivered fiery sermons, urging the toppling of the Ba'athist "infidel" regime. Shiite demonstrators poured from the mosques in the Al-Thawarah, Al-Shu'la, Al-Kazimiyah, Bab al-Sheik and Fadwat Arab slums and tried to march to the presidential palace. Units of the Republican Guard began firing into the crowds, and when they did not disperse, helicopter gunships began strafing the crowd, causing extremely heavy casualties. Simultaneously, other

troops with helicopters and tanks, assaulted a rioting crowd in Saddam City, a Baghdad suburb of about 1 million, killed hundreds and caused heavy damage. Nevertheless, Shiite rioting against Saddam Hussein continued to escalate in at least five low-income neighborhoods of Baghdad despite a ruthless crackdown by the Republican Guards with the use of helicopter gunships.

Significantly, the Friday sermons in Najaf and Karbala, the Shiites' holiest cities were even more combative. The Believers were urged to escalate the revolt and accept whatever martyrdom and self-sacrificing required in order to rid themselves of the Ba'athist yoke. Baghdad's reaction was swift and effective, with loyalist forces using mustard gas, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery to defeat the uprising. The most brutal reprisals were committed in the Shiite shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, as well as against rebellious crowds in nearby cities. Jawad Maliki of ad-Dawā claimed that the Iraqi forces used mustard gas in Najaf and that casualties from all causes numbered in the hundreds. In a later report, Al-Maliki said that mustard gas was also used against Shiite rioters in al-Haleh, al-Kifil, and Najaf.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish rebellion also escalated in areas near the Iranian border. Dr. Baham Salih of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) reported that Kurdish forces captured the military garrison at al-Salam in Suleimaniyah province, including a number of helicopter gunships. The Kurdish rebels also captured the garrison of nearby Taslooja, including the local missile installation and an ammunition depot.

Saddam Hussein reacted swiftly to the marked surge in rebel activities on Friday, showing every sign that he would fight to retain power. Indeed, there were strong indications that Baghdad was planning a new wave of terror to defeat the popular uprising. Baghdad's major papers reiterated the government's resolve. Al-Tharwa repeated accusations that the revolts were the result of allied plots to destabilize Iraq and avenge their failures. "The aggressors want to sow the seeds of unrest to achieve what they failed to achieve in the war." Al-Qadisiyah declared that there could be no alternative to ruthless suppression of the revolt. "The enemy stooges have explicitly expressed their evil aims, leaving no alternative but to bury the conspiracy and obliterate its elements."

On 9 March, Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin, Gen. Ali Hassan al-Majid, as interior minister to head the campaign to crush the revolt. Known as "the butcher of the Kurds," Majid was the commander of the 1988 campaign against the Kurds in which the Iraqi

military used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians, killing thousands and razing some 3,000 villages to the ground. More recently, Majid was the governor of Kuwait and in charge of the troops that committed the atrocities in that country.

Despite the route of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the war, Saddam Hussein was able to muster a sizable force for the suppression of the revolt. The backbone of that force was at least 300,000 Republican Guards troops with tanks, combat vehicles and heavy artillery, as well as several hundred combat aircraft and helicopters. (Further, Saddam Hussein gave the Republican Guard soldiers a significant pay increase, pardoned their deserters and freed prisoners.) In addition, Hussein also enlisted the aid of an undetermined number of People's Army and Ba'ath Party militia units, as well as a security apparatus of more than 60,000 armed personnel and the support of the million members of the Ba'ath Party who had been armed on the eve of the Persian Gulf war.

In the event, there were only sporadic clashes and riots in the Shiite areas during 9 March. In all likelihood, the population needed the day to recover from the casualties of the day before. In Teheran, Ad-Dawa claimed that the Army's 7th Division, based south of Basra, was led by its commander into joining the anti-Saddam Hussein forces in Basra. Meanwhile, Republican Guard tank and artillery fire set Basra's big petrochemical complex on fire.

However, Kurdish rebels claimed major achievements in the north. They claimed that they captured six cities, including Suleimaniyah. They also took control of the center of the city of Shaqwala and destroyed the security force and police headquarters located there. PUK claimed that large numbers of government troops have defected and joined its ranks, bringing with them helicopter gunships, an ammunition depot and a missile installation.

The most important developments on 10 March were reports of riots, albeit quite sporadic and unorganized, in Sunni towns that had been considered loyal to Saddam Hussein. Of these, the most critical were in Fallujah (with a major chemical weapons complex), and Ramadi; cities with highly select populations. In both cities, as in others, demonstrators shouted anti-Saddam slogans and attacked Ba'ath offices in the center of town. In addition, violence flared anew in Baghdad's predominantly Shiite slums. In Basra, Republican Guard tanks continued shelling rebel-held districts, causing thousands of civilian casualties. Heavy fighting raged all over southern Iraq, primarily between Republican Guard units and Shiite forces comprised

of Islamist militants and army deserters. However, the fighting had not become broader since the night before.

In Kurdistan, the rebellion appeared increasingly well organized and seemed to be escalating. On March 10, the Kurds claimed they were advancing on Kirkuk and its major oil and military installations. In Teheran, Barham Saleh, a senior PUK official, claimed that “large numbers” of Kurdish fighters captured the city of Koisanjaq in Erbil province, as well as the district towns of Agjeler, Kifri, Bazyn, Shamshamal and Hanger. “Our men are now within 20 kilometers of the center of Kirkuk city,” Saleh claimed, and asserted that, “they’ll be there later today.” He also described a spreading collapse of the local Army forces, claiming that “whole battalions [are] coming across to our side.” The Kurds also claimed to have captured “a large number” of helicopter gunships. “Unfortunately we don’t have any pilots to fly them,” Saleh added.

No less important were developments on the political front where statements by key leaders suggested a commitment to a nation-wide escalation of the rebellion. PUK leader Jalal Talabani declared on 9 March that the uprising in Iraq “is not a separatist Kurdish revolution and not an Islamic revolution. It’s a nationalist movement involving everyone in Iraq; Muslims, Kurds, Sunnis and minority groups.” Barham Saleh, another senior PUK official declared on the 10th that, “Saddam’s regime is literally crumbling.” On Teheran radio, an unidentified Iraqi opposition leader stated: “Much of (the) 29 cities and hundreds of towns are out of the hands of the Ba’athists. This is almost three-fourths of Iraq.”

These optimistic declarations, irrespective of their accuracy, are extremely important, for they provide the justification for Teheran’s decision to increase its overt commitment to the revolt in Iraq. On 10 March, President Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned Baghdad that “to continue suppressing the people will only complicate the situation more than before,” alluding to the possibility of further Iranian intervention. Hashemi-Rafsanjani then expressed Teheran’s apprehension that Iraq was sliding into a “civil war” that might lead into its dismemberment by warring factions. “We think it is necessary for the government and all domestic groups in Iraq to cooperate in order to prevent the country from falling to pieces,” Hashemi-Rafsanjani concluded.

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Meanwhile, in spite of their recent experience, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already moving to appease the emerging bloc. Syrian forces will constitute a major component of the new pan-Arab security force to be based in the Persian Gulf, and it is commonly accepted that Iran's legitimate interests will be recognized and taken into consideration in the formulation of a new regional security arrangement in the Persian Gulf. Also, Riyadh and Kuwait are equally reluctant to have a "tame Saddam Hussein" remain in power or to have an Islamist government in Baghdad. Little wonder, therefore, that the Gulf governments decided to accept at face value Iran and Syria's promises to ensure a favorable regime in Iraq.

Indeed, on 8 March, in the Damascus meeting with representatives of the Iraqi opposition coalition, the Saudis accepted the Syrian and Iranian guarantees that there would be no new Khomeini in post-Saddam Iraq. An Iraqi opposition source clarified the Iranian assurances. He explained that Hassan Habibie's meeting with both secular and religious Iraqi opposition figures "proves that Iran has no intentions of establishing an Islamic republic in Iraq... that it respects the will and freedom of the Iraqi people to choose a successor for Saddam."

The Saudi's tacit endorsement of the Syrian-Iranian position is a sharp deviation from the Iraqi policy they and the Kuwaitis had actively pursued, at least until recently, in the past. Both countries have already floated reports in favor of possible alternative leaders, all of whom are associated with the ruling Ba'ath party. The Kuwaitis (for example through the London-based Swat al-Kuwayt al-Duwali on 19 February 1991) identify Sa'dun Hammadi as Saddam Hussein's likely successor and claim that he is already strong and confident enough to argue with Saddam Hussein on matters of politics. Similarly, the Saudi-controlled "Voice of Free Iraq" is touting Salah 'Umar al-'Ali, a former member of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party and former member of the Revolutionary Command Council, as the single most senior and authoritative spokesman for a post-war free Iraq. The Saudis and Kuwaitis, for their part, have suggested that there is a possibility to come to terms with such leaders and a reformed Ba'ath leadership. Indeed, the Saudis are even contemplating the installation in Baghdad of some token representative of the London-based opposition. That notion was clearly stated to the Syrian- and Iranian- supported Iraqi opposition leaders during their recent futile visit to Saudi Arabia and

failed attempts to meet Saudi and Kuwaiti authorities to discuss post-Saddam Iraq.

There should be little doubt that Riyadh and Kuwait know that they are once again actively engaging in appeasement. However, they see no other alternative because they recognize the profundity of the events unfolding inside Iraq. Riyadh and Kuwait know that the majority of the Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation was Islamist, with many Shiites actively involved in the insurrection while the bulk of the Sunni elite escaped into exile with the Al-Sabah royal family. The depth and pervasiveness of the Islamist opposition developed in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis is yet to subside. The social and economic issues raised by the Islamists are legitimate, but the al-Saud royal family is reluctant to address them. Thus, there is a basic fear in both Riyadh and Kuwait that the success of any grass-roots liberation movement in Iraq, especially one with Islamist credentials, will embolden and rejuvenate their own populations to take comparable steps.

However, only a massive use of force has a chance of forcing the rebellious Iraqi population into accepting a Sunni centralized rule in Baghdad. This is because Iraq is an artificial creation of the colonial powers and as such has a heterogeneous population, made up primarily of an oppressed Kurdish minority (22% of the population), itself fractured among dominant tribes and clans, many other sects (Christian and quasi-Muslim that are oppressed and hated by all) and a Shiite majority (+60% of the population) that is economically and socially oppressed and underprivileged in rural areas. There is also a Sunni population that is sharply divided between very poor Sunni tribes and clans in rural areas and small towns (except for the minority surrounding Saddam Hussein who came from an identical background to the poorer Sunnis, but assumed unprecedented riches and powers) and a predominantly Sunni urban elite and intelligentsia. However, this urban stratum has been purged by all of Iraq's dictatorial regimes and most of its elite is in exile.

It is impossible to peacefully solve Iraq's current domestic problems without first addressing the legacy of the internal and regional dynamics that have existed since Iraq's artificial creation by the British in the aftermath of World War I. The Hashemite King Faysal, son of the Sharief Husayn of the Hijaz and brother of King Abdallah of Trans-Jordan (King Hussein's grandfather), was crowned by the British in Baghdad on 23 August 1921 after having been first installed by the British in Damascus and then deposed by the French in 1920 when they took over the Syrian mandate. He was then brought to

Iraq from the Hijaz by the British only on 24 June 1921. Since 1921, and until the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy by young officers in July 1958, the British (later with U.S. assistance) actively prevented the emergence of a genuine national elite and indigenous political leadership in order to prevent any challenge to the Hashemite royalty they had imposed on Iraq. Thus, in July 1958, the radicalized military and security forces constituted the only centralized institution in the country.

The Iraqi radical military-police elite was determined to preserve its dominance and refused any power sharing. Consequently, for a whole generation now, the only political culture prevailing in Iraq has been that of legitimacy and power achieved by force of arms and oppression and exercised by secret police raids, imprisonment and torture. The entire establishment and institution of government has been built around the principle of total servitude to, oppression by, and in the name of, a supreme leader. Therefore, without foreign intervention, the building of internal pressure in Iraq can only cause somebody stronger and more ruthless than Saddam Hussein – More Saddam than Saddam,” according to one Arab commentator – to assassinate Saddam Hussein and establish an even tighter dictatorship.

The so-called Iraqi opposition is fractured and divided into a myriad of mini-groups, the vast majority of which are totally controlled by Syria and Iran. The so-called Westernized groups have little constituency beyond their immediate family members. Those that have widespread popular support are either ethnic separatist, mainly the Kurds, or fundamentalist Shiites that are more anti-Western than Saddam Hussein. For example, Ayatollah Khoi, by far the most senior Shiite leader in Iraq, is considered the source of inspiration by such Shiite notables as Sheik Fadlallah of the HizbAllah. As discussed above, the Shiites and Kurds spearheaded the current popular revolt with active support from Syria and Iran.

Therefore, the royal elites of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states prefer to see Iran and Syria consolidate a bloc that will stabilize the situation in Iraq. Indeed, it appears that only Damascus and Teheran can establish, or impose, a stable centralized government in Baghdad. This is a certainty because Hafiz Assad will have it no other way. Riyadh and Kuwait are convinced that only the Damascus-Teheran bloc can prevent the spillover of a Khomeinist-type popular Islamist revolt into their own oppressed Shiite population. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states are also fully aware of the immense terrorism potential controlled by Syria and Iran. They know

that terrorists can be used to enforce regional realities favorable to the emerging bloc by means of assassinations and the sabotaging of key economic installations. As has been the case for more than a generation, Riyadh and Kuwait are still convinced that they would be able to buy stability by paying off Damascus and Teheran with money and strategic appeasement. Moreover, in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, Riyadh and Kuwait now know that if Teheran and/or Damascus threaten them, the U.S. and the West will rush back and save them by use of force, as they had just done. Since Washington no longer considers Soviet hegemony as a threat, the Persian Gulf states can definitely live with that, especially when Moscow is capable of restraining Damascus, Teheran and Baghdad. This semblance of security and stability would enable the royal families to assure the continuance of their governments.

The new Iranian-Syrian led bloc is already seeking Islamic legitimacy and acceptance by, and support from, the Arab world by reviving the confrontation with Israel. The lowest common denominator throughout the Middle East, in essence the only thing that holds the Arab states together, is their commitment to confrontation with Israel. The most successful and lingering aspect of Saddam Hussein's war appears to have been in his call for the redirection of the pan-Arab struggle against Israel. Moreover, the escalation of an anti-Israeli crisis answers to the main demands of both Syria and Iran from the very beginning of the Gulf crisis. The anticipated confrontation with Israel need not be a major war. A few spectacular acts of terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets, especially if conducted in the West or the U.S., would suffice to gain the acknowledgement and support of the Arab public. Little wonder that it is in the vested interests of both Damascus and Teheran to redirect the anger of the public against Israel and to compel the other Arab states to support the new strategic realities, thus accepting the bloc's dominance.

For the royal elites of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states, the Israeli issue is an instrument for gaining Islamic legitimacy, so crucial for their survival in the face of growing internal problems. Kuwait's policy epitomizes the opportunistic approach to the Israel question. On the one hand, the majority of Kuwaitis currently oppress, arrest, kill and are ready to expel Kuwait's Palestinian residents as a community for actively cooperating with the Iraqi occupation forces. At the very same time, the Emir's government has already expressed its commitment to the Palestinians and has conditioned any compromise with Israel and the establishment of a regional peaceful order on the

implementation of the traditional Arab “perception of the settlement of the Palestinian problem,” a euphemism for the destruction of Israel.

* * *

The overall situation in the Middle East has been radicalized and destabilized in the wake of Operation Desert Storm. Arab and Muslim populations are already reacting to the shock of the Iraqi defeat. The call for avenging tarnished Islamic and/or Arab honor will soon grow significantly with the coming of Ramadhan and the Hajj season, the practice of both of which usually involves intense Muslim emotional agitation and excitement. Indeed, Islamist individuals and organizations have already launched terrorist attacks such as the stabbings of several Israeli women and the attempted infiltration of a handful of terrorists into Israel from Jordan demonstrate. The emergence of the anti-U.S. Islamic bloc led by Syria and Iran, and its acceptance by the conservative Arab states, has already set the radical tone of the post-war Middle East posture. The Government of Egypt, and the royal elites of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states are already confronted with an agitated population demanding Islamic legitimacy and the improvement of their lot.

It is therefore impossible to expect enduring stability and meaningful peace in the Middle East without overwhelming popular support, or at least consent, for the actions and positions of the Arab governments. Peace established on the tips of the bayonets of autocratic regimes or compelled by the financial power of conservative regimes will only become yet another source of enduring instability for these regimes, as well as compound the internal instability and radicalism already growing throughout the Arab world. Therefore, only when the Arab population is stabilized and calmed will it be possible to expect the Arabs to accept the notion of a new regional order and stability.

At the same time, however, it should also be recognized that representative government is a concept alien to Arabs and Islam. A democratic government has never been really practiced in the Arab world. Moreover, most democratic principles, as defined in Western constitutions and laws cannot even be properly expressed in Arabic. There are, however, traditional institutions that enable the legitimate ruler to involve others, who could be elected representatives, in government. It is imperative to convince the Arab rulers and governments that listening to their people, preoccupation with domestic issues, and commitment to the betterment of their lot, will not tarnish

their pride and honor. The key to long-term stability in the Middle East is a liberalization drive throughout the Arab world. Many Arab countries are ripe for transformation and liberalization, especially when such a reform is associated with the return of government powers to the traditional indigenous elites.

Thus, the beginning of a stabilization process of the Arab world is a precondition for the success of any peace process in the Middle East. Arab governments must first make peace with their own citizens before they can contemplate making a meaningful peace with Israel.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representative
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Jordan: The Center of Sunni Islamist Terrorism

April 9, 1991

Amman is currently the most important center of the Sunni Islamist terrorist organizations, popularly known as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The availability of recruits and commanders for the Islamic Jihad that has made Amman so important is the outcome of an indigenous trend, namely, the maturing and radicalization of the Islamist community in Jordan. Significantly, this socio-political process could not have evolved into the establishment of a large-scale and active terrorist safe haven without the full knowledge and active assistance of King Hussein himself.

Indeed, since the summer of 1990, King Hussein has not only allowed, but has encouraged the entire leadership of the most radical Palestinian terrorist organizations to return to Amman as a major component of his efforts to build an aura of pan-Arab militant solidarity with Saddam Hussein and to facilitate the redirection of the Arab struggle toward Israel.

The revival of this terrorist infrastructure in Jordan is taking place some 20 years after the Jordanian Armed Forces, under King Hussein's personal command, conducted a thorough purge of Palestinian terrorists – the 1970 Black September – and then evicted the entire leadership of

the terrorist organizations and their surviving forces from Jordan. With memories of Black September still fresh throughout Jordan, not to mention the militant Palestinian community, nobody in Amman, save the King himself, would have dared to allow the Palestinian terrorists to resume an armed presence in, let alone conduct operations from, Jordan.

However, since the mid-1980s, Jordan's predominantly Palestinian population has been hit hard by a series of economic crises wrought by government mismanagement and the outright corruption of circles directly associated with the Royal Palace. Consequently, many Jordanian and Palestinian youths were driven toward radical Islam and militancy. However, the radicalization of the Islamist community in Jordan, as well as a widespread Islamicization of virtually all segments of the Jordanian population, including the Bedouin tribes of the south, could not have forged these Islamist youths into an effective terrorist apparatus. The popular bitterness was professionally and financially augmented and inflamed by the PLO, and especially Yassir Arafat's own al-Fath, in a campaign begun in 1986 by the late Abu-Jihad.

Thus, since 1989, Islamic Jihad, and all of its factions and sub-organizations, have been the most active terrorist groups inside Israel and the territories. Most of their operations are guided and directed from Jordan. Indeed, it was in Amman that the Beit al-Muqadas faction of Islamic Jihad, under the command of Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi, planned and prepared for the 4 February 1990 attack on the Israeli tourist bus near Ismailia, Egypt. (The organization's military commander, Ibrahim Sarbal, currently operates out of secured installations in Amman.) However, even more important in the long term is the radical religious agitation of Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi. Widely recognized as one of the most senior religious authorities of Jordan, Sheikh Tamimi embarked on a campaign to legitimize and encourage terrorist operations against the U.S. and Israel as a central theme of his call for the rejuvenation of pure Islam in Jordan.

At the same time, other factions of the Islamic Jihad have established their headquarters in Amman. HAMAS, the militant fundamentalist organization that is most active in the West Bank and Gaza, maintains its main military and financial headquarters in Amman. Consequently, in mid-February 1989, HAMAS moved its center of operations from Gaza to the Tul-Karem – Nablus area in order to expedite cooperation and contacts with Jordan.

Furthermore, most Palestinian terrorist organizations with official connections to the PLO, as well as those operating with Iraqi support, opened their forward headquarters in Amman in early-1990. Subsequently, the recruitment of local youth for operations inside Israel was begun immediately by such organizations as al-Fatah's Security Organizations (Arafat's intelligence and special operations), and al-Fatah's Force 17. Also, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine reopened a forward headquarters under the veteran commander Ahmad Dakhil in order to support terrorist intimidation operations inside the territories. The training of terrorists for all these organizations began in refugee camps in Jordan.

Significantly, even before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was increasing its active assistance to several terrorist organizations associated with the PLO (Arafat branch) such as the PLO's Intelligence and Security Apparatus under Abdul Latief Abu Hijlah (Abu-Tariq); the PLO's Special Operations Group under Col. Hawari; the Organization of 15 May under Mohammad Amri (Abu-Ibrahim); the Organization of the Survivors of Hammah (a Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization associated with Islamic Jihad and HAMAS that is conducting operations into both Syria and Israel); and the Palestinian Liberation Front of Mohammad Zaidan Abbas (Abu-Abbas) that also operates under Arafat's control. At Iraq's request, all these organizations were permitted to establish forward headquarters and facilities in Amman and in Palestinian camps in Jordan.

When King Hussein agreed to the return of Palestinian terrorists to Amman, his security services insisted that Palestinian activities be limited to support and coordination of activities inside Israel and Israeli held territories. By February 1990, however, the Jordanians had lost control over the Palestinian terrorists and in due course, armed attacks on Israel from Jordan increased. Moreover, most of the initial skirmishes along the Jordanian border were performed by one or a few Islamist soldiers of the Jordanian Army taking their personal weapons and embarking on personal Jihads against Israel. Despite some half-hearted efforts, the Jordanian Army and the internal security forces largely failed to block this trend.

In the spring of 1990, as the pervasiveness of the Islamist penetration of the Jordanian security system was becoming clear, the commanders of the reorganized Jordanian intelligence services urged a fundamental shift in policy. Consequently, King Hussein and the Jordanian security forces decided to tolerate, and even tacitly encourage, these personal Jihad operations against Israel. Their

objective was to divert the extremist Islamists and militant Palestinians away from political activities in Jordan and into confrontation with Israel. Moreover, Amman was already under pressure from Baghdad to permit Iraqi-supported terrorists to operate from Jordanian territory.

Thus, the repeated clashes on the Israeli border involving Jordanian soldiers and even officers of the internal security forces constitute a milestone in Jordanian politics because they reflect the collapse of the Jordanian security system and the extent of the widespread support for Sheikh Tamimi and his disciples. By now, Sheikh As'aad al-Tamimi has already consolidated himself as the supreme leader of a network of several armed groups affiliated with the cover of Islamic Jihad. The most important organizations are al-Tamimi's own Jihad al-Muqadas, the Jihad al-Mahna under the command of Ahmad Mahna, the Al-Aqsa Brigade under the command of Ibrahim Sarbal, the Islamic Jihad group under the command of Fathi Shiqaqi and Abd al-Aziz, the Islamic Jihad group under Jabar Amaar (who arrived especially from Sudan), as well as several Palestinian Islamic Jihad forces established since 1985 by Arafat and Abu-Jihad.

The Islamists immediately exploited their growing power and influence. In a 23 March 1990 interview, Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi outlined his grand design: "Our objective is to establish Allah's rule on the land and to liberate the occupied holy land from the Jewish usurper so that Jerusalem may become the capital of the promised orthodox caliphate as defined in the provisions." Such an undertaking must be a pan-Arab effort, he explained. "It is a duty to fight Israel in order to destroy it and to establish Allah's rule in its place." It is highly significant that Sheikh Tamimi considers the struggle against Israel as a component of, and the catalyst for, a general campaign aimed at rejuvenating and liberating the entire Arab world. "It has been Palestine's fate to face foreign invasion throughout history, including Crusader occupation and Tatar invasion. Therefore, political meetings are a waste of time. The nation will ultimately resume the fight in the form of jihad," Tamimi concluded.

On 30 March 1990, the Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan called for "abandoning the option of the peaceful solution [in the Middle East], re-embracing the military option, and striking at U.S. interests in the region." The Muslim Brotherhood emphasized the significance of the mobilization of the entire Arab nation [ummah] and their transformation into an armed popular army aimed at expelling "the invaders" from the Middle East. The Brotherhood also called for the dissemination of the slogan: "It is either victorious jihad or

martyrdom.” On 8 April, Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi announced in Amman that he ordered his followers in Israel and elsewhere to take up arms and begin an uncompromising armed struggle.

Soon after its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq began a major effort to organize a large anti-Western terrorist force and launch a unified concentrated terrorist campaign against the U.S. Jordan provided the conditions for a crucial turning point in this effort.

On 15 September 1990, representatives of more than 120 “popular parties and organizations” from all over the Arab world gathered in Amman for a 3-day conference to express their solidarity with Iraq and discuss methods to harm the U.S. The participants included senior commanders of virtually all the radical Palestinian and other Arab terrorist organizations (except for the Egyptians who were arrested a few days beforehand). Among the prominent participants were George Habbash of the PFLP and Nayif Hawatimah of the DFLP. It was the first time they had been allowed into Jordan since September 1970.

King Hussein opened the conference by delivering a fiery speech, urging an all-out campaign against the West in support for Iraq. At the end of the conference, on 18 September, George Habbash announced in Amman: “The PLO will mount a campaign to overthrow the leaders of Arab countries who sent troops to Saudi Arabia if Iraq comes under attack.” He also warned that “in case the United States and its allies commit an aggression against Iraq, our fingers will pull the trigger to open fire on the forces of aggression and enemy targets” wherever they might be.

Thus, the radical Islamist clergy, led by Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi, played a crucial role in establishing and sanctioning Saddam Hussein's Islamic credentials and legitimacy. Starting late-September, Sheikh Tamimi began issuing a series of fatwas [decrees] that the presence of the coalition forces in Saudi Arabia was a crime against Islam. He therefore urged and sanctioned terrorist strikes against the U.S. Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi traveled to Iraq during the fall for meetings with Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials.

On 5 October 1990, Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi stated in Amman that by sending forces to Saudi Arabia, “Bush and Thatcher have revived in the Muslims the spirit of jihad and martyrdom.” He then decreed that, “if war breaks out against Iraq, we will fight a comprehensive war and ruthlessly transfer the battle to the heart of America and Europe.” He stated that Islamic Jihad already had the forces to carry out such strikes.

This was not an idle threat. A delegation of senior Islamist leaders associated with the extremist militant trend of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Yunis al-Tamimi, Sheikh Tamimi's son, and Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, the chief ideologue of the militant Muslim Brotherhood, visited the U.S. in the summer of 1990. They were the leading speakers in the convention of the Islamic Society of North America held in New Jersey between 31 August and 3 September 1990. At the conference, they urged the audience to follow the tenets of the Islamist trend as the only hope for Islam in the 1990s. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad insisted that only terrorist violence is capable of changing society and bringing down hostile regimes, thus saving and preserving Islam. (The assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahana in New York on 5 November 1990 by Al-Sayyid Abdul-Aziz Nossair, an Islamist from New Jersey, demonstrates that militant Islamist radicalism exists in the U.S. and that there is a receptive audience, be it individuals or organized groups, to the violent message of Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood.)

Sheikh Tamimi returned from Baghdad not only committed to the Iraqi-declared Jihad, but also convinced in the Islamic legitimacy of Saddam Hussein's leadership. "For the first and only time in this century, one of our Arab leaders is steadfastly standing to and confronts the enemies of the Arabs – the Americans and the Israelis," al-Tamimi declared in late-November. "Saddam Hussein is the leader of [Islam's] triumph. He is the real Salah ad-Din." Sheikh Tamimi decreed that since Saddam Hussein's return to Islam is genuine, the Islamist community is committed to an all-out support for the Iraqi-led struggle against the U.S. and Israel. He also put all the forces of Islamic Jihad under Iraqi command.

Later, there was a profound escalation in the rhetoric of Sheikh As'ad Biyud al-Tamimi and his Islamic Jihad during November 1990. Sheikh Tamimi stated that the Islamic uprising will continue until "the liberation armies arrive from Iraq to liberate Palestine." He presented the Gulf crisis in terms of a profound struggle between Islam and the infidel West:

The West and Israel want to eradicate Iraq's armed forces and decision independence. They do not come to Saudi [Arabia] for the oil. The oil reaches them from the Gulf states and even Iraq did not declare that it would deny oil from the West. Thus, the West arrived in the region in order to prevent unity and the

publicized spread of independent decision, so that Iraq remains subservient to the Western-Jewish influence. For this reason, we support Iraq, which is a legitimate obligation, and everyone who respects himself cannot accept a different position.

Meanwhile, Sheikh Ibrahim Musarbil, a spokesman for the Islamic Jihad Movement – al-Aqsa Battalions, announced on 26 October in the main camp for the group in al-Rusayfah near Amman, that the movement “decided to use firearms against the Israeli enemy” beginning November 1st. He also praised Saddam Hussein's efforts to liberate Palestine and repeated Sheikh Tamimi's decree that “if the American and Europeans attack Iraq, they will face the same fate they faced in Lebanon at the hands of the movement's men throughout Europe and the United States.”

Leaflets of the Islamic Jihad distributed in the territories hailed the organization's terrorist attacks. Islamic Jihad urged their followers to escalate “the Knife Revolution” and personally stab Jews. In an early-December leaflet, the Islamic Jihad decreed that the murdering of Jews with knives is the climax of the pan-Arab struggle against a conspiracy led by the U.S. stretching from the Gulf to Palestine because every killing proves that “the enemy's military might is incapable of defending the Zionist police from the knives of the Islamic Jihad in the heart of Jerusalem.” The Islamic Jihad concluded that there was no alternative to a marked escalation in the confrontation with Israel because “the surrender solutions with the enemy are but an illusion, and therefore there is not alternative but for the means of the blood and the lead.”

These messages were repeated in several leaflets and sermons distributed during January and February 1991. For example, on 16 January, the Beit al-Muqadas faction of Islamic Jihad distributed a leaflet with a fatwa of Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi that hailed the sacrifices of the Palestinians and decreed that the martyrs of stabbing and other violent attacks on Jews “would be rewarded with entry into Paradise.” Sheikh Tamimi also called on all those cooperating with Israel “to repent and kill the enemies or otherwise they would be killed right next to them.”

Once the magnitude of the Iraqi defeat was becoming clear, the Islamists in Jordan shifted emphasis in their agitation. They now considered the Iraqi defeat at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition as the spark that would ignite a cataclysmic clash between revivalist Islam

and the West, and especially the U.S. On 21 January 1991, Sheikh Nadr al-Tamimi of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad declared that Muslims “are entitled to strike back in the Western countries. This is our reaction to the bombardments.” The next day, Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi anticipated that “many volunteers for suicidal attacks against Western interests will launch their operations shortly” because he had already given them spiritual guidance and issued fatwas encouraging such strikes. Sheikh As'aad al-Tamimi predicted that once confronted with the Islamists' wrath, the U.S. will “face its end in this war against Islam in spite of its strength because Allah is greater and stronger.”

Thus, since the fall of 1990, there has been a continued escalation in attempts of Islamist terrorist detachments to penetrate Israel from Jordan either directly across the border or via Egypt (by crossing the Gulf of Aqaba into the Sinai and attacking from there). These operations are planned, prepared and launched from the bases of Islamic Jihad in Jordan. The Jordanian Armed Forces periodically try to block these terrorist activities as part of their struggle to regain stability and control in their own country. However, the spreading sympathy and support for Sheikh Tamimi and the Islamists among the rank and file of the military and security forces significantly reduces the effectiveness of these efforts. Thus, the Jordanian High Command is often confronted with the dilemma of risking a revolt by a military or a security forces unit if it is pressed too much to engage Islamist terrorist detachments.

In mid-March, the Jordanian security services even attempted to crush the Islamists by raiding Islamist centers including Sheikh Tamimi's house and arresting several militant leaders, including Tamimi's sons. However, the popular outcry was so high, that all were quietly released within days and the operation did not amount to more than a futile symbolic gesture. The reason for this about face is that King Hussein was unwilling to, and incapable of, confronting the Islamists.

At present, Jordan is the world's center of Sunni radical Islamist terrorism. From his base in Amman, Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi provides the (Sunni) Islamic Jihad with authoritative religious-spiritual guidance. His role among the Sunni terrorists is of a magnitude and importance comparable to that of the Shiite Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah in the HizbAllah. Little wonder that a growing number of extremist factions and terrorist groups are flocking to Amman to join the Islamist struggle declared by Sheikh Tamimi. Moreover, many of these groups, such as Islamic Jihad of Fathi Shiqaqi, also closely cooperate with Iran

and Syria. In the fall of 1990, radical Palestinian terrorist organizations followed the Islamists back to Amman. The reopening of terrorist installations and headquarters could not have taken place without a formal and specific authorization by King Hussein himself.

Thus, Jordan is becoming once more an active and leading center of radical international terrorism, this time, Islamist terrorism. Amman's importance in the international terrorist system is growing because of the overall trend of a return to Islam among the youth of the Arab world for whom Islamist radicalism and terrorism is the wave of the future. Thus, while there is an extensive terrorist training infrastructure elsewhere in the Arab world (for example, in Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, etc.), the authoritative Islamist leadership of the Islamic Jihad movement – led by Sheikh As'aad Bayyud al-Tamimi – is based in, and is operating from, Amman.

Whether King Hussein is compelled to tolerate the rise of a terrorist infrastructure in Amman for fear of the toppling of his regime, as some of his supporters in the West claim, or is actually encouraging the rise of Islamist radicalism as the most promising force capable of rejuvenating the pan-Arab struggle and his return to what he sees as his historic reign over Islam's Holy Shrines, as his recent speeches in Arabic clearly suggest, is quite irrelevant. Either way, a radical and vehemently anti-U.S. terrorist infrastructure is functioning in Jordan with little or no interference from the Jordanian security authorities.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Long Fuse: One Year After the Gulf War

July 29, 1991

The Middle East has undergone a major upheaval during the last year. On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded and annexed Kuwait. A huge U.S.-dominated expeditionary force deployed to the Arabian peninsula, and, in January-February 1991, heavily bombed Iraq, and subsequently liberated a still-burning Kuwait. To the West, Saddam Hussein's defeat seems obvious. Unfortunately, that view is too complacent, and it has now become apparent that far from being a crushing blow, Saddam Hussein's recent defeat was nothing more than one spark on a long burning fuse.

In fact, the Gulf Crisis brought to a climax a lingering struggle in the Middle East between an imposed world order (political realities and ideologies based on the predominance of nation-states derived from Judeo-Christian values) and the desire in the Arab world for a return to traditional Arab/Islamic ways (through a fateful confrontation with the West, if need be) as the key to the rejuvenation of the Arab world and the return to Islamic glory and might. In the struggle between conventional political realities ("world order") and radical messianic Islam, the militant Islamist message has prevailed and is on the rise.

Thus, from the Arab point of view, Saddam Hussein won the Gulf War because he challenged and then took on the greatest infidel power(s) on earth and managed to remain in power in Baghdad. Furthermore, he continues to demonstrate defiance and audacity by cheating the infidels on the matter of his weapons of mass destruction. However, because of his failure to unite the Arab/Muslim world, Saddam Hussein has forfeited his claim to the leadership of the rejuvenated Arab world. For the masses, this is Allah's Decree and Saddam Hussein's fate. Therefore, the defeat is not held against him; his intentions were noble and righteous. It was Allah's Will that Saddam Hussein did not realize his manifest destiny in 1990-91. However, from the Arab perspective, the process he invigorated continues.

This is important to note because, although the Gulf Crisis is deemed in the West to have begun with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the real "first shot" was fired by Libya's Muammar Qaddafi back in May 1990. During the Arab Summit in Baghdad, Qaddafi demanded a secret session with the other leaders where he gave an alarming speech on the future course of the Arab world. "We all must, virtually today, establish a joint alliance to stand strong/steadfast against the radical-extremist Islamic groups that are seeking to take over the entire Middle East. They multiply with the speed of lightning," Qaddafi warned. "We are likely to wake up one morning facing the masses raising the slogans whereby 'Islam is the solution to all our economic and social woes,' and demanding that we, the present rulers, evict the arena." In his speech, Qaddafi accurately and insightfully defined the state of the Arab masses even before they were exposed to the crisis of the Gulf War.

In reaction, Saddam Hussein, who had long considered himself the self-appointed leader of the Arab world, moved to legitimize his supreme leadership in the most traditional and time honored Arab way, namely, conquest and the use of overwhelming force. His objective was to organize the reunified Arab world for the inevitable confrontation with the West for global supremacy. Saddam Hussein believed that in launching and leading a crisis involving all Arabs he would have legitimized himself as an Islamic leader in the eyes of the rising masses.

In this context, the occupation and annexation of Kuwait was to be an Iraqi demonstration for the entire Arab world to see of Iraq's control of its own fate, thus legitimizing Iraq's claim to pan-Arab leadership. However, Saddam Hussein ended up challenging the entire civilized world, the predominance of its Judeo-Christian values, and its right and

ability to impose its own version of a world order on others. For these reasons alone, the confrontation with the United States over Kuwait became inevitable. However, Washington reacted virtually only to the military-tactical threat to its vital interests (access to oil under friendly docile regimes) and ignored completely the Islamic/strategic long term implications of Saddam Hussein's grand design, (which focused on the liberation of Islam's Holy Shrines in the Hejaz and Israel), as well as its regional arrangements and their ramifications.

Thus, the Gulf Crisis shattered many old myths in the Arab world without the West ever taking sufficient notice. Most crucially, the myth of Arab unity as represented by nation-state regimes and rulers collapsed. The deployment of over half-a-million foreign troops to the Arabian peninsula as the decisive force in liberating Kuwait was also a traumatic experience for the Arab world. That these drastic steps took place with the blessing of Arab rulers does not mean that the masses realized their importance and/or accepted their Islamic legitimacy.

In fact, it was because the leaders of the Gulf States panicked that they were willing to undertake measures normally considered unacceptable to the region's populace. The unusually draconian population control measures imposed by Arab regimes prevented an all-out popular outcry after the first few weeks of the war, but did not change the fact that anti-Western sentiments remained.

For example, there were riots in eastern Syria with the population demanding to be annexed to Iraq. In countries with a less tight control, (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt), there were genuinely popular pro-Iraq riots and demonstrations. There was an even wider anti-Western sentiment in circles that simultaneously denounced Saddam Hussein. In short, the hostility toward the West prevails and the legitimacy of nominally pro-Western Arab rulers is all the more precarious.

Thus, during the past year, the Arab populace has shifted suddenly and sharply from a euphoria of rejuvenated hope and belief in the honor of the Glorious Arab solution, to the shock and shame of the presence of "Crusader troops" in Arabia. The Arabs were crushed and shamed once more, thus having it confirmed that the infidel-West would not permit an Arab revival. Indeed, Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i summed up the Middle East's view of the legacy of the U.S. role in the Gulf Crisis: "The Americans have cheated themselves in this war. Everybody hates them now."

Seeing the mood of the man in the street was sufficient for the Arab governments to realize their precarious position. Consequently, these

governments are now seeking to maneuver between becoming over-active in a new Jihad and seeking to confirm and reassert their Islamic legitimacy. In this connection, Arab leaders are divided between the activists, that is, those who are determined to exploit the current circumstances in the region to further and realize their own Grand (Divine) Designs, and these who are simply trying to survive by trying to retain as much of the status quo ante bellum as possible. The former have the initiative, leadership, and widespread popular following. The latter are therefore driven to compromise with the former, but in so doing find themselves increasingly isolated in the new regional order.

Chief among those who find themselves increasingly isolated are the conservative Sheiks and Emirs in the Gulf who are trying to short cut their way to the status quo ante bellum through the oppression of minorities and radicals. They are over-confident that the U.S. will rush again to their rescue if things go wrong, and thus they are taking repressive measures that are creating enormous social pressures in the direction of the further radicalization of their populations.

In this context, President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria is the most important and activist Arab leader in the post war Middle East. Assad's grand design is to rule Sham (Greater Syria comprised of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and parts of Jordan, Turkey and Iraq) and dominate the entire Mashriq (the Arab world east of the Suez Canal) in accordance with the traditional aspirations as defined in Ba'ath ideology. While personally a progressive secularist, Assad is fully aware of the power of Islam and is determined to exploit it. He is also fully aware that his Islamic legitimacy, namely the recognition of his Allawite sect as Shi'ite Muslims, is in the hands of the Iranian Mullahs, and this fact alone places Damascus "hand in glove" with Teheran's own ambitions. Moreover, the USSR is putting great pressure on Syria to form a tight alliance with Teheran, and Iran is sweetening this deal with generous subsidies of money and very cheap oil.

Consequently, Assad envisages himself in the center of a complex alliance with Iran in a strategic bloc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indus river, where he rules Sham, shares hegemony in the eastern Mashriq (the Persian Gulf area) with Iran, and plays a supporting role in the eastern reaches of the Syrian-Iranian bloc (Afghanistan & Pakistan). Assad believes that the West would never permit his conquests and is therefore determined to expel the West from the Middle East as a precondition to his empire building.

Further, in the Gulf Crisis, Assad saw what a confrontational and defiant attitude toward the U.S./West and an overly prominent profile

did to Saddam Hussein. He is too shrewd to fall into the same trap. Instead, Assad would like to be accepted in Washington, just like Saddam Hussein was for a time, as a key component to regional stability so that he can concentrate on pursuing his regional aspirations without fear of a sudden clash with the U.S./West, and, if possible, with generous financial assistance from the U.S./West. Toward that end, Assad is determined to endear himself to Washington through symbolic gestures without giving up anything of substance.

Thus, he sent soldiers, the Red Eagles of the Beirut legacy, to Saudi Arabia and once the war ended spread the story that they had been ordered to shoot to miss in order not to kill brethren Arabs. He repeatedly promised to solve the hostage crisis and then got U.S. "permission" to virtually annex Lebanon, but is yet to find even the hostages who are held in a Bekkaa Valley that has been occupied by the Syrian Armed Forces since 1976. He has given positive answers to the U.S. peace proposal, but only after his foreign minister, Faruq Al-Shar, reiterated Syria's commitment to the cause of the Palestinians living "under Israeli occupation" for 24 years (since 1967) and 43 years (since 1948), thus in effect challenging Israel's right to exist. In short, Assad remains committed to "a comprehensive peace for the area," meaning that any bilateral agreement is contingent upon a satisfactory solution of the Palestinian problem, and rejects any possibility for a territorial compromise by the Arabs. "If the Arabs agreed to relinquish territory, it wouldn't mean peace but capitulation," he told The Washington Post on July 28.

In the final analysis, Syria's actions reflect the widespread belief throughout the Arab world about the U.S. role in the post-Crisis Middle East. The Arabs are convinced that the Americans will ultimately, and quite soon, return to America. The Muslim/Arab world will then be left to deal with its own problems, challenges, and struggles. Israel will remain behind as "the regional policeman" on behalf of the U.S./West. Therefore, it is imperative for the Arab leaders not to impede in any way the U.S. withdrawal from the region. Only then will it be possible for Assad, and other aspiring leaders, to unify the Arab-Muslim ranks and lead the Jihad to cleanse the Middle East of the Western/Israeli presence.

Thus, in the summer of 1991, the Arab world seems to be returning to its original objectives and priorities. Saddam Hussein remains in power and is busy killing his own people and building his armed forces anew. Syria is in the midst of a massive rearmament program aimed at establishing Damascus as the region's unchallengeable power so that it

can finally consolidate an alliance to take on Israel. Further, while the world's attention centered on the Persian Gulf, Syria was able to complete its occupation and "de-facto annexation of Lebanon" (except for Israel's security zone), which, claims a Lebanese intellectual, were "only slightly more subtle than the take-over by Iraq of Kuwait." He also pointed out the regional ramifications of the developments in Lebanon: "The peace, engineered from Damascus, was viewed as the West's reward to Syria for its role in the Gulf War alliance." Moreover, since Damascus was able to complete the move while violating several "Red-Lines" agreed upon with the U.S. and Israel (such as the use of air power), Middle East leaders learned that given the right political climate, Washington would look the other way.

In the meantime, the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and other Gulf Emirs and Sheiks are busy imposing strict Islamic laws on their subjects, including a spate of public beheadings in Saudi Arabia, as the primary instrument for reasserting their claim to Islamic legitimacy. (Although it is important to add that there is an increasing and unprecedented division in Saudi Arabia as key Islamic preachers have taken to openly criticizing the al-Saud House on religious and legitimacy issues. The widespread acceptability of, and support for, these opinions are reflected in the leaflets, pamphlets and cassettes advocating Islamist solutions and attacking the royal family that are being distributed in growing numbers all over the Kingdom.)

As for Egypt, she has never been fully integrated into the Mashriq dominated Arab world. (Egypt did not claim to be an Arab country until 1947.) In the late-1980s, Cairo was incapable of deciding on the right course for acceptability and leadership. Its efforts to return to the Arab fold were complicated by the traditional and worsening crisis with the Persian Gulf rulers, which was always based on their ethnic disdain for the Egyptians. Then, in the summer of 1990, Cairo suddenly switched from being a central member of Saddam Hussein's grand design to one of being a leading Arab member of the Allied coalition during the war in order to mend fences with the Sheiks and Emirs.

However, once the war was over, the Sheiks and Emirs demonstrated their disdain and refused to recognize Egypt's strategic posture. Despite the fact that it was perceived by the U.S. as the core of the new security arrangement and peacekeeping forces in the Persian Gulf, Egypt pulled all its forces from the Gulf area in May because of its treatment at the hands of local rulers. Marwan Fouad, an Egyptian journalist, pointed out that Cairo was intentionally embarking on a confrontational strategy: "The decision to pull out has been seen as a

deliberate Egyptian attempt to express displeasure as recent aspects of the Gulf countries' policies, and induce a crisis in relations which would, it was hoped, provoke a reversal in their positions. A definite deterioration in relations has taken place and Arab countries on both sides of the divide are now looking nervously toward Egypt.”

Meanwhile, Assad and Qaddafi are offering, in their own ways, important roles for Egypt in their respective grand designs. Consequently, Egypt is again wavering about its place in the Mashriq dominated Arab world and is contemplating the possibility a return to the Maghreb, as urged by Libya, or a glorious isolation.

* * *

Nevertheless, despite the intense preoccupation with pre-Crisis issues, profound scars and the foundations of a long-term impact do remain in the Middle East as a result of the Persian Gulf War. However, these developments have more to do with means and preconditions for pursuing age-old aspirations and policies than with a fundamental change. Similarly, as has already been stated, all rulers are striving to cope with the rise of Islam as an activist political force by modifying their policies, both internal and external, to fit Islamists' goals. These realities create the peculiar conditions that facilitate the current strategic military developments in the Middle East.

Thus, for example, the Gulf Crisis brought the “culture” of the ballistic missile and the weapons of mass destruction to a new height. Once Saddam Hussein introduced the ballistic missile as the primary manifestation of his resolve to reach Israel, hitting the civilian rear, and his defiance of the U.S., by firing at Saudi Arabia, the missile became a status symbol and a measure of the regional importance of rulers.

The profound development of the missile culture is that it is no longer enough to have ballistic missiles. “Ownership” can be proven only by launch in combat. A state must use its missiles in order to prove strategic capabilities. This development not only increases the risk of large-scale use of SSMs in a future war, but also has driven the region's countries into an unprecedented procurement effort.

Ironically, Saudi Arabia introduced the precedent that the launching of ballistic missiles is a vital expression of strategic importance and no longer just the action of a pariah state. As Operation Desert Shield was rapidly advancing toward becoming Desert Storm, the Saudi king and defense minister decided that it was imperative for

Saudi Arabia to have unilateral strategic capabilities to demonstrate their independence from the West.

Advance preparations began during the first days of 1991 and, on January 9th, 35 Chinese military experts arrived in Riyadh on a special aircraft to activate the Saudi DF-3As (CSS-2s) and prepare them for launch. After the first 4 Iraqi Al-Husseins fell in the Riyadh area on 21 January 1991 just after midnight (the night of 20/21 January), the King decreed that Saudi Arabia must retaliate in kind and launch missiles in response. Such launches were deemed necessary by the Saudi royal family in order to preserve its honor. Soon afterwards 3 DF-3As (CSS-2s) with HE warheads were launched by the Chinese teams (officially with the help of the Chinese) from a base 50 kms north-west of Riyadh toward Iraqi oil refinery targets in great secrecy. Originally, the Saudis wanted to launch "non-conventional warheads" (chemical and possibly even ABO) but were discouraged from doing so. Thus, little or no damage was done, but the Royal honor was restored, and a dangerous precedent was set.

Soon after the war, other countries all over the Middle East began rushing to acquire SSMs and to demonstrate comparable capabilities. Even Sudan deployed SCUD launchers in 8 sites in northeastern Sudan "for defensive purposes." These SCUDs were taken from the Iraqi deployment during the Gulf Crisis.

However, the emphasis is shifting to self-production even though SSMs are currently readily available from the PRC and DPRK. Even Egypt has embarked on a crash program to begin the production of an upgraded SCUD-derivative within 2-4 months with technical assistance from such diverse sources as Britain and North Korea. Meanwhile, both the PRC and the DPRK are determined to continue exporting missiles and in May, the PRC transferred 10 advance model SCUD follow-ups to the DPRK for self-production so that export can continue even if the U.S. compels Beijing to reduce missile delivery.

Nevertheless, potential clients are apprehensive about Beijing's inability to deliver SSMs and have opted for substitutes or fall back positions. Even Pakistan, which enjoys intimate strategic-nuclear cooperation with the PRC, intensified its cooperation with Iran on a substitute for the M-11 just in case Beijing was incapable of exporting more of them. Similarly, Iran embarked on a large-scale production of SCUDs and their derivatives based on up-graded SCUD C and SCUD follow-up technology received from North Korea and the PRC. A new major production line in Isphahan began producing in early-February 1991 what Teheran called "long-range missiles with high-destructive

power.” Iran tested two SCUD Cs in mid-May 1991 from the Qom area eastward.

The true significance of the Iranian SCUD project can be deduced from the massive SSM acquisition by Syria. As Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began pouring billions of dollars into financing Syria's “contribution” to the coalition, Damascus immediately embarked on a massive weapons acquisition spree (that is discussed below) including the procurement of ballistic missiles – M-9s from the PRC, and some 150 SCUD Cs and a few SCUD-follow-ups from the DPRK. The first 24 SCUD Cs and 20 mobile launchers were shipped in March via Cyprus to Latakia, and by June Syria received a total of some 100 SCUD Cs. The M-9s are also shipped to Syria via Cyprus since June.

Additionally, a Syrian deal with North Korea is revealing as to Syria's long-term planning. The Syrians have a very long operational experience with Soviet SCUDs, having purchased several hundred missiles for their 18 mobile launchers. Damascus then knows very well the required missile-to-launcher ratios. The deal with the DPRK has too few missiles per launcher. Therefore, the North Korean deal means that Damascus intends to augment its SCUD arsenal (reloads) with additional missiles from another source, most likely a source that does not require hard currency, namely, the Iranian production line.

In addition to the missile race, the entire Middle East has embarked on a massive military build-up with emphasis on combat aircraft. Most significant is the Iranian-Syrian effort because it is clearly offensive oriented and aimed at consolidating the military predominance of the regional bloc they are establishing. Syria remains committed to attaining strategic parity (superiority) with Israel. Iran is determined to return to the status of a regional superpower. Both countries remain committed to Soviet-made and Soviet-style weapons because of their low maintenance requirements.

In addition to the SSMs mentioned above, Syria bought from the USSR 49 MiG-29s, 24 Su-24s, 300 T-72s/T-74s, several SA-11 and SA-13 batteries, SA-16s, and modern ballistic missiles (most likely SS-21s). There are discussions with Moscow on additional new SAMs and interceptors (most likely MiG-31s). Syria also has purchased more than 500 tanks from Czechoslovakia, 300 of them new T-72s and the rest used T-62s.

Significantly, Iran is also engaged in a massive arms procurement effort. In the last year, it has received some 40-50 MiG-29s, SA-6 and SA-5 SAM batteries, and other types of advance missiles from the USSR. Gen. Mansour Sattari, the commander of the Iranian Air Force,

visited Moscow in mid-July 1991 to discuss new major arms deals and increased cooperation with the USSR in building Iran's air force and air defense. Sattari declared that, "Iran will use Soviet-made aircraft in order to boost its defense potential." Subsequently, the USSR agreed to supply a large number of quality aircraft, including additional MiG-29s, new MiG-31s, Su-24s, and what the Iranians call "supersonic Tupolev bombers and reconnaissance aircraft." Soviet and North Korean experts and technicians are also involved in servicing the 91 Iraqi Soviet-made combat aircraft that fled to Iran during the war: 24 Su-24s; 40 Su-22s; 4 Su-20s; 7 Su-25s; 4 MiG-23BNs; 7 MiG-23MLs; 1 MiG-23U; 4 MiG-29s. Reportedly, at least 85 of them are in good shape.

In addition, Iran has 33 ex-Iraqi transport aircraft: 18 are western transports compatible with the Iran Air/Air Force fleets and 15 are Soviet-made Il-76Ts military transports. Meanwhile, Iran continues to cooperate closely with Pakistan in the refurbishment of the 24 Mirage F-1s. Iran also purchased over 1,000 tanks from Eastern Europe, most of them brand new T-72s.

Also of great importance is the possibility of a marked escalation of anti-Western international terrorism that still looms large despite, or actually because of, the inability of various terrorist organizations to launch the massive campaign they and Saddam Hussein promised as part of the Arab reaction to the Gulf Crisis. The West prevented some of the escalation by a massive expulsion and containment of possible perpetrators. Moreover, Arafat's PLO and the Iraqi-controlled elements were torn from within by a struggle of mistrust and lust for power that led, in the wake of Abu-Iyad's assassination (purge), to a near paralysis as Operation Desert Storm was escalating. However, the most important reason was that Iran and Syria reneged on their deal with Saddam Hussein and actively prevented their terrorists from supporting the Iraqi cause. Since the international terrorist system controlled by Iran and Syria is the best organized and most capable in the industrialized West, there was not much the Iraqis could do once they were denied access to this infrastructure.

Ironically, the Iraqi military defeat, and the ensuing quest for revenge by both Arafat and Saddam Hussein, rejuvenated the Palestinian-Iraqi preparations for an escalation of the terrorist campaign. A clear indication of this came in mid-April 1991 when Arafat ordered the transfer of the majority of the PLO's fighters from Tunisia to the Sara camp in Libya, some 1,000 kms from Tripoli, for intensive training. The terrorists' families were not permitted to join them in Sara so as not to distract them from their arduous training.

Having been identified as one of the prominent sponsors of international terrorism, and on a campaign to establish a new “moderate” image, Syria's Hafiz al-Assad found an ingenious way to revive international terrorism under his control, yet in a deniable manner. Toward this end, Syria has intensified its efforts to take over the PLO from within, leaving Assad's nemesis Arafat as a token head so that future terrorist operations will be attributed to the PLO and not to Syria. Arafat has gone along with the plan if only because the alternative is a purge. Indeed, since the spring, Syria and its supporters have held several meetings in Damascus with high-level representatives of Arafat's PLO in an attempt to restore unity. Faruq Qaddumi, himself a former member of the Syrian Ba'ath Party, visited Damascus in May on behalf of Arafat to “negotiate” under what conditions (policies) Assad would tolerate Arafat's continued “leadership” of the PLO.

Qaddumi also met with Ahmad Jibril and the PFLP-GC leadership, who are tightly controlled by Syria and Iran, to discuss closer operational cooperation. Damascus added some “incentives” by unleashing the Lebanese forces on the PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon, resulting in the destruction of PLO forces and assets, including their main command room, the confiscation of their weapons, and the incarceration of many commanders. These actions stand in sharp contrast with the treatment of the pro-Syrian and HizbAllah terrorists in the area. They were simply moved to new camps in the Bekkaa with all their weapons.

By June, there were strong indications that the arrangement was working and that the PLO was on the verge of escalating international terrorism. In mid-June, Hakam Bal'awi, the head of Arafat's office in Tunis, chaired a meeting in Tunis of senior commanders of al-Fatah, the Fatah – Revolutionary Council (Abu-Nidal's Organization), and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, most of whom “have led and carried out several terrorist operations in Arab and Western capitals.” “On Arafat's personal orders, they decided that the return to terrorism and violence was unavoidable in order to draw the world's attention to the PLO again,” explained Sawt al-Kuwayt al-Duwali. They also discussed the expansion of specialized terrorist training toward the launch of the campaign.

Soon afterward, George Habbash, an Assad loyalist who maintained close relations with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Crisis, held meetings with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad to discuss the emerging course of the terrorist struggle. Subsequently, Saddam Hussein held meetings with other terrorist leaders that have camps and

assets in Iraq and promised Iraq's support for their renewed operations. These negotiations culminated in a secret agreement between Saddam Hussein and Yassir Arafat to transfer some 10,000 PLO fighters to Iraq in order to bolster a "special force" formed by Iraqi intelligence in the Ramadi camp near Baghdad and which already includes the "special guards" commando of the Iraqi Republican Guards as well as Palestinian, Yemeni, Sudanese, Jordanian, and other Arab terrorists.

The next major phase in the consolidation of the terrorist front took place in the first week of July in Rifa't al-Assad's villa in Marbala, Spain. Abdul Sallam Jallud, Libya's number 2 man, secretly arrived in Marbala for discussions with Syrian officials. Libya was assured of the impending escalation of the armed [terrorist] struggle and that the suppression of the PLO in Lebanon should in no way be interpreted as a threat to international terrorism from Lebanon. The Syrians and the Libyans then discussed Libya's role in, and contribution to, the new phase in international terrorism. On July 14, Libya announced that the preoccupation of the U.S. and the West with the Iraqi nuclear weapons "is a premeditated aggressive action not only against Iraq, but also against the whole Arab nation, aimed at bringing it to its knees, and subjugating and humiliating it." Tripoli had a clear solution to this challenge:

Facing these facts, and in the shadow of the absence of the strategic balance between the Arabs and their enemies, and of the lack of international credibility, the Arabs now have no alternative but to launch a popular war against the foreign forces occupying the Arab land in order to preserve their dignity, restore their rights, and be worthy of occupying their place on earth under the sun.

On July 19, Qaddafi repeated his call to arms, explaining that, "the Arabs have nothing left but to wage a popular war to confront this conspiracy being hatched against this nation. The Arabs have no choice but unity to confront the U.S.-Zionist attempt to corner Iraq and humiliate the Arabs."

Meanwhile, the PLO has also escalated the terrorist warnings. In early-July, Muhammad Milhim of the PLO Executive Committee issued a statement to *Sawt al-Sha'b* in which he warned "the United States and the European countries" that unless a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem acceptable to the PLO is found, "the

next year would be a black one.” He emphasized that in “giving peace a final chance,” the PLO insists on a full and sole representation of the Palestinians. Milhim stated that if these conditions were not met immediately, “a new action strategy will be adopted [by the PLO] based on the military option for as long as the Zionist enemy continues to occupy our land.”

As if to reflect this, after a spate of terrorist strikes during the Gulf War, there was a lull. Recently, however, international terrorism has revived. On 19 April, a powerful bomb exploded in the hands of a would-be Palestinian terrorist in Patra, Greece, killing 6 bystanders and wounding dozens. The terrorists planned to blow up the British consulate. Police found a large cache in Salonika. Although the PLO representative in Athens promised to assist the Greek authorities to solve the case and hinted to the responsibility of Abu-Nidal, it was soon discovered that the perpetrators were members of an Islamic Jihad faction affiliated with the PLO itself.

On 3 July, Syria signaled to Israel its control over terrorism by sending a Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine squad to ambush soldiers near the Israeli Defense Force Hermon stronghold, causing 1 fatality. The significance of this DFLP ambush is that the perpetrators came from, and withdrew to, Syria in a path passing through several Syrian military dispositions. Thus, the DFLP could not have conducted this operation without direct support from the Syrian Armed Forces. Damascus thus delivered a clear message that an escalation of terrorism from the Syrian border is always possible given the right political circumstances, and that the key to such an escalation is in Assad's hands.

The PLO's escalation of active international terrorism is all the more threatening because it has acquired proven chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Already in 1987, as part of its support for the development of highly lethal sabotage capabilities, Iraq provided the PLO with chemical weapons. Muhammad Ahmad al-Natur (Abu-Tayyib), the commander of the PLO's Force 17, disclosed that his forces had acquired chemical weapons. “The chemical weapons are necessary for the war we are waging and we won't hesitate to use them in future battles in the appropriate way and time against military installations of our enemy,” Abu-al-Tayyib warned.

Similarly, Iraqi forces and terrorists received training in East Germany until the summer of 1990. A former trainer in a camp near Koenigs Wusterhausen, some 25 miles from Berlin, provided details about courses given to Iraqi terrorists. Chemical and biological warfare

played a “decisive role” in the training. The Iraqis received “knowledge about combat agents that cause nerve damage,” as well as other types of gases (Mustard and Sarin) and “super poisons.” The terrorists were also taught the use of “bacteriological combat agents” (hepatitis, pneumonia, anthrax viruses, etc.) The trainer explained that the terrorists were taught how to use these diseases for “the contamination of wells, cache basins, and rivers, or the poisoning of entire areas.” German security authorities who examined the courses given in this camp alone concluded that “the [Iraqi] terrorist cadres want to carry out as big a massacre as possible.”

Neither the Gulf Crisis nor the reunification of Germany put an end to the chemical and biological training provided to Iraqi and Iraqi-controlled terrorists. In August 1990, Abu-Nidal's Fatah – Revolutionary Council (FRC) resumed operating from Iraq after special arrangements were made by Saddam Hussein's son Uday. The FRC terrorists are located in two camps in the Ramadi district west of Baghdad. Preparations for highly specialized operations started soon afterward in Abu-Ali, 125 km from Baghdad. There, Abu-Nidal's men and Iraqi special forces train in chemical and biological terrorism under the direction of (ex-East) German experts.

In the fall, Al-Fatah increased the transfer of “special” terrorists [al-Fatah definition] from camps in Lebanon to Iraq where they were assigned to the command of Force 17. These forces joined the Iraqi-controlled “special force.” Palestinian sources claimed that these were “volunteers ready to carry out suicide missions against foreign forces stationed in Saudi Arabia.” Discussing the new Iraq-based units of Force 17, Abu al-Tayyib repeated that his forces “will not hesitate to use” the chemical weapons they had recently received.

Thus, the recent threats of the PLO, especially al-Fatah (including Force 17) and the FRC, to escalate the armed struggle, including international terrorism in revenge for the destruction of Iraq by the U.S. and West, the mistreatment of Palestinians by the Gulf rulers and Israel, almost invite an act of shocking violence in order to redirect world attention to the Palestinian cause as seen by the terrorists. Moreover, for Assad, such carnage would serve several objectives simultaneously. Not only will it punish the hated U.S./West without any blame for him, but it would discredit his enemies – Saddam Hussein and Yassir Arafat – worldwide, thus, expediting his taking over their domains.

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In short, the Arab world, yearning for miracles and revenge, is ready and eager for the most radical solutions. However, at the same time and in quite a contradiction with these dominant sentiments, there is also a widespread reluctance to undertake overly drastic steps toward “an Islamic solution” for fear of the Crusaders' retribution. In this context, militant Islam has found the way to bridge the gap between dreams and realism.

Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and related movements, have learned to operate within the national system. The Ikhwan joined the political process wherever the regimes permitted the slightest political freedoms. Within months, they became the dominant populist force in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan, winning decisively all the elections they took part in (from the parliamentary elections in Jordan, to local elections, to elections in union, commercial and student bodies, etc.). Moreover, as the widespread street fighting and riots in Algeria and Jordan aptly demonstrate, the Islamist masses now demand their share in power and in the national establishment. Instead of directly confronting and destroying the existing government structure, as was done in Iran in 1979, the Islamists are now committed to taking over the government from within and only then will they convert it in accordance with their grand designs. Wherever there is a little freedom of speech and thought, the most “westernized” and “progressive” societies are returning to strict radical Islam.

This can be seen, for example, in the Turkish government, which is increasingly worried about the “reappearance of religion as a force to be reckoned with in Modern Turkey.” The Islamist problem is compounded, as the quarter-of-million graduates of the religious high schools, revived in the 1980s to counter Khomeyni's influence, now constitute the majority of students in universities. Meanwhile, there is a growing attendance in religious schools as the Turkish Islamists have learned to work within the system.

In order to be more acceptable, they call their “legitimate” party Refah, which means Welfare. They present their Islamic solution, in the words of Abdur Rahman Dilipak, a key Refah ideologist, as a “utopian democracy within which all, including Americans, can live according to their own laws.”

Meanwhile, militant Islamists increase their terrorist activities, thus pushing the bulk of the Turks leaning toward Islam into the Refah bloc,

and at the same time, legitimizing it as a “moderate” alternative to the local HizbAllah.

Similarly, in Israel and the territories, where the Arab population enjoys freedoms uncommon in most Arab countries, there is a surge in radical Islam, emerging as the dominant political force. In the territories, where Arabs enjoy almost complete freedom of speech and opinion, there is a clear trend toward militant Islamism. The PLO has long been dejected, even with the political “hopes,” the money sent in, and the intimidation by the PLO's thugs (“the masked ones”) who had been escalating their campaign of terror (mainly horrendous fratricidal killings) as a last resort to avoid the population's complete rejection of the PLO.

* * *

Thus, Syria and Iran have stepped into this traumatized Arab world, yearning for an Islamic miracle and for revenge against the West, with a set of proven credentials and confidence in their working solutions. Teheran, Damascus, and their protégés see in the upheaval in the Muslim world a golden opportunity to redirect the existing and building frustration and hostility into an anti-Western struggle leading to “a new Muslim world order” under their hegemony. The masses are willing to accept them because their steadfastness and hostility toward the Great Satan are well recorded and proven. Through terrorism, they hit the West at its rear and compelled the U.S. to change its Lebanese policy. On the state level, both countries are now acquiring the means to reach the strategic parity and military capabilities Saddam Hussein could not have realized, and all these steps are being taken within the context of a vision of a new Muslim World Order.

HizbAllah leader Sheik Hussayn al-Mussawi explained this concept in late-December 1990:

We hope that the Islamic Republic [of Iran] with the cooperation of Syria and Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine, as well as all Muslims throughout the world, will be able to establish an Islamic world order. This can prevent the U.S. from imposing its power and order on Muslims. In this regard we hope that all Muslims cooperate with Iran, because Imam Khomeyni's path is still continuing. This path is being continued by the leader of the Islamic Revolution

Ayatollah Khamenei. We hope the Muslims will be able to stand up against their enemies.

Iran aspires to realize the new Muslim world order by mobilizing the masses toward a common noble cause with as little (overt) direct challenge to existing regimes as possible. In early-June, Khamenei explained that the process is irreversible. He urged prudence because the process is so fateful. Khamenei pointed out that “looking at the world one feels that the great Islamic movement is growing bigger and stronger everyday. Time is on the side of the Islamic and spiritual values. The world Muslims have awakened and are awakening – whether the arrogant and bullies want it or not, whether America likes it or not. This is a reality that is happening.”

However, Khamenei warned of overconfidence. “Now that the movement is progressing toward the glory and awakening of the Muslims, no doubt the enemies are lying in ambush along the way.” The greatest threat is attempts by imperialist regimes to foster “disunity among Muslims, discord between various Islamic tribes and sects, rifts between Muslim peoples.” Governments are being manipulated into fighting each other and oppressing segments of their population. “Our immediate aim, our great step, is to create unity among Islamic tribes and sects and Muslim groups,” Khamenei explained. “And if the Muslims are wise, have self-esteem, and believe in the glory of Islam and their own strength, no doubt this movement will attain its goals.” Little wonder, therefore, that the Iranian-Syrian message of Islamic unity and confrontational approach is so appealing and tempting to both governments and the masses.

Paradoxically, it is the almost desperate attempt of the Arabian Peninsula's ruling families to disengage from the Arab political turmoil and the Syrian quest for leadership of the Mashriq by concentrating on their own self-preservation that has allowed Iran to consolidate its posture as the Persian Gulf's hegemonic power. Marwan Fouad observed that the most prevailing socio-political process in the Middle East is “the broad divisions separating the Gulf countries from the rest of the Arab world.” As the rulers' self-imposed isolation and their fears of the outcome of the alienation of radical regimes are growing, Teheran projects an image of self-confidence. Indeed, observed an Arab journalist, the only sure development is that “Teheran certainly wants to reassert itself as a leading power in the region now that Iraq has been neutralized as a military power in the region.”

These new realities are most evident in Saudi Arabia. After killing more than a thousand pilgrims to prevent the Shi'ite-style politicization of the Hajj, Riyadh suddenly accepted all of Teheran's conditions, including the dispatch of a 115,000 Iranian pilgrims, and renewed diplomatic relations Iran. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, went to Teheran to negotiate the Hajj conditions, the restoration of diplomatic relations, and even invited Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Riyadh. Nevertheless, the seemingly forthcoming Iranians could not resist challenging the Saudi legitimacy all the same, referring to the Saudi as Mr. Saud al-Faisal, thus not accepting the legitimacy of his family credentials, that is, of the entire House of al-Saud.

Nevertheless, the warming Saudi-Iranian relations are having an important effect on the entire Muslim world because they are interpreted, and rightly so, as a Saudi concession to the Iranian demands concerning the Islamic legitimacy of the rules of Hajj set by the Saudis. With the house of al-Saud deriving its legitimacy and authority as the Servants of the Two Holy Shrines (Mecca and Medina), any concession concerning the Hajj, especially one so fundamental and important as the compromise with the Shi'ites, significantly damages their own standing and legitimacy.

There are also far reaching strategic and political ramifications to the Iranian presence and practicing in the Hajj, which reflect Riyadh's lack of self-confidence. With the U.S. forces not even out of the region, the Saudis permitted the Iranian pilgrims to denounce "the United States and its clients" in the Hajj. Ayatollah Muhammad Reyshahri, the former head of SAVAMA, hailed Iran's victory in the Hajj, and explained that, "as far as we see it, this year's Hajj will be performed in the same manner as previously announced by Imam Khomeyni. Support for the oppressed masses and outcries of 'Death to the U.S.' and 'Death to Israel' will continue to be the guidelines."

This bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, coupled with the hopes and visions of an Islamic bloc represented by Syria and Iran reverberates in the ears of the Arab public. Already there is a popular disengagement from non-Islamic political process. As indicated above, some Islamist parties are trying to take over the governments from within by taking part in the political process. However, once this trend is blocked by "moderate," "progressive," or "secular" ideologies and power structure, there is an immediate popular disengagement and withdrawal until an Islamist revolution is possible.

Similarly, when the U.S./West closely identifies with an Arab leader, they further alienate the masses by attaching to that leader the stigma of an apostate. For example, Marwan Fouad warns of too great a reliance on President Mubarak and the political process he runs because of Mubarak's isolation from the Egyptian man in the street. "Egypt's political parties have little grass-roots support and do not adequately represent the wishes of the people," he observed. Ultimately, the Arab public will revolt, demanding the Islamic solution they believe in. Even Khaled Maena, the editor of the Saudi Government's Arab News, is openly aware of the emerging threat. He contrasted the current and future popular threats by explaining that, "right now the pot is bubbling, not [yet] boiling."

Into this Middle Eastern powder-keg of traumatized masses seeking a utopian Islamic solution and a divine confrontation, while their rulers are preoccupied with their own self-preservation and retaining their Islamic legitimacy, the U.S. has thrown in a burning torch in the form of the peace making campaign. In the countries where there is a semblance of free speech in the political arena, there is a determined opposition to the process. On 22 July, the Jordanian Parliament, dominated by Islamists, issued a formal statement strongly condemning the entire peace process and especially the U.S. role in instigating it. The Jordanian Parliament warned that the U.S.-led policy is treachery that "would enhance Israel's occupation of Palestine and bring to an end its enmity with surrounding Arab states" thus complicating the mobilization of the Arab world toward the ultimate destruction of Israel.

Nevertheless, the Arab regimes have to go along with the U.S. plan. All the Arab governments involved agreed to participate in the conference proposed by Secretary Baker because of overwhelming considerations concerning their bilateral relations with the U.S., and not because they suddenly saw the light and decided to make peace. Consequently, Arab leaders are now desperately trying to maneuver between near-term objectives vis-à-vis Washington and the ever-present anger of their publics and the ensuing danger of an Islamic revolution as was predicted by Qaddafi in May 1991. Significantly, one year later in May 1991, Nassir Nashashibi, a Palestinian and one of the most sophisticated elder-statesmen of the Arab world, highlighted this duality in the Arab leaders' approach to the peace process, emphasizing the ultimate triumph of the Islamist masses:

Can Assad afford a peace arrangement with Israel? To my estimation – yes, in the near term, and no with a capital 'N' in the further future. What do I mean? Peace between Israel and Syria, if attained, will be able to hold only for a brief period. I am willing to bet that the peace with Egypt will not be able to hold beyond the next five to ten years. The warning lights are already blinking: There is no real normalization. There are foci of objection/resistance. Peace will end in the wake of a massive uprising of the reactionaries, that will incite the masses to pour into the streets, burn public buildings, empty the weapon storages.

In a sharp contrast with these threats, the bloc dominated by Iran and Syria offers salvation for both governments and the masses. For the governments, the massive procurement of quality strategic weapons, as well as of technology for weapons of mass destruction, with the active support of the USSR, PRC and DPRK, makes the bloc a tempting shelter against the possible wrath of a United States government angered by states that break away from the peace process. Furthermore, both Iran and the supporting powers see in the Iranian-Syrian initiative the possible beginning of a drive for an anti-U.S. world order throughout the entire Third World.

For example, in early July, Ayatollah Khamenei and the visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng discussed “the establishment of the new order in international relations.” Khamenei explained the counter-strategy Iran and the PRC agreed on: “What America calls the new world order is harmful to nations and advantageous to America's absolute hegemony. Therefore, Third World countries, particularly those in sensitive areas, should establish more contacts with each other.” Li Peng defined his visit as “a turning point” in the PRC's strategic posture.

Similarly, returning from a mid-July visit to Pakistan where he began implementing the strategic agreements with Pakistan and the PRC, IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai explained that Teheran sees itself as the center of the rejuvenation of a unified Muslim world. “Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the upholder of the banner of unity the world over. Iran is a major Islamic country which can help unite the Islamic world.” Rezai emphasized that the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis has created new regional posture whereupon “under the

present sensitive conditions, a state of unity must emerge among Muslim countries.”

For the region's governments, the development and improvement of the international terrorist movement, not only more lethal and professional than ever before, but also more tightly controlled by Iran and Syria, constitutes both a hope for revenge against the U.S. and a credible threat to regimes that refuse to cooperate with it. Meanwhile, Khomeyni's legacy is ever inspiring for the masses and therefore Iran's Islamic legitimacy is unchallengeable. Thus, when the masses break the existing order and/or the Arab regimes realize the public's yearnings and follow their lead to avoid open confrontation with their citizens, they will be seeking leadership for the up-coming Jihad. Only the Iranian-Syrian bloc will be able to provide that leadership.

Although the Islamic-revolutionary bloc led by Iran and Syria seems to have emerged from the ashes of the Gulf War, its roots actually pre-date the war. Even Saddam Hussein contemplated this option in early-1991 once he had decided to absorb the U.S. first strike and remain on the defensive. Baghdad believed that the combination of an American threat to the Shi'ite Holy Shrines in Najaf and Qarbalah, and a call for a Shi'ite-dominated Jihad against the Great Satan, for the destruction of Israel, and the restoration of a Khomeyni-style traditional Islamic rule over the Holy Shrines in Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina will be impossible for Teheran and Damascus to ignore.

Such a grand design was built on the strategic arrangements reached between Baghdad and Teheran (then speaking also for Damascus) in July and November 1990. Both Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Assad supported wholeheartedly this grand design. All indications from the Arab world pointed to massive popular support for any pan-Arab/pan-Islamic uprising. However, both Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Assad saw no reason why a Takriti Sunni, that is Saddam Hussein, should lead and dominate such a Jihad. Therefore, they stayed out of the war, but only after Teheran had convinced Baghdad to deploy to Iran many of Iraq's strategic reserves, such as the aircraft, tanks and artillery, which are now being used by the Iranians.

Thus, the grand design presented by Baghdad was not new in Teheran. Ayatollah Khomeyni originally conceived it in late-1981/early-1982. Khomeyni believed that the Islamic Revolution would be both secure and capable of exporting its Islamist ideology only if Iran constituted the core of a regional bloc. Former Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr explained that Khomeyni was contemplating “an 'Islamic belt in the Middle East,' a group of Shi'ite

countries under his heel that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

Therefore, it is an ironic twist that, at present, the only lasting effect of Saddam Hussein's daring strategic gambit, the U.S. military reaction and subsequent peace making efforts, has been the near realization of Khomeyni's original Grand Design for the Middle East – and the fuse continues to burn.

Yossef Bodansky
James E. Geoffrey II
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Israel and the Paradox of the American Peace Initiative

July 29, 1991

In the wake of the Gulf Crisis, the U.S. has geared its efforts to promoting a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict by initiating an international peace conference with subsequent bilateral negotiations. Ironically, this plan, far from stabilizing the Middle East situation, runs the risk of upsetting the current balance of power, and in so doing may make war more, rather than less likely. In this connection, it is America's ally Israel that is being uniquely threatened by the American effort to bring peace.

Paradoxically, it was Saddam Hussein who originally introduced the "linkage" between the Palestinian problem and his occupation of Kuwait. Although the U.S. rejected such linkage during the war, there has since been an on-going U.S. emphasis on a "historic window of opportunity" created by the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. Thus, the Bush Administration's current emphasis on the peace process has had the unintended effect of confirming to the Arabs the correctness of Saddam Hussein's original approach, and has therefore suggested to them the existence of an at least residual Iraqi victory on an issue symbolically important to all Arabs.

In this context, it is important to remember that Arab leaders examine the peace process within the context of their overall situation. All involved agreed to participate in the conference proposed by the U.S. not because they suddenly decided to recognize Israel's right to exist, but because of overwhelming considerations concerning their bilateral relations with the U.S., primarily the need for economic assistance. For it is the ultimate priority of all Arab rulers to consolidate their power position in view of the emerging new power distribution and to cope with the challenges of Islam. At present, they need a combination of stability (no war with Israel), and an existing external threat to unify their publics (Israel as a threat in being and Palestine as a declared objective) to justify and facilitate their power maneuvers. Genuine long-term peace with Israel contradicts these imperatives.

Moreover, the primary challenge to the viability of the peace process is the mood in the Arab world itself. That mood is not promising. The latest surveys in the Arab world show that (1) a vast majority of the population, estimated at 85-90%, support Saddam Hussein's initiative (though not Saddam himself) that a new Salah ad-Din, that is a pan-Arab/Islamic leader, is needed to unify the Arab world, and are convinced that the Arabs are obliged to completely destroy Israel before there can be salvation, tranquility, prosperity, honor and glory in the Middle East; and (2) a majority (of the total population), about 60-70%, believe that the return to "true" Islamic Government (at various degrees of "fundamentalism" and different approaches to ecumenical issues within Islam) is the only viable method to attain the above goals, and that a Jihad should start immediately irrespective of their governments' positions.

Similarly, even the proposed maximalist solution for the Palestinian problem – a total Israeli withdrawal from all the territories captured in the Six Days War and the establishment there of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem – is totally meaningless when examined in the context of the prevailing trends among the "Palestinians:"

- Over two-thirds of the Arab population in the territories support the Islamists, mainly the HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad, who launched, and who still are, the driving force behind the Intifadah. These Islamists are all explicitly dedicated to the complete destruction of Israel. Furthermore, their religious leaders have repeatedly decreed that they will not consider the

creation of an independent Palestinian state in the territories to be the end of their struggle.

- The vast majority of the PLO supporters in exile all over the Arab world, including Arafat himself and most of the Palestinian leadership, started their struggle for, and are determined to return to, the old Arab places in the Israel of 1949. (The PLO was established in 1964 as an organization committed to the destruction of “smaller” Israel and recognizing the Jordanian and Egyptian control over the territories.) Therefore, a Palestinian state in the territories will not solve their problem. These PLO-supporting exiles are the Palestinian refugees who have been the source of the Palestinian problem all over the Middle East, and whose presence in exile has contributed to radicalism and instability in their host countries.

Therefore, the U.S.-sponsored “peace process,” as it is emerging now, irrespective of what Israel does or does not do, will have the following effect: (1) It will de-legitimize moderate Arab governments by introducing major causes for popular Islamist revolts; (2) endanger Arab governments that the U.S. is committed to supporting (such as the Gulf states) because it does not remove the radical destabilizing Palestinian communities from their midst; and (3) it forces rulers, especially secular revolutionaries like Assad, Mubarak, and Saddam, to tighten their grip over their populations (most likely leading to armed suppression as happened in Algeria), thereby forcing them to reassert their commitment to their ideological credentials – all of which are pan-Arab and militant – and thus consequently trade away “peace” with Israel for stability at home. (Indeed, based on the media and government communiqués, it is already possible to see this trend taking place in Egypt, despite its peace treaty with Israel.)

Thus, as discussed above, the main challenge to stability in the Middle East is the fundamental and profound gap between the Arab public and its leaders. However, the simple act of recognizing, and making a peace treaty with Israel, forces Arab leaders to contradict the Call of Islam, thus exposing themselves to the wrath of their publics. In point of fact, the echoes of Sadat's assassination a decade ago still reverberate throughout the Middle East as demonstrated by the fact that the writings of the Islamic Jihad ideologues who were instrumental in

arranging the Egyptian President's murder are becoming ever more popular all over the Arab world.

In this environment, in return for formal peace, Israel is being asked to take some significant military risks. Even today, its reputation for military proficiency notwithstanding, Israel's strategic posture is precarious at best. The new political climate in the Middle East already challenges the fundamental doctrine of Israel since its establishment, namely, that belligerent Arab states should be actively prevented from having and/or not allowed to have the capacity to launch a surprise attack on the Israeli civilian rear with weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, Syria has already acquired large quantities of such missiles and warheads, but because of the legacy of the Gulf Crisis, an Israeli preemptive strike is inconceivable. Moreover, for the Arabs, the lesson of Israel's restraint during Operation Desert Storm is that it is possible to manipulate Washington to pressure Israel to do what was previously unthinkable.

Indeed, even when in a state of formal war with its neighbors, Israel was repeatedly pressured, mainly by Washington, not to react militarily to gross violations of "Red Lines" set in agreements. In 1970, Israel was restrained from attacking Egyptian SAM batteries moved into position after the U.S.-negotiated ceasefire in the War of Attrition, thus creating the military context for the Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Israel was convinced not to react to the Syrian introduction of SAMs into Lebanon (1981) and to its use of combat aircraft in Beirut (1990), and was warned not to respond to Iraqi military deployments to Jordan in 1989-1990. With peace treaties at stake, it is fair to assume that the pressure on Israel to restrain from reacting to force movements of this kind and to other infringements would be overwhelming.

Therefore, the real problem for Israel would lie in the gray area of Arab military moves while Arab governments insist on the viability of the peace agreements. What should Israel do in case of terrorist attacks from the territories should it evacuate those territories? At present, Israel does not pursue terrorists into the Sinai. Consequently, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks across that frontier because the Egyptians hardly react and if the perpetrators are not killed in action, they are virtually assured a safe to return to their bases. Indeed, the Islamists have already vowed to launch an all out terrorist campaign against the Israeli civilian rear in case of "peace." The old 'Green Line' cannot be blocked.

Thus, certain questions need to be asked: Will Israel have to endure Islamist terrorism in the name of peace? Will the safety of Israel's

population be left in the hands of, say, Jordanian-Palestinian security authorities, and if they fail, will each time the Israeli government considers a retaliatory or preventative action, will it have to consider the potential for a collapse of the peace?

Similarly, what should Israel do in case of unauthorized movements of armed forces to agree upon demilitarized areas? Militarily, a smaller “pre-1967” Israel will be indefensible against major armed forces on the attack. Therefore, after a sizable withdrawal from the territories, the danger exists that Israel would not be able to endure and survive a Yom Kippur-type attack. In such circumstances, Israel would be obliged to preempt and strike any threatening force concentration simply in order to survive. However, with peace agreements in place, there would always be the question: “Do these violations really justify going to war and destroying the peace?” Further, what guarantees would there be that there would not be an intelligence error leading to an accidental war in which the peace agreements would leave Israel vulnerable?

The key point to these questions are that they all point to the fact that almost all of the peace treaties Israel might be asked to sign are with minority dictatorial governments whose legitimacy is challenged by their populations. Moreover, as indicated above, the vast majority of the Arab population is not only opposed to peace, but is calling for the destruction of Israel. In all these Arab countries there are very popular Islamist leaders who claim their right as leaders and vow to implement the Jihad. What if one of these Islamist leaders overthrows the current government, as they have repeatedly declared that it is their intention to do, and decrees the peace agreement null and void? Israel would be forced into a position where she would either be forced to attack and re-occupy the territories, or remain condemned to being surrounded by hostile regimes without peace or any other guarantees.

Thus, under current circumstances, any peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors would leave Israel a hostage to the well being of a few Arab rulers and their ability to control and restrain their populations. With Islamist pressures growing, Arab regimes will be increasingly radicalized and Israel will be expected to understand and comply. This is a “hair trigger” environment that admits of enormous consequences should there be a miscalculation.

The fact of the matter is that the Arab world is not ready to accept Israel, let alone live in peace with it. Such a tense situation, even if it were formally called peace, is a recipe for a future war. Stability, normalization, peaceful co-existence, and even formal peace in the very

long term, will be possible in the Middle East only when the Arab publics realize that they have a vested interest in such a development.

Therefore, the truly urgent challenge facing the U.S., Israel and the West in the Middle East is to create a situation where the Arab population has a genuine interest in the socio-political situation (standard of living, basic freedoms, etc.), and in the overall political processes of their own countries (such as representation, impact on local or area politics, etc.) so that there is genuine democracy and a vested interest in stability and tranquility. Only then will it be possible to expect the Arab population to accept compromises, recognize the existence of Israel (not simply its legitimacy or right to exist), and even reach levels of co-existence and cooperation with it. In short, the Arabs must first make peace with themselves, before they can make peace with Israel.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Narco-Terrorism and the Syrian Connection

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It has become increasingly apparent that the highest levels of the Syrian government are directly involved in the production, processing and distribution of drugs throughout the West. Indeed, Damascus considers drugs as an integral component, along with more classic forms of terrorism, of its clandestine war against the West, Israel and conservative Arab regimes, as well as a major source of foreign currency for Syria. Moreover, in order to expand its market share by answering a growing need for cocaine and crack, Syrian military intelligence has recently concluded barter deals with the Colombian Medellin Cartel based on swapping drugs for terrorist expertise, operatives, training and equipment, (both directly and via Libya). Thus, Syria's direct involvement in the drug trade has not only had the effect of increasing the supply of drugs available for consumption in the West, but has significantly increased the threat of sophisticated international terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.

Financial statistics of drug revenues for 1987-1990 should suffice to indicate the magnitude of Syria's narco-terrorist operation: Lebanese income in the late-1980s from drug sales were some \$1.5-2.0b a year or about 40% of the GDP. The direct Syrian income, that is revenues

collected by government agencies, was about \$500-700m a year. With the other indirect and complementary income included (for services rendered, indirect revenues, etc.), a total of up-to \$1.0b a year was reaching the treasury in Damascus, that is, about 10% of the GDP. Thus, drug activities and trade constitute a major source of foreign currency for Syria, which is extremely important to Damascus because of the current economic crisis and the growing need for hard currency to finance arms deals. In addition, the key players in this drug trade derive immense personal profits that go unrecorded. Further, Syria is not the only beneficiary from the drug activities in the Bekkaa. In 1988-89, the HizbAllah's income from drug activities in Lebanon exceeded \$100m a year.

Thus, the Bekkaa has a major role in the production of world drug supplies and processing, with large quantities going to the U.S., Europe and Israel. Indeed, Lebanon is the largest Hashish grower in the world (20,000-30,000 acres in the Bekkaa with 20,000 elsewhere), and is a major Opium grower (some 7,500 acres) as well. Significantly, the vast majority of the drug growing fields (at least 85% cultivated area and growing) are in areas that have been controlled by the Syrian armed forces since 1976.

Furthermore, the Bekkaa and Syria are also centers for laboratories producing heroin from both locally grown opium and imports from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. The Syrian intelligence and military ensures that factional fighting does not interfere with the drug business and takes care of the security of the processing facilities as well as transportation across factional and militia lines. Indeed, Syrian Brig.Gen. Ghazi Kan'an is himself personally responsible for issuing special security passes to the main traffickers such as the four critical heroin labs located in Brital, a Shi'ite village in the Bekkaa associated with the HizbAllah, which provide services to Christian and Sunni crime families with the approval of Syrian intelligence.

The production that comes out of this system is enormous. For example, from the 7,500 acres for opium poppies in the Bekkaa alone, some 30 tons of opium are harvested and used for the extraction of 3 tons of pure heroin. In addition, the Bekkaa labs produce at least 2 tons of heroin from imported opium. The quantities of heroin production are constantly growing and since the spring of 1989, the Syrians have facilitated a further increase and expansion of poppy fields that has been limited only by a lack of road security. However, it should be noted that the Bekkaa heroin is considered to be of low quality.

An even truer measure of Syria's role in drug activities can be discerned from the direct involvement of Syria's most senior officials. Most of the Syrian drug processing facilities are controlled by the Allawite elite, mainly the family and inner circle of President Hafiz al-Assad. Although there is no hard evidence that President Assad himself enjoys profits from drug dealing, there is little doubt that he is fully aware of the extent of Syrian involvement in drug matters considering the seniority of the officials directly involved and Assad's style of tight personal supervision of all security, intelligence and terrorist operations. Moreover, Assad must be aware of the contribution of drug trafficking to Syria's budget.

That said, the most senior official directly involved in drug activities is Rif'at al-Assad, the President's brother. He has accumulated tremendous personal wealth, invested in Western Europe and the U.S., which is considered to be the "rainy day savings" of the entire Assad clan. Rif'at Assad is personally involved in all phases of the drug industry. He openly uses the military forces he controls – especially the 569th division – to supervise and extract money from all aspects of drug activities in the Bekkaa, and he has interests in the drug business of several dealers, including Tarik Fakhir al-Din; Sohil Hamadi; 'Ali and Muhammad 'Id; Bassam Matraji; 'Ali al-Zain; and 'Ali Ja'afar. Rif'at Assad has also established and supported a Lebanese militia – the Red Riders – whose sole purpose is to protect drug operations and shipments. He has even sought close cooperation with the key Maronite families to expedite drug smuggling to Western Europe via Beirut and Junia. These drug and financial transactions transpired even at the height of the fighting in Lebanon.

In addition, Rif'at al-Assad's sons – Firas and Darid – are actively involved in intelligence, drugs and organized crime in Western Europe, especially France. Their expertise and personal responsibility is to provide "special services" to the Saudi and Gulf princes in Europe and in the Middle East. Syrian intelligence is intimately involved in these activities and utilizes the evidence collected for extortion and other clandestine activities.

The Assads also ship stolen cars, primarily Mercedes and BMWs, from Europe to the Middle East, and some of these cars are modified for the smuggling of "forbidden goods" to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Other cars are modified for the smuggling of drugs and terrorist equipment back to Western Europe.

Another key official personally involved in the drug business is Muhammad Da'abul, a.k.a. Abu-Salim, who is Hafiz al-Assad's

personal administrative assistant. The actual supervision and control of drug affairs are conducted through military intelligence, under the command of General 'Ali Duba, and the Syrian armed forces under the command of the Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlass.

General 'Ali Duba, the head of the Syrian and intelligence security forces and one of the closest confidants of Hafiz al-Assad, is directly involved in all drug-related activities. He runs a very tight organization and the extent of the involvement of Syrian intelligence personnel in all stages of drug activities in Lebanon and Syria could not have escaped his attention. Moreover, he directly coordinates the main financial transactions of drug money for the benefit of both the Syrian treasury and his own pocket. For his own personal gain, Gen. Duba has his own protégés in the Bekkaa, mainly the Jafar clan from Kafr Rua'ima, who give him a share of the income from their fields, laboratory and trafficking in return for protection and personally-signed passes of safe conduct.

'Ali Duba is also involved in the flourishing Damascus night life, a phenomena that is a part of the new "smiling Syria" campaign ordered in 1989 by President Assad, that includes intimate contacts with the West European organized crime families. At present, the primary relationship concerning the Damascus entertainment world is the trading of women and liquor for drugs. An indication of Duba's personal involvement surfaced in September 1989, when Sami Tukasi, a protégé of Duba, was arrested. In response to the arrest, Duba sent a detachment of special forces to arrest relatives of the senior arresting officer, 'Adnan Badir Hassan, who were then traded for Tukasi. Duba received a new BMW in gratitude.

Similarly, Mustafa Tlass is personally involved in all aspects of the drug trade both in his capacity as Minister of Defense and because of his desire for an income to facilitate his life-style in Switzerland and France (vacation houses, a large number of girls and women, stables with race horses, etc.). Tlass also provides passes of safe conduct to his protégés (see figure). His main personal interest is with Ahmad 'Ali Alkis from Ba'albakk. Tlass visited the 'Ali Alkis home at least twice, in March 1983 and in March 1990 and regularly receives large sums of money in return for the tight supervision of, and assistance to, the Alkis operation. Using his good offices, Tlass has arranged for Alkis's heroin to be smuggled to Western Europe on land via Syria, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

Other key senior officer in Syria and Lebanon directly involved in drug production and smuggling include:

- Brig.Gen. Ahmed 'Abud Muhammad: a nephew and deputy of Gen. Duba, who oversees the free movement of drugs, especially of the Ahmaz and Gha'afar families, from the Bekkaa into western Syria and the subsequent dispatch of their drugs.
- Brig.Gen. Ghazi Kan'an: the head of security and intelligence in Lebanon, who issues passes and essentially controls all activities on the ground.
- Brig.Gen. 'Ali Hamad: the commander of the Syrian observers in Lebanon, who supervises traffic in the Beirut area.
- Brig.Gen. Jodat Sa'id: the commander of a commando regiment in the Tripoli area, responsible for the supervision of shipments from port of Tripoli.
- Lt.Col. Ghassan Khador: from the security and intelligence branch in Lebanon, is in charge of activities in the eastern Bekkaa.
- Lt.Col. Kassim Kassim: from the security and intelligence branch in Lebanon and the commander of 'Anjar (HQ of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon), is in charge of activities in the Bekkaa, especially the collection of "protection" money.
- Lt.Col. Mo'in Zaza: from Sweida, does most of the legwork for Kassim.

In addition to the above, Lt.Col. Muhsin Salman, the commander of Beirut International Airport, oversees smuggling by air to Western Europe and other areas. Salman has a personal interest in the activities of Ziad Salam (Bint Jubayl) and Sami al-Ana (Beirut). However, in May 1990, when Ziad Salman failed to share his profits with his superiors in the Syrian commando outfit, 25 containers of drugs hidden in cheese were suddenly seized with his name on the labels and manifests. Several dozen officers, from majors to lieutenants, carried out the actual operation on behalf of their superiors.

In addition to their domestic operations, the direct involvement of Syrian senior officers in drug trafficking continues overseas. For example, in November 1989, French authorities seized a ship called 'Cleopatra Sky' after its crew threw overboard 4 tons of Hashish. The interrogation of the Captain, Mohammad Bartuzi, revealed that the shipment was loaded in Tripoli under the supervision of Brig.Gen. Jodat Sa'id's men and was to be distributed in Europe in coordination with Brig.Gen. Hassan 'Ali, the Syrian military attaché in Paris.

In all of this, Syrian intelligence takes care of the drug growers. When in 1982 there was a decline in productivity of poppies, Syrian intelligence smuggled “expert growers” from Turkey and brought them to the Bekkaa to inspect and advise on the recovery of poppy fields and opium crops, as well as instruct local workers on how to establish more efficient laboratories for morphine base and heroin. Consequently, opium from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey is being shipped to Damascus and then channeled to labs in Lebanon for processing under tight accountability and control. Exports are shipped mainly through Syria and Syrian controlled Lebanese facilities and Syrian military intelligence is also in control of all phases of production with an emphasis on tight control, prevention of competition and extraction of maximum revenues.

Furthermore, special military patrols under junior military intelligence officers ensure “protection of crops” on the eve of harvesting and each year they burn about 25-40 acres as “a demonstration” and punishment for unauthorized activities. An example of this took place in May 1988 when 500 acres were destroyed in the Ba'albakk area to punish a Shi'ite attempt to strike an independent deal with the Maronites in Zahleh. Subsequently, after the demonstration of field burning, the “destruction patrols” began the practice of collecting protection money from the growers.

In this connection, Syrian soldiers and NCOs regularly receive bonuses to increase their zeal in extracting protection money, and regional patrols under the command of senior officers constantly inspect activities in the field. In this operation, the headquarters of Syrian intelligence in 'Anjar is directly responsible for the collection and transfer of funds to Damascus, with estimates of the 1990 income from poppy growing ranging from between \$0.5-1.0m per harvest, with two harvests a year. In addition, local military officers stop water supplies until paid “water ransom” money. Apparently, this procedure began as a local initiative and was adopted by military intelligence as a way of creating another source of revenues.

Subsequently, in the mid-1980s, in order to meet the growing demand for drugs, the Syrian military destroyed and burned corn crops near Sha'at, in the Bekkaa, and ordered the villagers to plant poppies instead. After harvesting, the Syrians began to deploy road blocks and conduct vehicle inspections, as well as raids on known and suspected houses of major drug labs owners. Unless the owners were protégés of senior officers, family members were “arrested for drug crimes,” (in reality, were taken hostage to ensure timely payment of protection

money.) In case of problems, the Syrian forces seized the labs, but did not stop production, choosing instead to hand over the facilities to their protégés.

In addition to these practices, Syrian military patrols set up road blocks to collect levies for transportation. They also provide, on payment, protection escorts for convoys all the way to distribution points. The 569th division, originally under Rifa'at al-Assad's direct command, is most active in providing such escorts.

Needless to say, the most loyal and cooperative drug barons receive special passes from the highest authorities in Damascus, including Tlass and Duba in person. Smaller kingpins receive passes from Syrian authorities in Lebanon. Such passes permit the bearer "freedom of movement within the regions of Lebanon and Syria with his car, his weapon, and cargo, without being searched or detained." Passes cost large sums in cash, the revenues from which go both to Damascus and to the signing official. Both Tlass and Duba receive hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash for each pass they sign.

Despite their cost, these passes have power and are in great demand. For example, in June 1987, a drug dealer was detained in the Jadid border pass from Lebanon to Syria because the local officer suspected his pass. After one telephone call, Muhammad Da'abul personally intervened and ordered the immediate release of the drug dealer. Similarly, when sectarian fighting escalated in the mid-1980s, the Syrian Army provided Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters to carry drugs from the Bekkaa to Latakia and Tartus for further export by sea.

Another indication of the importance of the drug trade to Damascus is the strict measures imposed to ensure the government's monopoly. Syrian military authorities inflict extremely harsh penalties, including executions, on "unauthorized" drug dealings. The security forces crush any efforts at independent smuggling from the country's main ports and airports. (An indication of this approach can be found in the propagandistic highlighting of the very small quantities of drugs seized and the stiff penalties given to the captured would be smugglers.) In addition, senior officers, mainly Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, of the Syrian Air Force intelligence and security services, most of them from key Allawite families, personally oversee the dispatch of drug shipments by loyal Lebanese merchants via Damascus airport and other ports.

As of 1989, as part of Syria's campaign of "moderation," Damascus decided to reduce the volume of drugs shipped to the West from Syrian ports and airports. Instead, Syrian military intelligence arranged for the

main Allawite drug dealers in the 'Akar area (President Assad's home area), all of whom are family members of senior Ba'ath officials – such as Shukry Shawfiq, Na'ami Mi'anadakak from 'Akar and Jian Anton and Raymond Yussuf Nassir from al-Kubayat – to ship their merchandise to Western Europe and the U.S. through the ports of Tripoli and al-Minya in Lebanon. Both ports are controlled, and in effect run, by Syrian military intelligence and commando forces. The most important shipments, and as many others as possible, are conducted in ships partly owned by Syrian intelligence in the form of personal interests and/or partnerships by senior officers. They exercise control on operations for Syrian intelligence and make money for themselves and Damascus in the process.

Since the mid-1980s, the huge profits, and especially vast amounts of cash and goods, available in Lebanon have tempted several Syrian officers to look more after their own personal interests than the motherland's. Consequently, in order to avoid competition, Hafiz al-Assad has launched a campaign against the “plague of corruption” in the ranks of the military personnel involved in “handling” the drug smuggling. To facilitate this campaign, a special political security force under the command of 'Adnan Badar Hasan has received complete freedom of action to control and investigate the people of the intelligence forces under 'Ali Duba and Majid Sa'id.

Thus, in 1987, Lt.Col. Ahmad Mahana, then in charge of coastal and seaport security in Syria and Lebanon, was transferred from his position in the course of an investigation of corruption among senior officers facilitating the smuggling of drugs by sea. Convoys of military trucks carrying drugs into Syria were stopped and drugs confiscated when it was discovered that they were dispatched on the “initiative” of local junior officers without “coordination” with proper authorities in Damascus. The drugs were then diverted to Tripoli for shipment through normal channels.

In addition to Syria, Iran's fundamentalist government is also involved in narco-terrorism. Although drug use is considered a sin to Islam, and drug dealers involved in domestic sales are hanged routinely in Iran, Khomeyni and Shi'ite leaders in Lebanon issued a series of decrees authorizing the HizbAllah's involvement in the Syrian drug trade because it is part of the “plot” to weaken and corrupt the West. The HizbAllah leader Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli justified his organization's involvement in the drug operations “as being justified since drugs are sold to Israel, the United States and Western countries, and weakens the nemesis of Islam.”

Not surprisingly, the Iranians use drugs to finance terrorist operations in Europe. For example, in 1985-87, heroin was smuggled into France, along with explosives and detonators, in order to finance the operations of the main terrorist network in that country, including a spate of bombings in Paris. Similarly, Syrian intelligence provides Kurdish terrorists with drugs to carry across the border into Turkey. Lt.Col. Hitham of the Syrian Air Force security and intelligence in the northern command is directly involved in these operations.

Significantly, Syria's involvement in the drug trade has brought international terrorism closer to the U.S. itself via a so-called "Crack-for-terrorist technology" deal between Damascus and the Colombian cartel. Syria has long been eager to meet the growing need in Western Europe for cocaine. However, it proved virtually impossible to grow coca plants in Lebanon. Therefore, there emerged a need for imports of coca "base" and the appropriate know-how to produce "American style" crack.

Enter Talal Daizum, a drug dealer and smuggler from Kamid, and the major protégé of Mustafa Tlass and especially of Tlass' wife. Daizum is known for his widespread and intimate contacts with smuggling networks in Western Europe and the U.S., (run through Cyprus and Turkey,) and his loyalty and effectiveness has been proven several times when Syrian intelligence has used his couriers to carry drugs and terrorist materials all the way into the U.S. Further, at Tlass's request, Daizum investigated the possibility of acquiring cocaine for Syria. Consequently, in 1989, Pablo Escobar of the Colombian "Medellin Cartel" met senior Syrian military and intelligence officials in Larnaca, Cyprus, to discuss the expansion of their cooperation.

The essence of the agreement that was reached was that the Cartel would help Syria in its Lebanon-based cocaine activities in return for the Syrians supplying the Cartel with terrorist expertise and equipment so that it could take on local governments and deal with whatever U.S. intervention might take place. Soon afterward, a few Basque terrorists experts from the ETA were sent from the Ta'lbaya and al-Marj camps in the Bekkaa to teach terrorist tactics in Latin America.

Subsequently, the supply of commercial quantities of coca base began in 1989-1990, and the production of usable cocaine began in local labs located in the Shouf mountains. Export to Western Europe, via Italy, to the U.S. was arranged through the Algia anchorage, which was then controlled by Walid Jumblatt's Druze forces. When Algia was closed due to fighting, Brig.Gen. Ghazi Kan'an provided alternate routes via al-Masnah, and land routes protected by HizbAllah forces

under Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli. As the demand in Europe and the U.S. increased, additional labs were opened, with the main labs located in the heart of the Syrian controlled Bekkaa and neighboring areas like Harmel, Ba'albakk, Dir al-Ahmad and Zahleh.

As a direct result of Escobar's visit to Larnaca, a "factory" for crack was set up in the Bekkaa in January 1990 using raw materials provided from Colombia (and Latin America), initially in order to satisfy growing demand in Western Europe and the Far East. Ultimately, it will become a part of a general transfer of vulnerable drug infrastructure away from the reach of U.S. forces.

Meanwhile, the Medelline Cartel has been quick to put into action what it learned from the Syrians. On 27 November 1989, an Avianca Boeing 727 exploded in mid-air 5 minutes after taking off from the Bogota airport, killing all 6 crew members and 101 passengers. Investigation disclosed that the bomb used by the Medelline Cartel was made of SEMTEX and that the detonator was similar to the one used to blow up Pan-Am Flight 103. Thus, the United States has been given an ominous warning of what impact Syrian narco-terrorism may have on the West.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Confronting the Pax-Americana

November 5, 1991

As Israeli and Arab delegations were gathering in Madrid for a peace conference organized and brokered by the U.S., the region's radicals, led by Iran and Syria, were committing themselves to a major terrorist campaign against the U.S. For the radicals, the mere existence of U.S. influence in the Middle East and the legitimization of Israel via the acknowledging of its right to exist are perceived as a major threat to their vital interests. Consequently, the radical Islamic states are preparing to take drastic measures – primarily anti-American international terrorism – to counter this threat. Indeed, as of mid-August 1991, as it was becoming clear that the U.S. was going to be successful in its efforts to convene a peace conference, the Middle East's radicals, led by Iran and Syria, began a hectic campaign to confront the West and prevent, virtually at all costs, its return to the Islamic Middle East.

The process of releasing of Western hostages and Israeli POWs in return for the Shi'ite HizbAllahi held by Israel was, in this context, also part of this strategy. The radicals used the gradual release of hostages as insurance that the West would not retaliate against, or interfere with, HizbAllah and Iranian terrorist operations in any serious way. The

calculation being that the West would assume that any retaliation would jeopardize the further release of hostages. Thus, the hostage release process was and is to serve as a shield for radical Islamic forces once they begin their anti-American terrorist campaign.

This policy of terrorist attacks combined with the releasing of hostages was established by Iran. Several HizbAllah leaders, including its secretary-general, Seyyid Abbas al-Mussawi, traveled to Teheran in mid-August 1991, where they met with the Iranian leadership and discussed the "latest developments in Lebanon and the region." As a result of these consultations, Iran decided to help bring about a breakthrough in the hostage saga "by playing down its long-standing preconditions" in anticipation of "concessions from the West" that would come subsequently. Lebanese Shi'ite leaders had no doubt about the real objectives. "The Iranian decision to close the hostage file is final and irreversible. The hostage card is a spent card no matter what changes take place in the world or the region," one of these Shi'ite leaders explained.

Originally, the hostage policy had been aimed at expediting the eviction of the West from Lebanon and the Middle East as a whole. This strategy had been formulated by senior officials of the Iranian, Syrian and Libyan intelligence services, and in January 1985, the 3 sponsoring states chaired the highly important international terrorist conference in Hermel, Lebanon. At that conference, the HizbAllah representatives offered to cleanse Beirut of all Westerners for both religious-ideological and for more pragmatic reasons, namely, to make it safer to prepare and conduct the escalation of a terrorist campaign with much less danger from Western intelligence services. Consequently, it was agreed in Hermel that the HizbAllah would force Westerners out of Beirut under the rubric of the Islamic Jihad organization.

As of late-1991, the immediate objectives concerning Beirut have been accomplished. Westerners have long left Beirut and show no inclination to return. Syria's control over Lebanon was recognized by the U.S. and the world, and therefore the continued holding of Western hostages attracts attention to HizbAllah, Syria, and Iran's role in their imprisonment. Thus, the hostages are being released, having outlived their usefulness, but with the effect of generating international good will toward Teheran and Damascus.

However, the radicals' ultimate strategic objectives, namely eradicating the Western presence in the Middle East, have not changed since the 1980s. On the contrary, the Gulf War and the consequent

increase in the United States' presence in the Middle East has only intensified the radical's desire to expel the U.S.

This duality of approach was outlined by Iran's leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, in a speech on 19 August. The U.S. was pushing for its own kind of peace to achieve the "long-standing dream of sacrificing the Palestinian cause at the feet of brutal Zionists," Khamene'i explained. "The solution of the Palestinian issue lies in the destruction of the usurper [Israeli] regime so that the owners of the land – Muslims, Christians, Jews, or whoever – may set up their government and live together." In Khamene'i's view, the unfolding events in the Middle East only increase the threat to Islam and therefore must be reversed immediately. "Those who installed a wicked, mercenary and usurper regime in the region and who have stained their hands with the blood of people by approving its crimes are now planning to force Muslims and the owners of the land to admit that the land belonged to the usurpers," he warned. Khamene'i concluded by urging Muslim youth to take action against the U.S. "Are the zealous Muslim youths of Palestine and other Islamic countries so dead that America can easily settle the biggest problem of the Islamic world in its own interest?"

Syria is also committed to this "dual track" strategy. However, in a pattern characteristic since the Gulf War, Damascus has been pursuing its real objectives clandestinely while overtly expressing moderation and pretending to be in the U.S. camp. Indeed, Damascus has felt confident to pursue such an audacious policy because of the aggregate impact of new military-strategic arrangements it has concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran.

In fact, the Soviet strategic and military commitment was clarified in high-level consultations between very senior military delegations led by Adm.Flt.USSR V.N. Chernavin, the Commander of the Soviet Fleet, and Gen. Mustafa Tlass, the Syrian Minister of Defense, during the second half of September 1991. In these talks, Moscow reassured Syria that it was not going to reduce its military and naval cooperation, including the use of the Tartus and Latakia naval bases, and was considering additional ways to enhance their joint activities, including increased military assistance.

Among the key weapons systems the USSR will soon supply to Syria are the S-300 [SA-10] SAM system with ATBM capabilities and, possibly, Su-27 interceptors. In addition, the USSR will assist Syria in repairing the Soviet-made weapons systems the 9th Division brought back from the Gulf. There is also expected to be an acceleration of the

transfer of Soviet military equipment that it was already agreed would be given to Syria.

Meanwhile, Damascus and Teheran continuously coordinate their Middle Eastern policy at the highest levels, including through direct discussions between their presidents. Indeed, in late-September, the Syrians went to Iran to explain their attitude toward the "peace process" and to coordinate their strategy and policy with Teheran. Needless to say, it is not by accident that the formal treaties and high level coordination were arranged between the senior defense officials of both countries. In fact, in the last week of September, the Syrian Chief of Staff Gen. Hikmat al-Shihabi visited Teheran to coordinate defense policy, inspect Iranian defense and industrial facilities, and decide on forms of greater mutual cooperation in the areas of armaments and the expansion of defense industries. Gen. Shihabi brought with him a personal verbal message from Assad to Hashemi-Rafsanjani, which "emphasized the importance of Teheran-Damascus relations."

In his response, Hashemi-Rafsanjani reiterated the "unanimity of strategic objectives" between the two countries. Shihabi also explained to the Iranians Syria's approach to the peace conference, emphasizing that Syria was going to Madrid "to ensure the rights of the Palestinians and (the) return of all occupied territories" rather than to make peace with Israel. Thus, Syria's relations and strategic alliance with Iran are even stronger as a result of the visit. Additionally, Syria has also finalized an agreement with North Korea and Iran on the development and production of SCUD Cs in both Iran and Syria.

Thus, the Syrian Armed Forces are in the midst of an unprecedented buildup, both qualitative and quantitative. Syria has assured its radical allies that it is going to Madrid because of Soviet requests and assurances and also because of important economic considerations such as the anticipated massive flow of aid from the U.S. and the Gulf states. Indeed, Syria's real posture is reflected by its enhanced strategic military cooperation that began in mid-September with Iran, North Korea and the USSR.

In any event, from early October an assertive Teheran was at the forefront of stating the radicals' strategic perception and of urging drastic measures, mainly international terrorism to carry it out. On 4 October 1991, Ayatollah Abdul Qarim Mussawi Ardebili devoted his Friday Sermon to "this great calamity of American domination and her unrivaled sway over Islamic countries." He defined the situation as "a catastrophe, a disaster for Muslim peoples." The U.S. was bringing turmoil to the Near East. "It is incumbent upon all regional Muslims to

attack American interests and take away their peace,” he decreed. “What I say to you is a duty, a religious and obligatory duty. Muslims must take away their security, just as they have taken security away from Muslims.”

In point of fact, Ardebili favors the escalation of international terrorism. “The Kuwaitis, the Iraqis, the Pakistanis and the Iranians should form resistance cells and endanger their American interests,” he explained. “They should make life difficult for them. We do not know about classical warfare, but we know about this sort of thing (terrorism).” Ardebili assured his listeners that whoever “is killed in the process he will be a martyr.” Ardebili then urged immediate action, especially by trained terrorists such as the HizbAllah. “If this is delayed even by an hour, it will be too late. The youths, those who have so far proved in the arena that they are capable of it, they should form resistance cells and attack them (Americans), their properties, their interests, deprive them of their peace and security.”

The importance of Ayatollah Ardebili's call to arms and terrorism was reflected by the extensive coverage the sermon received in the Iranian media and especially in the international broadcasts and IRNA. “We are not able to engage in a classic war with them but we can at least do this (terrorism). And whoever is killed in this path is certainly a martyr,” IRNA quoted Ardebili.

In Beirut, the HizbAllah was in full agreement with Teheran. Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi's explanations and rationalization of the situation in the region was even more explicit than Teheran's. “In the HizbAllah, our strategic policy has always been persistent – to push Israel out of south Lebanon and evict the Western powers out of Lebanon,” he stated. Mussawi put the current objective in the context of the HizbAllah's previous encounters with the West. “The great achievement of the HizbAllah is that through two operations of sacred martyrdom against the American marines and the French paratroopers, the organization was able to evict America and the multi-national force from Beirut.” He added that the kidnapping and holding of Western hostages, although not carried out by the Hizballah, are an integral part of this campaign.

In essence, Mussawi reaffirmed the validity of a long-standing strategy of the HizbAllah and the states sponsoring it. The eviction of the West from Beirut, and the Middle East as a whole, has been a key component of the strategy of Syria, Iran and the HizbAllah. Needless to say, HizbAllah views the peace conference, as a form of legitimization for Israel and thus as a further enhancement of U.S. influence in the

region. As such, it is in sharp contrast to what the radicals view as their vital interests.

Thus, in response to this view, on 18 October, Iran convened the International Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution of the People of Palestine. Over 400 delegates from 45 countries attended the conference. Participants included members of parliament and government officials from all the Arab and many Third World countries, Islamic religious leaders from several countries, including the U.S., and a large number of Palestinian, Lebanese, Afghan and other Muslim terrorist leaders and commanders. Among the delegates were Fathi al-Shiqaqi, Asaad Bayyud al-Tamimi, Ahmad Jibril, Abu-Musa, Said Shaban, Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah, Abbas al-Mussawi, Jumblatt, and 'Abd-al-Aziz Nuri of HAMAS.

A high-level delegation of Syrian parliamentarians led by Shakir Sa'id also arrived with a message from President Assad and was extremely active throughout the conference. In addition, a Jordanian delegation was led by Abd-al-Latif Arabiyat, the speaker of the parliament, and Sheikh Muhammad Abdur-Rahman Khalifa, the vice-speaker.

Also in attendance was Mehdi Karrubi, the speaker of the Majlis (parliament), who served as president of the conference. He personally met with each delegation leader during and after the conference, and in his opening speech, he called on the participants to "take decisive actions against the greatest problem which faces the world of Islam," and vowed that Teheran would provide "extensive support" for all the Muslim strugglers.

Also, Hojjat ol-Islam Abdul-Vahed Musavi-Lari, who served as chairman, explained the conference's objectives and structure:

In the conference – composed of a number of popular and revolutionary personalities – practical ways of supporting the Palestinian revolutionaries and ending up their oppression will be examined... In the three-sided committees to be set-up in the conference, means of giving aid in terms of finance, arms, training Muslim Palestinian resistance fighters, as well as ways of countering the dangerous phenomenon of Jewish migration to the occupied territories will be examined.

At the conference, the president of Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, delivered the opening speech. He stated that Iran was ready

to fight Israel in order to create a Palestinian state. He announced "Iran's readiness to join the jihad for the liberation of Palestine." "We are ready to contribute to the needs of the Palestinians, and if we could, I would say that we would meet all their needs," he declared. Hashemi-Rafsanjani offered money, weapons and training. "Iran is even ready to dispatch troops to fight Israel along with the Palestinians," he added. He described the U.S. return to the Middle East as "a strategic blunder" that "would prompt the wrath of one fourth of the world's population." Hashemi-Rafsanjani defined the peace conference as "an imposed conference with the aim of sowing discord among the Moslems."

In a subsequent speech, Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i, explained why the issue of Palestine is so crucial to Iran and to the entire Muslim world. "The issue is that the world of arrogance needs the land of Palestine, which is the geographical heart of the Islamic world, in order to crush Islam; in order to put pressure on Islamic nations; in order to check the Islamic movement." He emphasized that there is no substitute to an armed struggle against Israel. "You cannot talk to her [Israel] except with the language of power: the power of a nation; the power of an Islamic Ummah across the world." He urged the gathered into activism. "You must be decisive here, you must take decisive actions," Khamene'i told them.

Subsequent speakers from the highest levels of the Iranian leadership stuck to more practical matters. Maj.Gen. Mohsen Reza'i, the IRGC commander, urged the formation of an Islamic army to liberate Palestine. "This conference should decide for a Palestinian Islamic army and each country contribute a brigade so that this Islamic army will take decisive steps in the future." Reza'i explained that such an army was needed because once the U.S. destroyed Palestine through the Madrid peace conference, it would turn on Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. "As an army man, I propose that this conference decide for a Palestinian Islamic army. I propose that each country accept the responsibility of contributing a brigade so that this Islamic army would take decisive steps in the future," he told the conference.

Two other highly significant points were made at the conference: The first was the definition of Islam as the religion/ideology to replace Marxism as the principle intellectual force in opposition to Western democratic capitalism, which was made in a speech given by Ahmad Khomeyni. This was the first time that elements in the radical Islamic world has defined themselves as a rival power center to the West.

The other crucial point was the declaration made by Hojjat ol-Islam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, head of the Defense and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Committee in the Majlis, that those who attended the peace conference, including President Bush himself, were Mujahideen, the greatest evil in Islam. This second point is significant in that it will allow the faithful greater freedom of action in launching terrorist attacks and acts of assassination. In effect, Mohtashemi's statement freed dedicated Muslims of the obligation to secure a fatwa (religious decree) before undertaking possibly suicidal missions, which would otherwise be forbidden by Islamic law.

In addition, several Middle Eastern and Third World speakers urged, in the words of Hojjat ol-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim of SAIRI, the formulation of "a common strategy for all Muslims and combatants so that all of them will move in one direction" because "America's objective is... to annihilate liberation movements... all of which are carried out with Islamic aspirations."

Several dozen speakers concurred with this theme. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt observed that "Israel will not give any concessions and the Arab states will not gain anything." He called for a long-term plan that would unify all the region's liberation struggles. Sheikh Muhammad Abdur-Rahman Khalifa, the vice-speaker of the Jordanian parliament said that Muslims must "uproot the cancerous tumor of Zionism." Israel must be destroyed and replaced with a Palestinian state. In addition, Khalifa delegitimized the peace process: "Palestinian territory is an Islamic land and no one dare compromise it," he declared. Several participants asked Teheran for additional funds for the escalation of their struggles. Two days later, Ayatollah Khamene'i opened accounts in Iranian banks to collect donations and transfer money to the Islamist struggle.

The Conference concluded with a commitment to continue attacks on Israel and anybody that supports or is in contact with the Jewish state. Iran and its guests pledged to support obstructions to the peace process, raising the specter of violent attacks and terrorism. In addition, Libya re-asserted its vow "to support and back the Palestine people until they are able to liberate their land from the river to the sea and establish their independent state over the whole Palestinian Arab soil." Further, the Conference decided to establish a permanent secretariat and staff in Teheran under Musavi-Lari to coordinate the operations decided upon. Finally, in its formal resolution, the conference called for an "all out Jihad" against Israel and the West. Most PLO factions signed the Teheran declaration.

Teheran believes that the conference will be the catalyst of a myriad of activities throughout the Muslim world. Mehdi Karrubi attributed this to the nature of the attending delegates: "The presence of revolutionary forces, university lecturers, scientific personalities, writers, and publishers on the one hand, and parliamentary delegations, political personalities, and advisors to the presidents of some of the Islamic countries on the other can be most effective for the future movements of the Islamic revolution of Palestine." In addition, Karrubi urged the adoption of Islamist legislation by parliaments all over the Muslim world. "The presence of parliamentary speakers, considering their status among the people and their legal position, can be effective in the drafting and preparing of laws in support of the Islamic Revolution of Palestine. The Majlis also has approved special bills and budgets in this regard, and there is to be more cooperation between the Islamic states' parliaments, which we hope to be useful in furthering the Palestine Islamic revolution."

Finally, the conference in Teheran was also used for consultations between senior commanders of the various organizations that are members of the Iranian and Syrian controlled terrorist network. Ahmad Jibril, 'Umar al-Shihabi and Fadl Shururu of the PFLP-GC, Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi, Mr. Abu-Hassan and Mr. Tal'at of the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine; 'Abbas al-Mussawi, Ibrahim al-Amin, and other senior HizbAllah officials agreed to coordinate their operations for the up-coming struggle. They decided on the organization of a "Front of the Islamic Forces in Palestine," comprising the forces of the HAMAS, Islamic Jihad and most PLO factions, which will concentrate on fighting Israel and escalating the intifadah. The terrorist leaders were assured that "Iran and Syria will support and assist the courageous struggle of the Front against the American-Zionist conspiracies." They vowed to continue their armed struggle because "the Muslim Ummah will not be satisfied by anything less than the establishment of a Palestinian state over the entire land of Palestine."

The resolutions of the Teheran conference were not idle talk. Almost immediately after it adjourned, there was a spate of terrorist attacks in the region.

In Turkey, on 28 October, two well-placed explosive charges killed a U.S. serviceman and badly injured an Egyptian diplomat when they started their cars. "We will not allow the imperialist powers to divide up the Middle East at the peace summit," announced the Turkish Islamic Jihad, claiming responsibility.

Shortly afterward, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) opened fire on a busload of settlers in the West Bank, killing two civilians and wounding several others. Shells and rockets were fired at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, causing little or no damage, and there was a marked escalation in the number of attempts to attack Israel from southern Lebanon, including the launching of 3 very-light aircraft by the PFLP-GC (this unit is normally stationed in a Syrian Air Force base), the driving of suicide trucks into Israeli patrols, cross border shelling, and, on 1 November, a HizbAllah attempt to infiltrate a suicide squad into Galilee whose aim was, according to a video they had prepared before embarking on their mission, to “kill the largest number possible of Zionist settlers.”

However, these are only the first shots in an escalating terrorist campaign. Moreover, they were largely carried out by the low- to mid-quality assets available to the Syrian and Iranian controlled terrorist system. A close examination of the known preparations for more spectacular operations strongly indicates that the ultimate objectives of the sponsoring states are regional/strategic rather than merely retaliation for the peace process.

Both Teheran and Damascus have exploited the emotional issue of the peace process in order to further, through the use of international terrorism, the consolidation of their regional bloc in a way they could not have done in a conventional political process. Thus, for example, Annis Naccache, Muhsin Rfiq-Dust's closest aide, was put in charge of sabotaging the Gulf oil installations starting with Kuwait's. This is a strategic objective of Iran's that has little to do with the peace process. Meanwhile, in Beirut, Sheikh 'Abbas al-Mussawi, the “maestro” of operations, brought with him instructions from Teheran to activate the HizbAllah's special operations command. 'Imad Mughaniyah is in charge of special operations such as aircraft hijackings and bombings, overseas sabotage as well as kidnappings. He is assisted by 'Abd al-Hadi Hamadih and Mustafa Badr-ad-Din, Mughaniyah's brother-in-law who had been in command of the Kuwait 17 and was released from jail in August 1990. In the first phase, they concentrated on launching operations in Western Europe, with Spain and Germany being among the initial objectives. The latter is Hamadih's personal obsession because of his brothers' continued incarceration there.

However, as Mohtashemi stated repeatedly, this time the ultimate objective is the U.S. itself. Both Teheran and Damascus have realized that U.S. influence in the region, being demonstrated and enhanced in the peace process, would not enable the realization of their strategic

designs – the New Islamic World Order. The U.S. must be evicted from the Middle East and South-West Asia as a precondition for the rise of the Islamist bloc. Thus, a confrontation with Washington is, in their view, inevitable. Damascus and Teheran believe, on the basis of their experience in Beirut in the early-1980s, that it is possible to compel Washington into drastic changes in its policy by a few spectacular terrorist operations, especially if the carnage is massive. This time, however, they would prefer to do it on U.S. soil.

In this connection, it is important to note that the terrorist sponsoring states have allies in place in the U.S. committed to the resolutions of the Teheran Conference. Two of these allies sent delegations from the U.S. to take part in the conference in Teheran. The first delegation was headed by Muhammad al-Asi, the Sunni Friday prayer leader of the Washington Mosque. He compared the differences between the conferences in Teheran and Madrid to the difference “between justice and injustice.” Al-Asi vowed to do everything so that “American statesmen come to their senses and grasp the fact that the United States' security is in no way linked to the existence of the illegitimate existence of the terrorist Zionist regime on Palestinian soil.”

The second delegation was headed by 'Abd-ul-'Alim Mussa, the Shi'ite Friday prayer leader of the Mostazafan [Oppressed] Mosque in Washington D.C. that is associated with Teheran. He urged “the annihilation of the illegitimate Zionist entity and the funneling of all possible support for the intifadah in Palestine.”

The states and movements gathered in Teheran believe that they are embarking on the epoch making fateful confrontation between Islam and a hostile world. They are fully aware of the magnitude of the challenge and the determination of their foes, but they are convinced that the inevitable triumph is theirs and that their sought after Islamic World Order will ultimately be realized. Therefore, they are not going to rush into operations beyond a few symbolic acts to demonstrate their presence and power.

The highly professional terrorist elite, and the sponsoring intelligence services, will take their time to prepare for major terrorist operations and make sure that their subsequent steps are successful. Once they are ready, it will be up to Teheran and Damascus to give the “Go” order.

Thus, all indications are that the HizbAllah and its partners are ready to begin carrying out spectacular terrorist operations both in Western Europe and the U.S. All that remains unanswered is the

question of whether or not the West can deter Teheran and Damascus from pursuing the realization of their regional strategic designs for fear of the ramifications of such a policy.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Last Days of the House of Al-Saud?

September 26, 1994

The regime in Saudi Arabia is currently facing perhaps its most severe crisis since coming to power. With the “Custodian of the Holy Shrines,” King Fahd, in extremely poor health, two major forces are maneuvering into position to hijack the succession process and establish themselves at the helm of the Riyadh government. The following paper will discuss the interplay of these forces and how they will impact the Saudi state.

* * *

The two major factions contending for control of Saudi Arabia are:

- The forces of Prince Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz, the Governor of Riyadh and King Fahd's younger brother. The prince is determined to preempt the inevitable succession struggle between Prince Abdallah and Prince Sultan once the King dies (or is completely incapacitated)

- The Islamists, supported by Sudan and Iran, who have already activated their terrorist organization – The Brigades/Battalions of Faith [Kata'ib Al-Iman] – in Saudi Arabia, as well as in Western Europe and the U.S. Overseas, the Saudi Islamists enjoy support from the networks of Sudanese spiritual leader, Hassan al-Turabi's Armed Islamic International, as well as from Iranian Intelligence.

Since early September, Riyadh has been reacting almost erratically to threats posed by the Islamists. These actions have significantly intensified an already tense situation, pushing the kingdom to the verge of civil war. Atop this building crisis, King Fahd seems oblivious – like the Shah of Iran in the late 1970s – to the crumbling of his country.

Indeed, as the socio-economic fabric of Saudi Arabia rapidly disintegrates, and as the population increasingly recognizes the authority of the Islamist leaders, the leading members of the House of al-Saud have engaged in a bitter succession struggle. These individuals, and the factions that they represent, seem to have convinced themselves that sheer force will somehow remove the Islamist menace and secure the stability of the regime.

Meanwhile, by early September 1994, Islamist elements in Saudi Arabia had come to the conclusion that the Riyadh government was on the threshold of an irreversible crisis. The Saudi economy had been deteriorating as a result of accumulating debt to the point that Riyadh was unable to meet many of its financial commitments, both domestically and internationally. This had produced, in the Islamist view, a comparatively severe economic crisis just at a time when the expectations of the Saudi middle class had begun to rise.

Furthermore, the Islamists believed, the current crisis had been made significantly worse by “scandalous mismanagement and misappropriation of funds.” This latter message resonated particularly with the middle class, whose economic influence was rising, but whose contribution to the political system was still severely limited.

Unfortunately, as already noted, instead of concentrating on resolving the economic crisis, the fractured and factionalized royal family has been increasingly involved in a fratricidal power struggle described by many Arab insiders and European officials as “the worst and the most fierce in its history.” Furthermore, there has been great anticipation in Riyadh of the imminent death of King Fahd. In fact, some of these Arab insiders and European officials describe him as “senile and feeble-minded.”

Against this background, the immediate cause of the succession crisis is a vague edict of King Fahd concerning the transfer of power after his death. Back in the fall of 1990, at the height of the Gulf Crisis, King Fahd raised for the first time the desirability of transferring power to a younger generation that would be better able to deal with the challenges of the modern world. However, as has always been his nature, the King failed to make a specific decision. Instead, he called in the two strongest princes – Abdallah, the official Crown Prince, and Sultan, the defense minister who was in line for the throne after the Crown Prince.

The King explained to the two princes the need to bring in young blood to the uppermost circles of power. He then decreed that if he died “within a short time,” the then effective succession arrangement would remain operative and Prince Abdallah would become King. However, if he lived longer, Fahd added, the younger generation would inherit power and the throne. Fahd stated specifically that his favorite candidate among the younger princes was Prince Sultan's son – Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, but said little else, leaving it up to the princes to determine just how long a “short time” would be.

Not surprisingly, the confusion concerning the succession process has led to other aspirant contenders joining the contest. On the surface, Prince Abdallah remains the Crown Prince, Prince Sultan is still the next in line, and both are actively building strong camps for the inevitable power struggle. However, many members of the royal family have already begun considering alternatives, with some opting to pick a younger brother of King Fahd as a compromise successor. The name of Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, has begun to surface in this connection.

Moreover, many of the leading figures within the Saudi court have begun actively urging the nomination of one of the “capable grandsons” who already constitute the professional elite of the kingdom. The leading candidates include the two sons of the late King Faisal – Foreign Minister Saud, and Intelligence Chief Turki; one of King Fahd's own sons – Muhammad, the governor of the oil-rich eastern province; Sultan's sons – the Saudi commander during the Gulf War, Khalid, and the ambassador to Washington, Bandar; as well as Abdullah's son – the deputy military chief of the National Guard Mitab.

Given King Fahd's earlier, and undisputed, selection of Prince Bandar, his road to succession should have been smooth. However, in

the early Fall his candidacy suffered a near-fatal blow when leading members of Saudi Arabia's Council of Senior Ulema issued an opinion disqualifying him for the throne. The Ulema determined that Prince Bandar bin Sultan should have "no direct claim on the Throne because his mother was a slave." This proclamation, however, did not alter Prince Bandar's secure position as an astute political operator and as Riyadh's most qualified "king-maker."

Nevertheless, despite the undisputed selection of Bandar by King Fahd, who has yet to withdraw the 1990 promises made to Princes Abdallah and Sultan, the upper-most members of the royal family decided to accept the opinion of the Senior Ulema without dispute. This decision alone was a clear indication of their fear of, and self-perceived vulnerability to, the Islamists. For their part, Tehran and the Islamist leaders immediately decided to capitalize on the situation and to accelerate their drive to establish an Islamist regime in Saudi Arabia.

(It is noteworthy that the analysis coming out of Tehran since the summer of 1994 regarding the innermost maneuvers within the House of Saud have proven most detailed and accurate. This suggests that their reading of the situation, and subsequent decision to act expeditiously, was based on specific knowledge of the situation in Riyadh.)

Meanwhile, Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, began actively preparing for a take-over of power by compelling King Fahd, his brother, to abdicate the throne before his death. Prince Salman seems to have concluded, and quite rightly, that his chances will be minimal after the King's death because he would stand no chance in the fierce struggle between the Abdallah and Sultan camps.

Members of Prince Salman's inner circle of supporters are convinced that he will be able to convince his brother – King Fahd – to nominate him King as a compromise successor, thus averting a debilitating struggle between the Abdallah and Sultan camps. According to both Saudi Islamist leaders and Arab insiders, Prince Salman has already obtained "a personal mandate" from King Fahd "to administer the country's affairs." With this mandate, Prince Salam has immediately begun using the suppression of Islamist elements as his ticket to power and to the throne.

* * *

Prince Salman, born in 1936, is only 58 years old. His crowning would therefore accomplish a change in generations while, at the same

time, leaving the throne within the present circle of King Fahd's brothers. Prince Salman is also one of the so-called "Sudairi Seven" and has already secured their support as a "lobbying group" within the uppermost circles of the family. Their support might prove crucial to secure Salman's candidature.

Those who know Prince Salman testify to his charm and ability. As the Governor of the province of Riyadh, Prince Salman is in constant contact with the King and the innermost circles of power. He is generally respected by the other members of the royal family, who, until recently, did not consider him a threat to their own position. Compared with other leading Princes, Prince Salman is relatively untainted by allegations of corruption and scandal although he was, via one of his corporations, a shareholder in BCCI. Arab insiders also point out that Prince Salman is "popular with Western governments," but warn that this might actually become a liability given the current political climate in Riyadh.

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Whatever the case, by July 1994, both Islamist and establishment circles in the Middle East were convinced that the United States had given up on the Saudi royal family. For example, the Jordanian Islamist newspaper, *al-Majd*, observed that Washington was "anticipating substantive changes in the tribal based Saudi regime. The country was... weighed down by an assortment of local and external strains and political and economic ills." The Islamists attributed this development to the widespread realization that "King Fahd's time is up and his days in office are numbered."

Against this backdrop, the Islamists provided a very intriguing analysis of the succession maneuvers in Riyadh. "The struggle among the sons and grandsons of the late King Saud bin Abd-al-Aziz over who will succeed King Fahd has never been so intense." Saudi Islamist leaders argued that the two leading candidates specifically nominated by King Fahd were actually out of the succession race. Crown Prince Abdallah bin Abd-al-Aziz was disqualified because of "his extreme kindness and poor knowledge of state governance." Prince Bandar bin Sultan was disqualified because of "his unabashed corruption and clear unpopularity at home."

The Islamists alleged that Prince Bandar was once "the target of an unpublicized assassination attempt by members of the National Guards, who owe absolute loyalty to Prince Abdallah." The Islamists also

pointed out that the United States and its supporters among the ruling House of al-Saud were trying to strengthen the position of Prince Saud al-Faysal, the foreign minister and King Faisal's son. U.S. support, the Islamists observed, would prove counter-productive.

Reflecting the common Islamist position, al-Majd concluded that, "certain Arab rulers have also begun preparations to set themselves up as the supreme Islamic authority by the end of the year to coincide with the reconfiguration in the Saudi political scene." Thus, by the summer of 1994, the Saudi Islamist leaders shared the opinion of leading experts in the West that, for all intents and purposes, "the Kingdom had no effective leadership." This reality of course served as an incentive for the Islamists to escalate their struggle.

* * *

Meanwhile, in early July, Prince Salman began moving against the Islamist establishment in Saudi Arabia. "Ten major charities in Riyadh were suddenly dissolved and ordered to stop their activities by a direct order from Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh," Islamist circles reported. These charities were closed down because of intelligence reports that the trustees of the groups were Islamist activists who used these charities to finance Islamist activities, including what the authorities termed "sedition," inside Saudi Arabia.

On the surface of it, this move was extremely odd. Prince Salman's only other claim to prominence within the uppermost circles of the Saudi establishment had been his patronage of, and responsibility for, worldwide Jihad causes – from Afghanistan to Bosnia, from sub-Saharan Africa to Central Asia. In the 1980s, Prince Salman had become a close friend with Usama bin-Laden while cooperating on Afghan operations. Their relationship remained intact even after Bin-Laden was stripped of his Saudi citizenship in April 1994 because of his support for Hassan al-Turabi. With such a record, it seemed rather strange that Prince Salman would emerge as the champion of the anti-Islamist struggle.

Nevertheless, by early August, there were indications of a growing anti-Islamist purge in the Riyadh area. On August 7, the security authorities arrested Sulayman bin Ahmad al-Daweesh, a mosque Imam, and his nephew Abdul-Rahman bin Abdelaziz al-Daweesh. The security forces employed "savage and gangsterous" tactics against both men.

Subsequently, the authorities arrested a religious teacher, Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Furayj, and an activist, Sulayman Abdallah al-Suwalyimi, in the town of al-Bukayriyah in al-Qaseem region. Meanwhile, in al-Jawf, Manawi bin-Harran al-Ruwayli, a warrant officer in the Prisons Authority was fired from his post and then arrested for sympathizing with the Islamists. Moreover, Abd-al-Aziz bin Fahd al-Jarallah al-Shamri was arrested in the al-Khaffji area and Abdallah al-Rubaysh was arrested in Buraida.

This situation was further intensified in early September in the context of the UN Population Conference in Cairo. On 1 September 1994, just as the hype concerning Saudi Arabia's boycott of the UN conference was peaking in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's Council of Senior Ulema issued a major Fatwa. On the surface, this Fatwa reaffirmed that "attendance of the population parley would be a violation of Islam" because the conference "violates Islam and all divine laws." However, the Council then took the unusual step of implying that the position taken by Riyadh was not sufficiently Islamic, thus challenging the standing of the Royal House as religious leaders.

Equally as significant, however, was the fact that the Saudi Ulema warned that the conference's program, if implemented, was likely to produce undesirable effects that would, in turn, aggravate the struggle between the West and Islam. The UN conference would violate, "the sanctities of Islamic law, including the sanctity of religion, life, honor and procreation. Licentiousness is a violation of the sanctity of religion." The Fatwa decreed that the mere existence of the conference "is a challenge to Muslim sensibilities and a confiscation of Muslims' values and ideals." Therefore, the conference should be considered as "a fierce assault on Islamic society, with all its decency and honor, to turn it into a replica of the societies suffering from the diseases of sexual perversion and moral depravity."

Furthermore, the Saudi Ulema specifically noted the high profile of the U.S. participation in, and Washington's strong support for, the conference. The inference from the Fatwa text was that by considering the United States a close ally of Saudi Arabia, the House of al-Saud was on the wrong side in the upcoming struggle between Islam and the West.

Predictably, the upper echelons of the House of al-Saud reacted with alarm to the notion of their involvement in un-Islamic activities. For example, Prince Sultan not only failed to criticize the Fatwa, but praised the Council and stressed that their criticism was not aimed at any specific leader. Simultaneously, Saudi leaders began putting

distance between themselves and the U.S. on various issues, including matters of crucial importance to Washington such as the peace process, the isolation of both Iraq and Iran, and the stability of the oil market.

The apparent growing acrimony between Washington and Riyadh was immediately exploited by the Islamist network in Saudi Arabia. The Islamists attributed the hysteria in Riyadh to its realization that Washington had already decided to abandon Saudi Arabia. Thus, in early September, Saudi Islamist leaders claimed that,

King Fahd is very angry and un-controllable. American officials have told him that they feared that Saudi Arabia was having similar conditions as Iran right before the fall of the Shah, and they told him that he is not doing his job correctly.

Irrespective of the accuracy of the report about the American position, the overall analysis accurately reflected the sentiment in Islamist circles, and served to galvanize them into taking further action against Riyadh. Thus, in mid September, Tehran strongly endorsed this analysis of the situation in Riyadh and reiterated Iran's commitment to support the Saudi Islamists.

Prince Salman, grasping how the Islamist effort would distress his fellow princes, decided to launch a massive purge of the Islamists. Such an action was undertaken in order to both neutralize the Islamist opposition, and to demonstrate Prince Salman's own effectiveness and gain the House of al-Saud's support for, or at least acquiescence in, his own aspirations to the throne.

Consequently, on 4-5 September 1994, the security forces stormed and thoroughly searched the houses of young junior Islamist academics and Ulama in Riyadh. A few were arrested while the fathers and other family members of those who managed to avoid detention were also arrested in order to compel the wanted individuals to surrender to the authorities for fear of the fate of their loved ones.

On September 9, the Saudi regime directly challenged the leaders of the domestic Islamist movement. Internal Security agents actually went to arrest Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Udah, 39, at a place where it was believed that he was teaching. Instead, they found and arrested Sheikh Safar bin Abd-al-Rahman al-Hawalay, one of the most fiery Islamist preachers in Saudi Arabia. For his part, Sheikh al-Udah escaped into hiding.

Then, on September 10, the Islamists initiated a major show of defiance to the Saudi authorities. Sheikh Salman al-Udah came out of hiding, and escorted by a protective convoy of over 20 cars, traveled the road between Riyadh and al-Qaseem with impunity. By the time Sheikh al-Udah arrived at his home in Buraida, in the al-Qaseem area, several hundred supporters were already waiting. These supporters filled the surrounding streets, making it impossible for anybody to reach the Sheikh. Sheikh al-Udah then delivered a dramatic speech, urging the Ummah to “stand up for its rights and never retreat.”

Later that day, Prince Salman suffered yet another painful setback, this time concerning Sheikh Safar al-Hawaly. When arrested, Sheikh al-Hawaly was on a Da'wa [Islamic Teaching] visit to the tribes in southern al-Jazirah. Thus, when the security forces arrested him, they violated the “hospitality rites” of the local tribes. Stunned, embarrassed and outraged, the tribesmen immediately gathered in a mob around the Government building where Sheikh al-Hawaly was being held. The Islamists would later describe the situation as “almost a war scene.”

Fearing a riot or worse, Prince Salman ordered that Sheikh al-Hawaly be immediately released, for he was the only one able to calm the angry tribesman before they stormed the Government facilities. The tribesmen then escorted Sheikh al-Hawaly to his office in Mecca and immediately established a human cordon around him. Meanwhile, Sheikh al-Udah transformed his home in Buraida, in the area of al-Qaseem, into an active center of popular agitation for Islamist revolt against Riyadh.

Upset by the precedent set by the forced release of Sheikh al-Hawaly, Prince Salman over-reacted once again. A Government official from the al-Qaseem Immara arrived at the home of Sheikh al-Udah for what was described as reconciliation talks. Instead, once inside, the official ordered the Sheikh to surrender to the Government and to come voluntarily for detention in the House of Immara. Sheikh al-Udah refused, demanding a written official arrest warrant. The official, rather than press the issue, left.

Within an hour, some 300 armed soldiers of the National Guard's Riot Police showed up at Sheikh al-Udah's residence, where they were immediately challenged by several thousand men. Leaders of the mob warned the troops that they had vowed to die for Sheikh al-Udah and that they would crush the National Guard in the process if they attempted to reach him.

When automatic weapons were aimed at the crowd, Sheikh al-Udah offered to go along with the soldiers in order not to risk the lives of his

followers. However, the mob leaders refused and instead began negotiations with the National Guard commander and the Saudi Government official on the scene. They reached a compromise whereupon the government would first withdraw the troops and then the mob would escort Sheikh al-Udah to the House of Immara – the local government facility.

Subsequently, the soldiers withdrew within half an hour. Sheikh al-Udah went to the House of Immara where he was surrounded by about 500 of his most ardent supporters. Arriving at the building, the Sheikh was escorted inside by the Government official for what was described to the crowd as a brief meeting at the Governor's office.

Inside, Sheikh al-Udah was immediately detained and was handed a document to sign. The document was officially worded but unsigned by any Saudi authorities and included the text of a commitment from Sheikh al-Udah to stop engaging in any manner of Islamist activity at any time or any place. The Sheikh refused to sign the document, and when threatened with arrest, he defiantly informed the officials present that he would rather leave Saudi Arabia for another Muslim country than discontinue his Islamist propaganda activities.

Meanwhile, additional followers continued to gather around the House of Immara. When Sheikh al-Udah failed to come out after some 90 minutes, the crowd grew agitated. One of the mob leaders decreed that, "it took him too long to get out." Immediately, the mob stormed the building. Some of the 500 loyalists overcame the guards and broke their way into the Governor's office. They then ordered the Government officials to release the Sheikh while other Islamists ransacked the building with impunity. Significantly, the local troops and policemen stayed out of the clash, and neither threatened nor interfered with the storming and destruction of the House of Immara.

Not surprisingly, Sheikh al-Udah was immediately freed and allowed to go home. By the time he returned to his Mosque in Buraida, the crowd of his followers waiting for him had grown to some 10,000 strong. Upon his arrival before the crowd, Sheikh al-Udah then delivered a speech in which he declared "the breakup of the siege that the regime had set around him," and announced the beginning of a campaign of defiance to be expressed by ever larger mobs around Islamic centers all over the country. He urged his followers to return the following evening in ever-greater numbers in order to demonstrate their defiance. In response, the excited crowd shouted Islamist and anti-Riyadh slogans well into the night.

A large crowd remained overnight around Sheikh al-Udah's mosque. The next day, September 12, they continued their demonstration of defiance. After the noon prayers, Sheikh al-Udah delivered yet another short sermon, urging the gathering of large crowds for the evening's events. He attacked the government and confided that there was no way Riyadh could tolerate the events of the previous day. He therefore told his followers that once he was arrested, they should continue their struggle "motivated and vigilant."

According to Islamist sources, over 20,000 Islamists "from all over the Kingdom" gathered around the mosque that evening. Sheikh al-Udah delivered a passionate sermon on "solidarity with the oppressed in the Muslim world", clearly suggesting that the crowd at hand was part of those being oppressed. The gathering then issued a communiqué directed at the Council of Senior Ulema, warning them that by "acting in complicity with the Saudi rulers" they were culpable for their un-Islamic "abuses of basic human rights, freedoms of expression and assembly and the like."

Being the guardians of Islam in Saudi Arabia, the communiqué continued, the Senior Ulema "are even more responsible for the crimes of the Regime than the Regime itself." Islamist leaders claim that all 20,000 present attached their signatures to the communiqué. According to Arab insiders, the number of signatures was only a few thousands. Either way, Riyadh could not but react swiftly to this challenge.

On September 13, immediately after dawn prayers, a large contingent of National Guard and other security forces, armed with machine guns, tear gas canisters, and shields, surrounded Sheikh Salman al-Udah's home. Under the command of Abdallah al-Muhameed, they broke through the crowd and arrested the Sheikh.

By noon, the Islamists organized a march on the Governor's Mansion where Sheikh al-Udah was being detained. The crowd was met by columns of heavily armed National Guard and Riot Police who permitted three or four of the leaders of the mob inside. A short and uneventful meeting followed in which the Government insisted that the Sheikh would not be released.

Consequently, preparations were made for a large solidarity rally that evening. Some 20,000 people returned to the mosque while the government sent in some traditional clerics to the city in order to attempt to dissuade the people from attending. However, "the new generation clerics" – young militant Islamists – were able to address the public after the older clerics and were able to mobilize the crowd. A large police and National Guard force was assembled near the mosque,

but it did not intervene in the evening protests, and no clashes with the security forces were recorded despite the heated tempers on both sides. That said, the gathered Islamists decided to send a five-cleric delegation “to the highest Saudi authorities” and demand “the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners and detainees.” It was also decided that the delegation would give the government “one day to decide their reaction to this request.” Meanwhile, the Islamists decided to call for a larger rally to be held the next day in Riyadh in order demonstrate the strength and resolve of the Islamists.

The Islamists also issued a communiqué on September 13 concerning reaction to “the arrest of our respected Muslim Scholar, Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Udah.” It read:

Those who receive our message in the land of al-Jazirah are urged to go immediately to the Masjid [Mosque] of Sheikh Salman [al-Udah] in the city of Buraidah, in order to reinforce the gathering of thousands Muslims who vowed to resist Saudi regime at any cost after the arrest in the early morning hours of Sheikh Salman [al-Udah].

The same day, September 13, saw the first overt communiqué of an Islamist terrorist organization inside Saudi Arabia. An organization calling itself the “Brigades/Battalions of Faith [Kata'ib al-Iman]” issued an ultimatum to the Saudi authorities to release Sheikh Salman al-Udah within five days or the organization would spring into action.

In their communiqué, the Brigades/Battalions of Faith threatened to:

Destroy Western institutions, which include embassies, banks, corporations... Kidnap American and Western citizens; kidnap Royal Family members... Destroy the investment corporations of the Al-Saud Family, like SASCO, NAFTA, ARA, MEED... and Kidnap senior officers in all armed and security forces

The communiqué stated that, “all the Arabian Peninsula is an open theatre for our Jihad operations.” Significantly, the Brigades/Battalions of Faith contrasted the detention of Sheikh al-Udah with the Saudi relations with the West, declaring that, “it is never acceptable that

Christians and Jews are wondering freely in the Peninsula while the Ulema are held in prison.” The communiqué then gave clear orders for the followers of the Brigades/Battalions of Faith to start executing their plan in accordance with existing orders immediately as soon as the five-day ultimatum had passed.

By now, it became clear that Prince Salman and the authorities in Riyadh were taking the Islamists threat very seriously. On September 14, just before the planned march, a very large anti-riot force, augmented by strong and heavily armed Army and National Guard forces, was deployed in the streets of Riyadh. Significantly, representatives of all the armed and law enforcement forces in Saudi Arabia participated in this show of force to stress the point that they were all loyal to the regime, as well assure that even if some individuals crossed over to the Islamists, the other units were there to deal with the mob.

Meanwhile, Islamist leaders in the Riyadh area were summoned by the authorities and threatened with severe repercussions to themselves and their followers if the march took place. Fearing heavy casualties, the Islamists called off the large demonstration. Ultimately, only some 1,000 die-hard supporters of Sheikh al-Udah showed up, and 70 of them were arrested after a brief clash with the security forces.

One reason Riyadh was on edge was the spread of rumors throughout Saudi Arabia on September 14 and 15, that there had been a significant worsening in the health of King Fahd during the night of the 13/14. Reportedly, King Fahd's condition required that he be flown by helicopter to receive emergency treatment in the Jedah hospital. Official Riyadh strongly denied these reports, and has since pointed to the string of foreign dignitaries, including British Prime Minister John Major, who have met with the King in Jedah as evidence of the monarch's continued vitality. However, irrespective of the extent of the worsening of King's medical condition in mid September, the mere spread of these rumors exacerbated the situation for both the regime and the Islamists.

Thus, Riyadh went on the offensive on September 15 in Buraida. Numerous units of the Police, the Army, and the Royal Guard were rushed to the city and succeeded in putting it under siege. Buraida was transformed into a military base, and Islamist leaders urged their followers to avoid the town. Nevertheless, some 5,000 supporters gathered at the al-Diyah Mosque, but dispersed peacefully before the security forces had an opportunity to clash with them. Instead, Islamist

activities were organized in several cities simultaneously in an effort to impress upon Riyadh the extent of Islamist sentiment in the kingdom.

These gatherings were quite an achievement for the Islamists considering that Riyadh had launched an all-out effort earlier that day, September 15, to neutralize them. Numerous Sheikhs who were to lead the demonstrations and speak at gatherings were arrested in security forces raids, including Sheikh Zayid al-Qarny (arrested In Riyadh), Sheikh Salih al-Muhameed, Sheikh Mohammad al-Dubaikhi, Sheikh Ali al-Fowzan, Sheikh Abd-al-Wahhab al-Tirery (his fate not clear), and Sheikh Mohammed bin Ahmad al-Farraj.

Meanwhile, the Brigades/Battalions of Faith repeated their ultimatum, this time issuing copies also in Western Europe and the U.S. Faxed copies were sent to most Saudi Embassies demanding the immediate release of Sheikh al-Udah, and stressing that following the period of five days,

if the Sheikh is not released, members of the group will strike the following targets in Al-Jazirah: Western Interests including banks, embassies and Companies; Kidnapping of Foreigners; Kidnapping of royal family members; Attacking financial centers of al-Saud; Attacking gas stations; [as well as] Kidnapping of High ranking officers and security commanders.

Consequently, Friday, September 16, proved a major test case. Some 8,000 worshippers attended the Friday prayers services at the al-Diyab Mosque in Buraida. They actively resisted an attempt by the security forces to enter the mosque and arrest the khatib – the Imam who was delivering the sermon. In at least two other mosques, however, the security forces succeeded in arresting the khatibs and several worshippers before the seditious sermons could be delivered.

According to Saudi Islamists and other Arab sources, there were over 1,000 Islamist detainees in Buraida alone, some 250 in Riyadh, and nearly 50 elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula.

That fact notwithstanding, the Islamists began preparations to recover from the arrest of Sheikh al-Udah by reviving the operation of his offices. Consequently, on the night of September 17/18, several of the Sheikh's followers entered his office in order to retrieve a number of important faxes and other files. While they were inside, a large contingent of Saudi security forces raided the home of the still imprisoned Sheikh al-Udah with full riot gear, firing tear-gas and

machine guns. They arrested all the males found in the building (14 men), and, according to the Islamists, “violated commonly expected Arabian manners when they insulted the wife of the imprisoned Sheikh Salman al-Udah.” Ultimately, the security forces hauled away two truckloads of Sheikh al-Udah's personal belongings, primarily his Islamic library as well as other written materials.

In addition, a second wave of arrests of Islamist intellectuals and professionals, primarily university professors and famous clerics, was launched throughout Saudi Arabia. Among those arrested were Sheikh Safar al-Hawali, Sheikh Nassir al-Umar, and the 70-years-old Sheikh Abdallah al-Jalali.

Moreover, evidence emerged that Riyadh was determined to brutally suppress the Islamists. Some of the released detainees, primarily those caught in the mass detention during the storming of Sheikh al-Udah's mosque, reported that while in jail, they had been pressured to sign “statements describing Sheikh Salman al-Udah as one of the khawarij.” Khawarij, meaning subversive against the state and the Royal House, is an offense that carries a mandatory death penalty in Saudi Arabia.

By September 18, the following key Islamist leaders were already under arrest:

- Sheikh Safar al-Hawali
- Sheikh Nassir al-Umar and some 150 other followers
- Sheikh Ayedh al-Qarni, who was prevented from defending the Ph.D. thesis
- Sheikh Hmood Ghazay al-Harbi
- Sheikh Muhammad al-Dubaikhi
- Sheikh Ali al-Khudhair
- Sheikh Saleh al-Mohaimed
- Sheikh Abdallah al-Jalali
- Sheikh Abd-al-Aziz al-Juwee

- Ahmad al-Fahad
- Yousef al-Emer
- Khalid al-Ghefari
- Abd-al-Rahman al-Dekheel Allah
- Saad al-Hur
- Ahmad al-Salameh
- Mohammad al-Ghefari
- Nassir al-Barak, whom police chased and fired upon. The information about his fate has not been confirmed.
- Ahmad Aba al-Kail
- Abd-al-Aziz al-Umairi
- Ali al-Fouzan
- Khali Abd-al-Aziz al-Ghefari
- Sulayman al-Yehya
- Abdallah al-Mohaimed
- Muhammad al-Ghunaittee
- Ahmad al-Reshoodi
- Abdallah al-Rubaee
- Sulayman Abdallah al-Reshoodi
- Ahmad Saleh al-Sawee
- Ahmad al-Sannat

- Rumaiyan al-Rumaiyan
- Mohammad al-Abd-al-Munaim
- Saleh al-Rajhi
- Bandar al-Rajhi
- Salleh al-Luhaidan
- Ttuwayan al-Ttuwayan (Ukaz Reporter)
- Saleh al-Judaie

In total, Saudi Islamist leaders in the West estimate that there were some 50 Sheikhs and 650 other Islamists from their own organizations placed under arrest. Moreover, Saudi Government troops surrounded most of the mosques during prayers, preventing any gathering or sermons.

In the meantime, by September 21, the Saudi security forces had already arrested hundreds of people in the first phase of a crackdown on militant Islamists who were demanding stricter enforcement of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. Islamist sources claim that more than 1,000 people were detained in Buraida while Western sources estimate that only 400 to 500 people were arrested there. In addition, some 250 Islamists were arrested in the Riyadh area, and some 50 elsewhere in Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Prince Nayif bin Abd-al-Aziz, the Saudi Interior Minister, stated on September 21 that there was “complete security” in the kingdom, and denied all reports of civil disorder. “The security which our land is blessed with is complete and will continue, as every fellow-citizen and resident safeguards his religion, himself, his womenfolk and his property,” Prince Nayif bin Abd-al-Aziz was quoted as saying. Currently, official Riyadh continues to issue a blanket denial of the unfolding crisis. At the same time, the Islamists' call for a show of solidarity overseas was beginning to be heeded. For example, some 10-15 Saudi Islamists conducted a quiet solidarity demonstration in front of the Saudi Embassy in Washington on 23 September.

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The escalating Islamist struggle in Saudi Arabia, like many of the Islamist revolutionary armed movements worldwide, is sponsored by Iran and Sudan. While the rise of the Islamist movement and the current upsurge in Saudi Arabia are first and foremost the result of indigenous trends inside the country, the importance of the foreign sponsorship and support should not be discounted. The primary effort of the Iranian and Sudanese lies in the prodding of radical Saudi Islamists toward armed struggle, as well as in providing them the means and training to launch that struggle.

Thus, the emergence of the Kata'ib al-Iman terrorist organization is a most significant development because it not only confirms the existence of an Islamist armed underground inside Saudi Arabia, but also points to its participation in the overall Iran-led Islamist terrorist movement. Indeed, in the ultimatum issued by the Saudi Islamists in which retaliation was threatened if Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Udah was not released, the targets identified for attack were as much anti-American and anti-Western as anti-Saudi. The Kata'ib al-Iman threatened to strike Western interests including banks, embassies and companies including those owned by the House of Saud. These target lists are virtually identical to the generic target priority lists issued by the Islamist terrorist network.

Indeed, the Saudi Islamists are fully integrated into the Armed Islamic Movement that is dominated by Iran and run from Sudan. For example, on September 10, the Saudi Islamists identified Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman as a leader who delivered a sermon for them by phone from his New York prison. In this sermon, Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman "condemned the arrests by the Saudi regime, especially that of Sheikh Safar Al-Hawaly." He added that, "Allah the Almighty had exposed this regime which falsely claims it is protecting and promoting Islam." Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman concluded that, "Allah will put his punishment on this oppressive regime for attacking the followers of Allah who were only spreading the teachings of Islam."

The Iranian-Sudanese terrorist system is instrumental in providing the Saudi Islamist terrorists with the means to escalate their armed struggle against Riyadh. There is already an intensified flow of Islamist terrorists, including hundreds of Saudi "Afghans," from Sudan and Yemen into western Saudi Arabia. In addition, Shi'ite Islamists have arrived in the eastern provinces of the kingdom from Iran, some across the Persian Gulf and many via Iraq.

There is also a flow of weapons and other means of armed struggle into Saudi Arabia in anticipation of an Islamist uprising. Moreover, the Islamists, sponsored by Iran and Sudan, are activating a support and control mechanism for the Saudi Islamists from the U.S. This support system is not unlike that established for the HAMAS in Israel, where it proved instrumental in the efforts to revive that organization. The extent of these preparations strongly suggest that Tehran and Khartoum expect a major and lengthy struggle that will spread throughout Saudi Arabia.

Indeed, Tehran even anticipates that the U.S. might deploy major forces into the Arabian Peninsula in order to rescue its allies in Riyadh and defend the oil fields. Consequently, the Iranian military has begun moving large forces to the northern Persian Gulf under the guise of the “largest exercise ever.”

Thus, the major Falaq-2 missile war games of the IRGC began in the Persian Gulf on September 19, dealing mainly with anti-shipping strikes. On September 22, Iran began simultaneously “six massive exercises [to] demonstrate a fraction of the country's military power and the forces' readiness for war.” Among these exercises was the Olama-3 ground force exercise in central and southern Iran involving major tanks assault, as well as a major air force exercise.

Meanwhile, Baghdad has intensified the drainage of the marshes in southern Iraq. Significantly, Iran has remained silent even though its Iraqi Shi'ite allies have been massacred in the process. The reason for this operation is that the dried-up areas are crucial to any invasion from Iran into Saudi Arabia should the need arise.

Needless to say, the various Islamist incidents described here are but the tip of the iceberg. They represent the initial opening of an immense wave of social unrest among the Saudi youth. Conservative Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the world's principal advocate of pure Islam, is increasingly haunted by this resurgent religious militancy, while the Saudi Islamists are obsessed by what they see as a dangerous decline in moral and ethical standards. The Islamists believe that the escalating succession struggle, because of its unprecedented bitterness, creates a favorable opportunity for the overthrow of the hated House of al-Saud and they are preparing to achieve that goal.

Meanwhile, Riyadh is haunted by the legacy of the fall of the Shah of Iran. Just like their Iranian predecessors, some of the upper echelons in the royal family are too obsessed with the succession struggle to notice the gathering storm. Further, the already fractured and overcomplicated Saudi government system is based on a delicate

balance of power amongst the members of the various family branches. Consequently, as the worsening feuds inside the House of al-Saud has reduced cooperation between the various members of the dynasty key sectors of the government have become paralyzed at a crucial moment.

At the same time, other sectors of the government, most notably those led by Prince Salman and his supporters have confined their actions to the suppression of the Islamist threat without addressing its root causes. The primary reason for this approach, as will be explained in a moment, is that Prince Salman ultimately considers the royal family's fear of radical Islam to be a primary component in his plan for attaining power in Riyadh. Consequently, the Saudi security forces have been left postponing the inevitable while hostility within the Islamist community continues to build.

It is in the context of Prince Salman's true aspirations, however, that the significance of the Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia should be understood. The Islamist threat has already grown to the point that its complete reversal or suppression is highly unlikely. Prince Salman should know this better than most in the upper-most circles of the House of al-Saud given his ties to various Islamist elements. He is also aware of the obsessive preoccupation of his fellow princes with their own survival. Therefore, it is conceivable that Prince Salman is intentionally building up the Islamist "bogeyman" in order to maneuver his relatives into acquiescing, if not supporting, his rise to the Saudi throne.

In this scenario, as Islamist violence rises, Prince Salman will be able to come to King Fahd and the leading Princes of the dynasty and present himself, in view of his past contacts and recently demonstrated zeal, as the only one who can strike a deal with the Islamists – a deal that will preserve the House of al-Saud in power and prevent the rise of a Saudi Khomeyni. At the very same time, Prince Salman still remains, from within the upper-most levels of the House of al-Saud, the Prince most acceptable to the Islamists. Indeed, he may even convince Turabi and the Islamist leaders to tacitly support his reign as the sole alternative to the rise of a pro-American King.

Thus, for the Saudi Islamists, the future looks promising despite the current wave of repression. The Islamists' options range from the establishment of an Islamist republic to the rise of a sympathetic and accommodating King such as Prince Salman. However, the main challenge presently facing the Islamists, and their sponsoring states, is to be sure that they are in a position to move quickly and grab enough power as to be able to consolidate a dominant position at the helm of a

post-Fahd Saudi Arabia. For the Islamists, therefore, there are few alternatives to an escalation of their terrorist activities because this is the only way they can impose their presence on the political elite in Riyadh.

Little wonder, therefore, that Islamists who have just come out of Saudi Arabia describe their communities, and the country as a whole, as being on the verge of an Islamic revolution. For example, on September 18th, an Islamist Saudi told a congregation in the central United States that, "there may be a major uprising against the Saudi monarchy in progress in Riyadh, Medina, and other cities."

Riyadh is at the beginning of a major crisis that will determine the fate of the House of al-Saud. However, its outcome is not yet certain. The future of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will ultimately be determined by the ability of the leading Princes to close ranks and deal effectively with both the succession crisis and the Islamist uprising. Selecting who will be the next "Custodian of the Holy Shrines" [King], especially if the successor comes from a younger generation, is a major and complicated challenge.

However, in this climate of instability, it is imperative that the succession issue be resolved very soon. This is because the ever-prudent Tehran and Khartoum will unleash the Islamists only when they sense opportunity and vulnerability. Therefore, Riyadh must reassert itself as a bastion of stability and resolve. Otherwise, the seeming vulnerability and impending collapse of the House of al-Saud will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The case for this view goes back to the history of the Iranian Revolution. In the late 1970s, the Shah was toppled and Khomeyni took over in Iran only when both the "street" and the Islamist leaders became convinced that the Shah and his regime had lost their resolve. Consequently, it was the Shah's self-inflicted defeat rather than an Islamist triumph that brought Khomeyni to the helm. In fact, Khomeyni and his inner circle were surprised by the speed of the regime's collapse and by its lack of resistance.

Presently, immersed as it is in its bitter succession struggle, the House of al-Saud portrays a similar image of vulnerability and exhaustion. This impression can only encourage the Islamists and their sponsoring states to attempt to repeat in Riyadh the triumph of Tehran. So it is that the indications are that the Islamist challenge to Riyadh has already begun, but it is not yet irreversible. This is significant because, for the U.S., the rise of an Islamist regime in Saudi Arabia would be a strategic setback far worse than any it has known since the fall of the

Shah. Consequently, it is now in great measure up to Washington to decide whether or not it can afford another "Tehran."

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
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The Persian Gulf Redux

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Since early October 1994, the overall situation in Saudi Arabia has deteriorated significantly. This is a direct result of the impact of the Iraqi troop movements toward, and then away from, the Kuwaiti border. Riyadh's reaction to these Iraqi maneuvers has both exposed the dissent within the House of Saud and confirmed Saudi Arabia's dependence on the U.S. for its defense – a point stressed by Islamists as proof of Riyadh's un-Islamic character.

In fact, as early as the latter half of September, even though the Saudi security forces continued mass arrests of Islamists, Riyadh had already lost its struggle with the Islamist movement. This happened the moment the highest levels of the House of Saud felt obliged to react to the Fatwas and other religious decrees issued by the Islamist opposition – both inside Saudi Arabia as well as by such organizations as the London-based CDLR.

The most significant of these was a communiqué issued inside Saudi Arabia on 24 September 1994. The “Statement to the Ummah,” which was issued by a group of religious leaders, stressed that Riyadh had lost touch with both the people and the religious leadership. The Islamists declared that, “what has happened has been the direct result of

the Authorities not responding to the advice of the people and not listening to the repeated correction calls.” They went on to warn of dire ramifications, primarily,

the loss of security. History – recent and old – witnesses that violence can only produce violence, so be aware of violence in confronting Daa’wa, which is what has destroyed societies around us. We, the Students of Knowledge, can see the ideal solution for the insecurity the society is living in lies in the response by the Government to the calls of correction and their advice, with dialogue, with the scholars, and with the people of wisdom in the society.

The Statement also urged the security forces to remain loyal to their declared mission as,

the guards of the people and the soldiers of [Islam]... your job is not to commit the crime of breaking in the Houses of Allah and hurting worshippers and breaking their prayers. Be afraid of Allah, brothers, and be afraid of call to Allah by those you have been hurting.

Riyadh's reaction was electric. On October 2, Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdel-Rahman al-Jibrin, a member of Saudi Arabia's Committee of Religious Edicts and a leading Saudi Arabian preacher working for the government, issued a Fatwa that CDLR's statements should “not be distributed or published in any way.”

Considering that the Statement to the Ummah, as well as other Islamist literature, are not mentioned in the official media and are distributed only clandestinely, the primary objective of the Saudi Fatwa was to express Riyadh's determination to do something about its deteriorating situation. In reality, Riyadh's Fatwa was meaningless.

Nonetheless, in short order Riyadh had launched a media blitz both in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states against the Islamists. They were described as “fanatical extremists intent on destabilizing the [Saudi] kingdom” without any religious authority. Riyadh urged the other Gulf states “to join forces to resist... a plot to spread extremism... in order to jeopardize security and stability.” Officials in Bahrain concurred that, “All mechanisms of common action must be

devoted to confronting this vicious assault at all levels, whether it takes the form of sabotage or of sinister propaganda.”

Somewhat surprisingly, the Saudi-inspired propaganda blamed the West for the growing instability. Alluding to the existence of opposition organizations in the West, local Saudi columnists accused Western governments of instigating a destabilization effort through the media:

It is no longer a matter of the ways or methods in which the Western media function, but an assault whose intensity grows by the day which has clear features and specific aims and whose goal is to exert pressure and sow dissent and instability so as to blackmail the region.

The Saudi columnists stressed that, “the attempts at extortion to which the West has lately started resorting in order to drain this region's resources are immoral, and are a cheap way of reaching this goal by the shortest route.” It is therefore imperative for the Gulf states to close ranks behind Saudi Arabia, being “the key to regional stability and development,” and develop a joint “domestic front” against the extremist onslaught “and resist the full-scale campaign being waged by the Western press for well-known reasons.”

At the same time, writing in the leading Saudi paper, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, columnist Ghassan al-Imam pointed out that “Saudi Arabia is no stranger to confrontation with religious extremists,” and warned that those “in Tehran, Khartoum or Beirut” who entertain the notion that the current clash “will destabilize the country had better think again.” This oblique comment was the first indication that Riyadh, despite its protestations to the contrary, was beginning to realize the extent of its troubles.

Meanwhile, the upper echelons of the House of Saud continue to fragment. This has become increasingly clear, as several key princes have now realized both the extent of the Islamist threat and the popularity of the suppression of the Islamist movement within the ranks of senior princes who are alarmed by what an Islamist state would mean to the future of the dynasty.

Among the more important of these princes is Prince Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz, the governor of Riyadh and a major claimant to the throne, who has made himself several powerful enemies. The first, and to date, most important of these enemies is Prince Nayef, the Minister

of Interior, who is also a Sudairi. Back in December 1993, Nayef had directed a half-hearted crackdown of Islamists that resulted in a few hundred arrests. That campaign was launched at the instigation of Prince Turki bin Faisal, head of the intelligence services, who is very apprehensive about a foreign-sponsored Islamist conspiracy. Currently, Princes Nayef and Turki are working to revive their anti-Islamist credentials. However, Nayef's early denials of any Islamist threat to the regime, although made on order of King Fahd, have damaged his reputation.

Another senior prince who has discovered the Islamist card is Crown Prince Abdallah, the chief of the National Guard. Abdallah is a strong supporter of the suppression of the Islamist movement, and indeed the National Guard is very active in this regard, but is also apprehensive about Prince Salman's growing power. Abdallah also believes that Nayef and Turki are likely to support Prince Sultan. Therefore, Abdallah handles the struggle against the Islamists in such a way as to make sure that none of his competitors can benefit from it.

In this environment, as Riyadh escalates its suppression of the Islamist movement, King Fahd has moved to try and restore the Islamist credentials of the House of Saud. On October 4, the government announced the establishment of the "Higher Council for Islamic Affairs." The Council was made responsible for "organizing [the Kingdom's] activities in favor of Muslims throughout the world." Announcing the Council's establishment, King Fahd declared that its goal was to "deepen Saudi Arabia's service of Islam."

However, its real purpose is, in the words of one Saudi official, "to dilute the authority of the Ulemas Council" because of the Ulemas Council's increasing leanings toward the Islamists. Indeed, the Council for Islamic Affairs is chaired not by a religious authority, but by Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd-al-Aziz, and all key government ministers – including the ministers of interior, foreign affairs, higher education, economy and finances, justice and Islamic affairs – are among its members. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Ali, the General Secretary of the Islamic World League and a friend of Sudanese spiritual leader Hassan al-Turabi, is the only non-Minister among the senior members of the Council.

After creating the Council, on October 8, King Fahd ordered,

the establishment of the Islamic Call and Guidance Council which will be responsible for planning and supervising all issues related to the Islamic call and

approving its programs and plans and determining the qualities which should be found in Muslim preachers, the method of selecting them and following up their work.

It is significant that the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Dr. Abdallah bin Abd-al-Muhsin al-Turki, was nominated as the council's chairman. Al-Turki belongs to the "underground" Saudi Muslim Brotherhood, which is formally affiliated with the International Muslim Brotherhood and, through it, Turabi's Armed Islamic Movement. However, because of his family ties, Al-Turki is considered bound by his "oath of allegiance" to King Fahd, even though the Brotherhood is actively striving to strip the al-Saud family of any Islamic legitimacy. King Fahd hopes that al-Turki will be able to deliver some sort of compromise with Tehran and Khartoum.

That fact notwithstanding, these measures were not sufficient to pacify the Islamists. On October 16, 1994, Sheikh Abd-al-Aziz bin Baz of the Grand Mosque defended the recently imprisoned Islamist Sheikhs Salman and Safar. Sheikh bin Baz compared what the two Islamists were going through to the trials endured by "earlier Scholars of Islam and Prophets" during the days of the Prophet Muhammad. In so doing, Sheikh bin Baz in fact compared the Saudi regime to the anti-Muslim rulers who had tried to suppress the establishment of Islam and were decimated after Muhammad rose to power.

Sheikh bin Baz also issued an opinion about Prince Bander bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., in view of his comment that "Sheikhs Safar and Salman wanted to take the Ummah nine centuries backward." Sheikh bin Baz decreed that this and such statements were "ones of Hypocrites and enemies of Islam" who should be punished accordingly. It was also announced at the Grand Mosque that senior scholars, including Sheikhs bin Jabreen, Humood al-Aqila, and Salih al-Mansoor, had expressed their support for, and endorsement of, the positions of Sheikhs Safar and Salman.

The next day, the Committee for Advice and Reformation, a Saudi Islamist group closely affiliated with Khartoum, specifically condemned the establishment of the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs. In a statement signed by Usama bin Laden, the Committee accused Riyadh of "trying to deceive the public" and of attempting to portray itself as protector of the Islamic "message and creed." "The members of the council, duties assigned to it, the timing and the circumstances of

its formation, are all indications of the problems which dominate the behavior of the regime in its war against Islam,” the statement read.

Bin Laden further accused Riyadh of attempting “to put an end to genuine Islam,” under the guise of reforms. The Council's establishment is “an indication of the government's determination to exacerbate the situation while refusing the reconciliation efforts by Sheikh Abd-al-Aziz bin Baz and other clerics,” the Committee added. “The usurpation” of Sheikh bin Baz's most important duties were a punishment for his opposition to the recent arrests of various Islamist activists.

* * *

The importance of these events should be examined in the context of the overall escalation and situation in the region, especially the Iranian position. The Iraqi deployment of Republican Guard forces near the Saudi and Kuwaiti border in mid to late October was but an opening phase – a catalyst – for a far wider strategic challenge to the West. In this strategic grand design, Baghdad is but an instrument – albeit a very important one – in Tehran's overall design. In this connection, had the Iraqi military move been more successful, Tehran and its allies might have been able to overthrow the Saudi regime and consolidate their control over the Persian Gulf and its oil resources.

That said, Tehran has an even bigger and more ambitious grand design in mind. Tehran considers the current crisis in Saudi Arabia a turning point in the unfolding long-term dynamics of the Near East, if not the entire so-called “Hub of Islam.” On the one hand, the Islamist trend seems within reach of a strategic victory – as demonstrated by the rapid deterioration of, and Islamist successes in, such key countries as Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. However, at the very same time, Tehran and its allies are fully aware of the importance of the region to the United States.

Therefore, it has become imperative for Tehran to confront the U.S. with a major test that will prove once and for all that Washington is a paper tiger – incapable of confronting Islam and of defending its self-declared “vital interests” in the Hub of Islam.

Indeed, in mid September, Tehran concluded that a clash over several islands in the Strait of Hormuz – Abu-Mousa and the Tumbs – was inevitable. This assessment was based on intelligence from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and was reflected in

the intensification of Iranian military preparations and exercises in the Persian Gulf.

By late September, Tehran was actively preparing for a possible military confrontation with the Persian Gulf states over the islands. Tehran believes that by demonstrating its assertive and uncompromising position over Persian Gulf issues, it will be able to influence such countries as Egypt and Iraq to recognize Iran's unique position in the Hub of Islam.

The case of Iraq is most important. Tehran has concluded that Saddam Hussein's regime is no longer in danger of collapse. Moreover, Iranian intelligence has concluded that even under extreme pressure, Saudi Arabia and the GCC would not accept Iraq joining forces with them in a new anti-Iranian alliance. Therefore, Tehran is convinced that an increase in tension with the Persian Gulf states is likely, and that it could even lead to a "state of military conflict" involving other powers. However, with Iraq on Tehran's side, the Iranian Government is convinced such a conflict can only serve the long-term interests of the Islamist cause.

However, before embarking on such a conflict, the ever-prudent Tehran needs a catalyst – an international crisis involving the U.S. that will not implicate Iran. In this way, Tehran would not be blamed for the conflict while, at the same time, being able to gauge the extent of U.S. commitment to intervention in the Persian Gulf region.

Against this backdrop, since the fall of 1994, there has been a very distinct Islamist revival in Iraq that has been tolerated by the Ba'ath regime. Baghdad portrays Saddam Hussein as both a military leader and a man of faith, while the Iraqi propaganda machine stresses religious issues. Billboards and newspaper pictures portray Saddam Hussein kneeling on a prayer rug in full military dress. Government television now breaks for prayers five times a day and features long lectures by religious sheiks. Moreover, Baghdad has already implemented strict Islamic punishments as specified in the Koran – from hand amputations for thieves to death by stoning for repeat offenders and adulterers.

The Islamicization of Iraq might have begun as a ploy – a warning that if the sanctions are not lifted, Iraq, the steadfast barrier against Iranian Islamist expansion, would ultimately move into the embrace of Islamic fundamentalism. However, with the exception of a small urban elite, the public has embraced the new measures at face value, a fact that has startled Baghdad. With growing unrest due to the harsh economic conditions, the popular enthusiasm and support for the

introduction of fundamentalist Islam has been too good for the Ba'athist leadership in Baghdad to ignore. Thus, Iraq has begun to intensify its slide toward Islam.

The ensuing institutionalization of Islamic ways is officially designated the National Religious Belief Campaign. The Ba'ath elite is attempting to balance the popularity of Islamism with the fear of an Islamist challenge to the regime. "The National Religious Belief Campaign concentrates on the main concepts of religious belief," a senior Iraqi official explained, "but not on fundamentalism. This has made both sects [of Iraqi Muslims] surprised, because they cannot understand this campaign which concentrates not on the political concepts, but on the concepts of belief."

Still, the campaign is ultimately political. Parliament Speaker Saadi Mahdi Saleh explained that encouraging Islam is a way of feeding the public's patience and readiness for sacrifice. "Hard or difficult circumstances make man seek God's help," he said.

You in the West are driving the region toward this kind of practice because when unjust pressure is put upon societies, those societies cannot answer back the way they would like to, and then they will go to God and pray. When unjust pressure comes, religion becomes stronger, and as a conclusion it would end up declaring jihad against those who are practicing these unjust deeds.

In mid September, Baghdad was convinced that although such powers as Russia, Germany and France were eager to resume economic relations with Iraq, the U.S. was so resolutely against the lifting of sanctions that it was able to manipulate the UN into keeping them in effect. Indeed, Tariq Aziz was sent to New York not to get the sanctions reversed, but to confirm Baghdad's conviction that the U.S. would never let it happen.

That point was driven home in what was perceived as the insulting remarks of Ambassador Albright about Aziz's speech – a speech outlined by Saddam Hussein who also confirmed the final version and which had been presented by the Iraqis to numerous Arab diplomats as a major initiative by the Iraqi leadership. Ms. Albright's remarks were thus considered a blatant and intentional insult to Saddam Hussein, and not just Iraq. This incident provided Baghdad with the final

confirmation that a confrontation with the U.S., as urged and advocated by Tehran, was indeed inevitable.

In this connection, a major aspect of the crisis surrounding the forward deployment of the Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti and Saudi borders was the Islamist reading and analysis of that event. The Islamists stressed that, "Saddam wanted to create a minor crisis" in order to prove to the world that he was still defiant, as well as "provoke a reconsideration of the sanctions." The Islamists insist that what was new in the current crisis was Washington's reaction:

Saddam has been doing this 'minor crisis' routine for several years now both in the South (at the Kuwaiti borders) and the north (with the Kurds) but this time was different because the U.S. chose to help him out. Until then, U.S. officials were still taking the old position of ignoring the Iraqi moves so as not to give Saddam the crisis he wanted.

This time, however, Washington intentionally created "a war atmosphere" and gave Saddam Hussein "not the minor crisis he was looking for, but a major crisis." Even though Baghdad left no doubt that "this was nothing but a political maneuver tried several times before," Washington frightened the world that there was "a real threat of war."

The Islamists explain that Washington went along with the Iraqi deception in order to push its way into Baghdad's pocket instead of its allies. "The U.S. understands that the sanctions on Iraq can not continue any longer... So the U.S. needs to prepare a scenario for the lifting of the sanctions in a way acceptable and PROFITABLE to it." As a result of raising the war scare Washington,

pushed for condemnation of Iraq and more sanctions in the UN. Now those championing the lifting of sanctions will have to give the U.S. some incentives to move from this position to their position. Incentives will have to come as giving the U.S. some kind of economic control... The 'crisis' is no more than the U.S.' opening position in the coming negotiations between the Western Capitalists on dividing the pie in Iraq.

At the same time, the crisis exposed the duplicity and inherent weakness of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Falling into the American trap, the local rulers willingly accepted the return of anti-Islamic colonialism to the Arabian Peninsula:

We are back to the colonialist era again with Kaffir bases and troops strewn around in Muslim lands... But then if the traitors who rule our Ummah surrendered us to the mercy of the Kaffir Christians, what difference does it make if they surrender also to the Kaffir Jews. Instead of the prosperity that Secularists continue to promise us with under the rule of their Kuffir system, the Secularists ruling our Ummah not only robbed the it of its wealth but also its dignity. Now Kaffirs are occupying (a.k.a. defending) the heart of the Khalifah (Turkey) and the Ka'aba. Day by day, the urgency of removing the secular filth from the rule of our Ummah and bring back Islam to life continues to manifest itself.

The Islamists argue that the primary lesson of the U.S.-led international reaction to the Iraqi provocation is that there is an urgent need to restore Islamic rule over the entire Muslim world before it succumbs to American anti-Islamic neo-colonialism.

Thus, just on the eve of the Iraqi-induced crisis, Tehran appeared poised to capitalize on an imminent confrontation in Riyadh. On September 29, the Tehran Times, which is considered close to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, predicted in an editorial titled "King Fahd in the Footsteps of the Shah," that, "King Fahd would soon be toppled like the Shah of Iran." The editorial went on to say that the crisis is motivated by the yearnings of the people of Saudi Arabia to live under a truly Islamic government and not an American puppet.

"The Saudi people want nothing but a democratic form of government in which neither Americans nor Britons but common people have their say," Tehran Times argued. "In the footsteps of the Shah, the Saudi King is not ready to surrender power, power which his ancestors seized by force. The end is clear. History repeats itself. Final victory belongs to the people."

The Tehran Times compared Saudi Arabian weapons purchases from the U.S. and the UK, stressing that consequently tens of thousands of American soldiers and military advisers are stationed in Saudi

Arabia, to the situation in Iran in the last years of the Shah. Moreover, Riyadh, even though it pretends to be the leader of the Islamic world, did nothing but “flashed money, mostly in poor Islamic countries, to woo the innocent and ignorant.”

According to the Times, this effort in bribery is not working because Riyadh lacks Islamic legitimacy:

The Saudis, however, failed in their objective as Muslims in general have found true Islam in Iran, not in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royal family has been looking after the interests of the West rather than Muslims or even Saudi Arabians.

The Tehran Times concluded that, “Thorough analysis by regional and international analysts and the current unrest in Saudi Arabia indicates that the fall of King Fahd is imminent.” To reinforce this point, the Iranian media highlighted the recent arrests of Islamists by Riyadh, emphasizing that these arrests accurately reflected the anti-Islamic character of the House of Saud.

On October 2, 1994, the Saudi Gazette responded to Tehran:

The failure of President Hashemi- Rafsanjani's government in political and economic spheres is once again turning Iran back to even more counter-productive radicalism, which has resulted in that country's isolation and miseries for the people of Iran.

Riyadh went on to allude to the Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia:

Iran... is bent on creating chaos around it and spread anarchy. The Iranian foreign policy is based on hatred of others and it is not prepared to improve relations with its neighbors or other nations of the world. This intolerance has resulted in wars and destruction in the region... Thus, Iran is the biggest cause of instability in this volatile region, which has been struggling to maintain peace and security and create an atmosphere for progress and prosperity of its peoples.

The Saudi Gazette warned that, “Iran will from now on adopt a ‘higher revolutionary profile’.”

Riyadh concluded with a warning to Tehran about the ramifications of its policies:

Now a return to the flunked extremism of the past suggests that the Iranian leaders do not have a clear perception of the developments within and outside Iran, nor do they have an understanding of the results of their misguided actions. They have little awareness about the effects of turmoil they wish to create in their close neighborhood on Iran itself. Hence they have disqualified themselves of leading their nation. And, on the other hand, they are least trusted and least respected people for others in the world. The nation which builds their future on disorder throws itself into anarchy.

In the wake of this editorial tit for tat, Tehran concluded that an Islamist surge could indeed be transformed into a major Islamist uprising. Further, on October 6, Iranian officials observed that, “the rising wave of opposition against the Saudi rulers” is of “significance because of the backing it receives from religious and scientific authorities inside the country.” Moreover, “the crisis in Saudi Arabia has even engulfed the royal court.”

Tehran believes that, in view of the West’s resolute reaction to the Iraqi troop movements, there is a possibility that the collapse of the House of Saud will actually be instigated by Washington. In this regard, Iranian officials have wondered aloud,

if the USA had found a successor for King Fahd or Washington had come to the conclusion in the assessments about its Middle East policies that continuation of support for the Saudi family is not advisable for the U.S. administration.

Since it is inconceivable that Washington would willingly relinquish its hold over the Arabian Peninsula, the U.S. might be “thinking about the establishment of a republic there” primarily because the current crisis is “taking place in the framework of [an] internal power struggle in the Saudi family.”

However, Tehran concluded, the character of the Islamist surge and the identity of the key activists should leave no doubt that, irrespective

of Washington's original design, the Islamist revolution is genuine and likely to succeed. Indeed, Iranian officials stress "the backing shown by the scientific and religious sources in the country for the new wave of opposition against the Saudi rulers" is evidence of the deep roots of the Islamist trend. Moreover, since the Saudi Islamists "have risen up against the ever-increasing influence of the U.S. and Zionist regime in the holy lands," they will not accept any U.S.-installed alternative regime.

Therefore, the possibility of such a grand design should be examined in the context of the intensity of the forthcoming struggle for the Arabian Peninsula, and not as an indication of doubt of the struggle's ultimate outcome – an Islamic Republic in Saudi Arabia. "Maybe all of these are simple imaginations," Tehran noted, but relaxing, let alone ignoring, the Islamist struggle for Saudi Arabia means that "the world of Islam would come to itself one day and realize that not only the Al-Aqsa Mosque but even the Ka'bah [in Mecca] is under Zionist control." The Iranian officials concluded with a vague, yet very suggestive, comment: "All these indicate that Saudi Arabia is expecting unpredictable events, either a revolution or an offensive." What is unclear is whether Tehran was referring to the choice between an Islamist Revolution on the one hand, or an Iranian-led intervention in the form of an invasion on the other.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Declaring Islamist Jihad in Saudi Arabia

April 17, 1995

The crisis in Saudi Arabia has reached a turning point with the declaration of the beginning of Islamist armed struggle. This escalation is a direct development of the relatively non-violent, though very important, crisis unfolding since the fall of 1994.

The major event of the first phase of the crisis was the arrest in mid September 1994 of Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Udah, a young and charismatic Islamist preacher. He has been held in prison since then. However, in the last couple of months, Sheikh Udah began smuggling teaching and taped sermons from jail. He called for the intensification of the Islamist challenge to, and protests against, the rulers of the House of al-Saud.

On 9/10 April 1995, the followers of Sheikh Udah issued the text of a taped lecture recently smuggle from jail that amounted to a declaration of an armed Jihad against the House of al-Saud. The title of the lecture is Death Workmanship – Sina'at al-Mawt.

Sheikh Udah argues that the prevailing conditions throughout the Muslim Ummah (Nation), and primarily Saudi Arabia, necessitates the resumption of a comprehensive armed struggle. "The world today is

pushing Muslims and compelling them... to Death Workmanship, the profession of Death, and is making of them strong fighters.”

Sheikh Uдах warns that the Muslim Ummah is suffering “from political under-development, economic dependence and military weakness” that do not enable it “to race and compete in the big theater of life.” Although the present plight of the Muslim Ummah seems irreversible, “this religion proved its eternity and historical extension and its survival. Many nations attacked it, but these nations went and Islam stayed.” Nevertheless, it is imperative that the Believers strive to reverse the trend and “save this Ummah.” Sheikh Uдах emphasizes that conventional spiritual methods such as widespread teaching of Islam and knowledge of its laws “will not be enough” to resolve the current crisis. Nor will the adoption of Western ways – “importing technology, manufacturing and graduating experts and specialists” – be enough to reverse the trend. Sheikh Uдах even acknowledges that even the work of preachers and teachers like himself “may contribute, but it will not do what is required, even the efforts of Du’at and preachers, however great it is, it can only affect a small piece of the Ummah.”

There is no longer substitute for action. “[W]hat must occur to cause the change,” Sheikh Uдах emphasizes, “is events and incidents and happenings. These happenings may be made by the enemy, but it melts the Ummah and dissolves its evil and uncovers its good. It allows the Ummah to recognize its enemies from friends, and unites all loyals who defend Islam and its people.”

Sheikh Uдах anticipates the beginning of a widespread Islamist armed struggle. “The Islamic world today, I say it frankly to every friend and foe, the Islamic world today is transforming into a factory: a busy factory to prepare the fighters. The one who will not fight out of faith and enthusiasm, you will find him compelled to fight for his own survival because he has no other way.” Ultimately, most fighters will transform into Mujahideen. “The Mujahid Muslim who is looking for death is of a different breed. He sees that death is life in itself. Allah The Almighty Says: ‘Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead, nay they live finding their sustenance from their Lord.’”

Sheikh Uдах stresses that only an intense Jihad can cleanse and rejuvenate the Muslim Ummah to withstand and prevail in the modern world. “It is death that gives life, yes it is Jihad in the sake of Allah, the obliged fate on this Ummah. Otherwise it is extinction. If the Ummah abandoned Jihad and ignored it, then Allah will hit it and punish it by making it low among the nations, like the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: ‘If you abandoned Jihad, and became satisfied with

growing plants, then Allah will direct at you being low among the nations, and you will not be able to come out of it until you return to your religion and declare Jihad in the sake of Allah.”

Sheikh Udah further warns that the rejection of the Jihad in its original meaning – an uncompromising armed struggle – in favor of interpretations of modernity – namely, other forms of non-violent activities, are also dangerous to the very survival of Islam. “The abolishing of Jihad in the sake of Allah and its rejection and the refusal to believe in it as part of our Islamic creed is an apostasy from Islam, and makes the person outside the people of Islam. [This is] because Allah the Almighty Has ordered us to do Jihad clearly in the Qur’an without any ambiguity, and it was mentioned in the noble authenticated Hadith, and Islam can never be established and sustained without Jihad.”

Sheikh Udah’s lecture Death Workmanship [Sina’at al-Mawt] amounts to Fatwa permitting and ordering the launch of an armed Jihad against the Saudi government. In the lecture, he described the plight of the Ummah, and decreed that only Jihad can save Islam. Moreover, he decreed that any rejection of the armed Jihad in favor of another form of resistance is apostasy – a capital offense according to the Shari’a. Therefore, Sheikh Udah leaves the Believer with no alternative to armed struggle. Consequently, anybody who considers himself Muslim is therefore obliged to commit himself to the waging of the Jihad. Hence, the release of Sheikh Udah’s lecture is a major development.

Further more, the only previous threat of violence in the context of the Islamist struggle against the House of al-Saud was back on 13 September 1994. It was the release of the first overt communiqué of an Islamist terrorist organization inside Saudi Arabia. An organization calling itself The Brigades/Battalions of Faith [Kata’ib al-Iman] issued an ultimatum to the Saudi authorities to release Sheikh Salman al-Udah within five days or the organization will spring into action. In their communiqué, The Brigades/Battalions of Faith threatened various forms of terrorism against Saudis and Americans. The communiqué concluded that, “all the Arabian Peninsula is an open theatre for our Jihad operations.”

The Brigades/Battalions of Faith never materialized their threats. Moreover, their ultimatum communiqué was carefully phrased so as not to suggest that Sheikh Udah or the Islamist leadership was actually involved in, or event endorsed, the call for armed struggle. The communiqué left a convenient gap of deniability between the Islamist leadership and the Saudi Mujahideen.

This is no more. Now, one of the most popular and authoritative leaders of the Saudi Islamist movement gave very clear and explicit instructions concerning the armed struggle. The call for Jihad against the House of al-Saud was made at the highest possible level of authority. Sheikh Udah's lecture *Death Workmanship* is essentially a Fatwa authorizing the Jihad.

Further more, although Sheikh Udah has refrained from specifically mentioning the House of al-Saud, let alone the U.S., as the primary objectives of the Jihad he is urging, his followers fill the gaps. For example, Sheikh Udah's lecture *Death Workmanship* is being distributed in the U.S. with the following comment: "Sheikh Salman al-Udah is still in prison with hundreds of other Scholars in the Arabian Peninsula. He was jailed by the cowardly oppressive regime of Al-Saud family by what some believe the urging of the U.S. government." Soon after the publication of Sheikh Udah's Fatwa, other Islamist circles began acting on it, mainly by preparing their supporters to the transformation of the Islamist resistance in Saudi Arabia.

Most important is the change in the position of the London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights [CDLR]. The CDLR is a very "modernistic" Islamist movement that is making a concentrated effort to create in the West an image of a "moderate Islamist" movement. The CDLR stresses its commitment to non-violent populist opposition to the Saudi government. CDLR activists organized a host of "sit-in" protests and other forms of public protests in Saudi Arabia and Western capitals specifically in order to appeal to Western media and embarrass the Saudi government by demonstrating Riyadh's inability to deal with, or even conceal, the widespread opposition to the regime.

However, immediately in the aftermath of the release of Sheikh Udah's lecture, there was a major change in the policy line advocated by the CDLR. Now, the CDLR stresses that such popular protests are no longer sufficient to cause the overthrow of the government in Riyadh. Instead, these popular activities should be done in support for a struggle carried out by a small core of activists who are willing to sacrifice everything, including their lives, in pursuit of this noble struggle.

In its mid April communiqué, the CDLR stressed the need for an all-sacrificing elite – Mujahideen – at the forefront of the struggle against the Saudi regime: "No one can doubt the unity and agreement of the Nation in support of the legitimate leaders and that the reform process has the sympathy of all levels of society. This, however, was

not the real test. The test in question was regarding ‘who is prepared to sacrifice.’ Those hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions, of supporters and sympathizers are unable to present any real opposition unless they are led at the forefront by a committed group of people who are readily prepared to sacrifice their all for the cause. Indeed, sacrifices such as detention, torture and even death must be prepared for and accepted. Unless this leading group is solidly steadfast, then the rest of the support will collapse. The leading group does not necessarily need to be large, as it was a small group that Allah gave victory to in the story of David and Goliath.”

To further ensure that their audience understands that this general statement is in fact an endorsement of Sheikh Uдах’s call for the Jihad, the CDLR uses as an example of able leadership and sacrifice the protests in Burayda – Sheikh Uдах’s stronghold. CDLR explains that these most loyal and devoted followers of Sheikh Uдах, and thus most likely to implement his call for the Jihad, already constitute part of the sacrificing core required to bring about success. “The method the Government adopts now is of no real significance because the main obstacle has been overcome and the leading group has been formed. If tyranny and oppression were in any way effective, or served any purpose, this would have been evident after the first Burayda uprising.” (The first Burayda uprising is the popular struggle surrounding the arrest of Sheikh Uдах in September 1994. It is discussed in the Task Force report *The Last Days of the House of Al-Saud?*, 26 September 1994)

Thus, taken together, Sheikh Uдах’s lecture *Death Workmanship* and the CDLR’s endorsement, reflect the decision by the Saudi Islamist leadership to begin the armed Jihad as the only viable instrument to overthrow the Saudi regime. This is not an idle threat or an empty boast. For several years now, a large cadre of Saudi Islamists (estimates vary between 15,000 and 25,000), spearheaded by over 5,000 Saudi ‘Afghans’, has been trained, prepared, and equipped in camps in Iran, Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan/Afghanistan. There is a large Islamist underground network inside Saudi Arabia claiming to be ready to absorb and support these Saudi Mujahideen. These forces should not be confused with the over 10,000 Saudi Shi’ite militants Iran also supports. These Islamist militants are ready to be activated and committed to the Jihad in Saudi Arabia.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Lebanonization of Gaza

17 April 1995

The two suicide bombings on 9 April 1995, in which an American student and seven Israelis were killed, are indicative of a far more serious development in the Gaza Strip – the Lebanonization of Gaza.

The issue at hand is not just the escalating violence against Israel. Under the Palestinian authorities, the Gaza Strip has never been quiet. In recent months shooting incidents and detonation of small explosive charges at roadside have become such a common routine, that only the highly lethal suicide bombings receive media attention. The Palestinian security authorities have not only done nothing to contain the spread of violence, but actually support tacitly the conduct of many of these terrorist operations. The escalating violence is but one symptom of the process of Lebanonization.

The essence of Lebanonization is the internal collapse of the Gaza Strip. The fabric of society is virtually at the point of destruction. The distraught population has been alienated from the local authorities to the point of loyally and devotedly following alternate sources of authorities. Moreover, there is a popular uprising, including the use of force, against the “order” rejected by the population. (The Arabic term for this kind of rejection is Intifadah.)

It should be stressed that oppressed and suppressed population does not rebel because it can no longer tolerate its plight, but only when there is an alternate source of hope, inspiration, and guidance. The objective of popular uprisings is to empower a form of civil order the public at large believe in, while, in the process, destroying the now rejected present form of authority.

In the case of Gaza of the mid 1990s, just like wide segments of the Muslim population of Lebanon between the late 1970s and the mid 1980s, the new source of hope, inspiration, and guidance, are the Islamists. The primary goal of the escalating the terrorism struggle against Israel – conducted with declared objective of establishing an Islamic State on all the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, in other words, the total destruction of Israel – is to earn the respect and support of the public at large. The Islamists demonstrate their zeal and commitment through the series of spectacular terrorist operations, convincing the public that their commitment to the wellbeing of the Muslim population is equally strong. The concurrent emergence of the Islamists as the sole force capable of establishing some form of civil order, provide basic services for the population, as well as give guidance and hope, completes the shift of the public's allegiance to the Islamists.

The Islamists reinforce their power through a cyclical dynamics of violence and population manipulation. Spectacular terrorism brings enthusiasm to the street as well as hurt the population economically, leading to greater militancy of the youth. The ensuing escalation of terrorism and violence takes place while the population endures further erosion of the economic posture. The hardship is blamed on the enemies, while the greater violence is presented as manifestation of commitment and steadfastness. The first victim of this cyclical dynamics is the total collapse of the prevailing civil order.

In the spiraling dynamics of the Gaza Strip, Yassir Arafat is the main problem – a devastatingly effective catalyst expediting the rise of the most radical Islamists – not the potential solution to the Islamist threat.

That these developments are so entrenched only a few months after Yassir Arafat's triumphant return to Gaza should raise doubt as to Arafat's ability to properly control areas vacated by Israel, let alone maintain safety and security in the areas under his control, not to speak about preventing terrorism against Israel. The overall state of affairs in the Gaza Strip is not surprising when examined in the context of Arafat's priorities and general approach to running Gaza.

Arafat hardly arrived from Tunisia, when he immediately established the infrastructure of a police state in Gaza and Jericho. Most important is the myriad of competing and overlapping internal security forces and organs. The command echelons and key personnel of these forces are all based on personal loyalties to Yassir Arafat. Indeed, these organs care mainly about the safety and well being of Arafat and a few close cronies of his. Moreover, no effort has been made to dismantle the support infrastructure for international terrorism. Hakam Ballawi, the Director General of the PLO's Intelligence and Security Services is a veteran terrorist operative who still concentrates on worldwide issues.

Meanwhile, the PLO established a sizeable armed force in Gaza and Jericho. By mid March 1995, in the Gaza Strip alone, the PLO had well over 15,000 "policemen" even though the agreement with Israel permits only 9,000. Most important are the three internal security agencies: (1) The Preventive Intelligence and Security Organ under Jibril Rajub and Muhammad Dahlan with over 2,000 elite forces, (2) The General Intelligence Organ under Amir al-Hindi with 1,000 elite forces; and (3) The Military Intelligence under Mussa Arafat with some 500-600 elite forces. In addition, the PLO maintains the Palestinian National Security Forces, the thinly disguised commando units, under Nasr Yussuf (in Gaza) and Abd-al-Razzaq Majayidah (in Rafah); the Palestinian Police Force under Ghazi al-Jabali; and a host of smaller intelligence and security detachments and private forces. Ultimately, Arafat's security services are fractured and pre-occupied with spying on each other to prevent conspiracies against Yassir Arafat.

These security organs have no mission to, let alone interest in, dealing with the Islamists as long as they do not conspire against Arafat. Indeed, back in mid September 1994, Jibril Rajub stressed that there are "blood ties and single fate" between the PLO and the HAMAS. Rajub rejected any notion of his forces taking part in fighting Islamist terrorism, or even limiting the activities of the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip in order to prevent terrorism inside Israel. "We are not an insurance company," he explained. "We are not responsible for the security of the Israelis, but to the security of the Palestinians." Their track record speaks volumes. For example, by the PLO's own estimates there are over 26,000 "unregistered" weapons (weapons not approved by Israel in accordance with the interim agreement) in the Gaza Strip. To-date, in all the sweeps and anti-terrorism operations, the Palestinian authorities confiscated a total of 11 weapons!

Essentially, the PLO security forces are unwilling and cannot afford to confront the Islamists for objective reasons. First, the entire Palestinian security establishment is riddled with Islamists. They are most likely to rebel, at the very least defect en masse, if ordered to go beyond “make believe” suppression of the Islamists. Moreover, this is highly unlikely to happen if only because the entire high command of Arafat’s security organs has blood relations – usually brothers and first cousins – within the Islamist elite and the high command of the terrorist organizations. Arafat knows all that, and has long realized that he cannot trust even his own security elite to take on the Islamists.

The mere fact that members of so many prominent families are very active and hold senior positions in the Islamist organizations is an expression of the recognition by the traditional elite that the Islamists are the up-and-coming force. Therefore, the traditional elite deems it imperative that prominent youth of the key families establish themselves there in high positions to ensure that the interest of their own clan/extended family is secured once the Islamists reach power. The insertion of family representatives into the winning trend is a traditional way of doing business in the region, and has proven itself as a most accurate way to map society’s real reading of the emerging trends in the power and political structure. Moreover, traditionally, the key families markedly expand their presence in the leaderships of opposition groups once they gave up on the survival of the current power structure.

In Arafat’s Gaza Strip the situation is even more complex. Despite the enthusiastic welcome on his return from exile, Yassir Arafat and his cronies are yet to consolidate and legitimize their leadership. The Gaza elite and politically active population is torn between the old and the new trends. The veteran nationalistic group is the radicalized leftist revolutionary leadership – the leadership that endured the hardships of living under Israel while maintaining a level of functioning clandestine organization and terrorist struggle – and their armed detachments (including the Fatah Hawks). The young and up-and-coming elite is the rapidly growing myriad of Islamist forces in which the HAMAS-Muslim Brotherhood trend is the most dominant, with the Islamic Jihad second. The Islamists also maintain a wide variety of support institutions for the population.

The old revolutionary elite used to be formally associated with various member organizations of the PLO. In the late 1980s, many of its leaders were instrumental in presenting the Islamist Intifadah as an expression of popular support for Yassir Arafat. Therefore, this entire

establishment could, and should, have been the sound basis for Arafat's new leadership in Gaza. However, immediately upon returning from Tunisia, Arafat succeeded to alienate them even quicker than the Islamists! He treated people who endured suffering, including long prison terms, for his cause with disdain and open mistrust, preferring always his cronies from Tunis and Yemen. Presently, the gap between the indigenous Gaza PLO supporters and Yassir Arafat's group is virtually unbridgeable.

Meanwhile, the Islamists are predominant among the younger generation, particularly the professional and educated youth. The population of the Gaza Strip is very young, and continues to grow rapidly. These demographic trends alone ensure that the power of the Islamists will continue to rise. Moreover, the Islamist leaders are young, dynamic, charismatic and, most important, local! Even the cripple and imprisoned Sheikh Yassin has a dramatic presence through his fiery and brilliant speeches and lectures. Estimates of public support for the Islamists range between 45% and 65% of the population. In view of the corruption and oppression of Arafat's establishment, the Islamists' rallying cry – "Islam is the solution!" – is increasingly appealing and popular throughout the Gaza Strip.

The aggregate impact of these socio-political dynamics is the loss of public trust in the authority of Arafat and conventional political establishment in principle. Thus, the most dangerous aspect of the Lebanonization of Gaza is not the fratricidal violence inside the Gaza Strip, or the spate of terrorism out of Gaza. It is the demise of the population's thrust in any form of secular authorities. And secular political authorities, be they Arafat's or any other contender's, are the only ones willing to negotiate with Israel. Indeed, Jerusalem's primary justification for continued dealing with Arafat is that he is the only one willing to talk to Israel. Meanwhile, the Gaza population is moving the other way.

There is a growing recognition of the Islamist leadership as the sole entity capable of delivering nothing for the population. The support for the Islamists' call for violence is an integral part of this process. Having played the same game in Beirut in the 1970s and early 1980s, Yassir Arafat is not only fully aware of the internal dynamics in Gaza, but is confident in his ability to manipulate and exploit them for his own benefit. Arafat prides himself as a closet Islamist (having been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood at least in his youth) and believes that as a distant relative of Hajj Amin al-Hussayni he can expect

legitimization from Islamists. Arafat has no doubt in the triumph of the Islamist trend. He is equally adamant to remain in total power.

Arafat and his confidants are convinced that Islamist terrorism is the **sole** instrument at their disposal to force Israel to “negotiate” with Arafat – that is, to continue and hand over territory and power to Arafat even though he has long abandoned any pretence to live up to even the most basic conditions of the original Oslo agreement (like cancelling parts of Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel), or hide his determination to cancel the agreement the moment conditions are conducive. Arafat and his cronies, as well as the Israeli left, including the present government, point to the marked deterioration of security due to the unprecedented escalation of Islamist terrorism as indicative of what Israel can expect from the Islamists. They justify the continuation of the peace process with the threat that if Arafat falls, HAMAS will take over in the territories and terrorism will escalate dramatically. Thus, for Yassir Arafat, the mere existence of Islamist terrorism at the heart of Israel is a guarantee of continued recognition and negotiations even if he does nothing to live up to his part of the agreements already reached with Israel.

Arafat also needs tension with Israel, especially the closure of the Gaza Strip and the prevention of Gazans from working in Israel, in order to blame Israel for the economic collapse in Gaza. There have been wide expectations of economic miracles when Arafat returned with promises for international economic aid. But overall conditions have only worsened under Arafat. It is imperative for Arafat to have an outside force responsible for the economic disaster because the bulk of the foreign aid donated to the PLO for humanitarian assistance and development projects is being consumed by Arafat’s own cronies and the security system, with Arafat personally controlling the dispensation of every penny. The extent of misuse and embezzlement of foreign funds is widely known, and strongly criticized by the Islamists. Fearing a conspiracy against himself, Yassir Arafat cannot afford to discontinue the flow of funds to his security people. Consequently, his establishment is discredited beyond recovery on the basis of the rampant corruption at the top. The only way for Arafat to somewhat pacify the radicalized and alienated masses is by blaming Israel for the crisis, and then assisting the Islamists in their Holy War against Israel.

Little wonder, therefore, that all sides in the political map of the Gaza Strip know that Arafat’s threats of an all out assault on the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, or even his promises of a crackdown, are empty gestures. Moreover, Arafat himself has repeatedly assured the

Islamist leadership at the highest levels of his support for their struggle and terrorism. For example, in early October 1994, Yassir Arafat wrote a letter to Sheikh Yassin, the supreme leader of the HAMAS, and al-Ahdi Hunim, a leading Islamist terrorist, both of whom are still in Israeli jail, confirming his appreciation of, and support for, the Islamist armed struggle: “My brother Sheikh Yassin, and my brother the sacred Sheikh al-Ahdi Hunim, I admire your participation in the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. It is because of you that Palestine is free. We’ve proven with the blood of our martyrs that the Palestinian people is ‘the strong number’ in the Middle East.”

While Arafat’s people make periodic threats of armed crackdown, the threat of an Islamist uprising is always there even if the leadership of both HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad avoid the subject to the best of their ability. The intensity of the Islamist struggles in Egypt and Algeria, and the power demonstrated by the Islamist organizations at the height of the Intifadah, are sufficient reminders for Arafat of the potential might of the Islamists. Arafat’s people are now fully aware of the extent of the direct Iranian sponsorship of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian security forces found detailed instructions from Iran in the apartment destroyed in an explosion in early April 1995. Therefore, both sides are apprehensive about a declaration of armed struggle by the Islamists. Not only would such an outburst destroy, or at the very least severely weaken, Arafat, but it would doom any future Israeli evacuation of additional territory. Therefore, the Islamist direct their ire at the Israeli government.

Little wonder that the Palestinian crackdowns are for the Israeli and Western consumption. The couple of hundred Islamists routinely arrested are low to mid level support cadres, none of whom is armed or involved in terrorist operations. Besides, they are quietly released almost immediately. Both sides know they are going through a ritual. The latest crackdown was not different. Most of those arrested are already out, and not a single weapons cache was discovered even though Arafat vowed to destroy the stockpiles of explosives.

Two HAMAS terrorists were caught in a fire fight after the Palestinian authorities announced that their commander was sentenced to 15 years for training martyrs. Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdallah Shami, was quickly acquitted. The Islamist leaders in Gaza have already been notified not to worry and that a quiet clemency will not be long.

Still, this time the Islamist leadership is raising the ante at its own initiative. In mid April, both HAMAS and Islamic Jihad issued formal

warnings against any attempt to disarm them. In its communiqué, the HAMAS warned Arafat's people "not to dare to prevent us from carrying out the strikes in the course of our Jihad." An assertive HAMAS put Arafat on notice: "In making the decision to confiscate weapons, the Palestinian Authorities are playing with fire. The outcome of this policy will enter us into a new phase that nobody knows its boundaries and its outcome." However, Israel is the primary objective of the HAMAS: "Rabin, don't be glad about the numerous arrests of our sacred brothers. The Palestinian Authority crossed the red lines, and our response will be against the Israelis – and at the heart of Israel."

The reason for the sudden assertiveness is the perception of the Islamist leadership that both Yassir Arafat and the peace process are near collapse. The Islamists are determined to seize the initiative, and ensure their prominence in the new realities in the Gaza Strip, as well as Israel and the territories as a whole.

Indeed, Yassir Arafat is falling apart. He is increasingly isolated and capricious, markedly increasing the number of armed guards around him. He never moves without his "emergency button" – an electronic buzzer that immediately activates an elaborate security system surrounding Arafat at any moment. When Arafat was separated momentarily from his "emergency button" during a meeting with Israeli officials, he went crazy.

Yassir Arafat is becoming delusional. In March, for example, Arafat told a visiting American delegation that came to express support for the peace process, that senior Israeli security officials were responsible for the suicide bombings near Natania. Israel conducted the bombings in order to harm him and derail the peace process. According to a participant, Arafat was incoherent and shaking with rage during the entire meeting. "We saw a man isolated, at least partially, from reality and driven by paranoia," the participant described Arafat.

Meanwhile, the majority of Israelis have already given up on the peace process in its current form. They do not trust the Rabin Government to deliver peace and even ensure security for as long as Israel permits Arafat to continue in his current policies in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, on April 10, even six Knesset Members of Rabin's own Labor Party sent him a letter demanding that the IDF be sent back into Gaza in order to rout Islamist terrorism. MK Shlomo Bohbot explained that "we can no longer count on the Palestinian Authority for our security," and that therefore it is imperative "to send Israeli troops into

the Strip to carry out operations against HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad.”

Israeli intelligence now doubts that Arafat is in control of the situation in Gaza. With no credible political establishment of any type and ideology capable of assuming power, and with a growing majority of the population supporting the vague and amorphous “Islamic solution,” the Lebanonization of the Gaza Strip is all but completed. Unless the Israeli Defense Forces reenter the Gaza Strip, putting an end to the peace process, the marked escalation of Islamist terrorism at the heart of Israel by operatives coming out of the Gaza Strip is only a question of time.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

**They Mean What They Warn:
The Message of the Riyadh Bombing**

The car bomb that exploded in the middle of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 13 November 1995 was much more than just a spectacular terrorist strike. This operation is both a demonstration and a confirmation of the activation of a comprehensive and vibrant Islamist subversive infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The core of the Saudi Islamist armed movement is based on expert cadres meticulously organized, and now tightly controlled, by Tehran and Khartoum. The network that struck in Riyadh epitomizes the Saudi Sunni Islamist underground – a combination of grassroots Saudis, cadres predominantly consisting of Saudi ‘Afghans,’ as well as supporters and members at the heart of the Saudi security establishment. Moreover, considering that the Saudi Islamist underground has evolved when the younger Ulama gave up on the corrupt, collapsing, and immersed in self-destruction House of al-Saud – the explosions in Riyadh should serve as an indication that the Saudi Islamist leadership, as well as the exceptionally well informed Islamist leadership in Tehran and Khartoum, already concluded that the fate of the House of al-Saud is irreversible, and that a surge of an Islamist Jihad might hasten their demise.

* * *

On November 13, 1995, two massive explosions rocked Riyadh in quick succession. First, a car bomb exploded in the parking lot in front of the three-story building housing the Saudi American National Guard Development Mission. This blast blew off one side of the building. This explosion alone also destroyed more than 45 cars, and shattered windows more than a mile (1.6 km) away. Then, within a few minutes a secondary anti-personnel bomb exploded in the parking lot, inflicting additional casualties from among the people rushing to help these injured in the first explosion. All together, the two bombs caused six fatalities (five of them Americans) and more than sixty wounded (more than half of them Americans) some of them in critical state. This is an extremely high level of casualties considering that only some 200 Americans work in this building.

The main bomb was an expertly constructed bomb made of between 200 and 225 pounds (around 100 kgs) of high explosives and installed in a van. It was activated by a complex set of fuses, primarily a timing device with a possible remote control back-up system. (No remains of a body were found in the tangled remains of the van, thus ruling out a suicide bomb.) The secondary anti-personnel bomb was expertly constructed, placed and timed to cause maximum casualties despite its small size. All together, this bomb complex was quite sophisticated and required a degree of expertise to build and install.

Most significant was the timing of the explosion – 11:30 a.m. (local). It proves that the operation was specifically anti-American. At this hour, the Americans go to lunch in the cafeteria in the forward part of the building while the Saudis are in the nearby mosque for noon prayers. Thus, the timing and placement of the bombs clearly reflect inside knowledge and lengthy monitoring of the site. Considering the double-bomb arrangement, the operation also reflects expert preparations.

Saudi sources quietly acknowledge that “whatever quarter hatched and planned the explosion, it chose its target very carefully and displayed extraordinary professionalism in implementation. The danger lies not only in the explosion and its victims – and they are U.S. military experts – but also in the acquisition of advanced detonation technologies and the use of all kinds of advanced camouflage and security infiltration methods to reach the target.” Another well-informed Saudi source in London explained that, “those who carried out the explosion have a very advanced security and political sense.

They chose a U.S. target in the heart of Riyadh city in order to attract the biggest amount possible of world media attention and to cause a huge political furor.” He pointed out that the strike serves as “a clear message to the Americans to the effect that the regime is not in control and unstable.”

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Considering the magnitude of the explosion at the heart of Riyadh, even the House of al-Saud could not ignore or conceal it. It was impossible to deny the terrorism aspect of the explosion and the security implications. The government owned newspaper Al-Yawm acknowledged that the bombing was “a desperate attempt to destabilize the security of this country.” In the UAE, the newspaper Al-Fajr warned that the explosion in Riyadh indicated an expression of “ill-intentions being hatched for the region.”

Still, Riyadh insisted that the act of terrorism was aimed at a third party and not the Saudi regime. The daily Al-Riyadh stressed the point. “Terrorism takes place where it is most unlikely,” because “terrorism sometimes takes place in one territory as a kind of vexation or the settling of account with another territory.” Still, Prince Nayif Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, the interior minister, acknowledged to the newspaper Al-Jazirah that the explosions were part “this dangerous epidemic.”

Furthermore, Riyadh refuses to confront the root causes for the emergence of Islamist terrorism on its soil. The highly authoritative Al-Hayah, a mouth piece of Prince Sultan and the defense establishment, stressed this point: “No one believes that the blast has internal connotations, but it is true that the perpetrators have taken advantage of the atmosphere of security to carry it out... The act is ‘alien,’ which simply means that it is foreign-made and serves a foreign purpose, regional to be precise.” Having examined possible motives of Iraq, Iran, and Israel to strike in Riyadh, Al-Hayah concludes that the Saudi government could have done nothing to warrant such an act of terrorism. “That is why it is difficult to detect any genuine purpose in the Riyadh blast, except for those hostile and resentful elements whose interests reside in sabotage for sabotage’s sake.”

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However, a closer examination of the Riyadh terrorist operation leaves little doubt that it was indeed the beginning of the long advocated Islamist Jihad against the House of al-Saud.

The target selected – a U.S. military installation used to support the hated Royal Guard (known in the West as the National Guard) – fit to perfection the recent and still building ultimatum campaign. The target bombed follows the declared ultimatums so perfectly that even without any communiqué, the association of the bombing with the Islamist opposition will be undisputable in the public's mind.

Further more, the style of the bombing – a combination of a major car bomb and a smaller anti-personnel bomb – as well as the types of high explosives and fuses used, are identical to the techniques taught in the Islamist elite terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Sudan. It is in these camps that a small cadre of Saudi 'Afghans' has been taught the art of sophisticated bomb making and bomb placement techniques in order to launch a wave of spectacular terrorist operations starting the summer of 1995.

These operational preparations, peaking in the early spring of 1995, closely coincide with strategic and political activities at the highest levels of the international Islamist movement. In the spring of 1995, the crisis in Saudi Arabia reached a turning point with the declaration of the beginning of the Islamist armed struggle. This escalation is a direct development of the relatively non-violent, though very important, crisis unfolding since the fall of 1994 when the Saudi authorities launched a campaign of mass arrests of the leading young Islamist Ulama, particularly Sheikh Salman al-Udah.

In the spring of 1995, the Saudi Islamist leadership concurred with recommendations of Hassan al-Turabi, themselves based on a thorough research done by Iranian intelligence and Arab experts operating in Khartoum, to escalate their struggle against the House of al-Saud into an armed Jihad. Soon afterwards, Sheikh Uдах smuggled from jail his lecture on Death Workmanship, which sanctified the calls for an armed Jihad against the House of al-Saud. Significantly, Sheikh Uдах's call received endorsement from the CDLR. These, and the ensuing communiqué of The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula reflected the decision by the Saudi Islamist leadership to begin the armed Jihad as the only viable instrument to overthrow the Saudi regime. This was not an idle threat or an empty boast.

From an operational point of view, most important was the emergence of an Islamist organization calling itself The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in the Arabian Peninsula [Harakat Al-Tagh'ir Al-Islamiyyah – Al-Janah Al-Jihadi Fi Al-Jazirah Al-'Arabiyyah]. “In the interest of the removal of that regime, the expulsion of the invaders, and the restoration of the nation’s dignity and honor, the Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in the Arabian Peninsula is raising the banner of Jihad for Allah and will use all means available to it.”

On April 10, The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in the Arabian Peninsula issued a warning of impending armed attacks against American and British forces throughout the Arabian Peninsula as well as the House of al-Saud. The communiqué, dated April 6, gave the Western forces until 28 June 1995 to evacuate the Arabian Peninsula, at which date they will become a legitimate target for the Jihad. The communiqué added that the Royal [National] Guard and Military Police forces, as well as other forces which protect the current regime, would also be a target of operations. The communiqué accused the Saudi royal family of turning against Islam, as demonstrated in the purges and persecution of notable Islamic preachers and teachers, in the service of the “crusade forces.” It is significant that the communiqué of The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula came in support of the jailed Islamist leaders, essentially recognizing their leadership.

The importance of, and extent of commitment to, this ultimatum of early April 1995 and the formal launch of armed Jihad against the House of al-Saud, can be found in the context of the Islamist regional grand design reached in Khartoum at that time – at the PAIC Conference in Khartoum in the last week of March 1995.

In highly secret meetings during the PAIC Conference, Turabi and his closest aides discussed region-wide Islamist escalation. Turabi argued that the effort to assassinate Egyptian President Husni Mubarak as a spark for a widespread popular Islamist uprising in Egypt. Although the government in Cairo would be toppled in the aftermath of a lengthy fight by highly trained fighters, and not popular violence, once fighting for its life, Cairo would be unable live up-to its regional interests and obligations. Consequently, Egypt would not react to the subversion of Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states – deploying forces to save the local regimes. Thus, Turabi argued, the overthrow of the Saudi regime necessitated the collapse, at the least neutralization, of Egypt. Indeed, the deadline given to the Western

forces to vacate Saudi Arabia – June 28 – fit closely with the Islamist plans to assassinate Mubarak.

Little wonder, therefore, that when the assassination attempt on Mubarak failed on June 26, all other Islamist plans throughout the region were frozen. Immediately, the Islamist leadership in Khartoum decided to call off the planned escalation of the Islamist uprising in Egypt until after the situation could be assessed. Soon afterwards, new preparations for a revived armed Jihad in Egypt have been, including, for example, the establishing and consolidation of new routes for smuggling of weapons and personnel from Sudan into Egypt via southern Libya.

The Khartoum decision affected the Saudi Islamists because they are an integral component of the regional Jihad. Indeed, on 3 July 1995, The Islamic Change Movement issued a clarifying communiqué, explaining their decision to postpone the implementation of their April ultimatum. The communiqué stressed that the movement was determined to soon begin to carry out its threats by attacking senior princes and foreign forces in Saudi Arabia. The communiqué reaffirmed the validity of the 28 June 1995 deadline, as well as the movement's determination "to use all available means to move the 'crusader forces' off the peninsula of Islam." The July communiqué clarified that although active preparations had been made since April, reaching the June deadline did not mean that the operations had to be carried out immediately. The actual launch of operations depends on the judgment of The Islamic Change Movement, and the deadline set for the foreign forces was an ultimatum, after which these forces will have become a legitimate target.

The anticipated region-wide escalation of Islamist violence began in the fall of 1995. In early October, the Islamists declared a formal Jihad against Qadhafi's Libya in order, among other reasons, expedite the flow of weapons and personnel from Sudan to Algeria and Egypt via southern Libya. Indeed as of late October, there has been a marked escalation in Islamist violence in Egypt, particularly renewed attacks on police stations, trains and tourist buses. As anticipated, Cairo is preoccupied with a new cycle of crackdowns of the increasingly effective and popular Islamist forces. By early November, Egypt was again on the verge of Islamist popular uprising with the population increasingly demonstrating genuine desire for an Islamic regime of some sort.

Meanwhile, both Tehran and Khartoum remain convinced that they can bring about the collapse of the conservative regimes of Arabian

Peninsula and take over the Holy Shrines rather quickly. The basic analysis, namely, that the only way the Islamists could take over the Arabian Peninsula is if Cairo is so preoccupied with a domestic crisis that it cannot afford to come to the assistance of the conservative regimes, remains valid. In early November, the experts and leaders in Tehran and Khartoum reached the conclusion that the road was open to carrying out the Saudi part of the grand design.

* * *

Islamist forces in Saudi Arabia were activated and received green light in early November. The AIM-affiliated network operating in the Riyadh area comprises a local infrastructure and a small group of experts largely made of Saudi ‘Afghans.’ The local network was bolstered on the eve of the operation by a few expert terrorists who arrived separately from Europe and Asia. Arab Islamist sources stressed that the hard core of both the support network and the perpetrators were “Saudi nationals.”

There were suggestions by Saudi and opposition sources that there were aspects of an “inside job” in the Riyadh operation. The Saudi source in London explained that, “those who planted the explosives could be Saudis who received training abroad or Saudi military elements dissatisfied with the regime.” Similarly, Yossef Choueiri, a lecturer in modern Arab history at the University of Exeter, suggested that there was “some coordination between an outside regime or political force and elements of the National Guard... to carry out this explosion.”

Islamist, as well as Saudi and opposition, sources are unanimous in their conviction that the expert terrorists at the command and core of the Riyadh operation are “disgruntled young Saudis trained in Afghanistan.” Significantly, Saudi Islamist opposition sources specified that there are Saudi expert bomb-makers “trained by the CIA and Pakistan’s military intelligence” who now provide expertise to the ‘Afghan’ networks in the Middle East and Bosnia. The main concentrations of Saudi ‘Afghans’ active in international Islamist terrorism are presently in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan.

Most intriguing is the description provided by Pakistani and Afghan sources in Peshawar. They also divide the network into Saudi-based infrastructure and a quality core made of ‘Afghans.’ The Saudi-based cadres were motivated by homegrown considerations. However these Pakistani and Afghan sources stressed Saudi foreign policy,

rather than oppression by the House of al-Saud, as the primary reason for the confrontation. "The Saudi monarchy continues to play the murky game of inter-Arab politics with the unspoken and effective shield of American military support. At home, critics of the monarchy have shown some resilience despite ruthless repressive measures," explained a knowledgeable Pakistani. The international Islamist character of the expert core of the Riyadh operation is stressed by all Pakistani and Afghan sources. "There are reasons to believe that these critics, mostly wedded to Islamic revivalism, have their contacts with similar movements across the Islamic world," explained the knowledgeable Pakistani. He identified the key perpetrators as Saudi "Islamic radicals" frustrated by the fact that King Fahd "has sought, time and again, to impart an Islamic gloss to the unrepresentative character of his rule."

Final preparations for the operation were so intense that there were leaks. Indeed, ranking Saudi officials now concede that the authorities in Riyadh had been warned about an imminent terrorist action for nearly a week before the explosion. However, they did not take it seriously and placed security forces on a low-level alert primarily as a pro-forma.

One reason for that, presently speculated among highly knowledgeable Saudis in the Middle East and Western Europe, is that Prince Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz let the terrorist operation take place so that he can capitalize on it for his own personal gains. The Governor of Riyadh and aspirant successor to King Fahd, Prince Salman has based his drive to the throne using the growing Islamist threat, the dread of the entire House of al-Saud, and his reputed ability to suppress them, as his ticket to power, acceptability, and ultimately the Throne. According to both Saudi Islamist leaders and Arab insiders, Prince Salman had obtained already in the fall of 1994 "a personal mandate" from King Fahd "to administer the country's affairs," namely, the internal security and stability.

Prince Salman is known to have maintained contacts with Islamists, as recently as the fall of 1995. Al-Mass'ari insists that Prince Salman "is more intelligent and more open than the others [in House of al-Saud]. But he is also the most hypocritical: His overtures [to the Islamists] are only apparent and he aims really only to stay in the saddle." Little wonder that many Saudis now repeat the rumors that Prince Salman allowed the explosion to happen in order to increase the fear of Islamist violence among the uppermost echelons in the House of

al-Saud, and hence, increase his own power and posture as the key to their suppression.

Meanwhile, the uppermost echelons of the House of al-Saud are also working feverishly to suppress real investigation into the bombing because it would expose a colossal failure of Saudi Intelligence. The main issue is a secret Saudi-Pakistani deal to suppress Saudi 'Afghans', which Islamabad did not keep despite assurances from Benazir Bhutto. In early March 1995, Prince Turki bin Faysal, head of the Saudi secret and intelligence services, traveled to Islamabad for high-level consultations with Ms. Bhutto. Prince Turki told her that Riyadh was most apprehensive about the Saudi 'Afghans' operating in and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly considering that all the 'Afghan' camps in both countries are still under ISI control. Prince Turki offered Ms. Bhutto "a deal." In addition to generous financial assistance, Riyadh will use its power and influence in Washington to pressure for Pakistani interests if the ISI contained the Saudi 'Afghans' and limit their ability to travel. While the Saudis lived up to their commitment, pressuring and lobbying in Washington, Islamabad quickly subverted the deal with the ISI taking few "for show" steps whenever the Saudis raised the issue.

Pakistani representatives stressed their commitment to the Islamist issue already during the PAIC Conference convened in Khartoum in the last days of March. The ISI representative explained Islamabad's political difficulties with the U.S. and the lucrative Saudi offer. It was imperative for Islamabad to create a distance of deniability between Ms. Bhutto's government and the support for Islamist terrorism. Therefore, the ISI reported on further modifications of the terrorism sponsorship system, including the establishment of a major AIM control center in Karachi, undertaken in order to help Islamabad's image. Meanwhile, Islamabad assured Riyadh that with the establishment of the Karachi center, the ISI's attention will be focused on Kashmir and the Balkans. Consequently, Prince Turki assured Islamabad that once the Karachi center was up and running, Riyadh would "tolerate" the use of Saudi money and international companies for comparable operations, including in the United States. Meanwhile, Riyadh was confident that Islamabad was effectively controlling the Saudi 'Afghans', sending the most radicals to either Sudan or Bosnia. Now, in the fall of 1995, it is becoming clear to Riyadh that the ISI was taking their money, and Islamabad was building on their influence in Washington, while Saudi 'Afghans' were being trained and supported

all this time in Pakistan, Afghanistan, as well as Sudan and Iran, in preparations for operations in Saudi Arabia.

Indeed, the car bomb that exploded on 13 November 1995 shocked the entire Saudi establishment, causing more damage to the innermost corridors of power at the highest levels of the House of al-Saud than to the buildings in Riyadh.

Meanwhile, the claims of responsibility that followed the November 13 explosions serve mainly to clarify and substantiate the various components involved in the beginning of the Islamist Jihad in Saudi Arabia and their own stands on the subject.

The first claim was issued by the previously unknown organization, the Tigers of the Gulf. This is a bogus name of a non-existing organization aimed to disassociate any legitimate Islamist organizations and frameworks. The only important aspect in this claim is that it was done by phone from inside Saudi Arabia, thus proving the existence of locally active Islamist cells. “The attacks will continue until the departure of the last American soldier” from Saudi Arabia, the caller said in two successive calls from Saudi Arabia. The Tigers’ use of the standard Islamist phraseology identified them as components of the largest Islamist umbrella.

It was only after the viability of a communicating network inside Saudi Arabia was established, that the primary organization responsible for the operation – The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula – issued its own statement through the regular Islamist channels. The primary objective of the communiqué of the Islamic Change Movement is to legitimate it as a component of AIM while confirming its ability to live up-to previous warnings and ultimatums.

In its communiqué, The Islamic Change Movement repeated the Tigers’ position that they were opposed to Saudi Arabia’s “total surrender to the USA and its Western allies” and its commitment to “exert all available means to evict these forces.” The communiqué repeated all the now established objectives of the Movement – its intention to overthrow the House of al-Saud, have the “invaders” leave the country, and the nation regain its pride and dignity. Ensuring that the objective of the bombing is not lost, the communiqué also vented rage at the Saudi government because it has become “infidel agents” who have “opened the land of the Two Holy Shrines and the peninsula of the Arabs to invading colonialist, crusader forces.” The communiqué stressed that the Islamic Change Movement will continue to target foreign troops, the Saudi royal family, and the Saudi security forces.

Most important was the endorsement of both The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula and the bombing in Riyadh by the CDLR. The London-based CDLR is the larger and best-organized Saudi Islamic opposition group, and it enjoys access to the Saudi elite at home and in the West. “We found that the group, The Movement for Islamic Change, is a legitimate group and might be behind the blast,” declared Sa’id al-Faqih, the CDLR’s London Director.

The international and state-sponsored aspect of the Riyadh operation was not neglected either. The Armed Islamic Movement, especially its Pakistan-based Islamist ‘Afghans’ forces, moved to take due credit for the Riyadh operation only after the Saudi entities had ample time to advocate their justification.

AIM claimed credit only a day later, issuing a communiqué in the name of the previously unknown group calling itself The Militant Partisans of God Organization [Munazzamat Ansar Allah Al-Muqatilah]. The AIM communiqué also stressed that the Riyadh operation “is the first of our Jihad operations.” However, AIM stressed the universal and anti-American character of its Jihad. The communiqué first demanded that, “the U.S. occupying forces leave the territory of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states, and that His Eminence Dr. Umar Abd-al-Rahman, Dr. Musa Abu-Marzuq, and Ramzi Yousef and his comrades be released from U.S. jails immediately.” The AIM communiqué also agrees with demands of previous groups, demanding that the “Saudi authorities lift all the restrictions imposed on Muslim ulamah and preachers, immediately release all detainees from Saudi jails, and apply all the rules of the Islamic Shari’a.”

The AIM communiqué concludes with an ultimatum, warning that, “if these just demands are not met, the Militant Partisans of God Organization will declare its pledge to die for Allah’s cause, targeting U.S. interests on the territory of the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf states.” However, this communiqué went beyond the previous communiqués to warn of an escalation of its anti-U.S. war beyond the region. The Militant Partisans of God Organization concluded their communiqué with this warning: “O Americans, our blessed operations will not be halted until all our demands are met, otherwise you are imposing on yourselves a relentless war... a real war that makes you know your real worth... a war to break your false arrogance.”

Significantly, the CDLR stressed that the explosion in Riyadh was the beginning of an armed struggle aimed to overthrow the regime. The

CDLR's Muhammad al-Mass'ari predicted that, "there will be more acts similar to this incident because the [al-Saud] regime is known for its enmity toward its citizens." He pointed out that the bombing was carried out by "disgruntled young people who oppose the Saudi leadership" including "some trained in military tactics in Afghanistan or elsewhere." Al-Mass'ari suggested that the Islamists decided to act now "because all important and vocal reformers and activists and preachers have been detained since September 1994 without any end in sight." At the same time, he noted that although Americans were the intended victims of the attack, the ultimate target was the House of al-Saud. Al-Mass'ari stressed that, "the question is to whom the war declaration is directed and that's to the Saudi regime."

A well-informed Saudi source in London explained that the audacity of the Riyadh operation was also "designed to draw attention to the fact that the arrival in Saudi Arabia of the technology of booby-trapped cars is a serious tuning point which could have repercussions." He stressed that this does not mean that future operations will be car bombs. He warned that, "oil installations could become potential targets in the future to ensure the largest possible amount of world publicity."

From the very beginning, CDLR also alluded to an escalating and diversifying Islamist Jihad. Sa'id al-Faqih explained that, "there is more than one group inside the kingdom which plans violent attacks. These groups are well trained and have decided to attack sensitive targets." Muhammad al-Mass'ari explained that the bombers "chose a target that would be acceptable to everyone." He therefore expected that "there will be more violent action but not necessarily this form." He also warned that, "King Fahd's life could also be at risk."

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The most important legacy of the November 13 explosions in Riyadh is that the Saudi Islamists, along with Iran, Sudan, and other states sponsoring them, have finally crossed the line – launching their armed Jihad inside Saudi Arabia. There can be no way back from this position. The growing popularity of the Islamists in virtually all segments of society – from the widespread popular following of Sheikh Uadah to, at the higher strata of society, the attention paid to the CDLR – will put pressure on the militant Islamists to continue and escalate their armed struggle and terrorism until the overthrow of the House of al-Saud.

With active support and sponsorship from Tehran and Khartoum, the Islamist forces are ready for such escalation. For several years now, a large cadre of Saudi Islamists (estimates vary between 15,000 and 25,000), spearheaded by over 5,000 Saudi 'Afghans' (perhaps as many as 10,000 according to the Saudi opposition), has been trained, prepared, and equipped in camps in Iran, Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan/Afghanistan. They are organized under effective leadership that presently uses the cover name The Islamic Change Movement – the Jihad Wing in Arabian Peninsula. In addition, there is a large Islamist underground network inside Saudi Arabia known to be ready to absorb and support these Saudi Mujahideen. Moreover, there are over 10,000 Saudi Shi'ite militants ready to be activated and committed to the Jihad in Saudi Arabia. Most important among these are the few thousand members of the HizbAllah al-Hijaz and the Islamic Revolution – Jazirat al-'Arab organizations – all of them graduates of elite terrorist schools in Iran and the Biqaa who are now residing in camps in Iran and Lebanon.

Ultimately, however, the primary threat that these Islamist forces constitute lies not in their impressive size and capabilities, but in the fact that they actually provide the coup de grace in the rapidly accelerating self-destruction and collapse of the House of al-Saud.

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Hour of Reckoning in Riyadh

The uppermost echelons of the House of al-Saud have reached the conclusion that the nomination of a successor to King Fahd can no longer be postponed. On January 1st, 1996, Riyadh formally announced that King Fahd handed the affairs of the state to Crown Prince Abdallah. A royal decree said that King Fahd ordered the Crown Prince "to undertake the affairs of the state while we enjoy rest." This announcement has long been anticipated.

Starting about December 5, 1995, leading Saudi Princes have been warned by the innermost circles in the House of al-Saud to be ready for "death watch" for King Fahd – that is, be ready for the religious ceremonies surrounding the death of the King and for a subsequent Council in which the successor will be agreed upon and crowned.

However, the succession issue may be forced upon the House of al-Saud even before the King dies because of the rapid deterioration in his overall medical situation and especially mental capacity. Already on December 3, the Saudi medical authorities responsible for the King's health formally informed the uppermost Princes – the King's Sudairi Brothers – that, "the health of King Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz has deteriorated so much that it will be extremely difficult for him to remain in charge of the kingdom's affairs in the short run." Within a

few days, the leadership began actively preparing for a de-facto hand-over of power even if King Fahd remains alive.

Even though presently there is no overt challenge to the position of Prince Abdallah as the Crown Prince, Saudi sources are adamant that his title is titular and that a younger Prince will be crowned. Prince Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz, the Governor of Riyadh and King Fahd's younger brother, is still the leading compromise candidate. The older princes, including the "Sudairi Seven," seem to prefer a transfer of power via Prince Abdallah so that "order and tradition" are maintained, thus enhancing the aura of stability.

However, around December 7, younger leading members of the House of al-Saud for the first time dared to raise the possibility of breaking the tight monopoly on power of the "Sudairi Seven" through the succession process. They floated the name of Prince Saud bin Faysal, the Foreign Minister and son of the late King Faysal, as an alternate candidate. The mere fact that some younger princes dared to challenge the Sudairi establishment is in itself of tremendous importance. That these deliberations take place in great secrecy reflects the enduring might of the Sudairi establishment.

By December 10 or 11, the leading princes seem to have reached the principles of a compromise between the various branches of the House of al-Saud. According to the emerging "arrangement," Prince Abdallah will inherit the throne as the Crown Prince and immediately transfer power to Prince Salman who will be the new king. Simultaneously, Prince Saud will become new the Crown Prince with the guarantee that the "grandsons" generation of princes will rise to power as expeditiously as possible. There are persistent reports in Riyadh that King Fahd has recently expressed his desire to see the younger generation rise to power.

Meanwhile, time is running out in Riyadh because of the marked deterioration in the medical condition of King Fahd. King Fahd's hospitalization in last November was not for check-up as officially announced. The King suffered a stroke. Further more, the reaction of the Saudi medical authorities was slow, and it took time before an American team of experts was rushed to Riyadh.

According to Arab medical experts privately consulted by the Saudis, "King Fahd had suffered a blockage in one of the arteries in the head" which caused brain damage. There are indications that the damage may be severe. A major indication of such brain damage is the loss of coherent speech faculty. The Saudi TV reports about the "good health" of King Fahd showed him sitting in bed surrounded by family

but did not broadcast any sound from the room or any other pronouncement by the King. While it may be too early to determine the extent and permanence of the brain damage, these experts are adamant that King Fahd “will not be able to resume his normal activities soon even if he experiences a sustained recovery.”

It should be stressed that King Fahd’s recent crisis comes on top an already deteriorating health. King Fahd’s cardiovascular system is weak after a life of chain-smoking and over-eating. The 73/74 years old and overweight King also suffers from diabetes, arthritis and gall bladder troubles. The aggregate effects of these afflictions alone are taking their toll.

According to one Arab source, a leading figure in the Gulf States in intimate contacts with the Saudi elite, there are “unambiguous signs that King Fahd’s medical problems may soon be too serious and numerous for him to overcome.” In mid December 1995, sources close to the House of al-Saud reported that King Fahd was about to go for a “lengthy rest” in a clinic either in Germany or in Switzerland, not far from his house in Geneva. Indeed, the consensus among the innermost circles of the House of al-Saud is that even if it would be possible for the King to overcome the partial paralysis and speech impairment he suffers from, as well as retain most basic physical functions (such as walking), his brain damage is debilitating.

Therefore, there is no escape from selecting the new King even if King Fahd remains alive. The temporary transfer of powers to Prince Abdallah on January 1, 1996, does not solve the principal succession problem. With Saudi Arabia already at the throes of a major stability crisis, surviving the concurrent succession crisis may prove beyond the capabilities of the House of al-Saud.



**TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Approaching the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting

10 December 1996

Approaching the end of 1996, the Middle East may well be on the verge of a major regional war. Numerous sources in the region report that the supreme leaders – both civilians and military – in most Arab states as well as in Iran and Pakistan are convinced that the present vulnerability of Israel is so great that there is a unique opportunity to, at the very least, begin the process leading to the destruction of Israel. These circumstances are considered to be a historic window of opportunity the Muslim World should not miss. Therefore, these Muslim leaders have finalized numerous strategies and tactical alliances heretofore non-existent in the region.

Toward this end, several Arab states, as well as Iran and Pakistan, have been engaged in a frantic military build-up and active preparations in the last few months. Indeed, this crisis is escalating even as all key players continue to reassert their commitment to the U.S.-inspired “Peace Process.” However, the slide to war is the real and dominant dynamic in the Near East because it represents the reaction of the Muslim World to the challenges of modernization – petrification exacerbated and aggravated by the post-Gulf Crisis regional dynamics,

and particularly the intrusion policy of the Clinton Administration toward the Hub of Islam.

In late November 1996, Nail Mukhaybar, one of the most authoritative Arab commentators on Middle East affairs observed: “The question is no longer: Will the expected and planned war between Israel and Syria ever break out? It is rather: When will the war break out?” This is not a minority opinion. It is also shared by senior officials in the Arab Middle East.

For example, in late October, a senior Jordanian diplomat warned that, “Syria is preparing for a surprise military attack on Israel in the coming weeks.” This assessment was based on high-level contacts between Damascus and Amman, especially between senior officers of both armies, in which the military situation in the region was discussed. In these meetings the Syrians asked for passive and indirect support from the Jordanian military – for Jordan to hold maneuvers near Israeli border in order to compel IDF to divert forces and hold them there.

Many other Arab and Iranian officials share the same view. There is a commonly shared firm belief among the senior experts serving Middle Eastern governments that the political-strategic dynamics in the Middle East have already reached a deadlock that makes a dramatic breakout inevitable. The strong commitment to such a dramatic breakout among most senior leaders is the key to understanding the present dangers. These leaders see no alternative to a dramatic breakout possible only through cataclysmic violence. The mere revival of the ongoing processes – be it the peace process on the Arabs terms or even the return to a region-wide state of war – will no longer suffice to meet the strategic challenges from Islamic revivalism. Hence, the slide toward the resumption of violence – ranging from spectacular terrorism to an all-out war – between the Arabs and Israel. This is a very prudent and reasonable assessment given the overall regional dynamics over the last few months, particularly if examined in the context of the strategic regional dynamics of the last couple of years. Essentially, in their entirety, the tactical and military developments of recent months reinforce and confirm the earlier strategic posturing. Therefore, these military activities can, and should, be perceived as implementation of earlier grand designs. And this complementary relationship between the strategic and tactical dynamics is the key to the alarmist approach to interpreting the unfolding events.

When analyzing these unfolding developments, it is highly significant to recall the emerging mega-trends in the region:

- The rise of militant Islam as the primary motivating factor of the Arab public has already reached unprecedented levels. The popular mistrust in existing nation-states, the hostility toward the U.S./West over intervention and presence in the Muslim World (in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), and the pressure on those in power to pursue “Islamic policies continue to markedly increase. It will be difficult for rulers to resist the growing popular outcry and stay out of a major crisis with Israel, let alone support the U.S. under such circumstances.
- The present leaders of Iran, Syria and Iraq are determined to transfer power to their sons-and-heirs. They are convinced that only the emergence of a close alliance leading to a perpetual crisis against the rest of the world will rally the potential contenders in their own respective coteries to accept their chosen sons as leaders. The mere existence of a functioning militant block will enable the other “sons-of” to assist and save a “son-of” in distress. Given its popular Islamist connotations – liberating al-Quds – the current policy of brinkmanship and crisis is the best possible starting point for the establishment of this block.
- The succession struggle in Saudi Arabia is peaking. The Abdallah faction is determined to seize power through the eviction of the U.S. from the region, the solution of Saudi Arabia’s shortage of cash by accepting more lucrative contracts with East Asia at the expense of the West, and by establishing close relations with the radical states as a guarantee against Islamist subversion. The very close Abdallah-Assad relations constitute the key to Prince Abdullah’s rise to power. These relations have already initiated the bombing in Dahrán. Prince Abdullah has already promised Damascus to deliver a comprehensive oil embargo against the West in case of a major crisis with Israel.

Thus, the mega-trends in the Middle East are pushing toward a crisis environment. A dramatic breakout from the deadlock is virtually inevitable. The latest developments in the military threat to Israel fit perfectly into this overall trend.

The Latest Strategic Military Moves at the Theater Level

Specific military moves at the national-strategic level suggesting active preparations for a possible war in the near future began in the spring of 1996. These activities range from highly irregular and highly significant military exercises to political and international agreements.

In the Spring of 1996, Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Hussein met secretly for a summit to ensure joint pursuit of regional objectives. The meeting took place in the area where the borders of Turkey, Iraq and Syria meet. This summit was aimed to get the endorsement and approval of both top leaders to the completion of strategic agreements reached in the course of recent high-level bilateral and tripartite high-level negotiations (Tehran is the third party). This summit created the conditions for the revival of the Eastern Front and set the specific and workable arrangements for the dispatch of Iranian expeditionary forces and weapons to the Syrian front.

In late May 1996, Tehran demonstrated how seriously Iran takes the possibility of dispatching forces to the Israeli front. Iran conducted its largest military exercise ever – Velayat. The essence of Velayat was a multiple corps deep offensive in the aftermath of a long-range advance identical to the distance between Iran and Israel. The objective of Velayat was to confirm Iran's ability to send a strategically effective expeditionary force – the Velayat Force – to contribute to a regional war against high-quality armies. The primary intended objective of the exercise is Israel. The entire Iranian top leadership and high command were present at the exercise. Subsequent Iranian analysis pointed out deficiencies in the planning of the operations of a key special forces unit. These were quickly corrected and these improvements were demonstrated to the Tehran leadership in a follow-up exercise in late October.

With Iran's ability to significantly contribute to the military effort against Israel proven, Damascus and Tehran conducted high-level discussions aimed at the formulation of a joint war strategy. In mid June, Iran and Syria signed a major agreement specifically for the codification of their military cooperation against Israel. This agreement also provides for joint exercises in northern and northeastern Iran of the command elements of Syrian units and the Iranian units that will arrive to support them on the Golan front. By mid August, Iraq was brought into this framework with the establishment of a tripartite "joint command" specifically aimed to expedite the preparations for, and conduct of, "a major war against Israel." A key component of this joint

command has been the coordination of the activities of Iran, Iraq, and Syria in mobilizing their SSM forces for a possible missile barrage against Israel.

In late September, the Palestinian factor was added to the joint preparations when the Palestinian Authorities (PA) entered into a major military agreement with Syria. Significantly, this agreement is between the PA, and not the PLO, and Syria, thus explicitly committing the Palestinian forces in the territories. The essence of the agreement is for the Palestinian “police” forces and other armed elements (terrorist organizations) to flare-up the Israeli interior in case of an escalation in the north. Syrian and PLO intelligence established a liaison section made up of senior Syrian and Palestinian intelligence officers with HQs in Beirut, Damascus and Gaza. In return, Syria will provide weapons and advanced training to PLO units in the refugee camps in southern Lebanon – units disarmed as part of the Israeli-Lebanese agreements. Meanwhile, the PLO’s preparations for an imminent war are evident. In Gaza, Arafat ordered the marked acceleration of the building of a personal command bunker, four stories deep. Moreover, the PLO is rapidly building all over Gaza a chain of command centers, ammunition and weapons-storage areas – all of them underground and well fortified to even withstand Israeli bombing and shelling. The PA’s security services are also accumulating large stockpiles of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, including missiles, even though they are forbidden by the Oslo Accords.

In mid September, the Egyptian Armed Forces conducted their largest military exercise since the late 1970s. The 10-day Badr-96 exercise simulated a strategic deep offensive against Israel and included a large scale call-up of reserves, a major amphibious landing on the Sinai coast, a nightly assault crossing of the Suez Canal, and major breakthroughs of defensive dispositions manned by high quality forces. In mid October, senior officers of the Egyptian Army conducted a tour of the Sinai, including areas near the Israeli border, in violation of the provisions of the peace agreement with Israel. It was a commanders’ tour aimed to acquaint them with the peculiarities of a theater they might have to operate in. Meanwhile, Cairo encourages the resumption of calls for war at the political level. Brig.Gen. (Ret.) Mohammed Muawad Gad al-Moula, was permitted to establish a new political party committed “to revive the ‘victorious spirit’ of the October 1973 War” and whose leadership is made of retired senior officers. “We have no choice but to adopt a platform for rebuilding a strong Egypt and preparing a new generation capable of fighting any attackers,” al-

Moula told the semi-official al-Ahram. “We have to prepare for a fresh confrontation with Israel.”

Starting early October, there have been several cycles of bilateral and multilateral political-military discussions and coordination sessions between Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan. According to high-level Iranian sources, the initial phase of these consultations led to the adoption of “pan-Arab cooperation” making it possible “to impose a military blockade on Israel from the north, east, and south.” In late October, senior officers from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon held a series of meetings to coordinate and agree on a number of specific military measures and strategies for the forthcoming confrontation with Israel.

In early November, second-tier states were being brought into “the circle of confrontation” – the group of states of committed to contributing to the Arab-Iranian war effort. Most significant was Syrian-Pakistani military agreement signed in Islamabad by the Defense Ministers of Syria and Pakistan which arranged for the seconding of Pakistani military experts and senior officers, pilots and technicians, and key equipment to Syria.

In late November, Damascus shared a comprehensive intelligence assessment with its Arab allies and a host of terrorist organizations. The primary objective was to warn of an impending major war between Israel and Syria with the active participation of, and support from, U.S. forces on the side of Israel. Damascus has already concluded that “Israel is now preparing for a comprehensive war with Syria.” The Syrian briefing points out to the call-up of reserves in Israel as indicative of an impending war. Special attention is paid to the military training in the Negev with U.S. Marines. Syrian intelligence claims that, “the training, objectives, and plans of these maneuvers focus on the occupied Syrian Golan and a number of positions west of Damascus.” The Syrian sources are convinced that “one of these positions is a Syrian manufacturing plant for chemical weapons.”

Concerning the political-strategic situation in Damascus, the Syrian briefing is consistent in its emphasis on the immediacy of war, but seemingly self-contradictory on the sources of this war. On the one hand, the Syrian briefing states that, “the Syrian leadership now believes that the military option to liberate the Golan from the Israeli Army is a legitimate Syrian option. It also believes that Syria has the right to resort to this option any time it deems appropriate.” This assertion virtually confirms the Syrian intention to initiate hostilities in order to break the deadlock in the region.

However, the section dealing with the military assessment of Syrian Intelligence emphasizes the possibility of an Israeli attack on Syria. Damascus now believes that “the Israeli Army will launch an imminent large-scale military operation against the Syrian Forces stationed adjacent to the Golan, in addition to the Syrian Forces that were relocated in Lebanon near the eastern Syrian border with Lebanon that extends to the Golan Heights.” Presumably, this will be an Israeli preemptive strike given the extent of the Syrian preparations.

The Syrian briefing leaves no doubt that even under these circumstances, Damascus will pursue its own assertive war aims, not just repel the Israeli aggression. The Syrian briefing states that, “the Syrian President instructed the command of the Syrian Forces stationed near the Golan to immediately retaliate against any attack by the Israeli Army.” Moreover, Assad ordered his forces to immediately launch a deep strategic strike and, toward this end, “the Syrian Army placed its SCUD missile systems at maximum alert should war break out with Israel.” These SSMs, Damascus argues, “can hit any target inside Israel.”

The extent of the Iranian commitment to actively supporting the Syrian war effort is of crucial importance for the highest levels of leadership in Damascus. Indeed, in late November, Syrian sources stressed that Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani had just reassured President Assad in a written message that “should war break out with Israel, Iran will support Syria with the necessary military hardware in order to strengthen the Syrian military position.

Tehran takes this commitment very seriously, and, in the first week of December, dispatched Foreign Minister Au Akbar Velayati for urgent high-level consultations. Velayati arrived in Damascus carrying yet another extremely important message from Hashemi-Rafsanjani for Assad. He then conducted extensive discussions with Assad and other senior officials on regional issues. According to the Iranian media, “the latest regional and international developments as well as further promotion of Tehran-Damascus ties were discussed in the meetings.”

Velayati’s discussions with Assad and his immediate aides went far beyond that, addressing Syrian-Iranian cooperation in the imminent and possibly inevitable war. Iranian sources highlighted the discussions with Assad in which Velayati “referred to foreign pressures and the Zionist plots and underlined the need to strengthen cooperation between Iran and Syria. The Syrian President stressed this cooperation will help establishment of peace and tranquility in the whole region.” Both Damascus and Tehran agree that there is going to be a lot of

violence – ranging from terrorism to war – on the road to regional peace.

Iranian sources report that, “the Syrian President stressed the need to support the Islamic resistance in south Lebanon to confront the Zionist aggressions and to defend the Lebanese territory.” Velayati and Assad also expressed support and commitment to ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity – a precondition for Saddam Hussein’s support. Velayati also reiterated the Iranian long-standing support for ‘the aspiration of the Palestinian nation and the Islamic resistance in their struggle against the Zionist regime.’ He called for “a united action by the Islamic states to foil conspiracies of enemies.” Velayati assured Assad that “the Tehran-Damascus close cooperation will lead to establishment of regional peace and tranquility.” Velayati returned to Tehran carrying a most important message from Assad to Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

Specific Tactical Preparations

Starting mid August, the Syrian Armed Forces have conducted a series of redeployments and maneuvers that have direct implications for their ability to launch an attack on Israel. The concurrent activities of both the Iraqi Armed Forces and PLO forces in Lebanon also contribute to the enhancement of the Arab military capabilities against Israel.

The initial Syrian force movements in Lebanon and near the Golan, especially near Mt. Hermon, already changed the strategic posture in the region. The changes in the deployment of Syrian forces and units in Lebanon were accomplished in two stages.

In the first phase, in late August, mechanized units deployed from Bhandun and Dahr al-Baydar in central Lebanon to forward positions very close to the Israeli-held security zone. These Syrian forces deployed in such a way that any Israeli retaliation against terrorists in south Lebanon will inevitably kill Syrian soldiers, thus creating the “excuse” for further escalation. In addition, two of the three regiments of 14th Special Forces/Commando Division deployed from the Biqaa to forward positions on the Syrian Hermon overlooking the Israeli key early warning station on Mt. Hermon from the north and east.

In the second phase, completed in mid September, units of the 10th Mechanized Division deployed from the Beirut area along the Beirut-Damascus Highway all the way to the Biqaa, replacing the units that had deployed to the south. The third regiment of the 14th Special Forces/Commando Division deployed from Beirut to forward positions

in southeastern Lebanon, overlooking the Israeli Mt. Hermon from the west.

The deployment of the 14th Special Forces/Commando Division enables it to strike Israel's key early warning station on a moment notice, thus harming, if not paralyzing Israel's ability to detect a major surprise attack.

Units of the Syrian internal police replaced the Syrian troops in Beirut. Moreover, Syrian Air Defense units – both mobile SAM batteries and AAA – deployed to forward positions on the Beirut-Damascus Highway very close to the Lebanese border, but still on Syrian territory.

In late September, the Syrian forces were in a position to instigate a provocation of strategic dimensions. Syrian forces deployed behind a thin layer of Lebanese Army units around the SLA-held Jezzine salient. Additional Lebanese Army forces, totaling three brigades, deployed along the Israeli- and SLA-held security zone in front of the Syrian forces. The Syrian operational plan calls for an assault, by the Lebanese Army with "support" from the Syrian Army, on Jezzine, and, should the need arise, also on sectors of the security zone. According to Lebanese sources, the Syrian High Command is convinced that Jezzine will fall within 12 hours, and a few segments in the security zone within 24 hours. Damascus knows that Israel will have to retaliate with massive ground forces, thus providing the "justification" for the Syrian launching of a major escalation and war.

All through the summer and fall of 1996, the Syrian Armed Forces conducted a series of offensive exercises and related troop movements. As a result of these activities, numerous Syrian units ended up much closer to the Golan Heights than their permanent deployment areas. Moreover, these units are now deployed in a high state of readiness and can move on the offensive with a very short forewarning.

Of unique importance within these military activities were the exercises involving SCUD SAMs. At the end of the summer exercises, a Syrian unit launched a SCUD-C under conditions of an offensive war. Since then, and particularly in the second half of October, Damascus began conducting "irregular movements" with its SCUD units. According to Lebanese and Syrian sources, these constant maneuvers are aimed to further complicate Israel's ability to neutralize the Syrian deep strike capabilities through a preemptive strike.

In late October, Syrian officials briefed their Lebanese counterparts that the Syrian Armed Forces were properly deployed and ready for a preemptive strike against Israel. "The Syrians are capable of

preceding/preempting Netanyahu's strike by initiating the attack," reported Lebanese sources.

As of mid October, Iraqi military units, including armor, artillery and missile units, began moving from central Iraq toward the Syrian border. Iraq also began a call up of reservists and the activation of units in western Iraq that had been dormant since the Gulf War. The majority of the main roads leading toward the Syrian border were taken over by the Iraqi military and closed for civilian traffic. Jordanian sources stressed that these are movements of Iraqi reinforcements to near the Syrian border in anticipation for the eruption of hostilities.

By mid to late October, the Syrian large-scale maneuvers and related troop movements got too close to the Golan Heights to be ignored as "routine." Taken in the context of the latest Syrian "exercises" with SSMs and major armored forces, these activities amount to "crawling" toward the forward positions enabling Syria to launch a surprise surge into the Golan as well as escalation in southern Lebanon aimed to achieve initial grabs.

Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 1996, Iran delivered, via Syria, a whole range of vastly improved weapons to the HizbAllah and other terrorist forces based on the border with Israel. Among these weapon systems are the truck-mounted Fajr-3 240mm rockets (which, with a range of 26-27 miles, can hit major Israeli objectives from beyond the security zone), the highly lethal FAGOT ATGMs (Soviet design), 35mm Oerlikon automatic guns (a Swiss weapon good against both helicopters and surface objectives). The Iranians also delivered large quantities of weapons already in the HizbAllah arsenals including Grad-M 122mm rockets, Isphahan rockets, Stingers SFSAMs, SAGGER ATOMs, night vision equipment, explosives and ammunition. The Iranians and the Syrians also oversaw the flow of weapons to the PLO units in the refugee camps of southwest Lebanon, implementing Syria's part in the PLO-Syria agreement. The Iranian airlift of weapons and equipment for the HizbAllah and terrorist organizations intensified markedly in the first week of December. Tens of flights of both military and civilian transports delivered military equipment and highly specialized systems for terrorists to the Damascus airport, from where the goods were delivered to Syrian and HizbAllah units.

The Nuclear Factor

The nuclear factor has become a crucial element in any conflict in the Middle East. Iran has nuclear weapons, and so does Pakistan. The supreme leaders in Tehran are convinced that the numerous warheads purchased from the former Soviet Central Asia are operational. Irrespective of skeptic “expert opinion” in the West, they – the decision-makers in Tehran – operate on the basis of their own conviction that Iran has operational nuclear weapons. Moreover, there are indications of a Pakistani agreement, with Chinese consent, to “contribute” to the Muslim nuclear deterrence. And there is no doubt that Pakistan has operational nuclear weapons.

The Arabs have a well-defined nuclear doctrine. Already in the late 1970s, the Syrians introduced the doctrinal tenet that since Israel cannot withstand even a few nuclear strikes while the Muslim World can prevail a massive nuclear attack of the magnitude attributed to Israel’s capabilities, the nuclear factor is essentially irrelevant for as long as Arab leaders can hold their position in a strategic nuclear brinkmanship. While Tehran and Damascus are willing to gamble on such brinkmanship, Jerusalem cannot afford to be wrong – Israel will not survive as a viable country in the aftermath of a strike with the few tactical nuclear warheads Iran has. Therefore, the mere existence of a credible nuclear threat (on top of the known arsenals of chemical and biological weapons) in effect neutralizes Israel’s “deterrence factor” at the very least for the strategically crucial initial period of war – the time frame in which the Arab-Iranian forces manage their strategic grab, while the Israeli government agonizes over the decision how to react to the nuclear ultimatum and the sudden war. Moreover, Washington will be most reluctant to commit American forces and assets under conditions of possible exposure to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, particularly given the current Gulf Syndrome crisis. Hence, the Arabs and the Iranians can also deter an American cover for Israel.

The nuclear issue is not a theoretical academic or speculative issue. In the last days of November, Tehran “determined” that Israel already put its missiles on “atomic readiness.” According to Iranian sources, Tehran did so in part on the basis of intelligence data (such satellite photographs and intercepts) acquired in Russia and Central Asia. On the basis of this “data” Tehran undertook the “appropriate countermeasures.” And it is under this umbrella of nuclear uncertainty, that the Arab-Iranian non-nuclear war will be waged.

The War Scenario

The Syrians and their allies have well defined contingency plans. The basic Syrian approach to a major war is based on the contingency plans prepared and exercised for the war that almost was in the Fall of 1992, while the plans for a strategic grab in a limited war are based on contingency plans prepared in 1994, and exercised since then.

Israeli security sources describe the 1994 contingency plan for a quick territorial grab on the Golan in the context of a limited war. The first step is the deployment of Commando forces to advance positions near the Israeli border. Then, once Damascus determines that hostilities are imminent, the Syrians will begin the moving around of SSMs inside Syria to reduce vulnerability to Israeli preemption or retaliation. The attack by the Commando forces on key objectives in the Israeli tactical depth will be followed immediately by an offensive surge of tank heavy forces. At the same time, other major Syrian units will be rushing toward the Golan in order to deter Israel from escalation and a massive counter-attack. Damascus intends to complete all these moves within 24-48 hours. Then, with Syrian forces still holding a small part of the Golan and a few Israeli POWs, Damascus and the Arab World will call for imitational pressure on Israel to impose cease-fire, and to demonstrate “flexibility” and “realism” in negotiations with Syria.

Numerous Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese sources provided data that enables the reconstruction of the Syrian contingency plans for a major war. The first step will be a provocation launched from Lebanon – a “Lebanese” attack on the SLA and/or a major HizbAllah operation against an Israeli strategic target and/or a spectacular terrorist strike at the heart of Israel. As planned, such a provocation is bound to instigate a major Israeli “response” in Lebanon. Since, because of the nature of the Syrian deployment in south Lebanon, Syrian troops will be killed in any such an Israeli retaliatory strike, Damascus will thus be in a position to call the Israeli actions an unacceptable aggression and threat to Damascus.

The Syrians will then have the “justification” to “retaliate” by launching a barrage of SSMs against Israeli cities and key military facilities. Meanwhile, in solidarity with Palestinian victims in south Lebanon, the PLO’s 50,000 “police” and “auxiliaries” will launch a massive “intifadah” and a wave of terrorism from their safe-havens in the territories. Taken together, these activities will prove sufficient to prevent a timely deployment of Israeli reserves to the Golan.

By then, however, the Syrian Armed Forces will have already launched a surprise surge largely based on the 1994 contingency plan. Given the Israeli inability to react, the Syrian forces will succeed in securing limited grabs on the Golan. Then, Damascus and its allies are convinced, international pressure – especially, if there are also oil embargo and Egyptian threat to intervene militarily – will compel Israel to reach a political compromise on their terms.

Meanwhile, in case of an Israeli refusal to compromise, and hence a failure with the diplomatic initiative, the Syrians will be in position to impose a major escalation with the arrival of the main Syrian forces, as well as the sizeable Iraqi and Iranian expeditionary forces. Now surging also through Jordan, these forces will vastly expand and enlarge the Eastern front.

Given Badr-96, the mere war preparations in Egypt, will, at the very least, compel the IDF to keep forces on the southern border, just to be safe. Moreover, building pressure in the Arab/Muslim World for all governments and peoples to join the Jihad or face popular uprisings because of their “un-Islamic” posture will most likely entice such governments as Egypt’s and Jordan’s to join the war rather than risk overthrow. Meanwhile, led by Saudi Arabia, the Muslim World will declare oil embargo. There are sufficient Islamist terrorists all over the West to launch a wave of terrorism in Europe and the U.S. in order to prevent (or delay) U.S. assistance to Israel.

With the militarily debilitating winter weather coming very soon, this scenario is all the more tempting from a strategic point of view. Given the adverse opening conditions and initial period of war, as well as the sudden escalation of the Arab-Iranian offensive, it is safe to assume that it will take the IDE more than a few days to repel all the Arab-Iranian forces from Israeli territory. Damascus, Tehran, Cairo and Baghdad believe that it is not inconceivable that a marked deterioration in the weather will slow down the Israelis before their counter-attacks could evict the Arab-Iranian forces from the Golan Heights. The Arabs and Iranians are convinced that the consequent virtual pause in the mobile war and severe limitations on the use of the Israeli Air Force will create both an opportunity and an incentive for the international community to pressure Israel into capitulation before the spring weather creates proper conditions for the resumption of a major mobile war.

Assessment

When dealing with the Third World, and particularly the Middle East, one should leave the Crystal Ball under lock and key. Given the dominant power of the personality of individual leaders as the source of decision-making – based on these leaders’ own reading of the situation on the basis of the information they have and believe in – and given the penchant of these leaders for the “conspiracy” theories and susceptibility to the “straw factor” (a small and at time relatively insignificant input pushes the leader into a major decision he has been procrastinating on – the straw that breaks the camel’s back), it is virtually impossible to accurately predict what any of the dominant leaders involved in this crisis will ultimately do. However, it is possible to point out to emerging and dominant trends in the crisis management.

Starting the current crisis, the principal leaders may not have wanted war. At the least, they were wavering about it. Since the late 1980s, Arab leaders have been reluctant to embark on major undertakings against Israel. However, these Arab leaders are also convinced that a major brinkmanship crisis, the return to a no-war-no-peace tense situation, and even the resumption of limited clashes, are a must to their own survival. These leaders also know that any of these measures can quickly escalate into a major war. Hence, their undertaking these steps means that these Arab leaders are fully ready to meet the possibility of a major war.

One reason for the readiness to face war, as opposed to the reluctance shown previously, is the Muslim World’s reading of Israel. Indeed, most senior leaders (especially in Damascus, Tehran, Baghdad and Cairo) are convinced that Israel is falling apart – collapsing from within in a unique state of self-confusion, of having lost the WILL to fight and survive. Hence, the current crisis is unfolding in the context of a historical window of opportunity to resolve the Zionist menace once and for good. In this context, the extent of the populist power of Islam – as reflected in the return to Islamic traditions in all aspects of life in the Hub of Islam, in the increasing Islamic profile of the supreme leaders – over national security decisions is a major yet unquantifiable factor. There should be no doubt that the most important leaders are strongly influenced by their Islamic heritage and their own legacy and historical contribution to the Islamic “cause.” Hence, the lure of the possibility to liberate al-Quds and destroy Israel may be a far stronger an input to their decision making process than what cold logic would have. Considering the building Islamist pressure to destroy Israel under

any conditions, the Arab and Iranian leaders who are determined to hold to power may find these circumstances too tempting to be passed over.

Meanwhile, on a more pragmatic and realistic level, the fear of Israel's military might has shrunk. These leaders, particularly in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, are fully aware of the escalatory potential of their move – the initiation of major brinkmanship and crisis. They know that a crisis of the magnitude and potential strategic impact they are instigating can easily escalate to a major regional war. But now, they have the nuclear umbrella. Arab strategic studies, as well as the unprecedented magnitude of development and acquisition of SSMS and all types of weapons of mass destruction, show that this factor is high on the leaders' mind. This newly found sense of self-confidence and the firm belief in the ability to succeed in the initial phase of a war create a new, and worrisome, framework within which these leaders examine the choices ahead of them.

Further more, at the higher political levels of the entire Arab World, and most significantly in Cairo, Amman and other capitals considered relatively supportive of the "peace process", there is a distinct and marked change in the attitude towards Israel. The present attitude is more hostile and confrontational, and the resort to force is no longer ruled out as being anathema in the era of a "peace process." This widespread acceptability of the possibility of war encourages these leaders who are committed to conflict. The Egyptians now talk about a state of "cold war" between Israel and its Arab partners to peace – a fundamental change from the previous term of "cold peace." Other political-military forces in Egypt call for the pursuit of policies of "armed peace" and even "confrontational peace" toward Israel.

Taken together, the multitude of political, strategic and tactical moves leave no doubt that the key leaders in the Arab World and Iran have already determined to continue the escalatory brinkmanship even as the likelihood of war is growing. Moreover, the overall situation and dynamics in the Arab Middle East contribute to a self-reinforcing escalation. Hence, the three key leaderships in Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, as well as Cairo and the Abdallah faction in Riyadh, are increasingly convinced that war is essentially inevitable. Consequently, there is already a clear shift in these leaders' deliberations and consultations. They are now preoccupied mainly with strategic and military decisions – that is, determining the optimal conditions for initiating the war, achieving surprise despite the protracted escalatory crisis and Israel's edginess, etc.

However, there is no hard evidence, yet, of a specific decision to start something on a fixed date. Presently, the prevailing mood among the political, military and security elites in the Arab World is that of an almost passive, though wiling, acceptance of fate's course. As the region continues to deteriorate towards an eruption of violence, they are waiting for the inevitable spark to emerge and "compel" them into taking action. Among the supreme leaders that really count, the "straw" seems to be still missing. But for how long?

Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

The Almost War

During the last days of 1996, the crisis between Syria and Israel was much closer to an explosion and war than previously thought.

Since mid December 1996, Syrian and Iranian intelligence had been increasingly apprehensive about Israel's reading of the strategic situation in the Middle East. In the second half of December, Syrian Intelligence acquired data that pointed to what Damascus believed to be "secret movements" by Israeli Forces on the Golan Heights and in south Lebanon. Most alarming for Damascus was information acquired by the Syrian electronic intelligence according to which "Israeli command posts were redeployed" for a possible war. Syrian analysis of this data concluded that, "the contacts which were made between these posts divulged aggressive Israeli intentions."

What Syrian intelligence detected was actually a high-level command and headquarters exercise aimed to test the functioning of the IDF's major units at war, their ability to communicate and coordinate theater-wide operations. This was a static map exercise and no actual units were involved or moved. Significantly, while preparing for this exercise, the IDF was certain that Syrian intelligence would not detect it. Therefore, Jerusalem decided not to inform Damascus about the exercise.

Meanwhile, Damascus was now convinced that Israel was about to launch a preemptive strike. Consequently, military units throughout Syria were put on wartime alert. Damascus also sounded the alarm in Tehran. The ever prudent and professional Iranian intelligence demanded to check the Syrian intelligence against their own data. The Iranian intelligence experts then concurred with the Syrian presentation and recommended preparations for intervention in the imminent war in accordance with the Syrian-Iranian agreement.

Further more, an alarmed Tehran approached the uppermost circles of power in Riyadh through both official and emergency channels, and informed Riyadh that Iran was determined to provide Syria with all possible help. Tehran assured Riyadh that the anticipated massive troop and air power movements, as well as other forms of high wartime military readiness, were aimed solely to assist Syria in its war with Israel and would not be aimed at the Arabian Peninsula.

At the same time, Syrian intelligence summoned leaders of Islamist and Palestinian terrorist organizations and instructed them to prepare for a wave of terrorism and violence in south Lebanon as well as in Judea and Samaria in order to harass Israel and slow down the IDF's ability to carry out its own war plans.

However, Damascus still remained very apprehensive about its ability to withstand an Israeli preemptive strike. The analysis of both Syrian and Iranian intelligence suggested a compressed time frame that would make it impossible for the Syrians and their allies to preempt the anticipated Israeli attack. Damascus therefore decided to compel Israel to abandon its war plans.

Hence, the U.S. ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Damascus. The Syrians presented their intelligence data about the "secret movements" of Israeli forces, as well as the findings of their electronic intelligence about the activation of the Israeli command posts and their preparations for war. The Syrians stressed that this data could not but confirm "aggressive Israeli intentions." Damascus now demanded that Washington either stopped Israel from launching the war or support the Syrian strike. Damascus informed the U.S. that the Syrian forces near the Israeli border had already been put on wartime alert. The Syrians also threatened massive retaliation and extremely heavy casualties throughout Israel in case Israel attacked. Washington raised the alarm in Jerusalem. Similar messages were also sent via France and Germany. Assad then personally called President Husni Mubarak, who, in turn, personally called Prime Minister Netanyahu and warned Israel against attacking the Syrians. Using the

good services of the U.S., Egypt, France and Germany, Jerusalem went out of its way to convince the Syrians that that was not the case and that Israel had not had any aggressive intentions toward Syria.

And then the bus exploded in the middle of Damascus on New Year's Eve. Although it would later be learned that the bomb was actually a part of the succession struggle in Damascus, the Syrian leadership decided to exploit the explosion for political purposes. The Syrian government quickly attributed the massive bomb to Israeli intelligence. Hence, even though those at the very top knew the truth – that Syrian intelligence was responsible for this bomb – most officials in the Syrian intelligence and military establishment were incited by the government issued reports of Israeli responsibility for the carnage. It did not take long for the cover-up lies of the Syrian leadership to begin taking on a life of their own. Soon enough, they had a major impact on the Syrian strategic decision making process.

Syrian and Iranian military intelligence interpreted the ramifications of the Damascus bombing in the context of the recent war alarm. Neither Damascus nor Tehran was fully convinced that Israel had not intended to launch a preemptive war on Syria back in late December. Tehran was adamant that the Israeli assurances were deceptive and so informed Damascus. Additional intelligence from Palestinian sources in Judea and Samaria were also disquieting because they reported intense Israeli military activities (actually in anticipation of crises because of the forthcoming withdrawal from Hebron).

Relying on this information, the Syrian high command concluded in the first days of January 1997 that the bombing of the bus in Damascus was an Israeli provocation aimed to incite Damascus to make a retaliatory move. Such a move, the Syrian analysis went, would in turn be used by Jerusalem to justify an Israeli military strike and thus overcome the American and Egyptian warnings of late December. Significantly, the Syrian depiction of the Israeli strategic dynamics was in essence a mirror image of Syria's own logic, doctrine and contingency plans for the future war – and was therefore most believable for the Syrian senior officers.

Meanwhile, the Syrian propaganda machine intensified its accusations of the Israeli responsibility for the Damascus bomb, building justification for retaliation and the war that would surely follow.

Then, on the afternoon/evening of January 3, the slide to crisis was suddenly stalled without any apparent reason. The Islamist terrorist leaders were called in by Syrian intelligence and ordered to stop their

preparations. By mid January, there was an overall slowdown in Syrian military activities. With the weather markedly deteriorating and major rain storms hitting the entire Middle East, Syrian forward units were pulled back to the shelter of their permanent bases, and thousands of reservists were released. The threat of war seems to have been reduced until the weather improves, perhaps only in springtime.

The main question that must be answered is what happened? Why the sudden reversal in Damascus' road to war? In retrospect, the determining factor was the deterioration in Hafiz al-Assad's health – a process that necessitated the prostate surgery on January 7. During the last month leading to the surgery, Assad had bouts of loss of consciousness that worried his doctors so much that they called in experts from Moscow. It is inconceivable for Damascus to risk war, or even a major crisis, while Assad is incapacitated.

Even though the war did not break out, the swift slide to war exposed the mood among the top echelons in Damascus and Tehran. The uppermost senior leaders are on edge, and there are an unambiguous institutional willingness and readiness to jump the gun. This time Assad's prostate and the sudden deterioration in the weather stalled the escalation and prevented the eruption of war. The continued tension in Damascus, now exacerbated by the succession crisis, only increases the instability and edginess of the senior decision makers. A major crisis and even a general war are proven instruments to consolidating power in Damascus. Hence the temptation to go to war – irrespective of the ultimate outcome – only grows as the Syrian succession crisis intensifies.



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
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Arafat's Peace Process

July 30, 1997

The capture in mid July, 1997, of three Palestinian Police officers from Nablus on their way to commit a terrorist strike near Har Brakha, a Jewish settlement, provided a strong confirmation that the uppermost leadership of the Palestinian Authority [PA] supports the return to terrorism as means to leverage the “negotiations” with Israel.

The three policemen were armed with Uzi submachine guns, which the PA Police Forces are not supposed to have, so that the PA will be able to deny later any connection with the attack. However, they carried instructions from Col. Jihad Massimi, the Commander of the PA Police in Nablus, to ambush cars and “kill Jews.” Further more, Israel has intercepts of Col. Jihad Massimi receiving his orders from General Ghazi Jabali in Gaza. General Jabali is the Chief of the PA Police Force and a close confidant of Yassir Arafat. Hence, Jabali would not have instructed Massimi but with Arafat's full knowledge and understanding.

This Har Brakha incident has brought to the fore a profound development in Arafat's own strategy for dealing with Israel – the revival of the armed struggle as the primary instrument capable of

compelling Israel to withdraw from the territories and acquiesce to the establishment of a hostile Palestinian state. Additional evidence testifies to Arafat's personal decision to revive the armed struggle against Israel, as well as his commitment to use terrorism in order to both bolster his own leadership and further the Palestinian cause.

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The roots of the current escalation can be traced to early 1997. The turning point was the last phase of the PA's negotiations with the U.S. and Israel over the Hebron Agreement, which was signed by Arafat and Israel's Netanyahu on the night of January 14-15, 1997. It did not take long for Arafat and his coterie to be confronted with the ramifications of the Hebron Agreement, particularly the implications of the active U.S. participation and mediation: Having played a major role in reaching the Hebron Agreement, Washington was initially disinclined to amend it to suit Arafat's interpretations or political needs.

Pushing the negotiations through, Arafat promised his lieutenants results he could not deliver. He created the impression that in return for Arafat's signing the Hebron Agreement, the U.S. and the West Europeans will impose upon Israel the unconditional implementation of the three Israeli phased pullbacks from the West Bank, the release of all Palestinian prisoners, the establishment of an ex-territorial safe passage-way between Gaza and the West Bank, the opening of the Gaza airport to unsupervised international flights, and the transfer of international crossing points to the unilateral control of the PA. Arafat also stated that the Hebron Agreement stipulates that Israel must transfer over 85% of the West Bank to the PA's jurisdiction by mid 1998 or one year before finalizing the permanent status negotiations (whichever comes first). When the U.S. endorsed the Israeli rejection of these interpretations and demands, Arafat had to confront growing mistrust and alienation among some of his closest aides.

Meanwhile, the Islamists in Hebron, as well as throughout both the territories and the Muslim World, considered the remaining of Jews in Hebron Arafat's surrender to Israeli pressure. The Islamists vowed to escalate their Jihad for the salvation of Hebron. Specifically, organizations sponsored by Iran and Syria began activating terrorist cells inside the territories. Not without reason, Arafat now feared that once again the initiative and leadership of the liberation Jihad would shift to the Islamists. It became imperative for Arafat and his coterie to

regain control over the growing radicalization and militancy in the territories by becoming the leaders and champions of the trend.

By February, Arafat realized that Jerusalem was not capitulating. On the contrary, Israel started building in Har Homa – a clear demonstration of resolve. Arafat's lieutenants began a series of clandestine consultations with Islamist leaders both in the territories and throughout the Arab World on the proper response to the challenges of Hebron and Har Homa. The PA leadership particularly wanted to ascertain just how crucial was the return to armed struggle and terrorism to the Islamist and radical leaders. The response was a resounding cry for violence.

Early March was a decision time for Arafat. On the night of March 9, Arafat and a few close aides secretly met with the heads of HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and numerous rejectionist organizations to discuss the resumption of terrorism at the heart of Israel. Arafat opened the meeting by launching a diatribe against Israel and demanding retribution. Unlike earlier meetings, this time Arafat did not qualify his remarks with a disclaimer that he was not sanctioning terrorism. All agreed that it was imperative to shock Israel into major concessions as well as punish Jerusalem for its intransigence. As the discussion heated up, Arafat began uttering a sentence connoting violence and the use of force. At this point he was interrupted by one of his aides. He advised Arafat to be careful in what he says. A head of one of the rejectionist groups noted that there was no need for Arafat to be explicit and that those present understood him well. The other leaders nodded or murmured in agreement.

A few days later, the leaders of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad met again with senior officials of the PA to discuss the implementation of Arafat's desire. The PA officials stated in this meeting that Arafat would endorse and permit terrorist attacks at the heart of Israel. To demonstrate the sincerity of the PA, Arafat ordered the release of all HAMAS and Islamic Jihad prisoners, including Islamist leaders imprisoned for conspiring against Arafat. Within days, the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad cadres were enjoying greater freedom of action than they had had prior to the wave of suicide bombings of the Spring of 1996. In Islamist mosques and gatherings in Gaza and throughout the West Bank, the youth openly talked about Arafat's permission ('green light') to strike Israel in retaliation for building in Har Homa.

Significantly, Damascus was directly involved in the active preparations for terrorist strikes at the heart of Israel, including the process that ultimately led to the bomb planting in the Apropos Cafe in

Tel Aviv on March 21, 1997. Prior to agreeing with, and ultimately implementing, Arafat's 'green light', the HAMAS high command in the territories communicated with the HAMAS command center in Damascus. They sought advice and permission to proceed. In the process, the HAMAS high command in Damascus consulted with both the Syrian and Iranian Governments before urging the HAMAS in the territories to strike out. For Tehran, these consultations provided a major indication that Arafat was indeed ready to embrace the Islamists' perception of the situation and the commitment to a terroristic *Jihad* as the sole method to dealing with Israel.

Meanwhile, the PA also conducted a major test case in Hebron. The flare up of major riots in late March was distinct because of the direct involvement of the PA Police in the violence. Initially, the Palestinian security forces did not interfere with the rioters. However, by the time the riots ended in early April, PA Police, intelligence and security forces were in near total control of events, to the point of outright facilitation and directing of clashes with Israeli security forces and settlers. As part of this effort, the PA paid youths 30 to 50 NIS (\$10 to \$17) per day for taking part in riots and attacking Israeli soldiers. By then, the PA had already deployed over 1,500 policemen in Hebron (instead of the 400 allowed) armed with weapons forbidden by the agreement. By mid April, since Israel did not cancel the Hebron Agreement over the riots and violations, Arafat's aides were convinced they could safely control riots with near impunity. The PA security forces also proved they could control and run major outbursts of "popular rage" even though the key incitement was Islamist and the driving force was the Mosque.

These operations – the late March bomb in Apropos Cafe in Tel Aviv that killed three young women and injured dozens, as well as the incitement and controlling of violent riots in Hebron – were planned for the time Arafat and his immediate coterie would be out of the country – in the OIC [Organization of Islamic Countries] Summit in Pakistan. For Arafat, the Islamabad Summit was also a unique opportunity to revive direct contacts with Tehran. Arafat met with Iran's President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, while his aides held numerous discussions with their counterparts from Iran and other radical Muslim states.

The Islamabad Summit opened the door to further contacts and dialogue between the PA and Tehran, both directly and via the good services of Syria and radical Palestinian commanders in Lebanon who cooperate closely with Iran and the HizbAllah. Between late March and late June 1997, Arafat dispatched several PA officials to Tehran,

including Hebron Mayor Mustafa Natshah, and a senior advisor to Arafat who had closely dealt with Khomeyni during and soon after the Islamic Revolution. Arafat also raised the political profile of senior leaders, most notably Hani al-Hassan, known to be both hostile to the Oslo Agreement and previously close to Khomeyni's Tehran.

The ensuing rapprochement with Iran has already enabled the PA to improve relationship and cooperation with the Islamist leadership, particularly the HAMAS high command. Consequently, not only the PA support base expanded, but the options for escalation of the armed struggle multiplied. Indeed, Arafat sought and received Tehran's endorsement of, and support for, the gradual escalation of terrorism against Israel on the basis of a contingency plan developed together with Syrian experts. Tehran promised not to utilize its vast assets and support core in the territories to unseat Arafat (as long as he is pursuing the agreed upon strategy), as well as order its Palestinian assets to obey the PA in the context of their joint Jihad.

The Iranian conditional promise not to challenge Arafat for the time being is of crucial importance given the prevailing conditions in the territories. According to an Iranian senior intelligence officer, Tehran ascertained already in the Spring of 1996 that at least a quarter of the Palestinian security and intelligence forces, as well as the leadership cadres around Yassir Arafat himself, were actually working for HAMAS. These clandestine cadres maintain honest and close relationship with the HAMAS leadership, and they trust each other. The senior intelligence officer stressed that Iranian intelligence influences, as well as exercises varying degrees of control over, these Palestinian cadres both directly and through Syria and the HAMAS high command. The growing number of Islamists in the ranks of the PA is a reflection of the extent of public support for militant Islamism throughout the territories.

Furthermore, there is a new generation of Iran- and Syria-trained expert terrorists, including committed martyrs, already deployed in territories. The Iranian senior intelligence officer stressed that Tehran has made an exceptional effort to ensure the clandestine character of this training and preparatory effort so that these terrorists are virtually clean and in all likelihood unknown to both the Israeli GSS and Arafat's security organs.

Arafat recognizes the growing strength of the Palestinian Islamists. Even if he does not have a full picture of the extent of the Iranian penetration of, and influence over, the Palestinian security organs and terrorist infrastructure, he knows that Tehran can destabilize his hold of

power at will. This awareness was reflected in Arafat's revived negotiations with Iran in Islamabad. Around May, Arafat was notified that the Islamists had already received green light from Tehran and Damascus to cooperate and actually assume a leading role in the unfolding escalation. This agreement on the role of the Islamists has created conducive conditions for closer cooperation and coordination between the PA's police and security services and the leadership of both the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. In turn, such close contacts will reduce the likelihood of an Islamist coup against Arafat.

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Meanwhile, Arafat was laying down the groundwork for the expanded Jihad. The first tangible results of the late September 1996 military agreement between the PA and Syria played a major role. In the Spring of 1997, Syrian experts, both in the joint intelligence HQ in Gaza and concealed in the ranks of the various Palestinian security organs in the West Bank, assisted their Palestinian counterparts with the conduct of a major study of, and formulation of strategy for, the revival of the armed struggle.

In April-May 1997, a select team of Palestinian and Syrian experts completed a thorough study of the security situation in Israel, particularly in the territories, and formulated possible strategies for dealing with Israel. Their primary objective was to formulate a strategy for an armed struggle in order to induce a unilateral Israeli withdrawal while bolstering Arafat's position in the process. The study's conclusions, as embraced by Arafat and his close aides, are extremely significant.

Even though martyrdom bombings and other spectacular terrorist strikes at the heart of Israel have had a great impact on official Jerusalem and the Israeli public as a whole, these operations also have a political peculiarity that prevents their widespread use. As a rule, spectacular terrorist operations involve only very small secretive cells, and thus have no public participation or mobilization value. Moreover, these strikes, particularly martyrdom strikes, are unambiguously associated with the militant Islamists and not the PA. Thus, even though such operations remain crucial to pushing Jerusalem into capitulation, from the PA's point of view they are effective only in the context of a larger and wider populist Jihad.

The PA leadership acknowledges that for objective reasons there is no longer potential for a populist Intifadah. With the exception of a

small segment of Hebron, there is no longer contact between Jews (including the IDF and the settlers) and the bulk of the Palestinian population. Consequently, there are no longer points of friction where “spontaneous” clashes involving large crowds can be instigated. Moreover, as a series of clashes organized in Gush Katif (in the Gaza Strip) to test the extent of Israeli reaction demonstrated, it proved very difficult for the PA security authorities to incite crowds to travel long distances to an obscure road section and be ready to return when faced with massive reaction by the IDF. Thus, mobs can be mobilized and excited only in their immediate vicinity – in and around the Arab cities.

Instead, the Syrians recommended that the Palestinians formulate a new strategy on the basis of the experience and lessons of the popular war waged against the IDF in Lebanon between late 1982 and early 1985. In the 1980s, the main forces were Palestinian and the Shi’ite irregular units under the command of Syrian special forces and Iranian intelligence. This war, Damascus claims, brought about the Israeli withdrawal to the security zone. The essence of the war was the accumulating impact of relentless attacks on the IDF’s transportation and support infrastructure. For the territories, the Syrians now suggest a similar campaign of attrition on the transportation and other infrastructure (electricity and telephone lines, water and oil pipelines, pumping stations, etc.) of both the IDF and the settlers. For these strikes to be effective in the West Bank, they must be conducted by professional special forces. These forces will intentionally operate from, and withdraw into, the centers of population – the Palestinian cities.

The Syrians argue, and the PLO agrees, that under such circumstances it will be possible to first accomplish a profound disruption of the settlers’ routine and security. The IDF will then be compelled to deploy disproportionately large forces to protect the settlers and their traffic. This will cause disruption in Israel and bring about an outcry from the “peace camp” opposition to abandon the territories and even for a unilateral withdrawal – much like the anti-Lebanon War opposition back in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, sporadic spectacular terrorist strikes, including martyrdom operations, will further increase agitation in Israel and reinforce the calls for major concessions and a unilateral withdrawal.

Moreover, the Palestinians anticipate that the IDF will ultimately start to avenge and prevent Palestinian strikes on the roads and against infrastructure by closing in on, perhaps even entering into, the major cities. These moves will instigate an all out mobilization of the

population behind the PA. If the IDF chooses to enter any of the cities by force, the PA security authorities are convinced that the Islamist and other irregular armed bands will rally behind them to jointly fight the IDF. However, the Syrians argued, the IDF will not enter the cities because the price will be too high. (This last observation was ultimately confirmed by the IDF's own simulation and exercises. War games conducted in July by the Israeli General Staff demonstrate that the reoccupation of the Arab cities presently under PA control will require huge forces and will cost the IDF hundreds of fatalities and thousands of injured. Instead, the General Staff recommends that the IDF lay tight siege on the cities in case of a widespread popular outburst.)

Arafat accepted these recommendations, and in the first half of May ordered their expedient implementation. He also ordered the simultaneous escalation of other forms of armed struggle. By now there has been a growing sense of urgency among Arafat and his coterie as a result of a marked deterioration in both Arafat's popularity and public support for the PA. Simultaneously there has been a widespread growth in militancy, anti-Israel sentiments, and practice of radical Islam among the Palestinian urban population.

These trends in the Palestinian population are confirmed by a series of polls conducted by the Jerusalem Center of Communications, which is close to the PA, among the PA-controlled Arab population. In early July 1997, only 8.2% of the population expressed strong support for the Oslo Accords, a decline from 19.7% in December 1996. At the same time, 30.4% of the population strongly opposed the Accords, a rise from 19.2%. Moreover, in early July, 49.5% rated Arafat's overall performance as good – a decline from 53.8% in May 1997. Given the sycophancy, personality cult and media blitz, as well as the widespread fear of the politicized intelligence and security organs, Arafat's support rate is actually extremely low. Most telling is the population's response to the question about corruption: 44.9% believe the level of corruption is "very large", 40.7% believe there is "significant" corruption, and only 6.6% believe there is "hardly any" corruption. Indicative of the lingering fear of the security, police and intelligence forces is the fact that they are the only segment of the PA government which performance have recently improved: 36.3% believe the security organs are doing a better job, while 29.7% believe their performance have declined. This data confirms that any escalation of armed struggle against, and confrontation with, Israel will increase and galvanize popular support for Arafat.

Meanwhile, Arafat ordered in early/mid May the establishment of a new special forces body specifically in order to wage the new type of war on the basis of study recommendations. The new organization is tightly controlled by Arafat himself through a very small number of highly trusted confidants. The key commanders are Amin al-Hindi (Chief of the General Intelligence Service), Musa Arafat (Chief of Military Intelligence), Faysal Abu-Sharah (Chief of Arafat's own Force 17) and Ghazi Jabali (Chief of the PA Police Force). Jibril Rajub (Chief of the most powerful Preventive Security Service) controls the interface with the Islamist terrorist organizations in the West Bank. At the same time, the actual operations will be carried out in a deniable manner – as if by “volunteers” and renegades. The organization and activation of the new force began in great secrecy in mid May, and the core of the force was deemed operational by early July.

The key special forces elements are made of about 500 “volunteers” – all members of the Fatah's inner apparatus called the Tanzim, and who are selected from the ranks of the most loyal veteran cadres of the PA police, security and intelligence services. They are all being paid an extra \$1200 a month for being ready to strike out at a moment notice. Special effort is made by the PA to ensure the clandestine nature of the new Tanzim force through a web of isolated cells and compartmentalized networks. Indeed, the new Tanzim special forces have no command structure or fixed organization. Instead, individuals and cells are activated directly by, or on behalf of, the higher-ups as required. This arrangement not only enhances security, but also ensures Arafat's direct control over each and every action.

Of great significance are the people making the fighting core of the new Tanzim special forces. From the uppermost layer of the high command that is answerable directly to Arafat down to the fighters themselves, the vast majority of the “volunteers” come from the “territories” elite. These are the *Fatah* young terrorists who rose up fighting Israel – a distinct group that is adversarial to Arafat's “Tunisians” (the PLO elite that returned with Arafat from Tunisia and now constitutes the core of the PA corrupt establishment). The “territories” elite has been hardened by fighting during the Intifadah and imprisonment by Israel. Its members have established and maintained extensive clandestine networking from their Intifadah and terrorism days in the 1980s.

Moreover, the “territories” cadres enjoy genuine popular support within the cities. In their long years of underground activities and jail terms, they have also established and institutionalized a comprehensive

system of operational cooperation, communication, and sharing of intelligence between the PA security forces and local networks of the HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and other rejectionist forces. All of these characteristics make the new Tanzim special forces highly suitable for clandestine and covert operations.

Anticipating a virtually inevitable Israeli reaction to the escalation of terrorism, Arafat also ordered a marked expansion of the military forces deployed to confront the IDF in case they advance into any of the Arab cities the PA controls. Most important is the organization of elite teams – the storm units that include martyr detachments – to confront the besieging IDF units. These teams will use heavy weapons – RPGs and mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles (against helicopters that proved so effective in the October 1996 clashes), as well as human bombs – against the IDF. The PA's contingency plans call for the popular resistance to the IDF to be built around quality cores made of the storm units. The primary objective of these forces is to bleed the IDF on live TV. The PA anticipates hostile public opinion to build popular pressure on the Israeli Government to succumb and withdraw.

In order to ensure large quantities of ammunition for these weapons, the PA has launched several underground (and illegal) production lines for weapons and ammunition. These include a factory for bombs, mines and grenades in Gaza, a factory for RPGs, light mortars and ammunition for them in Ramallah, and a factory for ammunition and bombs in Nablus.

Meanwhile, the Spring also saw an expansion of the weapons' smuggling to the territories, and particularly the West Bank. (There is a rather smooth and large scale smuggling into the Gaza Strip from Egypt via tunnels, and from Syria, Lebanon and Egypt by fishing boats and small cargo vessels. This pipeline still operates efficiently. However, the PA has problems transferring heavy weapons to the West Bank because of greater Israeli supervision over the VIP vehicles – to-date the primary means of transfer of heavy weapons – and the absence of extra-territorial axis the PA keeps demanding.)

Appealing directly to Saddam Hussein, Arafat arranged for the allocation of large quantities of weapons, including anti-tank weaponry, Katyusha rockets, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles [SFSAMs], as well as large quantities of small arms, ammunition and explosives, from Iraqi arsenals. Further more, in a recent meeting with the Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan, who is a senior intelligence officer and a close confidant of Saddam Hussein, Arafat stressed the urgent need for a

stepped-up supply in view of the anticipated escalation and major confrontation with the IDF.

Baghdad was happy to comply. The recent exposure in Jordan of one smuggling network is indicative of the extent of the pushing of Iraqi weapons to the PA. When apprehended, the network was preparing to ship across the Dead Sea a single rubber-boat loaded with SFSAMs, anti-armor RPGs along with their launchers, as well as numerous hand grenades, handguns, and machineguns. This network, along with several other similar groups, have been smuggling various types of weapons, including RPGs, SAMs, and grenades to a site near Jericho. Some of the weapons were for the use of the PA forces in Jericho and the rest were sent onward to Hebron. Jordanian security authorities confirmed that this operation was conducted on behalf of the PA. "The consignment was delivered to a Palestinian security officer named [Captain] Salih," explained a Jordanian security official. "The initial investigation points to the involvement of Colonel Jibril al-Rajub's Palestinian Preventive Security."

Concurrently, there began a marked intensification of incitement and mobilization of the masses both through official PA media and in the mosques by both PA-appointed and Islamist leaders. The July 11 Friday Sermon delivered by Sheikh Ikrama Sabri, the PA-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, is one of many similar sermons loaded with politics and hatred. "Oh Allah, destroy America, for she is ruled by Zionist Jews," Sheikh Sabri called. He assured his listeners that the Arabs would soon inherit the Jewish settlements. "The homes the Jews are building will become Arab property, with Allah's help," Sheikh Sabri explained. "Allah shall take revenge on behalf of his Prophet against the colonialist settlers who are sons of monkeys and pigs. Forgive us, Muhammad, for the acts of these sons of monkeys and pigs, who sought to harm your sanctuary." The identification of the Jews as sons of monkeys and pigs is based on the Quran [5:60] and hence the action, that is violence, Sabri calls for is sanctified.

Similarly, on July 19, thousands of HAMAS supporters marched in Hebron burning Israeli flags and urging the resumption of terrorism. "Our grenades and bombs will burn those who insulted our Prophet," declared one of the banners carried. Naif Rajub, a HAMAS leader, also reminded the crowd that Holy Quran deemed that Jews are "the children of pigs and monkeys" and therefore must be punished severely for all transgressions against Muslim Arabs. He warned that Israel was planning to destroy Al-Aqsa Mosque in order to build a Jewish Temple

(a frequent incitement theme) and urged the crowd to march and liberate Jerusalem by force of arms before this happens. Large forces of the PA Police and security forces were present. They did not interfere with the incitement and some even participated in the exercising of the crowd by the Islamist preachers, shouting such slogans as “Jews, Jews, the army of Muhammad will return!” and Quranic verses urging Jihad.

The propaganda and agitation broadcasted and printed by the PA controlled media also constitutes unprecedented harsh incitement. The dominant theme is preparing the public for a decisive and most violent fighting against Israel. The Voice of Palestine is broadcasting in wartime mood, urging a total mobilization for the struggle against “the Tel-Aviv government and its blood-thirsty occupation forces.” Moreover, there is an increase in the distinctly anti-Jewish, rather than political (that is, anti-Israeli Government, anti-IDF, anti-settlers, etc.), incitement that stresses that no solution or even co-existence are possible between Jews and Muslims irrespective of who’s in power in Jerusalem.

Senior officials openly endorse this propaganda. For example, in mid June, Col. Jihad Massimi told the Jerusalem paper *Al-Quds* about an Israeli conspiracy to spread AIDS among the Arab youth – the fighters of the forthcoming struggle – by sending in prostitutes inflicted by AIDS. Israel is also accused of spreading in the West Bank chewing gum laced with drugs that increase sex drive among young women to both break families through promiscuity and dishonor, as well as send young girls into prostitution. (The same propaganda line is also prevalent in Egypt in both Muslim Brotherhood circles and government-controlled media.) All of these stories are preparing and agitating the Palestinian population for the coming struggle and war.

In Jerusalem, the PA is reviving the mood of the height of the Intifadah – a time of violent clashes with, and uprising against, Israel. Activists operating under Jibril Rajub recently distributed in Jerusalem “Leaflet No. 1 of the Jerusalem National Command.” The leaflet had the same format as the leaflets issued by the National Leadership of the Intifadah during the late 1980s. “Leaflet No. 1 of the Jerusalem National Command” called for violence and terrorism, and instructed the readers to “hit mobile and stationary targets of the Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem.” The leaflet stressed the need to strike at the Israeli police, municipality, national insurance and income tax authorities, and the settlers. It also announced progress toward the establishment of “strike committees” – tailored after the violent squads

of the Intifadah during the late 1980s – in order to better prepare for the forthcoming armed struggle.

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In early June, Arafat convened his closest aides and ordered the gradual escalation of violence under the tight control of the PA security organs, particularly Jibril Rajub's Preventive Security. The primary objective of this escalation would be to test and gauge the extent of the Israeli reaction to the provocations. Hebron was again selected as the main theater because of the settlers' presence. Fatah Tanzim activists immediately began recruiting many youths and ordered them to escalate the clashes in Hebron, and specifically increase the use of fire bombs/bottles. However, the preparations and recruitment were not limited to the Hebron area. Tanzim activists stressed their actions were part of "an effort to set the territories on fire under orders from Arafat." Indeed, there was a gradual expansion of operations to the roads used by settlers, particularly in the Ramallah area. These attacks included an increase in the use of firearms against settlers' cars, as well as an attempt to kidnap an Israeli driver in Ramallah by a Palestinian police officer pretending to be an Israeli Border Policeman.

Emboldened by the success of the initial operations, Arafat ordered further escalation in early July. Arafat's new orders called for the launching of the Lebanon-style war by the Tanzim special forces and their Islamist allies, as well as "spontaneous" riots in Hebron and Bethlehem, and selected spectacular terrorist strikes or bombings in Jerusalem that can be portrayed as local reaction to Har Homa. (The Jerusalem case is uniquely complex because it also involves the bitter power struggle between Arafat and Faisal Husseini over dominance in Jerusalem. The Saudi Government and Gulf Islamists are funding Husseini's effort to build illegal Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem as well as provide other nationalist services to the Arab population. Fearing loss of standing, Arafat must regain control by instigating violence because of the mobilizing impact of the public's instant dramatic reaction.) In some of these discussions, Arafat told the uppermost leadership of the Tanzim special forces that the time has come to "kill Jews" because nothing else would compel the Netanyahu Government and the Clinton White House into making unilateral concessions and large-scale withdrawals.

When asked on several occasions by most-senior security officials who will implement his wishes, Arafat smiled and said: "Alladina

amanu...” This is a loaded answer and a quintessential Arafat exercise in deniability. Literally, Arafat’s answer means “Those who believe in Allah’s Law.” However, these words are also the opening words in one of the key verses in the Quran [4:76] that codifies the Muslim way of warfare. The full sentence reads: “*Alladina amanu yuqatiluna fi sabil Allah*” which means “Those who believe in Allah’s Law fight-to-annihilate in the path of Allah.” The rest of the verse urges the Believers to annihilate “the friends of Satan” – a term frequently used to describe Jews. There should be no doubt that all of Arafat’s listeners knew exactly what he meant by uttering these two words.

Such an exchange took place during Arafat’s visit to Nablus in early July. He met with the leaders of the city, including Governor Mahmud Alloul, Chief of Police Jihad Massimi, and all local security and intelligence chiefs. Arafat demanded “popular” demonstrations to express opposition to the Israeli policies. The local leaders pointed out that events involving rioting crowds would be difficult to organize in the absence of outright Israeli provocation inside Nablus. Arafat then observed that “a regime of limited actions against the Israelis” should be established in order to create an appropriate environment in Nablus and Samaria as a whole. Arafat did not instruct that any specific operation be undertaken either by the Tanzim squad in the ranks of Massimi’s PA Police Forces or the local HAMAS group they were cooperating with. Arafat simply endorsed the overall trend and expressed his confidence that “Believers” will always succeed. He then left it to Jabali to make the explicit and thus incriminating call to Massimi when the time for action was ripe.

Immediately, several actions have taken place simultaneously in the Nablus area:

- The body of a land dealer – Bassam Tahir, 33 – was found on a road side leading to Nablus. He was a holder of Israeli identity card. Tahir was shot in the head execution style. There were signs of torture all over his body, and he suffered wounds in the chest before being shot. Alloul denied any connection to the killing but knew Tahir was killed because he was “a collaborator” and not a land dealer.
- The activation of a 16-terrorist strong HAMAS squad. They were preparing for a series of operations along the Cross-Samaria Highway when captured by the Israeli GSS in mid July. It was a mixed group made of veteran and highly

experienced terrorists and recent recruits. This means that the old core cadres felt secure to emerge from underground, move around and recruit. Indeed, this HAMAS squad enjoyed close support and cooperation from the PA police and intelligence in Nablus.

- Massimi's sending of the three police officers. These three are veteran *Fatah Tanzim* terrorists who spent time in Israeli jail for terrorist activities in the 1980s. They are members of Massimi's own handpicked hard core loyalists – first inside the Fatah underground and now inside the PA Police. They were caught on a routine operation. This detachment had already fired at a car belonging to a rabbi near Alon Moreh on the night of July 10. They were on their way for a similar ambush, this time near Har Brakha, when they were caught. These three, or another cell from within the Nablus PA Police, also exploded two side bombs near Border Police patrols, and fired at IDF and Border Police patrols in the general area. The three police officers also reported that the Nablus Tanzim special forces were preparing to kidnap Israelis for bargaining.
- After the exposure of the police officers and HAMAS networks, Massimi arrested three members of Force 17 and an accomplice. He claimed they admitted that they had kidnapped and tortured fellow Palestinians, particularly members of security forces, on instructions from the Israeli GSS in order to manufacture incriminating evidence as if Palestinian – members of the security services and HAMAS – were involved in terrorism. They also tried to incriminate the security services in oppression of the people of the Nablus area.

Of significance is the evidence of close cooperation and coordination between the Nablus PA security forces and the local HAMAS forces. The mid July arrest of a 16-member HAMAS squad that enjoyed close cooperation with, and support from, the Nablus police force confirmed a growing trend. Similar HAMAS cells known to be cooperating with the PA police, security, and intelligence forces are operating in Tulkarm, Ramallah, Hebron, and Bethlehem. Moreover, the PA security establishment increases its close and intimate cooperation by sharing intelligence with Islamist terrorist

networks, shielding and protection of Islamists by the security authorities, as well as other forms of operational support.

Furthermore, comparable joint PA-Islamist operations were prevented when Israeli security forces arrested on July 15 a senior Palestinian police officer. Col. Munir Abushi, the deputy commander PA Police in Tulkarm, was arrested by an IDF road block while traveling with a colleague to Nablus for consultations with local colleagues that would have included Massimi. Subsequently, Israeli security forces conducted a clandestine operation in Tulkarm on the night of July 24-25, capturing Ghassan Mahmud Abd-al-Rahman Mahdawi. Having escaped from jail in Israel, Mahdawi found shelter in Tulkarm where he became the commander of the local Islamic Jihad forces. Mahdawi enjoyed Abushi's protection and patronage, and his Islamic Jihad networks received extensive operational support from the Tulkarm PA Police force. The capture of both Abushi and Mahdawi has already resulted in the calling off of several terrorist attacks against Israelis near Tulkarm that Abushi had already ordered and that were to be carried out by both detachments of the PA Police and Mahdawi's Islamic Jihad networks.

This growing cooperation between the PA security forces and Islamist terrorists almost led to a major bombing in Jerusalem in mid July. The strike was averted when a senior HAMAS operative – Issa Shuwka a.k.a. Ayish Khallil Salam, 41 – accidentally blew himself up in Bethlehem while preparing the bomb. He was part of a major network as demonstrated by the bomb factory in Beith Sakhur the PA security forces subsequently “exposed” in late July. Actually, the Bethlehem PA security forces had known about this HAMAS cell and its safe house for at least three months, the time Israel had originally warned them about it. The safe house was a two-story house in Beith Sakhur. The HAMAS stockpiles included 30 kgs of high explosives, hydrogen, chemical substances, timers and watches, some bombs already packed into plastic boxes with timers and fuses ready for dispatch and placement. The HAMAS also stored IDF uniforms, wigs, beards, make-up, disguises, skullcaps, prayer shawls, and cellular phones. Needless to say that all leaders and commanders of this HAMAS cell have so far succeeded to elude the PA police.

Meanwhile, the Tanzim special forces revived operations in the Bethlehem area. For example, they are suspected of opening automatic fire on an Israeli Air Force helicopter while flying over Bethlehem on the night of 22-23 July 1997. Most likely unbeknown to the terrorists,

the IDF's Deputy Chief of Staff, Matan Vilnai, was traveling in this helicopter.

Taken together, these terrorist activities constitute a dangerous escalation in the PA's sponsorship of violence and terrorism. Significantly, the overall statistics of terrorist activities in the West Bank since May corroborates the intelligence information about Arafat's instructions and guidelines. Since the beginning of June, and particularly early July, there has been an unprecedented increase in violence in Judea and Samaria. The data on three main categories is self-evident:

- Explosive charges: May – 0, June – 7, first half of July – 8
- Fire bombs/bottles: May – 21, June – 132, first half of July – 364
- Small arms fire: May – 1, June – 2, first half of July – 6

Such a marked and simultaneous escalation in all forms of violence in the territories cannot but reflect a guiding hand – Yassir Arafat's.

Indeed, senior Palestinian officials, who can no longer ignore the documented involvement of PA police officers and other security personnel in the riots and terrorism, intimate that the issue is really spontaneous outburst of popular frustration and rage because of misery, Israel's refusal to abide by agreements as interpreted by PA, as well as the recent "pig poster" incident.

Alarmed by these developments, the Netanyahu Government also rushed to offer a fig leaf to its partner in peace. The Chief of GSS, Ami Ayalon had a secret meeting with Arafat on July 16 in which he warned Arafat that given the extent of support for the terrorists among senior officers of the PA police and security forces, there must be a conspiracy to unseat him. Ayalon opined that these terrorist actions must be but a part of a larger coup against Arafat. Jerusalem promptly leaked the secret meeting and the warning delivered as a self-justification for continuing the "peace process" with Arafat. For his part, a smug Arafat denied all rumors of coups and other conspiracies against him.

Arafat did order a series of perfunctory arrests and summary military trials. He also established an investigation commission headed by Saadi Naji, Ismail ash-Shafi, and Ahmad al-Mubayid to unearth the truth about the situation in Nablus. But, according to Palestinian officials, the commission has already run into problems implementing

its mandate because Israel does not give it pertinent intelligence as well as refuses to transfer Abushi to the PA authorities. Meanwhile, as far as Washington and Jerusalem are concerned, the charade is complete, the self-delusion intact, and the pursuit of the Oslo Process can continue.

However, even if the arguments of the senior Palestinian officials and the excuses of the Israeli Government are taken at face value, they do not justify the hostility openly expressed by senior officials. An example for the current mood can be found in the participation of Ahmad Qorei – The Speaker of the PA Legislative Council – in the burning of an Israeli flag in Ramallah. His mere presence on the scene, with a smile on his face, served as a tacit endorsement. Thus, Qorei’s presence reflects the open hostility now permissible even to a senior negotiator with Israel who is considered a cornerstone of the Palestinian “peace camp.” Moreover, similar actions by Palestinian leaders are reported with endorsement by the PA-controlled media and thus serve to encourage the population to follow suit.

And there is a growing grassroots desire to resume the armed struggle throughout the territories. Following the arrest of his three police officers, an assertive Massimi stressed this point. He told Roni Shaked of *Yediot Aharonot*: “The Fatah has strong operational bodies. If there is a decision to return to armed struggle, all the mountains of Palestine will be full with Fidayeen. There is tendency among Fatah members to return to the [armed] struggle. Tens of members come to me every day, demanding to renew it [armed struggle] and I, just like other leaders, restrain them. If we hadn’t stopped this trend, the situation would have been much worse.”

But grassroots frustration and rage do not necessarily transform into a police force and security organs initiating acts of terrorism, especially not on orders of senior officers who are Arafat’s closest confidants. The recent and ongoing outbreak of violence is a result of a thought of policy by Arafat and his advisors. The same approach applies to their building of attrition that will incite the Israeli opposition to pressure the government to make unilateral concessions and withdraw.

* * *

The significance of these latest developments should be assessed in their overall context. Although Arafat’s direct involvement in terrorism has burst into the open in mid July, these activities were but fledgling operations in a campaign aimed to build momentum and intensify

toward September 1997. Arafat has already promised his coterie a major Israeli unilateral withdrawal in September, and he expects Washington to deliver unconditional implementation. He intends to build pressure on Israel until then through gradual escalation and expansion of violence – ranging from the new “popular war” in the territories to sporadic spectacular terrorist strikes at the heart of Israel. Moreover, Arafat already has contingency plans for an all out eruption if Israel does not deliver. Significantly, this eruption will take place in September – a period considered optimal for the outbreak of a regional war initiated by the Arabs. The Arab armies will be able to accomplish strategic grabs before winter freezes the situation and thus gives time for international pressure on Israel to compromise.

Even without the possible intervention of Arab armed forces in the crisis, Arafat’s contingency plans for the September crisis are alarming. If the building wave of terrorism, to be escalated with Islamic Jihad and HAMAS strikes at the heart of Israel as needed, does not deliver results during the summer, Arafat will order a major provocation. The objective of this most outrageous and horrific strike is to compel the IDF to invade Zone A – the main Arab cities controlled by the PA. Such an escalation will bleed Israel, incite the “peace camp” opposition, and embarrass the U.S. Government with carnage against Arab civilians (to be placed intentionally in harm way and in front of TV cameras). By now, the threat of fighting in the territories escalating into a regional war and oil embargo will bring pressure from Western Europe, the U.S. and the Israeli opposition on the Netanyahu Government to succumb to Palestinian and Arab demands. This scenario has already been discussed with the most senior officials in Cairo who endorsed Arafat’s analysis and promised Egypt’s all out support.

Palestinian senior officials also discussed the scenario with their counterparts in Tehran and Damascus. The Syrian and Iranian experts agree with Arafat’s analysis up to a point. They are convinced that once the IDF begins to roll forward into the Arab cities no international pressure will stop it. Therefore, the Arabs, and the entire Muslim World, must capitalize on Israel’s initial preoccupation with the Palestinians and political constraints because of the international pressure (that will be there but incapable of delivering tangible results) in order to deliver a major surprise attack. Such a regional war, Damascus and Tehran are convinced, stands a chance to destroy Israel once and for all. The Syrian and Iranian experts offered Arafat’s confidants major help in order to be better prepared to conduct the

escalation in the fighting against the IDF. The Palestinians did not refuse the help. Nor did they reject the Syrian-Iranian escalation scenario.

These offers are very serious, for credible steps are already undertaken to prepare for this eventuality. Just how serious Tehran is was demonstrated through the centrality of the HizbAllah in the preparations for the forthcoming terrorist strikes.

In early July, the HizbAllah leaders summoned a high-level meeting in the Biqa, Lebanon, with the leaders of HAMAS to convey Tehran's instruction for the renewal of terrorist operations at the heart of Israel. The Chairman of the HizbAllah, Hassan Nasrallah, chaired the meeting. The key participants were Mustafa al-Liddawi, the HAMAS representative in Lebanon, and Talal al-Naji, Ahmad Jibril's representative. Nasrallah told them that Tehran was upset with the unexplained delays in implementing the agreed upon plans for bombings and spectacular terrorist operations in Israel. Nasrallah reminded Liddawi that the headquarters in Damascus and Tehran are the supreme ones and that their instructions as to the timing of escalation are mandatory. This was a tacit reminder to the HAMAS that they must abide by their previous agreements irrespective of 'green lights' from Arafat.

However, the main issue raised by Nasrallah was the anticipated long-term escalation in the overall terrorism campaign. In order to enhance the HAMAS' ability to carry out additional operations, Talal al-Naji reported that the PFLP-GC will train HAMAS terrorist experts in two camps controlled by Syrian Intelligence that are currently reserved to the most loyal terrorist elite. The three organizations also agreed to closely cooperate in sending terrorists into Israel from abroad so that they are immune from the dangers of Israeli penetration of local cells and networks. These operations will be conducted under the supervision of Tehran and Damascus, and on their specific instructions.

Subsequently, the entire HizbAllah leadership – General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah, his deputy Na'im Qassim, as well as the key senior combat commanders Muhammad Raad, Muhammad Yazbik, Abdallah Kassir, Hussayn Khalil, and Hashim Safi-al-Din – traveled to Tehran mid-July in order to discuss the forthcoming escalation. They met with all the uppermost leaders in Tehran who confirmed to the HizbAllah leaders Iran's endorsement of the contingency plans. Beyond the usual discussions of escalation in south Lebanon, the deployment of additional units and new weapon systems, there was a sharp deviation in the Iranian strategic objectives. The Iranian experts raised an option

for the HizbAllah to establish corridors to the Israeli border. The objective of these corridors is the transfer of weapons and expert terrorists (HizbAllah and Palestinian Islamists) both for operations in northern Israel, as well as for transfer by Israeli Arabs, who will meet the infiltrators in the Galilee, to the West Bank where they will help the Palestinian uprising. The impression of the HizbAllah visitors is that Tehran is convinced that there is already a solid clandestine infrastructure inside Israel ready to implement these plans.

Upon returning to Lebanon, Nasrallah summoned Mustafa al-Liddawi for another meeting. He conveyed Tehran's instructions, stressing the centrality of joint operations. Tehran emphasized, the HizbAllah leaders instructed the HAMAS, that it was imperative to expedite the escalation of the armed struggle inside Israel. For these spectacular strikes, the HAMAS will rely on the headquarters in Damascus and Tehran in order not to implicate Arafat with complicity in terrorism.

* * *

The common denominator in all the scenarios is the centrality of a marked escalation of terrorism by both Arafat's PA security forces in cooperation with the HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. This wave of terrorism is seen as a precursor to a major crisis that will peak in September 1997, if Jerusalem does not succumb beforehand. Thus, the recent events – particularly the documented involvement of Arafat and his closest aides in both planning and implementing terrorism, as well as the growing operational cooperation and coordination between the PA security organs and the Islamists – serve to reinforce the credibility of the reports of the next phases in Arafat's grand design.

The anticipated escalation is being openly discussed between Arafat and the senior commanders of the PA intelligence and security forces. For example, on the night of July 28, Arafat met with the leadership in Hebron, including all local chiefs of Police, intelligence and security services. He demanded that they prepare for "a long struggle against Israel." The local PA forces must intensify their anti-Israeli activities as part of what Arafat reiterated is going to be a long and arduous struggle against Israel until the entire Hebron as well as Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem are reclaimed.

Meanwhile, Arafat himself does not conceal his perception of where the Middle East is heading. Arafat has recently begun to openly warn the leadership of the Arab World about the return to armed

struggle through interviews with Saudi-owned periodicals read by the Arab elites. Arafat introduced this theme in a late July interview with Zaki Shihab of *Al-Wasat* – a weekly magazine published in London owned by Prince Khalid bin-Sultan and represents the Sultan faction in Riyadh.

The discussion dealt with the mounting threats to the Palestinians from Israel's refusal to abide by earlier agreements. "The Palestinians have all options; my people fear nothing," Arafat stated. Shihab asked if that meant that "the military option" was viable. "All options are open," Arafat cut in, "and no one can humiliate the Palestinian people. Believe me: It is either peace or anarchy/chaos, not only between us and the Israelis, but throughout the Middle East. Peace with the Palestinians is the backbone of the peace process in the Middle East. In other words, there can be no peace with the Jordanians without peace with the Palestinians, nor can there be peace with the Egyptians without peace with the Palestinians. The same applies to our brothers in Syria and Lebanon and all Arabs." Arafat went on to stress that, "our relations with Syria are good. I am satisfied with these relations, which have not been severed..."

Subsequently, Arafat intensified his warnings. Of great significance is Arafat's late July interview with the London-based *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*. This Saudi-owned paper is a major outlet for the nationalist-Islamist elite. Moreover, the interview was conducted by Salih Qallab, an Arafat crony. Thus, Arafat was able to lay down his vision and expectation for the leaders and elite of the Arab World most likely to come to his aid at time of crisis.

Arafat stressed that there would be no compromise from the Palestinian side despite the punishment endured during the current stalemate. "The Palestinians have endured sufferings for a whole century [in order to attain their goals]," Arafat exclaimed. "The Palestinian people, who have been hardened by events and tribulations, will continue to be ready to make more sacrifices until they exact their full undiminished rights and foremost among them their right to self-determination and their right to establish their own independent state with its capital in holy Jerusalem which is the heart of the Palestinian people and without which there can be no full and lasting solution." But Israel and the U.S. should not rely on the Palestinian perseverance and endurance. "There is a limit to patience," Arafat warned. "The Palestinian people's patience cannot continue forever."

After Arafat described in great length the deadlock in the region and Israel's hostility, Qallab asked whether "there will be an explosion

in the region” if there’s no breakthrough. “Everyone, especially in Israel, should know that a lack of progress in the peace process on the Palestinian track would put the entire the region at the mouth of a volcano,” Arafat responded. “Leaving matters as they are would lead to general anarchy whose future dimensions nobody can predict.”

“Do you mean that leaving the situation as it is would lead to war?” Qallab followed up. “No,” Arafat corrected, “it would lead to anarchy/chaos. War is only a small part of anarchy/chaos.” Can this crisis include “a real war breaking out, a conventional war between armies?” “Yes,” Arafat answered, “there is a high possibility of a new war but anarchy/chaos in the region would be more dangerous. I am warning that anarchy/chaos will prevail in the region if the Israeli Government continues to behave in this way and if the Americans continue to take this nonchalant position.”

In Arafat’s definition, “anarchy/chaos” means a combination of a major war in the Middle East and world wide international terrorism, primarily by Islamists. And he warns Washington of the possibility of international terrorism if the U.S. does not deliver Israel. “If the U.S. Administration does not act quickly to get the peace process out of the bottleneck there will be an explosion, hundreds of secret extremist organizations will emerge in this region, and the entire world will suffer,” Arafat explained.

* * *

On July 30, the Palestinians returned their Jihad to the heart of Jerusalem. Two bombs exploded on 1:15 and 1:18 pm respectively at the heart of the Mahne Yehuda market in west Jerusalem. They caused around 11 fatalities (excluding the two martyr-bombers) and well over 150 wounded, at least five of whom are not expected to live. Israeli security forces estimate the charges to be 10kg (22lb) each. Both were activated by sophisticated electronic fuses.

Initial reports describe a sequence of events aimed to inflict maximum carnage and heavy casualties. The two bombers, both in their twenties, were dressed in dark suits and white shirts, perhaps in order to look like ultra-orthodox Jews. They arrived together in a car. However, they walked into the market in quick succession. They stayed about 50 yards from each other, keeping eye contact for a while. At least one of them carried a big handbag. The first explosion was near a shoe store. When the crowd gathered to help the injured, the second terrorist

mingled and blew himself up in their midst. He might have had a strap-on bomb on the lower part of his body.

Thus, irrespective of Arafat's sanctimonious condemnations, the era of "anarchy/chaos" he has been preaching and preparing for has arrived.

Yossef Bodansky



TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

**U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Palestine is Jordan

February 24, 1998

The time that has passed since Mr. Rabin and Mr. Arafat shook hands on White House lawn in September 1993 constitutes a period long enough in duration to examine the progress of the “peace process” between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. By now, a sufficient amount of evidence has accumulated, and a track record clearly established. Hence, it is high time to pause and reflect on, the events that have unfolded.

This state of affairs need not surprise. For more than five years, ever since the initial implementation of Oslo, there accumulated many doubts about the sincerity of Arafat and his coterie and the extent of their commitment to real peace. The Palestinian leaders continue to declare that a Holy War is a viable option for attaining their ultimate objectives if the “peace process” does not work in their favor. The Palestinian Authority is not only failing to comply with signed agreements concerning the size and armament of the so-called “police” forces, but is actively preparing these forces for a violent confrontation with Israel.

Most disturbing, however, is the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic brainwashing of the Palestinian children. The Palestinian educational

system as well as the media incite young Palestinians for virulent hostility toward, and inadmissibility of reconciliation with, all Jews. The issue here is not disagreements over certain aspects of the permanent agreement, but the incitement and indoctrination of a whole generation to hate Jews to such an extent that irrespective of existing formal agreements, genuine reconciliation and peace will be impossible to attain.

Moreover, these problems have been exacerbated with the passage of time. Despite Israel's concessions – withdrawal from territories of immense security value – and despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian population is already living under the PA control; and despite the U.S. guarantees concerning the implementation of signed agreements, the PA continues to violate various agreements while demanding more concessions from Israel.

The PA would not even commit itself to recognizing Israel's pre-Six Day War boundaries (the maximalist position acceptable to the Israeli peace camp). This position was authoritatively stated in a mid-December 1998 article by Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala, the Chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the chief negotiator with Israel) in the PA's official newspaper *Al-Hayah al-Jadidah*. Qurei asserts that "Israel's legitimacy remained dependent and conditional upon the existence of the Palestinian State based on... [UN] Resolution 181 of 1947." That resolution partitioned British-mandate Palestine into two states – a Jewish and an Arab – with the Jewish state accorded smaller size, untenable and indefensible borders, and put Jerusalem under international rule. Qurei stressed this aspect of Resolution 181. "There is no doubt that all the UN resolutions that recognized the creation of the Jewish State, on the basis of Resolution 181, included an inherent recognition of the boundaries of that Palestinian State, whose legitimacy still exists although it was not established at the time [1947]," he concluded. Furthermore, through the insistence on the right of return of the refugees of 1948, ensures that no permanent solution is viable other than the destruction of Israel whether in the 1947 or 1967 boundaries.

However, the primary concern vis-à-vis the "Peace Process" is not the PA's repeated violations of agreements with Israel, not that such violations have stopped, but what Arafat and his coterie are doing to their own people. Presently, the bulk of the Palestinian population is living under the PA's control and their fate resembles their intended lot under the independent Palestine to which Arafat aspires. If allowed to

continue, the current state of affairs will lead to further radicalization, and militarization. This is a vitally important reason for concern.

Meanwhile, and this subject has been discussed repeatedly and documented as well, the PA embezzles, steals, and mismanages the lavish foreign aid donated to alleviate the plight of the average Palestinian. Since there is no viable indigenous economy in the PA-controlled areas, the foreign aid is the primary source of income for the population. Thus, the PA leadership is directly responsible for the poverty, misery and destitution of their people. The PA leadership's blatant disregard of their responsibility as leaders of their own people also results in environmental disasters including the abuse and contamination of the area's scarce water resources.

The situation is so bad that even Suha Arafat – Yasser's wife – had to speak up against it. In a recent interview with the Jerusalem Report, she launched a scathing attack on her husband's fledgling "government" calling it a bunch of "yes men." Mrs. Arafat accused her husband's closest cronies of greed, dishonesty and incompetence. She even chided Arafat for turning a blind eye to the rampant corruption around him, warning that such a state of affair might lead to a popular revolt against Arafat. "I've told him over and over again to get rid of these people who build private palaces next to refugee camps, before it is too late," Mrs. Arafat said. However, she attributed the growing crisis to the impact of the Peace Process. "Everyone is complaining about the peace process," Mrs. Arafat noted. "People say we still live in what could be described as a prison and I can't help but agree." Suha Arafat also noted that Yasser was "profoundly depressed" about the state of the peace process. She stressed that she shared his doubts about the wisdom in clinging to the peace any longer. "I'm prepared to wait for a true peace – a peace that gives us land and justice. It makes no difference if it takes 30, 40, even 50 years, as long as we keep our dignity," Mrs. Arafat concluded.

The situation in the PA controlled areas continues to deteriorate. The infrastructure left behind by Israel – such as roads, public works and services – is in great disrepair. The Palestinian work force in Israel has shrunk to historically low levels; hence, that source of income is all but gone. Meanwhile, the myriad of Palestinian security authorities oppress the population. Consequently, there is already a profound gap of mistrust between the "Tunisians" (Arafat's aides who arrived with him from Tunisia) and their "thugs" (the name used for Arafat's security police/army) and the average Palestinians. This gap of trust is

so wide it might already be beyond bridging. Consequently, the public withdraws into the fold of Islam.

Yasser Arafat knows all of this, and is therefore determined to make a dramatic breakout of the debilitating and hopeless “peace process.” His own condition aggravates the crisis. With his health rapidly deteriorating, and with no viable succession process, Arafat must consolidate gains if he wants to ensure the survival of the Palestinian struggle. In other words, Arafat sees his sacred cause – the cause to which he has devoted his entire life – crumbling and collapsing before his own eyes. Therefore, Arafat feels compelled to take huge risks and bold initiatives as the sole alternatives to the inevitable collapse of the Palestinian entity.

The recent death of King Hussein gave Arafat impetus – a grim reminder of his own mortality – and an opportunity – the seeming weakness of Hashemites, especially because of the feud between the new King Abdullah II and the just fired ex-Crown Prince, Prince Hassan. Jordan is a logical target. After all, over two thirds of Jordan’s population is so-called “Palestinian” – most of them are NOT refugees but longtime local inhabitants. However, “Palestinian” is now the popular name for the non-Bedouin agrarian and urban population that shares clan/family relations with the population west of the Jordan River as well as eastward into central Iraq. Since the 1960s, Arafat and other radical Palestinian organizations – from militant communists to militant Islamists – have deeply penetrated this population on the basis of family ties. Now, in early 1999, Arafat is convinced he can exploit these ties. “The PLO is claiming the allegiance of the majority of the population in Jordan,” noted Professor Dan Schueftan of the Haifa University. “Even if at the moment, Arafat or his successor does not press the issue, it is always there... hanging over the monarchy like the Sword of Damocles.”

Arafat did not wait long before making his audacious move against Jordan. On February 12, he suddenly announced his commitment to a “confederation” with Jordan. In an address to Fatah loyalists, Arafat stated: “We want him [King Abdullah II] to know that the PNC has agreed to a confederation with Jordan. But that is up to Abdullah. We are, after all, twin brothers, Palestine and Jordan.” Nabil Abu Rdeineh, Arafat’s spokesman, reiterated that the PA was ready to immediately pursue “a union” with Jordan, even before the establishment of a Palestinian state. “If Jordan wants immediate coordination and discussion over [the issue of] creating a confederacy, we are ready,” he said. What Arafat really wants is to capitalize on the stability and

viability of Jordan in order to bolster the crumbling Palestinian entity. Arab commentators do not fail to discern Arafat's real objective. For example, Fuad al-Hashim of the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Watan wrote: "This pragmatic personality [Arafat] only knows too well that it will not obtain integrated land in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip but a number of 'land' islands [enclaves] surrounded from all sides by the Israelis, military and settlers. Therefore, his saliva, which is always dribbling, dribbles over Jordan, especially that his strong man, that is King Hussein, whom he did not dare to cross, passed away. So, why should he not try his mumbo jumbo with the new and young king, Abdullah?!!"

And, Arafat's threats are not empty. With help from the Iraqis, steps have already been taken to destabilize Jordan and build pressure toward the implementation of Arafat's "confederation" solution. Indeed, a myriad of subversive Jordanian-Palestinian organizations – ranging from Arafat cronies to militant Islamists (HAMAS-affiliated) – are activating their supporters to pressure Amman into supporting their "causes." Also of great danger to Amman is Iraqi intelligence that has massive presence in Jordan and proven inclination to use violence even against members of the Amman elite as demonstrated in a series of assassinations for political and economic reasons. Moreover, the Iraqis smuggled large quantities of weapons across Jordan for Arafat's security forces in the West Bank, and are now diverting some of these weapons to their own and Arafat's supporters in Jordan. Meanwhile, the militant Islamists tacitly support Arafat's initiative for they know that the PLO's grassroots support and legitimization are rapidly diminishing in the PA controlled areas because of the misery and corruption. With the Islamists fast becoming the dynamic and dominant trend, they would ultimately be able to capitalize on Arafat's destruction of the Hashemite administration to build their own Islamic Republic in both Jordan and the PA-held areas.

These developments worry Israel. The prospects of either a PLO and/or Iraqi dominated Jordan, let alone an Islamist Jordan, reinforce Jerusalem's determination to retain strategic assets – key territory – required to meeting the security demands of worst-case scenarios. The key losers of this situation is the Arab population – the Palestinians living west of the Jordan river. Under Arafat's rule, they are deprived of a chance to run their own lives, develop economically, and build their own society. They thus become a radicalized powder keg that only further reduces Israel's inclination for territorial compromises.

These attempts to destabilize Jordan must not be permitted to continue. This point is elucidated in the analysis and conclusions of Gregory Copley, the President of the International Strategic Studies Association. In a recent article in *Defense and Foreign Affairs: Strategic Policy*, he noted that, “the Palestinian leadership under PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat is already considering how to test King Abdullah of Jordan. The seizure of all of Jordan is the option favored by the Arafat camp, honeyed words about King Hussein and King Abdullah notwithstanding. Clearly, this is a solution, which would place a corrupt and destabilizing leadership into a position of greater regional power, without necessarily contributing to the well being of the Palestinian people, nor any of their neighbors. One viable solution remains, ‘though it flies in the face of U.S. and British policy: the incorporation of the Palestinian lands into Jordan, which has, in any event, been home and safety to the Palestinians for many years. That should be the goal of the steps toward saving the Palestinian society and giving hope to its children.’”

Thus, Arafat’s call for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation might after all hold the key to a viable solution and the reconciliation of prevailing problems. However, the key to the solution of the Palestinian problem is in the empowerment of the Hashemites over areas vacated by Israel, as well as the establishment of Israeli-Jordanian co-sovereignty and functional sharing of responsibility over other populated areas. Indeed, the same people live on both sides of the Jordan river. Together, they constitute a viable entity from social and economic point of view. The knowledge that the Hashemites are in control will allay Israel’s fears of a possible violent eruption and war – thus making Jerusalem’s position more flexible. After all, the peace between Israel and Jordan is a warm peace based on convergence of national security interests and decades of contacts between the uppermost leadership in both Jerusalem and Amman. Furthermore, the Palestinians currently under Arafat’s rule will be direct beneficiaries of such an arrangement. The proven fiscal responsibility and transparency of the Jordanian government will ensure that the U.S. and other foreign aid will be put to good use. Amman will handle properly the aid to the “Palestinians” and will thus increase the West’s willingness to contribute and invest. This will improve the lot of the people – reduce radicalization and militancy, stabilize the situation, and build peace. Ultimately, the average Palestinian will enjoy greater personal freedoms and basic human rights than under Arafat’s regime.

The United States should encourage and support such an Israeli-Jordanian arrangement with regard to the PA-held areas not only because such an arrangement will prevent the collapse of Jordan, reduce the dangers to Israel's precarious security, and improve the lot of the Palestinians, but primarily because such an Israeli-Jordanian arrangement can further other vital strategic interests of the United States. A strong Israel-Jordan bloc is the natural springboard for the Hashemites – the traditional rulers of Iraq before the series of Ba'athist military coups – to reclaim Iraq.

The U.S. national objective is not limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein – the U.S. primary long-term objective is the establishment of a legitimate, viable and pro-Western government in Baghdad. The restoration of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy – relatives of the Jordanian Hashemites – will constitute a unifying force and instrument of nation building to a population tormented by Saddam's excesses and driven to militant separatism. In contrast, a Hashemite-run constitutional monarchy will use Iraq's oil fortunes to boost the regional economy, especially that of Israel and Jordan, thus strengthening real peace. Moreover, a Hashemite-based Iraqi government will be eager to absorb Palestinians in order to increase the Sunni segment of population most loyal to the Hashemites, bolster the urban middle class, provide skilled manpower for the reconstruction of Iraq, and, in so doing, will reduce the "returnees" problem that keeps radicalizing the Palestinian refugees. Ultimately, the mere existence of a friendly government in Iraq will break down the Iran-Iraq-Syria axis and will thus markedly reduce the military threat to Israel and other U.S. allies throughout the region. This will contribute to American vital interests.

Therefore, there ought to be a sharp deviation from the current policy of the Clinton Administration – the essence of which is a senseless coercive pressure on Israel in order to salvage the doomed and counterproductive "deals" with Arafat and his coterie. Instead, the U.S. should work closely with its allies in Israel and Jordan in order to forge an arrangement that will not only genuinely alleviate the plight of the Palestinians currently under Arafat's yoke, but will serve as the foundation for the realization of America's own vital interests in this region and the establishment of genuine peace and stability. Failing to expeditiously embark on this road will facilitate the rise of militant Islamist radicalism and strong anti-American sentiment.

Yossef Bodansky

About the Editors

Richard J. Leitner

Richard J. Leitner earned a Bachelor of Arts in English in May 2008 from Tulane University in New Orleans. He is the author of the 2006 New Orleans blog on the U.S. News & World Report website. As a research assistant with the Washington Center for Peace and Justice, he helped represent the interests of American children kidnapped to Saudi Arabia from the United States by non-custodial Saudi fathers. This activity involved making presentations in Geneva, Switzerland, before the UN Human Rights Committee and its sub-committee on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.

Peter M. Leitner

As a subject matter expert in biological warfare, intelligence, and terrorism, Peter Leitner was a founding member of the faculty of the National Center for Biodefense within the Microbiology & Molecular Biology Department at George Mason University in Virginia.

In addition, he is one of the nation's leading experts in the counter-proliferation and export control fields having served as a Senior Strategic Trade Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 21 years where he was the principal expert for CBRN and terrorism issues within the Defense Technology Security Administration,

Currently, Peter Leitner is President of MaxWell USA, LLC, an international pharmaceutical company, with operations in the United States and Ukraine. Among his many other related activities, he is also President of the nonprofit Higgins Counterterrorism Research Center where he has helped to train over 8,000 law enforcement, first responders, military, FBI, and CIA personnel. In addition, he is President of the Washington Center for Peace & Justice, another nonprofit organization dedicated to providing assistance to victims of terrorism and their families. He has authored several books, numerous journal articles and has testified before the United States Congress (House and Senate) on seven occasions. He is also a frequent speaker at important international conferences – most recently in Switzerland, Singapore, Croatia, New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC.

Dr. Leitner holds Doctorate from the University of Southern California and four Master's degrees from several Universities. He resides in Virginia with his wife and four children.