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### National Identity and Independence Attitudes: Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales

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#### Abstract

Although about collective processes, the major theories of nationalism necessarily make assumptions about individual attitudes. This paper relies on these theories to model the correlates of national identity and attitudes towards independence in Scotland and Wales. Through an analysis of extensive national surveys, the paper argues that some factors unique to modern societies, such as the mass media and the declining role of religion, are indeed related to minority nationalisms. Social class is also significantly related to minority national identity, suggesting that the internal colonialism argument is plausible. Most importantly, although national identity is the most important predictor, other important factors unrelated to national identity affect attitudes towards independence.

#### Introduction<sup>i</sup>

The political impact of nationalism has been felt throughout the modern world (Gellner and Smith 1996). It was clearly evident, for example, in Eastern Europe with the fall of communism and the establishment of the so-called "new" democracies (Brubaker 1996). Nationalist movements have also been influential in the Western world, especially in Spain and Canada, where there have been threats to the legitimacy of the state from minority nations (Keating 1996). Although less severe, nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales have challenged the legitimacy of the British state, and in the process, have successfully campaigned for devolution of some of the governing powers to regional governments (cf Curtice and Heath, 2000). In response to globalization, nationalist sentiment has been brought to the forefront even within relatively homogenous countries (Heath et. al 1999). For example, European integration has become a major issue in many European nations, with some citizens are unwilling to give up national autonomy or national symbols (see, for example, Heath et al 2001). This has been no more apparent than in Denmark and England where nationalist sentiment has prevented the two countries from joining the rest of the European union in a common European currency.

Despite the rising importance of nationalist sentiment, there has been relatively little research on the sociological factors associated with it. Until recently, few academic surveys addressed this question at all (see Hechter, 1992:268). This paper attempts to fill some of this gap by using survey data to explore the factors associated with national identity and attitudes towards independence Scotland and Wales. The paper has two main research questions: (1) Are some types of individuals more likely to identify with minority nations? (2) If so, are they equally more likely to hold nationalist attitudes? The analysis is guided by rival theories of nationalism, from which the possible relationships between social variables and national identity and nationalist attitudes are identified.

#### **Nationalism and the State**

Nationalism can be generally thought of as an ideology that uses national identity as the basis for social

This paper used data from the Welsh Assembly Election Study 1999 (WAES) and the Scottish Parliamentary Election Study 1999 (SPES). The WAES was conducted jointly by the Institute for Welsh Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends (CREST). The SPES was carried out by the University of Edinburgh and the National Centre for Social Research, London, UK. CREST is an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded Research Centre based jointly at the National Centre for Social Research and the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford. This paper is an edited version of a paper originally presented at the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Meetings in Quebec City, May 2001. The author wishes to thank David Cox, Doug Baer and Anthony Heath for their suggestions regarding the previous version.

and political action. The ultimate goal of a nationalist movement is the achievement or maintenance of power in the form of the nation state. Gellner perhaps puts it best when he defines nationalism as:

primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment (Gellner 1983:1).

Few would deny that nationalism is a powerful social and psychological force. Even though it is seldom a populous movement, nationalism is usually presented as such, and many argue that it is generally able to gain support from individuals of all social backgrounds so long as they identify with the nation (Hroch 1985). As Hutchinson and Smith (1994:4) state, 'What is often conceded is the power, even primacy, of national loyalties and identities over those of even class, gender, and race. Perhaps only religious attachments have rivalled national loyalties in their scope and fervour.' This psychological force is considered important, if not necessary, to state formation and maintenance. As Sidney Verba (1965:529) states:

unless those individuals who are physically and legally members of a political system (that is, who live within its boundaries and are subject to its laws) are also psychologically members of that system (that is, feel themselves to be members) orderly patterns of change are unlikely. It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimises the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers.

Although there are many types of nationalism, this paper is interested in the contrast between two specific types of nationalism: official nationalism and minority nationalism. Official nationalism is promoted by the state (e.g., an official language, and other state-sanctioned symbols) to cultivate and maintain the dominance of a specific nation (Kellas 1991:52); minority nationalisms evolve in reaction to official nationalisms. Although he labels them differently, Hechter (2000) has a similar typology. He argues that state-building nationalism reflects the efforts of a state to incorporate culturally distinctive regions. On the other hand, '...peripheral nationalism occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government (as in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia). Often this type of nationalism is spurred by the very efforts of state-building nationalism described above' (Hechter 2000:15). Although we will refer to minority nationalism throughout the paper, this can be seen as synonymous with peripheral nationalism. In this respect, Scottish and Welsh nationalism can be seen as peripheral or minority nationalisms that are pitted against the official nationalism of Great Britain.

Research on nationalism has typically been historical, examining the development of particular nationstates. Many of these studies fall under what is termed the 'modernisation' school, where it is held that
modernisation led to 'nation building'. Simply put, nationalism is seen as an integrative force that led to
the establishment of nation states. For example, Deutsch (1966) argues that the growth of markets, and
more importantly, mass communications aided the rise of nationalism because it enabled the transmission
of a common culture. Similarly, Gellner (1983) argues that the necessity of a trained workforce in order
to achieve industrial economic growth led to the modern state and homogeneous education systems which
disseminated 'high culture' and standardized language, creating the ideal conditions for the development
of nationhood. Anderson's (1983) theory is similar to Gellner in that he argues print capitalism allowed
the dissemination of a common language which provided the impetus for the development of national
identities. Anderson differs, however, by examining the role of psychology, arguing that with the declining
role of religion, nationalism offers an alternative form of after life in the form of identification with an
extended kinship, the nation.

Although arguably the dominant school of thought, modernisation theories are by no means universally accepted. Rival theories argue that nationalism is not necessarily an integrative force. In this regard, Hechter's (1975; 1978) theory of internal colonialism has been especially influential. Hechter (1975; 1978) argues that nationalism is just as likely to lead to disunity and to the destruction of existing states, especially if large numbers of a minority nation are relegated to disadvantaged positions (see also Keating 1988; 1996). Using Scotland as one of his case studies, Hechter finds that modernisation and capitalism can create a 'cultural division of labour' whereby the dominant ethnic group or region relegates those of other groups to inferior positions. If they are segregated into a common region, and they dominate that region, protests by minority groups can take the form of nationalism. He concludes that 'regions that have *both* distinctive economic interests and distinctive cultures have the best prospects' of developing independence movements (Hechter 1992: 271).

Heath and Kellas (1998; see also Heath et al. 1999) provide the foundations of a new theory of nationalism that concentrates on the relationship between how much one is integrated into the institutions of the dominant nation and nationalist sentiment. Heath and Kellas (1998) speculate that minority nationalism is more likely to flourish among those who are less integrated into institutions that uphold the official nationalism of the state. They also argue that it is possible to have 'dual identities', where one identity is nested in another, without threatening the legitimacy of the state. For example, they found that many Scots identified with Scotland, but still had a strong attachment to Britain as well. In other words,

simply identifying with a minority nation is not alone reason enough for individuals to uphold minority nationalist attitudes that oppose the official nationalism of the state.

### **Assessing Theories of Nationalism**

If these theories can account for nationalist movements there should be evidence at the individual level. This paper explores this proposition using survey data from Scotland and Wales. A number of specific hypotheses are tested. First, following Hechter's theory of internal colonialism we should expect to find that desire for national independence is related to social class as well as national identity. That is, working class individuals will be more likely to hold nationalist attitudes than those of higher social classes. Secondly, following modernisation theory, we should expect religiosity to be negatively related to attitudes towards independence, and that reading national newspapers will be positively related to national identity and attitudes towards independence. Thirdly, we should also expect less support for official nationalism among those who are well integrated within British institutions, such as the established Anglican Church. Finally, although not directly related to the theories discussed above, the models test whether age is positively related to attitudes towards independence. This latter association is expected on the grounds that older people are generally resistant to social change (Alwin and Krosnick 1991), and political generations theory. When applied to Britain, political generations theory holds that those of older birth cohorts—i.e., those whose impressionable years occurred when there were common British projects such as the British Empire and the two World Wars—have stronger attachments to the British state (see Heath and Kellas 1998).

#### Data:

### The Welsh Assembly Election Study and the Scottish Parliamentary Election Study

The analysis employs two sources of related data: the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election Study (SPES) and the 1999 Welsh Assembly Election Study (WAES). These data sets provide information on demographic variables, media attention, national identity and attitudes towards independence.

The SPES was carried out as part of the 1999 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey. The SPES contains 1482 face-to-face interviews with respondents who were selected to be representative of the population 18 years and older in Scotland. The SPES had a response rate of approximately 59 percent. Only those whose identity was either Scottish or British are included in the analysis, giving an effective sample size of 1423.

The WAES was developed in close co-ordination with SPES in order to facilitate comparisons between Scotland and Wales. The WAES was designed to yield a random sample of the population of Wales aged 18 years and over. The achieved sample was 1255 respondents, 729 of whom were interviewed over the telephone and 522 of whom were given face-to-face interviews. The response rate for the face-to-face survey was approximately 67 percent. For the telephone survey the response rate was approximately 50 percent. All respondents who are not Welsh or British are excluded from the analysis, giving an analytical sample size of 1161.

#### **Measuring National Identity and Nationalist Attitudes**

The primary dependent variables of interest are nationalist attitudes and national identity. National identity is measured using a scale originally developed by Moreno (1988) to study national identity in Scotland and Catalonia. This is an especially useful scale since it taps dual identities, allowing us to determine how Scottish and Welsh identities are related to British identity. The exact wording of the Moreno scale is below (codes assigned to the categories are in parentheses):

"Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

- Scottish / Welsh not British (coded 5)
- More Scottish / Welsh than British (coded 4)
- Equally Scottish / Welsh and British (coded 3)
- More British than Scottish / Welsh (coded 2)
- British not Scottish / Welsh (coded 1)"

There is perhaps no better measure of nationalist attitudes than attitudes towards independence. Although they had slight differences in wording, both the WAES and the SPES contain five-point scales asking respondents to describe the degree of independence that they preferred their nation to have. Scottish nationalism was tapped with the following question (codes in parentheses):

"Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

- Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union (coded 5)
- Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union (coded 4)
- Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers (coded 3)
- Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers (coded 2)
- Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament (coded 1)."

Welsh nationalism was measured using the following question:

"Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

- Wales should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union (coded 5)
- Wales should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union (coded 4)
- Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has law-making and taxation powers (coded 3)
- Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly which has limited law-making powers only (coded 2)
- Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly (coded 1)."

#### **Explanatory and Intermediate Variables**

The primary explanatory variables in the study are age, social class, religion, and newspapers readership. Age is treated simply as a continuous variable. Social class is also measured the same in all three nations, using two dummy regressors: (1) manual labourers, and (2) Technicians and Foremen. In cases where the respondent was not economically active or was retired but his/her spouse or partner was still economically active, the partner's social class is substituted.

Differences in religious institutions required that different measures of religion were used for each nation. In Scotland religion is a dummy regressor coded 1 for practising members of the Church of Scotland. Due to the significant proportion of people in Wales belonging to the Anglican Church and relatively few numbers belonging to Welsh churches, two dummy regressors are used to measure religion in Wales: (1) practising members of the Anglican Church, (2) practising members of the Welsh Calvinist Church.

National newspaper readership is operationalized using a dummy regressor coded 1 for those who regularly read national newspapers (i.e., a newspaper based in Scotland or Wales) and 0 for those who did not. Since recent research has shown political orientations and type of newspaper to be related (Norris et al 1999), it was also necessary to control for type of newspaper. This is done by treating non-readers as the reference category with two dummy regressors: (1) those who read quality broadsheet newspapers, and (2) those who read tabloid newspapers (irrespective of whether the newspaper is Scottish/Welsh or British).

Finally, gender and education are included as control variables. Gender is a dummy variable coded 1 for men, and education is measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has a university degree.

### Modelling procedure

Graphical chain models are used to test our hypotheses. Using graphs to display causal relationships has a long tradition in sociological research (see, for example, Duncan 1966, 1975; Alwin and Hauser 1975; Bollen 1989), but the use of graphical chain models is relatively new (Cox and Wermuth 1993, 1996, 2001). Although basically an exploratory method, graphical chains can uncover relationships consistent with causal interpretations.

Graphical chain models have some slight differences from traditional causal diagrams. Boxes are used to contain variables between which no temporal ordering is assumed. Unlike traditional causal diagrams, explanatory variables are placed in boxes to the *right* of boxes containing response variables, reflecting the order in which they would occur in regression equations. Variables included together in the same box are assumed to be conditionally dependent on all variables in boxes to their right. Similar to other causal diagrams, arrows represent causal relationships. Lines connecting variables without arrows indicate dependences that are not given causal interpretation. Figure 1 displays the ordering of the variables in our initial models. The same model is fit separately to the Scottish and Welsh data.

Figure 1
Ordering of variables in initial graphical chain models of national identity and attitudes towards independence

Attitudes towards independence (Scotland, Wales and England)

AND

Attitudes towards British unity (England only) Moreno national identity scale

Newspaper Readership (National newspapers) (controls for Tabloids, broadsheets, other) Gender (men) Age (continuous) Education (University degree) Religion Scotland: (Church of Scotland) Wales (Welsh Calvinist, Church of England, otheri England (Church of England) Social class (working class,

foremen, other)

A series of logistic regressions, both ordinal and binary, are used to determine conditional dependencies. The multivariate dependencies of nationalist attitudes and national identity are determined by ordinal logit models.<sup>ii</sup> Binary logit models are used to uncover the factors associated with reading national newspapers. Initially several models are constructed with each dependent variable being regressed on all variables to the right in the chain. The final model includes only the explanatory variables that were statistically significant (i.e., p-value<.05).

#### Results

Table 1 presents response to the Moreno national identity scale in the two nations. It is clear that Scottish identity is more prevalent than Welsh identity—almost 70 percent of those interviewed in Scotland see themselves as more Scottish than British, while slightly less than 40 percent of people in Wales considered themselves as more Welsh than British. Considering the large number of English nationals in Wales, this finding is not surprising. As we shall see below, the relatively high proportion of Scottish identity compared to Welsh identity is also reflected in a stronger Scottish nationalism.

Table 1 National Identity in Scotland and Wales. Responses to the Moreno identity scale, in percent.					
"Which of the following best describes how					
you see yourself?"	Scotlan	Wales			
	d				
Scottish/Welsh, not British	33.7	17.9			
More Scottish/Welsh than British	35.6	20.2			
Equally Scottish/Welsh and British	23.4	39.0			
More British than Scottish/Welsh	3.5	8.3			
British, not Scottish/Welsh	3.7	14.6			
Number of cases	1423	1161			


Table 2 displays attitudes towards independence in Scotland and Wales. It is clear from this table that there is significant support for independence in both nations. Once again, however, minority nationalism appears to be strongest in Scotland. Nearly 90 percent of respondents in Scotland, while 74 percent of respondents in Wales favour some form of independent parliament or assembly.

Table 2		
Attitudes towards independence		
Percentage reporting that	Scotl	W
Scotland/Wales should:	and	al
		es
become independent, separate from the UK and the	10.	2.9
European Union	8	
become independent, separate from the UK but part of the	17.	8.2
European Union	3	
remain part of the UK, with its own elected	53.	24.8
parliament/assembly with taxation powers	7	
remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament/assembly with limited powers	9.2	37.9
remain part of the UK without an elected parliament/assembly	9.1	26.2
Number of cases	142	10
	3	84

The analysis now turns to the graphical chain models. Coefficients from the models are in Tables 3-5 below. Coefficients are provided for both the initial models including all possible conditional dependencies and the final models containing only those variables that had statistically significant estimates in the initial model. The results from the final models for Scotland and Wales are also shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. In order to facilitate comparison of the two models, we use dashed edges to represent negative relationships and solid edges to represent positive relationships. We begin with a discussion of the models of national identity and then continue with a discussion of the models of nationalist attitudes.

Figure 2
Graphical chain models of attitudes towards independence and national identity in Scotland and Wales

#### Scot land



#### Wales





Figure 3
Graphical chain models of English national identity and attitudes towards English independence and British unity, England

### English independence



#### British unity




Table 3 displays the coefficients from the models of national identity. Recall that high scores of national identity imply strong Scottish or Welsh identity while low scores represent strong British identity. The patterns of the conditional dependencies of national identity are very similar in Wales and Scotland. Before assessing the hypotheses tests, some mention is needed regarding the slight differences between the two countries. These differences pertain to the role of broadsheet newspapers, education and religion.

Explanatory variable         Scotland         Wales           Hodel         First Model         Final Model	Coefficients	from ordered log	le 3 it models of natio	onal identity	
Model         Model         Model         Model         Model           Men        062         N.S.        147         N.S.           .(.103)         (.110)	Explanatory variable				ales
Men        062 (.103)         N.S. (.110)        147 (.110)         N.S. (.110)           Age        012*** (.003)        013*** (.003)        013*** (.003)        013*** (.003)           Religion         Anglican church		First	Final	First	Final
Age012***013***013***013***013**  Religion  Anglican church093 N.S. 1.077* 1.042 (.137)  Scottish/Welsh church093 N.S. 1.077* 1.042 (.124) (.533) (.52)  University degree612***624***234 N.S.  Social Class  Manual labour .234* .266* .448*** .474** (.118) (.113) (.124) (.11  Technicians/Foremen .737** .742*** .356 N.S.  (.213) (.208) (.214)  Newspaper readership  National .266* .384*** .476** .566** (.130) (.105) (.154) (.11  Tabloid .222 N.S207 N.S.  (.142) (.142) (.146) Broadsheet .355*525*** .248 N.S.  (.172) (.142) (.140)  Cut points  ?1 -3.799 -3.855 -2.190 -2.13 ?2 -3.083 -3.139 -1.625 -1.56 ?3 -1.288 -1.344 .158 .20 ?4 .283 .223 1.235 1.27 LR ?2 102.86 99.50 71.28 59.6  Degrees of freedom 9 6 10 -9-value <<.001 <<.001 <<.001		Model	Model	Model	Model
Age      012***      013***      013***      013***         Religion	Men	062	N.S.	147	N.S.
Comparison   Com					
Religion	Age	012***	013***	013***	013***
Anglican church  Scottish/Welsh church 093  N.S.  (.137)  N.S.  (.137)  Scottish/Welsh church 093  N.S.  1.077*  1.042  (.533)  (.52)  University degree 612*** 624*** 234  N.S.  Social Class  Manual labour 234* 266*  Manual labour  (.118)  (.113)  (.124)  (.11  Technicians/Foremen 737** 742***  356  N.S.  (.213)  Newspaper readership  National 266* 384*** 476** 566**  N.S.  N.S.  N.S.  N.S.  N.S.  207  N.S.  1.142)  Broadsheet 355* 525*** 248  N.S.  Cut points 3799  -3.855 525***  -248  N.S.  Cut points 128 3083 3139  -1.625  -1.52 3 3 1.288  -1.344  -1.283  -1.235  1.27  LR ?²  102.86  99.50  71.28  59.60  P-value		(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Scottish/Welsh church	Religion				
Scottish/Welsh church        093         N.S.         1.077*         1.042           University degree        612***        624***        234         N.S.           Social Class         (.162)         (.162)         (.160)         N.S.           Manual labour         .234*         .266*         .448***         .474**           (.118)         (.113)         (.124)         (.11           Technicians/Foremen         .737**         .742***         .356         N.S.           Newspaper readership         (.213)         (.208)         (.214)         N.S.           National         .266*         .384***         .476**         .566**           National         .266*         .384***         .476**         .566**           National         .222         N.S.         .207         N.S.           (.142)         (.140)         (.146)         N.S.           Broadsheet        355*        525***         .248         N.S.           Cut points        122         .3.083         -3.139         -1.625         -1.56           ? 2         -3.083         -3.139         -1.625         -1.56           ? 3         -1.288         -1.344<	Anglican church			178	N.S.
University degree612***624***234 N.S.  Social Class  Manual labour .234* .266* .448*** .474**  (.118) (.113) (.124) (.11  Technicians/Foremen .737** .742*** .356 N.S.  (.213) (.208) (.214)  Newspaper readership  National .266* .384*** .476** .566**  (.130) (.105) (.154) (.11  Tabloid .222 N.S207 N.S.  (.146)  Broadsheet .355*525*** .248 N.S.  (.172) (.142) (.180)  Cut points  ?1				(.137)	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Scottish/Welsh church	093	N.S.	1.077*	1.042*
(.162) (.162) (.160)  Social Class  Manual labour		(.124)		(.533)	(.529)
Social Class         Manual labour         .234*         .266*         .448***         .474***           (.118)         (.113)         (.124)         (.11           Technicians/Foremen         .737**         .742***         .356         N.S.           (.213)         (.208)         (.214)         N.S.           Newspaper readership         .266*         .384***         .476**         .566**           National         .266*         .384***         .476**         .566**           (.130)         (.105)         (.154)         (.11           Tabloid         .222         N.S.         .207         N.S.           (.142)         (.146)         S.         .248         N.S.           (.172)         (.142)         (.180)         .200           Cut points         .2         .3.855         -2.190         -2.13           ?2         -3.083         -3.139         -1.625         -1.50           ?3         -1.2	University degree	612***	624***	234	N.S.
Manual labour       .234*       .266*       .448***       .474***         (.118)       (.113)       (.124)       (.11         Technicians/Foremen       .737**       .742***       .356       N.S.         (.213)       (.208)       (.214)       N.S.         Newspaper readership         National       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       .222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .207       N.S.         Broadsheet      355*      525***       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)          Cut points         ?1       -3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.56         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?²       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10	, ,	(.162)	(.162)	(.160)	
Technicians/Foremen       (.118)       (.113)       (.124)       (.11         Technicians/Foremen       (.213)       (.208)       (.214)         Newspaper readership         National       (.266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       (.222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .207       N.S.         Broadsheet      355*      525***       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)          Cut points         ?1       -3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.50         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?²       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10       -1.00       -1.00         p-value       <<.001	Social Class				
Technicians/Foremen       .737**       .742***       .356       N.S.         (.213)       (.208)       (.214)         Newspaper readership         National       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       .222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)          Cut points         ?1       -3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.56         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?2       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10       -2.00         p-value       <<.001	Manual labour	.234*	.266*	.448***	.474***
(.213)       (.208)       (.214)         Newspaper readership         National       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       .222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)       .24       N.S.         Cut points       .21       .3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.56         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?2       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10         p-value       <<.001		(.118)	(.113)	(.124)	(.116)
Newspaper readership       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         National       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       .222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .207       N.S.         Broadsheet      355*      525***       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)          Cut points             ?1       -3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.56         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?2       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10         p-value       <<.001	Technicians/Foremen	.737**	.742***	.356	N.S.
National       .266*       .384***       .476**       .566**         (.130)       (.105)       (.154)       (.11         Tabloid       .222       N.S.       .207       N.S.         (.142)       (.146)       N.S.       .248       N.S.         Broadsheet      355*      525***       .248       N.S.         (.172)       (.142)       (.180)         Cut points       -1       -3.799       -3.855       -2.190       -2.13         ?2       -3.083       -3.139       -1.625       -1.56         ?3       -1.288       -1.344       .158       .20         ?4       .283       .223       1.235       1.27         LR ?2       102.86       99.50       71.28       59.6         Degrees of freedom       9       6       10         p-value       <<.001		(.213)	(.208)	(.214)	
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Newspaper readership				
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	National	.266*	.384***	.476**	.566***
Broadsheet $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(.130)	(.105)	(.154)	(.115)
Broadsheet $355*$ $525***$ .248 N.S	Tabloid	.222	N.S.	.207	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(.142)		(.146)	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Broadsheet		525***		N.S.
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(.172)	(.142)		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Cut points	` '	` ′	• /	
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-3.799	-3.855	-2.190	-2.130
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-3.083	-3.139	-1.625	-1.566
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-1.288	-1.344	.158	.204
LR $?^2$ 102.86 99.50 71.28 59.6 Degrees of freedom 9 6 10 $p$ -value $<<.001$ $<<.001$ $<<.001$	? 4	.283	.223	1.235	1.272
<i>p</i> -value <<.001 <<.001 <<.00	LR ? <sup>2</sup>	102.86	99.50	71.28	59.68
<i>p</i> -value <<.001 <<.001 <<.00	Degrees of freedom	9	6	10	4
	- C	<<.001	<<.001	<<.001	<<.001
		1414	1414	1161	1161

With respect to education, the patterns of association are similar in the two countries and the coefficients differ only in size and the level of statistical significance-the effects are smaller and not statistically significant in Wales but statistically significant in Scotland. Differences in newspaper readership are also easy to explain. Broadsheet newspapers are typically supportive of the British state, including those in Scotland (see Norris et al 1999), so we might expect people who read them to be more British than people who do not. The fact that this pattern shows only in Scotland, and not in Wales, reflects the dominance of the English broadsheets in Wales, and the much stronger Scottish press in Scotland. In other words, people in Wales have little choice aside from English-based papers. The differences in the effects of religion also require explanation. Although Scottish identity is unrelated to belonging to the Church of Scotland, there is a strong positive relationship between Welsh identity and belonging to the Welsh Calvinist church. This discrepancy can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Anglican church has a stronger presence in Wales than in Scotland. In other words, the Welsh church has a greater minority status relative to the Scottish church, which may in turn encourage strong Welsh identity in reaction to the official British nationalism.

Attention now turns directly to the hypotheses regarding the correlates of national identity. The discussion starts with the impact of social class. In both Scotland and Wales those in the working classes are much more likely to associate with the minority nation, providing support for the internal colonialism argument. This finding is simple to explain. Higher class Scots and Welsh are less likely to feel disadvantaged by the system and more likely to be integrated into British institutions—in fact, they may realise that they are in a privileged position. As result, they may be more likely to see themselves as British rather than just Scottish or Welsh.

The models also give significant support for the hypothesis that newspaper readership is related to national identity. Those who regularly read Scottish newspapers were more likely to have a strong Scottish identity. Similarly, but with even greater strength, reading Welsh newspapers was positively related to Welsh national identity. However, the direction of causation between reading national newspapers and national identity is not clear and there is no way of confidently disentangling this relationship statistically with cross-sectional observational data. Still the coefficients presented in Table 4 are consistent with the argument that there is at least some kind of reciprocal relationship. Controlling for everything else in the model, there is a strong positive relationship between national identity and the newspapers people read.

Table 4 Coefficients from binary logit models of national newspaper readership Scotland Wales First Final First Final Explanatory variable Model Model Model Model Men .196 N.S. .399\*\* .345\*\* (.112)(.132)(.129).010\*\* Age .002 N.S. .009\* (.003)(.004)(.004)Religion N.S. Anglican Church .205 (.163).342\*\* Scottish/Welsh church .363\*\* .212 N.S. (.136)(.129)(.605)University degree .026 N.S. .526\*\* .633\*\*\* (.174)(.298)(.184)Social Class Manual labour .198 N.S. -.284 N.S. (.124)(.152)Technicians/Foremen -.097 N.S. -.246 N.S. (.264)(.225)288\*\*\* .273\*\*\* National identity .173\*\* .172\*\* (.053)(.055)(.054)(.055)-2.404 Intercept -1.031 -.753 -2.348(.291)(.218)(.298)(.302) $LR ?^2$ 25.08 17.11 46.70 52.60 Degrees of freedom 8 *p*-value .001 <<.001 <<.001 <<.001

Number of cases

1414

Having explored the correlates of national identity, it is of interest to determine how these patterns are related to nationalist attitudes. Table 5 provides estimates from the ordinal logit model of nationalist attitudes. Recall that the dependent variable—attitudes towards independence—is coded so that high values indicate pro-independence attitudes. As expected, there is a strong generational impact on nationalist attitudes in all nations, with older people being more likely than young people to desire a united Great Britain. We also find support for modernisation theory in that religion has a significant impact on nationalist attitudes in both Scotland and Wales. Those who are practising members of the established church tend to be less supportive of independence than others.

1423

1161

1161

<sup>\*</sup>p-value<.05; \*\*p-value<.01; p-value<.001

N.S. Variable omitted from the final model because it was not statistically significant

Coefficients from o	Tabl		wards independer	100
Explanatory variable	ordered logit models of attitudes to Scotland		Wales	
-	First	Final	First	Final
	Model	Model	Model	Model
National identity	.684**	.686**	.420**	.417**
ž	(.056	(.055	(.048	(.047
Men	.087	N.S.	.232*	.240*
	(.109)		(.115)	(.113)
Age	080**	008**	008*	009**
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Religion				
Anglican church			375**	366**
_			(.144)	(.143)
Scottish/Welsh church	254	297**	.062	N.S.
	(.133)	(.131)	(.585)	
University degree	.229	N.S.	.285	N.S.
	(.173)		(.165)	
Social Class				
Manual labour	.499***	.508***	.104	N.S.
	(.127)	(.114)	(.131)	
Technicians/Foremen	.247	N.S.	260	N.S.
	(.218)		(.228)	
Newspaper readership				
National	084	N.S.	176	N.S.
	(.139)		(.160)	
Tabloid	.233	N.S.	.078	N.S.
	(.153)		(.153)	
Broadsheet	.031	N.S.	.305	N.S.
	(.184)		(.188)	
Cut points				
? 1	051	227	113	234
? 2	.820	.642	1.638	1.508
? 3	3.607	3.417	3.261	3.122
? 4	4.891	4.697	4.742	4.598
LR? <sup>2</sup>	228.54	221.75	120.28	111.97
Degrees of freedom	10	4	11	4
<i>p</i> -value	<<.001	<<.001	<<.001	<<.001
Number of cases	1345	1345	1078	1078

<sup>\*</sup>p-value<.05; \*\*p-value<.01; p-value<.001

N.S. Variable omitted from the final model because it was not statistically significant

The models also suggest that working class people are more likely than non-working class people to support independence in both Scotland and Wales. This implies, then, that attitudes towards independence can be influenced by economic conditions. In other words, people unhappy with present economic conditions may consider them to be the result of constitutional arrangements, or perhaps government performance, and hence think a change in system would result in better conditions. Working class people who are less advantaged are probably most likely to view the situation in this manner.

Robert Andersen

The most important finding with respect to nationalist attitudes is not visible in Figure 2 and requires close

inspection of Table 5. That Scottish and Welsh nationalisms are true minority nationalisms is obvious in the

impact of national identity on attitudes towards independence: indeed for both nations the coefficients for

national identity are much larger than the coefficients for any other factor in the model.

**Discussion and Conclusion** 

The goal of this paper was to explore the correlates of national identity and nationalist attitudes in Wales and

Scotland. The dominant theories of nationalism set the stage for the analysis. Although macro in focus, these

theories imply assumptions about individual attitudes that have not been properly tested. This paper attempted to

fill this gap by exploring the relationships between national identity, nationalist attitudes, and background variables

using survey data.

The analyses reported here provide significant support for the claim that modernisation creates the ideal

conditions for nationalist movements. Important to the modern world are mass communications such as national

newspapers. The findings suggest that regularly reading national newspapers is related to minority national

identification. It is plausible that reading national newspapers increases one's awareness of news associated with

their nation, and this in turn increases national identity. It is equally possible, however, that those with high levels

of national identity are more likely to read newspapers that cater to their identity. That our findings suggest both

these processes may be at work is interesting and indicates further research is needed in the area.

Modernisation theories also dictate that the decline of religion has led to the need for other forms of social

integration that take the place of the communal aspect of formal religion and the belief in afterlife (Anderson

1983). In line with this theory, this study found a negative relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards

independence. This finding is consistent with the argument that nationalism helps fill the void left by the decline of

religion.

The findings also lend support to the theory of internal colonialism. National identity in Scotland and Wales is

significantly related to social class. This is consistent with the argument that minority nationalism, or peripheral

nationalism as Hechter (2000) labels them, are most likely to flourish in minority nations whose members feel

disadvantaged by the state because of their nationality. Of course, these data do not allow us to prove this theory,

but the results are suggestive of this mechanism. Simply put, modernisation theories claims of the conditions

required for national movements have some merit but their argument that nationalist movements are largely

integrative is not supported by these data.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that, although national identity is the most important influence, attitudes towards independence can be related to other things. For example, when controlling for national identity, the impacts of social class and religion varied in their impact on nationalist attitudes. It is also evident that older generations are much more likely to favour keeping Great Britain united. Considered together these findings indicate that although national identity is the primary driving force for independence, it is not the only important factor. Attitudes related to economic concerns may be related to independence attitudes in a manner quite unique from national identity. The asymmetry in the relationships between national identity and social background, and attitudes towards independence and social background, is interesting is a topic deserving of further research.

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