## (Reader Note)

**The Army Lineage Book, Volume II: Infantry, dtd 1953**

The enclosed "pdf" document is an extract of The Army Lineage Book, Volume II: Infantry, dtd 1953, prepared at the Office, Chief of Military History.

The extract is provided to show the Lineage and History of the Infantry Regiments that comprised the 34th Infantry Division from inception on 1 October 1917 thru WWI, mid war reorganizations, thru WWII, and the reconstitutions of the division after World War II and up to 1953. The Army Regiments covered in this document extract are:

133rd Infantry Regiment, Iowa

134th Infantry Regiment, Nebraska

135th Infantry Regiment, Minnesota

136th Infantry Regiment, Minnesota

164th Infantry Regiment, North Dakota

168th Infantry Regiment, Iowa

For lineage updates of the infantry regiments of the 34th Infantry Division after 1953, the reader will have to refer to later reference publications of the U.S. Army Center for Military History.

Pages In Order: i – vii, 386-398, 474-476, 488-490, 1-5, 34-61

# The ARMY LINEAGE BOOK



*1953*

## Volume II: Infantry

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# THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK

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# FOREWORD

THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK was prepared at the Office, Chief of Military History, and includes information on unit insignia prepared at the Office of the Quartermaster General. The purpose of THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK is to gather into compact form the official historical records of all major units of the United States Army, in order to perpetuate and publicize their traditions, honors, and devices.

Because of the large number of organizational changes which have occurred since the last official publication of Army lineages, and the even larger number of units whose lineages have never been published, it has been necessary to reexamine completely the historical background of all the units mentioned herein. New facts discovered have led to numerous changes. In view of these changes, and because many organizations have not as yet been authorized distinctive insignia, it has been considered advisable to publish THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK initially as a series of provisional volumes, which can be combined into a single, definitive book at a later date.

This volume is intended primarily for the use of the units it mentions, and for officers at major headquarters responsible for military history and troop morale. Distribution is limited by available funds, and it is suggested that this volume be given the widest possible availability within the headquarters or unit receiving it. Additional copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

It should be emphasized that the lineage, honors and insignia of a unit are all based directly upon its actual history as interpreted by the Department of the Army. If, at a later date, it is determined that they have been based upon errors of fact, they may be changed. Comments and corrections are invited and should be addressed to the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

# PREFACE

The Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, is responsible for the official determination and publication of unit lineages and battle honors. Such determination is governed by AR 220–305, 18 March 1949, and AR 220–315, 11 April 1952, with changes. National Guard Regulations contain provisions relating specifically to units of the National Guard.

The officially authorized lineages and battle honors of units of the United States Regular Army were published by the War Department in the annual *Army Register* through the year 1916. On 1 May 1921, a booklet titled "Outlines of History of Regiments, United States Army" was issued by the Statistics Branch, General Staff, which corrected the lineages to that date. Subsequently, those of Regular Army units were published in the *Army Register*, 1922–1938, while those of National Guard units appeared in the *National Guard Register*, 1939. No compilation of the lineages of Organized Reserve Corps units has been officially published before.

Army organizations of regimental and battalion size, formally constituted and of fixed type, are authorized a coat of arms and a distinctive insignia. The former is displayed on the organizational color or standard, while the latter is worn on the uniform. The authorization and wear of distinctive unit insignia is governed by SR 600–60–1, 26 October 1951, and The Quartermaster General is charged with responsibility for the design and approval of all such devices. No compilation thereof has been officially published before.

As far as practicable, the terminology used in lineages has been that in use at the time of the action described. Modern terminology is prescribed in AR 220–5, 23 October 1953.

In all cases, the coat of arms of a unit is pictured on the left side of the page above its statement of lineage, and its distinctive insignia, on the right side. Each is described at the end of the statement. The colors of both are represented by heraldic tricking, explained in the chart on page 62.

An overall history of American Infantry organization has been included in order to make the separate lineages more understandable. Bibliographies of unit histories have been added in the belief that many commanding officers will desire to pursue the histories of their commands beyond the narrow limits of the official lineage. Almost

the Office of Military History assumes no responsibility.

As a general rule, lineages have been carried only to the outbreak of the Korean operations in June 1950. However, in cases where a change occurred in a unit's designation after June 1950, its lineage has been continued to embrace this change, although Korean honors, if any, may not have been added.

Only those regiments and battalions are included which are carried on the rolls of the Army. These rolls comprise two categories of units, active and inactive, and exclude all that have been disbanded. The term disbanded simply means removed from the rolls of the Army. The reader who cannot find his own regiment is advised to search carefully through the lineages. By this means he may find its history perpetuated in some other command. Certain infantry units have been converted to other branches, and consequently will appear in later volumes.



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


## 133d INFANTRY REGIMENT (FIRST IOWA)

**NG (Iowa)**
**(34th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

Constituted and organized in May 1861 as 2d and 3d Regiments, Iowa Volunteer Infantry, and mustered into Federal service 27 May and 8 June 1861, respectively. Reorganized at expiration of 3 years service as 2d Regiment, 22 May 1864, with 6 companies, and 3d Regiment, 8 July 1864, with 3 companies. Consolidated 4 November 1864 as 2d Regiment, Iowa Volunteer Infantry; mustered out of Federal service 12 July 1865 at Louisville, Ky.

Reorganized 1876–1878 as independent companies of volunteer militia. (Iowa State Militia redesignated Iowa National Guard 3 April 1878.) Separate companies in central portion of State consolidated 11 September 1879 to form 8th Infantry Regiment, I. N. G. Reorganized 1880–1881 by an exchange of companies and redesignated 1 October 1881 as 1st Infantry Regiment. Mustered into Federal service as 49th Iowa Volunteer Infantry 2 June 1898 at Camp McKinley, Des Moines, Iowa; mustered out 13 May 1899 at Savannah, Ga. Reorganized and redesignated 53d Infantry Regiment 30 November 1902. Reorganized and redesignated 1st Infantry Regiment 3 July 1915.



Mustered into Federal service 2 June 1916 at Camp Dodge, Iowa, for Mexican Border; mustered out 15 January 1917 at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Called into Federal service 25 March 1917; drafted in 5 August 1917. Reorganized and redesignated 133d Infantry Regiment, 34th Division, 1 October 1917. Demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill. (34th Division demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill.; reorganized 1922.) Reorganized, consolidated with 4th Infantry Regiment (organized 1918–1919 in Iowa State Guard), and Federally recognized 1 April 1921 as 134th Infantry Regiment, 34th Division. Redesignated 133d Infantry Regiment 11 July 1921.

Inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941 at Sioux City. Inactivated 3 November 1945 at Camp Patrick Henry, Va. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 25 November 1946 at Cedar Falls.

### Home Area

Central Iowa.

### Campaign Streamers

*Civil War*
- Fort Donelson
- Shiloh
- Vicksburg
- Atlanta

*World War I*
- Without inscription

*World War II*
- Tunisia
- Naples-Foggia
- Anzio
- Rome-Arno
- North Apennines
- Po Valley

### Decorations

Fr CdeG with Palm embroidered BELVEDERE. (DA GO 43, 1950).

Following elements each entitled to DUC embroidered NORTHERN ITALY:

Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion
Company A
Company B
(WD GO 113, 1946)

### Coat of Arms

*Shield.* Argent, a Spanish castle debased gules, to chief a fleur-de-lis of the like and on a mount a giant cactus vert.

*Crest.* That for the regiments of the Iowa National Guard: On a wreath of the colors (argent and gules) a hawk's head erased proper.

*Motto. Avauncez* (Advance, or Forward).

The shield is silver, or white, the old Infantry color. The Spanish castle, taken from the Spanish campaign medal, is used to

represent military service outside the continental limits of the United States, while the cactus and fleur-de-lis are for Mexican Border and World War I service, respectively.

### Distinctive Insignia

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms of the regiment.

### Published Histories


Lt S. D. Thompson, *Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment* (Cincinnati, 1864).

Capt A. A. Stuart, *Iowa Colonels and Regiments: Being a History of Iowa Regiments in the War of the Rebellion; and Containing a Description of the Battles in which They Fought* (Des Moines, 1865), 35–108.

Lurton Dunham Ingersoll, *Iowa and the Rebellion. A History of the Troops Furnished by the State of Iowa to the Volunteer Armies of the Union . . .* (3d ed, Philadelphia, Dubuque, 1867).

Lt John T. Bell, *Tramps and Triumphs of the Second Iowa Infantry, Briefly Sketched* (Omaha, 1886).

Samuel Hawthorne Marshall Byers, *Iowa in War Times* (Des Moines, 1888), 482–86.

Warren Olney, "Shiloh as Seen by a Private Soldier," *M. O. L. L. U. S., California War Papers* No. 5 (1889).

Col George W. Crosley, "Charge of the Light Brigade," *M. O. L. L. U. S., Iowa War Sketches and Incidents* (Des Moines, 1893), Vol. 1, 380–92.

Gen J. M. Tuttle, "Personal Recollections of 1861," *M. O. L. L. U. S., Iowa War Sketches and Incidents* (Des Moines, 1893, Vol. 1, 18–24.

Capt J. E. Whipple, *The Story of the Forty-ninth [Iowa U. S. Volunteer Infantry]* (Vinton, 1903).

Robert I. Garden, *History of Scott Township, Mahasha County, Iowa, War Reminiscences . . .* (Oskaloosa, 1907). 91–205.

*Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers in the War of the Rebellion Together with Historical Sketches of Volunteer Organizations 1861–1866* (Des Moines, 1908), Vol. 1, 89–524.





## 134th INFANTRY REGIMENT (FIRST NEBRASKA)

**NG (Neb.)**
**(34th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

Organized in 1855 from independent militia companies of Nebraska Territory as 1st and 2d Regiments, Nebraska Militia, Brig Gen John M. Thayer. Reorganized in part at Omaha, Nebraska Territory, as 1st Regiment, Nebraska Volunteer Infantry (two companies organized from volunteers of Iowa), Col John M. Thayer, and mustered into Federal service 11 June–21 July 1861. Redesignated 1st Nebraska Cavalry 5 November 1863. Consolidated with 1st Battalion, Nebraska Veteran Cavalry (organized 23 October 1862–24 March 1863 at Omaha; mustered out 4 September–23 December 1863, and reorganized 14 January–31 August 1864 as 1st Battalion, Nebraska Veteran Cavalry) and redesignated 1st Nebraska Cavalry Veteran Volunteers 18 July 1865. Mustered out of Federal service 1 July 1866 at Omaha.

Reorganized until 1875 as independent companies, Nebraska Militia. Reorganized by 1879 as 1st Regiment of Mounted Infantry (formed 1875–1876) and 2d Regiment of Infantry (formed 1878–1879). Consolidated and reorganized 13 July 1881 as 1st Regiment,

Nebraska National Guard. (Nebraska Militia redesignated Nebraska National Guard 28 February 1881.) Mustered into Federal service as 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry 9–10 May 1898 at Lincoln; mustered out 23 August 1899 at San Francisco, Calif. Reorganized 11 June 1900 as 1st Infantry Regiment, N. N. G. Consolidated with 2d Infantry Regiment (organized 13 August 1887) and reorganized as 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments 1 April 1913.

4th and 5th Infantry Regiments mustered into Federal service 3 July 1916 for Mexican Border; mustered out 21 February 1917. Called into Federal service 15 July 1917; drafted in 5 August 1917. Redesignated 134th Infantry Regiment, 34th Division, 1 October 1917. Demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill. (34th Division demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill.) Reorganized 1920–1921 as 1st Infantry Regiment, N. N. G. Redesignated 134th Infantry Regiment 22 June 1921.

Inducted into Federal service 23 December 1940 at Omaha, as element of 35th Division. Inactivated 21 November 1945 at Camp Breckinridge, Ky. Relieved from assignment to 35th Infantry Division 19 June 1946 and assigned to 34th Infantry Division. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 17 October 1946 at Omaha.

### Home Area

State at large.

### Campaign Streamers

*Indian Wars*
- Dakota 1863
- Nebraska 1864–1865
- Colorado 1865
- Pine Ridge

*Civil War*
- Missouri 1861–1865
- Henry and Donelson
- Mississippi River
- Shiloh
- Arkansas 1864

*War with Spain*
- Manila

*Philippine Insurrection*
- Manila
- Malolos

*World War I*
- Without inscription

*World War II*
- Aleutian Islands
- Normandy
- Northern France
- Rhineland
- Ardennes-Alsace
- Central Europe

### Decorations

DUC embroidered BASTOGNE. (WD GO 62, 1947)

Fr CdeG with Palm embroidered ST. LO. (DA GO 43, 1950)

All companies 1st Battalion entitled to DUC embroidered ST. LO. (WD GO 66, 1945)

Company C entitled to DUC embroidered HABKIRCHEN. (WD GO 68, 1945)



Following elements each entitled to MUC embroidered EUROPEAN THEATER:

Headquarters Company
Medical Detachment
(GO 15, 24, 49, 59, 35th Inf Div, 1945)

Service Company entitled to two MUC each embroidered EUROPEAN THEATER. (GO 59, 35th Inf Div, 1945)

### Coat of Arms

*Shield.* Per chevron azure and argent, in chief the Katipunan sun in splendor and an olla or charged with a bull skull gules, in base on a mound vert a palm tree proper entwined with a snake of the fifth.

*Crest.* That for the regiments of the Nebraska National Guard: On a wreath of the colors (argent and azure) an ear of corn in full ear partially husked proper.

*Motto. Lah we lah his* (The Brave).

The shield is argent and azure, the old and the present colors of Infantry. The Katipunan sun represents service in the Philippine Insurrection and the palm tree that in the War with Spain. The olla is made gold to comply with heraldic rules, and denotes the World War I service of the organization in the 34th Division. The snake symbolizes Mexican Border duty.

### Distinctive Insignia

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms of the regiment.

### Published Histories

Harrison Johnson, *Johnson's History of Nebraska* (Omaha, 1880), 150–62.

*History of the State of Nebraska* (Chicago, 1882), pp. 230–318.

Alfred Sorenson, *History of Omaha from the Pioneer Days to the Present Time* (Omaha, 1889), 161–86.

J. W. Savage, J. T. Bill, and C. W. Butterfield, *History of the City of Omaha, Nebraska, and South Omaha* (New York, 1894), 149–61.

Maj Gen Butler B. Miltonberger and Maj James A. Huston, *134th Infantry Regiment: Combat History of World War II* (Baton Rouge, 1946).

James A. Huston, *Biography of a Battalion; Being the Life and Times of an Infantry Battalion in World War II* (Gering, 1950).




## 135th INFANTRY REGIMENT (FIRST MINNESOTA)

**NG (Minn.)**
**(47th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

1st Regiment, Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, organized 27 April 1861 at Fort Snelling, Minn. (Company A, Pioneer Guards, organized 17 April 1856 at St. Paul.) Mustered into Federal service 29 April 1861 for three years. Reorganized April 1864 as 1st Battalion, Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. Expanded and redesignated 1st Regiment, Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, 23 February 1865. Mustered out of Federal service 14 July 1865 at Jeffersonville, Ind.

Reorganized 1870 from regimental veteran association as 1st Regiment, Minnesota Enrolled Militia. (Active or volunteer element of Minnesota Enrolled Militia redesignated Minnesota National Guard by Act of Legislature 1 March 1871.) (Regimental organization remained inactive after about 1875, except for St. Paul Light Infantry active 1875–1879.)

Reorganized 1880 as 1st Battalion, M. N. G., to embrace following independent volunteer companies in St. Paul-Minneapolis area: Minneapolis Light Infantry, organized 1879, as Company A; Minneapolis Zouave Corps, organized 1879, as Company B; St. Paul Guards, organized 1879 as Company C; Allen Light Guards, organized 1879 in St. Paul, as Company D. Expanded and redesignated 1883 as 1st



Infantry Regiment, M. N. G., with companies as follows: Company A, Minneapolis; Company B, Minneapolis; Company C, St. Paul; Company D, St. Paul; Company E, St. Paul; Company F, Fergus Falls; Company G, Red Wing; Company H, Litchfield; Company I, Minneapolis; Company K, Stillwater. Redesignated 13th Infantry Regiment, Minnesota Volunteers, 4 May 1898 and mustered into Federal service 7 May 1898 at Camp Ramsey, Minn.; mustered out 3 October 1899 at San Francisco, Calif. Reorganized as 1st Infantry Regiment, M. N. G., 27 March 1900.

Mustered into Federal service 30 June 1916 at Fort Snelling, Minn., for Mexican Border; mustered out 14 March 1917 at Fort Snelling. Called into Federal service 25 March 1917 and mustered in 26 March–7 April 1917; drafted in 5 August 1917. Redesignated 135th Infantry Regiment, 34th Division, 1 October 1917. Demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill. (34th Division demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill.; reorganized about 1922.) Reorganized as 1st Infantry Regiment, M. N. G., 31 January 1920. Redesignated 135th Infantry Regiment, 34th Division, 21 November 1921.

Inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941 at Minneapolis. Inactivated 3 November 1945 at Camp Patrick Henry, Va. Relieved from assignment to 34th Infantry Division and assigned to 47th Infantry Division 19 June 1946. Reorganized, less former companies of 3d Battalion, with Headquarters Federally recognized 23 September 1946 at Mankato.

### Home Area

Southern Minnesota.

### Campaign Streamers

*Civil War*
- Virginia 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865
- Bull Run
- Peninsula
- Valley
- Antietam
- Fredericksburg
- Gettysburg
- Petersburg

*War with Spain*
- Manila

*Philippine Insurrection*
- Luzon
- San Isidro

*World War I*
- Without inscription

*World War II*
- Tunisia
- Naples Foggia
- Anzio
- Rome Arno
- North Apennines
- Po Valley

### Decorations

Fr CdeG with Palm embroidered BELVEDERE (WD GO 24, 1947)

### Coat of Arms

*Shield.* Argent, on a saltire azure between in chief a fleur-de-lis gules, in fess the Corps badge of the 2d Division, VIII Army

262292—54——26

Corps, during the War with Spain proper (two white circles overlapping each other one-third radius, resembling the figure "8") fringed of the third, and two bolos saltirewise, and in base a bull's skull of the like; the 2d Division, II Corps, badge of the Civil War of the fourth (a white three-leafed clover with stem, voided).

*Crest.* That for the regiments and battalions of the Minnesota National Guard: On a wreath of the colors (argent and azure) a sheaf of wheat proper.

*Motto.* To the Last Man.

The shield is white, the old Infantry color. The blue saltire is taken from the Confederate flag and represents Civil War service. At the battle of Gettysburg the 1st Minnesota Infantry Volunteers were in the 2d Division, II Corps (Hancock's), whose badge was the three-leafed clover. The figure "8" represents War with Spain service, the crossed bolos Philippine Insurrection service, and the fleur-de-lis World War I service. The bull's skull, shoulder sleeve insignia of the 34th Infantry Division, indicates service with the division during the period of peace and through World War II.

### Distinctive Insignia

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms.

### Published Histories


J. N. Searles, "The First Minnesota Volunteer Infantry," *M. O. L. L. U. S. Minnesota. Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle* (St. Paul, 1890), 2d Series, 80–113.

*Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861–1865* (St. Paul, 1891), Vol. 1, 1–78.

William Lochren, "The First Minnesota at Gettysburg," *M. O. L. L. U. S. Minnesota. Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle* (St. Paul, 1893), 3d Series, 42–56.

*13th Minn. Vols. (1st Regiment N. G. S. M.): Historical Record in the War with Spain* (Minneapolis, 1900).

John Bowe, *With the 13th Minnesota in the Philippines* (Minneapolis, 1905?).

Corp Hiram David Frankel, *ed, Company "C," First Infantry Minnesota National Guard; Its History and Development* (St. Paul, 1905).

Jasper N. Searles, Matthew F. Taylor, *et al, History of the First Regiment Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, 1861–1864* (Stillwater, 1916).

Franklin F. Holbrook, *ed, Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection* (St. Paul, 1923), Vol. 1, 46–72.

Franklin F. Holbrook and Livia Appel, *Minnesota in the War with Germany* (St. Paul, 1928), Vol. 1, 268–97.

. . . *Welcome to the 135th Inf.* (n. p., 1945).







## 136th INFANTRY REGIMENT (SECOND MINNESOTA)

**NG (Minn.)**
**(47th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

Organized 22 July 1861 at Fort Snelling, Minn., as 2d Regiment, Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. Companies mustered into Federal service 26 June–23 August 1861; reorganized 29 December 1863. Mustered out of Federal service 10 July 1865 at Louisville, Ky. (Active or volunteer element of Minnesota Enrolled Militia redesignated Minnesota National Guard by Act of Legislature 1 March 1871.)

Reorganized as independent companies, M. N. G., including Governor's Guard, organized 1874 at New Ulm, and Faribault Guards, organized in 1876; consolidated in 1880 to form 2d Battalion, M. N. G. Expanded and redesignated 27 February 1883 as 2d Infantry Regiment, with Headquarters at New Ulm. Redesignated 4 May 1898 as 12th Infantry Regiment, Minnesota Volunteers, and mustered into Federal service 7 May 1898 at St. Paul; mustered out 5 November 1898 at New Ulm (did not serve outside continental United States). Reorganized 3 March 1899 as 2d Infantry Regiment, M. N. G.

Mustered into Federal service 26 June 1916 at Fort Snelling,

Minn., for Mexican Border; mustered out 24 January 1917 at Fort Snelling. Called into Federal service 15 July 1917; drafted in 5 August 1917. Redesignated 136th Infantry Regiment, 34th Division, 1 October 1917. Demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill. (34th Division demobilized 18 February 1919 at Camp Grant, Ill.)

Reconstituted and activated 1 April 1942 in Army of the United States (organized with personnel of infantry of 33d Infantry Division, Illinois National Guard) and assigned to the 33d Infantry Division. Inactivated 5 February 1946 at Otsu, Japan, and relieved from assignment to 33d Infantry Division. Assigned to 47th Infantry Division 10 June 1946. Allotted to Minnesota National Guard 21 June 1946 and consolidated with former 217th Coast Artillery Regiment (*see* ANNEX) with no change in designation. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 23 September 1946 at St. Cloud.

## Annex

2d and 3d Infantry Regiments, Minnesota National Guard, organized in June and July 1918, respectively, by consolidation of 1st, 5th, 6th, 11th, and 15th Battalions, Home Guard (organized 1917–1918). Redesignated 1 August 1918 as 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments, and Federally recognized 17 and 30 January 1919, respectively. Redesignated 1 December 1923 as 205th and 206th Infantry Regiments. Converted and reorganized 1 July 1940 in part as 217th Coast Artillery Regiment, and inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941. Reorganized and redesignated 10 September 1943 as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Group; 1st Battalion as 775th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion; 2d Battalion as 257th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion; 3d Battalion as 344th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Battalion. Elements inactiviated as follows: 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Group 24 August 1944 at Camp Bowie, Tex.; 775th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion 6 May 1944 at Camp Phillips, Kan.; 257th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion 1 December 1944 at Camp Livingston, La; 344th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Battalion 12 June 1944 at Camp Haan, Calif. Converted and consolidated 21 June 1946 with 136th Infantry Regiment.

## Home Area

Northern Minnesota.



## Campaign Streamers

*Civil War*
- Shiloh
- Kentucky 1862
- Tennessee 1862
- Alabama 1862
- Chickamauga
- Chattanooga
- Atlanta

*Civil War*—Continued
- North Carolina 1865

*World War I*
- Without inscription

*World War II*
- New Guinea
- Luzon

## Decorations

Following elements each entitled to DUC embroidered LUZON:

Company A
Company F
Company G
Company I

(WD GO 108, 1946; DA GO 28, 1947)

Following elements each entitled to MUC embroidered ASIATIC-PACIFIC THEATER:

Service Company
Medical Company

(GO 129, 33d Inf Div, 1945)

## Coat of Arms

*Shield.* Azure, a bearcat rampant argent langued gules between in fess a five-pointed mullet and a gopher sejant or; on a chief of the second a saltire couped of the field.

*Crest.* That for the regiments and battalions of the Minnesota National Guard; On a wreath of the colors (argent and azure) a sheaf of wheat proper.

*Motto. Rex Montis* (King of the Hill).

The bearcat is from the coat of arms of the 136th Infantry Regiment; the star and gopher are from the coats of arms of the former 205th and 206th Infantry Regiments, predecessors of the 217th Coast Artillery Regiment. The chief bearing a saltire, is incorporated to symbolize Civil War service of the 136th Infantry Regiment. The shield is blue for Infantry.

## Distinctive Insignia

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms of the regiment.

## Published Histories

William Bircher, *A Drummer-Boy's Diary; Comprising Four Years of Service with the Second Regiment Minnesota Veteran Volunteers, 1861 to 1865* (St. Paul, 1889).

Brevet Brig Gen J. W. Bishop, "The Mill Spring Campaign, *M.O.L.L.U.S. Minnesota. Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle* (St. Paul, 1890), 2d Series, 52–79.

Brevet Brig Gen Judson W. Bishop, *The Story of a Regiment; Being a Narrative of the Service of the Second Regiment, Minnesota Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War of 1861–1865* (St. Paul, 1890).

*Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861–1865* (St. Paul, 1890), Vol. 1, 79–122.

Capt S. C. Donahower, "Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge," *M. O. L. L. U. S. Minnesota. Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle* (St. Paul, 1903) 5th Series, 74–102.

Brevet Brig Gen J. W. Bishop, "Van Derveer's Brigade at Chickamauga," *M. O. L. L. U. S. Minnesota. Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle* (Minneapolis, 1909), 6th Series, 54–74.

Franklin F. Holbrook, *ed, Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection* (St. Paul, 1923), Vol. 1, 32–45.

Franklin F. Holbrook and Livia Appel, *Minnesota in the War with Germany* (St. Paul, 1928), Vol. 1, 268–302.

Lt D. L. Waage, *comp, A History of the Fighting 136th Infantry "Bearcat" Regiment 1861–1951* (Camp Rucker, Ala., 1951).







## 164th INFANTRY REGIMENT (FIRST NORTH DAKOTA)

**NG (N. D.)**
**(47th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

Organized 31 January 1885 as 1st Regiment, Dakota Territory. (Territory of Dakota divided into States of North Dakota and South Dakota by enabling Act of Congress 22 February 1889; organized militia of North Dakota redesignated North Dakota National Guard 6 March 1891.) Mustered into Federal service as 1st North Dakota Volunteer Infantry Regiment 20 May 1898; mustered out 25 September 1899 at San Francisco, Calif. Reorganized as 1st Infantry Regiment, N. D. N. G., in November 1899.

Mustered into Federal service 1 July 1916 for Mexican Border; mustered out 14 February 1917 at Fort Snelling, Minn. 2d Battalion called into Federal service 25 March 1917. Balance of regiment called into Federal service 15 July 1917. Regiment drafted into Federal service 5 August 1917. Regiment redesignated 164th Infantry Regiment, 41st Division, 19 September 1917. Demobilized 11 March 1919 at Camp Dodge, Iowa. (41st Division demobilized 22 February 1919, relieving components from assignment.) Reorganized as 164th Infantry Regiment, N. D. N. G., 3 January 1920; assigned to 34th Division.



Inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941 at Fargo. Relieved from assignment to 34th Division 8 December 1941. Assigned to Americal Division in New Caledonia 24 May 1942. Inactivated 24 November 1945 at Fort Lawton, Wash. Relieved from assignment to Americal Division and assigned to 47th Infantry Division 10 June 1946. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 6 November 1946 at Hettinger.

### Home Area

State at large.

### Campaign Streamers

*War with Spain*
Manila
*Philippine Insurrection*
Manila
Laguna De Bay
San Isidro
*World War I*
Without inscription
*World War II*
Guadalcanal
Northern Solomons
Leyte
Southern Philippines

Tank Company (Harvey; then Antitank Company) entitled to silver band as follows:

*World War II*
Southern Philippines (with arrowhead)

### Decorations

Presidential Unit Citation (Navy) streamer embroidered SOLOMONS. (DA GO 73, 1948)

Philippine PUC embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945. (DA GO 47, 1950)

### Coat of Arms

*Shield.* Azure, a Spanish castle gules fimbriated between three six-pointed mullets, one and two, and behind a rising sun issuing from base, all or.

*Crest.* That for the regiments of the North Dakota National Guard: On a wreath of the colors (or and azure) a sheaf of three arrows argent, armed and flighted gules, behind a stringed bow fessways or with grip of the second.

*Motto. Je suis Pret* (I am Ready).

The shield is blue for Infantry, with the Spanish castle taken from the Spanish campaign medal representing service in the War with Spain. Philippine Insurrection service is indicated by the three mullets from the Philippine Islands flag. The sun in base, from the 41st Division shoulder sleeve insignia, denotes World War I service with that division.

### Distinctive Insignia

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms of the regiment.

### Published Histories

Herbert Clay Fish and R. M. Black, *A Brief History of North Dakota* (New York, Cincinnati, etc., 1925), 168–74, 192–204.




## 168th INFANTRY REGIMENT (THIRD IOWA)

**NG (Iowa)**
**(34th Inf Div)**

### Lineage

Organized from independent companies in southwestern area of State (including Council Bluffs Guards organized 1855–1856) as 4th Regiment, Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Col Grenville M. Dodge, and mustered into Federal service 8–31 August 1861 by companies; reorganized 1 January 1864 as 4th Iowa Veteran Infantry; mustered out 24 July 1865 at Louisville, Ky.

Reorganized 1868–1876 as independent companies of volunteer militia. Companies consolidated 1876–1877 to form 3d Infantry Regiment (organized 18 February 1876) and 5th Infantry Regiment (organized 15 January 1877). (Iowa State Militia redesignated Iowa National Guard 3 April 1878.) Regiments consolidated and redesignated 3d Infantry Regiment, I. N. G., 30 April 1892. Mustered into Federal service as 51st Infantry Regiment, Iowa Volunteers, 30 May 1898 at Des Moines; mustered out 2 November 1899 at San Francisco, Calif. Reorganized as 51st Infantry Regiment 26 March 1900. Redesignated 55th Infantry Regiment 26 November 1902. Redesignated 3d Infantry Regiment 4 July 1915.



Mustered into Federal service 26 June 1916 for Mexican Border; mustered out 20 February 1917. Called into Federal service 15 July 1917; drafted in 5 August 1917. Redesignated 168th Infantry Regiment, 42d Division, 16 August 1917. Demobilized 17 May 1919 at Camp Dodge, Iowa. (42d Division demobilized 9 May 1919 relieving component from assignment.) Reorganized and Federally recognized 1920–21 as 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division.

Inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941 at Des Moines. Inactivated 3 November 1945 at Camp Patrick Henry, Va. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 23 January 1947 at Council Bluffs.

### Home Area

Southern Iowa.

### Campaign Streamers

*Civil War*
- Arkansas 1862
- Vicksburg
- Chattanooga
- Alabama 1863
- Atlanta
- North Carolina 1865
- South Carolina 1865

*Philippine Insurrection*
- Manila
- Malolos

*World War I*
- Champagne-Marne
- Aisne-Marne
- Lorraine
- Champagne
- St. Mihiel
- Meuse-Argonne

*World War II*
- Algeria-French Morocco (with arrowhead)
- Tunisia
- Naples-Foggia
- Anzio
- Rome-Arno
- North Apennines
- Po Valley

### Decorations

Fr CdeG with Palm embroidered BELVEDERE. (DA GO 24, 1947)

Company B (Des Moines) entitled to DUC embroidered MT. PANTANO, ITALY. (WD GO 86, 1944)

Following elements each entitled to DUC embroidered CERVARO, ITALY:

Company E (Shenandoah)
Company F (Villisca)
Company G (Centerville)

(WD GO 6, 1945)

Following elements each entitled to Fr CdeG with Silver Star embroidered FRANCE:

Mortar Section, Headquarters Company (nondisplayable)
1st Platoon, Company B (nondisplayable)
2d Platoon, Company B (nondisplayable)

(WD GO 11, 1924)

262292—54——32

*Shield.* Argent, a bend archy in the colors of the rainbow between in chief a prickly pear cactus and in base a palm tree on a mound proper.

*Crest.* That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Iowa National Guard: On a wreath of the colors (argent and azure) a hawk's head erased proper.

*Motto.* On Guard.

The shield is white, the old Infantry color. The bend archy in the form of a rainbow shows the service of the 168th Infantry in World War I in the 42d Division. The cactus represents the Mexican Border duty and the palm tree the Philippine service.

**Distinctive Insignia**

The insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms of the regiment.

**Published Histories**


Capt A. A. Stuart, *Iowa Colonels and Regiments: Being a History of Iowa Regiments in the War of the Rebellion; and Containing a Description of the Battles in Which They Fought* (Des Moines, 1865), 109–24.

Lurton Dunham Ingersoll, *Iowa and the Rebellion. A History of the Troops Furnished by the State of Iowa to the Volunteer Armies of the Union . . .* (3d ed, Philadelphia, Dubuque, 1867).

Samuel Hawthorne Marshall Byers, *Iowa in War Times* (Des Moines, 1888), 486–88.

Joseph I. Markey, *From Iowa to the Philippines: A History of Company M, Fifty-first Iowa Infantry Volunteers* (Red Oak, 1900).

*Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers in the War of the Rebellion Together with Historical Sketches of Volunteer Organizations 1861–1866* (Des Moines, 1908), Vol. 1, 525–672.

Capt Clifford Powell, *ed, Company Orders of the Dodge Light Guards, Company L, 3d Iowa Infantry, 1894–1916* (Council Bluffs, 1916).

Winfred E. Robb, *The Price of Our Heritage; in Memory of the Heroic Dead of the 168th Infantry; History of the Old 3d Iowa* (Des Moines, 1919).

Lawrence O. Stewart, *Rainbow Bright; 168th Infantry, 42d (Rainbow) Division, with Illustrations by the Author.* (Philadelphia, 1923).

Jno. H. Taber, *The Story of the 168th Infantry* (Iowa City, 1925), 2 vols.

# HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES INFANTRY

*The Era of Revolution*

By John K. Mahon

Infantry are those troops that fight on foot and that rely chiefly upon the small arms carried by individuals. The present account of infantry in the United States is sharply limited as follows. First, instead of probing into the earlier history of British infantry in the new world, it begins with the American Revolution. Second, it deals only with the organization of foot units at the level of regiments and below.

When Congress, 14 June 1775, authorized ten companies of riflemen to be raised in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, it created the Continental Army. Before leaving the home state, the six companies from Pennsylvania were combined to form William Thompson's Rifle Battalion. This battalion and the other new rifle units organized rapidly and marched quickly to Boston. Later, Congress also took over the New England Army then besieging the British in Boston as part of the Continental establishment. In consequence of this addition, the establishment acquired artillery as well as infantry, but no cavalry.

The New England Army before Boston was composed of citizen soldiers. From the earliest times that type of soldier (male members of the community aged 18–45) had been required to associate in military organizations called "militia," and to train to defend his own locality. The militia system amounted to universal military training for men of active ages, but it was for local defense almost entirely. What is more, its enforcement rested altogether with the colonies. At the outbreak of the Revolution, all the colonies had military organizations operating, but their effectiveness was, in many cases, slight. It was the general ineffectiveness of the militia system, coupled with the need for centralized control, that brought about the creation of the Continental Army. Even so, on account of the militia, the colonies were able to utilize the experience of many veterans of England's colonial wars, familiar with the British Army and with the Indian modes of fighting it. These veterans were a very valuable asset.

In addition to the rifle units and the besieging army, Congress later authorized the raising and maintaining of Continental infantry

battalions in the southern States. All in all, by December 1775 there were forty-nine infantry battalions (or regiments, for the two terms were virtually synonymous) and several unattached companies in the establishment.

The Continental Congress took the bulk of the army besieging Boston in 1775 as it found it. Since most of the units were enlisted only for the calendar year, General Washington had either to attempt to reenlist the soldiers already in service or to assemble a new army. During the fall of 1775, he strove to retain the Continental troops for the duration of the war, but was only successful in keeping part of them, and those for just one more year. A canvass of the officers of thirty-nine regiments in November showed that 751 officers were willing to continue their service for one year while 406 were not.

The legislators set the size of the army before Boston at 20,372 officers and men, to be organized into twenty-seven regiments and some separate companies. In this scheme New England, which had supplied forty-two in 1775, provided twenty-six Continental regiments in 1776. These twenty-six were numbered from the 2d through the 27th. They were designated Continental Infantry in an attempt to transfer the men's loyalty from the States to the Congress.

The 1st Continental did not come from New England, but was built around the nine companies of riflemen then in William Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion. As has been said, six of those companies were among the original units of the Continental Army, while the other three joined up later. All lost their specialization as rifle companies and the "regiment" became a standard element of the line.

Diverse units entered the Continental service, until by December 1776 there were eighty-two battalions of foot soldiers in all. During the year 1776 the following new units of battalion size were added to the establishment:

John Haslet's Delaware Regiment
James Livingston's Regiment, known as the 1st Canadian
Moses Hazen's Regiment, known as the 2d Canadian, also as "Congress' Own" (the two Canadian regiments contained about equal numbers of Canadians and New Englanders, but in January 1781 all foreigners in the service were transferred to Hazen's).
Seth Warner's Regiment, officered by men who had participated in the invasion of Canada in 1775 and, in part, filled by Green Mountain Boys
Samuel Miles' Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment
2d–12th Pennsylvania
1st–3d Georgia
1st–3d New Jersey



1st–9th Virginia
William Smallwood's Maryland Regiment
Charles Burrall's Connecticut Regiment
Samuel Elmore's Connecticut Regiment
Andrew Ward's Connecticut Regiment
The German Battalion

Their officers were appointed by Congress upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief.

Late in 1776 it was once again necessary to cope with the dissolution of the army, but this time Congress took a new tack. It attempted to create a force to serve "during the present war." The legislators, observing the size of the army in being, set the new establishment at eighty-eight battalions, and apportioned these among all the States, so that Massachusetts had to provide the greatest number, fifteen, and Delaware and Georgia the smallest, one apiece. The eighty-eight battalions thus authorized were raised, equipped, and officered by the States. They were no longer known by Continental numbers, but carried instead numbers in the several State organizations. These State organizations were called "lines," the term used then for the "regular infantry" or "foot" that made up the line of battle of an army. The State lines together comprised the Continental Line. These should not be confused with the occasional State regiments which were raised on a permanent basis for local service only.

Although the regiments of the several States, arranged in the Continental Line, replaced the numbered regiments of 1776 (for example, the 9th Continental of 1776 became the 1st Regiment of the Rhode Island Line in 1777), the change was mostly one of name. The relationship of regiments to States remained about as it had been, and the appointment of officers continued to be in practice a collaboration between Congress, the Commander in Chief, and the States. Some of the Continental regiments became units in the State lines, while the men and officers of others transferred to the new regiments of 1777 without carrying the lineage of their 1776 outfits with them. The reorganization of the winter of 1776 did not radically alter the way men came into the Continental service or the manner in which regiments were organized, but it did place responsibility for procurement, replacement, and supply more squarely upon the States. This stimulated an increased effort in some States: for example, Massachusetts and Connecticut (although later overruled by the Congress) voted to supplement the Continental pay of their lines.

In December 1776, while the reorganization of the American Army was taking place, the British advanced into New Jersey. Faced with this threat, Congress authorized Washington to add sixteen purely Continental battalions to the foot establishment. This

action resulted in part from the fact that the States had been unutterably slow in supplying their quotas for the eighty-eight line battalions. The term of service of the new sixteen was the same as that of the State lines, for three years or for the duration, but the similarity ended there. Washington raised them wherever he could, and himself appointed all their officers. The new Continental regiments were usually recruited within one State and, like all other units, had a hard struggle to reach full strength.

The organization established late in 1776 and early in 1777—containing as it did the State lines coupled with the sixteen additional Continental battalions—was a compromise between two needs. The first need was to utilize the powerful authority of the States, without which the conflict could not be prosecuted; the second was to have at least a few (16) regiments subject only to the will of the commander.

All regiments sent out their own recruiting parties to prescribed areas, but to keep the fighting army up to strength was almost an impossible job. In consequence, during 1780, when the theater of war had moved south, Washington had not enough troops to act against the enemy with the part of the army that he commanded in person. Indeed, Congress found it necessary to consolidate the sixteen additional Continentals with the State lines, and, at the same time, to fuse the separate corps and the German Battalion into them too. More important, the infantry of the entire Continental establishment was reduced to fifty battalions by 1 January 1781. Such a reduction of the infantry was not dictated by strategy. On the contrary, it was the result of a grave failure, the failure to be able to maintain a larger number of regiments.

As had been the case in previous years, new units appeared in the roster of the Continental Army during the four years beginning with 1777. They were often the fruit of the reorganization of earlier outfits. Whatever their source, a list of them follows:

1st–15th Massachusetts
5th New York
1st–6th Maryland
4th New Jersey
7th–10th North Carolina
10th–15th Virginia
The Corps of Invalids.

The regiments in this, and in the preceding list on page 2, made up the spine of the Army after 1776. They were not static; indeed some of the early ones provided elements of the others. Moreover, they supplied companies to special corps such as the legions of Henry Lee and Casimir Pulaski, and the Corps of Light Infantry.



Up to this point we have sketched the expansions and contractions of the Continental infantry in the broadest terms. We now direct our attention to the internal organization of regiments and their components. This shift of focus requires a short explanation of the tactics of infantry.

To begin with, the heart of a battle as fought in western Europe was the line of infantry. It was this line which had to be broken if victory were to be won; hence the heavy fire of the artillery and the maneuvers of the cavalry were chiefly directed against it. It was common in Europe for the battle line to be formed on an open plain just outside of effective artillery range of the enemy. This meant that the two lines took their positions within 500 yards of each other, a distance at which, with modern firearms, few men would be left standing. This is the fact which makes it hardest for moderns to visualize early warfare. The effective range of the musket of the period was not over 100 yards and was often nearer 50. Fighting at such ranges, infantry organization was founded upon the need to form the line, control it in battle, renew it when decimated, and maneuver it so as to place the enemy at disadvantage. But this was not the beginning and the end of infantry tactics, particularly in the rough, wooded terrain of North America.

In the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, the need had grown for infantrymen to precede the battle line. Their purpose was to screen the advance or retreat of their own main body, to break up the power of the volley from the enemy's line, and otherwise to soften that line for an assault with bayonets. Such an assault commonly began at a distance of fifty yards or less from the foe. As a result of it, one of two things took place: either a savage hand-to-hand encounter, or a collapse and retreat by one of the lines. In any case, the infantrymen who moved out ahead of the line were trained to aim at individuals, to protect themselves by using cover, and to operate with an interval of several yards between them. They came to be called "light infantry." In contrast to their action, the line fired by volley, without taking individual aim, remained standing unless ordered to do otherwise, and advanced with the men in it actually elbow to elbow up to the moment of the assault.

In the American service, as in the British, battalions and regiments were usually one and the same. An English regiment had ten companies in it, eight of them (the "battalion companies") for the line, the other two for special uses. These last were the elite or "flank companies." One called the "Grenadier Company" was composed of men picked for their strength and courage. As often as not (for instance, at Bunker Hill) the grenadier companies were detached from their regiments and used together in provisional grenadier battalions. These were given the most difficult assignments, and the posts of honor (i. e., of greatest danger) if used in the battle line.

of cavalry and artillery in the Regular Army. Also, some foot units of the National Guard in seaboard States were converted into coast artillery. This does not mean that he thought there was an excess of Regular infantry. On the contrary, in 1909 he asked that both infantry and artillery be increased. He fixed the proper proportion of infantry at 50 percent of the whole; but in the decade from 1901 to 1911, the ratio actually dropped from 50 percent to 35.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the growing role of the Signal Corps in support of infantry. As developed during the Civil War, the Corps had provided strategic communication, but by the time of the War with Spain it gave some tactical communication as well. This was accomplished by means of signal flags, and, to an ever increasing extent, by telephones. Telephone lines began to follow the infantry very close to the firing line. This was but a beginning, for telephone wires were to be the medium which in the twentieth century would link units of the same force on the vast battlefields, and link them better than they had once been linked by close-order formations.

### *The First World War*

A full ten months ahead of our formal entry into World War I, the National Defense Act, 3 June 1916, erected the framework on which to expand the military establishment if conflict should come. At the time, there were thirty-one regiments of Regular infantry, counting the Puerto Rico Regiment of two battalions, plus thirteen battalions of Philippine Scouts. In addition, the National Guard contained around 110 regiments of infantry.

The National Defense Act raised the authorized size of the Army from 100,000 to 175,000, and provided that the increase be made in five increments, beginning 1 July 1916. The first increment included seven new infantry regiments, the 31st through the 37th. The 31st was organized from Americans in the Philippines, the 32d from Americans in Hawaii, the 33d from the same in the Canal Zone, and the other four in continental United States. All seven of them expanded from cadres supplied by specified existing regiments. In addition, as soon as war commenced twenty-seven new infantry regiments were constituted and organized by the transfer of cadres from the other thirty-seven. When this process was completed, the Regular infantry comprised more regiments by seventeen than ever before in American history. The grand total was sixty-five.

The National Defense Act recognized four elements in the land forces: the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Reserve Corps, and in wartime, the Volunteer Army. Once the nation actually went to war, the character of the latter element changed, for volunteering was scrapped except in the Regular Army and in the National Guard. The Volunteer Army became the National Army, which was raised by



conscription. All in all, the wartime Army contained 297 infantry regiments of one kind or another, and 165 machine-gun battalions classed as infantry.

Infantry regiments and machine-gun battalions, lumped together, totaled 462 in World War I, a figure which is dwarfed by the 1,700-plus that served in the Civil War. One of the reasons for the contrast was the fact that regiments had increased three times in size; but the chief reason was that the units of the later war remained to the end, while those of the earlier one came and went.

The War Department on 11 July 1917 set up a system by which infantry units were designated. The designating numbers for all segments of the Regular Army began with 1. Regiments ran from 1 through 100, but these slots were never all filled. Just sixty-five Regular regiments, in twenty divisions, came into being, but the higher numbers allocated to the Regulars were finally used by National Army units. No 66th was raised, but during July, August, and September 1918, the 67th through the 90th were organized around cadres from the first sixty-four. None of them (67th–90th) reached the theater of war. The numbers reserved for regiments of the National Guard began at 101 and ran to 300, those for the National Army began with 301. Actually, the Guard regiments never used the numbers beyond 168, nor the National Army those past 388. The 376th through 378th, the 385th, and 386th never came into being.

Late in the conflict, on 7 August 1918, the distinction between National Guard, Reserve Corps, Regular Army, and National Army was legally abrogated and all four elements were fused into one organization, the United States Army. This was the first time in American affairs that career soldiers, citizen soldiers, and drafted men of the infantry had found themselves on the same legal basis.

Three years of observation of the war in Europe had convinced the General Staff that American tables of organization were obsolete. Accordingly, on 14 July 1917 a series of changes in them began. The first one altered the triangular division, containing elements grouped by threes, to a square one. In this change, the three brigades of a division and the three regiments of a brigade gave way to two of each. These alterations were based on the observed fact that a square division demonstrated far greater power to penetrate the system of trenches (peculiar to World War I) than other types. The result was a much larger division and brigade than any used by the nations of Europe. As finally shaken down, an American division contained 27,123 men, nearly twice the number in European units. Fire power in both division and brigade was greatly augmented.

In the transition from triangular to square divisions, and in the consequent alteration of regiments and battalions, the elements of the National Guard were seriously dislocated. Since out of the 367,223

enlisted men of the Guard originally inducted, 242,000 (66%) were infantrymen, it was believed necessary to break up many infantry units. As a result, old regiments and other units were consolidated and broken up, thereby losing their identity and their proud State designations.

As an example of the dislocation, consider the infantry elements of the State of Massachusetts. The old 2d Infantry was fortunate enough to remain intact under a new number, the 104th. The three other regiments, however, provided men for three infantry regiments, the 101st, 102d, and 103d, as well as for the 3d, 4th, and 5th Pioneer Infantry regiments, the 101st Engineer Train, the 101st Supply Train, and the 101st Headquarters and Military Police.

Since several of the newly constituted regiments of Pioneer Infantry drew their personnel from the breakup of National Guard units, they require brief mention. Resembling standard infantry regiments only in size (3,551 enlisted men), they were in reality a labor force used primarily to repair roads and bridges. Ninety-seven regiments were organized in all, the 1st through the 6th, 51st through 65th, and 801st through 816th. National Guard personnel went into the 1st through the 59th Regiments and drafted men into the 60th through the 65th. The outfits in the 800 series were formed of Negro personnel in 1918 to relieve the 1st through the 61st Regiments, so that the latter could reorganize for service as combat infantry.

Regimental organization underwent some changes, but the National Defense Act forbade increasing the number of companies in a regiment beyond fifteen. Among the fifteen, a headquarters, a supply, and a machine-gun company received permanent status for the first time. In any case, the changes reflected the requirements of trench warfare in Europe. As a result, an infantry regiment jumped from 2,002 to 3,720 enlisted men with an even larger increase in fire power.

The increase in size resulted from the need for deep formations in both attack and defense. In the attack, two battalions abreast might make up the first wave and the companies within them would be arranged also in depth. Behind the attack wave would come a support wave, perhaps the third battalion, and behind it would be elements, withdrawn from the three battalions, operating as a reserve. Likewise successive positions in depth were the standard formation in defense. Such formations to be adequate required large regiments. As had been the case since the War with Spain, infantry regiments contained three battalions of four companies each.

At the root of the organizational changes listed, and others that took place, were the demands of weapons. The machine gun led the list. The necessity to develop a proper organizational framework for the best use of that lethal arm raised a thorny problem, a problem which was heightened by the great increase in number of guns. In



May 1917 there was but one machine-gun company to each infantry regiment, while by July the number had risen to one per battalion. The ideal arrangement, after July, was to include three machine gun companies in every infantry regiment. Unfortunately, this could not be done—because of the way the National Defense Act was worded—without cutting some rifle companies out of the regiment. Accordingly, it was necessary to create machine-gun battalions that were elements of brigades and divisions, leaving just one company organic to infantry regiments. In numbering, the machine-gun battalions followed the general rule. Battalions of Regular divisions and brigades were given numbers solid from 1 through 60; those of the National Guard 101 through 151; and those of the National Army from 301 through 366. These units had to be put together from diverse segments of others that were broken up, hence their histories have not been passed down to modern outfits except in the National Guard.

The brigade battalions of machine guns contained three companies, while the division battalion was at first organized with four. This made a very awkward arrangement since machine gun companies had to be drawn from three sources—regiment, brigade, and division—in order to work with infantry battalions. Although the arrangement remained awkward throughout the war, and brigade and divisional battalions continued in being, the division battalion was finally reduced to two companies. These were motorized and used as a highly mobile element of the divisional reserve.

It was easier to alter organization in order to embrace machine guns than it was to supply these weapons. Although machine guns had been included in American arms since 1862, the Great War expanded their use so much that manufacturers in the United States could not at first supply them. As a result, American doughboys employed Chauchat automatic rifles and Hotchkiss heavy machine guns made in France. This continued throughout the war; indeed the American substitutes for French machine weapons—the inventions of John M. Browning—were not used against the enemy at all until 13 September 1918, and then not in quantities.

Of all the weapons an infantryman handled, his rifle changed the least. For supply reasons, the British Enfield became standard, and it did not differ very much from the Springfield, Model 1903, which the soldier knew. Likewise, the bayonet of the Enfield, a knife seventeen inches long, resembled the one it temporarily replaced. In short, the standard rifle required no changes in the organization of units, but its power, coupled with that of other weapons, enforced changes in fighting formations.

Trench warfare brought with it a pressing need for weapons that were decisive in close combat. Out of this need came hand grenades, rifle grenades, the submachine gun, and a more extensive

use of pistols and revolvers. Such short-range fireweapons tended to supersede cold steel and rifle butts as the tools of shock action, but American doctrine considered proficiency with the bayonet as still indispensible because it gave confidence and aggressiveness to foot soldiers.

In addition to the weapons that infantrymen handled as individuals were two they used as crews. One, also a creature of trench warfare, was the Stokes mortar, which could lob projectiles into enemy trenches and shell holes. Another was the one-pounder cannon, an antitank and antimachine gun piece. These two weapons were placed together in a platoon of the headquarters company of every infantry regiment.

The weapons mentioned above, coupled with artillery, gas, tanks, and aircraft (which we can do no more than mention in this study), dictated the minor tactics of infantry and slaughtered the troops of commanders who failed to heed their dictates. Indeed, machine guns are credited with having created the war of position, and the accompanying stalemates which prevailed during 1915, 1916, and 1917. General Pershing carried this interpretation farther. He said that trench warfare had caused the belligerents in Europe to embrace a faulty doctrine. The latter placed too great a reliance on artillery and on mechanical aids. Pershing insisted, in contrast, that the basis of a sound army remained, as it had always been, a sturdy infantry. Accordingly, he required that American foot soldiers be trained primarily for open warfare, and only incidentally for duty in the trenches.

As we have seen, depth was necessary to infantry formations. In the attack this meant successive waves of men; in defense, numerous positions, staggered irregularly one behind the other. Accordingly, all units from division down to platoon were organized to give the required depth within their respective sectors. Having mentioned platoons it is important to register the fact that the war confirmed the trend toward refining the organization of infantry units. Squads and platoons proved to be indispensible in twentieth century combat. Frequently the outcome of a fight depended on the integrity of those elements since they, and they alone, could be controlled personally by their leaders when under very heavy fire.

In addition to being organized to give depth, units at all levels were formed to give effect to the new weapons, and to avoid losses from them in the hands of the enemy. It has been noted that the expanding use of machine guns required reorganizations which reached from divisions down to companies. The other weapons exacted changes, but they were not quite as widely disseminated. For example, infantry mortars and one-pounder guns found a place in the headquarters companies of regiments. Hand grenades, rifle grenades, and automatic



rifles caused many changes in the organization of companies and their components. The fact is that the question as to their best arrangement was never definitely settled during the war. All were included in a rifle company, but sometimes the AR men were formed together, as were the grenadiers and rifle grenadiers; other times they were scattered among the squads. As late as November 1918, in the Meuse-Argonne battle, the specialists stayed together in combat groups, but the trend was toward dispersion so that every squad contained at least one AR man, one good grenade thrower, and one rifle grenadier.

Whatever the organization, extended order became necessary in combat. Men could not bunch up and live. Therefore, close formations had to break up when they came within artillery range. Approach to the enemy resulted in a progressive extension, and this, in turn threw a greater burden on the commanders of platoons and squads. Small units of men inched themselves forward, taking advantage of shell holes and other cover.

It remains to mention briefly two allies of infantrymen that virtually revolutionized their combat methods. The first was the motor truck, which gave foot soldiers greater mobility than they had ever before had. The second was a miscellany of signal equipment. This helped the infantry to operate with some degree of coordination on huge battlefields where arm signals could no longer be seen, and noise drowned out the human voice. It aided in making foot troops an effective instrument of the will of the commander, and served to rectify, at least a little, the disorganization that resulted from the necessity for soldiers to disperse widely in order to survive.

### *Between World Wars, 1919–1941*

During the two decades between the two world wars, the infantry underwent startling changes that exceeded any in its previous history. The greatest of these was in speed! In 1919 a prime object had been to secure trucks to replace horses, so that foot soldiers could move toward the battlefield at 15 to 25 miles an hour. In contrast, twenty years later the equivalent object was to use air craft so that doughboys could hurtle toward fields of battle 10 times as fast.

These twenty years were as contradictory as they were revolutionary. In them, the foot establishment declined steadily for the first seventeen years, and then soared to great heights in the last two.

During the first of the two decades, the impact of World War I was quite naturally dominant. Civilian Americans were determined to retrench from the unheard of costs of world war and, while they were at it, to forget warfare altogether. As a result, the authorized strength of the Regular infantry slid from 110,000 in 1920 to 40,331 in 1932. The proportion of foot soldiers to the whole establishment likewise dropped from near 50 percent to slightly less than 25.

So great a cut in the infantry—it amounted to 63 percent—of course played havoc with the regiments. Of the sixty-five in the Regular service, eighteen were inactivated in 1921 and eight during 1922. None of these were revived until 1940 and after. This heavy pruning left the block of regiments from the 1st through the 31st intact, with scattered numbers thereafter. The 33d, 34th, 35th, 38th, 42d, 45th (Philippine Scouts), 57th (Philippine Scouts), and 65th (Puerto Rican) Regiments survived, but the 42d was inactivated in 1927.

The list shown above calls to mind the fact that certain regiments in the Regular infantry were reserved for nonwhite races. Among these were two, the 24th and 25th, which had contained only Negro enlisted men since 1866. Another was the Puerto Rico Regiment manned by natives of that island but commanded by officers from the continent. This outfit, although incorporated into the Regular establishment in 1908, did not receive a numerical designation until 1920 when it became the 65th Infantry. The same year, the Philippine Scout battalions were grouped into regiments and given numbers. They became the 43d, 45th, 57th, and 62d Infantry Regiments, two of which (43d and 62d) were inactivated during the next two years.

Even after twenty-seven regiments had been inactivated, it was necessary to lop some battalions from those that survived. In consequence, by 1938 there were fourteen regiments out of the thirty-eight with but two battalions apiece. Nor was the whole reduction yet complete. Next, it was necessary to modify the tables of organization so that in peacetime all but two regiments had headquarters detachments instead of companies, while only one had a howitzer company, the rest having howitzer platoons. Also, rifle and machine-gun companies contained two instead of three platoons. Thus reduced, they were hard pressed to turn out one war-strength platoon for purposes of training.

It is apparent from the figures just given that the thinking of Congress and of the people was more isolationist than ever before. This fact, reflected in the emaciation of the Army, enforced a defensive psychology on the officers in the service. Accordingly, during the 1920's all strategic planning was based on the assumption that if war came it would be waged against us by some first-class power fighting upon our own continent.

The squeeze was aggravated by the expansion of the Air Corps, whose growth could only proceed at the expense of the other arms. By mid-1931 the infantry had already given 2,656 enlisted men to the growing air arm, and was soon to be drawn on for more. It was necessary to inactivate five battalions in 1930 to meet the quota.

A sharp pinch persisted until 1935, but that year the Government's policy of spending to combat the Great Depression finally reached the Army and resulted, among other things, in an increased appropriation for personnel. This was abetted by the troubled state of Europe. At first the growth was slow, so that by 1939 the Infantry had risen 17,000 from its 1932 low. That year the over-all policy changed. Whereas before 1939 the Army had been recognized as no more than a cadre, afterwards there was official recognition that an army-in-being was needed, and $1,000,000,000 appropriated to implement its creation.

Beginning in 1940, some of the Regular regiments, inactive for eighteen or nineteen years, were reactivated. That same year, forty regiments of National Guard infantry were inducted into Federal service, and the next year, thirty-six more. Hence, by mid-1941, there were 379,845 infantrymen of all types in service, organized in 136 regiments (including 18 armored), 32 battalions (15 of them tanks), and 34 separate companies.

Even this number did not seem adequate to the Chief of Infantry, whose office was created in 1920. He pointed out that combat infantrymen made up less than 25 percent of the whole Army under the expansion plans, as contrasted with 50 percent in the German establishment. Such a proportion, he said, was not justified. It resulted from the fact that certain elements had been laid upon the Army which had tended to squeeze the infantry out. One of these was the heavy siege elements introduced during World War I for reducing trenches; the other was the armored element brought in afterward for use in distant maneuver. If the high command shared this view, it did not show the fact by altering the ratio of infantry to the whole Army; but basic doctrine as late as 1939 restated the old principle that infantry was the prime element in combat, and that rifle and bayonet were still the chief weapons.

The experience of the World War was distilled into one document that cut across every phase of military life. This was the National Defense Act of 1920. It touched the infantry in many ways, but the principal way was in the creation of a Chief of Infantry. For some years agitation to provide the combat arms with chiefs had been growing. As a result of the National Defense Act, the doughboys after 1 July 1920, for the first time in United States history, had a chief who was the peer of the chiefs of the coast artillery, field artillery, and of the technical services.

Another consequence of that comprehensive act was the assignment of tank units to the infantry. Thereafter for twenty years, development of tank materiel and doctrine was a responsibility of the Chief of Infantry. Tank units were known as "infantry (tanks)." A Tank Board and a Tank School were transferred in 1920 from the abolished Tank Corps of World War I, along with a number of tank companies. In 1929 some of these companies were formed into two newly constituted regiments, designated the 1st and 2d Tank Regi-



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ments. In 1932 they were redesignated the 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) and 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks), respectively. Next year saw the constitution of two additional Light Tank regiments, the 68th and 69th, which were kept inactive. In 1940 the 69th was disbanded and the other three regiments, together with the former divisional tank companies, were assigned to the new Armored Force. The history of these elements properly belongs in the history of Armor.

Lean as the infantry establishment was between world wars—even with the tanks in it—it nonetheless benefited from more careful planning and study than ever before. A few months prior to the appointment of a Chief, an Infantry Board to guide and plan developments in weapons and organization came into being at Fort Benning. This body reported to The Adjutant General through The Infantry School. Attached to it was a Department of Experiment whose mission was to subject weapons and equipment to extensive tests. Naturally, when the Chief took office these units became responsible to him.

The Chief of Infantry, The Infantry School, the Infantry Board, the Department of Experiment, the Tank Board, and the Tank School engaged vigorously in the development of infantry. The earliest fruit of their attention was a complete revision of the tables of organization. In this alteration, made during the twenties, the square division survived, but some of its infantry components were considerably modified. The most extreme change took place in infantry battalions, where one rifle company was eliminated and replaced by a machine-gun company. This alteration corrected the confusion of World War I in the use of machine guns by placing the heavies under the control of infantry battalion commanders. Almost as extreme was the reduction of the number of platoons in a rifle company from four to three. Both these changes were in the direction of what was later called "triangularization," although it was not yet accepted as a broad principle.

Such changes, of course, reduced the fire power actually carried forward by infantrymen in an assault. No one claimed that the heavy machine guns, now organic to a battalion, could keep pace with the attacking doughboy. The reduction stemmed in part from the experience of the world war which had shown the number of rifles in a regiment to be close to impossible to control. Also, it stemmed from the shrinking quantity of manpower available to the Army. In any case, two types of tables of organization were prepared, one for war, the other for peace; and this dualism persisted to the very eve of the next war.

By the early thirties, improvements in weapons had made it possible for fewer men to deliver the same volume of fire. As an example, experts tinkered with the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) in an effort to correct its known weaknesses. By adding a butt-plate, a small



bipod, and a cyclic-rate regulator, they greatly augmented the value of the weapon. The improvements, unfortunately, added five pounds to its weight.

Before the automatic rifle was steadied down, it remained located within the rifle squad where it had come to rest at the close of the war. While so placed, in 1930, one more was added provisionally to build up infantry firepower, making two to every squad. This arrangement did not last long but gave place to the older order in which one BAR was in every squad. Not until 1 February 1940 was this organization disturbed. Then, at the express request of the Chief of Infantry, who thought the added weight of the gun had put it out of the class of arms to be carried forward by riflemen, the BAR was removed from the rifle squad and put into a separate squad within the rifle platoon. The gun remained thus located until 1942.

The BAR was not regarded as the decisive element in infantry firepower. American emphasis remained on the individual doughboy's shoulder arm. Accordingly, in the effort to substitute firepower for manpower there was a continuous search for an efficient self-loading rifle. Experiments by the Infantry Board soon made it clear that a semi-automatic rifle could increase the infantryman's rate of fire from ten or fifteen aimed shots to twenty or thirty per minute. What is more, the rounds could be better aimed because the marksman did not have to unsettle his aim to operate a bolt.

As matters developed, the Garand rifle, designated M1, was selected for development. By 1934 there were eighty M1's on hand, and by the fall of 1938 they were replacing the M1903 at the rate of 150 per week. Even so, the new rifle did not replace the old until after war had begun. Since the new rifle could deliver twice the fire of its predecessor, it made possible a reduction in other weapons. For example, the total of automatic rifles in a regiment dropped from 189 to 81 in 1943. Although the figure subsequently rose, it never again, not even in war, attained the earlier level.

Likewise, the M1 influenced fire tactics. Notwithstanding that arms like it were known and used in Europe, they did not affect doctrine the same way as in this country. On the continent, firepower was increased principally by augmenting the number of light machine guns; while in the United States the increase came principally from the faster-shooting shoulder arm of the individual rifleman. Thus in Europe, fire superiority depended on a gun served by a crew; in the United States, on the individual doughboy and his weapon.

It is not implied that the American Army slighted light machine guns. On the contrary, the World War I weaknesses of the BAR, together with its limitations, provoked much research to develop a suitable light machine gun. During the twenties and part of the thirties, the BAR was included in infantry armament only as a sub-

stitute for a hypothetical light machine gun which experts expected to be developed. Finally, in February 1940, at the suggestion of the Chief of Infantry, a true light machine gun appeared for the first time in the table of equipment. As this weapon was in very short supply, the improved BAR was made official substitute. As a result, for the time being BAR's were found in two different portions of an infantry company. They were standard armament in each rifle squad, and in addition, they were substitute armament in what was called the weapons platoon.

This weapons platoon (new in 1939) was part of a trend—of which more will be said later—to integrate all necessary weapons except artillery and tanks into the basic tactical unit, the battalion. That trend made every element of an infantry battalion, even the squad, a more complex organization than before, and at the same time vastly increased its firepower. The heightened complexity, of course, brought with it the need for better communications, better training, and, above all, better leadership.

The improvements in portable weapons that we have discussed so far were important, but by no means as sharp a break with the past as the development of the arms that have come to be known as heavy weapons. These were first used during World War I, hence there was much to be done toward improving them and adjusting organization to use them most efficiently.

The first change to accommodate organization to the heavy weapons was the creation in 1920 of a howitzer company in each regiment to utilize the Stokes mortars and one-pounder cannon. As we have seen, the Regular infantry had not enough men to maintain the new howitzer companies, so they were reduced to platoons. The National Guard, however, continued to support full companies. Into the howitzer unit, whether platoon or company, from time to time went various heavy infantry weapons devised between the wars. Among these were 81-mm mortars, which were first used in very limited quantities in 1932; the various types of 37-mm cannon, which replaced the one-pounder cannon; and .50-caliber machine guns.

The howitzer company was always more of an aspiration than a reality. Its name gave no clue to the weapons in it. Rather the name indicated the desire for a howitzer to accompany the infantry, a need which combat in the first World War had seemed to reveal. In the years between wars no adequate accompanying cannon was developed. Finally, in the sweeping revision of 1939, the howitzer company was eliminated and its 37-mm cannon put into a new antitank company in each regiment.

In the same broad revision, the old machine-gun companies of battalions were reorganized to become heavy weapons companies, still designated D, H, and M. They absorbed the heavy machine guns of the old-type company and in addition acquired two 81-mm mortars, and two .50-caliber machine guns. The creation of the battalion heavy weapons company was part of the trend, already mentioned, to include all weapons within a battalion that it would need to use whether attacking or defending. The process added greatly to the fire power of a battalion.

All the changes in organization, all the vigorous experiment with arms, did not actually produce the weapons that were needed for training. Everything was in very short supply. In consequence, as late as 1941 mortar crews went through maneuvers with stove pipes and the crews of light machine guns set up and aimed broomsticks. These harsh facts caused the Chief of Infantry to state on the eve of war that a consciousness of obsolescence in all their arms had seriously damaged the morale of American infantrymen.

After 1939, battalion heavy weapons companies, regimental antitank companies, and weapons platoons within rifle companies were largely manned by soldiers who required some side arm other than the heavy Garand. The proportion of infantrymen who fought with a rifle had sharply declined since the first World War. Thus, whereas, 2,500 of the 3,600 men in an infantry regiment in that war had carried a rifle, only 970 out of 3,500 did so in 1941. The ideal weapon for the crews of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns had to be light, have a rapid rate of fire, and yet have greater range and accuracy than a pistol. As a result, the number of pistols authorized declined steadily, while new light side arms multiplied. One of the latter was the carbine, which came into general use in 1942. Another was the submachine gun, which had been used experimentally since 1922.

The World War had displayed two very pressing needs in warfare. One was for protection from devastating fires, the other for greater mobility. When applied to infantry, the two were contradictory, for the more protection the infantryman had, the heavier and slower he tended to become. After the war, as we have seen, tanks were made part of the infantry. They offered to foot soldiers some added mobility and some protection. Accordingly, infantry doctrine took tanks into account, and the American infantry division included a company of light tanks in its organic structure. Indeed, in the basic theory, expressed in the Field Service Regulations of 1939, armor was given the primary mission of helping the infantry advance. This being so, one can understand why the Chief of Infantry strongly protested when, in July 1940, armor was removed from the control of infantry. As of 1939, tanks dropped out of our infantry divisions, and never reentered organically until after the second World War.

Mobility was slowly increased in the infantry by the use of trucks. Hardly anyone doubted the value of motor vehicles to speed the movement of foot troops, but lack of funds restricted their use. Beginning

in 1922 trucks replaced animals in the field and combat trains of four regiments. Later, other regiments received vehicles for the same purpose, until, by 1932, twelve were partly motorized. The trucks, however, were mostly worn-out leftovers from World War I.

It was the priming of the economic pump that finally secured some new vehicles for the infantry. In 1936 Congress authorized the purchase of 1,000 trucks and cars. With these, division and regimental headquarters could have autos, and six regiments could motorize their machine-gun companies and howitzer and communications platoons.

Experiments with organization, motorization, weapons, and equipment were continuous in the decades between the wars, but the culminating experiments took place in 1937, 1938, and 1939. These were brought about by a growing belief among military leaders that the square divisional organization of World War I was too large and too unwieldy. Experts did not expect the static warfare of 1915—1917 to recur; hence they no longer saw the need of the great power of penetration possessed by the square division. On the contrary, mobility was rising in importance, and it was hampered by large numbers.

These were not the only considerations which prompted an attempt to reorganize. Regimental organization was in such confusion that there were five different types in the United States, while no two regiments serving overseas were alike. On this account, and for other reasons, a movement to overhaul the fighting organization got under way late in 1935 and matured in the experiments mentioned above.

As we have said, the object sought was an infantry division that was smaller and faster than the old but with as much fire power. To obtain it the infantry establishment, from squad up to division, was given the most thorough examination it had ever received. Not everyone engaged in the examination agreed as to the means to the end. Most accepted three infantry regiments to a division, but differed as to their composition. The Chief of Infantry, for example, proposed four, instead of three platoons to a rifle company, and a fourth rifle company in each battalion.

In any case, in 1937, the 2d Division was formed into a provisional unit to test the various proposals. For several months it tried out the suggested arrangements in the field. The trials were remarkably thorough, although they were handicapped by shortages of weapons and vehicles. For example, no light mortars were available, while only one regiment could be completely equipped with the M1 rifle. There were not enough .50-caliber machine guns, and, of course, no light machine guns at all.

What emerged from the tests was a full new set of tables of organization which were effective 1 January 1939. The new tables were



built upon a triangular basis in which, from squads up to regiments, elements within an infantry division were associated by three's. Two levels of organization in the infantry were eliminated altogether, one large and the other small. These were brigades and sections. As we shall see, triangularization made possible a simple and effective tactical doctrine, but some students belittled this aspect. They said that the real reform in 1939 did not come from embracing a triangular organization but from the modernization of weapons that accompanied it.

The cornerstone of all infantry organization, the squad, was enlarged in wartime from eight men to twelve. This was done in spite of the evidence produced in the field tests that seven or eight men were all one corporal could hope to control in battle. The Chief of Infantry strongly urged the increase. The command weakness of so large a squad was corrected late in 1940 when the leader was made a sergeant and his assistant a corporal. With two noncoms in charge of it, the infantry squad remained at twelve throughout the coming war.

One fact that made smaller divisions feasible was the fixed principle that divisions would always operate as parts of larger units, that is, corps and armies. As parts they could draw upon pools established in the big elements whenever they needed more men or more equipment than was normal. In other words, they would retain as organic to them only the units they needed for normal operations. The War Department called this arrangement "pooling," and put it into effect wherever practicable. The new grouping of heavy and crew-served weapons into battalion heavy weapons companies and the weapons platoons of companies was a practical application of pooling. Also, the antitank weapons of regiments were pooled in an antitank company, the heavy weapons of the battalions in special companies, and the light machine guns and mortars in the weapons platoons of rifle companies.

The regiment adopted in 1939 was much smaller than before, containing but 2,542 men. According to the Chief of Infantry, such a regiment was too small by several hundred for effective combat action, and he vehemently protested. His protests resulted in a new table of organization the next year which raised the strength of a regiment by 900 men, and battalion and company proportionately.

The new triangular organization was put into effect in the Regular Army during 1939. Within the National Guard, however, the square organization, somewhat modified, persisted even after many units had entered Federal service in 1940.

All in all, the Chief of Infantry contended, and rightly, that in the years from 1937 to 1941 American Infantry had undergone a real revolution. Organizationwise, the foot establishment was arranged along lines that had been more carefully tested than ever

before in peacetime. As for weapons, they were turned over completely, except for the .30-caliber heavy machine gun. In other words, the 60-mm mortar (first adopted as standard in 1937, but remaining scarce) had replaced the old Stokes and its successors, while a heavier mortar, 81-mm, had been introduced. A light machine gun had actually been adopted and the BAR so much improved as to be virtually made over. Finally, the Springfield 1903 shoulder rifle had yielded place to the semi-automatic M1. In addition, new small arms such as carbines and submachine guns had entered infantry armament, together with the larger machine gun, the .50-caliber.

As a result of the revolution, the Chief of Infantry believed his branch to be organized on sound principles. The battalion, he said, was at length a complete combat unit which contained within itself all elements, save armor and artillery, necessary to attack or to defend. Its weapons could be employed in direct or indirect fire and for high-angle missions, or, if needed, for those requiring flat trajectories and high muzzle velocity. It was no longer dependent on attachments from regimental units for its fire power, needing to draw on pools only under unusual conditions.

Moreover, the elements of infantry were arranged according to mobility. A squad had the standard mobility of the rifleman; a platoon that of a BAR man. Platoons contained no crew-served weapons, and none requiring continuous resupply of ammunition. No weapon in the platoon served as a focus for hostile fire. At company level, the heaviest weapons (light machine guns and 60-mm mortars) could be carried by hand; while even a battalion contained no guns which could not be manhandled for several hundred yards. All weapons needing prime movers were placed in regimental units.

### *The Second World War*

The coming of war resulted in the largest expansion of the infantry ever undertaken. During the three years 1941–1943, it increased 600 percent. Although this was 100 percent more than the field artillery, it fell far short of some of the newer arms, for example the antiaircraft artillery, which expanded 1,150 percent and later had to be cut back. In any case, before the conflict ended sixty-seven infantry divisions came into being, plus one mountain and five airborne divisions. Even the creation of armored divisions expanded the infantry, since they contained substantial foot components.

There were in all, at some time during the war, 317 regiments of infantry of various kinds. Among these were types unknown before the war, such as three mountain, twelve glider, and sixteen parachute infantry regiments. In addition there were 99 separate battalions, some of which were also very highly specialized.



Among the remarkable separate battalions were the 1st–6th Rangers. These were light infantry trained to slash deep into enemy-held territory in order to demoralize the foe in every way they could. Although the Ranger battalions were not created by redesignating existing infantry outfits, and so not given any official history before the time of their constitution in 1942, they were nevertheless heirs to a very old and proud tradition. That tradition went farther back even than the American Revolution; indeed the rules drawn up by Robert Rogers in 1757 for his famous ranger companies that served for England in North America were reprinted for use in training the Rangers of World War II.

The Rangers were not the only infantry constituted to perform commando missions. A comparable unit was the 1st Special Service Force, established in June 1942. This force was designed to operate behind enemy lines when snow covered Europe. Accordingly, all its men were volunteers whose civilian aptitudes seemed to prepare them for swift operations in snow. Among them were lumberjacks, game wardens, forest rangers, and professional skiers. The 1st Special Service Force was remarkable also in another way; its personnel was drawn about equally from Canada and from the United States. It was an early experiment in international cooperation, and it worked well. After vigorous campaigning—but not much of it in snow—the unit was inactivated in December 1944 and most of its personnel transferred to a new regiment, the 474th Infantry.

Still another commando-type outfit was the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) which was organized in September 1943. Its specialization was operation in Burma along the Ledo Road, and its personnel was drawn from men who knew jungle fighting. On account of its discharge of its special mission, this unit became very famous under the nickname of "Merrill's Marauders." Like the men of the Rangers and of the 1st Special Service Force, the Marauders were volunteers. At length, on 10 August 1944 the unit was reorganized and called the 475th Infantry.

The next type of specialized infantry to be mentioned was that intended to provide the foot elements of the new armored divisions. It was called "armored infantry." The first of this type in the United States Army came into being when the old 6th Infantry was converted to armored on 15 July 1940. After that, certain numbers which had been inactive on the infantry list since just after the first World War were activated in 1941 and 1942 to become armored infantry. These were the 36th, 41st, 46th, 48th–52d, 54th–56th, 58th, 59th, and 62d Regiments. Within a few months the new armored infantry regiments were broken up to form separate armored infantry battalions. First and last there were sixty-six of the latter.

Armored infantry differed very little from standard, and General Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General, General Headquarters, objected to its differing at all. The chief variance was that armored troops had enough organic vehicles to move all of their men at once. They shared this characteristic with motorized infantry (an element of motorized divisions), which came into existence in August 1940 and lasted only until July 1943. Unlike motorized, armored infantry had vehicles that could operate across country and that were lightly armored to repel small arms fire.

In addition to the specialized regiments and battalions just covered, there were two other types of light infantry that were extensively tested. One type was specialized for jungle action. This type, embodied in the regiments of the 71st and the 89th Divisions, never had a chance to prove itself in combat. It had not shown to very good advantage in training; hence was converted to standard infantry in the early summer of 1944. In consequence, it was the ordinary doughboy who, beginning in the fall of 1942, did the jungle fighting in the Southwest Pacific. The second specialized type was organized for use in mountains. It was embodied in the regiments of the 10th Mountain Division, which, unlike, the jungle divisions, enjoyed a brief opportunity to practice its specialty. The 10th Division reached Italy late in 1944 and took part in the fight. Its arrival, however, did not preclude many other infantry outfits from having to fight in the mountains the best way they could.

The last of the nonstandard types of infantry units to be considered here was the most specialized. It included the foot soldiers who were trained and equipped to reach the combat zone by air, and to assault from the air. Their primary mission was to land behind the enemy's main line of resistance and there employ commando tactics. This type, new in the United States, like armored infantry was first organized in 1940. As with armored, General McNair objected in the beginning to so high a degree of specialization, but by 1942 acknowledged the need for airborne troops.

The foot troops that assaulted from the air were dropped behind the enemy's line by parachute. Numbers above 500 were reserved for the designation of paratroops. Thus the lowest numbered paratroop infantry was the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment. In addition there was a second type of airborne foot troops, that is Glider Infantry. According to the doctrine, these landed by glider in the airheads cleared by the paratroops, to reinforce the latter and to widen the assault upon the rear of the foe. The numerical designations for glider units were drawn from the whole range of numbers below 500. They were the result of an effort to perpetuate an earlier history, as in the case of the 88th Glider Infantry Regiment which sprang from the 88th Infantry of World War I. Likewise, the 325th–328th Glider



Infantry Regiments were redesignated from the infantry regiments of the same numbers which had made up the 82d Division in the first World War. The same was true of the 401st Glider Infantry of the 101st Division. Both the 82d and the 101st Divisions became airborne divisions on 15 August 1942.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the entire infantry establishment, it remains for us to mention a few units that were made up of Americans of different racial extraction. There was ample precedent for such outfits. Indian and Negro infantry regiments were the oldest, but Puerto Rican and Filipino ones came close behind. Added to these during World War II were several separate battalions, the most conspicuous of which was the 100th Infantry Battalion because it contained soldiers of an enemy race. Its men were American-born Japanese. The 100th Battalion was organized in June 1942, and two years later was absorbed as one of the battalions of an all-Japanese-American regiment designated the 442d. Here, on account of its distinguished record in the conflict in Europe, it has been allowed to retain its designation, hence it is the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment, of the Army Reserve in Hawaii.

Next to be mentioned is the 99th, made up of Norwegian-Americans and marked for use in Scandinavia. Although the 99th did not get to the Scandinavian Peninsula until the Germans there had surrendered, it did distinguish itself in the fighting in Europe. Finally, early in 1945, when its use as a separate battalion seemed to be over, it was made one of the battalions of a newly organized regiment designated the 474th. The latter, already mentioned, was a remarkable hybrid. It contained many men from the inactivated 1st Special Service Force, some from the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions, and finally the entire 99th Battalion. Another hybrid was the 473d Infantry. Also created early in 1945, it absorbed no groups of nationals but rather the veterans of four antiaircraft battalions coupled with the headquarters of an armored group.

We turn now to consider the main body of the infantry. Early in the war the organization of scores of new units proceeded along the lines laid down in the reorganization of 1939. The National Guard, however, entered Federal service in square combinations and retained them until directed to triangularize during the first four months of 1942. As in World War I the reorganization of the National Guard for Federal service wrecked many old outfits and associations. For example, in each of the square divisions one whole regiment of infantry had to be cut away and broken up or associated elsewhere.

In spite of the wrench it gave the National Guard, triangularization brought with it important benefits. Not the least of these was a very simple tactical doctrine which had the advantage of being appli-

cable to the use of units of any size from squad up to division. This doctrine was developed and well established by the time the National Guard was triangularized. Its essence was that one of the three elements of every level, say one regiment, should, in the assault, fix the enemy in position, a second was to maneuver around him, once fixed, in order to strike a decisive blow, while the third element acted as a reserve. This doctrine gave great flexibility to American infantry.

During the five years before Pearl Harbor, the position of the doughboy's champion, the Chief of Infantry, weakened. The Chief himself felt that his Office was being bypassed in important matters; while the Chief of Staff inclined more and more to the opinion that all of the heads of combat arms fostered schisms within the Army. In any case, during the grand revision of the late thirties, the General Staff, more often than not, overruled the recommendations of the Chief of Infantry. Moreover, the latter had less control over his branch than he thought necessary. For example, in the revamping of the infantry division his responsibility was held to the preparation of tables of organization and equipment for brigades and below. The end came in the spring of 1942 when the top command was completely reorganized. In that great realigning the Chief of Infantry, together with the other chiefs of combat arms, was eliminated. Thereafter, the problems of the Infantry were considered by special branches of the newly created Army Ground Forces.

General Lesley McNair became Chief of the new organization. He had been chief of staff of the provisional division that had tested triangularization in 1937, and he believed in the basic principles of the revision that had resulted. Foremost among these was pooling. Its natural corollary was to keep all units lean, because, when extraordinary needs arose, those units could draw from the pools maintained at the next higher level. Another one of the important principles embraced by McNair was that which gave the best of men and equipment to the offensive portions of units, and cut the other segments to a minimum. The application of these austere principles was sharpened by the urgent need to conserve shipping space; so McNair caused infantry organization to be finely combed for excess personnel and equipment.

A general revision of the tables of organization and equipment took place in the spring of 1942. For the most part, McNair's principles prevailed in these; but he was unable to prevent two significant changes in a contrary direction. The first of these was the substitution of headquarters companies for detachments in all battalions. In spite of this alteration the total strength of a battalion dropped by sixteen, the cut occurring in the rifle companies and in heavy weapons. The second change brought a new company, the Cannon Company, into the regiment. In it were at last to be found the accompanying



cannon that officers had been seeking since World War I. As first equipped, the new cannon company contained six self-propelled 75-mm howitzers and two self-propelled 105's. It added 123 officers and men to regiment, but since the other regimental companies were cut at the same time, a regiment was actually enlarged by only 23 men.

The tables of organization of 1 April 1942 moved automatic rifles for the last time. These weapons, which were proving themselves more and more valuable, went back to the rifle squad where they had been placed prior to February 1940. They had gone into a separate AR squad at the insistance of the Chief of Infantry, and they returned to the rifle squad when that office was eliminated.

The pinch for shipping space continued so great that the War Department requested cuts in the April tables of organization. Accordingly, a Reduction Board was established in November 1942. Before its recommendations were approved General McNair strove to shrink the rifle regiment by 400 men, a slice which he believed could be made without diminishing the number of front-line riflemen to any great extent. His proposal was made into a table of organization and equipment and published 1 March 1943. Chiefest single casualty was the Cannon Company, which was eliminated altogether and its howitzers put into Headquarters Company. This arrangement was shortlived, since the final work of the Board resulted in a cut of only 216 which, when finally approved, was embodied in tables dated 15 July. Most of the 216 came from administrative elements and from heavy weapons.The cannon company was back, but this time with towed howitzers. The sharpest reduction in arms that accompanied the drop in personnel fell upon BAR's. These were eliminated from every echelon except the rifle squad, where there was one per squad. This change removed very little AR fire from the firing line, but it did reduce the number of the guns in a regiment from 189 to 81 (there being 81 rifle squads in a regiment).

If a regiment lost any fire power due to the cut in automatic rifles, it made it up by the addition of twenty-four .50-caliber machine guns plus one hundred and twelve new 2.36-inch rocket launchers, nicknamed bazookas. The bazookas, which had splendid attributes for antitank and antipillbox use, were extra weapons, that is, no specific men were designated to operate them. In consequence, each regiment made its own organizational modification to use the new arm. Later, as we shall see, the orphan situation of rocket launchers was officially corrected.

Bazookas and .50-caliber machine guns fitted into General McNair's theory of antitank and antiaircraft defense for infantry regiments. He held that AT and AA defense should center on weapons which individual infantrymen, not crews, could operate. Once again, he did not win out 100 percent; for he failed to eliminate either the

towed antitank guns from the armament of regiments or the mine platoon from antitank companies. There were, however, changes in the AT guns: their caliber was increased from 37-mm to 57-mm, while the number in the regiment dropped from 24 to 18. Half of the 18 remaining were in the regimental AT company, the other half divided evenly (three each) among the battalions. Considering the mine platoon as strictly defensive, General McNair strove to eliminate it altogether. Accordingly, it did not find a place in the T/O & E of 26 May 1943; but was back, 15 July, thirty-one strong.

Removal of tanks from the infantry and the creation of an armored force in 1940 had left unsolved problems in the relationship of foot soldiers to tanks. The principle of pooling took care of the association of tanks with infantry units, for tank elements were simply attached in the quantities needed. This, however, did not help to determine how much infantry ought to be organic to armored divisions. These divisions, as first set up, did not include enough foot soldiers, so General McNair created pools of separate armored infantry battalions from which the divisions could draw. Later his solution was scrapped, and in September 1943 the quantity of organic infantry doubled. In consequence, all but one of the separate infantry battalions were inactivated.

Each of the studies of infantry organization, made in the first three years of the war, had to take vehicles into account. The number of motors allowed to units was closely related to the shipping space then available. Shortage of shipping was one of the factors which caused the elimination of motorized infantry in the summer of 1943, since the planners felt that more economical means of moving standard infantry by motor were at hand. The first such means was to attach truck outfits to the infantry for specific movements. This method remained standard until divisions developed the field expedient of piling their doughboys onto their tanks, tank destroyers, and howitzers.

All the complications sketched above were faced by Army Ground Forces during the year from October 1942 to October 1943, and the organization developed for infantry in that year persisted for the duration of the war in Europe. However, when redeployment to the Pacific area became necessary, Ground Forces once more examined the tables of organization and equipment. This time three factors were decisive in the appraisal. The first one was the wealth of combat experience accumulated in Europe; the second, that the scarcity of shipping space had eased; and the third, the death of General McNair. These new factors resulted in a general enlargement of infantry units.

The new tables were dated 1 June 1945. They carried the implication that the earlier arrangements had been too lean for greatest efficiency. For example, they increased an infantry regiment from 3,323 enlisted men to 3,538, and added weapons and vehicles. Most of the increase took place in rifle companies, which jumped from 193 to 242 men. Indeed, two new sections were added to them, both in the weapons platoons. The first one, called an assault section, was based on a 2.36-inch bazooka (the number of which was doubled from three to six in a rifle company). With this change, rocket launchers ceased to be orphans. They became the principal weapons of the men in the new section. The other, a special-weapons section, employed a revolutionary type of new arm, the 57-mm recoilless rifle.

Further use of the recoilless technique occurred at battalion level. Here a 75-mm rifle was added to the armament, and a gun platoon created in the heavy weapons company to operate it. The two new types of recoilless guns, which combined the effect of artillery with the mobility of soldier-carried arms, gave an unheard of weight of fire to the infantry.

Yet another remarkable change related to the infantry regiment's artillery. All towed guns were at last eliminated from a regiment. The 57's of the regimental antitank company gave place to tanks which mounted 90-mm rifles, while those in battalions went out with the AT platoons. The cannon company became in effect a tank unit equipped with heavy tanks mounting 105's. The pieces of the antitank and the cannon companies, mounted as they were on tanks, were much more mobile than their predecessors, and they threw much more metal.

The organization established in June 1945, slightly modified from time to time, was the one that governed to the end of the conflict. There was, however, one development which went forward apart from the tables of organization. This was an ever widening use of regimental combat teams (RCT's). An RCT was a grouping of combat units around an infantry regiment in order to accomplish a special mission. A typical combat team contained a regiment of infantry, a battalion of 105-mm artillery, a company of combat engineers, a medical collecting company, and a signal detachment. But, because its very essence was flexibility, any element needed to accomplish the special mission might be attached. RCT's proved of great value in adopting organization to all types of terrain and conditions of combat, and in consequence have continued in use. They remain, however, temporary arrangements without official history or lineage. We have suggested earlier that their forerunners were the sublegions of the Army from 1792–1796. The sublegions, like modern RCT's, were discontinued when their special mission had been accomplished.

Before concluding this short sketch of the organization of United States Infantry it remains to record a few generalizations relating to the use of infantry in the greatest of wars. First, it is clear than no earlier conflict had sent American infantrymen into so many different parts of the world. As we have seen, specialized units were at first created to fight in extreme zones. But, in fact, mountain, jungle, and

arctic foot soldiers carried a very small part of the fighting in extreme climates and terrain. As a result, the standard doughfoot took over the job.

The doctrine of fixing the enemy, maneuvering to strike him in flank or rear, all the while holding an element in reserve to exploit an advantage or cover a retreat, applied in all terrains. Naturally the details of using it varied with geography. Thus in Normandy the hedgerows obliged the infantry to work out a team play with tanks and engineers. Likewise, in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific, the coral atolls of the Central Pacific, the desert of North Africa, and the mountains of Italy it was necessary to develop the exact means by which the doctrine was applied. But in all cases it required closer-than-ever cooperation with the other arms.

Furthermore, never before had the doughboys been required to use so bewildering a complex of weapons. Perhaps the most confusing of the latter to adjust to was the greatly enlarged class of defensive weapons, which included land mines and boobytraps. These insidious manglers complicated an infantryman's task and introduced a new type of terror into his campaigning. He dared no longer even trust the ground, which had always been his close ally. As a result, it was necessary to learn not only to detect and disarm the enemy's mines and traps, but to lay some effectively for his own protection. Also he had to learn to use demolition charges and often to improvise them out of materials at hand.

To add to the confusion, types of grenades, hand and rifle, were multiplied. What is more, their use vastly increased. Whether the enemy lurked in rocks or in dense vegetation, grenades helped to root him out. To supplement them in the business of dislodging the foe from strong positions, new weapons developed. The most notable of these, not already mentioned, was a flame thrower which, carried by foot soldiers or mounted on tanks, did terrible execution.

Tank and air enthusiasts, observing the Nazi blitzkrieg, had jumped to the conclusion that infantry could be used only to hold ground taken by armor or by air bombardment. This did not prove to be the case. Although foot soldiers, more than ever before, had to learn to cooperate with tanks and with planes, this did not spare them from having to be in the forefront of almost all important assaults. In short, while they could not advance against the enemy without the aid of tanks, artillery, and air, neither could those arms gain ground or destroy the enemy's will to fight without the aid of the infantry. What was required, then, was not a reshuffling of the importance of the several branches, but the development of better techniques by means of which they could work together. Such techniques were far from perfect when the conflict came to an end.

Battlefield communication continued its trend—which stretched



back to the Civil War—toward improvement. For the first time there was radio communication between the elements of a company. Five hand radios were included in a company's equipment. These, and telephones, knit companies tighter together than had been the case since the Civil War; but it by no means made them act as one man. Dispersion to avoid the deadly effects of enemy fire threw squads, or fractions of squads, on their own in combat, particularly in dense foliage, in the mountains, and in night operations. This put a heavier-than-ever burden on the ingenuity of squad and platoon leaders, and even on the individual doughboy. Here one encounters the following seeming paradox: that as armies have grown from thousands to millions, each of the numberless infantrymen on the firing line, instead of sinking to the level of an automaton, has had to rise to new levels of individual initiative. And, by the same token, modern battle has, as often as in the past, been in reality a compound of scores of small-unit fights, relatively unconnected.

Probably the most important technique to come out of the war had to do with landing an attacking force on hostile shores. The doctrine for such operations had been in the process of development by the U. S. Marine Corps since the 1920's. Marine theory worked well, but it required the assistance of special amphibious equipment which was not developed until war had commenced. Indeed, in the early landings in 1942, landing forces were obliged to use the vessels that were ready at hand.- Gradually, however, landing craft were developed. These were the LCI's, LST's, LCT's, amphibious tanks, and DUKW's that have since become so well known. In the greatest amphibious operations of World War II, these craft were as essential to success as the weapons of the infantry.

Whether in landing actions, in airborne assaults, or in advances of a traditional type, infantry was better prepared than in the past to fight on a circular perimeter. This was true because of the many supporting mortars, machine guns, and rocket launchers, made organic to infantry units, which enabled them to throw fire quickly in all directions. Thus, the tendency was to be less sensitive about the flanks than in earlier wars, and to push forward with slighter concern for the progress of the units to the right and to the left.

During the second World War new terrains, new climates, strange weapons, and unfamiliar peoples acted upon the American infantrymen. These destroyed thousands of men, put a lifelong mark on others, and changed somewhat the techniques of fighting on foot; nevertheless, in spite of everything, the basic characteristics of the infantry hardly shifted. Foot soldiers continued to be the only carriers of weapons who, in theory, were never exhausted, could always go another mile, and who could be counted upon to move across any terrain in every quarter of the globe.

262292—54——5

| Date | Enlisted men authorized in military establishment | Percent of infantry in military establishment | Number of infantry regiments | Number of enlisted men in regiments | Number of companies in regiments | Number of enlisted men in companies | Battalions in regiments | Explanations and comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1784 | 700 | 80 | 1 | 700 | 10 | 70 | 1 | Two of the companies were artillery. |
| 3 Oct 1787 | 840 | 66 | 1 | 560 | 8 | 70 | 1 | Artillery augmented and made into a separate battalion. |
| 30 Apr 1790 | 1, 216 | 67 | 1 | 912 | 12 | 76 | 3 | 4 companies to a battalion. |
| 3 Mar 1791 | 2, 128 | 85 | 2 | 912 | 12 | 76 | 3 | |
| 5 Mar 1792 | 5, 120 | | [1] 4 | 1, 140 | 12 | 95 | [2] 3 | U. S. Army converted into a Legion of 4 sublegions. Sublegions contain 8 companies infantry, 4 companies rifles, 1 company artillery, and 1 company of cavalry. |
| 30 May 1796 | 3, 126 | 64 | 4 | 502 | 8 | 62 | ([3]) ([4]) | Legions abandoned; sublegions become regiments. |
| 16 July 1798 | 12, 696 | 79 | 16 | 704 | 10 | 70 | ([3]) | Very little of this organization ever raised. A paper army. |
| 2 Mar 1799 | 41, 040 | | 40 | 1, 026 | 10 | 102 | 2 | A paper organization. Actual strength of Army 19 Dec 1801, 5,144 enlisted. |
| 16 Mar 1802 | 3, 068 | 50 | 2 | 763 | 10 | 76 | ([3]) | |
| 12 Apr 1808 | 9, 311 | 68 | [5] 8 | 805 | 10 | 80 | ([3]) | Rifle regiment enters the service. Actual strength 29 Jan 1810, 6,488. |
| 11 Jan 1812 | 34, 315 | 79 | [5] 18 | 1, 980 | 18 | 110 | 2 | These large regiments were only partially raised. |
| 26 June 1812 | 34, 502 | 76 | [5] 26 | 1, 026 | 10 | 102 | ([3]) | |
| 29 Jan 1813 | 55, 222 | 85 | [5] 46 | 1, 036 | 10 | 103 | ([3]) | |
| 3 Mar 1815 | 10, 000 | 70 | [5] 9 | 786 | 10 | 78 | ([3]) | Actual strength 22 Dec 1817, 7,580 enlisted. |
| 2 Mar 1821 | 5, 642 | 63 | 7 | 514 | 10 | 51 | ([3]) | Rifle regiment and 8th infantry eliminated. Actual strength 5,809 enlisted. |
| 3 Mar 1833 | 6, 595 | 55 | 7 | 514 | 10 | 51 | ([3]) | Increase came from 1st Regiment. Dragoons being organized. Actual strength 5,809. |
| 23 May 1836 | 7, 130 | 50 | 7 | 514 | 10 | 51 | ([3]) | 2d Dragoons organized. |
| 5 July 1838 | 11, 804 | 61 | 8 | 904 | 10 | 90 | ([3]) | 8th Regiment organized. Actual strength Nov 1838, 7,918. |
| 23 Aug. 1842 | 7, 880 | 61 | [5] 9 | 524 | 10 | 52 | ([3]) | 2d Dragoons converted to rifle regiment. Actual strength 8,202 enlisted. |
| May 1846 | 11, 420 | | 8 | 744 | 10 | 90 to 110 | ([3]) | President authorized to raise companies to 110 enlisted men. Authorized figure based on 80 men to a Company. |
| 11 Feb 1847 | 29, 512 | 78 | 17 | 1, 104 | 10 | 110 | ([3]) | Companies expanded to 110 as previously authorized. |
| 1848 | 9, 435 | 44 | 8 | 524 | 10 | 52 | ([3]) | Actual strength Nov 1848, 9,153 enlisted. |
| 3 Mar 1855 | (16,790) 11, 658 | 44 | 10 | (844) 524 | 10 | (84) 52 | ([3]) | 9th and 10th Regiments added. President may raise companies on the frontier to 84 enlisted. 180 companies were increased. Minimum shown, maximum in parenthesis. |
| 1862, 10 old regiments | 37, 264 | | 19 | 868 | 10 | 84 | 1 | Strength is shown only at maximum. |
| 1862, 9 new regiments | | | | 2, 367 | 24 | 97 | 3 | Each battalion contained eight companies. |
| 1866 | 77, 314 | 70 | 45 | 1, 196 | 10 | 119 | ([3]) | Maximum strength shown. Minimum would be 69 enlisted per company, 696 per regiment. |

See footnotes at end of table.

INFANTRY OF THE REGULAR ARMY—Continued

| Date | Enlisted men authorized in military establishment | Percent of infantry in military establishment | Number of infantry regiments | Number of enlisted men in regiments | Number of companies in regiments | Number of enlisted men in companies | Battalions in regiments | Explanations and comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 Nov 1867 | 49, 975 | 62 | 45 | 696 | 10 | 69 | (3) | Actual strength 48,081. |
| 20 Oct 1870 | 32, 926 | 50 | 25 | 655 | 10 | 65 | (3) | To be reduced to 30,000 by 1 July 1871. |
| 1 July 1871 | 30, 000 | 50 | 25 | 605 | 10 | 69 | (3) | Actual strength 20 Oct 1871, 26,848 enlisted. |
| 15 Aug 1876 | 25, 000 | 38 | 25 | 375 | 10 | 37 | (3) | Act specified that no reduction be made in cavalry. |
| 11 Oct 1880 | 25, 000 | 50 | 25 | 505 | 10 | 50 | (3) | Actual strength, 24,259. |
| 1898 | 62, 579 | 50 | 25 | 1, 309 | 12 | 106 | 3 | To be reduced upon return of peace to 26,610 enlisted. |
| 3 May 1901 | 77, 287 | 50 | 30 | 1, 284 | 12 | 104 | 3 | President authorized to regulate size of Army between minimum of 59,131 and maximum of 100,000. Limits for companies 65 enlisted to 150; for regiments 816 to 1,836. |
| 31 May 1902 | 66, 497 | 44 | 30 | 996 | 12 | 80 | 3 | Puerto Rico regiment authorized also Philippine Scouts. Neither included in number of regiments. |
| 24 Oct 1902 | 59, 866 | 40 | 30 | 816 | 12 | 65 | 3 | Note that bottom limit is attained. |
| 27 Sep 1906 | 62, 489 | -------- | 30 | 837 | 12 | 65 | 3 | One MG platoon added to each regiment. Also added to cavalry. |
| 25 Jan 1907 | 69, 861 | 36 | 30 | 837 | 12 | 65 | 3 | Increase and reorganization of the artillery. |
| 15 Oct 1909 | 78, 788 | 34 | 31 | 837 | 12 | 65 | 3 | Increase shown here took place gradually 1907–1909. Puerto Rico regiment entered Regular establishment, 30 June 1908. |
| 9 Oct 1911 | 77, 523 | 35 | 31 | 869 | 12 | 65 | 3 | 15 mounted scouts, 17 in headquarters detachment added to regiments. |
| 30 June 1916 | 133, 164 | 38 | 38 | 1, 348 | 15 | 100 | 3 | Headquarters, Supply, MG companys added to regiments. |
| 14 May 1917 | 238, 455 | 35. 5 | 65 | 2, 002 | 15 | 150 | 3 | |
| 26 June 1918 | 3, 665, 000 | 31. 6 | 297 | 3, 664 | 15 | 250 | 3 | Distinction between Regulars and others removed. Regiments larger because of reduction of number of them in divisions from 9 to 4. |
| 9 June 1920 | 280, 000 | 39 | 65 | 3, 037 | 18 | 200 | 3 | Strength figures from T/Os. War strength dated 15 Apr 1921. Howitzer and headquarters companies of battalions added to regiments. |
| June 1932 | 118, 000 | 34 | 38 | 2, 901 | 18 | 193 | 3 | Enlisted total is actual not authorized. War strength given; peace T/O much less. |
| 1 Jan 1939 | 174, 079 | 40 | 38 | 2, 330 | 14 | -------- | 3 | Column 1 includes Philippine strengths. |
| 1 Oct 1940 | 407, 501 | 18 | 88 | 3, 229 | 15 | 217 | 3 | All entries below also include them. Peace strength of regiments 1,698. Howitzer and headquarters companies of battalions eliminated. |
| 1 Apr 1942 | 2, 236, 547 | -------- | 235 | 3, 323 | 19 | 187 | 3 | Cannon company and headquarters companies for battalions added to regiments. |
| 1 June 1945 | 7, 398, 949 | 15 | 288 | 3, 538 | 19 | 235 | 3 | |

[1] See comments.
[2] Includes 1 rifle battalion.
[3] Not mentioned. Regiment and battalion the same.
[4] Hereafter "actual strength" will refer to actual strength of the line of the Army.
[4] Includes 1 rifle regiment.