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Iraq: Patterns of Violence, Casualty Trends and Emerging Security Threats

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Executive Summary

Unless major changes take place in US and Iraq policy, US combat forces will withdraw from Iraq at the end of this year. The Iraq War will not come to an end with this withdrawal, any more than it did when the US withdraw from Iraqi cities and formally end combat operations early in the summer of 2010. Extremist attacks will probably continue for at least several years, and there are still serious risks of new outbreaks of sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The broad patterns in the US pat of the Iraq War are, however, now documented in a wide range of tables and graphs that show the history of this violence over the period from 2003 to the end of 2010. In addition, enough data are emerging to show that major changes are occurring in the patterns of violence that affect the future ability of the Iraqi government to bring security, stability, and development to the Iraq people. This briefing uses a wide range of such indicators to the patterns of violence during 2003 to end 2010, and show some of the key changes occurring in these patterns.

The briefing is divided into eight main sections:

Section One is entitled "**Overall Trends in Violence: 2003-2009**:" It shows the historical trend data in major attacks by cause through the end of 2010. It compares the levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the declining patterns of violence by province over time, and patterns in casualties by cause and category. It documents both escalation into a major war, and a form of near victory by US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces.

It is important to note, however, that such data suffer from serious limitations. Decisions were taken early in the war to note break out patterns of violence by suspected attacker and group (including government security forces), and by ethnic and sectarian group and target.) Moreover, unclassified chronological analysis was patchy to non-existent. In many cases, it showed that a key ethnic or sectarian attack have a major impact on the course of the war. These decisions may have reduced the impact such data had on sectarian and ethnic tensions, but they also disguise the underlying causes and patterns in the conflict.

Moreover, then – as now – official data were not developed on the overall patterns in wounded and low-level violence (which also had a critical impact on the war), or on perceptions of the causes and levels of violence. Polling by ABC and other groups indicates that perceptions of violence were both a driving factor in the war, and differed sharply from the patterns in major incident counts. For example, polling showed that during large periods in the war most Iraqis saw the US and Coalition as posing an equal threat relative to insurgents and extremists.

Section Two is entitled "**Emerging Patterns in Violence: 2010**." It shows that "victory" is relative as long as extremists and insurgents can keep up a consistent pattern of low level attacks. According to the GOI, more than 3,600 civilians and ISF personnel were killed in violent incidents during 2010.35 For the third consecutive month, however, December set a 2010 record for the fewest number of persons killed in attacks, down 151 from the previous month's 2010 record low of 171. It also shows that more than 70% of the documented security incidents in the war from 2004 to end 2010 were bombs and IEDs. At the same time, it shows a shift in the pattern of violence to targeting Iraqi officials and security personnel.

It is again important to note, however, these data still focus on major incidents. A look on media reports of the chronology of violence show a clear pattern of high profile attacks on civilians designed to discredit the Iraqi government and provoke ethnic and sectarian tensions. It is also critical to understand that these data do not include crime, kidnapping, extortion, perceived bias and failures by the Iraqi security services, and perceptions of the overall effectiveness and fairness of the police and courts. These are all critical indicators now that major fighting has halted. They measure the broad level of stability and security in Iraq, and the risk Iraqi and international investors and businesses run in the post-US forces era.

Section Three is entitled "**Mapping Key Patterns in Violence by Area.
2003-2010**." It corrects some of the problems citied earlier by showing the geographic patterns in violence, and focusing on several key areas. Violence in the areas north and west of Baghdad Province largely involved

and affected Sunnis, with some directed against Kurds and Christians. Patterns south of Baghdad largely affected Shi'ites. Baghdad Province was the main scene of violence throughout the US-led phase of the fighting, and was largely Sunni vs. Shi'ite. The patterns of AQIP Sunni and Sadrist Shi'ite violence are also clear. It is important to note Syria was the main source of support to Sunni insurgents, and Iran was a major source of support to Shi'ite extremists.

The more recent maps in this section show a steady concentration of violence in the north in Diyala and Ninewa provinces, ongoing violence in Baghdad, and mixed violence in the south – much of it consisting of bombings and suicide attacks designed to create sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi'ite.

The final maps in this section highlight the bombings and attacks on civilians mentioned above, new patterns in violence along the ethnic faultline in Kirkuk, violence against the Sunni Sons of Iraq, and violence in Basrah Province – a critical area in terms of petroleum development and investment. They highlight the new patterns of violence that are coming to dominate Iraq, and the need for new metrics that spotlight key problems and threats by target and local area.

Nationwide trends, and reports that aggregate all types of violence without regard to area, goal, and type of target have become increasingly meaningless or misleading, and maps and graphs need to be supported by detailed chronologies of the patterns in violence.

Section Four is entitled "**Spotlight on Baghdad**." These data highlight the critical importance of Baghdad as a center of the fighting. Baghdad remains a key center of bombings, suicide attacks, and crime.

Section Five is entitled "**Iraqi Attitudes Towards Violence**." These maps highlight the limited range of data provided in official reporting on Iraqi perceptions towards the end of the war. To be blunt, such data – and their equivalent in Afghanistan – are extremely suspect. The more detailed data publish in various US reports often

seemed to be designed to prove positive results, and the results rarely tracked with the far more comprehensive polling done by broadcast media and NGOs. They lack explanation as to method, and were often briefed as being "statistically valid" based on sampling methods that may have given this description had some mathematical justification – but only if divorced from the problems in real world sampling. In general, the unofficial polling conducted by ABC/BBC/and ARD seems far more credible and useful.

Section Six is entitled "**Different Estimates of Casualty Trends: 2003-2010**." These data show a range of Iraqi, NGO, and US estimates of casualties, and do provide some insights into the cumulative level of ethnic and sectarian violence.

As noted earlier, these data only count killed – not injured and wounded – with the exception of the data on US forces. As a rough estimate, injured and wounded would have totaled 5-7 times the number killed. The data differ significantly according to source and definition – usually with no clear explanation of all the reasons for the differences. They also do not include those who died or injured in ways that never became part of the official record – including significant numbers of disappearances.

What all sources do have in common, however, is that casualties have dropped sharply and continued to drop during 2010 – in spite of the ongoing attacks of Sunni and Shi'ite factions. This trend has applied to total civilian casualties, ethnic and sectarian casualties, and Iraqi and US military casualties.

Section Seven is entitled "**More is Involved than Casualties: Displaced Persons**." These data show another key impact of the war. They do, however, present the problem that such counts are very difficult to make, and internally displaced persons often do not count Iraqis making local moves into move secure sectarian and ethnic neighborhoods in the same town or city, and those who lost a business or access to jobs because of the inability to operate in a high risk or hostile sectarian and ethnic area.

Section Eight is entitled "**IEDs and Weapons Caches: 2003-2010**." It measures the trends in the most critical source of violence in war as it affected US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces. The downward trend in such attacks has reached the point, however, where it has lost much of its impact on the overall pattern of the fighting. New reporting is needed on bombings and suicide attacks on civilians and should included both killed and wounded, and ethnic and sectarian breakouts.

Taken together, these data amount to a tactical victory during the US-led phase of the war, but do not yet define anything approaching a strategic victory on the war. Such a victory will have to be won by Iraqis, both in terms of security and stability, and by transition to a civil rule of law and ongoing economic development. This phase of the war has been delayed by both a major budget crisis in 2009 and most of 2010, and the long crisis over forming a new Iraqi government.

Success will also depend heavily on US ability and willingness to create a strong military, police, and civil aid program after US military withdrawal at the end of 2011. These programs have been proposed by the Obama Administration, but have not yet been accepted by the new Iraqi government or accepted and funded by the US Congress.

Section Nine is entitled "The Iranian-Iraq Power Vacuum:" It highlights the fact that the US-led invasion destroyed Iraq's conventional forces and capability to defend Iraq against foreign threats. It shows this left a major vacuum in the balance of power in the Gulf, and one that cannot be corrected before 2020 under anything like current plans and spending levels.

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Section One

Overall Trends in Violence: 2003-2009

Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to August 2009

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

GAO: "Afghanistan's Security Environment, November 5, 2009, GAO-10-178R, p.3.

Trends in Terrorism in Iraq: 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
■ Terrorist Attacks in Iraq	3,438	6,631	6,210	3,256	2,458
■ Iraq Attacks with at least killed, injured, or kidnapped	2,648	5,910	5,507	2,878	2,167
■ People killed, inujured, or kidnapped in Iraq	20,629	38,878	44,012	19,077	16,869

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: *Annex of Statistical Information*, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009

Trends in Terrorism in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
■ Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan	494	962	1,124	1,222	2,126
■ Afghan Attacks with at least killed, injured, or kidnapped	357	667	898	982	1,480
■ People killed, inujured, or kidnapped in Afghanistan	1,557	3,532	4,657	5,453	7,584

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: *Annex of Statistical Information*, **Country Reports on Terrorism 2009**, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009

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Terrorism in Iraq vs. Afghanistan: 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
▪ Terrorist Attacks in Iraq	3,438	6,631	6,210	3,256	2,458
▪ Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan	494	962	1,124	1,222	2,126
▪ Iraq Attacks with at least 1 killed, inj kidnapped	2,648	5,910	5,507	2,878	2,167
▪ Afghan Attacks with at least 1 killed, or kidnapped	357	667	898	982	1,480
▪ People killed, inujured, or kidnapped i	20,629	38,878	44,012	19,077	16,869
▪ People killed, inujured, or kidnapped Afghanistan	1,557	3,532	4,657	5,453	7,584

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: *Annex of Statistical Information*, **Country Reports on Terrorism 2009**, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009

Iraqi Security Patterns: 2004-2009

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province
2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009

Legend: > 20 incidents | 10–20 incidents | 2–10 incidents | 0–2 incidents

Security Incidents, by Type

- Found and Cleared Bombs: 22%
- Detonated Bombs: 25%
- Sniper, Ambush, and Other Small Arms Attacks: 21%
- Attacks against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations: 15%
- Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-air Attacks: 15%
- Unspecified

Cumulative Fatalities

- Coalition Military (Non-U.S.): 223
- Contractors: 1,426
- U.S. Military: 3,859
- Iraqi Security Forces: 8,015

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 42

Major Security Incidents: Feb 2004 – Feb 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the Rise of the Insurgency to the Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Section Two

Emerging Patterns in Violence: 2010

Iraqi High Profile Attacks: 2006 - 2010

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)
May 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Does not include found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 2010, p.31

Iraqi Security Incidents by Type
Jan 2004 – Mar 2010

Security Incidents, by Type

Sniper, Ambush, and Other Small Arms Attacks — 15%

Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks — 12%

Detonated Bombs — 40%

Found and Cleared Bombs — 33%

Attacks against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations

Security Incidents vs. Casualties: 2004-2010

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND FATALITIES IN IRAQ, 1/2004–12/2010

According to the GOI, more than 3,600 civilians and ISF personnel were killed in violent incidents during 2010. For the third consecutive month, however, December set a 2010 record for the fewest number of persons killed in attacks, down 151 from the previous month's 2010 record low of 171.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. .66

New and Old Comparisons of Security Incidents per Month: 1/2004-12/2010

SIGIR has relied on U.S. military authorities (in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), USF-I, and the predecessor Multi-National Force entities) for the security incident data presented in SIGIR's Quarterly Reports. In February 2010, because SIGIR did not have a historically complete set of data at the time, CENTCOM provided SIGIR with a complete set covering security incidents from January 2004 through December 2008. This data set came from Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and it was consistent with previous data provided by MNC-I on security incidents through the first half of 2009.

In preparation for its April 2010 Quarterly Report, SIGIR received an- other set of data from USF-I that covered the period from April 1, 2009, through March 26, 2010. On the surface, this more recent data set seemed inconsistent with the older set because it showed markedly more incidents in the April– June 2009 period. SIGIR questioned the accuracy of the data and was told that it was all that could be provided. The "monthly incident" line in Figure 2.11 of Figure 4.7

the April 2010 SIGIR Quarterly Report reflects the discontinuity of the data and makes clear that the data came from two different sources. Supplemented with updates from USF-I, SIGIR displayed the same historical data in its July and October 2010 Quarterly Reports.

On November 30, 2010, USF-I contacted SIGIR and challenged the accuracy of the security incidents data displayed in SIGIR's October 2010 Quarterly Report. After reviewing the underlying data, USF-I acknowledged that SIGIR's graphs faithfully mirrored the data that USF-I had provided to SIGIR— but that the data was incorrect. USF-I informed SIGIR that it had "unknowingly provided an incorrect data file in September 2010 when responding to the quarterly data call."299 According to USF-I, the faulty data reflected "raw incidents (pre-analysis) across multiple categories, the majority of which did not meet the refined post-analysis criteria required of recordable security incidents."300

SIGIR received revised data from USF- I on January 4, 2011. Figure 4.7 compares the old "incorrect" data with the new "correct" data. USF-I has acknowledged that, "while the graph depicts the data submitted, it is not representative of the formally recorded monthly security data."301 The new data set shows more security incidents than previously reported for the period from mid-2006 to mid-2007. According to USF-I, that difference is explained by inclusion of information provided by the host nation that has been reported in the Department of Defense (DoD) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) since August 2006. The new data also deviates significantly from the old data set starting in April 2009. From April 2009 through August 2010, the revised data shows a 50% reduction in total security incidents relative to the data previously provided by USF-I. If the new data is accurate, then all the security incident data that SIGIR received from USF-I in 2010—not just the data received in September—had inaccuracies.

All security incident figures in this January 2011 Quarterly Report use the new, corrected data that USF-I provided on January 4, 2011.

Average Security Incidents per Day by Quarter: 1/2004-12/2010

In 2010, as the number of U.S. troops fell by half from 2009 levels, the number of security incidents fell by more than 20%.296 As of December 31, 2010, the overall level of violence in Iraq was about 90% lower than the peak seen in 2007. Last year, the average number of daily security incidents nationwide was less than 25—making 2010 the least violent year since U.S. operations began in 2003

Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the Peak of the Insurgency to the Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Deployment of surge forces completed, 15 June 2007

Attacks against Iraqi Authority
Unexploded IEDs
Detonated IEDs
Close engagement
Standoff attacks

Sadr calls for a freeze in Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) operations, August 2007

Iraqi Security Forces offensive in Al Basrah begins, 25 March 2008

Redeployment of surge forces completed, 16 July 2008

Security Agreement deadline for US withdrawal from Iraqi cities, 30 June 2009

Iraqi national legislative election, 7 March

| 25-31 May | 13-19 Jul | 31 Aug-6 Sep | 19-25 Oct | 7-13 Dec | 25 Jan-1 Feb 08 | 14-20 Mar | 2-8 May | 20-26 Jun | 8-14 Aug | 26 Sep-2 Oct | 14-20 Nov | 2-8 Jan 09 | 20-26 Feb | 10-16 Apr | 29 May-4 Jun | 17-23 Jul | 4-10 Sep | 23-29 Oct | 4-10 Dec | 15-21 Jan 10 | 26-4 Mar | 9-15 Apr | 21-27 May | 2-8 Jul | 20-26 Aug |

08   09   10

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010

Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the End of Surge to Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Legend:
- Attacks against Iraqi Authority
- Unexploded IEDs
- Detonated IEDs
- Close engagement
- Standoff attacks

Redeployment of surge forces completed, 16 July 2008

Security Agreement deadline for US withdrawal from Iraqi cities, 30 June 2009

Iraqi national legislative election, 7 March

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010

Security Update

In his clearest statement yet of the future of American forces in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that the Status of Forces Agreement and the withdrawal deadline of 2011 are "not subject to extension, not subject to alteration," though he did say that an extension of the deadline would require a completely new agreement, which is unlikely to take place

Attacks in Iraq continue to occur on a daily basis.

According to US officials, the number of foreign fighters in Iraq is increasing. One unofficial estimate sets the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq in October at 250. The US claims the monthly number of foreign fighters entering Iraq is as low at 10. Iraqi officials warn of increased funding to Al Qaeda in Iraq as the US prepares to withdraw.

Casualties in Iraq are dropping. According to Iraq Body Count, in November, 245 civilian deaths so far have been recorded. They were 298 in October. According to iCasualties, 2 Coalition deaths occurred in October and November each, down from 9 and 11, respectively last year. The Iraqi government reports 171 deaths from violence in November, the lowest monthly toll since November 2009.

Approximately 100,000 civilians have died from violence since the 2003 invasion.

Christian Iraqis have suffered a recent spate of violence, and now many are heading north or abroad. The most violence recent attack was in October, when five suicide bombers seized a church. The terrorist attack and police counterattack left an estimated 53 dead and 75 wounded. Four of the attackers were Libyan or Syrian and had entered Iraq with fake ID cards identifying themselves as mutes so they would not have to reveal their accents to checkpoint guards. The number of Christians in Iraq has declined from an estimated 1.2 million in 2003 to an estimated 600,000 today.

The Sons of Iraq were promised new jobs, 20% in security and 80% in other ministries or the private sector. Hiring freezes in the Ministry of Interior and Defense have turned these into empty promises and now erratic pay have led to many deserting their posts

Sources: Iraq Body Count, accessed December 12, 2010 , http://www.iraqbodycount.org/; iCasualties, accessed December 12, 2010 , http://www.icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx;
"Iraq monthly toll lowest in a year," AFP, December 1, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iE9MczJ_j4b_dj1hIF1WAufdyA5Q?docId=CNG.971a06de1b0beeb30a344fe5499a3f6d.271;
"Iraqi Christians Remember Church Siege Victims, 40 Days Later," The Christian Post, December 10, http://www.christianpost.com/article/20101210/iraqi-christians-remember-church-siege-victims40-days-later/;
"Attacks in Iraq kill 4, including 2 policemen," The Washington Post, December 10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/10/AR2010121001252.html
"More foreign fighters seen slipping back into Iraq," AP, December 5, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iPUXvyVD9cVX2Ql3-kvpvSBLV6KQ?docId=6688ea51d95642a8a8790298fd14d078
Joel Wing, "What's In The Future For The Sons Of Iraq", Musings on Iraq, December 27, 2010, http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2010/12/whats-in-future-for-sons-of-iraq.html
"More Christians Flee Iraq After New Violence," The New York Times, December 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html

Post-election targets of violence

Political leaders , foreign embassies, and consulates. Notably, Judge Mohammed Abdel Ghaffur

Sunni Awakening members

Apartments & local Shiite mosques

Shiite pilgrims targeted in attacks in key areas like Karbala

Attacks on high visibility targets: Central Bank of Iraq, Al-Arabyia News Station

Iraq: Average Weekly Violence Against Civilians: 2006- June 2010

Targeting Iraqi Officials: 10/2010-1/2011

Targets/Victims	Location (Province)	Date	Circumstances	Result
Police lieutenant colonel	Salah Al-Din	10/19/2010	Bombing	Lieutenant colonel injured; at least 11 killed
Senior police officer	Salah Al-Din	10/19/2010	IED attack on residence	No reported casualties
Ministry of Electricity director general	Baghdad	10/25/2010	Attacked by gunmen using silencers	Director general killed
Ministry of Interior official	Baghdad	10/25/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	MOI official killed; 3 injured
Ministry of Planning undersecretary	Baghdad	10/26/2010	IED attack	Undersecretary unharmed; 4 injured
Police colonel	Baghdad	10/28/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Colonel killed
ISF commander	Baghdad	10/28/2010	IED	Commander injured
Senior police officer	Ninewa	11/1/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Officer killed; driver injured
Local government official	Anbar	11/4/2010	Multiple IEDs	Official and driver killed
Senior national security official	Ninewa	11/16/2010	Residence bombed	No reported casualties
CoR members from al-Iraqiya bloc	Ninewa	11/19/2010	IED attack on mortorcade	Members unharmed; 1 bodyguard killed
Senior passport office official	Anbar	11/22/2010	IED	Official killed
Ministry of Municipalities IG officials	Baghdad	11/22/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	2 IG officials killed; 2 injured
Ministry of Higher Education official	Baghdad	11/23/2010	Residence attacked by gunmen	Official killed
Iraqi Army brigadier	Baghdad	11/24/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Brigadier killed
Ministry of Interior colonel	Baghdad	11/24/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Colonel injured
Police brigadier	Baghdad	11/28/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Brigadier killed
Sunni Endowment official	Baghdad	11/28/2010	IED	Official injured
Ministry of Health official	Baghdad	12/1/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Official injured
Ministry of Human Rights official	Baghdad	12/1/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Official killed
Local government official	Wassit	12/1/2010	Residence attacked by gunmen	Official unharmed; 2 injured
Senior police officer	Tameem	12/1/2010	IEC attack on motorcade	Officer unharmed
Thi-Qar provincial intelligence officer	Baghdad	12/3/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Officer injured
Commission of Integrity official	Diyala	12/14/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Official unharmed
Former Ministry of Electricity official	Baghdad	12/16/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Former official killed
President of Mosul University	Ninewa	12/20/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	President seriously injured
Intelligence officer	Baghdad	12/20/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Officer killed
Shia Endowment official	Baghdad	12/21/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Official injured
Ministry of Health official	Baghdad	12/22/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Official killed
Iraqi Army brigadier	Baghdad	12/23/2010	Attacked by gunmen using silencers	Brigadier killed; 1 injured
Police colonel	Baghdad	12/23/2010	Ambushed by gunmen	Colonel injured
Ministry of Interior official	Baghdad	12/26/2010	Automobile attacked by gunmen	Official and driver injured
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official	Baghdad	12/28/2010	IED attack on automobile	Official injured
Criminal court judge	Baghdad	12/29/2010	Sticky bomb attached to car	Judge injured
Mosul police commander	Ninewa	12/29/2010	Multiple suicide bombers attacked HQ	Police commander killed
Ministry of Interior lieutenant colonel	Baghdad	1/1/2011	Automobile attacked by gunmen	Lieutenant colonel killed
Sunni Endowment official	Diyala	1/2/2011	Multiple IEDs	Official seriously injured
Ninewa provincial council chairman	Ninewa	1/2/2011	Multiple IEDs	IEDs dismantled prior to detonation; chairman unharmed
Ministry of Interior brigadier	Baghdad	1/3/2011	Ambushed by gunmen	Brigadier injured
Local security official	Tameem	1/5/2011	IED	Official injured
Chief of Police	Anbar	1/10/2011	IED	Chief and several associates killed
Provincial governor	Anbar	1/17/2011	Suicide bomber	Governor unharmed; several injured

Note: This table provides examples of assassinations, attempted assassinations, and other small-scale acts of violence that appear to have been aimed at specific persons or groups this quarter. It does not purport to be all-inclusive, nor presume to imply the attackers' respective motives.

Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. 12

Section Three

Mapping Key Patterns in Violence by Area: 2003-2010

Annual Security Incidents in Iraq per : 10,000 People by Province: 2004-2010

Anbar Awakening Council Formed

President Bush Announces U.S. Surge

Muqtada al-Sadr Declares Cease-fire

Basrah and Sadr City Operations

"Sunni Triangle"

"Triangle of Death"

Disputed Internal Boundaries

Insurgency
1/1/2004—2/21/2006

Civil Conflict
2/22/2006—5/2/2007

U.S. Surge (>150,000 Troops)

State-building and Consolidation
5/1/2008—12/30/2010

| > 50 incidents | 20–50 incidents | 10–20 incidents | 2-10 incidents | 0–2 incidents | Sunni | Shia |

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. "U.S. Surge" denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq. ISF fatality data for deaths that occurred before 1/4/2005 is not available.
Sources: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 2/2006–9/2009; DoL, responses to SIGIR data calls, 11/25/2009, 1/5/2010, 4/12/2010, 7/7/2010, 10/7/2010, and 1/14/2011; Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, 12/30/2010, pp. 12 and 14; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 4/2009, 10/2009, and 1/2010; GOI, response to SIGIR data call, 12/21/2009; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

Major Threats to Iraq

Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges
Pre-Census "Guesstimates"

Sectarian Challenges
- 60-65% Shi'a
- 32-37% Sunni
- 3% Christian or other

Ethnic Challenges
- 75-82% Arab
- 13-20% Kurdish
- 3% Turkoman, Assyrian and other

Tribal Challenges
- Confederations
- Broad area
- Heavily urbanized.

Iraqi Ethnic Divisions

Source: BBC, "Iraq Body Count: War dead figures," Oct 23, 2006

Iraqi National Unity

Legend:
- Self-Reliant
- Performing
- Sustainable
- Developing
- Beginning

Anbar: Moved Forward
There was greater power-sharing among political parties on Anbar's Provincial Council, and the Sunni-dominated provincial government engaged constructively with the Shia-led central government.

Ninewa: Moved Backward
There was a series of high-profile attacks on minority groups. National unity remains unlikely without resolving the internally disputed boundaries and the status of Kurdish forces in Ninewa. Arab and Kurdish communities are divided along ethnosectarian lines.

Tameem: Moved Backward
The future status of Tameem province remains a major challenge to national unity. The three main ethnoreligious groups refused to make concessions on issues such as elections out of fear that any compromise could harm their future territorial claims in the province. The presence of security forces controlled by political parties remains a major concern.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. .73

Al Qa'ida in Iraq
Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008

Winter 2006-2007

Fall 2008

General David H. Petraeus, "Iraq Update," October 7, 2008

Key Areas of Shi'ite Extremist Activity
Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

General David H. Petraeus, "Iraq Update," October 7, 2008

Key Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: February 2009

Location of Sunni and Shi'ite Insurgent Capability: August 2009

SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS BY REGION, 10/21/2009–1/13/2010
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)

Source: SIGIR analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 43

Attacks by Province

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
December 1, 2009 – February 28, 2010

Provinces (left to right): Baghdad, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Diyala, Tamim, Anbar, Babil, Basrah, Wasit, Qadisiyah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Irbil, Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 29, 2010, p. 34

Sectarian and Ethnic Struggle to form a Government

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT FORMATION, 3/1/2010–1/15/2011

March | April | May | June | July | August

- Council of Representatives elections
- IHEC announces election results
- Ayad Allawi meets with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf
- Prime Minister meets with al-Iraqiya representative Rafi al-Eissawi
- IHEC begins recount of 2.5 million votes cast in Baghdad province
- IHEC concludes Baghdad recount confirming initial results
- Winning parliamentary candidate from al-Iraqiya list assassinated in Mosul
- IHEC rejects final appeals of election results
- Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud certifies election results
- Two al-Iraqiya parliamentary candidates assassinated
- Prime Minister meets with Ayad Allawi
- New CoR holds first session
- Minister of Electricity announces resignation
- Ally of PM al-Maliki visits Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani in Najaf
- Iraqi Foreign Minister calls lack of government "embarrassing"
- Head of ISCI, al-Hakim, meets with Ahmed Chalabi
- Former PM Allawi meets Muqtada al-Sadr in Syria
- Prime Minister again meets with Ayad Allawi
- PM al-Maliki meets with Assistant Secretary of State Feltman
- Second meeting of CoR indefinitely postponed
- PM al-Maliki meets with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ADM Mullen

September | October | November | December | January

- Kurdistani Alliance reportedly sends 19 conditions to both al-Iraqiya and SoL
- New U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey presents his credentials to President Talabani
- Six-month anniversary of CoR elections
- VP Biden arrives in Erbil to meet Kurdish officials, including President Barzani
- Muqtada al-Sadr supports second term for PM al-Maliki; predominantly Shia National Alliance endorses al-Maliki for PM
- Chief Judge Medhat orders CoR to meet
- Large sit-in in central Baghdad protests lack of government
- CoR convenes; al-Iraqiya's Osama al-Nujaifi elected Speaker; President Talabani elected to second term; al-Iraqiya walks out
- CoR meets again; al-Iraqiya ends walkout
- Group of Iraqi NGOs announce suit demanding return of CoR members' salaries
- Shia al-Fadhila party announces support for PM al-Maliki
- Provisional power-sharing accord agreed to by PM al-Maliki and former PM Allawi
- Al-Iraqiya completes its draft law for the National Council for Higher Policies
- President Talabani asks PM al-Maliki to form a new government within 30 days
- Al-Iraqiya and SoL attempt to agree on language for National Council for Higher Policies law
- CoR votes to lift ban on eligibility of certain Sunni politicians to participate in government; however, many Shia lawmakers boycott vote
- PM al-Maliki announces new government, leaving 11 posts unfilled; CoR endorses
- Council of Ministers postpones indefinitely the national census that had been scheduled for December 5, 2010
- Muqtada al-Sadr, whose followers control 39 seats in the CoR, returns from Iran
- Al-Iraqiya announces that National Council for Higher Policies will not be formed until at least late January 2011

To secure a working majority in the 325-person parliament, SoL, which won 89 seats, offered prominent cabinet posts to its former rivals. Under the November agreement, each bloc submitted three candidates for the ministries it sought, and Prime Minister al-Maliki selected from those nominees. The broad power-sharing agreement resulted in the following apportionment of power:

- **State of Law Shi'ite)** .SoL controls 7 seats in the new cabinet, including the ministries of Defense and Interior, both of which are currently filled by the prime minister in an acting capacity. SoL holds about 17% of the cabinet seats and 27% of the CoR (89 seats).

- **Al-Iraqiya (Sunni/Mixed)** .Al-Iraqiya secured 10 cabinet-level positions, including the ministries of Finance, Electricity, Agriculture, and Industry and Minerals. Al-Iraqiya controls about 24% of the cabinet and 28% of the parliament (91 seats).

- **Iraqi Nationl Alliance (INA). (Shi'ite)** This grouping of Shia parties, including the Sadrist Trend and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), has at least 12 spots in the cabinet, including the minis-tries of Oil, Justice, and Transportation. The INA holds about 29% of the cabinet posts and 22% of the total CoR (70 seats).31

Kurdistani Alliance (KA). The Kurds hold 7 cabinet posts, including the ministries of For- eign Affairs and Health. The KA controls about 17% of the cabinet and 13% of the CoR (43 seats).

The remaining positions are filled by represen-tatives from minor parties. As of January 18, the government is still being formed, and all reported positions are subject to change.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. 6 & 7

Post Election Cycles of Violence:
March-July 2010

SECURITY INCIDENTS IN IRAQ, 3/7/2010–7/18/2010

CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

Sources: David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010.

Sources: MNF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 and 7/2/2009; CENTCOM, response to SIGIR data call, 1/10/2009; USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/1/2010, 3/31/2010, and 7/1/2010; SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open source information in English and Arabic.

Source: SIGIR Report, July 30, 2010. p. 56, 57.

Where The Risks Were: 1/1/2010-3/31/2010

SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS, BY REGION, 1/1/2010–3/31/2010

Disputed Internal Boundaries

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People

- 10–20 incidents
- 2–10 incidents
- 0–2 incidents

Sources: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 3/31/2010; SIGIR analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 48

Where The Risks Were: 3/7/2010-7/18/2010

SECURITY INCIDENTS IN IRAQ, 3/7/2010–7/18/2010

Post-Election Period

Preceding Year

3/7/2009–3/6/2010   3/7/2010–6/22/2010

Annualized Security Incidents per 10,000 People

0–2   2–10   10–20   20–50

Sources: MNF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 and 7/2/2009;
CENTCOM, response to SIGIR data call, 1/10/2009; USF-I, responses to SIGIR
data calls, 4/1/2010, 3/31/2010, and 7/1/2010; SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S.
government documents and open source information in English and Arabic.

SIGIR Report, July 30, 2010, p. 56

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MAJOR SECURITY INCIDENTS, 10/20/2010–1/20/2011

1/18/2011
Suicide bomber strikes police recruitment center in Tikrit; at least 50 reported killed and more than 100 injured

12/12/2010
Anbar provincial government compound bombed; at least 10 killed

12/27/2010
Multiple suicide bombings in Ramadi strike assembled relatives of those killed on 12/12/2010; at least 19 killed and more than 40 injured

12/4/2010
Multiple bombings; approximately 14 killed

11/8/2010
Car bombs target Iranian pilgrims in Kerbala and Najaf; 10 killed

12/29/2010
Multiple suicide bombers attacked Mosul police HQ; police commander killed

10/26/2010
Kirkuk jewelry store robbed; 10 killed

10/29/2010
Cafe in Balad Ruz bombed; 26 killed

11/2/2010
12 bombs detonated in mostly Shia areas of Baghdad; more than 60 killed

11/10/2010
Multiple attacks on Christian homes; 3 killed and more than 20 injured

10/31/2010
Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad attacked; more than 50 killed

1/20/2011
Multiple car bombings strike Shia pilgrims in Kerbala; at least 50 killed and more than 150 injured

Map labels: Dahuk, Ninewa, Erbil, Tameem, Sulaymaniyah, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, Anbar, Baghdad, Kerbala, Babylon, Wassit, Qadissiya, Missan, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Basrah

Note: All casualty figures are based on best available information.

MOI officials informed SIGIR that nearly 240 ISF and intelligence personnel and about 120 civilian government employees have been assassinated in recent months. More than three dozen mid- to senior-level GOI civilian and military officials were the apparent targets of assassination attempts this quarter, continuing a disturbing trend SIGIR first reported on in January 2010

Unknown assailants attacked two Iraqi judges in January, killing one. Since 2003, more than 40 judges have been killed in Iraq. The HJC at-tempted to secure funding in the 2011 budget for an additional 4,000 judicial security personnel, but the CoM rejected the request, leaving the HJC far short of the number of trained personnel it needs to guard Iraq's 1,260 judges.

In the bloodiest incident of anti-Christian violence since 2003, insurgent gunmen stormed a Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad on October 31, 2010, killing more than 50 people. The remnant Christian community in Iraq also fell prey to several other violent attacks, The UN estimates that several thousand Christians fled Ninewa and Baghdad provinces in the wake of the church massacre, seeking refuge in the Kurdistan Region and other areas of northern Iraq

Weak Governance at Every Level Affecting Stability and Security

Province	Basic Services	Government Effectiveness	Political Effectiveness	Economic Development	Rule of Law
Anbar	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Stable
Babylon	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Unstable
Baghdad	Very Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable
Basrah	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Unstable
Diyala	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Moderately Stable
Kerbala	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Unstable
Kurdistan Region	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Moderately Stable	Moderately Stable
Missan	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Very Unstable	Unstable
Muthanna	Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Unstable
Najaf	Very Unstable	Moderately Stable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Unstable
Ninewa	Very Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Very Unstable
Qadissiya	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Moderately Stable
Salah Al-Din	Very Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable
Tameem	Very Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable
Thi-Qar	Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Stable	Unstable	Moderately Stable
Wassit	Very Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable	Unstable

Legend: Very Unstable · Unstable · Moderately Stable · Stable · Very Stable

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. 59

Violence and the Sons of Iraq

SOI ATTACKS AND MEMBERS KILLED IN ACTION, 10/2008–11/2010

TIME PERIOD	NUMBER OF ATTACKS	TOTAL KILLED
Oct–Dec 2008	119	78
Jan–Mar 2009	137	40
Apr–Jun 2009	112	56
Jul–Sep 2009	71	32
Oct–Dec 2009	52	40
Jan–Mar 2010	28	11
Apr–Jun 2010	69	34
Jul–Sep 2010	41	79
Oct–Nov 2010	34	17
Total	**663**	**387**

Source: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

- SOI members have assumed considerable personal risk during the course of the program, and the danger continues even after the high-profile period of the surge.

- As of November 2010, 387 SOI had been killed in 663 attacks. Attacks on the SOI appear to have been more targeted in 2010.

- Although the number of total attacks in 2009 was 116% higher than in 2010, the number of SOI killed in 2010 was just 16% below the reported number of SOI killed in 2009.

- Moreover, this comparison does not include those killed during the month of December 2010

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. .71

Security in Basrah: 2004-2010

MONTHLY SECURITY INCIDENTS IN BASRAH, 1/2004–12/2010

Sadrists declare cease-fire

Operation Charge of the Knights

Source: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

BASRAH: SECURITY TIME LINE, 2003–2010

2003 **2004** **2005** **2006** **2007** **2008** **2009** **2010**

March
UK forces enter Iraq from Kuwait.

May
About 26,000 UK troops in Iraq, mainly in the southeast.

July
Approximately 9,000 UK forces remain.

September 19
Pro-militia police detain two UK soldiers; subsequent UK rescue mission leads to large battle with Sadrist forces.

July–August
Better organized Sadrist forces seize key areas of Basrah City.

September 17
UK forces raid Sadrist headquarters in Basrah; violence subsides.

October
Basrah provincial council suspends cooperation with UK forces.

May
· Basrah provincial council resumes cooperation with UK forces.
· New UK brigade suffers 41 attacks and 7 KIA in its first two weeks in country.

May 31
PM al-Maliki declares one-month state of emergency in Basrah City after 100 killed in sectarian clashes.

June
Basrah Operations Command created by GOI to oversee security operations.

August
Sadrists declare 6-month cease-fire.

September 3
GOI assumes custody of Basrah Palace as last UK troops leave the city center.

December 16
UK transfers control of Basrah province to GOI.

January 1
UK hands over complete control of Basrah International Airport to the GOI.

March 31
UK ends mission and turns over command of Coalition military operations in southern Iraq to the United States.

June 19
2 killed in Basrah electricity protests.

Deadly explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) increasingly used to target Coalition and ISF troops.

April–September 2007
UK forces gradually withdraw from Basrah City to their main base at the airport.

August 9
Basrah residents riot over fuel and electricity shortages.

June 24
6 Royal Military Police killed by mob at a police station near Basrah City.

April 7
UK forces take control of Basrah City and patrol with Iraqi police.

April 21
Multiple car bombs kill more than 70 in Basrah City.

January 31
SCIRI-dominated Shia coalition wins control of Basrah provincial council. Fadhila party (Shia) finishes second; secures governorship in later ballot.

March 15
Sadrist militia attack female Basrah University student; public demonstrations ensue.

September 29
UK forces launch Operation Sinbad to regain control of Basrah City from Shia militia.

December 25
UK forces battle with pro-militia Iraqi police units.

October 30
Shia militants kill 17 Sunni police recruits near a UK-run training center.

March
Operation Sinbad ends inconclusively.

Early April
Cease-fire between ISF and militias gradually implemented.

April–May
ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.

March 25
PM al-Maliki launches Operation Charge of the Knights to restore order in Basrah City.

March 26–27
ISF encounters fierce resistance from Iranian-supplied Shia militia forces; U.S. military rushes air assets and other support.

November 8
10 killed and more than 40 wounded by car bomb in western Basrah.

"The Kurdish Issue"

Sources of tension:

- Disputed territories
  - In Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Tameem
- Hydrocarbons law
  - Disagreements on contracts and management
- Constitution reform
  - KRG wants decentralization
  - GOI wants stronger center
- Security
  - Joint patrols of Iraqi and Kurdish forces
- Foreign policy
  - "KRG has been developing independent economic and political ties with foreign countries, signing separate oil deals, and meeting separately with foreign heads of state"

Legislative issues

- Article 23: covers property rights and prohibits owning property for demographic change
- Article 140: calls for census and referendum to end territory dispute, but none has taken place
- Article 141: recognizes Kurdish legislation, as long as it does not contradict the Iraqi Constitution. Dispute over draft constitution claiming Tameem province

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 67

"The Kurdish Issue"

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 67

Spotlighting Ethnic Violence: Kirkuk

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Roadside Bombs	919	334	208	142
Car Bombs	69	18	14	2

Source: Kirkuk Police and MoI as shown *in Washington Post*, 9.2.11, p. A8

Section Four

Spotlight on Baghdad

Ethno-Sectarian Violence: 2006-2009

Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 05-Sep-09; weekly beginning 01-May-06

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

Iraqi Security Patterns:
Oct 2009 to Jan 2010

October 2009

		5	0	0		
13	32	0	41	0	0	0
16	0	22	65	0	94	7
2	0	31	5	4	3	5
630+	5	2	18	3	3	25

Wednesday, October 14: 9 Iraqis killed and 56 wounded during armed attacks in Baghdad and bombings in Kerbala.

Friday, October 16: 14 Iraqis killed and 80 wounded during an attack on a mosque in Telafar.

Sunday, October 25: 132 Iraqis killed and at least 500 wounded in explosions outside of the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad Provincial Council headquarters building.

Saturday, October 31: 23 Iraqis wounded during attacks in Baghdad and Mosul.

November 2009

8	0	0	21	22	6	3
0	2	4	0	8	8	1
13	24	7	2	0	0	14
16	4	6	50	4	0	0
3	2					

Wednesday, November 4: More than 20 Iraqis injured during a series of explosions in Baghdad.

Thursday, November 5: 2 Iraqis killed and 20 wounded during attacks in Mosul, Ramadi, and Hilla.

Monday, November 16: 24 Iraqis killed during attacks in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Abu Ghraib.

Wednesday, November 25: Approximately 50 Iraqis wounded in bombings in Kerbala and Baghdad.

December 2009

	16	2	11	5	6
6	51	310+	5	0	3	7
3	4	9	7	3	0	1
4	0	5	11	20	132+	6
12	2	4	30	2		

Monday, December 7: 7 Iraqis killed and 41 wounded during an explosion in Sadr City in Baghdad.

Tuesday, December 8: At least 110 Iraqis killed and 200 wounded in a series of attacks in Baghdad that targeted GOI facilities.

Friday, December 25: 25 Iraqis killed and more than 100 wounded in bombings in Hilla.

Wednesday, December 30: 23 Iraqis killed during an attack in Ramadi, in which the governor of Anbar was wounded .

January 2010

			5	27
3	19	0	8	8	0	0
0	0	4	8	138	0	2
3	5	0	37			

Saturday, January 2: 2 Iraqis killed and 24 wounded in attacks in Mosul and Baghdad.

Thursday, January 14: Approximately 27 Iraqis killed and 111 wounded in a series of bombings in Najaf.

Wednesday, January 20: Approximately 36 Iraqis injured during an attack in Mosul.

Ministry of Finance

Temporary site of Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Justice

CCC-I Karkh

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

International Zone

U.S. Embassy

Attacks Per Month By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Legend:
- IED
- Mortar Landed
- Car Bomb Explosion
- Bicycle bomb
- Assasination
- Suicide Bomber
- Katyusha Rocket
- Body Found
- hand gernade
- magneticIED
- RPG

Source: Senior Iraqi official

Iraqi Casualties By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Legend:
- Wounded Civilian
- Dead Civilian
- Iraqi Security Force Wounded
- Iraqi Security Force Dead
- Body Found

Source: Senior Iraqi official

Section Five

Iraqi Attitudes Towards Violence

Iraqi Views of Security and Travel: July 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

Iraqi Views of ISF and Stability: July 2009

Government Security Efforts are Effective

Nationwide average = 48%

0%   100%
Percent Who Agree

Iraq is Stable

Nationwide average = 55%

0%   100%
Percent Who Agree

July 2009

Levels of Security and Travel: April 2010

DoD Quarterly Report, April 29, 2010, p. 37-38

Section Six:

Different Estimates of Casualty Trends: 2003-2010

Who Has Been the Target: 2007-2009

DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIPLE-FATALITY BOMBINGS IN IRAQ, BY GROUP TARGETED, 1/1/2007–12/31/2009

1 person represents 100 deaths.

Note: Totals correspond with attacks that targeted a particular group or occurred in an area in which the group was in the majority. "Indiscriminate" bombings occurred in areas with mixed sectarian populations. "Unknown" corresponds with attacks where no sectarian information or location was reported.

Source: Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, 1/7/2010, pp. 9–10.

Civilian casualties, March 2003 – September 2010

Source: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

Deaths in Iraq: 2007 – July 2010

	Shiite	Sunni	Kurd	IND*	UNKN	Iraqi Sec. Forces	US/Coalit. Forces	Iraqi Government	Monthly/Annual Totals
2007 Total	2575	549	675	391	342	649	182	117	5480
2008 Total	566	413	25	542	285	364	50	61	2306
2009 Total	833	206	128	516	130	190	19	36	2058
January (2010)	0	0	0	49	1	13	0	13	76
February (2010)	112	0	0	2	0	9	0	9	132
March (2010)	11	16	0	90	0	21	0	0	138
April (2010)	89	5	0	56	3	3	0	0	156
May (2010)	117	0	2	25	6	10	0	0	160
June (2010)	4	17	0	44	11	21	2	0	99
July (2010)	104	45	0	11	4	15	0	4	183
2010 Total	333	38	2	266	21	77	2	22	761

Source: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, July 28, 2010.

Civilian Deaths: January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

Civilian Deaths
January 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 2010, p.30

Civilian Deaths, 2006 – July 2010

Source: http://www.icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx

Iraq: Average Weekly Violence Against Civilians:
2006- June 2010

Number of incidents

Total civilians killed

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

ISF and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq
January 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports), DoD News Releases, and CIDNE as of February 28, 2010. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 2010, p. 29

US Military Deaths in Iraq:
March 2003 – September 2010

Fatalities

Total US Military Deaths, KIAs, and WIAs in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-1.20.11)

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS FATALITIES AS OF: December 6, 2010, 10 a.m. EST				
	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA
OIF U.S. Military Casualties	4,408	3,483	925	31,935
OIF U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties	13	9	4	0
Totals	4,421	3,492	929	31,935

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM includes casualties that occurred between March 19, 2003, and August 2010, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Emirates. Prior to March 19, 2003, casualties in these countries were considered OEF. Personnel injured in OIF who die after 1 September 2010 will be included in OIF statistics.

Source: http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx

Total Us Military Deaths, KIAs, and WIAs in Iraq (cont.): New Dawn (1.9.10 to 20..111)

OPERATION NEW DAWN (OND) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS** FATALITIES AS OF: December 6, 2010, 2010, 10 a.m. EST				
	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA
OND U.S. Military Casualties	11	3	8	65
OND U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties	0	0	0	
Totals	11	3	8	65

OPERATION NEW DAWN includes casualties that occurred on or after September 1, 2010 in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

Iraqi Civilian and ISF Casualties, Jan. '05 - Jan. '11

Source: iCasualties.org

Iraqi Civilian and ISF Casualties, Jan. '09 - Jan. '11

Source: iCasualties.org

Section Seven:

More is Involved than Casualties:

Displaced Persons

External Displaced Persons Challenge

October 2009

October 2010

IRAQI ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

FISCAL YEAR	NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS
2007	1,608
2008	13,822
2009	18,838
2010 through 9/22	19,674
Total	53,942

Source: DoS, PRM, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2010.

Note: Excludes refugee statistics for Europe and Australia.

Sources: UNHCR, "Country Operations Profile," www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html, accessed 10/8/2009; USCIS, "Iraqi Refugee Processing Fact Sheet," http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/iraqi_refugee_fs_11feb09.pdf, accessed 10/8/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2009, p 80-81 and SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 2010, p. 69

Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Returnees: 10/2009-9/2010

IDP Return

Refugee Return

Top reasons IDPs and refugees chose not to return to their places of origin:

- Continued real or perceived threats of violence in their neighborhoods
- Homes were either occupied by others or destroyed
- Lack of employment opportunities
- Lack of access to essential services

Returnees

- >5,000
- 500-5,000
- 100-500
- 0-100

Source: UNHCR, "Monthly Statistical Update on Return—September 2010," 9/2010.

While tens of thousands have returned to their places of origin, the flow of the displaced to their homes—measured at 9,500 to 15,000 per month before Iraq's March 2010 elections—has slowed to about 7,500 per month.267 The number of those displaced still far exceeds the number of people returned. The majority of returnees have been going back to Baghdad and Diyala provinces.268 According to Government of Iraq (GOI) data, more IDPs than refugees have returned home: From January to November 2010, about 22% of the 112,250 returnees were refugees; the rest were IDPs.269 Many who have returned lament their decision: A UNHCR survey of 2,353 Iraqis who had gone back to two Baghdad neighborhoods found that 61% of them regretted going home, and 60% cited security concerns as the reason

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 2010. p. 61

Externally Displaced Persons and Refugee Returnees: 10/2009-9/2010

KEY MOVEMENTS OF DISPLACED IRAQIS, 2006–9/2008

Map labels: Europe, Egypt and Lebanon, Dahuk, Ninewa, Erbil, Tameem, Sulaymaniyah, Salah Al-Din, Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Wassit, Kerbala, Babylon, Qadissiya, Missan, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Basrah, Muthanna

IDPs originating from:

- ⇢ Diyala province
- → Baghdad province
- → Ninewa province
- ⇢ Refugees originating from Iraq

Nearly 90% of those displaced came from provinces shaded in blue.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 1.5 million Iraqis continue to be displaced inside Iraq, and as of November 2010, it had registered 197,996 Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries. The actual number of Iraqi refugees in the region remains unknown, but may be much larger: neighboring host countries estimate that as many as 1.8 million refugees may reside in those countries.

Loss of homes to squatters or violence and poor access to essential services were cited as reasons some internally displaced persons (IDPs) chose to remain displaced. However, while the majority of IDPs live in rented housing, some 500,000 of them currently live in makeshift squatter settlements or in public buildings. An estimated 200,000 of that total live in more than 120 such settlements throughout Baghdad.264 IDPs in settlements suffer from severe overcrowding and inadequate shelter, and they have limited access to water and other essential services.

Religious Affiliation of Displaced Persons and Refugees as of /2010

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF IDPs AND REFUGEES

Religious Affiliation of IDPs in Iraq, as of 2/2010

Total: ~1.3 Million

- Other/Unknown 4%
- Christian 5%
- Sunni Muslim 33%
- Shia Muslim 58%

Religious Affiliation of Registered Refugees, at the End of 2008

Total: ~311,000

- Unspecified Muslim 4%
- Other/Unknown 5%
- Christian 14%
- Shia Muslim 21%
- Sunni Muslim 56%

Note: 221,983 IDP families were assessed.

IOM officials report that many Sunni refugees will choose not to return home until greater progress is made toward national reconciliation between Iraq's religious and ethnic groups.280 In a 2008 survey, Sunnis accounted for 56% of the approximately 311,000 refugees residing in neighboring countries and registered with UNHCR. Within Iraq, the situation is reversed: Shia accounted for the majority of 1.3 million internally displaced in a February 2010 assessment done by the IOM.

Security for Christians is a growing issue. The GOI reported that, on October 31, 2010, an estimated 50 members of Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad were killed, and approximately 75 injured, after a front-group for AQI attacked the church and held worshippers hostage for several hours. The attackers detonated suicide vests and responded with gunfire as Iraqi Police (IP) stormed the building, resulting in numerous hostages and seven police officers being killed. Five of the attackers were reportedly killed, and eight were captured.302

Ten days later, early morning bomb and mortar attacks on homes of Christians in Baghdad left at least 3 people dead and 26 wounded. Subsequently, Iraq's Immigration and Displacement Directorate in Dahuk province announced that it had received more than 80 Christian families who fled Baghdad and Mosul.

The Internal Displaced Persons Problem

FACTORS AFFECTING IDP DECISIONS TO STAY PUT OR RELOCATE

Reasons IDPs Said They Could Not Access Their Property

The Internal Displaced Persons Problem

Reasons IDPs Said They Chose To Return

Note: Survey respondents were allowed to select more than one reason; therefore, percentages do not add to 100%.

Sources: International Rescue Committee, "A Tough Road Home: Uprooted Iraqis in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq," 2/2010, p. 7; Norwegian Refugee Council, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Patterns of Return and Resettlement," 3/1/2010, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B9? OpenDocument&expand=11&link=23.11&count=10000#23.11, accessed 3/5/2010.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 84

Section Eight

IEDs and Weapons Caches: 2003-2010

Iraq - IED Incident Trends – Coalition Force (U)

	Jun-07	Jun-08	Jun-09
IED Incidents	2588	602	260
Found/Cleared	1345	371	142
Ineffective IED Attacks (no CF casualties)	1001	184	92
Effective Attacks	242	47	26
CF KIA	83	16	8
CF WIA	572	121	59

IEDs Found and Cleared

Ineffective IED Attacks

IED Attacks with Coalition Force Casualties

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Incident counts based on preliminary data for June 2009

Iraq - IED Incident Trends: July-December 2010

- **No significant change in number of IED events since July; % of effective attacks trending downward**
- **Coalition Force IED casualties continue to trend down, with only 2 CF IED WIA in December**
- **Host Nation IED casualties trends continue to vary month to month**

NOTES:

1) Effective IED attacks are those that caused Coalition Force (CF) and/or Host Nation (HN) casualties. Ineffective IED attacks caused no casualties, and include detonations with no casualties, early detection, and pre-detonations.

2) All data, including totals for preceding months, are subject to revision as new reporting becomes available.

Reasons for success:
- Effective COIN strategy
- Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces
- Effective host nation security force
- Political reconciliation
- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables

IED Incidents and Casualty Figures

Relative Frequency of IED Incident Types

Lethality of IEDs: 2003 - 2010

Weapons Caches Found by Coalition and Iraqi Forces
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

| 2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 to Date
1853	2915	2708	7043	9457	4367	723

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes caches and explosive remnants of war. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 29, 2010 p. 35

Section Nine

The Iranian-Iraqi Power Vacuum

Comparative Military Manpower: 2010

	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
Navy	18,000	1,100	15,500	700	2,000	4,200	1,800	2,500	1,700
Air Def	15,000	0	16,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Air	52,000	1,200	20,000	1,500	2,500	5,000	1,500	4,500	3,000
Guard	125,000	0	100,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Army	350,000	163,500	75,000	6,000	11,000	25,000	8,500	44,000	60,000

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2010

Iran vs. Iraq: 2003 vs. 2010

Main Battle Tanks

Combat Aircraft

11:1

312:0

	Main Battle Tanks: 2003	Main Battle Tanks: 2010	.	Combat Aircraft: 2003	Combat Aircraft 2010
Iran	1,565	1,613		283	312
Iraq	2,200	149		316	0

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane's sentinel series.

Details of Iraq's Loss of Deterrent and Defense Capability: 2003-2010

Category	2003				2010		
	Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio		Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio
Active Manpower	424,000	513,000	8:10		191,957	523,000	2:5
Reserve Manpower	650,000	350,000	19:10		0	350,000	NA
Main Battle Tanks	2,200	1,565	7:5		149	1,613	1:10
OAFVs	1,300	815	8:5		505	725	7:10
APCs	2,400	590	4:1		1,479	650	23:10
Towed Artillery	1,900	2,085	9:10		0	2,010	NA
SP Artillery	150	310	1:2		0	310	NA
MRLs	200	889	1:5		0	876	NA
Combat Aircraft	316	283	11:10		0	312	NA
Attack Helicopters	100	85	6:5		0	50	NA
Major SAM Launchers	225	205	11:10		0	234	NA

The Slow Pace of Change: US Arms Transfers

Real world Iraq plans delayed by budget crisis that began in 2009, election, and crisis in forming new government. Creating an effective national defense capability will take until at least 2020.

Only major modern weapons platforms now announced are limited buy of M-1 tanks and possible buy of F-16 fighters.

GOI is committed to 355 FMS agreements to acquire defense articles and services that the U.S. government proposes to sell. As of December 31, 2010, 72% of the $8.3 billion FMS program had been committed by the GOI.

Of the $1.97 billion in equipment and projects already delivered or in the process of being delivered, the GOI had funded 63.9%. Examples of recent activity in early 2011 included:

- **As of December 31, 2010, 63 of the 140 M1A1 tanks were delivered to Iraq at an estimated cost of $3.6 million per tank. The last shipment is expected to arrive in Iraq in August.**

- **Eight M88A2 Recovery Vehicles were produced and delivered to Iraq, with an estimated value of $29.6 million.**

- **Operator and maintainer training for the M1A1s and M88A2s, under the New Equipment Training program, have been placed on contract and are scheduled to begin February 1, 2011. Included is training for two regiments (70 tank crews) through December 31, 2011. Tank maintainer training is currently scheduled through February 28, 2012. The total cost of this training package is estimated at $34.2 million.**

- **A one-year contract to provide support for contractor logistics ($35 million, estimated) is scheduled to begin on February 1, 2011.**

- **The Iraqi Army Aviation Directorate accepted delivery of two new Mi-171E helicopters. This de- livery, coordinated with the USF-I's Iraq Security Assistance Mission, increased the directorate's total inventory of these Russian-made aircraft to eight. The helicopters will be used to conduct counter-terrorism, airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other missions.**