EPILOGUE: THE GRAND DICHOTOMY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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At the end of the century it has for the first time become possible to see what a world may be like in which the past, including the past in the present, has lost its role, in which the old maps and charts which guided human beings, singly and collectively, through life no longer represent the landscape through which we move, the sea on which we sail.(Hobsbawm 1994, p. 16).

In this concluding chapter I ask what story can be told about the overall framework of political thought across the twentieth century. I shall explore Hobsbawm's suggestion, cited in this chapter's epigraph, by applying it to politics and asking how political issues and conflicts over them were thought about in the course of the century. In particular, I shall focus on the idea, or metaphor, of political space as divided between left and right, examine its formal features, trace its history over

the span of the last century and ask whether, and if so when and why, the old left-right maps and charts have lost their applicability.

But a preliminary word should be said about Hobsbawm's cartographic analogy. 'Maps and charts' do not, of course, relate to our singular and collective lives as geographical maps and nautical charts relate to landscapes and seas. They enter and partly shape such lives. We live and act by them: they partly constitute what they map and chart. Furthermore, 'left' and 'right' are classifications that are both cognitive and symbolic: they promise understanding by interpreting and simplifying the complexities of political life and they stimulate emotions, awaken collective memories and induce loyalties and enmities. They are current among actors--whether politically active or not, though understood differently and to different degrees by different actors--and are thus indispensable to observers. They are, in short, Dukheimian *representations collectives*. So the question, more precisely formulated, becomes: whether, or better, to what extent, when and why did 'left-right' ways of representing politics cease to make sense of the practice of politics in the course of the twentieth century.

A final preliminary observation: the claim that the left-right opposition has ad its day is neither new nor politically neutral. It has been made repeatedly in the course of the century in various quarters and typically with political intent. In 1931 the French Radical philosopher Alain responded to a questionnaire launched by the monarchist publicist Beau de Lomenie entitled *Qu'appelez-vous droite et gauche?* with his famous aphorism:

When someone asks me whether the split between parties of the right and parties of the left, between men of the right and men of the left still makes sense, the first idea that strikes me is that the man asking this question is certainly not a man of the left. (Beau de Lomenie 1931, p.64)

In 1988 Timothy Garton Ash wrote in an essay on 'Reform and Revolution':

If asked 'How do you recognize a leftist oppositional intellectual in East Central Europe today?' the unkind answer might be: 'The leftist intellectual is the one who says that the categories left and right no longer have any significance in East Central Europe.' The right does not say that... (Garton Ash 1989, p. 237)

Yet Anthony Giddens, author of *Beyond Left and Right* (Giddens 1994) and promoter of the 'Third Way' politics of Blair and Schroeder, asserted in 2000 that

the division between left and right certainly won't disappear, but the division between them has less compelling power than it used to do. In the absence of a redemptive model, to be on the left is indeed primarily a matter of values...third way politics is unequivocally a politics of the left. (Giddens 2000, pp. 38, 39)

These three quotations suggest a possible narrative whose plausibility we must consider. The first two passages suggest that the half-century separating them saw a decline from the left's intellectually confident self-assertion in the France of the 1930s to a defensive disavowal of its own identity in the last days of communism. The third exhibits a further retreat: the left may survive as 'a matter of values' but it is no longer distinguished from the right in offering alternative analyses or the promise of an alternative institutional design for the economy that is both feasible and

superior to what exists. Yet the authors of all three passages employ the distinction and thus share the assumption that, despite claims to the contrary, what is left and what is right were and remain recognisable.

As for the major social and political movements of the century, their amenability to classification in left-right terms is by no means self-evident, and yet the distinction is helpful in enabling one to make this very point. Thus Zeev Sternhell's classic study of fascist ideology in France is entitled *Neither Right nor Left*. At the end of the nineteenth century, he argues, there was born a 'particularistic and organicist tradition, often dominated by a local variant of cultural nationalism that was sometimes, but not always, of a biological or racial character, very close to the *volkisch* tradition in Germany' which 'launched an all-out attack on liberal democracy, its philosophical foundations, its principles and their application. It was not only the institutional structures of the Republic that were questioned, but the whole heritage of the Enlightenment.' Subsequently, 'intellectual dissidents and rebels, of both the new right and the new left...together forged that brilliant and seductive ideology of revolt that the historian identifies as fascism.' (Sternhell 1996 [1986], pp. x, 302). As for the marxist tradition in its historically conquering form of Leninist and then Stalinist communism, this too was inhospitable to the categories of left and right. Marxist and communist parties and groups might be viewed as on the left in parliamentary democracies, but the continuing significance and prospective survival of left and right formed no part of communism's self-understanding, which was essentially Jacobin and aimed at the total occupation of political space (an affinity especially marked within French Marxism, as Professor Khilmani observes). Indeed, where the term 'left' was used, it was used pejoratively, as in Lenin's pamphlet, *'Left-wing'*

Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality (Lenin 1969 [1918]). As for nationalism, its numerous twentieth-century incarnations across the world, examined from different angles by Professors Mayell and Parekh, span the range from (right-wing) dominant, virulent expansionist powers to (left-wing) national liberation struggles. Yet all, to different degrees, exhibit nationalism's 'janus-like' character, embodying on the one hand, Enlightenment-based ideas of popular sovereignty, mass democracy, the rights of citizens, elite-driven modernisation and independence of external controlling power; and, on the other, narrow cultural or ethnically-based particularism , the 'invention of tradition', collectivist myth-making and mass manipulation, a predisposition to conflict with other nations and oppressive discrimination against internal minorities in the name of some 'imagined community.'

Left and Right: Formal Features

Yet this spatial representation of political life is remarkably durable and pervasive. It has lasted two centuries, from the French Revolution to the aftermath of communism, spreading from France via Italy to the rest of the world and surviving successive political movements, parties and ideologies. It is also remarkably adaptable, apparently making sense in utterly diverse political contexts in different societies at different stages of development. Politics, it has been observed,

> is said to have its left and right in China as in Lebanon, in Russia as in Switzerland. The Churches have their left and right in the United States as well as in France and so do the universities in their academic debates whether in Norway or Brazil (Laponce 1981, p. 28).

And it is general in a way that other political classifications are not. Being 'visual and spatial...it is immediately understandable and easily translatable across cultures.' (Laponce 1981, p.27). 'Liberal and conservative,' 'progressive and reactionary,' 'red and white' are all more context-specific; whereas 'left and right' can be used both to identify particular political divisions and to relate them to divisions in a wider range of other contexts, both past and present, within and across different societies, and to recognisable historical traditions.[1]

It is also a remarkably versatile spatial metaphor, for it allows for several possibilities. Left and right may dichotomise political space, or constitute opposite regions along a continuum or spectrum, or flank a centre. (And, as Norberto Bobbio has argued, that centre may, in turn, be seen as 'included,' as a distinctive alternative that separates the other two, or as 'inclusive', promising to supersede them by incorporating them in a 'higher synthesis' such as a 'third way' (Bobbio 1996, p.7).) Indeed, it allows one to move easily from one of these to the other, or to think of them all at once. We use this versatile metaphor (which has lost its quality as a live metaphor and become everyday political commonsense) in all these ways to map familiar political positions and to place unfamiliar ones. The journalist stepping off the aeroplane on a new assignment finds it indispensable. As Professor Lipset wrote long ago, 'at any given period and place it is usually possible to locate parties on a left to right continuum.' (Lipset 1960, p. 223). Even Fascists, as Professor Payne observes, can be grouped into left, right and centre schools of economic thought.

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1   Moreover, as we shall see, these other contrasts do not map on to that between left and right, either because, like liberal/conservative, they address different issues or because, like red/white, they are more narrowly tied to historical context.

It is not, however, necessary, though it seems natural. Before September 1789 it was unknown and it only caught on from the 1820s. Before that other spatial metaphors were present in the iconography of political space: notably verticality, signifying hierarchy and concentricity, as with the 'Sun King.' The perception of politics as a laterally organised conflict between forces that are opposed and themselves internally divided in left and right segments was (accidentally) invented at a particular time and place and has its own history, which, in principle, could and perhaps will or should come to an end.

Its pre-twentieth-century history can be briefly told. Its birth and sporadic use during the French Revolution were a false start because, although it distinguished opposed political groupings in the legislatures (initially those for and against the King's suspensive veto), the predominant preoccupation during this period was to abolish all political divisions. Its true birth dates from the Restoration, and in particular from the parliamentary session of 1819-1820 when it entered 'into customary practice in a coherent and regular form' in the division between liberals and ultras, deriving from the memory of 1789 and 'opposing old and new France.' (Gauchet 1994, p. 413). By the late 1820s the question of forming alliances capable of achieving a parliamentary majority was already framed in left-right terms between liberals and royalists, but it was with the achievement of universal suffrage in 1848 that left and right entered mass politics, applying not merely to the topography of parliamentary chambers but now as categories of political identity, spreading rapidly across the parliamentary systems of the world.

Its role within representative democracies has a further feature: left and right entail one another. Without a left there is no right and vice versa. Moreover, laterality suggests that left and right, and points between, are on the same level. So the metaphor neatly corresponds to Gauchet's observation that left and right offer the citizen 'the means at one and the same time of affirming a clear-cut partisan identity and of appreciating his position in relation to the context of the global political configuration.' (Gauchet 1994, p.450). The acceptance of left and right symbolises consent to discord--the acceptance, that is, of political pluralism in one of its several senses: of permanent, irreducible, institutionalised conflict as inseparable from democracy and a rejection of the idea that such conflict is a pathological deviation blocking the path to a unified, reconciled society. In short, we could say that the left-right division embodies what we might call the *Principle of Parity*: that implicit in the symbolism of laterality is the idea that alternative political positions--left, right and points between--co-exist on the same level, that political alternatives are legitimately equal contenders for the support of citizens.

But of course we know that parity does not exist between left and right, either in the real world or the world of symbolism. As Laponce has remarked, 'Left and right linked politics, at the level of the cosmos, with other symbolic systems, social a nd religious in particular, that had already been used to explain man, society and the transcendental.' (Laponce 1981, p. 68). Yet in such symbolic systems the pre-eminence of the right is virtually a cultural universal. (See Hertz 1928 and Needham 1973). Consider the evidence of Indo-European languages, such as the connotations of 'sinister', 'gauche', 'linkisch' and 'maladroit' and by contrast those of 'right' and 'rectitude', 'droit' and 'droite', 'diritto' and 'Recht'. (Arabic, apparently displays a similar bias). The words for right connote

dexterity, uprightness, what is customarily, morally and juridically correct, and the words for left their opposites.

Or consider the history of religions and the results of comparative ethnography, the evidence of which was summed up by Robert Hertz as follows:

> Thus the opposition between right and left has the same meaning and application as the series of contrasts, very different yet reducible to common principles, presented by the universe. Sacred power, source of life, truth, beauty, virtue, the rising sun, the male sex, and- -I can add, the right side; all these terms, like their contraries, are interchangeable....from one end of the world to the other of humanity, in the sacred places where the worshipper meets his god, in the cursed places where devilish pacts are made, on the throne as well as in the witness box, on the battlefield and in the peaceful workroom of the weaver, everywhere one unchangeable law governs the functions of the two hands...The supremacy of the right hand is at once an effect and a necessary condition of the order which governs and maintains the universe. (Hertz 1973[1928], pp. 14, 19, 20)

Virtually everywhere the right symbolically prevails. God made Eve out of Adam's left side, and the forces of evil are on the left in medieval Judaism. According to the New Testament, the Son of man 'shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on his left': to the former he shall say 'Come ye, blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world' but to the latter 'Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels' and the Son of man shall sit 'on the right hand of power'. Koranic theology displays the same bias. Tribal

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cultures show the same pattern. And in all these societies the right also prevails in ceremonial customs and social etiquette -- in taking oaths, saluting, concluding marriages and other contracts, in greetings and the expression of respect and friendship.

In the politics of representative democracies, however, the symbolism of left and right can be seen as signifying a rejection of this pre-eminence or dominance. Left and right are <u>representations collectives</u> which embody the principle of parity: that in representative democracies each has equal standing. It was, however, in the course of the nineteenth century that the left succeeded in establishing this principle, in France and elsewhere, and the right which for long opposed it. This perhaps explains what Louis Dumont calls the 'ideological predominance' that the left has enjoyed (Dumont 1990). It is perhaps why in political matters it has usually been the left that has been most forthright in drawing the distinction and proclaiming its own identity and why the right, as Alain noted, often denied the distinction and why it tended to acknowledge its identity with some reluctance and even embarrassment. Yet enemies of parity can certainly be found in both directions. It is not only reactionaries or religious 'fundamentalists' or nationalists who regard conflicts between left and right as pathological symptoms to be overcome in some future imagined unity. The marxist tradition too placed no intrinsic value upon parity in either capitalist or 'real socialist' societies and envisaged communism as a community of political and moral convergence. There was a considerable marxist and marxisant presence on the left in some countries, above all France, as Professor Khilmani's chapter amply shows,' but 'left 'and 'right' were never, as we have seen, part of the classical marxist lexicon, and indeed 'leftist' was used as a term of abuse. Where they came into

power, communist parties systematically destroyed the possibility of parity: hence the ideological reversal noted by Garton Ash.

From this brief discussion we can draw a single overall conclusion: that perceiving political divisions in left-right terms has both reflected and constituted the politics of representative democracies by means of a natural-seeming but historically contingent spatial metaphor that is durable, pervasive, adaptable, general and exceptionally versatile, and which embodies the principle of endemic and legitimate conflict between alternatives of equal standing.

But, having considered these formal features, we must now examine the *content* of the left-right model of political life. What, in the course of the twentieth century has distinguished the left from the right? By what features can parties, movements and ideologies of the left and the right be recognised, in familiar and unfamiliar contexts?

What divides Left from Right?

At the turn of the new century this question is not just an analytical one, of interest to scholars. With the fall of communism and the so-called crisis of social democracy, those parties and intellectuals who continue to identify themselves with the left seek to know what they are identifying themselves with. As left parties increasingly accept a capitalist framework and left intellectuals accept market principles and the logic of profit and even question the principle of redistribution and social transfers, it becomes important to know whether the left denotes socialism

or social democracy in all their variety, or whether it names a longer tradition and history of which these have been the latest incumbents but which can be thought of as surviving the abandonment of some of their essential commitments.

In trying to answer the question posed, we should avoid several dead-ends. One is the politically motivated temptation to respond to the crisis of identity on the left by devising a 'sanitised' conception of the left, for present consumption, with the unacceptable assumptions and beliefs of the past removed: a true or pure or sensible left from which the errors and excesses of the past are seen as deviations. A second dead-end is reductionism: that is, seeking to identify left and right by reference to their social, psychological or policy-related correlates. Thus sociologists have focussed on the social bases of voting, such as class; psychologists on attitudes or personality traits; and political scientists on orientations towards policy, such as governmental intervention in the economy. But such approaches fail to address the central issue at hand, namely, what (if anything) at the level of political thought (if not theory) can account for such choices, attitudes and orientations: what entitles us to classify them as left or right? A third dead-end is essentialism: the supposition that we can arrive at cut-and-dried definitions based on mutually exclusive principles expressed in alternative conceptual vocabularies that distinguish mutually exclusive political moralities or world views. Such an approach is a non-starter, if only because all political thought is framed throughout in terms of essentially contested concepts (such as 'liberty', 'equality' and 'democracy') whose interpretation is at issue across the left-right spectrum. And a fourth dead-end is the opposite of this--a thorough-going nominalism suggesting that the answer is always local and context-specific: that what is left and right is simply a matter of local nomenclature and can vary

indefinitely across time and space. In seeking an answer, it is best to respect, as far as possible, the variety of left and right movements, parties and thinkers while presuming that they are respectively united by more than words: by common origins, intersecting histories, shared, if contested, identities and distinct, identifiable traditions.

Louis Dumont has suggested that the French left has been characterised by a principled commitment to individualism: as a pure ideal repeatedly invoked as fresh as ever in its perfection and gradually and incompletely realised, transforming political and in some measure social institutions. Thus he cites the centrality of the 'Rights of Man' to the Dreyfus Affair and the remark of Jaures that 'the human individual is the measure of all things.' and he refers to Karl Polanyi's view of socialism as the end product of Christian individualism (Dumont 1980). Is individualism, as Dumont suggests, at the core of the left, while 'holism', valuing the global society above and against the individual, is to be found on the right? The trouble with this view, as Gauchet remarks, is that it implies too 'unilateral a view of both right and left, greatly underestimating the internal contradictions of each.' (Gauchet 1994, p. 455). Such an account might fit the liberals of the Restoration, but, as Part II of this volume amply shows, the various twentieth-century lefts have not lacked awareness of the imperatives of political mobilisation, organisation and collective discipline, repeatedly proclaiming and implementing policies of planning and law and order, and invoking patriotism and the common good. Conversely, the right has always, in France as elsewhere, been split between attachment to a hierarchical, organic collectivism, whether traditional or, as with Fascism, revolutionary and to an entrepreneurial, free-market capitalism that proclaims equal property rights and equality of opportunity. In this connection, the role of nationalism, discussed by Professor Mayell, is

interesting. For instance, it migrated from left to right in the course of the nineteenth century in France; only to migrate once more leftwards by the time of the Algerian war, when the anti-colonialist left sided with Third World nationalists. In short, left and right, in France and elsewhere, have distinctive ways of being both individualist and collectivist.

Nor does it appear much more persuasive to distinguish left from right, as various authors (cited in Bobbio 1996) have, by reference to their fundamental attitudes towards tradition. Is the right concerned above all to safeguard tradition whereas the left's purpose is liberation from the chains imposed by the privileges of race, status, class and so on? Or is the distinction based on attitudes to power, the right seeing it as a principle of cohesion, the left as a source of discrimination? But there are ingrained traditions of the left and indeed, in face of neo-liberalism in recent times, the left has often appeared as the guardian of tradition; and there are left-wing and right-wing ways of interpreting what counts as cohesion, discrimination and indeed power itself. Nor, as Bobbio has effectively shown, is it helpful to equate the left-right distinction with that between moderation and extremism. What extremism of the left and of the right share is hostility to democracy. This 'brings them together, not because of their position on the political spectrum, but because they occupy the two extreme points of that spectrum. The extremes meet.' (Bobbio 1994, p. 21). (This is an effective riposte to Professor O'Sullivan's suggestion that 'the influential spectrum analysis of politics' is 'misleading' in bracketing conservatism with fascism on the right end of the spectrum).

Perhaps a clue to the answer we are seeking lies in the symbolic reversal of left and right referred to above. Perhaps what unifies the left as a tradition across time and space is its very rejection of the

symbolic hierarchy and the inevitability of the inequalities it sanctifies. What this suggests is that the left denotes a tradition and a project, which found its first clear expression in the Enlightenment[2], which puts in question sacred principles of social order, contests unjustifiable but remediable inequalities of status, rights, powers and condition and seeks to eliminate them through political action. Its distinctive core commitment is to a demanding answer to the question of what equality means and implies. It envisions a society of equals and takes this vision to require a searching diagnosis, on the widest scale, of sources of unjustifiable discrimination and dependency and a practical programme to abolish or diminish them. It starts from the basic humanist idea of equality: the *moral* principle that all human beings are equally deserving of concern and respect, that they should treat one another as ends not means, as having dignity, not price, and so on – a principle commonly accepted, in modern times, across the political spectrum. The tradition of the left interprets this idea as requiring both a political and social ideal: the *political* ideal of equal citizenship, where all have equal civil rights that are independent of their capacities, achievements, circumstances and ascribed identities, so that government represents their interests on an equal basis; and the *social* ideal of conceiving 'society,' including the economy, as a co-operative order in which all are treated as equals, with equal standing or status. It is distrustful of the idea that markets and, in general, unregulated competition exemplify such co-operation since they naturally generate

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2   Perhaps the most succinct statement of it is that of Condorcet who wrote of 'real equality' as
        the final end of the social art, in which even the effects of the natural differences between men will be
        mitigated and the only kind of inequality to persist will be that which is in the interests of all and
        which favours the progress of civilization, of education and of industry, without entailing either
        poverty, humiliation or dependence.
Under such conditions, Condorcet believed, people would
        approach a condition in which everyone will have the knowledge necessary to conduct himself in the
        ordinary affairs of life, according to the light of his own reason, to preserve his mind free from
        prejudice, to understand his rights and to exercise them in accordance with his conscience and his
        creed; in which everyone will become able, through the development of his faculties, to find the means
        of providing for his needs; and in which at last misery and folly will be the exception, and no longer
        the habitual lot of a section of society (Condorcet, 1955 (1795), p. 174).

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inequalities of reward and condition, which, as they become excessive and cumulative, corrupt and nullify relations of social equality.

The left is, on this account, a critical, strongly egalitarian project[3] which, however, allows for successive and varying interpretations and reinterpretations of what unjustified inequalities consist in and of how -- through what methods and programmes-- they can be reduced or eliminated. Often, throughout the history of the left, that project has been abandoned or betrayed by those claiming to pursue it. What I here seek to identify is an ideal-typical left, an account that displays what its adherents can acknowledge as its most defensible rationale: the essential elements by virtue of which abandonment and betrayal can be identified as such. My suggestion, in a word, is that the left is defined by its commitment to what we may call the *Principle of Rectification*[4] and the right by opposition to it.

In making this suggestion, I seek to avoid essentialism. The varieties of the left are, clearly, related one to another by family resemblance. What counts as equality is essentially contestable: it has many faces and wears many masks. But the point is that the family of the left is a strongly egalitarian family, committed to rectification, whether radical or reformist, and it has a family history. The project of rectification can be expressed in a variety of ways -- in the language of rights or of class conflict, as a story of expanding citizenship, or justice or democracy, or as a continuing struggle against exploitation and oppression; it can take any number of organisational forms, based

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3   By 'egalitarian' I mean to include concern for those who are disadvantaged relatively to others (with respect to well-being, resources, opportunities or capabilities, etc) – a view sometimes labelled 'prioritarian', since it is not directly concerned with equality as such.
4   By 'rectification' I mean to suggest not only the putting to rights of past injustices but also the

on parties or movements, it can be elitist or democratic, statist or syndicalist or insurrectionary, it can be reformist or revolutionary, consensus-seeking or militant, integrative or sectarian, and its constituencies can be narrowly or broadly based. But whatever its language, form and following, it makes the assumption that there are unjustified inequalities which those on the Right see as sacred or inviolable or natural or inevitable and that these should be reduced or abolished.

It might be objected that few theories today challenge the basic humanist idea of moral equality. In the course of the twentieth century doctrines which rejected that very basic idea lost ground. Racist doctrines lost scientific credibility; Fascism and Nazism were defeated. As Tocqueville had foreseen, the *idea* of equality had, by mid-century, prevailed across the political spectrum, and increasingly across the globe. Even apologists for South Africa's apartheid spoke not of race-based inequality but of 'separate development'. Does it also go for the various schools of twentieth-century Islamic political thought surveyed by Professor Ismail? To what extent have these various attempts to 'reinterpret and reconstruct tradition' by thinkers confronting 'the presumed universality of western modernity' succeeded in de-emphasising and contextualising theologically and Shari'a-based positions concerning gender inequality and the subordinate ethical status of non-Muslims? To what extent are their voices actually and potentially influential among believing Muslims? Is it true that 'the ethical outlook of the Qu'ran …is uncompromisingly universalistic and inclusive' (Othman 1999, p. 182)? These questions are all the more pressing after September 11, given the urgency of the topic of Islam's relationship to modernity and the perceived threat of so-called 'fundamentalism' whose purpose, as Professor Parekh observes, is to 'close the doors of ijtihd or interpretation.'

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correction of present and the averting of future ones.

(typescript, p. 29). And what of Hinduism, whose very principle of caste hierarchy denies the core idea of moral equality, but which has responded to modernity in the various alternative ways outlined by Parekh in the world's largest liberal democracy? It may be that these doctrines do represent outposts of the language of inequality. Yet increasingly they must contend with the fact that virtually everywhere governments, diplomats and intellectuals speak the language of human rights—even those that proclaim the specificity of 'Asian values' (see Bauer and Bell 1999).

By the century's end, therefore, Professor Sen could write that 'every normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to demand equality of *something'* (Sen 1992, p.12), as alternative ways of implementing the basic idea across the surviving political spectrum. So, for instance, all the various political philosophers discussed by Miller and Dagger, including (equal) rights-based 'libertarians' such as Robert Nozick, seek equality, as Sen puts it, ' in some space'. The same goes for all utilitarians, for the market-favouring liberalism of Hayek and the monetarist and public choice theorists discussed by Professor Parsons, and for all the various conservative and Christian Democratic schools of thought surveyed by Professors O'Sullivan and Caciagli.

What distinguishes left-wing thinkers (and the left wings of right-wing schools and movements) is, in the first place, their thicker rather than thinner interpretations of the political and social ideals of equality and their redistributive and other implications for present action and policy. Thus the 'coming of the Welfare State', charted by Professor Freeden, was fuelled, especially in Britain and France, by thinkers and politicians who saw themselves as applying classical liberal principles to

the ever-more demanding 'Social Question'—avoiding unrest and even revolution, promoting stability and cohesion though social justice, and, after 1917, responding to the challenge of an apparent but really-existing non-liberal solution with solutions that would both sustain and transform capitalism. In Britain it was the social or new liberals (whose thought reached back to John Stuart Mill's 'Chapters on Socialism' and T. H. Green's idea that freedom meant actual opportunities and capacities not mere absence of restraints) who thought this way, and it is indeed striking that the post-war British Welfare State largely originated in the Liberal Governments of Asquith and Lloyd George and the theories and programmes of Beveridge and Keynes, who, in Skidelsky's words, 'talked right and left at the same time' and whose liberalism was qualified, as Professor Parsons rightly emphasises, by intellectual elitism and conservatism and a disinclination directly to use public policy to generate more equality. Others saw less opposition between liberal assumptions and socialist conclusions. Thus L. T. Hobhouse's classic statement of social liberalism had claimed that 'individualism, when it grapples with the facts, is driven no small distance along Socialist lines' (Hobhouse 1964 [1911], p. 54) echoing the Fabian socialist Sydney Olivier's view that 'Socialism is merely individualism rationalised, organised, clothed, and in its right mind' (Shaw 1889, p. 105). The same confluence of ideas can be seen elsewhere, for example in early twentieth-century France, where solidarism fed into Jauresian and other contemporary streams of socialism, and even in the United States, where socialism remained stillborn, in the thinking of John Dewey and the proponents of the New Deal. There, as Professor O'Sullivan, reminds us, 'liberalism' since the 1930s came to mean what Europeans understand as social democracy (though, one must add, in a much diluted form). And indeed, as Miller and Dagger's chapter brings out, it is largely from the United States that, within the academic world, so-called 'egalitarian' left-liberal theories have

achieved their most extensive elaboration at the hands, among many others, of John Rawls (above all), Ronald Dworkin, Michael Walzer and Amartya Sen (whose notion of equalising 'capabilities' returns the discussion to T.H. Green). Ironically, these advanced developments of egalitarian theory have coincided with an unprecedented and accelerating growth of actual inequalities at home, abroad and on a world scale.

'Socialism' was always supposed to be, and was seen by its adherents as, a more robust and forthright world-view, contrasting with both 'capitalism' and 'individualism.' It promised social transformation into a new social order, even a 'new civilisation' transcending both capitalism and liberal democracy. But here socialists faced a crux. What did their more radical interpretation of the social ideal of equality imply for the political ideal of civil equality? In other words, is socialism compatible with democracy? More specifically still, can it be achieved by pursuing a democratic, parliamentary path? The answer to this question—the 'dilemma of democratic socialism', as Peter Gay named it (Gay 1962)—was, as Professors Geary's and Harding's chapters demonstrate, what essentially divided the Second and Third Internationals. But the truth is that the Marxist socialist tradition, unlike liberalism, never had a principled commitment to the political ideal of equal civil rights or to limited and representative government. The Bolsheviks came to power without any theory of governance and, as Harding shows, there could be no discussion throughout the Soviet period of 'how to control, limit or hold power holders accountable', let alone 'politics as contestation, the open canvassing of alternative political and economic strategies, or public appeal to particular constituencies.' (typescript, p. 28). Moreover marxism's ethical core was the attainment of emancipation from the class oppression and exploitation of capitalism but its goal of

social equality under communism was not a subject for reflection, and nor were issues of distributive justice. In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* Marx had called the discussion of such matters 'obsolete verbal rubbish' and 'ideological nonsense' and Engels had similarly disparaged talk of equality, which he saw as 'a historical product' and no 'eternal truth.' In short, the Marxist conception of social equality was not a distinctive scheme of social co-operation governed by distinctive principles of distribution to be applied to the critique of present arrangements, but rather the vision of a world freed from the circumstances (scarcity, conflicting interests, human irrationality and conflicting values and ideals) that render rights and justice necessary--a world in which 'all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly' and 'the narrow horizon of bourgeois right' has been 'crossed in its entirety' and on whose banner is inscribed the principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.' This radically utopian vision of social equality could indeed inspire revolutionary ardour and loyalty to the communist cause but it had nothing to offer anyone seeking to rectify injustices this side of the coming revolution.

The expansive socio-political ideal of equality underlying the principle of rectification has several large implications. First that there is a standard of rightness or a counterfactual ideal against which existing disadvantages and inequalities can be seen as unjustified or standing in need of rectification; an implicit or explicit theory of justice or vision of equality. Second that the scope of egalitarian concern embraces these unjustifiable disadvantages and inequalities that are systematically or structurally caused by features of the political or economic or social system as well as those that are random, idiosyncratic, biologically determined or the unintended consequences of uncontrollable processes. Third that one seek to ascertain their causes through systematic, scientific inquiry. And

fourth that wherever possible they should be diminished, eliminated or compensated through human intervention resulting from political will.

What all this means is that the left is committed to a belief in coherence: a vision of the larger picture, a search for explanatory principles that account for social mechanisms and a commitment to an idea of social justice that is not merely local. This last may view justice as having a single overall sphere (as in Rawls 1971) or as occupying plural spheres, but even in the latter case social injustice consists in cumulative inequalities, the domination of one sphere over others, as when 'wealth is seized by the strong, honour by the wellborn, office by the well-educated' (Walzer 1983, p. 12). Often the left also sees coherence over time, viewing its project as part of some larger story of actual or at least potential progress: an overall narrative of cumulative conquests and setbacks, sometimes expressed in military metaphors. (as in Hobsbawm 1981). At the very least, it believes, progress in rectification is everywhere better than regress.

The left's project also embodies the practice of social criticism, since it is committed to putting institutions and practices, and the beliefs that sustain them, to the test of justificatory, discursive discussion. It is thus universalistic in several ways. Its commitment to social criticism commits it to advancing reasons that anyone, on due reflection, can accept, as opposed to merely advancing its constituents' interests or reinforcing their commitments -- reasons which citizens can publicly offer one another and acknowledge as compelling independently of their particular interests and commitments. Secondly, the standpoint from which the criticism is made is external: a critique of what some of us do in terms of a wider 'we.' Thirdly, the dynamic of the rectification principle is

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essentially boundary-crossing, in two ways: it moves naturally from, say, political to economic to educational to cultural inequalities and from, say, status to class to race to gender as their basis, but it is also implicitly cosmopolitan, moving from inequalities within the nation state to those on a global scale. If rectification is to take place within the nation state, what possible justification can there be for the maldistribution of the world's resources?

The conception of the left here advanced has been criticised on the ground that it 'suggests its own limits.' It allegedly 'requires no general theory of an alternative society, and accepts the need for a right as a perpetual counterweight to itself'. The values of left and right are, on this view, 'always relative' and 'a "left" could survive within an all-capitalist system that was to the right of anything now considered in the centre.' And it gives 'involuntary hostage to the enemy': in 'such a conception, the social fabric is always woven to the right: the left does no more than stretch or mend it.' [5] (Anderson 1994, p. 17).

But the limits indicated are, if they exist, imposed by reality, not internal to the conception. One question is whether or not there is a known alternative to capitalism that is both feasible and viable and promises greater equality than the most egalitarian feasible capitalist society. If so, then the left, or part of it, as here conceived, would have a theory of it and strive to bring it into being. A second question is whether the left needs the counterweight of the right, Here the evidence of history suggests that rectification requires parity: that where the left occupies the whole of political space, it subverts its own project. A third question is whether the future left may not lie to the right of the

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[5]   This criticism is in response to Lukes 1992.

present centre. But, on the conception proposed, where it lies will depend not on the idea of rectification but on the possibilities of rectification that the future holds.

What is Left?

I have focussed here on the meaning of the left on the assumption that the history of the right can be seen in part as reactive: that it is 'most helpfully conceived as a variety of responses to the left.' (Eatwell and O'Sullivan p. 63). More precisely, we can, consistently with the interpretation proposed, identify a series of lefts and corresponding rights over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

One can, as Hobsbawm has suggested, broadly distinguish three lefts. The first left was moderate though willing to mobilise the masses in pursuit of its political ends: it fought 'to overcome monarchical, absolutist and aristocratic governments in favour of the bourgeois institutions of liberal and constitutional government' and was in general the party of 'change and progress.' (Hobsbawm 2000, pp. 96, 98). The second left turned to the class struggle and formed around worker's movements and socialist parties in the nineteenth century, initially in alliance with the first left, incorporating its objectives and struggling for civil rights and political democracy but becoming increasingly independent of it, and fighting for public ownership and the planning of the economy, the rights of all to work and for social rights (though in the United States, where there was no independent working-class movement, it remained largely undeveloped and internal to the Democratic party). This second left was split asunder by the Russian Revolution. As social

democracy it succeeded throughout most of Europe in completing the first left's agenda, not least universal suffrage, and winning social rights and the establishment of extensive welfare systems, most extensively in Scandinavia (though in some countries these also derived from liberal and Catholic movements and parties). This moderate reformist left believed in what C. A. R. Crosland called *The Future of Socialism* (Crosland 1956): 'socialism' named 'the idea of a post-capitalist society through an ill-defined belief that public ownership and management would in time develop into something more and something new' (Hobsbawm 2000, p. 101). Its 'golden age', between 1945 and the 1970s, saw dramatic and widely, if unevenly, spread successes in achieving, through public ownership, fiscal and monetary means and corporatist economic policies, extensive redistribution, provision of welfare and public services and full employmen--all of it sustained by underlying conditions favourable to economic growth.

The end of this phase was heralded by the 1973 oil crisis, which signalled the gathering impact of the globalised economy in narrowing social democracy's scope of action within national borders. The most successful social democratic countries, notably Sweden and Norway, were markedly less successful from the md-1980s. No less important was the increasingly acknowledged impossibility of command socialism and eventual collapse in ruins of the entire Soviet communist system, depriving the world of even a failed alternative to capitalism. Lacking the model of a feasibly successful such alternative, and faced with the wave of political and economic neo-liberalism that swept across the world in the century's last decades and a widely perceived reluctance of taxpayers to finance redistribution and public goods, the second left became a weakened conservative force defending past social democratic gains against both intellectual and electoral tides.

Hobsbawm perceives a third left dating from the 1960s, but it is a left that is bereft of an electoral base and a single project. It is, in effect, the topic of this volume's Section IV: a series of single-issue movements, such as the women's, anti-racist and environmental movements, social movements belonging to what came to be called 'identity politics', and various internationally-focussed movements from anti-nuclear campaigns and the anti-Vietnam war movement to a burgeoning variety of movements and organisations campaigning for human rights and, at the century's end, against 'globalisation'. All of this activity belongs, in Hobsbawm's view, to 'what could be called the Left continuum.' This third left, Hobsbawm dismissively writes, 'is not very important politically, and its profile has mainly been raised by the crisis of the traditional political Left.' (Hobsbawm 2000, p. 103). Is Hobsbawm right?

There has certainly been a collapse of coherence, although we may well ask to what extent the coherence we see in the past is a retrospective illusion. To what extent was it clear that the social movements of the past would unite in the early days? Is there not a story to tell of the suppression and subordination of their contradictory agendas within hierarchical and exclusionary structures? Nevertheless, the left has fragmented. There is no longer any political movement or party, national or international, which integrates recognisably left-wing issues and campaigns within an overarching framework of ideas. Indeed, this situation is often seen as desirable. The contemporary left, it is said, requires a pluralistic agenda, embodied in different movements, and a network form of organisation that promises more equal and democratic forms of participation than the old hierarchical

forms, enabling different, single-issue and geographically dispersed movements to fight for greater equality locally and globally.

The fragmentation is, so to speak, both horizontal across issue areas and vertical across time. It is no longer plausible to see the various left wing causes as subsumed within a larger, encompassing socio-political project. For one thing, some of the issues in question, most obviously those central to green politics are, as Professor Ball's chapter shows, orthogonal to the anthropocentric left-right spectrum. Furthermore, when the different policies or programmes of the new social movements lead to trade-offs or dilemmas, as when environment-friendly policies would impoverish disadvantaged people or identity-based positive discrimination violates meritocratic selection or when religiously or ethnically based solidarities deflect and impede those based on class, there is no shared discourse of political priorities to resolve them. On the other hand, this was the very point of the third left's challenge to the second left, which it criticised for its hierarchical, patriarchal and materialist outlook, pointing to unjustified inequalities that it ignored or underplayed, of gender, race, ethnicity and so on. In this sense, the crisis of the second left was in part created by the third.

And in the dimension of time it is no longer plausible to view such movements as fitting into some larger story of social and political progress---whether it be a Marxist or marxisant story of class struggle leading to a future classless world or a social-democratic story of expanding citizenship that runs in cumulative fashion from civil to political to ever deepening and widening social and economic rights (see Marshall 1963). Hence we see the widespread development, discussed by Professor Bellamy, of new social and protest movements increasingly disaffected and detached from party

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politics, in which citizens take less and less interest. And the post-modernist theorising described by Peter Dews has both expressed and encouraged, in the century's last decades, a widespread scepticism about the 'grand narratives' embodied in the left-wing party-based politics of the past—'grand schemas of historical progress stemming from the Enlightenment.' Sometimes the exponents of these particular movements are disposed to adopt particularistic, even relativist views—a development postmodernism encourages. Such adherents of identity politics abandon the search for what Professor Tully calls 'agreement on norms of intersubjective recognition' on the basis of public, commonly acceptable or 'shared' reasons, maintaining that all reasons are 'internal' to cultures in contention and that the very notion of universalism is ethnocentric. For reasons suggested above, this kind of thinking is inimical to the very idea of the left. By embracing incoherence of thought, it can only encourage the process of fragmentation.

Does all this mean that the new social movements are 'not very important politically'? In the first place, many of them are not so new. Twentieth-century feminism, as Susan James admirably shows, is a long story that, beginning with campaigns against women's subordination within liberal institutions and within marriage and the family, led to the wider questioning of gender relations and the causes of women's oppression and thence to the focusing on the diversity of women's lives across different circumstances and experiences. Likewise, Professor Ceadel illuminatingly traces back the roots of absolutist and reformist anti-war movements to the origins of pacifism and pacificism and recounts their subsequent fates, and Professor Ball's account of green politics goes back to Rousseau and the early Marx. But secondly, no assessment of the 'Third Left's' importance can dispense with some stocktaking of its achievements. Looking back over the course of the twentieth

century, feminists and anti-racists, in both the developed and parts of the developing world, can observe immense progress in normative commitment (what it is respectable to say), in legislative enactments, and in the widening availability of real opportunities both of career and life-style—alongside areas of regression and failure and a huge uncompleted agenda for the future. Ecologists' ideas have been influential in the public domain only in the century's last decades, but they too can chalk up a considerable impact upon public awareness of the interconnected crises listed by Professor Ball, awareness that has mobilised activists and entered into the calculations of both public and private policy-making to an ever-increasing extent. The successes of identity politics are less straightforward to assess, in part because of the diversity of identities in question, in part because what counts as success may be contestable (is every claim to group recognition equally justified and meeting it therefore just?). Certainly discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has declined significantly in several Western countries at the normative, legislative and behavioural levels. As for the recognition of the claims of national minorities and ethnic groups, the story is mixed. Historically, the liberal tradition has accommodated minority rights and views within that tradition varied from 'strong support to deep anxiety' (Kymlicka 1995, p. 68) while the socialist tradition has been hostile to them. Yet until its very end, the twentieth century was not lacking in ethnically-based persecution and oppression across the globe. In the increasingly multicultural societies of the Western type, that have experienced waves of mass immigration, social norms, legislation and behaviour have adapted to this ever more visible challenge to the principle of rectification in different ways and with different degrees of success. The rising fortunes of the extreme right in much of Europe register the relative failures of the left in this domain.

But at the century's end it is the internationally-oriented movements that have constituted the most dynamic segment of the Third Left. Its achievements lie at different levels: the remarkable pervasiveness across the globe of the discourse of human rights, developments in international criminal law, including the setting up and successful functioning of international war crimes courts, the multiplication of campaigning non-governmental organisations in this area, and the increasing audibility of protest movements that call attention to global inequalities and Third World poverty and debt and their causes. It is too early to call such achievements successes, but they exemplify the rectification principle at work as does the rest of the foregoing catalogue, which it is hard to see as 'not very important politically'.

What is Right?

The successive phases of the right can be seen as responding to and interacting with these developments on the left. Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1989) have helpfully discerned five such incarnations of the right (sketched in Professor O'Sullivan's chapter), in a way that dovetails with the analysis offered here.

The first, the 'reactionary right', consisted in the genuine reactionaries and their followers who, literally, reacted to the French Revolution and its aftermath. Inspired by theocratic and authoritarian thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, this right condemned individualism and markets and Enlightenment-inspired notions of reason as dangerously anarchic and sought to return to an idealised past of hierarchy and order. It survived in ever-diminishing strength through the

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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in thinkers such as Hippolyte Taine and Charles Maurras (though, as Sternhell shows, it was one source of fascism), and it still survives in currents within the Catholic Church. The second, 'moderate' right has been far more long-lasting and internally complex. Its ancestor is Edmund Burke but also such liberals as Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville: its watchwords are 'limited government,' 'balance,' 'pragmatism' and a generalised suspicion of abstract principles in politics. Its more authoritarian side is seen in what Professor Payne calls the 'moderate authoritarian right of early twentieth century Europe' and described in Professor Caiciagli's chapter,: its twin sources lay in 'the search for a more controlled, elitist and authoritarian liberalism and in Catholic corporatism.' This kind of right resists, in Roger Scruton's words,

> those collective goals--liberty, equality and fraternity--whose specious clarity derives from their abstraction, and which can never be translated into reality without destroying the fruits of historic compromise. The right is suspicious, too, of projects which require the massive intervention of the state, but because it values society more. It respects those institutions, such as property, religion and law, which arise spontaneously from the social impulse, and in which responsibility, deference and authority take root. (Scruton 1992).

But, true to its pragmatism, it has responded to the challenges of the first and second lefts by selective absorption, eventually accepting their achievements and implementing, though seeking to moderate, counteract and where possible reverse the impact of their policies while contesting their programmes and principles.

The rise of the third, 'radical' right at the beginning of the twentieth century, and also referred to in Professor Payne's chapter, marks the moment when the right became an activist movement of

change, responding to the rise of socialism by seeking salvation through politics to implement an 'aggressive and romantic vision of nationalism' (Eatwell and O'Sullivan 1989, p.69). Influenced by thinkers such as Georges Sorel and Ernst Junger, it constituted another source of fascism, but there were also forms of right-wing radicalism, as Payne observes, that were quite distinct from the revolutionary thrust and cultural modernism of fascism in their social elitism, commitment to existing hierarchies and grounding in religion.. Its heyday was between the wars and it was eclipsed by the defeat of Nazism. The fourth category of 'extreme' right denotes the political movements and parties, hostile to both the left and conservative centre parties, and nationalist, sometimes localist, and anti-immigration and (incipiently if rarely explicitly) racist in ideology. Loosely linked to such organisations are the intellectuals of the *nouvelle droite* in France and the *nuova destra* in Italy, described by Professor O'Sullivan as 'post Second World War radical conservatives.' Though largely ostracised by fellow-intellectuals, this kind of politics grew considerabvly in influence and electoral appeal throughout much of Europe, especially in Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland and Italy in the last decades of the century. Driven more by political propaganda than intellectual reflection, this branch of the right became an integral part of late twentieth-century politics in those countries and has achieved governmental office in several.

Finally, there is the new, pro-active and utopian 'neo-liberal' right whose increasingly hegemonic ideology gripped the world in the latter part of the century with the ascendancy of President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher and changed the parameters within which all governments, including those claimed to be of the centre-left, operate. It represents the culmination of the right's transformation into a movement promoting innovative social transformation, through extensive marketisation, the

commercialisation of public services, de-regulation and privatisation, while retaining other more traditional attachments of the right, notably to patriotism, elitism and a strong commitment to law and order. Unlike the third left, this latest, and most dynamic, version of the right succeeded to a remarkable extent in combining various contradictory agendas within an overarching neo-liberal framework of ideas. Its intellectual inspiration derives from Austrian economics and libertarian philosophers and social scientists, who maintain, against all left projects of rectifying inequalities, that these are doomed to be either futile or counterproductive or destructive of other cherished values (see Hirschman 1991).

Questions

So has this newest right prevailed? By the end of the century, acute, endemic disadvantage and deprivation were evident along several dimensions, within both the developed and developing worlds, and between them. In the United States 11.5 per cent of the population, some 32 million people, including twenty per cent of all children, lived in absolute poverty and over 40 million people were without health insurance. There were already some twenty million people out of work in Western Europe alone, with no prospect of a return to full employment, while increasing poverty, marginalisation and social exclusion for more and more categories of people seemed to be inseparable from liberal capitalist societies. Moreover, it was widely believed that tax aversion and a so-called 'culture of contentment,' on the part of a majority of those who vote, had largely robbed fiscal

policy of its progressive or egalitarian potential, both in the United States and increasingly throughout Western Europe. As for global inequality, Bobbio's comment suffices:

> One has only to shift one's attention from the social questions within individual states which gave rise to socialism in the last century to the international social question in order to realise that the left has not only not completed its task, it has hardly commenced it. (Bobbio 1996, p. 82).[6]

At the same time, various arguments were increasingly advanced for the discarding of the old maps and charts. Thus Francis Fukayama, announcing 'The End of History,' proclaimed liberal democracy ('the best possible solution to the human problem') to be the framework of our 'post-historical world' in which 'the major issues will be economic ones like promoting competitiveness and innovation, managing internal and external deficits, maintaining full employment, dealing co-operatively with grave environmental problems, and the like.' On this view, if the 'left' survives, it will not be as an integral part of that system, but as a relatively minor threat to it, in the form of claims to recognition. Liberal capitalist societies are, it seems, increasingly, through various 'equalising processes,' eliminating all inequalities not attributable to nature or the economically necessary division of labour: those that remain will be necessary and ineradicable, 'due to the nature of things rather than the will of man.' (Fukayama 1992, pp. 338, 283, 291). Others argued that sheer social complexity was rendering old-style politics anachronistic: we are seeing an ever-greater paralysis of 'the political market, marginalising all non-conforming expectations, and emptying

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6   According to James K. Galbraith, 'During the decades that happen to coincide with the rise of neoliberal ideology, with the breakdown of national sovereignties , and with the end of Keynesian policies in the global debt crisis of the early 1980s, inequality rose worldwide.' (Galbraith 2002, p. 22)

competition between the parties of all its potential for innovation in the face of a growing complexity and mobility in the social environment.' On this view, the political system cannot perform any function other than reducing insecurity through the management of social risks and: strategies for greater equality are beyond its scope. (Zolo 1992, p. 123). And many, in the last decades of the century, came to focus on globalisation as the greatest problem:

> the emergence of a global economic system which stretches beyond the control of any single state (even of dominant states); the expansion of networks of transnational relations and communications over which particular states have limited influence; the enormous growth in international organisations and regimes which can limit the scope for action of the most powerful states, and the development of global military order, and the build-up of the means of the means of 'total' warfare as an enduring feature of the contemporary world, which can reduce the range of policies available to governments and their citizens.' (Held 1993, p. 38).

So is there, as Hobsbawm suggests, no longer a coherent left-wing project of rectifying inequalities but rather only a continuum of unco-ordinated and contradictory single-issue movements and campaigns? Or is Giddens persuasive in seeing the left, or at least the centre-left, as occupied by a coherent rectifying project informed by distinctive values that constitutes the only feasible alternative to that of the neo-liberal right? Is 'socialism' the appropriate name for the left segment of the political spectrum? Can it still be used to mean a feasible and viable socio-economic system that is an alternative to capitalism and has a prospect of replacing it?

Or is capitalism sufficiently versatile to render this supposition unnecessary? Was Keynes after all right in thinking, in Professor Parsons words, that liberal democracy and capitalism 'contained many *possibilities'* and is any approximation to socialism among them? Is private ownership combined with market allocation incompatible with egalitarian ideals? Where are markets and privatisation appropriate and where do they conflict with the requirements of social citizenship? Have we exhausted the possibilities of combining these principles? Even if Professor Goodin is right that 'the traditional universalistic cradle-to-grave welfare state' is 'politically dead for the foreseeable future', there are, as he documents, several ways of rethinking social insurance, social assistance and substantial redistribution to be found in contemporary, new-style welfare states. In Scandinavia the social democratic model was during its heyday (and since) remarkably successful at rectification along several dimensions (to cite only one, almost no-one was poor after taxes and transfers). That model began to fail in the 1980s with the end of centralised bargaining and of social democratic government. Is social democracy, then, over, in any recognisable form?[7] Was it weakened primarily by intrinsic internal deficiencies (such as excessive and inefficient regulation and government intervention, unsustainable universalistic welfare programmes, high marginal tax rates leading to capital flight and wage drift undermining the centralised wage bargains) or by external factors (the changing class structure, notably the decline of manual labour, and the impact of increasing international competition)? To what extent are these insurmountable? Does it still have a future, in an appropriately modified form, despite the manifold constraints of globalisation, perhaps within

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[7]   For a valuable discussion of this question, and of larger questions raised in this chapter, see Przeworski 1985 and 1993.

contexts larger, or smaller, than the nation state? By the end of the century none of these questions was decisively answered or even answerable.

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