

## Globalizing social movement theory: The case of eugenics

DEBORAH BARRETT and CHARLES KURZMAN

*School of Social Work and Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

**Abstract.** Transnational social movements are affected not only by national-level factors, but also by factors that operate at the global level. This article develops two conceptual tools for analyzing global factors: international political opportunity and global culture. The conduciveness of both factors appears to be important in understanding eugenics activity, which this article examines as a transnational social movement. The lack of international political opportunity before World War I and the hostile climate of global culture after World War II hindered eugenic mobilization during these periods, while the emergence of opportunities and cultural conduciveness during the Interwar period was associated with movement growth and effectiveness.

Not all social movements limit themselves within the boundaries of a single state. Indeed, although social movements may have arisen in their modern form in response to the emergence of national state institutions,<sup>1</sup> one of the hallmarks of contemporary movements is their frequent transcendence of the territorial boundaries established by these institutions.<sup>2</sup> The socialist, pro-democracy, anti-slavery, alcohol-prohibition, and other movements have taken more or less varied forms within multiple national contexts, but the activist networks, movement organizations, and shared ideals extended across continents.

As other scholars have noted, social movement theory has tended to focus on *variation* within transnational movements.<sup>3</sup> In conjunction with this approach, the field's conceptual tools have been most fully elaborated with reference to national contexts. Only recently has the field begun to explore *consistency* within a transnational movement, including the similarity of demands, coordination of mobilization, and

*Theory and Society* 33: 487–527, 2004.

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

clustering of policy outcomes across countries with varying political and cultural conditions.

The phenomenon of transnational consistency raises the issue of how global factors might affect social movements in multiple national settings. Much of the emerging literature on this subject has argued that global factors have only indirect effects, which are mediated by national-level contexts. This position has the advantage that global factors can still be studied with national-level analytical tools.<sup>4</sup> Marco Giugni has identified two mechanisms of indirect effect. One focuses on diffusion, the process by which a movement in one country is adopted in certain other countries with similar national contexts.<sup>5</sup> Another mechanism focuses on simultaneous shifts in a variety of national settings, leading to parallel movements in these settings.<sup>6</sup> Giugni concludes that global factors have “only an indirect impact on movement characteristics,” since they form “a general structural and cultural frame with little direct relation to social movement action.”<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Sidney Tarrow argues that global factors affect social movements only when “mediated by the nature and constraints of . . . national states.”<sup>8</sup> We offer evidence of indirect processes at work, but we propose that global factors also have a direct effect on transnational movements. To understand this direct effect, we translate two prominent concepts in the study of social movements from the national to the global level.

We then test these factors through an examination of the rise and fall of the eugenics movement, which for more than a century has sought to improve the human race through selective breeding. Studies of the eugenics movement generally focus on single regions or countries, and attribute the course of the movement to national or regional factors. We agree that these factors are important. However, we argue that these factors are not in themselves sufficient to account for the simultaneous trajectory of a transnational movement in multiple regions around the globe. The eugenics movement took off in the period between World Wars I and II (hereafter referred to as the Interwar period) in Europe, North America, South America, and elsewhere—regions with diverse political and cultural characteristics. When the movement crumbled after World War II, it did so in all of these regions at almost the same moment. We identify global factors that co-vary with the emergence and decline of the transnational eugenics movement. In addition, we offer evidence that participants in the movement were attuned to these global factors and tailored their activities to make the most of them.

### **Translating from the national to the global**

How are we to understand the global factors affecting transnational movements? The study of social movements has congealed in recent years around three central concepts: political opportunity, cultural framing, and organizational resources. Whether these concepts are treated as structural externalities, concatenations of causal mechanisms, or contingent processes, they constitute the core analytical principles that social movement scholars bring to their studies. These concepts cannot be translated in a simple way from the national level, where they were originally developed, to the transnational level. The global level appears to have its own properties. In this section, we attempt to outline some of the transformations involved in applying these concepts at the global level.<sup>9</sup>

Of the three central concepts in social movement theory, the theme of cultural framing is perhaps most readily extrapolated to the global level. We propose to adapt the social movement concept of frame resonance to address the cultural content of the international arena. Frame resonance refers to the cultural background in which social movements operate.<sup>10</sup> Movements whose message resonates with this shared set of understandings and values are more likely to attract popular support and achieve their goals. The literature on frames has focused almost exclusively on the national level, but there is nothing inherent in the concept that prevents the study of international frames as well. Indeed, we can find an analogous approach in the literature on the normative power of international regimes.<sup>11</sup> For a map of the cultural background that operates at the international level, we draw on the literature on “global culture.”<sup>12</sup> This literature argues that the concept of the world as a single place has grown tremendously over the past two centuries. Associated with this development is the spread of norms that are intended to apply to the whole world. Beginning in the nineteenth century, these norms multiplied dramatically, and international normative regimes can now be detected for a huge variety of issues.<sup>13</sup> As in local cultures, the norms of global culture are constantly contested and reconstituted, mutually contradictory, and frequently reflective of the interests of the elites who champion them. Global culture is in part the product of the very transnational movements that we argue are affected by it, but this reciprocal causation is not a problem for the study of a single transnational movement, such as eugenics, that played only a small role in the construction of global culture. For present purposes, we bracket the discussion of the sources of global culture for future

study, and focus here on the identification of certain themes that appear to be characteristic of global culture in particular periods.

The theme of resources is also readily extrapolated to the global level, but not with its full set of meanings intact. From a structural perspective, theorists have long recognized global patterns of military conflict and conquest, natural resource discovery and extraction, and economic development and exploitation as significant factors in the making and unmaking of revolutionary movements, most famously socialism.<sup>14</sup> Yet this literature on economic globalization and international inequality has not had much impact on the field of social movement studies, possibly because the two fields disagree on the relation between resources and movements. Although most inequality studies suggest that resistance arises from resource deprivation, social movement studies suggest the opposite, arguing that people need resources in order to engage in organized protest.

One bridge between these two literatures focuses on transnational social networks – diasporic communities, ideological linkages, and other forms of solidarity – that link impoverished people in certain countries with resource-rich people in other countries.<sup>15</sup> These networks, however, may be more attenuated than networks in more localized settings. The concept of networks, as social movements studies most often use it, focuses on ongoing, face-to-face relationships.<sup>16</sup> As geographical scale increases, ongoing relationships become episodic, and face-to-face relationships are mediated by courier, post, telephone, Internet, and other media. Sidney Tarrow has argued that this distinction disqualifies transnational networks from being social movements; in Tarrow's view, close personal networks are not just a causal factor, but also a defining feature of social movements.<sup>17</sup> Another way of approaching the issue is to acknowledge that transnational social movements – like nationwide movements in large countries – draw on a subset of the network ties that are available to more localized movements. We have not designed the present case study to test this hypothesis, however, and must limit discussion of resources to the theoretical level.

Political opportunity is the third key concept in social movement studies that we translate from the national to the global context. The concept of political opportunity is based on the observation that movements often emerge and succeed when the national state, or a subsidiary unit, undergoes a reconfiguration that movements identify as conducive to protest.<sup>18</sup> The concept of political opportunity has been applied to

transnational movements primarily to address cross-national *variation*: opportunities arose in certain countries and not in others.<sup>19</sup> A similar analysis could be applied to the international eugenics movement, for example by comparing places that adopted eugenic sterilization policies with places that did not: Estonia and Latvia but not Lithuania, Alberta and British Columbia but not Saskatchewan in Canada, Veracruz but not Puebla in Mexico. Such an approach would help us understand the differing outcomes of the movement in different settings.

However, if we wish to understand cross-regional *similarities* within a transnational movement, national and local explanations are incomplete. The eugenics movements arose in numerous places almost simultaneously, despite varied political structures: democratic Denmark and undemocratic Germany, or single-party-dominated Alabama and non-single-party-dominated New York. It is possible that each of these settings witnessed a parallel shift in political opportunities conducive to the eugenics movement. But simultaneity makes it unlikely that these shifts occurred independently of one another. Rather, we propose, they occurred in conjunction with the movement's recognition of an underlying institutional shift that took place at the global level. Following the lead of recent work by Jackie Smith and other scholars, we call this shift the emergence of "international political opportunity."<sup>20</sup>

Two partially overlapping literatures have begun to theorize the institutional structure that underlies this concept of international political opportunity – international regime theory in political science and world society theory in sociology, both of which analyze the emergence of a dense network of international organizations.<sup>21</sup> This formulation intentionally mixes inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, since the two forms are frequently intertwined and overlapping, and play similar roles with relation to transnational movements. This network has not coalesced into a single world government, but the world polity occasionally displays state-like properties: (1) it claims legitimacy as appropriate forums for discourse about "world" problems; (2) it attempts to "legislate" solutions to these problems; (3) it promotes this legislation through the allocation and withholding of resources and the demarcation of the boundaries of compliance; and (4) it establishes quasi-judicial proceedings for the contestation of these boundaries. The United Nations has grown into the most elaborately and self-consciously state-like international organization in history, but it is not the first or only international body to develop one or more of these state-like attributes.<sup>22</sup>

Yet, for all these state-like attributes, the world polity is not a state, and international political opportunity is not exactly the same thing as national-level political opportunity. As with the concept of social networks, the concept of political opportunity is transformed when it is translated to the global level. We attempt to specify these transformations by examining each of the four dimensions of political opportunity that Doug McAdam has identified at the national level: the relative openness or closure of the political system, the stability of elite alignments that “undergird” the polity, the presence of elite allies for a given movement, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.<sup>23</sup>

The first dimension of political opportunity, openness, refers to institutional channels into the state. In the world polity, however, boundaries are more porous than the boundaries of states. Access can be gained not just by selecting and lobbying political representatives – the usual mechanisms in national states – but also by formal affiliations such as observer status or, most commonly, by incorporation into the sprawling non-governmental sector. This is not to suggest that all groups have equal access to the institutions of the world polity – for example, the eugenics movement was largely frozen out of the world polity after World War II, as we discuss below. However, membership in the world polity consists in large part of self-nomination – a path that is open only to the most autonomous of autocratic states at the national level, and even then only to one or a few actors. This difference in conceptualizing openness reflects the differing treatment of non-governmental organizations in the literatures on national and global polities: few observers would argue that civil society at the national level is literally part of the state, while the definition of world polity includes the non-governmental organizations that some observers call “global civil society.”<sup>24</sup> When scholars speak of the opportunities presented by the world polity, this opening dimension is frequently what they are referring to: the creation of institutional settings outside of the national state to which social movements can appeal.<sup>25</sup>

McAdam’s second dimension of political opportunity, the stability of elite alignments undergirding the polity, is difficult to translate to the global level. By national standards, elite alignments in the world polity are never stable. Certain elite actors have never abandoned efforts to re-arrange the world by force – activities that suggest a lack of faith in the ability of the world polity to generate acceptable outcomes. In a national context, the pursuit of organized violence by non-state elites or sub-units of the polity against one another – that is, preparation for

civil war—would be taken as evidence of extreme instability. Yet in the world polity, military competition equivalent to global civil war has been permanent, and stability is conceptualized instead in terms of balance of power or unipolar dominance. Conflict is routine even among longstanding allies such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization members—consider intra-NATO squabbles from the Suez war to the ouster of Saddam Hussein. In addition, unlike national politics, where shared allegiance to the regime normally sets bounds on competition, it is routine for actors in the world polity to debate the very foundations of the international regime, including their own participation in it. Although complete exit from the world polity is not feasible, temporary partial exits—Olympic boycotts, withholding of UNESCO funds, and the like—are part of the repertoire of contestation that keeps the world polity divided. To translate elite alignment meaningfully from the national to the global level, then, we need a higher threshold for instability. One approach is to focus on episodes where global elites give serious attention to the overthrow of the world polity itself. For all the anarchy of the international system, there have been few sustained attempts by global elites to re-arrange the world polity. Indeed, one can count these attempts on two fingers: the rejection of the Hague Convention in favor of the League of Nations, and the rejection of the League in favor of the United Nations, each corresponding to a world war that signaled the breakdown of the previous inter-state system.

McAdam's third dimension of political opportunity, elite allies for a particular movement, can be globalized in a more straightforward manner. As with national allies, the presence of allies within the world polity may alter the cost-benefit calculations of activists through the identification of issues as worthy of attention, the convening of conferences, the creation of coordinating bodies, the accreditation and mobilization of experts, the publication and distribution of supportive materials, and the advocacy of policies, as well as the allocation of funds to movement organizations.<sup>26</sup> As the world polity has brought more and more issues into its purview, the odds of finding an elite ally for any given movement have increased—though, as the case study presented in this article demonstrates, not all such movements are equally well-placed to take advantage of these opportunities. Globalizing this concept exacerbates a complication that already exists at the national level: distinguishing elite allies from the concept of movement resources. Mayer Zald has argued that there should be no distinction, that elite allies are simply part of the network that provides resources for a movement: Zald points to the absurdity of considering Ronald Reagan “part of the

conservative movement before he ran for the presidency and not after.”<sup>27</sup> Certain authors writing about transnational movements concur.<sup>28</sup> We propose a relatively simple solution to this conundrum: we distinguish between current elite allies, who form part of the movement network, and potential elite allies, who form part of the political opportunity structure. Therefore, we treat international eugenics organizations as a component of the movement’s mobilization, while we treat other international organizations as constituting the opportunity structure for the movement.

Repression, the last of McAdam’s four dimensions of political opportunity, is not generally available to international organizations. This may be changing as the United Nations engages in more frequent “peace-keeping” interventions, the World Court gains jurisdiction over more numerous crimes, and international financial organizations insist on a widening range of conditionalities, but international organizations still have relatively little capacity to engage in serious repression of social movement activities, as compared with all but the weakest of national states.

To summarize, our translation of social movement concepts from the national to the global, we focus on global culture as the background conditions that are relevant to a movement’s attempts to generate frame resonance. We propose that social networks become attenuated as geographic scale increases, though we do not examine this feature in the present study. Finally, we argue that political opportunity exists at the global level when the world polity opens new avenues of institutional access, suffers cataclysmic instability (such as world war), and generates potential elite allies for a movement.

### **Operationalizing global concepts**

Most studies of transnational movements focus on their relations with a particular sector of international organizations. By contrast, we operationalize world polity and global culture as a whole, making the argument that important features of these phenomena are visible across all sectors of international activity. In order to systematize our approach to global factors, we propose three indicators of international political opportunity and two indicators of global culture.

*Period:* We operationalize the stability dimension of international political opportunity to distinguish three historic periods in the global



context for transnational movements. These periods are separated both by world wars and by the creation of new umbrella inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) – the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II – that dominated the international political opportunity structure of their eras. We do not intend to reify these three periods, or to suggest that conditions were uniform within each period. Rather, we suggest that significant developments in each period altered the political opportunity structure for transnational movements.

*Density:* We operationalize the opening dimension of international political opportunity by examining the number of international organizations, on the theory that each new organization increases the potential channels of access to the world polity. The density of IGOs is calculated from Michael Wallace and J. David Singer’s roster of 210 IGOs from 1815 to 1964, compiled from a variety of sources.<sup>29</sup> As an additional indicator, we include the density of international non-governmental organizations (INGO), from John Boli and George M. Thomas’s database of 5983 INGOs founded between 1875 and 1973, compiled from the Union of International Associations’ *Yearbook of International Organizations*.<sup>30</sup> INGOs are not composed of states, and thus might be considered less parallel to political opportunity at the national and sub-national level. However, the literature on the world polity is emphatic in including INGOs within its object of study, as they may take on some or all of the state-like properties discussed above. In any case, the findings for IGOs and INGOs are entirely consistent.<sup>31</sup>

*Agenda:* We operationalize the elite-ally dimension of international political opportunity by documenting the world polity’s expanding agenda, on the theory that consideration of additional themes will increase the likelihood of potential elite allies for any given movement. For IGOs, we work with the titles and stated aims of the United Nations, its subsidiary units, and their precursors. For INGOs, we adopt a quantitative measure, using the 42 sector categories that Boli and Thomas developed and coded from INGO titles and aims, as listed in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. For both density and agenda, we report also on the eugenics movement’s perceptions of international political opportunity, as potentially distinct from “objective” indicators of opportunity, though in the present case the two are closely aligned.

As for global culture, our operationalization of global culture pursues what Hank Johnston calls “macro-discourse analysis” involving “broad

patterns of what is talked and written about.”<sup>32</sup> In keeping with Robert D. Benford’s admonitions for the study of social movement frames, we examine changes in this macro discourse over time.<sup>33</sup> There is tremendous variation, within and among countries, in the manifestations of these discourses. Yet a large and consistent literature has suggested that one can identify and trace over time the core discourse. This discourse is related to, but distinct from, the world polity, in the same way that government is distinct from state, in contemporary social scientific usage: the latter refers to an institutional structure, while the former refers to the ideological movement occupying the structure. Put differently, world polity involves form, while global culture involves content: the frames that the world polity considers legitimate and effective.

Global culture is too broad and multifarious to be mapped in a single article. We therefore narrow our focus to two dimensions that the social scientific and historical literature elaborate particularly well and that we hypothesize as especially relevant to the eugenics movement: the ideology of national statehood and the ideology of personhood (these categories are adapted from the work of John Meyer and Roland Robertson).<sup>34</sup> We leave the mapping of other dimensions of global culture to future research.

*Ideology of national statehood:* The ideology of national statehood refers to global norms about the prerogatives and expectations of the national state. This meta-frame was crucial for the eugenics movement, which came to define the national state as the actor most suited to implementing eugenic plans. We adopt this indicator from theorists of the history of statehood, using illustrations drawn from contemporaneous sources.<sup>35</sup>

*Ideology of personhood:* The ideology of personhood forms a second meta-frame for eugenics appeals that depended on an exclusivist and hierarchical concept of personhood that made distinctions between “fit” and “unfit” individuals, often based on “race” or other pseudo-biological characteristics. We draw this indicator from theorists of the history of personhood with illustrations from each period under study.<sup>36</sup>

### **Case selection: The eugenics movement**

We propose to demonstrate the value of the concepts of international political opportunity and global culture for social movement theory by

showing how changes in these factors over time were associated with the rise and fall of the transnational eugenics movement. We define this movement as the activities of people who identify themselves with eugenics, with the understanding that these people may also identify themselves by other labels as well. Eugenics was an important scientific phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>37</sup> Its proponents argued that humans, like other valued species, ought to reproduce according to scientific principles to generate the best possible genetic pool. Eugenicists (also called eugenists) urged states to adopt policies encouraging the reproduction of the “fit” and discouraging the reproduction of the “unfit,”<sup>38</sup> thereby “improving human stock by giving the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable,” according to the movement’s founder, Francis Galton.<sup>39</sup> Eugenicists regarded their movement as a rational and humanitarian effort to improve the human condition.

We do not claim that eugenics is a “typical” social movement. For one thing, it involved “consensus mobilization,”<sup>40</sup> scaled up to the transnational level: an attempt to change policies in a context of broad ideological support and little organized opposition, through non-confrontational mobilization that bordered, at times, on public relations or lobbying.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the social basis of the eugenics movement was largely limited to an emerging class of professional scientists and other educated and well-to-do supporters.<sup>42</sup> The privileged social position of eugenicists and their consensus-mobilization approach no doubt helped them to capitalize on international political opportunities and to speak the elite and often elitist discourse of global culture. We hypothesize that global factors are important for other movements as well.

At the same time, the eugenics movement provides a compelling case study for three reasons. First, it is truly transnational. Mark B. Adams has counted 30 countries with active eugenics movements in the twentieth century,<sup>43</sup> and all studies of eugenics note the role of international interchange in spreading eugenics ideology. However, research on the history of eugenics has generally neglected this international activity in favor of an emphasis on variation among national manifestations of the movement, even in recent comparative pieces – the most important exceptions being Stefan Kühl’s book on what he calls the “Racist International,” and Paul Weindling’s analysis of “international eugenics.”<sup>44</sup> Our approach brings social movement analysis to bear on the transnational aspect of the movement.

A second justification for the case of eugenics is that it provides a long enough trajectory to examine changes in global culture and international institutions. Movements that emerged only after World War II, by contrast, offer less variation for the hypothesized independent variables. Third, the eugenics movement displays an intriguing international pattern. While many other scientific movements of the early twentieth century continued to progress in the second half of the century, eugenics could scarcely speak its own name after the mid-1940s. It thus offers variation on the dependent variable and allows us to examine both the rise and the collapse of a movement.

The dependent variable for this study is the success of the transnational eugenics movement. We use two indicators of success: one representing movement activity, and a second representing eugenic-inspired state policy. These indicators covary across the three time-periods under study.

*Movement activity:* We use the number of international non-governmental conferences on eugenic topics as an indicator of the level of transnational movement activity. These conferences are an appropriate indicator because they were a significant mobilization tactic for the movement, as for other twentieth-century international scientific movements. National eugenics organizations devoted considerable efforts to preparing for these conferences and reported on them extensively in their periodicals. These periodicals—primarily *Eugenical News* of New York and *Eugenics Review* of London—generated the basic list of international conferences, supplemented by handbooks published by the League of Nations, the U.S. Department of State, the Bibliographical Society of America, and the Union of International Associations; and by secondary historical works on the eugenics movement and related subjects.<sup>45</sup> Conferences were included if resolutions, keynote speakers, or major sections explicitly advocated eugenic positions. Figure 1 graphically represents the 43 international conferences that meet these criteria, the first in 1910 and the last in 1939.

*Policy adoption:* We measure the success of the eugenics movement by policy adoption at the national and sub-national levels—specifically, policies allowing involuntary sterilization on eugenic grounds. We choose this policy because it was perhaps the most controversial goal of the eugenics movement, and because it is relatively straightforward




Figure 1. International eugenics conferences and adoption of eugenic sterilization policies (Sources: See text).

to code, unlike, say, “positive eugenic” measures such as tax breaks intended to increase the fertility of the “fit.” We generated a list of these policies – amendments to existing policies are not included – and their year of adoption from publications of the eugenics movement,<sup>46</sup> which announced them as great successes; and from the secondary literature on eugenics in various national and regional contexts. We also examined the Codes of Law of all U.S. states and territories, from 1850 to 2000, to identify the initial policy and confirm the “involuntary” provision. This method generated a list of 10 eugenic sterilization policies at the national level (including the city-state Danzig) and 38 policies at a sub-national level, occurring in a total of 15 countries (see Figure 1). Non-eugenic sterilization policies are not included in this count, nor are involuntary sterilizations conducted without an overt state policy, as we are interested in policies that put the state on record as considering involuntary eugenic measures to be legitimate.

## The eugenics movement before World War I

### *International political opportunity before World War I*

*Density:* In the pre–World War I period, the world had no routinized IGO aspiring to universality and permanence – nothing comparable to the League of Nations in the Interwar period and the United Nations after World War II. “Before the world war we were often told, and even on the highest authority, that there never could come into existence such an international superorganization,” birth-control advocate and eugenicist Margaret Sanger later recalled.<sup>47</sup> Wallace and Singer’s list of IGOs generates an annual average of 23 IGOs in existence in the years 1875–1913, compared with 74 in 1919–1938 and 142 in 1946–1964 (Table 1 summarizes this and other indicators). In addition to low density, the world polity in the pre–World War I period was limited by inter-state disputes, restricted mandates, and lack of resources. The IGOs of the period had few full-time staff, convened irregularly, and often involved delegates lacking the authority to engage their states in multilateral agreements.

The non-governmental sector of the international polity underwent considerably more articulation during the pre–World War I period, which witnessed the “emergence of a universal international society”<sup>48</sup> and the “take-off phase” of globalization.<sup>49</sup> One source records nearly 3000 international conferences between 1840 and 1914, and more than 300 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) formed between 1900 and 1914<sup>50</sup> – though these numbers pale beside comparable counts of INGOs in later periods. Boli and Thomas count an average of 88 INGOs in existence between 1875 and 1913, ranging from 26 to 245; an average of 476 between 1919 and 1938, ranging from 290 to 646; and an average of 1778 from 1946 to 1973, ranging from 753 to 2968.

*Agenda:* The IGOs that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century were almost exclusively limited to single issues, routinizing inter-governmental cooperation on topics such as transportation, communications, sporting competitions, and science.<sup>51</sup> The INGOs of this period – generally divided into highly specialized professional associations and broad themes like public hygiene – covered a somewhat larger range of issues. According to Boli and Thomas’s coding of INGOs’ stated aims, there was significant INGO activity in 14 of 42 issue-areas (we define “significant” here as the founding of 10 or more INGOs,

Table 1. Summary of variables

	Before World War I	Interwar Period	After World War II
International political opportunity			
World polity density	Low IGOs: average 23, range 9–49 INGOs: average 88, range 26–245	Medium IGOs: average 74, range 52–83 INGOs: average 476, range 290–646	High IGOs: average 142, range 94–190 INGOs: average 1,778, range 753–2968
World polity agenda	Limited INGOs: 14 of 42 issue-areas	Growing INGOs: 22 of 42 issue-areas	Extensive INGOs: 38 of 42 issue-areas
Global culture			
Ideology of national statehood	Mixed Growing expectations of state interventions, pro-natalist concept of state strength	Mixed Growing expectations of state interventions, pro-natalist concept of state strength	Favorable Growing expectations of state interventions, anti-natalist concept of state strength
Ideology of personhood	Favorable Exclusivist/hierarchical	Favorable Exclusivist/hierarchical	Unfavorable Inclusionist/egalitarian
Eugenics movement outcomes			
Movement activism	Low to Medium 6 international conferences, 22 nations represented	High 37 international conferences, 56 nations represented	Low 0 international conferences, 0 nations represented
Policy adoption	Low 17 subnational, 0 national	High 30 subnational, 10 national	Low 2 subnational, 2 national

Sources: See text. Pre–World War I data refer to 1875–1913; Interwar data refer to 1919–1938; post–World War II data refer to 1946–1964 (IGOs), 1946–1973 (INGOs), 1946–2000 (eugenics conferences, policies).

though other cut-off points generate analogous patterns across our three time periods).

*Global culture before World War I*

*Ideology of national statehood:* The emergence of the world polity in the late nineteenth century coincided with a sea change in the ideology of national statehood. Novel interventions into the social realm came to be expected of the state. In addition to long-standing tasks such as defense, public order, and tax extraction, reformers now called upon the state to monitor and improve the populace. Among the innovations diffusing in this period were public school systems, public health measures, national censuses, and colonial “civilizing missions.”<sup>52</sup> Prior to World War I, however, these interventions were generally intermittent and limited in their scope and effects.

In keeping with an increasingly interventionist ideology of national statehood, numerous social reform movements, including eugenics, sought state action as the most effective means to achieve their goals. For example, the president of the 1st International Eugenics Congress, held in 1912 in London, articulated the movement’s goals in terms of state policy: “Ultimately it may be possible to induce Society to adopt a well-considered eugenic policy and to carry out reforms on eugenic lines.”<sup>53</sup> A sociologist at the meeting noted that the state has largely conquered the church and the family, which previously were autonomous institutions: “These suggestions indicate that in the modern state we have an organisation that would not hesitate to grapple with the problems of making a better race if only the path could be surely pointed out.”<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, non-state-oriented projects remained local and failed to mobilize on a national or international scale – for example, the marriage register compiled by the Eugenics Records Office in Cold Springs Harbor, New York, which listed individuals’ important inheritable characteristics to help people choose “fit” mates.<sup>55</sup>

While growing expectations of state intervention coincided with mainstream eugenic movement goals, a second aspect of the global ideology of national statehood hindered eugenic mobilization in the pre–World War I period. This was the pronatalist equation of state strength with large populations.<sup>56</sup> States of this period were expected to attempt to maximize subject populations, through colonial conquest and domestic fertility, for the purposes of military power, industrial expansion, and labor-intensive infrastructure projects. Pro-natalism militated against



the eugenics movement, which sought to limit the fertility of the less “fit.” Eugenics activists noted the contradiction at the time, calling pro-natalism “ridiculous” and attributing it to “militarists, who look upon men as food for [gun] powder,” and “capitalists, who desire an unlimited quantity of cheap labour.”<sup>57</sup>

Furthermore, eugenics activists of the pre–World War I period generally framed their movement in terms of benefits to future generations rather than existing ones. Eugenecists, like many other reformers of the period, justified their goals in terms of national “honor” and “duty.”<sup>58</sup> The president of the 1912 International Eugenics Congress argued, for example, that the nation that adopts eugenic policies “will be given a place of honour in the history of the world.”<sup>59</sup> This language of national sacrifice did not match a global culture emphasizing state strength.

*Ideology of personhood:* Global culture in the pre–World War I period granted full personhood only to the privileged males of European ancestry who all but monopolized the institutions and tribunes that constituted the world polity. This ideology manifested itself in the restriction of political rights—few countries enfranchised even half the adult population before World War I—and was visible also in racial hierarchizations, the “widespread belief that in the last analysis, all historical events are results of the interplay of innate racial qualities.”<sup>60</sup> This restrictive ideology of personhood paralleled eugenic discourse of “fitness,” which also ranked individuals on the basis of allegedly biological characteristics.

To summarize our independent variables, we find a low, though increasing, level of international political opportunity. Although the world-polity agenda would appear vague and unarticulated by the standards of later periods, the agenda was sufficient to attract the attention of the eugenics movement, as it started to mobilize at the turn of the century. Global culture involved contradictory implications: the growing ideology of state intervention into society and widespread racist ideologies were conducive to the eugenics movement; but the pro-natalist equation of state strength with large populations hindered eugenicists, as they noted at the time.

*Eugenics movement outcomes before World War I*

*Movement activity:* As World War I neared, the eugenics movement began to take note of and participate in the trend toward transnational

organization. As early as 1892, Francis Galton, the founder of the eugenics movement, sought out the world polity as an arena for eugenic mobilization. Speaking at the 7th International Conference on Hygiene and Demography (ICHD), an IGO whose modest aim was to “ameliorate the conditions of mankind everywhere,”<sup>61</sup> Galton appealed to his “fellow scientists” to bring issues of fertility and heredity into the sphere of “practical politics,” for “the future betterment of the human race.”<sup>62</sup> The conference’s earlier resolutions had resulted in institutions like public baths and air purity standards becoming widely adopted by participating countries. However, despite Galton’s appeal, eugenics remained a peripheral concern and was not included in the formal resolutions or policy initiatives proposed at the conclusion of the conference.

Largely excluded from the sparse IGOs of the period—eugenics discourse resurfaced at the 15th ICHD meeting in 1911, but remained peripheral—eugenics activists sought their own isomorphic voice in the expanding world of INGOs. Six international eugenics conferences took place in the final years before World War I, involving participants from 22 countries. Eugenics activists organized part of an INGO meeting in 1910, at the 3rd International Neo-Malthusian Conference, and eugenics fully permeated the 4th International Neo-Malthusian Conference in 1911 in Dresden, which was held in conjunction with the eugenics movement’s first international meeting of its own.

The second explicitly eugenic international conference met in 1912, at the behest of the Eugenics Education Society of Great Britain, founded in 1907 by Francis Galton. Like the German group that hosted the 1911 conference, the British organization immediately sought international affiliates. Members from the German Society for Race Hygiene organized a consultative committee for the conference, as did groups in Belgium, France, Italy, and the United States. In 1911, a permanent International Eugenics Committee was formed.

The linchpin of this activity was a shared vision of science as a vehicle for progress. Eugenicists suggested that positive eugenics—the increase of desirable human traits—should be implemented by state and non-governmental educational programs encouraging the “better stocks” to select similarly high-quality mates and reproduce prolifically. In keeping with the growing global culture of state intervention

into society, eugenicists argued that negative eugenics—the weeding out of diseased, criminal, impoverished, immoral or otherwise flawed human strains—ought to be carried out by state coercion, as “the lowest stratum of society has . . . neither intelligence nor self-control enough to justify the State to leave its matings in their own hands.”<sup>63</sup>

*Policy adoption:* In the pre–World War I period, eugenic policies were enacted only in the United States, which was both the hotbed of international eugenics activism and unusually decentralized politically, so that sub-national state units could adopt such policies in the absence of central state approval. Within the United States, eugenics organizations promoted isomorphic diffusion by drafting sample legislation, organizing lobbying campaigns, and carefully tracking state legislative activity.<sup>64</sup> Physicians in Alabama, for example, called in 1910 for a state policy of eugenic sterilization “in accord with such laws as now obtain in the states of Indiana, Connecticut, Utah, and California.”<sup>65</sup> Yet the international diffusion of these policies was limited at this time. Outside of the United States, policy achievements were so few that eugenics activists hailed a 1913 British law allowing the detention (not sterilization) of certain “mental defectives”—defined to include paupers, alcoholics, and welfare mothers bearing illegitimate children—as the “only piece of English social law extant in which the influence of heredity has been treated as a practical factor.”<sup>66</sup>

### **The eugenics movement in the Interwar period**

#### *International political opportunity in the Interwar period*

*Density:* The horror of World War I spurred states to establish a permanent world organization, the League of Nations, to prevent the repetition of international warfare. The League was explicitly fashioned as an instrument from which further international structures and agreements could be built, and it provided a focus for the activities of the proliferating IGOs and INGOs (see Table 1). According to the League’s covenant, all existing international organizations for the regulation of matters of international interest were to come, if they agreed, under the direction of the League. This was undermined to some extent by the refusal of the United States to join the League. However, the League succeeded in bringing together under a single roof many public and private bodies, as various pre–World War I organizations were

incorporated as League subdivisions. Other INGOs sponsored projects in conjunction with League offices, creating an interlocking world polity.

The eugenics movement immediately saw the growing world polity as a political opportunity. As a participant explained at the 2nd International Congress of Eugenics, held in New York in 1921, one result of the war “has been to develop what may be called the international sense among the peoples of the world,” contributing to the “evolution of international organization.” As INGOs receive official recognition and become IGOs, “the acts of the international body become more important and may even be followed by national enforcement through the laws of some countries or receive the imprimatur of an international convention to which all give their assent.” The speaker called on the eugenics movement to build an international organization “sufficiently strong to make its influence felt in the counsels of the League of Nations and the Pan-American Union. It would be desirable to establish direct relations with both bodies.” Eugenics could contribute to the peacekeeping goals of these IGOs by helping to breed “bloodthirstiness” and “pugnacity” out of the population.<sup>67</sup>

*Agenda:* The Interwar period launched the era of the permanent, multi-purpose, “global” IGO. The League of Nations’s primary duties, as described in its Covenant, were “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,” but the Covenant also stipulated League involvement in international law (Permanent Court of International Justice); “the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world” (Red Cross); “fair and humane conditions of labour” (International Labour Organisation); international trade, especially arms, illegal drugs, and “the traffic in women and children”; oversight of “the wellbeing and development of . . . [colonized] peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”; and “all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions.” This expanded agenda brought the world polity into numerous fields previously considered the exclusive province of nations, as acknowledged by the eugenics movement in its attempts to engage IGOs via the issues of birth control, intellectual cooperation, and migration.<sup>68</sup> Despite the relative brevity of the Interwar period, the INGO agenda expanded by more than half, from 14 to 22 out of 42 issue-areas coded by Boli and Thomas. The eugenics movement mobilized in several of these issue-areas, as described below.

*Global culture in the Interwar period*

*Ideology of national statehood:* The global ideology of national statehood continued to present a mixed picture for the eugenics movement in the Interwar period, as the two major themes identified in the pre-World War I period both strengthened after the war. On one hand, expectations for state intervention in society expanded and deepened in the Interwar period. As states began to fulfill the expectations of the pre-war era – compulsory education, infrastructure networks, and so on – new interventions were added to the list, including regulation of work, housing conditions, nutrition, scientific progress, and national “culture.” Continuing a trend that began before World War I, the expansion of these expectations was conducive to the addition of eugenic state interventions. As Henry Fairfield Osborn, the American host of the 1921 International Congress of Eugenics, noted in his “Address of Welcome”:

The right of the state to safeguard the character and integrity of the race or races on which its future depends is, to my mind, as incontestable as the right of the state to safeguard the health and morals of its people. As science has enlightened government in the prevention and spread of disease, it must also enlighten government in the prevention and spread and multiplication of worthless members of society, the spread of feeble-mindedness, of idiocy, and of all moral and intellectual as well as physical diseases.<sup>69</sup>

On the other hand, global discourse remained pro-natalist. Indeed, the vast casualties suffered in World War I made population growth appear even more important to the European nations that formed the imperial core and bellwether of global culture at the time.<sup>70</sup> Pro-natalist emphasis on population quantity rather than population quality continued to worry the eugenics movement.<sup>71</sup>

The eugenics movement altered its appeals to correspond to these global frames. As noted earlier, the pre-World War I eugenics movement pitched the rewards of eugenic interventions largely in terms of national “duty” and “honour,” which clashed with global notions of national self-interest; the Interwar eugenics movement, by contrast, spoke of eugenic interventions as generating national “strength.” The *Eugenics Review* began to run articles with titles like “What Nations and Classes Will Prevail?” and “Eugenics and Imperial Development.” At the 2nd International Congress of Eugenics in 1921, attended by many of the same individuals and organizations as the earlier meetings, speakers emphasized how eugenics “served the needs of each country of the world.” Countries affected by the war or by increasing

immigration could take measures to ensure or improve the “quality” of their race. The state, conferees claimed, should stave off “undesirables” who threatened to pollute and ruin the race, likening them to germs and diseases that states were used to combating. Speakers recommended setting up standards for physical, psychological and spiritual qualities and developing breeding programs to eliminate the “socially inadequate” who required state support. Conferees advised each country to set up an endowment to advance a eugenics plan for its citizens. What the eugenicists had previously portrayed as the *duty* of each state, for the good of society, they now depicted as the *right* of each state, to promote its own interest.<sup>72</sup>

*Ideology of personhood:* Exclusionary and hierarchical conceptions of personhood continued during the Interwar period, providing a conducive meta-frame for the eugenics movement. For example, in 1919 the founders of the League of Nations refused Japan’s request to expand a clause in the League’s Covenant on religious equality to include racial equality; the League’s mandate system was based on a more-or-less explicit hierarchicalization of races in terms of their potential for self-governance; and the period witnessed the peak of “scientific racism,” seeking to differentiate social groups and explain human behavior in terms of “scientific” understandings of racial characteristics. As the eugenics movement had always tried to position itself as a scientific enterprise – woe to nations that would neglect “the warning of science,” a leading eugenicist predicted<sup>73</sup> – the rise of scientific racism increased the conduciveness of global culture.<sup>74</sup>

To summarize our independent variables, increased opportunities were afforded by the growth of international organizations, especially the League of Nations, and their expanded agenda. Eugenicists were attuned to these opportunities and framed their movement accordingly. A hierarchical global culture of personhood continued to be conducive to the eugenics movement, and eugenicists recognized the national-interest exigencies of the global ideology of national statehood, switching from its earlier emphasis on self-sacrifice to an appeal to self-interest.

*Eugenics movement outcomes in the Interwar period*

*Movement activity:* The Interwar period was the heyday of eugenics activity. Figure 1 illustrates the proliferation of international conferences, 36 of them in the two decades after World War I, with participants

from 56 countries and official representatives from at least 30 national governments. The eugenics movement monitored transnational developments closely. The founder of the Chinese Eugenics Institute, for example, published an introduction to the eugenics movement worldwide, to which he appended a list of important eugenic organizations and their addresses.<sup>75</sup>

When World War I prevented the convening of the planned 2nd International Eugenics Conference, the United States held a national meeting in its stead. This meeting inaugurated the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations and the Pan-American Office of Eugenics, which formed an inter-linked array of INGOs and hosted several further international conferences during the Interwar period. In addition to the proliferation of explicitly eugenic organizations – the Latin Federation of Eugenics Societies also emerged in 1935 – eugenics activists became regular and influential participants in a variety of other scientific and social reform movements, such as birth control, demography, anthropology, and genetics.

Opponents of eugenics also mobilized on a transnational scale, but with limited effect.<sup>76</sup> While the Roman Catholic Church appealed to conscience,<sup>77</sup> the secular anti-eugenics movement took a form similar to the eugenics movement: it too formed or tried to form INGOs, solicited IGOs, and grounded its appeals in expert and scientific legitimacy. It almost induced the League of Nation's International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) to conduct an inquiry into international problems of racism, but the organization's executive committee eventually rejected the request so as not to offend Nazi Germany.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, a French-based organization, the Committee for the Initiative of International Action Against Racist Doctrines, unsuccessfully petitioned the League of Nations to help plan a Universal Race Congress at the 1939 Chicago World Fair.<sup>79</sup> These efforts paled beside eugenic mobilization of the period.

*Policy adoption:* By 1937, the eugenics movement claimed that it had achieved sterilization policies in 31 of the 48 United States.<sup>80</sup> Using stricter criteria, our dataset counts 29 states with such policies by the mid-1930s. U.S. sterilization laws became the model for similar eugenics policies in Europe.<sup>81</sup> Voluntary sterilization laws were adopted by the Swiss canton of Vaud in 1928 and Denmark in 1929, followed by Nazi Germany's involuntary measures of 1933.<sup>82</sup> Nazi eugenics was not seen at the time as peculiarly German. The Germans themselves

credited U.S. and other international models, and their 1933 policy of involuntary sterilization was essentially a translation of the sample legislation that American eugenicists had drafted and marketed to U.S. state legislatures.<sup>83</sup> At the 2nd International Congress for Studies on Population, held in 1935 in Berlin with representatives from 36 countries, an American described Germany eugenics laws as both an outgrowth of earlier British and American eugenics activism and a moral imperative:

It is from a synthesis of the work of [British and U.S. eugenicists] that the leader of the German nations, Adolf Hitler, ably supported by the Minister of Interior, Dr. Frick, and guided by the Nation's anthropologists, its eugenicists, and its social philosophers, has been able to construct a comprehensive racial policy of population development and improvement that promises to be epochal in racial history. It sets the pattern which other nations and other racial groups must follow, if they do not wish to fall behind in their racial quality, in their racial accomplishment, and in their prospects of survival.<sup>84</sup>

The Scandinavian countries followed suit in the mid-1930s. Other countries considered eugenic sterilization legislation, citing existing policies as models and justification. In the state of Veracruz, Mexico, for example, legislation on involuntary sterilization was adopted in 1932 because it was argued, as paraphrased by Nancy Leys Stepan, that since “eugenic sterilization was viewed favorably in the ‘vanguard’ countries – the United States, Sweden, Norway and elsewhere – Mexico should take a positive stand toward it also.”<sup>85</sup> Such discussions also took place in Australia, Austria, Bermuda, China, England, France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and elsewhere.<sup>86</sup> Some of these countries appeared likely to adopt eugenic policies, had World War II not intervened.

### **The eugenics movement after World War II**

#### *International political opportunity after World War II*

*Density:* World War II dramatically altered the shape of the world polity. The number of IGOs and INGOs doubled or tripled (see Table 1). In qualitative terms, the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations signified the increased importance of the world polity vis-à-vis national states. Whereas the League had been limited in its membership and its resources, the United Nations aspired to universal membership and built an elaborate bureaucratic machine. The United Nations was far from being a world government, and had few coercive powers of enforcement, but it offered a public forum for the expression



of opinions and proposals that individual national states may outlaw. Thus, the growth of the world polity after World War II represented a significant international political opportunity. We might therefore expect the eugenics movement to grow apace after World War II, as many other movements did. Eugenics activists may have expected this too; a British Eugenics Society member at a population conference in 1947 praised efforts “to work closely with U.N.O. [the United Nations Organization] and U.N.E.S.C.O.”<sup>87</sup> The fact that the opposite occurred, that the eugenics movement was forced underground, suggests that world polity density was not the only factor at work.

*Agenda:* In place of the League of Nations, the United Nations devoted itself to potentially unlimited goals, including “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,” as stated in the preamble to the United Nations Charter. These goals were advanced by a wide array of subsidiary IGOs that served as rallying points for transnational social movements, including the Commission on Population and Development, Commission on the Status of Women, High Commissioner for Refugees, Food and Agriculture Organization, and United Nations Environment Programme. In the non-governmental sector, the proliferation of INGOs has left few public issues without representation in the world polity: 38 of 42 issue-areas generated significant INGO representation in the three decades after World War II, according to the Boli and Thomas dataset.

#### *Global culture after World War II*

*Ideology of national statehood:* The ideology of national statehood shifted in a direction favorable to the eugenics movement after World War II. Expectations of state intervention in society continued to expand, with gender equity and traffic safety, to name two examples, eventually entering the list of social improvements that the state was supposed to secure. Indeed, eugenicists took heart that public life had entered into so many previously private realms, including reproduction: “to-day’s ‘conditions of law and sentiment’ [factors limiting eugenic reform, according to Francis Galton in the early twentieth century] admit of our talking without fear of indecency about vital features of a nation’s reproductive life.”<sup>88</sup> At the same time, with the exception of certain right-wing movements, conceptions of state strength became largely decoupled from pronatalist insistence on population growth.<sup>89</sup> The global discourse about unchecked population growth, particularly

in parts of the world considered “underdeveloped,” opened a meta-frame conducive to the eugenics movement, in that global culture encouraged states to intervene in the realm of reproduction and to focus on boosting population quality rather than quantity. However, global culture defined “quality” more in terms of individual improvement (through education, health, and so on) than inherited characteristics (with the exception of pre-natal screening for certain birth defects). As a result, the eugenics movement was never able to take advantage of the conducive ideology of national statehood in the post-World War II period.

*Ideology of personhood:* From its beginnings, the post-World War II global culture defined itself in absolute opposition to the exclusivist and hierarchical ideology of personhood that had characterized global culture in the earlier periods.<sup>90</sup> In 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established a Commission on Human Rights, which sought to prevent discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language, or religion. In 1948, the United Nations proclaimed the sanctity and equality of rights in its Declaration of Human Rights, one of the most widely ratified documents in the world. In 1950, UNESCO issued a statement on race specifically intended to disavow earlier racist attitudes, completing “a project that the IIC had intended, but had been unable, to carry out.”<sup>91</sup> The United Nations passed a Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1965, proclaimed the years 1973–1982 the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and extended this campaign for two further decades.<sup>92</sup> In the post-World War II period, in summary, “r-ce has replaced s-x as the great dirty word.”<sup>93</sup> While these UN statements do not discuss eugenics per se, they represent a firm commitment to what John Meyer has called the “self bathed in ultimate universalism and equality.”<sup>94</sup>

The egalitarian ideology of personhood raised a massive barrier to the eugenics movement. The eugenics movement outside of Germany recognized this even before World War II had ended, as Nazi eugenics policies began to be vilified.<sup>95</sup> After the war, eugenicists noted bitterly that UNESCO statements on race ignored “the whole science of eugenics” and that these statements demanded allegiance to certain scientific theories as “the only correct ones,” much as the Nazis had done.<sup>96</sup> The eugenicists’ complaints were not included in later UNESCO compilations on the topic of race.<sup>97</sup> In view of this unfavorable atmosphere, the eugenics movement recognized that “the time was not right for

aggressive eugenic propaganda,” as the minutes of a U.S. eugenic society meeting stated in 1947.<sup>98</sup>

To summarize, our independent variables, international political opportunity increased tremendously, with the United Nations and other international organizations providing a dense institutional network and a seemingly limitless agenda for movements to appeal to. The global ideology of national statehood also shifted in a direction favorable to eugenics, with state intervention in reproductive matters increasingly legitimate and pro-natalist ideology on the decline. However, the global ideology of personhood shifted dramatically in a direction adverse to eugenics, associating it with the Nazi holocaust. Eugenicists found themselves frozen out as the global culture of racial hierarchy gave way to a discourse of equality and rights.

*Eugenics movement outcomes after World War II*

*Movement activity:* After World War II, the international eugenics movement collapsed and went underground. Not one of the international eugenics organizations hosted another meeting: there was no 4th International Eugenics Conference, no 12th meeting of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations, and so on. Vestiges of the eugenics movement remained, though in general abjuring the formerly prominent goal of state coercion to achieve eugenic policies, including: the British and American Eugenic Societies, the Research and Study Group for European Civilization (GRECE) in France, the Society for Biological Anthropology, Eugenics, and Behavioral Science in Germany, and linking the national groups, the International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics.<sup>99</sup> These openly eugenicist organizations were small, defensive, ineffectual, and marginal to international society, much as the anti-eugenics movement of the Interwar period had been.

As the eugenics movement attempted to adapt to global culture, its appeals retreated from state intervention to further scientific study. The International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics, founded in 1959, framed its goals in terms of “restoring freedom of inquiry to those areas (particularly the study of race and race relations) where extraneous political and philosophical predispositions have frequently terminated discussions to the general detriment of the social and biological sciences.”<sup>100</sup> The eugenics movement of the post-World War II period felt itself constantly under suspicion of sharing the

state-interventionist inclinations of the Interwar eugenics movement, which it denied.<sup>101</sup>

Unlike the eugenics movement of previous periods, which sought publicity and openly debated strategies of “propaganda,” much of the post–World War II movement adopted a low profile that it called “crypto-eugenics”.<sup>102</sup> “to reach the goal of eugenics without saying frequently what one really seeks and without using the word eugenics,” as one movement leader explained.<sup>103</sup> The *Annals of Eugenics* was renamed *Annals of Human Genetics* in 1953, and *The Eugenics Review* and *The Eugenic News/Eugenic Quarterly* became *The Journal of Biosocial Science* and *Social Biology* in 1969. With a few exceptions, eugenics became “the science that dared not speak its name.”<sup>104</sup>

In keeping with the subterranean strategy, some eugenicists continued their work under the cover of non-eugenic disciplines and organizations, such as the birth-control and population-control movements. For example, the first administrator of the Population Council, a former president of the American Eugenics Society, recalled in 1974 that the post-war birth-control and abortion-rights movements were great eugenic causes, but “[i]f they had been advanced for eugenic reasons it would have retarded or stopped their acceptance.”<sup>105</sup> Eugenic ideals such as racism, paternalism, scientific authority, and genetic manipulation did not disappear from the world, and were arguably institutionalized in certain wings of the reproductive sciences.<sup>106</sup>

Yet eugenics as a distinct transnational movement was in collapse. Even as some of its themes were taken up by other movements, its identity and distinctive goals – particularly coercive sterilization – no longer mobilized the professional organizations that had supported eugenics in the Interwar period. The transnational birth-control movement, for example, disavowed state coercion in 1946, proclaiming that parents have the right to decide on the number of children a family should have.<sup>107</sup> The field of genetics reorganized itself with a self-conscious emphasis on individual and voluntary counseling and therapy. Geneticists censured “the misuse of genetic-hygienic measures,” lamented eugenics’ “long shadow” over genetics, and denied recurrent accusations that they harbored coercive eugenic intentions.<sup>108</sup> The U.S. Human Genome Project, for example, developed an Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) project largely to address such concerns.<sup>109</sup> Eugenics has not disappeared from these organizations as swiftly and completely as they proclaimed, but it no longer enjoyed open support.

*Policy adoption:* Only two countries have adopted openly eugenic and explicitly involuntary sterilization policies since World War II: Japan in 1948 and Finland in 1950, both passed amid international objections.<sup>110</sup> Four Chinese provinces adopted eugenic sterilization laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s, though these were overturned by a national law in 1995 requiring a fig leaf of voluntariness.<sup>111</sup> Singapore adopted a policy of partially voluntary eugenic sterilization in 1984, using financial incentives to induce poor people to undergo sterilization.<sup>112</sup> Two U.S. states, West Virginia (1992) and Delaware (1995), passed laws allowing judges to order involuntary sterilization of people deemed likely to have children with genetic defects. In addition, a number of countries and U.S. states left their eugenic sterilization policies on the books for decades, with intermittent implementation – 27 states in the 1960s, 16 in the 1970s, and 4 in 2000 (Delaware, Mississippi, North Carolina, West Virginia).<sup>113</sup>

Significantly, almost all of these eugenic policies and practices have met widespread opprobrium. When long-neglected policies have come to light in Europe and North America, they have generated scandal, outrage, and lawsuits.<sup>114</sup> China's flirtation with a national sterilization law in the 1990s faced loud foreign criticism, leading the government to remove "eugenics" from the name of the proposal and include at least nominal consent.<sup>115</sup>

### **Conclusion**

We summarize the findings of this study in Table 1. In short, the transnational eugenics movement was most active and successful in the Interwar period, when international political opportunities and global culture were both maximally conducive. Eugenic mobilization and success were low in the pre-World War I period, when international political opportunity was limited; and very low in the post-World War II period, when the global ideology of personhood turned hostile to the eugenic movement, associating it with the genocidal policies of the Nazi regime. By examining an instance in which the patterns of international opportunity and global culture do not run hand-in-hand in all periods, we are able to separate the two concepts empirically and show the separate influence of each. This brief outline suggests a correlation between eugenics movement outcomes and global political considerations.

Beyond this rough correlation, we present evidence of eugenics movement attentiveness and responsiveness to global opportunity and

culture. Eugenicists were well aware of the growth of the world polity, and its implications for their movement: for example, birth-control advocate Margaret Sanger noted with approval the emergence of “an international superorganization” after World War I, and another eugenicist urged his colleagues “to work closely with” the new IGOs created after World War II. The movement made repeated appeals to the world polity: individually, as in Francis Galton’s appeal to the ICHD before World War I; institutionally, as eugenics organizations sought “to establish direct relations” with IGOs and fellow INGOs in the Interwar period; and defensively, as eugenicists decried their exclusion from IGO activities after World War II. As it gained more experience in transnational mobilization, the eugenics movement adapted its approach to fit global culture. In the Interwar period, leading eugenicists recognized the global ideology of statehood and shifted their discourse to emphasize state strength rather than “duty” to future generations, arguing that eugenic interventions were “as incontestable as the right of the state to safeguard the health and morals of its people.” After World War II, the movement recognized the expansion of the ideology of statehood, noting that “to-day’s ‘conditions of law and sentiment’” allowed greater public discussion of matters of reproduction. Yet the movement also recognized that global culture now insisted on an egalitarian ideology of personhood as “the only correct” approach to human groupings, and that therefore “the time was not right for aggressive eugenic propaganda.” Those who stuck with the eugenic identity shifted their discourse to emphasize “freedom of inquiry” rather than coercive state intervention, while others submerged the identity in “crypto-eugenics” mobilization. In sum, the eugenics movement was highly attuned to international political opportunity and global culture.

We believe this case offers four contributions to the study of social movements.

*A focus on transnational consistency:* This study of international eugenic activity demonstrates the importance of examining cross-national consistency, in addition to the usual focus of social movement research on national case studies and differences among them. The eugenics movement expressed itself in similar terms, with similar goals, through similar organizational forms, in countries with varying cultural and political contexts. Moreover, this consistency increased over time: the German variant of eugenics, focusing on the concept of “race hygiene,” grew increasingly closer to the U.S. variant, whose sterilization laws were the model for German and other European eugenic legislation

in the 1930s. This consistency within the transnational movement was not absolute – Nazi Germany took eugenic policies farther than was seriously debated in the U.S. – but the extent of shared ideas is striking.

*The relevance of international political opportunity:* Drawing on the world polity and international regimes literatures, we follow Jackie Smith and other scholars in proposing that the burgeoning thicket of IGOs and INGOs constitutes “international political opportunity” – that it adds to or substitutes for access to the political system at the national level. In the case of eugenics, the development of the world polity in the Interwar period – both in terms of the number of institutions and their expanding agenda – stimulated increased international mobilization on the part of movement activists. They recognized the importance of this international arena, appealed to it, and reshaped their movement to fit in, creating the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations in the early 1920s as an isomorphic claimant to participation in the world polity.

*The importance of global cultural frames:* Drawing on the literature on global culture, we argue that the emerging set of global norms, global in aspirations if not origins, has shaped the distribution of claims that movements can successfully address. We look at two central aspects of global culture – the ideologies of nationstatehood and personhood – that represent important discursive scripts during the twentieth century. The expanding vision of statehood proved conducive to the eugenics movement, as to other social reform movements favoring new forms of state intervention into society. The ideology of personhood, however, shifted after World War II in a direction inimical to the eugenics movement, whose hierarchical and exclusivist conception of personhood was abandoned for an egalitarian and universalist version. This new ideology of personhood posed an insurmountable barrier to the eugenics movement, which attempted to dissociate itself from the ideologies of Nazism and racism, and to recast itself in terms more in keeping with the new global culture.

*The interplay of political opportunity and cultural frames:* If opportunity were the sole determinant of movement success, we would expect the eugenics movement to have thrived after World War II, as did so many other scientific and social reform movements, because of the great welter of new international organizations and the tremendous expansion of the international agenda. The world polity developed unprecedented forums for airing grievances and introducing scientific

and humanitarian plans for social betterment. This densely interconnected world society has increased both the homogeneity and diffusion of practices in many arenas of institutional life. That eugenics did not thrive in this period, we argue, demonstrates the importance of global culture. Yet if global culture were the sole determinant, we would also expect nearly as much international eugenics activity before World War I as after, since the frames of state intervention and unequal personhood were generally similar in both periods. That eugenics generated more international mobilization after World War I than in the decades before, we argue, demonstrates the importance of international political opportunity: as the density of the international arena thickened, it supported a higher level of transnational social movement activity. This finding – that both opportunity and culture are important – may well apply at the national and sub-national levels as well. Social movement theory generally examines cases where the two factors go hand in hand, so that one cannot easily establish the relative importance of each. “Deviant” cases such as the eugenics movement allow us to distinguish between the political and cultural dimensions.

### Acknowledgments

We thank John Boli, John W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, Richard Soloway, Larry Stern, Amy Ong Tsui, the reviewers and Editors of *Theory and Society*, and numerous other colleagues for their helpful comments.

### Notes

1. Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in Charles Bright and Susan Harding, editors, *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 297–317.
2. Prominent volumes on this burgeoning subject include: Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai, editors, *Global Social Movements* (London: Athlone Press, 2000); Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht, editors, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Houndmills, England: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Globalization and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, and Sasha Roseneil, editors, *Globalization and Social Movements* (London: Palgrave, 2001); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, editors, *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, editors, *Transnational Social Movements and World Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston, editors, *Globalization and Resistance:*



- Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
3. Marco Giugni, "The Other Side of the Coin: Explaining Crossnational Similarities between Social Movements," *Mobilization* 3 (1998): 89; Doug McAdam, "'Initiator' and 'Spin-Off' Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles," in Mark Traugott, editor, *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 213; Francisco O. Ramirez, "Comparative Social Movements," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, editors, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), 290–294.
  4. Gay W. Seidman, "Adjusting the Lens: What Do Globalizations, Transnationalism, and the Anti-apartheid Movement Mean for Social Movement Theory?" in Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, editors, *Globalization and Social Movements*, 345.
  5. Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak, "Globalization and Transnational Diffusion Between Social Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of the Gandhian Repertoire and the 'Coming Out' Routine," *Theory and Society* 31 (2002): 697–740; Mark N. Katz, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 181–206; Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, "The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (1993): 56–74; McAdam, "'Initiator' and 'Spin-Off' Movements"; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena," in della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht, editors, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, 23–39; David Strang and Sarah Soule, "Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 265–290.
  6. Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Transformation of the National Space in a Globalizing World," in Pedro Ibarra, editor, *Social Movements and Democracy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 195–209; Gregory M. Maney, "International Sources of Domestic Protest: Creating Theories and Assessing Evidence," *Mobilization* 6 (2001): 83–98; Doug McAdam, "On the International Origins of Domestic Political Opportunities," in Anne N. Costain and Andrew S. MacFarland, editors, *Social Movements and American Political Institutions* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 251–267.
  7. Giugni, "The Other Side of the Coin," 103.
  8. Sidney Tarrow, "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 15.
  9. Our discussion focuses on the national and global levels, but similar arguments may apply to sub-national and regional levels.
  10. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639.
  11. For example, Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy," *International Organization* 47 (1993): 565–597; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 1–35; Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes"; Janice Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 23–47.
  12. Mike Featherstone, editor, *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990); Ulf Hannerz, "Notes on the Global Ecumene," *Public Culture* 1 (1989): 66–75; Ulf Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 217–267; Roland Robertson, *Globalization* (London: Sage, 1992).
  13. Deborah A. Barrett, "Reproducing Persons as a Global Concern: The Making of an Institution," Ph.D. Dissertation (Department of Sociology, Stanford University, 1995); Nitza Berkovitch, *From Motherhood to Citizenship: Women's Rights and International*

- Organizations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," *American Sociological Review* 62 (1997): 171–190; John Boli and George M. Thomas, editors, *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Social Movements and Networks," in Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, editors, *Globalization and Social Movements*, 35–53, and in Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 39–78; Marc Ventresca, "When States Count: Institutional and Political Dynamics in Modern Census Establishment, 1800–1993," Ph.D. Dissertation (Department of Sociology, Stanford University, 1995).
14. For a variety of perspectives, see Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements* (London: Verso, 1989); Philip G. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action," *International Organization* 49 (1995): 595–625; Barry K. Gills, editor, *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic Political Conflict," *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 161–185; Peter Waterman, *Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalisms* (London: Mansell, 1998).
  15. Another bridge might build on the cross-national statistical finding that economic development is positively correlated with violent rebellion, controlling for repression and other factors. See Terry Boswell and William J. Dixon, "Marx's Theory of Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis of Class Exploitation, Economic Development, and Violent Revolt," *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993): 681–702.
  16. Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, "Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993): 640–667.
  17. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 188–189; Tarrow, "Transnational Politics," 11.
  18. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43, 45–47, *et passim*; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*. On the importance of movement perceptions, as opposed to "objective" opportunity structures, see Clifford Bob, "Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest among Nigeria's Ogoni Minority," *Social Problems* 49 (2002): 395–415; Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 153–170.
  19. Charles Brockett, "The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (1991): 253–274; Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Hein-Anton van der Heijden, Ruud Koopmans and Marco G. Giugni, "The West European Environmental Movement," in Matthias Finger, editor, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, supp. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 1–40; Christian Joppke, *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison of Germany and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller, editors, *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe: Consciousness, Political Opportunity, and Public Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986): 57–85; Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements," in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, editors, *The Politics of Social Protest* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 167–198; Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, "New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (1992): 219–244; Dieter Rucht, "The Impact of National Context on Social

- Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 185–204; Kurt Schock, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship Between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (1996): 98–133; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Tsutomu Watanabe, "Cross-National Analysis of Social Movements: Effectiveness of the Concept of Political Opportunity Structure," *Sociological Theory and Methods* 15 (2000): 135–148.
20. Giugni, "The Other Side of the Coin"; Florence Passy, "Supranational Political Opportunities as a Channel of Globalization of Political Conflicts: The Case of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," in della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, editors, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, 148–169; Jackie Smith, "Transnational Political Processes and the Human Rights Movement," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 18 (1995): 185–219.
  21. On international regimes, see Stephen D. Krasner, editor, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organizations* 44 (1990): 479–526. On world society, see John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen, editor, *Studies of the Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 109–137; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1997): 144–81; Boli and Thomas, *Constructing World Culture*.
  22. Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 30–58.
  23. Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27. It should be noted that these four dimensions have not been subjected to extensive empirical testing.
  24. Ronnie D. Lipschultz, "Restructuring World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21 (1992): 389–420; Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civil Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Craig Warkentin, *Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). For cautionary perspectives, see John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gordon Laxer and Sandra Halperin, editors, *Global Civil Society and its Limits* (Houndmills, England: Palgrave, 2003).
  25. Giugni, "The Other Side of the Coin," 93, 96; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; John W. Meyer, David John Frank, Ann Hironaka, Evan Schofer and Nancy Brandon Tuma, "The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870–1990," *International Organization* 51 (1997): 631–632; Ron Pagnucco and David Atwood, "Global Strategies for Peace and Justice," *Peace Review* 6 (1994): 412; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Structures of Governance and Transnational Relations: What Have We Learned?" in Thomas Risse-Kappen, editor, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 297–300; Smith, "Transnational Political Processes and the Human Rights Movement"; Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco, and Winnie Romeril, "Transnational Social Movement Organisations in the Global Political Arena," *Voluntas* 5 (1994): 121–154; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 181. On the European Union as an emerging site of political opportunity, see Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow, editors, *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, "Social Movements and Changing Structures of Political Opportunity in the European Community," *West European Politics* 19 (1996): 249–278.

26. On the theme of cost-benefit calculations, see Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action."
27. Mayer N. Zald, "Ideologically Structured Action: An Enlarged Agenda for Social Movement Research," *Mobilization* 5 (2000): 10.
28. Beth Schaefer Caniglia, "Elite Alliances and Transnational Environmental Movement Organizations," in Smith and Johnston, editors, *Globalization and Resistance*, 153–172; Jackie Smith, "Global Civil Society? Transnational Social Movement Organizations and Social Capital," *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (1998): 93–107.
29. Michael Wallace and J. David Singer, "Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964," *International Organization* 24 (1970): 239–287.
30. Boli and Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity."
31. International eugenics organizations are included in the INGO count, but their numbers are so low that they do not meaningfully conflate the independent and dependent variables. We thank John Boli and George Thomas for sharing their INGO dataset.
32. Hank Johnston, "A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schema," in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 219. Johnston prefers "micro-discourse analysis" involving close reading of individual texts, but at the level of global culture we have difficulty identifying a single text that would warrant such attention. We use texts, rather, as exemplary illustrations of the themes that other researchers have identified as crucial in each historical period under study.
33. Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," *Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 415–418.
34. John W. Meyer, "Rationalized Environment," in W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, et al., editors, *Institutional Environments and Organizations* (London: Sage, 1994), 38–39; Robertson, *Globalization*, 25, 58.
35. John Boli, "Human Rights or State Expansion: Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970," in Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli, editors, *Institutional Structure*, 133–149; Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, editors, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 117–126; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979); Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State"; John W. Meyer, "Rationalized Environment"; George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer, "The Expansion of the State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 10 (1984): 461–482; Robertson, *Globalization*.
36. Hugh Tinker, *Race, Conflict, and the International Order* (London: Macmillan, 1977); Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); R. J. Vincent, "Racial Equality," in Bull and Watson, editors, *The Expansion of International Society*, 239–54; Boli, "Human Rights or State Expansion"; Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).
37. Among dozens of works, see especially Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Richard A. Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Stefan Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten: Aufstieg und Niedergang der internationalen Bewegung für Eugenik und Rassenhygiene im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag, 1997).
38. The quotation marks indicate the authors' opinion that the eugenic concept of "fitness" is empirically meaningless and morally reprehensible. See also Elof Axel Carlson, *The Unfit*:

- A History of a Bad Idea* (Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2001).
39. Francis Galton, *Inquiries into the Human Faculty* (London: Macmillan, 1883), 24–25.
  40. John D. McCarthy and Mark Wolfson, “Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the Cooptation of Civic and State Infrastructures,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, editors, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
  41. Indeed, some scholars might claim that eugenics activism is not a social movement at all, since it does not involve mass mobilization, street demonstrations, or other “contentious” activities; we believe that such a definition is overly restrictive in that it rules out not only “consensus movements” but also hearts-and-minds campaigns and various confrontation-avoiding repertoires of collective action. We note that an influential recent contribution in social movement theory defines “contention” in terms of public claim-making, not in terms of conflict or mass mobilization. See McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 7.
  42. On professionals and social movements, see John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization,” in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, editors, *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987), 337–391; Jack L. Walker, Jr., *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
  43. Mark B. Adams, “Toward a Comparative History of Eugenics,” in Mark B. Adams, editor, *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 217–231.
  44. Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten*; Paul Weindling, “International Eugenics,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 24 (1999): 179–197. Other comparative works include Adams, “Toward a Comparative History of Eugenics”; Frank Dikötter, “Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics,” *American Historical Review* 103 (1998): 467–478; Robert Nye, “The Rise and Fall of the Eugenics Empire,” *Historical Journal* 36 (1993): 687–700; Philip J. Pauly, “The Eugenics Industry: Growth or Restructuring?” *Journal of the History of Biology* 26 (1993): 131–145; Peter Weingart, “Eugenics in Comparative Perspective,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 24 (1999): 163–177.
  45. League of Nations, *Handbook of International Organisations* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1926); United States Department of State, *List of Official International Conferences and Meetings* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947–1953); Winifred Gregory, editor, *International Congresses and Conferences, 1840–1937* (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1938); Union of International Associations, *Annuaire des organisations internationales* (Brussels: Union des associations internationales, 1948–1997); Union of International Associations, *Les congrès internationaux de 1681 à 1899, liste complète* (Brussels: Union des associations internationales, 1960); Michael S. Yesley, *ELSI Bibliography: Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project*, 2nd edition (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, 1993), 125–139; Michael S. Yesley and Pilar N. Ossorio, *ELSI Bibliography: 1994 Supplement* (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, 1994), 25–35.
  46. For instance, Harry H. Laughlin, *Eugenic Sterilization* (New Haven, CT: American Eugenics Society, 1926); J. H. Landman, *Human Sterilization: The History of the Sexual Sterilization Movement* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932); Marie E. Kopp, “Eugenic Sterilization Laws in Europe,” *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology* 34 (1937): 499–504; Hilda von Hellmer Wullen, “Eugenics in Other Lands: A Survey of Recent Developments,” *The Journal of Heredity* 28 (1937): 269–275.
  47. Margaret Sanger, editor, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference* (Geneva, August 29th to September 3rd, 1927) (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927), 359.
  48. Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” 123.
  49. Robertson, *Globalization*, 59.

50. F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815–1914* (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1963).
51. Wallace and Singer, “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964,” *International Organization* 24, 250–251.
52. John Boli, Francisco Ramirez and John W. Meyer, “Explaining the Origins and Expansion of Mass Education,” *Comparative Education Review* 29 (1985): 145–170; Dorothy Porter, editor, *The History of Public Health and the Modern State* (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1994); Ventresca, “When States Count”; Harrison M. Wright, *The “New Imperialism”: Analysis of Late Nineteenth-Century Expansion* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961).
53. International Eugenics Congress, *Problems in Eugenics*, Papers Communicated to the First International Eugenics Congress, held at the University of London, 24–30 July 1912, (London: Kingsway House, 1913), vol. 1.
54. International Eugenics Congress, *Problems in Eugenics*, vol. 2, 481.
55. Garland E. Allen, “The Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, 1910–1940,” *Osiris* 2 (1986): 225–264.
56. Johannes Overbeek, *History of Population Theories* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974); Barrett, “Reproducing Persons as a Global Concern.”
57. W. R. Inge, “Depopulation,” *Eugenics Review* 5 (1913): 261.
58. G. R. Searle, *Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900–1914* (Leiden: Noordhoff International Publishers, 1976), 38–39.
59. International Eugenics Congress, *Problems in Eugenics*, vol. 1, 6.
60. Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy” [1904], in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, editors, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 69.
61. C.E. Shelly, editor, *Transactions of the Seventh International Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, London, 10–17 August 1891, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1892), 11.
62. Shelly, *Transactions of the Seventh International Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, 7.
63. Charles B. Davenport, “The Eugenics Programme and Progress in Its Achievement” [1912], in Morton Aldrich, editor, *Eugenics: Twelve University Lectures* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1914), 10.
64. Harry H. Laughlin, *Report of the Committee to Study and to Report on the Best Practical Means of Cutting off the Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Population. II. The Legal, Legislative, and Administrative Aspects of Sterilization* (Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Eugenics Record Office Bulletin No. 10B, 1914).
65. Edward J. Larson and Leonard J. Nelson III, “Involuntary Sexual Sterilization of Incompetents in Alabama: Past, Present, and Future,” *Alabama Law Review* 43 (1992): 409.
66. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 99.
67. International Congress of Eugenics, *Eugenics, Genetics, and the Family*, and *Eugenics in Race and State*, Scientific Papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics, New York, 22–28 September 1921 (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1923), vol. 2, 427–429.
68. Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970* (New York: McGraw–Hill Book Company, 1973), 14–15 (on birth control); Institut International d’Anthropologie, *Rapport* (3rd Meeting, Amsterdam, 1927) (Paris: Librairie E. Nourry, 1928) (on intellectual cooperation); International Labour Office, *Acta Final*, 2nd International Conference on Emigration and Immigration, Havana, Cuba (Havana: Molina, 1928), 13 (on migration); *Eugenical News* 13 (1928): 73–75 (on migration).
69. International Congress of Eugenics, *Eugenics, Genetics, and the Family*, vol. 1, 3.
70. Overbeek, *History of Population Theories*, 140–154.
71. G. v. Hoffmann, “Drohende Verflachung und Einseitigkeit rassenhygienischer Bestrebungen in Deutschland,” *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie* 12 (1917): 344.
72. International Congress of Eugenics, *Eugenics in Race and State*.

73. *Report of the Ninth Conference of the International Federation of Eugenic Organisations*, Farnham, Dorset, 11–15 September 1930 (London: International Federation of Eugenic Organisations, 1930), 2.
74. Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten*, 64–94. However, some eugenicists distanced themselves from the movement's themes of "race and class prejudice" (Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 164), especially as they came to associate the movement with Nazism in the 1930s. See Elazar Barkan, *Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 202–209.
75. Frank Dikötter, "Eugenics in Republican China," *Republican China* 15 (1989): 5.
76. Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800–1960* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), 159; Elazar Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists Against Nazi Racism, 1933–1939," in George W. Stocking, Jr., editor, *Bones, Bodies, Behavior: Essays on Biological Anthropology* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 180–205.
77. Pius XI, *On Christian Marriage* (Washington: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1931), 24.
78. A. Metraux, "UNESCO and the Racial Problem," *International Social Science Bulletin* 2 (1950): 386.
79. Barkan, *Retreat of Scientific Racism*, 328.
80. *Eugenical News* 22 (1937): 94.
81. Gunnar Broberg and Matthias Tydén, "Eugenics and Sweden," and Nils Roll-Hansen, "Norwegian Eugenics: Sterilization as Social Reform," in Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, editors, *Eugenics and the Welfare State* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 135, 169–170; Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Marvin D. Miller, *Terminating the "Socially Inadequate": The American Eugenicists and the German Race Hygienists* (Commack, NY: Malamud-Rose, 1996).
82. Kopp, "Eugenic Sterilization Laws in Europe."
83. *Eugenical News* 18 (1933): 89; Kühl, *The Nazi Connection*, 37–44; Harry H. Laughlin, "Model Eugenic Sterilization Law" [1922], in Carl J. Bajema editor, *Eugenics Then and Now* (Stroudsburg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross, 1976), 138–145.
84. Hans Harmsen and Franz Lohse, editors, *Bevölkerungsfragen: Bericht des Internationalen Kongresses für Bevölkerungswissenschaft*, Berlin, 26 August–1 September 1935 (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1936), 602.
85. Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*, 131. Stepan also notes variation within the transnational movement, as certain Latin American eugenicists were more sympathetic than their North Atlantic colleagues toward Lamarckian views, in part because the inheritance of acquired characteristics offered a more hopeful prospect for nationalities and classes whom the eugenicists often considered to be "unfit." On similar debates in East Asia and the Soviet Union, see Yuehtsen Juliette Chung, *Struggle for National Survival: Eugenics in Sino-Japanese Contexts, 1896–1945* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Nikolai Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
86. Ross L. Jones, "The Master Potter and the Rejected Pots: Eugenic Legislation in Victoria, 1918–1939," *Australian Historical Studies* 30 (1999): 319–342 (on Australia); Doris Byer, *Rassenhygiene und Wohlfahrtspflege: Zur Entstehung eines sozialdemokratischer Machtdispositivus in Österreich bis 1934* (Frankfurt, West Germany: Campus Verlag, 1988) (on Austria); *New York Times*, May 29, 1935, 2 (on Bermuda); Frank Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions: Medical Knowledge, Birth Defects, and Eugenics in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 112–113 (on China); *Eugenics Review* 29 (1937): 3–4 (on England); Stepan, *The Idea of Race in Science*, 157 (on England); William H. Schneider, "The Eugenics Movement in France, 1890–1940," in Adams, editor, *The Wellborn Science*, 92 (on France); *Eugenical News* 19 (1934): 142 (on Hungary); *Eugenical News* 23 (1938): 52 (on Japan); Abraham Myerson, James B. Ayer, Tracy J. Putnam, Clyde E. Keeler, and Leo Alexander, *Eugenical Sterilization* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 23

- (on New Zealand); Wullen, "Eugenics in Other Lands," 273 (on New Zealand); *Eugenical News* 20 (1935): 13 (on Poland); Mark B. Adams, "Eugenics in Russia, 1900–1940," in Adams, editor, *The Wellborn Science*, 176 (on Russia); Saul Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 149–154 (on South Africa).
87. *Eugenics Review* 39 (1947): 87.
  88. C. P. Blacker, *Eugenics: Galton and After* (London: Duckworth, 1952), 320.
  89. Overbeek, *History of Population Theories*; Barrett, "Reproducing Persons as a Global Concern."
  90. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, 178–194.
  91. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), *The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry* (Paris: UNESCO, 1952), 6.
  92. Michael Banton, *International Action Against Racial Discrimination* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
  93. Pat Shipman, *The Evolution of Racism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 215.
  94. John W. Meyer, "Self and Life Course," in Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli, *Institutional Structure*, 260.
  95. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 145, 347.
  96. UNESCO, *The Race Concept*, 32, 34; see also Robert E. Kuttner, "Introduction" and "Addendum," in *Race and Modern Science* (New York: Social Science Press, 1967), xiii–xxvii.
  97. UNESCO, *The Race Question in Modern Science* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956); UNESCO, *Race, Science and Society* (Paris: UNESCO, 1974).
  98. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 252; see also *Eugenics Review* 40 (1949): 211–212; Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten*, 182–190.
  99. Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten*, 228–230.
  100. Frank C.J. McGurk, *Race Differences – 20 Years Later* (New York: International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics, 1978), 40.
  101. I. A. Newby, *Challenge to the Court: Social Scientists and the Defense of Segregation, 1954–1966*, revised edition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 237–365.
  102. Faith Schenk and A. S. Parkes. "The Activities of the Eugenics Society," *Eugenics Review* 60 (1968): 154–155.
  103. Kühl, *Die Internationale der Rassisten*, 194.
  104. Pauly, "The Eugenics Industry," 144.
  105. Mary Meehan, "How Eugenics Birthed Population Control," *The Human Life Review* 24 (1998): 78; see also Garland E. Allen, "Old Wine in New Bottles: From Eugenics to Population Control in the Work of Raymond Pearl," in Keith R. Benson, Jane Maienschein, and Ronald Rainger, editors, *The Expansion of American Biology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 231–261.
  106. Adele E. Clarke, *Disciplining Reproduction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Troy Duster, *Backdoor to Eugenics* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Diane B. Paul, *Controlling Human Heredity* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995).
  107. Beryl Suitters, *Be Brave and Angry: Chronicles of the International Planned Parenthood Federation* (London: IPPF, 1973), 20.
  108. Tage Kemp, editor, *The First International Congress of Human Genetics* (Copenhagen, 1–6 August 1956), *Proceedings* (Basel, Switzerland: S. Karger, 1956), xiii; L. C. Dunn, "Cross Currents in the History of Human Genetics," *American Journal of Human Genetics* 14 (1962): 3; Anne Kerr, Sarah Cunningham–Burley, and Amanda Amos, "Eugenics and the New Genetics in Britain: Examining Contemporary Professionals' Accounts," *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 23 (1998): 175–199.
  109. Eliot Marshall, "The Genome Program's Conscience: A Research Program on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Genome Studies, Launched as an 'Afterthought,' Is Now the World's Biggest Bioethics Program," *Science* 274 (1996): 488–491.



110. *Eugenical News* 33 (1948): 21–23, 58–61, and 34 (1949): 44–45; Marjatta Hietala, “From Race Hygiene to Sterilization: The Eugenics Movement in Finland,” in Broberg and Roll-Hansen, editors, *Eugenics and the Welfare State*, 241; Matsubara Yoko, “The Enactment of Japan’s Sterilization Laws in the 1940s: A Prelude to Postwar Eugenic Policy,” *Historia Scientiarum* 8 (1998): 187–201.
111. Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, 172–175.
112. J. John Palen, “Fertility and Eugenics: Singapore’s Population Policies,” *Population Research and Policy Review* 5 (1986): 3–14.
113. Daniel J. Penofsky, “Sexual Sterilization,” *American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts* 21 (1968): 297; George P. Smith, *Genetics, Ethics, and the Law* (Gaithersburg, MD: Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1981), 29; U.S. state, territory, and district legal codes for the year 2000.
114. Stephen Trombley, *The Right to Reproduce* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1988), 189, 235; *Maclean’s*, 8 September, 1997, 42; *Reproductive Health Matters*, November 1997, 156–161.
115. *New York Times*, August 16, 1998, 10; *Nature*, August 20, 1998, 707; Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, 174–175.