



Campaign Planning  
Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00  
Second Edition

# **JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 5-00**

## **CAMPAIGN PLANNING**

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is promulgated  
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

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Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, Development, Concepts and Doctrine

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## JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of NATO. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs).<sup>1</sup> From time to time, Interim Joint Doctrine Publications (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising from operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed in Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.

Details of the Joint Doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 '*Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*'.

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<sup>1</sup> Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

## RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Amendment No	Date of Amendment	Initials
Change 1	April 2011	DCDC

### CHANGE 1

Change 1 to JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* was promulgated in April 2011. Change 1 provides updated or new doctrine on:

**Strategic Communication:** building on JDN 1/11 *Strategic Communication: The Military Contribution*, this change provides guidance on the incorporation of strategic communication into the operational planning process. See paragraphs 215 and 248.

**Planning at the Operational level:** an updated introduction to planning at the operational level that recognises that, although the characteristics of the operational level may now manifest themselves at the tactical level, the nature of operational level command has not changed; it is still defined by complexity not scale. See paragraph 216.

**Hierarchy of Military Activity:** new doctrine that clarifies the hierarchy of terms that describe military activities and how they fit together linking strategy to tactical activity. See paragraph 224.

**The Operational Estimate:** updated doctrine that expands the operational estimate to include *design* within the planning process. See paragraph 248.

**Campaign Continuity:** new doctrine that describes both the problem and guidance on how the commander can mitigate the challenges of planning and execution during enduring campaigns. See paragraphs 294 to 299.

## PREFACE

1. **Purpose.** JDP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*' (BDD) (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) describes crisis management, a cross-Government endeavour that is often multinational as well as multi-agency, and the circumstances under which UK Armed Forces contribute. JDP 01 '*Campaigning*' addresses the military contribution from the perspective of the Joint Force Commander (JFC)<sup>2</sup>. Based on good practice developed during recent UK and coalition operations, JDP 5-00 describes the process of Defence crisis management and the fundamentals of operational planning. With JDP 2-00 '*Intelligence*' and JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*', and underpinned by JDP 01 '*Campaigning*', it provides authoritative guidance on the conduct of joint operations.
2. **Audience.** JDP 5-00 is aimed primarily at those engaged in or studying operational level **planning**, specifically staff employed in: the Permanent Joint Headquarters; the Joint Force Headquarters and, when deployed, respective Joint Task Force Headquarters or National Contingent Headquarters; and Component Command Headquarters. It will also be of considerable use to those routinely employed in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation including representatives from Other Government Departments (specifically the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit).
3. **Structure.** JDP 5-00 is divided into 3 chapters:
  - a. **Chapter 1 – Analysis** emphasises the importance of a JFC understanding the strategic context as a precursor to effective planning. It describes the role of Analysis in providing a JFC with the requisite knowledge of the context within which he may be required to intervene, as part of a comprehensive response to a crisis.
  - b. **Chapter 2 – Planning** describes the campaign planning process. With an understanding of the strategic context already reached through Analysis, the 6-Step Operational Estimate enables a JFC to frame the problem and then, through a flexible and adaptive process designed to address ill-structured problems, establish a suitable course of action to achieve campaign success.
  - c. **Chapter 3 – Defence Crisis Management** describes the development of military strategic direction, and subsequent operational level planning for national, multinational and multi-agency campaigns and operations.

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<sup>2</sup> 'A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise Operational Command or Control over a Joint Force', Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'.

## LINKAGES

4. JDP 5-00 is linked with:
  - a. JDP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*'.
  - b. '*Defence Strategic Guidance*'.
  - c. '*The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036*'.
  - d. JDP 01 '*Campaigning*'.
  - e. JDP 1-00 '*Personnel Support to Joint Operations*'.
  - f. JDP 2-00 '*Intelligence*'.
  - g. JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*'.
  - h. JDP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'.
  - i. JDP 6-00 '*Communications and Information Systems*'.
  
5. Knowledge of UK doctrine alone will not be sufficient to prepare headquarters staff for planning a multinational operation. The most likely coalitions will be US led and, although this doctrine is compatible with that of our major allies, it is not identical. Therefore, every effort should be made to become familiar with the equivalent doctrine of the lead nation or organisation. JDP 5-00 reflects principally UK national arrangements. Commanders and more probably their staff should know where to access relevant alliance and coalition lead nation doctrine.
  - a. **Allied Doctrine.** JDP 5-00 is coherent with the thrust of extant Allied joint doctrine: AJP-01 '*Allied Joint Doctrine*', AJP-3 '*Allied Joint Operations*' and AJP-5 '*Allied Joint Operational Planning*'. Where there are variations, UK joint doctrine has primacy for UK national and UK-led operations.
  - b. **Other Multinational Doctrine.** Useful guidance on operating within an *ad hoc* coalition can also be found in the Multinational Interoperability Council '*Coalition Building Guide*'. Equivalent US doctrine is centred on Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 '*Joint Operations Planning*'.

# CAMPAIGN PLANNING

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<b>Supplement 5A</b>	<b>United States Combatant Commanders Geographic Areas (November 2007)</b>

**Lexicon**

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## CHAPTER 1 – ANALYSIS

Chapter 1 describes the importance of situational understanding as a precursor to effective planning. It describes the role of analysis in providing a Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the requisite operational context.

Section I – Introduction

Section II – Conduct of Analysis

### SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

101. JDP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD) (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) describes the circumstances under which British Armed Forces contribute to crisis management. JDP 01 ‘*Campaigning*’ addresses the military contribution, from the perspective of the JFC,<sup>1</sup> in the context of a comprehensive national or multinational strategy. This publication focuses on the planning of the military contribution, principally at the operational level. An important precursor to planning is analysing the context within which a particular crisis has arisen, or looks as if it might arise in the future.

#### Rationale for Analysis

102. Understanding the nature of a crisis *situation* (to which the term analysis refers) helps to identify the *problem* as part of the process of planning; both of these are separate from (and should precede) determining the *solution*. This Chapter describes in detail the rationale for situational understanding, the key issues being:

- a. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis, but a significant start point in the crisis management process is a description of the current situation, in terms that promote shared understanding for as many stakeholders as possible.
- b. Any particular crisis may usefully be described as a series of conditions that characterise what is perceived to be wrong and what might be changed to improve matters; in other words, that which is required to effect a planned transition from one set of conditions to another, often described as a theory of change.
- c. Crises may arise in numerous different ways and, as importantly, be perceived differently by individual actors. There are seldom objective facts upon which to establish with any certainty what is happening and where, let

<sup>1</sup> ‘A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise Operational Command or Control over a Joint Force’, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 ‘*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*’.

alone why. Ambiguity, confusion and contradiction are likely to permeate, more or less continuously.

- d. The time available for analysis will almost always be limited, demanding a trade off between the improvement of understanding and the imperative to develop clear orders and instructions.

## Context and Complexity

103. The need for a commander to understand his situation, and to keep on updating that understanding before and during a campaign, is not new. There are, however, 2 reasons why analysis (the examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated operational context) is particularly important. First, it provides a commander with an appreciation of the potential complexity and, second, the process begins to indicate (based on existing *unfavourable* conditions) what might represent a more favourable situation in the future. In addition to affording analysis sufficient time, the other critical requirement is to gather a broad range of perspectives, including, perhaps most importantly, those that challenge any existing (national and/or military) paradigms.

104. **Context as Setting.** The term context is used to describe the relevant circumstances, participants and relationships, surroundings, and other influences that, collectively, form the setting for an event or crisis. Analysis, the scope of which is described in Annex 1A, indicates:

- a. The conditions under which military activity is required (including geospatial, political, demographic, cultural and language factors).
- b. The actors involved (hostile, friendly, neutral or belligerent), to what extent they are involved and why.
- c. The nature of participants' involvement (history, culture, relationships, motivations, perceptions, interests and desired outcomes).
- d. Other influences, both internal (for instance, societal factors) and external (for example, regional hegemony).
- e. The nature of the military activity required from our own forces, with whom it is to be carried out (including allies, coalition partners and Other Government Departments (OGDs)), and who such activity is intended to affect or what it should achieve.

105. **Dealing with Complexity.** Understanding context depends on not only acquiring the requisite *knowledge*, drawing upon information and intelligence, but also

on applying *intellect*. It is ultimately a commander's own reasoning and judgement that provide him with his *comprehension* or individual perception of a crisis situation. This thorough comprehension is perhaps the pre-eminent challenge for a JFC, as he prepares to *frame the problem* and to plan the military contribution to the response. Because crises are invariably complex (with a multitude of frequently interconnected parts) they also tend to be:

- a. **Adaptive**, such that any action causes reaction and any benefit has an associated opportunity cost.
- b. **Uncertain**, often confusing; some risks may be incalculable.
- c. **Ambiguous**, in that they can be perceived in quite different ways by different actors or external observers; there is seldom a universal view of the context to any particular problem (however manifestly 'clear' the situation may appear from an individual perspective).
- d. **Competitive or adversarial**, requiring compromise, if not submission, in relation to conflicts of interest or need, or perceived security.
- e. **Constrained**, by different parties' varying commitment to resolve a crisis, their capability to do so, and (internal and external) legitimacy to try.
- f. **Unbounded**, and permeating, or being affected by, regional dynamics and, with increasing globalisation, the rest of the international community as well.
- g. **Dynamic**, altering from the moment that military or other intervention is anticipated, let alone occurs.

106. A crisis situation should be examined in its entirety *as a system*, recognising that no single element exists in isolation. Intervention itself invariably alters the dynamics of a situation. Moreover, almost all situations are open systems affected by external intervention and influences as well as by internal dynamics.

### Nature of Analysis

107. Analysis is expansive and open-minded; it is different from problem-solving *per se*, which of necessity tends to be more narrowly focused on the key issues. Analysis not only takes into account all relevant factors, better to understand the complexity and causes of a crisis, but it also actively seeks to discover what has hitherto been unknown, and to include different perspectives, including the novel, the contrary and the extreme. Effective analysis is best achieved by accessing multiple sources of information and intelligence in the time available; not just from the

traditional military intelligence community, but from any relevant source, especially where that may provide an alternative perspective.

108. Analysis is based on a combination of objective data (for example, physical and demographic data) and subjective opinion (such as actors' reported aspirations and views). In interpreting the information presented, steps should be taken to guard against partiality or bias, especially given the natural inclination to exclude the unexpected, the inexplicable, the unpalatable or the counter-intuitive. Analysis is never exhaustive, nor absolutely certain, for the dynamics of most crises are too complex and volatile, but effective analysis can help a JFC to rationalise (though not necessarily reduce) that complexity and ambiguity to some degree.

109. Periodic review, including by those previously uninvolved, can provide a fresh perspective on a JFC's analysis and offset any tendency towards groupthink. During the execution of a campaign, while analysis will often become better informed, the gap between perception and reality (like the gap between actual and reported crime) will always remain elusive.

110. Analysis does more than look at the current situation, it also addresses what might happen next, based upon alternative assumptions regarding the actions and reactions of different actors (including the impact of any intervention). Together these enable a JFC to:

- a. Understand the context in which he is operating or intends to operate.
- b. Understand the potential impact of his actions or other events.
- c. Act upon this understanding to maximise the positive effects of any intervention (and to minimise the negative).

111. As well as informing a JFC of what is known (its primary purpose), analysis also identifies knowledge gaps, indicating risk – of the unknown – which should be managed accordingly. Analysis also highlights risk in broader terms, namely the risk associated with acting or not acting, and the risk of failure. Risk management is covered in Chapter 2.

### **McNamara: Paralysis by Analysis**

Robert McNamara was the youngest Assistant Professor of Harvard Business School. He became the President of the Ford Motor Company at the age of 44 in 1960. Five weeks later President-elect John F Kennedy invited him to become the US Secretary of Defence.

McNamara introduced many modern business practices into the Pentagon, including computer-based forms of systems analysis, which used almost exclusively quantitative (numerical) data. In theory the process was transparent to all; in practice few could understand the sheer weight of data presented. It was also thought that some results were effectively tailored by analysts to support decisions that McNamara had already taken.

Systems analysis was introduced to support analysis and assessment of the conduct of the Vietnam War. Its emphasis on quantitative data led, amongst other things, to the notorious 'body count'. Large numbers of staff spend considerable effort analysing and assessing, but systems analysis did not deliver adequate direction to tactical commanders.

Analysis and assessment are critical to the conduct of military operations. But it is important not to allow the tools and processes used to overtake their purpose, which is to guide military decision-making. Numerical assessments have their place, but so too does a commander's subjective analysis.

## **SECTION II – CONDUCT OF ANALYSIS**

112. Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, whole-headquarters activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterise a situation. As a situation evolves, analysis is updated by continuous assessment of progress.

### **Principles**

113. **Purposeful.** As a preliminary activity to planning, albeit one that continues during both planning and execution, analysis is invariably carried out against a finite, and often challenging, timeline. It should be managed pragmatically and purposefully, to provide situational understanding; analysis is a means to an end.

114. **Expansive.** Analysis is about understanding the nature of the crisis situation; it is during the planning process that a JFC searches for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives and expanding knowledge rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue.



115. **Inclusive.** Although time is always a limiting factor, consideration should be given to as many sources of information and ideas, perspectives and opinions as possible. Additional credible views and insights, however inconsistent or contradictory, can enrich understanding.

116. **Receptive.** The tendency to adopt a particular perspective early on, and then ignore information that fails to support that view, should be resisted. The impact of a closed mind may be to reject contrary views, and even exclude those who hold them, thus breaching an inclusive approach.

117. **Challenging.** A balance should be struck between being inclusive and being sufficiently discerning or discriminating. All ideas and information should be tested for their validity; any gaps in information should be similarly examined in a bid to build a comprehensive picture of the situation in the time available.

## Methodologies

118. The most appropriate methodologies for analysis will be dictated by the problem and the JFC's knowledge and preferences. Commonly used approaches include:

- a. **SWOT** analysis, frequently used in strategy formulation, helps to identify the (internal) strengths and weaknesses, and (external) opportunities and threats associated with a particular object (country, group, organisation, tribe, etc). A problem situation can thus be understood as a balance between protecting Strengths, minimising Weaknesses, exploiting Opportunities and mitigating Threats.
- b. **PEST** analysis is used to understand an object's external environment, and changes in that environment, in terms of Political, Economic, Social/demographic and Technological factors or influences. PEST factors may not be amenable to direct control by a JFC but will undoubtedly impact on how a crisis develops, and the potential effectiveness of military and other activities. There are a number of extensions and variations of the PEST analysis, such as:
  - (1) **PESTL, STEEPLE** adds Legal, Environmental and Ethic, factors.
  - (2) **PMESII**, used in the US and NATO planning processes, addresses Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information.
- c. The **constituents of a nation or society** include the rule of law, education, commercial, humanitarian and health, information, military,

economic and diplomacy, administration and governance (sometimes referred to as Jackson's Rope of inter-twined factors that, bound together, form the fabric of the nation or society). Each factor may represent either a strength or weakness of the nation, and thereby an opportunity or a threat to the success (for example) of an intervention force seeking to achieve peace and stability.

d. **Stakeholder analysis** is used to identify the driving and restraining forces for change in a situation. The eventual resolution of a crisis should satisfy the majority of stakeholders, or at least ensure that no powerful (and legitimate) stakeholder is left (too) dissatisfied. Stakeholder analysis can take a number of forms, but the purpose is broadly the same – to identify relevant stakeholders and the ways in which each may influence, or be influenced by, the situation. Actors and their influences can be depicted diagrammatically to depict formal, and informal, relationships – in essence, a stakeholder network.

e. A **cultural estimate** addresses a situation from a sociological perspective, addressing groups of actors' objectives, economic resources, political resources, means of social unification, and weaknesses.<sup>2</sup>

### Analysis Community of Interest

119. Analysis is driven by the commander to frame the problem. Problem-setting must precede problem-solving (see Chapter 2). The process is multi-disciplinary and pan-headquarters, driven by the Chief of Staff, who should harness the power of the staff. J2 will be the primary advocate, but analysis frequently involves other staff divisions. An effective community of interest should ideally be selected by the commander and draw upon external expertise. The pre-eminent beneficiary of analysis is the JFC; consequently he directs the community of interest from the outset and remains involved throughout. He re-directs, seeks clarification and adds perspective, not least because the knowledge stemming from his oversight of all operational activity makes him an invaluable contributor.

120. **Membership.** A community of interest need not be a permanent fixture, but may operate as a federated or virtual organisation convening in accordance with the headquarters' campaign rhythm, with J2 staff providing continuity. Membership may include:

a. **A leader**, selected from the most appropriate staff division, according to the nature and stage of the operation. He should include information security and information management within his responsibilities.

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<sup>2</sup> A recent example is the adoption of a socio-political estimate consultancy paper produced by Professor Anthony King, University of Exeter, for the Higher Command and Staff Course 2006, and subsequently used in Afghanistan by Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) and 3 Commando Brigade. The concept is being developed within the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to produce a cultural analysis template.

- b. **Chief J2 and other J2 experts.** The Defence Intelligence community and national intelligence agencies are represented directly or through the Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG).
- c. **Representatives of the main staff divisions and branches,** including: J3 and J3 (Operations Support); J5 (operational input); Joint Force Engineer staff (geospatial expertise); J4 (logistics and infrastructure input); J6 (Communications and Information Systems (CIS) input on friendly and Host Nation CIS infrastructure and Information Security); and J8/9 (financial, civil secretariat and political advice), according to the nature and stage of the operation. For instance, during a reconstruction phase J4 and J8/9 may play a larger part than during major combat operations.
- d. **Representatives from OGDs,** such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stabilisation Unit.
- e. **Official Host Nation representatives,** with appropriate security clearances.
- f. **Multinational partner representatives.**
- g. **Subject Matter Experts (SMEs),** including Government employees, academics and other experts (especially host nation nationals), covering areas such as country/regional knowledge, human factors (culture, language, religion, anthropology and sociology) and business/commercial aspects. A JFC can exploit reachback, including through secure video-conferencing (VTC), to exploit expertise not available in theatre. This might include, for example, universities, professional bodies for defence and security, and think tanks. In practice, SMEs' input may be distorted, consciously or subconsciously, by personal perspectives; its objectivity should be tested against alternative viewpoints wherever possible. The in-depth cultural awareness provided by indigenous SMEs is particularly important to inform both analysis and, as part of force generation, pre-deployment training.
- h. **Linguists.** MOD personnel with appropriate training may have command of relevant language(s), but individuals with appropriate national or ethnic backgrounds, whether UK based or locally employed, could have greater understanding, particularly in the areas of slang, idiom and colloquialisms. While likely to have a more developed sense of the cultural setting, indigenous linguists may also introduce their own local prejudices. Warning: linguists provide a *support function* only, which should not to be confused with *subject matter expertise*. If the boundary is blurred, linguists are

too easily perceived as *de facto* SMEs or *quasi* staff officers, which risks them achieving undue influence through personal bias.

121. **Information Sources and Management.** Annex 1B addresses potential information sources, including those accessible through reachout from a deployed headquarters. It highlights the associated information management issues.

### **Challenging the Orthodoxy**

122. Those conducting analysis should avoid the assumption that other parties will necessarily act as they do themselves (mirror-imaging). They should also mitigate the impact of so-called groupthink (covered in more detail in JDP 01, Chapter 3, Section III – Campaign Design), when consideration of alternative viewpoints or Courses of Action (CoA) is sacrificed in the interests of preserving a consensus.

123. **Red Teaming.** Alternative views can be introduced by red teaming to provide a variety of potential outcomes from the perspective of an opponent or other actors. A red team should be discrete from the main staff, to develop adversarial, neutral, cultural and contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived norms and outputs of analysis, planning, execution and assessment. It encompasses the standpoints of not only defined opponents (red), but also neutrals, aligned and non-aligned (green) actors; essentially any party that could enhance or frustrate friendly activities. A red team draws upon similar information and intelligence as the analysis community of interest (less that which only own forces could know), but applies it through the perspective of a particular actor(s) to develop potentially different conclusions. A red team may challenge accepted wisdom and, thereby, improve knowledge of a situation and its actors. For red teaming to be effective, team members should ‘think red’, assisted by cultural and host nation SMEs.

124. **Devil’s Advocacy.** Devil’s Advocacy requires a selected individual or element within the analysis community of interest to question, and potentially disprove, prevailing assumptions. It involves adopting a mindset that is different from the rest of the community of interest, and is well-suited to a non-conformist (but not to a blinkered or prejudiced) member of staff. Mentors can play a positive role here and have the added benefit of strengthening campaign continuity.

### **Operational Planning for the Kosovo Air Campaign: Inadequate Appreciation of an Adversary's Perspective (A Case for Red Teaming or Devil's Advocacy?)**

The Kosovo air campaign of 1999 was arguably a failure of operational planning. The error was not, however, one of setting inappropriate goals, nor of changing them during the operation. It was that of misunderstanding the adversary's perspective by failing to note how the adversary had adapted to previous experience.

In 1995 the NATO Operation Deliberate Force persuaded Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to join the negotiations which led to the Dayton peace accords and an end to conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In early 1999 the deteriorating situation in Kosovo prompted the Rambouillet peace talks. Milosevic did not attend. Serbia rejected the draft accord, which called for autonomy of Kosovo under NATO administration. On 23 March the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy, but rejected the related military conditions. On 24 March NATO initiated Operation Allied Force.

Deliberate Force had persuaded the Serbian leadership to negotiate, and NATO considered that coercion would work again, but the Serbs were mentally and physically prepared to sustain future attacks. It is often the loser who learns most and the Serbs had probably learnt more than NATO from Deliberate Force.

The early phases of Allied Force were a failure. Bad weather played a part. Moreover, the Serbian military dispersed among the civilian population and decentralised its decision making. The campaign rapidly became a test of NATO unity and resolve. Milosevic was prepared to accept some damage and play for time. NATO nations had difficulty agreeing to widen the scope and intensity of the campaign. When they finally did, Milosevic realised that NATO had sufficient resolve and agreed to negotiate. Other factors played a part, and it was probably not the bombing itself which directly persuaded Milosevic. The bombing did, however, show that NATO had the determination to conclude the issue on its terms.

NATO did not shift the goalposts. In broad terms, it achieved what it had set out to do. But it initially either underestimated Serbia's newly-found resolve, or it could not find consensus for a larger air offensive from the start. Of the 2 alternatives, the first is arguably the more plausible.


### **Analysis Products**

125. The results of analysis could include models of complex systems, but only as an aid to comprehension, not as a means to conduct operations. The results of analysis should be shared widely through the dissemination of preferably web-based graphical, textual and other products. The information generated may be extensive (including specific studies on, for example, local cultures, religions or political leaders) and an

executive summary should be used to highlight the key points, with supporting detail in annexes covering:

- a. **Mapping and Modelling.** Maps and models of a situation, or elements of it, as one or more systems.
- b. **Geospatial Material.**<sup>3</sup> Mapping and nautical charts (hard and soft copies), with information overlays covering areas such as opponent locations and activity, population distribution, language/religious/cultural divides and infrastructure.
- c. **Other Graphic Products.** Charts, diagrams and PowerPoint-type products showing, for example, economic statistics and demographics. However, a commander should also consider using a presentation that captures the essential elements of the problem. Such tools are widely used in US headquarters. This framing of the problem and first order analysis can be a useful foundation for the Commander's narrative and 'theory of change'; essentially, a concise and powerful expression of how he is addressing the problem.

126. It is important that analysis looks forward as well as examining the present, with its roots in the past. Outcome assessment involves the generation of a range of alternative scenarios, of varying likelihood and with variable consequences (more or less beneficial). These can then be represented as a spread of alternative outcomes.



**Figure 1.1 – Alternative Scenarios Derived from Analysis**

<sup>3</sup> Including meteorological, geographic and hydrographic material.

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## ANNEX 1A – SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

1A1. The scope of analysis – *what* is to be analysed – varies from one situation to another, but its purpose is always the same: to enable a Joint Force Commander (JFC) to understand his situation and to frame the problem. Analysis includes:

- a. An orientation to the circumstances and surroundings of a particular crisis or situation, from both a current and an historical perspective.
- b. An examination of potential sources of conflict, especially those which appear to be most prominent in the contemporary context.

### SECTION I – CRISIS CIRCUMSTANCES AND SURROUNDINGS

#### Circumstances

1A2. **History of Conflict.** The background to a crisis is frequently complex. Many crises are influenced by their historical origins as well as their more immediate causes.<sup>1</sup> Background analysis addresses:

- a. Significant events and relationships, perceived by one or more parties as fundamental to their identity or as pivotal moments in their history.
- b. Re-alignment of borders and boundaries, both formal and informal, that may have contributed to tensions or previous conflicts.
- c. Recent events that initiated the current crisis.

1A3. **Geo-Strategic Position.** A country's geo-strategic position – based on, for example, geography (including relations with neighbours), natural resources (such as oil) or particular expertise (such as nuclear capability) – has a major impact upon a crisis. Globalisation of ideas, expertise and economies, however, means that crises are rarely bounded; both regional and global actors may seek to manipulate events to their advantage. Widespread but sometimes influential diasporas can also increase the risk of conflict spreading.

1A4. **Physical Environment.**

- a. **Climate and the Environment.** Climate may precipitate disease or drought and can affect planned responses to an existing crisis, for example by exacerbating the impact of poor road infrastructure. Disputes over water access and grazing rights, deforestation, desertification and population displacement affect populations and economies, contributing to instability.

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<sup>1</sup> The former may remain directly and enduringly relevant to some actors. For example, Serbs still evoke the memory of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 in their rhetoric, even though its true relevance is questionable in the contemporary context.



b. **Geography, Hydrography and Oceanography.** Terrain affects the range of actors' potential activities, helping some tactics and frustrating others. Hydrography and oceanography influence the nature of maritime, riverine and littoral activity. The weather and seasons affect both and must be factored into the overall terrain/maritime analysis process.

1A5. **National and Regional Infrastructure.** Infrastructure may have a significant bearing on the operational environment, both directly (influencing the essential services provided to an indigenous population, for example) and indirectly (the potential contribution of other actors, such as Other Government Departments (OGDs) as part of a Comprehensive Approach). Relevant aspects include:

- a. Transport networks: road, rail, waterways and internal air services, and associated airports and seaports.
- b. Energy: electricity supplies, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.
- c. Communications: Internet and telephones (fixed and mobile networks).
- d. Media: radio, television and the press.
- e. Medical: hospitals, clinics and pharmacies.
- f. Education: primary, secondary and tertiary.
- g. Security sector (police forces, army, judiciary, prison service, etc).
- h. Manufacturing and industry: munitions, chemicals, nuclear, electronic and other industries.

## **Population and Culture**

1A6. **Population.** A population (in some multi-national doctrine referred to as the human terrain) may be divided on the basis of cultural, religious, ethnic, demographic or class distinctions:

- a. **Ethnicity.** The ethnic make-up of a population often reveals on the one hand overt distinctive cultural traits of a group in society, yet on the other hand much subtler differences between ethnic groups, which needs detailed study to appreciate. Ethnic boundaries may not overlap with physical borders or other boundaries; an additional complication that could restrict freedom of manoeuvre.
- b. **Language.** Languages are a key component of identity and, through variations in understanding, create barriers between actors and groups.

- c. **Class.** Class may conform to a broadly Marxist model (wealthy, bourgeoisie and proletariat) or be further complicated by caste, pastoral or agrarian differences.
- d. **Demography.** 87% of people under the age of 25 live in the developing world, providing a large pool of fighting age males with low economic expectations. Countries and regions where young adults comprise more than 40% of the population are statistically more than twice as likely to experience societal conflict.
- e. **Distribution.** Changes or extremes in population distribution, such as an urban/rural divide, major population centres and densely/sparsely-populated areas, can cause tension, frequently compounded by internal migration.
- f. **Epidemiology.** Knowledge of regional epidemiology (the incidence and distribution of diseases and other factors relating to health) is essential, not only for planning purposes, but also as part of a Comprehensive Approach. Prophylactics or cures for many debilitating diseases can be cheap, and improved health for an indigenous population may contribute to lasting crisis resolution.

1A7. **Culture and Religion.** Cultural awareness is essential, not just for analysis, but also for training as part of force preparation. Culture and religion often intertwined and can precipitating a crisis or influence an actors' inclination to use violence to resolve differences:

- a. **Religious Divides.** Religious divides may be inter-faith (such as Christian/animist) or inter-tradition (such as Sunni/Shi'ia).
- b. **Fundamentalism.** There is often tension between extreme fundamentalists and moderates within an observant religious society.
- c. **Cultural Divides.** Cultural divides include, for example, a rural/urban split or a traditionalist/modernist conflict. Such divisions may be deep-seated and exacerbated by resource inequality.
- d. **Distinctive Cultures.** Some societies, or groups within a society, have a distinctive culture, such as a nomadic lifestyle or warrior ethos, which separates them from more conventional members of society.

1A8. **Political, Economic and Social Issues.** Political, economic and social issues may have caused discontent and sporadic conflict for generations or be more recent:

- a. **Government.** A government's national and international legitimacy may be a symptom or a cause of a crisis. Indigenous governance may not

follow conventional Western models and the influence of religious, ethnic, tribal and other social networks should also be considered.

b. **Economy.** A local economy may not adhere to conventional Western rules and practices, but an improved economy is often crucial to longer-term stability. Most economies involve a combination of formal (e.g. paid employment) and informal (e.g. unregulated exchanges of goods or services) arrangements, with the latter predominating in less-developed countries. The availability of resources may cause a crisis<sup>2</sup> or provide a means to pursue it.<sup>3</sup> If a JFC can establish basic needs and his actual capacity to help fulfil them, he will better be able to manage expectations.

c. **Organised Crime.** In some places, organised crime has permeated society to such an extent that it affects the politics, economy<sup>4</sup> and social structure of a state, challenging the primacy of indigenous authority. In such circumstances, those engaged in organised crime may wield influence comparable to the recognised government and may be involved crisis resolution.

1A9. **Media.** The media's impact on national and international opinion can both reflect and influence a crisis. Reporting can be subject to bias – sometimes extreme – and media access to different audiences will determine its local, regional and even global influence.

1A10. **Legal Issues.** Legal issues include the legal system of the country in crisis, and national or international law applicable to any intervention force:

a. **Crisis/Host Nation Law.** The 3 main systems of law are: common law,<sup>5</sup> a Civil Code<sup>6</sup> and religious/culturally based law.<sup>7</sup> The imposition of religious law may even be a causal factor in a crisis. While Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), or exchange of letters covering the deployment of forces normally exempts personnel from local law, deployed forces should nevertheless be conversant with it. As with local governance and economic practice, local laws may not follow conventional Western practice, but reflect instead local cultural, religious and societal norms.

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<sup>2</sup> In Nigeria, for example, the environmental impact of oil extraction and the subsequent distribution of oil wealth, have led to armed conflict.

<sup>3</sup> Money from 'blood diamonds' in Africa has funded conflicts in Angola, Liberia and the Congo, and money from narcotics is a major economic factor in Afghanistan.

<sup>4</sup> Opium (and heroin) production forms over half the Gross Domestic Product of Afghanistan; the 'narco barons' in South America have huge influence in more than one country.

<sup>5</sup> The legal systems of the UK, many commonwealth countries and the US are based on common law.

<sup>6</sup> As exemplified by the French legal system.

<sup>7</sup> Such as Sharia courts used in Iran and parts of Afghanistan; many other nations' legal systems also incorporate traditional cultural practices.

- b. **National and International Law.** UK forces are subject to UK national law and international law,<sup>8</sup> as well as the legal provisions of any UN or other mandate.

## Catalysts

1A11. Geographical, functional or socio-cultural may, or may have the potential to, act as catalysts for conflict:

- a. **Natural Resources.** Some actors, such as local warlords, may seek to exploit natural resources, such as diamonds or strategic minerals, to fund their activities (or to deny the legitimate government any related income in an attempt to weaken it). The impact of these activities may depend on the resource's ease of extraction and processing; oil, for example, demands major investment, whereas alluvial diamonds can be literally available for the picking.
- b. **Borders and Boundaries.** Borders and boundaries, especially those that ignore tribal and ethnic areas of interest, may act as a focal point for discontent. Boundaries are sometimes disputed or unclear. There may be a requirement to set boundary commissions to resolve disputes or inter-ethnic divides.<sup>9</sup>
- c. **Critical Infrastructure and Lines of Communication.** Actors may wish to deny aspects of critical national infrastructure, including lines of communication, to a legitimate government (or, alternatively, to control them for their own purposes).
- d. **Socially-marginalised or Excluded Populations.** Socially-marginalised or otherwise excluded, often minority, populations are invariably concentrated in particular areas. These may become centres of hostile activity, require additional protection, or yield potential allies.

## SECTION II – ACTORS AND INFLUENCES

1A12. Those actively participating in a crisis, as well as those with the potential or inclination to do so, influence the course of events in ways which may be positive or negative, certain or uncertain, temporary or enduring. Most crises will be attributed to human interactions, sometimes with a hitherto cooperative state of affairs transformed into one of confrontation or conflict. In addition to an awareness of the circumstances and surroundings described in Section I, a JFC needs a thorough understanding of the

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<sup>8</sup> Such as the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions.

<sup>9</sup> The UN Buffer Zone (colloquially referred to as the Green Line) in Cyprus, dividing the Greek-Cypriot population from the Turkish-Cypriot population is an example.

full range of actors, their motivations and relationships, but will seldom have it. Therefore, he needs to find ways to test his hypotheses, if necessary by assessing reactions to his own actions.

### **Categorisation of Actors**

1A13. **Adversaries.** Adversaries, or opponents, are potentially hostile to the achievement of the desired outcome. They may employ legitimate political means, within a democratic system or resort to violence. Some adversaries may use both. Opposition may be singular and monolithic,<sup>10</sup> but is more likely to comprise a multitude of actors with shared<sup>11</sup> or multiple goals.<sup>12</sup>

1A14. **Belligerents.** Belligerents are hostile to each other; they may oppose the desired outcome, even if not directly hostile to the presence of an intervention force.

1A15. **Neutrals.** The degree of neutrality spans those who stop short of active opposition to the desired outcome, to those who support it with few reservations. They may or may not remain neutral. Neutral actors may include International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

1A16. **Friendly.** Friendly actors broadly support the achievement of the desired outcome; they may include allies and coalition partners, host nation security forces, as well as local population groups and those International Organisations and NGOs who are amenable to being characterised in this way.

1A17. **Spoilers.** Spoilers have an interest in maintaining the *status quo* and attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change that could adversely affect their activities. Examples include groups benefiting from a war economy: arms/drug dealers, smugglers and individuals or groups, such as warlords, whose influence and status would decline if the crisis were to be resolved.

### **Range of Actors**

1A18. Within each category of actor there may exist a variety of different individuals, groups and organisations whose identity, status and influence all need to be understood. These may include:

1A19. **Key Leaders.** The identification of, and subsequent engagement with, key leaders may be critical to success. Key leaders may be political, religious, tribal or military, acting as individuals or in cliques. Even within unitary states, including those

<sup>10</sup> As in the (Communist-led) Malayan Races Liberation Army during the Malayan Emergency, 1948 – 1960, or the Viet Cong in Vietnam during the US involvement in Vietnam 1965 – 1972; both organisations allowed no rival.

<sup>11</sup> As in Northern Ireland, where the main Republican groupings (The Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army) all shared the same goal of a united, independent Ireland.

<sup>12</sup> As in Iraq, where the common goal amongst the majority of actors is the removal of what they see as Western occupation; beyond that, they have a multiplicity of goals.

with apparently cohesive leaderships, such identification and engagement is not always simple; it becomes even more complex amongst actors with non-conventional (by Western standards) power structures. Link analysis may help to identify key leaders. Analysis should consider:

- a. **Real Leader.** The apparent leader may be a figurehead, and the real power may lie with separate power brokers or activists.
- b. **Power Structure.** The structure may be pyramidal or flat; it may follow a conventional Western pattern or, for example, a tribal model led by elders, families or hereditary rulers. The JFC should try to work out where the power lies and who has the biggest influence on senior level decision making, for example a close cohort of advisors or followers.
- c. **Power Base.** A leader's power base may be a democratic mandate, an institutional party, a tribe or religious sect. It may be economic, in that the leader maintains his power while he continues to provide perceived benefits to all, or to a powerful group within that society. The leader may derive his power from arms, as a dictator or warlord.
- d. **Leadership Style.** The leader may be autocratic or consensual.
- e. **Strengths, Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.** A leader's strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities may be institutional or personal, internal or external.
- f. **Aims and Intentions.** A leader's aims and intentions may be institutional or personal, internal or external. In some cases, his only aim may be to retain power.

1A20. **Other Leaders.** Apart from key leaders, other subordinates and associated organisations (local, national, regional and international) may also play an important role:

- a. Power Brokers:
  - (1) Political parties and networks (and non-political interest groups, such as peace groups).
  - (2) Military leaders and armed groups.
  - (3) Traditional authorities, such as tribal and clan leaders/elders.
  - (4) Religious leaders and organisations.
- b. Popular Forces:

- (1) Civil society.
- (2) Population (including refugees and internally displaced people).
- (3) Diaspora groups.
- c. Private sector/business (and associated trade unions).
- d. Extra-Territorial Interests:
  - (1) Neighbouring states.
  - (2) Foreign embassies.
  - (3) Regional organisations, such as the Arab League or African Union.
- e. International Organisations and NGOs.

### Analysis of Actors

1A21. Actors, as described above, impact upon a situation to varying degrees depending upon their aims, intentions and capabilities, ascertained through stakeholder analysis:

- a. **Aims.** An actor's underlying aim drives his activities. It may be broad and aspirational<sup>13</sup> or specific<sup>14</sup> and of local, national, regional or even global significance.
- b. **Motivation.** The achievement of an aim provides part of an actor's motivation, but local factors and allegiances such as score settling, personal gain and the thrill of risk taking or challenging authority may play a part. Motivations differ between individuals or sub-groups, and senior or junior echelons within an organisation.
- c. **Positions.** Actors may adopt specific positions for particular issues, irrespective of the interests and goals of others. An actor may, for instance, take what he sees as a principled position based on his political views, regardless of the potential consensus elsewhere.
- d. **Intentions.** Intentions are an actor's plans for current and near-term activities.

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<sup>13</sup> Al Qaeda's ultimate aim may be described as the re-creation of a transnational Islamic caliphate.

<sup>14</sup> The former Provisional IRA's stated aim was to create a '32-county Socialist Republic of Ireland'.

- e. **Sub-culture.** Individual groups of actors, although part of a wider culture, often have their own sub-cultures, which influence their aims.
- f. **Relationships.** Relationships are reflected in the interactions between actors at various levels; perceptions of these interactions may be as important as reality. As a situation changes, so too may the relationships. Seemingly strong alliances may be transient.<sup>15</sup> Analysis, informed by red teaming, should identify:
- (1) Historical relationships.
  - (2) Current relationships and the rationale behind them.
  - (3) Possible future relationships as the situation changes.
- g. **Capacity.** An actor's capacity is his capability to affect a situation, positively or negatively. Capacity is defined in terms of personal authority, arms, resources, access, social networks and alliances, within a given context and at a given time.
- h. **Critical Vulnerabilities.** All actors have vulnerabilities; actors are vulnerable to each other, to environmental and natural disasters, and to external intervention. These vulnerabilities are a key factor in Centre of Gravity (CoG) analysis.

### SECTION III – CAUSES OF CRISES

1A22. Understanding why states or other groups resort to the use of force is essential to the planning and conduct of operations. Erstwhile state-versus-state and force-on-force combat are giving way to complicated manifestations of conflict, including proxy and hybrid warfare with well hidden adversaries combining conventional capabilities and irregular tactics in complex terrain. Factors that have caused a crisis indicate both *why* events have occurred and, potentially, *how* they may be influenced to develop in a more favourable manner in the future. Crises are seldom attributable to a single cause (in the same way that they are seldom bi-polar). Analysis should encompass: the extent of causes, their strength and nature, and the linkages between them.

1A23. **Elemental Causes.** Elemental causes are those factors that relate to a nation, government or other actor's identity, its relationships with neighbouring nations or groups, or in extreme cases its very existence. They include:

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<sup>15</sup> As in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where several disparate groups united or set aside their differences to fight the Soviets. Once the Soviets left, this unifying factor disappeared, leading to civil war.



- a. **Fear or Survival.** Even where success is not guaranteed, a state or group may initiate armed conflict because of its fear or perception of an adversary's intentions or capabilities. It may also seek to avoid disadvantage by pre-emption.
- b. **Self-Interest.** A state or group may have an interest in gaining or preserving a position of relative power or preferential control of resources and territory.
- c. **Ideology and Values.** An absolute belief in the justice of a cause, ideology or set of values, whether secular or religious, may drive a party to conflict. When an ideology, sense of honour or reputation is perceived to be at stake, an actor may attempt to impose its will on another.

1A24. **Momentum for Conflict.** Even if the elemental causes above do not directly precipitate conflict, 2 other factors can intensify momentum towards it:

- a. **Culture.** Some actors have a culture of violence (a 'warrior nation'), normally reinforced by political, social or religious imperatives.
- b. **Political Will.** The will of an actor's leadership, and its ability to mobilise and sustain popular support, shapes its propensity for violence.

1A25. **Structural Causes.** Structural causes of instability are intrinsic within the policies, structures and fabric of certain societies:

- a. **Illegitimate Government.** A government may be seen as illegitimate for a variety of different reasons; it may have no electoral mandate, be the result of a palpably corrupt electoral process, or have been imposed by force or at the behest of another country.
- b. **Poor Governance.** A government may be corrupt or inept.
- c. **Lack of Political Participation.** The political process may be controlled by interest groups based on religion, ethnicity, class or business, excluding or even persecuting minorities.
- d. **Inequality and Social Exclusion.** Wealth distribution may be unequal, for instance between urban and rural communities. A significant underclass, based on ethnic, cultural, language, religious or economic circumstances, may be denied full participation in society.
- e. **Inequitable Access to Natural Resources.** Scarce natural resources may be allocated to, or retained by, particular interest groups; for example, water rights may be granted to certain actors to the detriment of others.

1A26. **Proximate Causes.** Proximate causes may contribute directly to a crisis, or provide the bedrock for more deep-seated but less immediate concern:

- a. **Uncontrolled Security Sector.** Militias, and even Private Military and Security Companies operating initially in support of ineffective state security forces, may overreach their remit.
- b. **Light Weapons Proliferation.** The collapse of state structures, arising from a successful insurgency for example, may result in arms and munitions, especially light weapons, being readily available throughout a population, exacerbating instability.
- c. **Human Rights Abuses.** Inhumane methods used to counter an internal crisis may result in the gradual alienation of an entire population or of discrete groups within it.
- d. **Destabilising Role of Neighbouring Countries.** Neighbouring countries may attempt to influence the outcome of a crisis by supporting specific groups within an unstable, or potentially unstable, state.
- e. **Role of Diasporas.** Diasporas may support particular factions or groups within their country of origin, or may use influence in their country of residence to provoke unhelpful political/media pressure.

1A27. **Triggers.** Triggers are actions or events (or their anticipation), that may set off or escalate violence:

- a. Elections.
- b. Arrest/assassination of key figure.
- c. Military coup.
- d. Environmental disaster.
- e. Increased price/scarcity of basic commodities.
- f. Economic crisis, such as a rapid increase in unemployment or a collapse of a local currency.
- g. Capital flight (when a group or population take their money and other portable assets out of the country, or convert circulating local currency into non-circulating hard currency or precious metal/stones).

1A28. **Crisis-Generated Causes.** Crises can be self-perpetuating:

- a. **Material Causes.** Conflict inherently increases the supply and circulation of weapons, which inevitably spread from those actors involved in the initial crisis to others, allowing them to pursue their own agendas; other weapons may fall into the hands of criminal actors. A ‘war economy’, with funds from backers and potentially foreign aid, may benefit some actors to the point that they are materially better off during a crisis than without one.
- b. **Emotional Causes.** A culture of violence can emerge, or the success of certain actors in achieving their aims may create new enemies, or inspire previously dormant actors to take up arms. In some cultures there is a tradition of revenge (such as the Pashtun *badal*) or vendetta; conflict, even if resolved at a higher level, may leave some individuals or groups dissatisfied and liable to re-ignite violence.

## SECTION IV – IMPLICATIONS

1A29. The practical output of analysis is a clearer picture in the mind of a JFC, but based on as many different opinions, perspectives and viewpoints as possible, of *what* is happening, *why* and, hence, what may happen *next*. Interaction between the various constituents of a given situation may have a number of implications, generating variously worst case, best case and most likely future outcomes. Each has associated with it different implications, with different possibilities of occurring, and different second-order effects. These may be highlighted in terms of:

- a. **Current Trends.** Current trends may be identified as enduring, or likely to escalate or de-escalate, subject to defined changes in circumstances.
- b. **Shocks.** Shocks are unexpected (low probability) but significant (high impact) occurrences likely to introduce a discontinuity in an established trend or pattern of events. Shocks may be natural (such as an unforeseen environmental disaster) or man-made (the result of unanticipated adversary activity). While their occurrence may be a surprise, their implications can be addressed through contingency planning.
- c. **Risks and Opportunities.** Negative or positive developments generate risks and opportunities for a JFC. His analysis of the situation assists him in managing the former and exploiting the latter.

## ANNEX 1B – INFORMATION SOURCES AND AGENCIES

### Information Sources and Agencies

1B1. The widest possible range of sources and agencies should be tasked or consulted to collect information and intelligence for analysis. This may involve reachout from a deployed headquarters.

1B2. **Intelligence.** The Defence Intelligence community provide significant input. The community comprises the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), including the Intelligence Collection Group (ICG), non-ICG Specialist Environmental Offices (such as the Hydrographic and Meteorological Offices) and J/N/G/A2 at all levels. The National Security Strategy has established a horizon-scanning process from which products are now available. It is conceivable that the process could be stimulated through reachback mechanisms to provide Intelligence inputs.

1B3. **In Theatre.** Organisations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are important sources, although care should be taken not to compromise the neutrality of independent or non-aligned civilian organisations. Key leader engagement can also be an important source of information, particularly for informing the assessment of significant actors' responses to friendly actions. Every soldier - and many other players in theatre – are potential intelligence sources.

1B4. **Other.** Non-military sources, such as diplomatic reporting and open sources (including the Royal United Services Institute, International Institute for Strategic Studies and Chatham House) provide useful perspectives and perceptions. Multinational commercial organisations can provide information, particularly on economic and internal security issues. Multinational partners may have their own distinct sources, including colonial-era links and other connections arising from disparate military or economic activity.

1B5. **Pre-prepared Analysis Products.** A HELIX target systems analysis is a web-based interactive intelligence product from the DIS that can be used as the basis for analysis. HELIX incorporates into a knowledge base all available DIS material and cross-Government input for a selected country or issue. Target systems analyses identify what we do know about a country or situation and, just as importantly, the information gaps, to assist in the subsequent collection effort. HELIX production may be initiated by tasking from the Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG); target systems analyses can take about 3 months to complete and are usually updated every 3 months.

1B6. **Objectivity.** UK government agencies, those of most multinational partners, and many technical and academic sources are likely to produce impartial information,

but everyone has a different perspective and a potential bias. Information from the media, which has undergone a subjective editorial process, reflects both the editorial control of the owner/publisher and the perceived needs of its intended audience. Similarly, some nations and host nation agencies may attempt to influence the results of analysis for their own purposes.

### **Information Management and Architecture**

1B7. Analysis may require large quantities of information for a wide variety of subject areas. It should be managed coherently and made available to all within the analysis community of interest, with appropriate controls to ensure accuracy, validity, currency and provenance. Information Management is crucial,<sup>1</sup> and the requirements of the analysis community of interest need to be factored in to the headquarters' Information Exchange Requirement (rather than developing bespoke arrangements outwith the overarching Information Management plan).

1B8. A headquarters' intelligence and information architecture should be designed to accommodate analysis, including:

- a. Information storage (variable formats) and archiving.
- b. Continuous updating.
- c. Wide but regulated access (including reachout).
- d. Search and retrieval (including capacity for data tagging).
- e. An ability to handle large geospatial data sets (including mapping and imagery) to form the basis of situational awareness.

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<sup>1</sup> Integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. JDP 6-00 '*Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations*'.

## CHAPTER 2 – PLANNING

“*The Plan is nothing. Planning is everything.*”<sup>1</sup>

Chapter 2 describes the campaign planning process, in 7 sections:

- Section I – Strategic Direction
- Section II – Planning at The Operational Level
- Section III – Priming the Planning Process
- Section IV – Operational Estimate
- Section V – Conducting the Estimate
- Section VI – Campaign Planning Products
- Section VII – Planning throughout the Campaign
- Section VIII – Campaign Continuity

201. This Chapter builds on JDP 01 ‘*Campaigning*’ and addresses the **how and why** of campaign planning, including the operational estimate; Chapter 3 addresses the **who, what and when**, in terms of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). For clarity, this Chapter focuses principally on national operations to provide an overall perspective, but that broad viewpoint is also valuable in a multinational operation as a junior partner. Section I addresses the formulation of crisis management strategy (building specifically on JDP 01 Chapter 2 – *Military Strategy*). Multinational (alliance and coalition) considerations are subsequently covered in Chapter 3.

### SECTION I – STRATEGIC DIRECTION


#### Overview of Military Planning and Decision-Making

202. The DCMO, situated within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Head Office in Whitehall and at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), provides the MOD focus for crisis management, both as a Strategic Headquarters and as a Department of State. The DCMO translates political intent into military activity; it also issues direction to, and monitors reporting from, deployed commands as shown in Figure 2.1. It is, however, but one part of a cross-Government and potentially multinational response to crises, which could involve Other Government Departments (OGDs), and other national governments, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The UK may commit military forces overseas on national operations,<sup>2</sup> or on multinational operations (as the framework or lead nation, or as a

<sup>1</sup> General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

<sup>2</sup> Although this Joint Doctrine Publication is concerned with operations overseas, much of it also applies to operations in the UK. The latter, while involving the DCMO, are not ordinarily directed by PJHQ; instead, Commander-in-Chief Land (CINCLAND) is dual-hatted as the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)). See JDP 02 ‘*Operations in the United Kingdom: The Defence Contribution to Resilience*’ (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).

contributing nation). Correspondingly, commanders may deploy under a number of alternate command relationships: National or Multinational/Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTFC); National Contingent Commander (NCC) on multinational operations; or Component (or Contingent) Commander (CC) on national or multinational operations.




**Figure 2.1 – UK Military Planning and Decision-Making**

### Political Control and Direction

203. Democratic control and political direction of the Armed Forces are exercised by Ministers, either individually or in committee. Desired outcomes are identified as Government policy, expressed as Government intent in the form of a national strategic aim, and translated into actionable objectives for national cross-Government strategic planning. Ministers decide on the most effective approach on a case-by-case basis, drawing upon a variety of cross-Government committees, the most significant being the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), specifically its Overseas and Defence Sub-Committee (NSID(OD)). Annex 2A describes the role of the National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) committee.

### Formulation of National Strategy

204. Based upon the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s intent, and drawing on the framework of the National Security Strategy, the National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence) committee determines policy and national strategic objectives through a process of political strategic analysis, and provides guidance for national planning. National policy is then implemented through an integrated cross-Government strategy, coordinated through the (Cabinet) Overseas and Defence Secretariat (or another cross-Government body, as appropriate). Figure 2.2 illustrates the structure for formulating national strategy.



**Figure 2.2 – Formulation of National Strategy**

205. **Political Strategic Analysis.** Political strategic analysis is a cross-Government analysis of a crisis and the options for its resolution; it is not necessarily led by any one Department, although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), guided by routinely updated Political-Military Estimates (see paragraph 207), usually leads on overseas policy including foreign security. Political strategic analysis seeks to balance national priorities and resources in often complex, ambiguous and uncertain



circumstances. The crisis itself is likely to be dynamic, and it may also take time for political direction to evolve, especially where the UK intends to act in conjunction with other nations or multinational institutions (who may develop their responses at a different tempo). Consequently a definitive national strategy may take time to mature; in the interim, military commanders should begin their planning based upon a judgement (informed by policy guidance) about the desired outcome. Prior to the definition of a formal national strategic aim, planners at the strategic level may agree a unifying theme (a central idea reflecting the character, context and direction of Government strategy) to underpin and provide coherence to initial planning efforts.

206. **Political-Military Estimate.** The MOD contributes to the formulation of national strategy by conducting its own political-military estimate. The political-military estimate is seldom neatly bounded or based on well-defined parameters from the outset; it develops over time with the cross-Government political strategic analysis and the progress of national and international political dialogue. Although MOD-led, key representation from the Cabinet Office and OGDs (specifically FCO, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit) validates the balance of political-military advice. Its central aim is to consider potential crisis areas around the world<sup>3</sup> and to assess political implications against military feasibility and sustainability. It makes a vital contribution to political strategic analysis and the development of national strategy; likewise, it informs any decision to initiate a Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS') Planning Directive.

## Strategic Outcomes

207. The term strategic outcome describes the Government's aspirations, goals and objectives for a particular crisis. How these are articulated will vary depending upon the nature of the crisis, the nature of the intended response (with varying degrees of emphasis on the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power), and the extent of collaboration envisaged with other nations, multinational institutions and International Organisations.

208. Commanders at all levels should anticipate strategic outcomes evolving over time, their definition and detail increasing as an individual crisis unfolds. Assumptions play an important part in strategic planning. These may inform not only initial planning but also consider how events may develop in the future (to ensure that long-term contingency planning, for example, is not delayed awaiting definitive planning guidance). Frequent and unpredictable changes in strategic direction are more likely to be the rule than the exception, although the JFC has a responsibility to engage personally and proactively across the political interface to mitigate their

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<sup>3</sup> Prioritised by the 3\* Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG). Under 2008 MOD Streamlining, the SCOG replaced the Operational Tasking Group (OTG) as the core forum in which decisions relating to ongoing, planned or potential crises are taken (see Annex 2A).

consequence. For at least 2 reasons, military commanders may seek – perhaps unreasonable degrees of – certainty:

- a. For practical reasons, training exercises tend to be initiated by clear planning guidance (including an explicit scenario and prescriptive start state); this seldom reflects reality but may create the misperception that it is a necessary pre-requisite for subsequent military planning in real life.
- b. ‘Selection and maintenance of the aim’, sometimes described as the cardinal principle of warfare, can suggest that not only is a clear aim essential (which it is), but that it needs to be maintained (which it cannot necessarily). The aim must be kept both relevant and up-to-date; as a crisis unfolds, the imperatives can change.

Strategic outcomes include aims and objectives,<sup>4</sup> terms that are widely used, but not always well-defined across Government. The MOD ascribes specific meanings to promote clearer dialogue within MOD and with other departments.

209. **National Strategic Aim.** A national strategic aim is ‘the Government’s declared purpose, normally expressed as a favourable and enduring outcome’. The national strategic aim may be articulated personally by Ministers, or it may be discerned indirectly from UK foreign policy statements and official records (such as the minutes of Cabinet, National Security, International Relations and Development committee, Cabinet sub-committees and engagements with multinational partners), or through discussions between politicians and officials. Achieving the national strategic aim invariably requires contributions from cross-Government, and perhaps from multiple agencies. It provides the unifying purpose for military commanders and leaders of non-military organisations.


210. **Strategic Objectives.** A strategic objective is ‘a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim’. It may be explicit, or deduced from Government policy, strategic direction or the decisions of committees. Objectives are likely to require significant coordination across departmental boundaries, even if allocated to a particular department to lead. In practice, formulating strategic objectives by consensus between departments may be challenging; the process should, ideally, be coordinated centrally, for example through the Cabinet or National Security, International Relations and Development committee.

211. **Military Contribution to the National Strategic Aim.** The extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is termed the military strategic end-state, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives. Within the resources, including time and space, assigned to him, a JFC is responsible for a series

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<sup>4</sup> Strategic objectives are reliant upon the contributions made by each of the national instruments of power. In describing strategic outcomes, military-strategic objectives are accompanied by diplomatic and economic objectives.

of campaign objectives, expressed in terms of one or more Decisive Conditions (DCs), the achievement of which indicates his campaign end-state (see Figure 2.3).



The **national strategic aim** is the government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. The **desired outcome** is a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively.

*The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations.*

A **strategic objective** is a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. Military strategic objectives are goals to be achieved principally by the military (and are the responsibility of the military-strategic commander (CDS)).

The **campaign end-state** is reached when all the campaign objectives have been achieved. It therefore represents the extent of the JFC's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim. A **campaign objective** is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim.

**Figure 2.3 – Outcomes and End-States**

## Military Strategic Direction

212. Chapter 3 describes how military strategic direction is developed and promulgated via the DCMO.<sup>5</sup> Military planning at the operational level is initiated by CDS' Planning Directive, issued to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) (normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)).<sup>6</sup> Once it has been decided to commit military resources, CDS' Operational Directive provides authority to conduct operations. Annexes 2B and 2C provide representative examples of CDS' Planning and Operational Directives.

213. The ability to *influence* participants involved in a crisis, rather than simply to intervene or *act* in a given situation, is critical to achieving the national strategic aim. For this reason, a National Information Strategy is normally formulated by the cross-Government Information Strategy Group to coordinate influence activities, with a subordinate information plan detailing specific target audiences, information objectives and themes (reflected in appropriate annexes to CDS' Directives).

214. CDS will nominate a Jt Comd. The Jt Comd issues a Jt Comd's Directive to empower the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and direct the enabling functions of deploy, sustain and, if applicable, recover. Key issues such as command authority, deployment plan, targeting delegations, Rules of Engagement (ROE), intelligence, Force Protection (FP), training, logistics and medical will feature in this directive. A representative Jt Comd's Directive, incorporating the Theatre Reference Document, is at Annex 2D.

## Strategic Communication

215. Strategic communication is defined as *advancing national interests by using all Defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people.*<sup>7</sup> It is primarily a philosophy, partly a capability and part process. Philosophy is the key element since it underpins the alignment of words, images and actions to realise influence. The CDS Planning and Operational directives will articulate the desired information effect<sup>8</sup> to the JFC, who will deliver the operational level military contribution as part of the wider cross-government strategic communication for a campaign or operation. This should be articulated through a strategic narrative,<sup>9</sup> or

<sup>5</sup> DCMO Standing Operating Procedures provide detail of the process.

<sup>6</sup> For operations within the UK, the Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS') Directive is ordinarily drafted by the Directorate for Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations (D CT & UK Ops) and issued to SJC(UK) as Joint Commander (Jt Comd).

<sup>7</sup> JDN 1/11 '*Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*'. This is a distillation of the National Security Council draft definition of 'the systematic and co-ordinated use of all means of communication to deliver UK national security objectives by influencing the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, groups and states'.

<sup>8</sup> Information effect is provisionally defined in JDN 1/11 as: the resultant attitude and behaviour of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and actions.

<sup>9</sup> JDN 1/11: narratives are *compelling story lines designed to resonate in the mind of its audience that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan.*

where additional focus is required, a MOD departmental narrative<sup>10</sup> from which the JFC will derive his key themes<sup>11</sup> and messages.<sup>12</sup> In this way the JFC ensures that the words of strategic communication are matched by the deeds of the joint force.

## SECTION II – PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

216. The operational level of warfare is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Campaigns are invariably joint, and most often multinational and multi-agency. Recent campaigns such as our contribution to complex stabilisation in Afghanistan have been described as compressing or blurring the levels of warfare. This happens because stabilisation is inherently political at all levels, and national levers of power are combined not just at the strategic and operational level, but also at the tactical level. This enables the security effort to be synchronised with economic development and governance. Although the characteristics of the operational level may now manifest themselves at the tactical level the nature of operational level command has not changed; it is still defined by complexity not scale. The analytical and planning tools of the joint operational level now have utility to both large scale campaigns and smaller scale operations conducted at the joint tactical level as part of a larger campaign. If future operations are to be similarly complex and multi-agency, this may apply to national operations too. Based on the complexity, duration and scope of operations the commander could elect to plan, direct and control joint operations from a single headquarters, based on a framework component, without establishing one or more component commanders. In this case his staff would be augmented by appropriate subject matter experts to perform specialist functions and assist in planning and coordination.

217. UK operational planning is command-led and dynamic. While staff may assist a JFC, ultimately it is *his* plan and he drives its development. The essence of this relationship is based on an acknowledgement that planning is a mental activity, aided but not driven by process. Although each individual campaign has a unique context, scale and mix of military activities, all campaigns share a common purpose: to translate strategic intent into tactical activity. Operational level planning requires a JFC to determine how (the *ways*) and a favourable situation (the dictated *ends*) may be created within the time and resources available (his allocated *means*). Such planning should be conducted in concert with OGDs and other agencies, whose combined and often inter-dependent efforts are required to achieve the national strategic aim.

<sup>10</sup> The requirement for a departmental narrative is situation dependent. Hereafter the strategic or departmental narrative is referred to as either strategic narrative or simply narrative.

<sup>11</sup> JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution* describes the theme as ‘an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad communication application’.

<sup>12</sup> JDP 3-40 describes messages as ‘a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific target audience’.

218. **Operational Art.** Operational art is the theory and practice of planning, preparing and conducting campaigns to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. In practice, it is essentially a commander's skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome. What is *to be achieved* can be aspirational, for which it is normal to use broad terms such as outcome, conditions and effects, which leave room for individual tactical flair and initiative. However, when describing what an individual or organisation *is to achieve*, then clear aims, objectives and activities should be used. The former tend to indicate the purpose or criteria that underlie the latter. Operational art is realised through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and campaign management. It is fundamentally a JFC's business and its mainspring is his creative and innovative thought or operational ideas.

219. **Campaign Design and Management.** *Campaign Design* develops and refines a commander's operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is underpinned by a clear understanding of the political and strategic context together with an effective framing of the problem. Tools and processes, for example the operational estimate, enable campaign design. *Campaign Management* integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Campaign design and campaign management are inter-related; during a campaign, the management function of assessment informs subsequent planning.

220. **Speed of Planning.** The product of planning will be determined by a combination of quality and speed. While acting early and fast is generally beneficial, the ideal is to assess, analyse and act *earlier and faster* than the adversary. Speed should always be seen in its appropriate context; sometimes it is right to gather all available information for a crucial decision. At other times, no amount of information will resolve ambiguity; sometimes more information will increase ambiguity. Optimum speed enables optimum weight of planning effort. Therefore, a principal skill for a JFC is to sense the *last sensible moment* to make any decision. Planning too quickly risks missing crucial information. Always seeking more information to resolve ambiguity slows down planning and risks decision paralysis. The test of any commander and of the efficiency of his staff is how well they can issue clear, achievable and above all timely orders.

221. **Campaign Planning Concepts.** Campaign planning uses a variety of building blocks known as campaign planning concepts to focus planning (i.e. they aid analysis and understanding) and to describe a plan in directives and orders (i.e. they aid communication). Different concepts have utility at different times during campaign planning; not all concepts are useful on all occasions.

222. **Operational Estimate and Associated Techniques.** The operational estimate (described in detail at Section IV) is a problem-solving tool; it helps a JFC to analyse an ill-structured problem. The process is rational, in that it progresses logically from

factor to deduction, but a JFC is not constrained to objective analysis alone. While his intellect and practical ability will inform his decision-making, his creativity and vision are more likely to prove decisive.

223. **Campaign Plan and Assessment.** A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a JFC's intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. During its execution, a campaign plan is kept under continuous review, informed by campaign assessment, and modified iteratively to reflect changes in the situation and in strategic direction.

### SECTION III – PRIMING THE PLANNING PROCESS

224. **Hierarchy of Military Activities.** Military activity takes place at all levels of warfare. There is a hierarchy of terms that describe military activities and how they fit together linking strategy to tactical activity. At the highest level national strategy directs the application of the levers of national power to resolve a crisis; this is crisis management.<sup>13</sup> The military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is one or more campaigns that are designed to achieve the military strategic objectives; these are expressed as the campaign end-states. A campaign consists of a single or a series of operations<sup>14</sup> that achieve, or shape progress towards, one or more campaign objectives. Operations have a unifying theme<sup>15,16</sup> that gives the underlying purpose and helps the commander frame the operating environment and problem. Operations consist of a series of synchronised military actions that achieve the commanders' specified objectives articulated as decisive conditions and their constituent supporting effects. Actions comprise tactical military activities that are orchestrated through Joint Action.<sup>17</sup>

225. Crisis response planning addresses 3 questions: what are the features of the current situation; what should the more favourable situation look like in future; and what is the commander's theory of change?

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
<sup>13</sup> JDP 5-00, Section I, Campaign Planning.

<sup>14</sup> Operations may be concurrent or sequential. Although they can be discrete there is likely to be significant interdependencies between them. If operations are sequential they may be aligned with the phases of a campaign.

<sup>15</sup> JDP 01, Section III. Campaigning defines the themes of operations as: major combat operations, security and stabilisation, peace support and peacetime military engagement.

<sup>16</sup> ADP 'Operations' uses a similar hierarchy of terminology to discuss military activities at the tactical level. It should be noted that the JDP 5-00 description of *operation* is broadly analogous with *military activity* in ADP 'Operations'.

<sup>17</sup> JDP 3-00 defines joint action as *the deliberate use and orchestration of military capability and activities to realise effects on other actors' will, capability and understanding, and the cohesion between them.*



**Figure 2.4 – Relationship between Operational and Strategic Planning**


226. A JFC develops his understanding of the situation through analysis. The result is reflected in the desired outcome (the object or purpose of the national strategic aim). While all of a JFC's efforts should be directed towards reaching this outcome, it is his framing of the problem and focus on decisive conditions that require definition during the planning process. This is a specific output of the operational estimate (see Figure 2.4). Armed with the first (situational understanding) and with a working definition of the last (the desired outcome or national strategic aim), a JFC starts his planning with detailed consideration of the problem and analysis of 2 campaign planning concepts in particular: the end-state and Centre of Gravity (CoG). These form the foundation for subsequent planning and may also trigger operational ideas, including initial decisive conditions.

### Campaign End-State

227. End-state analysis confirms the relationship of the in-theatre military contribution within the overall effort to reach a desired outcome. A JFC may be given his campaign end-state, or he may have to derive it himself. Subsequent analysis helps him to appreciate the political and military strategic purpose behind his specific activity and the intended relationship with the other instruments of power. Many



techniques can exist, for example **Hierarchical Mapping**; a campaign end-state can be mapped against other strategic outcomes, to explore their hierarchical relationship. Figure 2.5 shows only the military contribution (in terms of campaign and military strategic objectives), but could be expanded to include the contributions of other participants.



**Figure 2.5 – Hierarchical End-state Mapping**

### Centre of Gravity

228. Once clear on the desired outcome and associated end-state, a JFC focuses on how to change the situation from its current state of crisis or conflict to a more favourable and stable condition. CoG analysis seeks to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the principal protagonists. It complements the manoeuvrist approach, which applies strength against vulnerabilities, seeking

predominantly indirect ways and means to target the conceptual and moral components of an opponent's fighting power.

229. Defined as any 'characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight', a CoG(s) can sometimes unlock a campaign end-state and is worthy of close personal engagement by the JFC. Even if the JFC cannot clearly identify a CoG, the process invariably provides crucial information. A JFC determines who or what is important using CoG *identification*; he then determines their potential strengths and weakness through the CoG *analysis* described in Annex 2E. The purpose of CoG analysis is to identify those attributes of friendly forces (or other positive aspects) that need to be safeguarded and promoted, and those attributes of an opponent (or other negative aspects) that need to be neutralised or overcome.

### **Centre of Gravity in the South Atlantic**

Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982. Britain responded rapidly by despatching a task force to reoccupy the Islands.

The Argentinian armed forces had 220 jet aircraft. The British Task Force had 34, all of which were Harriers. Control of the air was vital to enable amphibious landings and provide the freedom of manoeuvre for surface forces. Initial planning showed that even after a successful reoccupation of the Islands, the Royal Navy would have to retain 2 aircraft carriers in the South Atlantic for several weeks, and probably longer. The only hard-surface runway in the Falklands, at Stanley, was not long enough to operate fast jet aircraft and could not easily be extended.

The Royal Navy had 2 aircraft carriers: HMS HERMES and HMS INVINCIBLE. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS had been launched but was not yet operational. The deduction was simple: for control of the air, the Task Force could not afford to lose a carrier.

That premise shaped the naval campaign. The Falklands lie 300 miles east of Argentina. Placing the 2 carriers east of the Falklands would keep them out of range of enemy aircraft. That had implications for the availability of air cover; the Harriers had to make relatively long transits to and from station. Because relatively few aircraft were available, they could keep station for only short periods. It was planned to build a forward operating base to accommodate 12 Harriers once land operations got underway. However, the loss of much of the stock of perforated steel planking on the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR limited the capacity of that base to only 4 aircraft.

HMS ILLUSTRIOUS joined the Task Force later in the year, but only after the Falkland Islands had been reoccupied. Using today's campaign planning concepts, 2 functioning carriers would arguably have been the Task Force CoG. The Argentinians knew how important the carriers were and repeatedly tried to find and sink them.

## Campaign Objective

230. A campaign objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. Campaign objectives are assigned to a JFC, as part of the MOD's overall military strategy; their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state. A military campaign is seldom, however, conducted in isolation. A JFC's campaign objectives are likely to be linked to those of other actors; collaboration is invariably required to ensure that all actors' activities contribute to the national strategic aim, as shown in Figure 2.4. The following paragraphs might suggest – especially in the calm of an academic environment – that a JFC could adopt a mechanistic approach to planning. The planning process is but one way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might better be understood. No matter how carefully any plan is conceived, it is neither predictable nor likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is highly dynamic. It does not lend itself to pseudo-scientific approaches,

## Decisive Conditions

231. A decisive condition is a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. Decisive conditions are campaign building blocks. They should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions and the relationship between each condition, the operational CoG(s), and campaign objectives. Decisive conditions may relate to the physical conditions of particular people or places (though they need not be geographically bounded), less tangible virtual phenomena such as the control of information (including its reception, transmission or manipulation), and even psychological factors such as levels of comprehension, mutual trust or cohesion between individuals and organisations. Decisive conditions are:

- a. Pre-requisites for the achievement of campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state. They are derived from analysis of the campaign end-state (or relevant CoG(s)), and then later refined during the estimate process.
- b. Articulated in a way that helps make it clear when they have been achieved. At the same time that he identifies decisive conditions, a JFC should also plan how to assess progress towards them.<sup>18</sup>

232. Decisive conditions are the criteria against which the achievement of assigned campaign objectives are judged. A JFC is unlikely to create and sustain all the

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<sup>18</sup> For additional clarity, decisive conditions can be expressed as a verb in the past tense (for example, *Warlord A deterred*), to focus attention on outcomes rather than activity (*how Warlord A is deterred* is a matter for subsequent planning).

conditions necessary for success without support from other actors. Moreover, he may be similarly dependent on others for the effective exploitation of decisive conditions. In either circumstance, a JFC who cannot either create the decisive conditions, or ensure that they contribute to the desired end-state, should either negotiate with others to resolve the situation collaboratively or refer it to his strategic headquarters. As an example, a JFC may identify an effective indigenous security capability as a decisive condition to contribute to an objective of territorial integrity. He may be able to recruit and train such a force, but be unable to ensure that its members are paid or that adequate governance arrangements are in place to ensure control and accountability. For these aspects, he may rely on other actors (either through direct negotiation or indirect influence via the chain of command). Alternatively, he could seek an extension to his mandate and additional resources.

### **Amiens: Supporting Effect, Decisive Condition and Campaign Objective**

The German Spring offensive of 1918 pushed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) up to 30 miles back on a 60 mile front. Only one main-line railway running North to South behind the front line remained in British hands. The town of Amiens was a major junction on that railway, close to the Allied line and within range of German artillery. The ability to move forces along the front, or to supply an offensive south of Amiens, was dependent on the use of the railway. Allied Commanders-in-Chief met at Bombon on 24 July 1918 to consider a counteroffensive.


The first counterattacks were initiated on the Marne by the French on 15 July, and the French and Americans in the Aisne-Marne area on 18 July. The British would start in August, their initial objective to push the Germans back at Amiens to gain unrestricted use of the railway. The attack was a success and a very early example of good air-land cooperation. The British gained 9 miles along the whole front and took 16,000 prisoners. The operational objective was obtained and local counter-attacks defeated.

Amiens was the beginning of a general British counteroffensive, the 'Hundred Days'. In modern terms, it was fought to protect the BEF's critical vulnerability: the use of the railway system through the area (its security was therefore a supporting effect). However, Amiens also had an unexpected strategic effect. General von Ludendorff, effectively the second-in-command of the German Army, called the 8<sup>th</sup> of August 'the black day of the German Army'. He believed that his Army was beaten and it was. At Amiens, the BEF showed that it could now break through German defensive positions. It would continue to do so throughout the Hundred Days. While it never achieved an operational-level breakthrough, it demonstrated it could defeat the German tactical defences wherever it chose (a decisive condition). It had also, albeit unexpectedly, broken the determination of the enemy high command (a campaign objective).

## Supporting Effects


233. Decisive conditions are derived through a top-down analysis of campaign objectives. They are achieved by realising supporting effects; activities are conducted to create these effects. Activities may, of course, have unintended effects as well. Supporting effects are:

- a. Derived through analysis of decisive conditions, an example of which is shown in Figure 2.6 (see Annex 2G for further detail). It may also be appropriate to indicate:
  - (1) The domain (physical, virtual or cognitive) in which supporting effects are to be realised.
  - (2) The dimension(s) of the battlespace, including time, in which supporting effects are to be created. They may be geographically localised or more widely distributed, be instantaneous or delayed, permanent or transitory.
- b. Measurable, either directly or indirectly.




**Figure 2.6 – Deriving Supporting Effects from Analysis of Decisive Conditions**

234. **Realising Supporting Effects.** Mission command recognises that events rarely proceed according to a master plan, and while military operations are undertaken to achieve specific effects (in order to improve conditions cumulatively and progressively), experience, intuition and operational art retain primacy. Joint Action provides a framework for the orchestration of fires, influence activities and manoeuvre to realise supporting effects. JDP 3-00 ‘*Campaign Execution*’ describes Joint Action in detail; PJHQ JFOPs<sup>19</sup> describe methodologies for its implementation. It is a military construct, within which the activities of an integrated joint force are coordinated, synchronised and prioritised. Joint Action is best executed with a unified command so that orchestration can be directed rather than simply invited. It embraces supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commands while delegating the freedom to act, under mission command. In the absence of unity of command, for example where non-military actors are engaged in activities alongside the military, unity of purpose can help maintain coherence between planned activities. Figure 2.7 illustrates this concept.



**Figure 2.7 – Realising Supporting Effects through Joint Action**

<sup>19</sup> Joint Force Operating Procedures – prepared by PJHQ J7.



**Note:** This diagram does not suggest a mechanistic approach to planning. The planning process is a way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might better be understood. Plans are neither predictable nor likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is dynamic and not suited to pseudo-scientific approaches.

**Campaign objectives** are expressed using an active verb, e.g. ‘defeat the enemy’ or ‘restore essential infrastructure’.

**Decisive conditions** are vital to achieve campaign objectives, e.g. ‘air superiority gained’ or ‘enemy reconnaissance defeated’.

**Supporting effects** support decisive conditions. Decisive conditions are limited in number to ensure that a campaign is properly focused, and that effort is duly concentrated on that which is truly decisive. Supporting effects are used to expand upon the changes or effects required to create the necessary conditions, e.g. ‘enemy AD neutralised’ or ‘enemy dispositions identified’.

Activities are tasks undertaken for specific purposes, that contribute to or realise supporting effects, for example ‘conduct SEAD in order to neutralise enemy AD’ or ‘deploy ISTAR capabilities in order to identify enemy dispositions’.

**Figure 2.8 – From National Strategic Aim to Activities**

## **Lines or Groupings of Operation**

235. Lines or groupings of operation are used to visualise the relationships between decisive conditions, campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state and CoG(s). Because a campaign is conditions-based and must be adaptive to events, lines of operation indicate a route rather than a timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), it is envisaged that the activities of the joint force will contribute to the achievement of decisive conditions and desired outcomes, but without stipulating precisely when. For this reason groupings rather than lines of operation, especially in the initial stages of campaign design, may offer a more appropriate means of visualisation. Depending upon the nature of the crisis, lines or groupings of operations may be environmental (air, maritime, etc), functional (force protection, intelligence, manoeuvre, etc) or thematic (governance, security, etc). Environmental lines may be appropriate for bi-polar warfighting; thematic lines may better suit complex crises.

## **Sequencing and Synchronisation**

236. Sequencing is the logical ordering of effects and activities based on their inter-dependencies; that is, effect/activity 'B' is to follow 'A'. Synchronisation addresses time and space; effect/activity 'B' is to occur at a certain time in a specific place that differs from 'A'. Sequencing establishes order and synchronisation establishes feasibility (especially where activities compete for finite resources). Broadly speaking: decisive conditions are sequenced; supporting effects are sequenced and may be synchronised; activities are sequenced and synchronised. The staff process of sequencing and synchronisation can make a considerable contribution to the successful balancing of ends, ways and means.

## **Phases**

237. A plan may be expressed in conditions-based phases, characterised by a predominant type of military activity, or a particular set of decisive conditions that bear close relation to one or more campaign objectives. Phasing assists a JFC to plan his campaign logically; it provides a framework for planning and execution, but should not be seen as prescriptive, over-simplistic or immutable.

## **Contingency Plans**

238. Unintended effects (which may be positive or negative) are inevitable and should be planned for. Risk analysis and management (Annex 2H) together with red teaming, wargaming and operational analysis (Annex 2I) identify requirements for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS). Some activities will have unforeseeable effects; these cannot be planned for in advance, but the possibility that such effects may arise (unexpectedly) requires agility on the part of the JFC.



239. CONPLANS address both reverses (which must be countered) and opportunities (which must be seized); see Annex 2G for examples. Note the important difference between CONPLANS and contingency planning. The former are written with clear intent and form part of crisis response planning; the latter are not written with intent, but are an appraisal of potential UK military involvement in future crises that are likely to affect UK interests. Indicators and warnings are an implicit element of contingency planning. A JFC can execute CONPLANS using elements of his joint force that are already committed, with an attendant opportunity cost, or by using an uncommitted reserve. There are 2 forms of CONPLAN:

- a. A **branch** provides an alternative way (different combination of supporting effects and activity) to achieve a decisive condition within a given phase of the campaign.
- b. A **sequel** provides an alternative option for the next phase of a campaign, based upon the outcome of the preceding phase. The default sequel is the next planned phase, but there may be alternatives, such as the creation of decisive conditions in a different order or sequence.

240. Branches and sequels are usually expressed in terms of alternative, or successive supporting effects, or groups of supporting effects to create decisive conditions in different ways or in different orders. If the situation changes significantly, or an assigned campaign end-state is modified, then a JFC may also be obliged to consider alternative decisive conditions.

### **Campaign Fulcrum**

241. A campaign fulcrum is the point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly; one side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. In practice, reaching a campaign fulcrum is difficult to predict in advance. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria, however, can help to identify opportunities to create the requisite conditions for success.

### **Culminating Point**

242. A joint force reaches its culminating point during a campaign when current operations can be maintained, but without the prospect of further progress. Making use of the culminating point – either exploiting that of an opponent or responding to that of one's own force to break a potential deadlock – is intrinsically difficult for 2 reasons. First, it is often challenging to identify in advance what criteria bring about culmination. During combat, an attacking force culminates when it is unable either to sustain or re-launch an offensive and is limited inexorably to the defence. During stabilisation, a force may culminate if it loses authority. Second, and even if the

criteria are known, it is often hard to determine (at the time) when the criteria are met. Culminating points can be physical or more abstract. Studying historic campaigns, as well as effective and timely assessment may allow a JFC to appreciate when and where he should bring his influence to bear. The possibilities are unlimited; it could be through key leader engagement (friendly, adversary or neutral) as much as it might be the timely initiation of a campaign branch or sequel.

243. A JFC who recognises the imminent culmination of an opponent should act swiftly to exploit the situation and to drive home his advantage against a force that is stalled. If he recognises with sufficient notice his own prospective culmination, then a JFC may defer or even prevent its onset, by imposing an operational pause, reassigning resources (including his reserve), or executing a relevant CONPLAN.

### **Operational Pause**

244. An operational pause can be imposed out of necessity (for example, a change in international mandate) or through choice (for example, to allow time for the orchestration of military and non-military activity, or as part of a deception plan). Although a pause tends to reduce tempo, at least in the short term, it can also provide greater effectiveness and improved tempo later on. Indeed, implicit in the term ‘pause’ is the ability to re-activate the campaign in order to regain the initiative and re-establish momentum. An operational pause can apply to a whole campaign or to just one line of operation, for example to concentrate effort on another. Therefore, an operational pause should be clearly identified (along with its causes), preferably in advance, and never allowed simply to occur. Regaining the initiative afterwards may require a concerted effort, purposefully planned and clearly directed, to include any necessary reallocation of resources or reassignment of missions and tasks.

## **SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE**

245. An estimate is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander, faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives at a decision for a Course of Action (CoA) to be taken in order to achieve his mission. Commanders at all levels in Defence, and other leaders elsewhere, use estimates of one form or another; they may have different titles (such as appreciation or assessment), and be conducted in different ways, but there is a broad consensus amongst those who adhere to rational planning of the need for formal analysis. In practice, planning is not a strictly linear or sequential process.

246. The estimate described here is designed for a JFC at the operational level to develop his campaign plan, however the *principles* apply more widely:

- a. At other levels of planning (such as the higher tactical level).

- b. On multinational operations, subject to the lead or framework nation (JDP 5-00 is consistent with, for example, the thrust of NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning.<sup>20</sup>)
- c. On multi-agency operations, noting that:
  - (1) In most cases, the product of the JFC's estimate will be a plan for military activity nested within a comprehensive response.
  - (2) The operational estimate is not intended to supplant or subsume individual OGD planning methodologies (see Chapter 3).

247. An estimate must be command-led; it is the JFC's decision that the process supports. It encompasses: an understanding of the situation and the problem (both symptoms and underlying causes); ascertaining what it is necessary to achieve and by when; identification of possible CoAs; selection of the optimum CoA; and a decision as to how it should be executed. The format of the estimate, shown in Figure 2.9, is designed to bring order to command-led and staff-assisted planning; a JFC should view the various steps as depositories for his ideas and findings, rather than as a bureaucratic process.

248. The estimate provides the intellectual underpinning to the commander's insight and vision. It allows both the commander and his staff to think creatively about the achievement of the objectives set. It is enabled by the collective skill, knowledge and experience of the commander and his staff to design and manage the campaign, and to employ military forces. Command-led, the estimate supports the JFC in developing his *theory of change* of how the operation will achieve the desired end-state and the information effect that is specified in CDS' Planning and Operational Directives. The *theory of change* is the commander's big idea of how the operation will change the current operational conditions to the future desired conditions and will be guided by the strategic narrative. By the end of step 2c, in Figure 2.9, the JFC must have:

- a. Sufficient understanding of the *true nature* of the operational environment.
- b. Confirmed the *essentials of the military problem*, in terms of the assigned mission, its objectives, information effect and the influence sought: the JFC's *ends*.
- c. Articulated, in broad order, his *theory of change* from the current operational conditions to the future desired conditions. This includes his

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<sup>20</sup> NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) Guidelines for Operational Planning, commonly referred to as the 'ACO GOP'.

outline operational concept,<sup>21</sup> key themes and messages, and assumptions for the campaign: the JFC's *ways*.<sup>22</sup>

d. Assessed the *art of the possible*, and articulated any associated risks. In particular he must consider the force's capabilities, resources, sustainability, legitimacy and time and space: the JFC's *means*.

249. The JFC's big idea remains under continuous review. The JFC must balance the requirement for continuity throughout the planning and execution processes with the need to adapt to the operational environment by reframing the problem or re-designing the solution.<sup>23</sup> Generally the need to conduct a full new estimate is driven by:

- a. A major international, national, host nation or theatre specific event causing a significant change to the operating environment.
- b. Campaign assessment showing a lack of progress.
- c. Key assumptions in the planning process being invalidated.
- d. A scheduled periodic review.

During steps 3 and 4 of the estimate the commander's big idea is formulated, developed and validated into a number of potential CoAs. The CoAs, derived from the commander's *theory of change* and shaped by the narrative, will include potential phases, lines of operation, decisive conditions, supporting effects, communication themes and messages, and centre's of gravity. During step 5, alternative CoAs are evaluated for feasibility, likelihood of achieving the operational objectives and coherence with the narrative; they can then be compared for their relative advantages, disadvantages and associated risks. In step 6 the commander decides on a particular CoA or combination of CoAs that best achieves his *theory of change* to deliver his *big idea*. The selected CoA is then translated into a concise statement of the commander's decision – *what* the joint force is to do and *why*, explaining as appropriate the elements of *when, where, who* and *how*. This should include a clear articulation of his intent, concept of operations and main effort. Within this must also be the key themes that flow from the narrative. The purpose of operational design and the use of narrative, themes and messages is, through the commander's application of the operational art, to


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<sup>21</sup> The commander will confirm any initial analysis by the staff of campaign planning concepts. Potential phases, lines of operation, decisive conditions and centres of gravity will then be developed into a coherent COA in step 3 of the estimate.

<sup>22</sup> This may be articulated either verbally, as a draft intent paragraph, or in the form of an effects schematic.

<sup>23</sup> US doctrine draws a distinction between design and planning. In US planning doctrine *design* aids commanders' understanding of the environment and the problem. The US see *design* as an iterative process that complements and primes a planning process that is largely sequential. JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* does not draw such a formal distinction between design and planning as these are complementary and concurrent and the operational estimate encapsulates both design and planning (or command and staff) functions.

establish a dialogue between the tactical level activity and strategy, where tactical execution is framed by strategy but can also feedback to inform its subsequent development. Strategy development may need to be dynamic and iterative.



**Figure 2.9 – Operational Estimate as a Rational Planning Process**

**Preparation**

250. Mental agility is essential to tackle the realities of carrying out an estimate, which will contain imperfect or incomplete information, in uncertain and changing circumstances, to achieve sometimes ambiguous or ill-defined objectives; all against

challenging timelines. Sound preparation, delegation, proven Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), and concurrent activity at all levels (triggered by timely warning orders) can mitigate some of the friction.

251. **Staff Timeline.** The staff timeline, showing what staff actions must be complete by when, is fixed by the time orders and directives need to be conveyed to subordinates. This is different from consideration of time as a factor in the estimate itself, which gives rise to a separate operational timeline. For staffing, the ‘ $\frac{1}{3} - \frac{2}{3}$ ’ rule ensures that sufficient time is allowed for subordinate planning. As a guide, the available planning time (the ‘ $\frac{1}{3}$ ’) might be allocated:

- a. 30% to understanding the situation and the problem.
- b. 50% to formulating, developing and validating potential CoAs.
- c. 20% to producing and issuing formal direction.

252. **Planning Teams.** The size, composition and *modus operandi* of a JFC’s operational planning team should be decided in advance. The team should be trained and practised wherever possible. Human Factors research indicates strongly that the composition, experience and degree of collaboration displayed by a planning team is one of the biggest factors determining its ability to plan well. Notwithstanding the dangers of groupthink (coming to premature conclusions that affirm prevailing assumptions), the importance of a well practised, efficient planning team is as fundamental as the quality of the information it works with.

#### **Importance of a Cohesive Staff Team: Command of the German Africa Corps**

In 1940 the Italian Army was defeated by the British in North Africa. Hitler agreed to send a German corps of 3 divisions to reinforce the Italians. The first element to arrive was Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel’s Reconnaissance Staff. The German Army also formed a larger staff, originally called ‘General Liaison Staff Italian Army Libya’. It was lead by a highly capable staff officer, Colonel Alfred Gause. Once command relationships had been confirmed, Rommel became commander of ‘Panzer Group Africa’. He had the German Africa Corps, the Italian XX Armoured and XXI Infantry Corps under command. Gause became Rommel’s Chief of Staff (COS) as COS of Panzer Group (subsequently Panzer Army) Africa.

Before arriving in Libya, Gause’s team had spent a month training in Bavaria. They had practiced staff procedures and assessed the situation in Libya in detail. The team was small; 25 officers, including the Political Adviser, but not the attached artillery staff. It contained just 4 staff trained officers: Gause; Siegfried von Westphal (subsequently Chief of Staff to Rommel, Field Marshal Kesselring, and then Field Marshal von Rundstedt); Friedrich von Mellenthin (subsequently COS of Fifth Panzer Army) and one other. Rommel had not attended staff college.

Rommel's staff was extraordinarily efficient. It operated under intense pressure, often with poor intelligence and minimal guidance from its commander. There were probably 4 factors behind its effectiveness. Firstly, the staff contained very capable individuals. Secondly it was socially cohesive; the staff all knew each other well. Thirdly, it had trained together before deploying. Finally, and importantly, it had already researched and assessed the situation in North Africa before arrival.


253. **Provision of Information and Intelligence.** The estimate is command-led but information and intelligence-driven; this presents a dichotomy. It is a JFC who issues his intelligence requirements during his conduct of the estimate, yet unless the intelligence community correctly anticipate the principal requirements early in the planning process, there is a possibility that they may become detached from it and left behind.

### Practice

254. The way in which a JFC conducts an estimate will reflect his own style and preferences. It is a collaborative endeavour, and should exploit expertise drawn from across the headquarters and beyond. Component Commanders (CCs) play a critical part in the process, particularly in the development and validation of CoAs. A range of techniques, illustrated at Annex 2F, is used to support the estimate process:

- 3-Column Format
- CoA Format
- Analysis Format
- End-State Analysis
- CoG Analysis
- CoA Comparator
- Schematics
- Measures of Effect (MOE)
- Red-Teaming
- Wargaming
- Operational Analysis
- Risk Analysis

255. **Format.** The 3-column format is often used to record the estimate process. It may help the JFC to keep in note form a written record of analysis and any key decisions, to use as a subsequent reference point later in the campaign. The mental audit trail of why things were done the way that they were can help to preserve campaign continuity.



**Figure 2.10 – 3-Column Format**


### Potential Outputs – 3-Column Format

- Commander's **planning guidance** to his staff, for example to act upon a particular idea or examine a particular area. A JFC may use a **focused question** to direct research into a specific issue.
- **Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)** that he deems essential to his decision-making and development of the plan.
- Other **information requirements**. Those Information Requirements that cannot be answered within the headquarters, or by tasking organic ISTAR assets, are issued to other headquarters and external organisations as **Requests for Information (RFIs)**.
- **Constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms** are: imposed on all parties (constraints), self-imposed (restraints) or generated by shortfalls in resources (limitations), as well as providing opportunities (freedoms).
- **Clarification** may be sought on, for example, higher commanders' direction.
- Potential **decisive conditions**, and perhaps even initial thoughts on supporting effects, or activities.
- **Risk** identified for analysis and, where necessary, risk management.
- Any **assumptions** on which the plan is based. These should be recorded, along with any implications should they prove incorrect, and responsibilities for monitoring them.



## SECTION V – CONDUCTING THE ESTIMATE

### Step 1 – Understand the Operating Environment (Framing the Problem)



**Figure 2.11 – Step 1 – Understand the Operating Environment (Framing the Problem)**

256. While analysis<sup>24</sup> uncovers a range of information, Step 1 of the estimate concentrates attention on *framing the commander's problem* in its unique context so that the commander gains sufficient understanding of the true nature of the operational environment. Correct framing of the problem is the essential initiation of the operational planning process; it must not be overlooked. At this stage, engagement with other headquarters should enable the JFC to understand the concerns of other commanders and to manage the likelihood and impact of subsequent changes in direction. Such consultation should occur in all 3 directions: upwards (higher command), sideways (allies and other agencies) and downwards (subordinates).

257. Understanding of the operating environment, including the communications environment<sup>25</sup>, may benefit from an integrated approach involving OGDs and appropriate agencies. These non-military actors will likely have contributed to, and received the output from, analysis. Although there are likely to be a number of considerations mutually applicable to both analysis and Step 1, it is important to retain Step 1 as a discrete stage in developing a plan. Analysis is an enduring process that requires focus on the precise nature of the crisis, its conditions, circumstances and influences. It allows a JFC to visualise the extent of the problem that he faces, what the current operational conditions are, the context of the narrative, and how he might shape and alter the environment to his advantage, which will inform his decision-making. Similarly it will inform the decisions taken by non-military leaders. This latter point underlines the need for an integrated approach to Step 1; it offers the prospects of a more effective comprehensive response to a crisis.


<sup>24</sup> Using methodologies that include PEST, SWOT, PMESII, and others – see Chapter 1, Section II.

<sup>25</sup> See JDN 1/11 – the environment in which strategic communication occurs.

## Step 2 – Understand the Problem

258. Having framed the problem, in Step 2 the JFC seeks better to understand it (what are the essentials of the military problem, why, what is his theory of change from the current conditions to the future desired conditions, and what risks are involved). He should also try to anticipate how the problem might change over the course of time and events, and the potential impact on ends, ways and means. The outcome of 2 parallel and inter-related activities – Mission Analysis (Step 2a) and Object/Factor Evaluation (Step 2b) – is then articulated by the JFC as his big idea as he seeks to confirm a fuller understanding of the problem (Step 2c) prior it being formulated, developed and validated as potential solutions.

### Step 2a – Understand the Problem (Mission Analysis)



**Figure 2.12 – Step 2a – Mission Analysis**

259. The JFC does his own mission analysis to establish, using 4 questions, precisely what his mission involves and where it fits into the bigger picture. Though not a final product at this stage, potential decisive conditions and themes and messages may be revealed.

- a. **Question 1.** What is the strategic intent (national, multinational, military, other)? What outcomes are sought, and what objectives are deemed necessary to reach them?
- b. **Question 2.** What is my role? What part do my campaign end-state, objectives and information effect play in the realisation of strategic outcomes? What are the future desired operational conditions?


c. **Question 3.** Do I have the freedoms, capability and authority to achieve my campaign end-state and information effect? How does the strategic narrative shape the operation?

d. **Question 4.** Has the situation changed and, if so, has this affected the overall outcomes sought? Can I make any provision now for how the situation might change in the future?

260. When analysis and assessment indicate a change to the situation, Question 4 is the point at which the estimate is re-entered. The output from Question 4 should be founded on an understanding of *how* the situation has changed, which should deliver new objects and factors for input into a revision of Step 2b. Step 2a considers superior command directives (including information strategies and plans); it may also draw upon the declared objectives of military partners and allies, as well as the published intentions of aligned civilian agencies. On completion of his mission analysis, a JFC should not only understand his mission but he should also be absolutely clear on his role and that of his joint force within the wider strategic context.

261. Ideally a JFC will have been given his campaign end-state and the information effect. If not then he may have the opportunity to negotiate them in detail with the military strategic commander. While it provides the focus for his military plan, the campaign end-state is not a discrete phenomenon, and the JFC should explore the relationships between his objectives and those of other actors, to determine inter-dependencies. He should consider how diplomatic and economic instruments of power, both national and multinational (including International Organisations), may contribute to (or unwittingly frustrate) his military campaign, and what requirements may emerge for coordination and/or mutual support. Where there are no formal mechanisms to control a comprehensive response in theatre, a JFC should take the opportunity at this early stage in his planning to clarify through the chain of command how, for example, supported and supporting relationships are to be managed. As a JFC comes to appreciate more clearly the mission, it is likely that he will identify potential CoG(s) for subsequent analysis, from which in turn potential decisive conditions may be established.

## Step 2b – Understand the Problem (Evaluate Objects and Factors)



**Figure 2.13 – Step 2b – Evaluate Objects and Factors**

262. In parallel with mission analysis, a JFC's staff examine the object(s) on which the mission bears, and other relevant factors. Initially, the staff should address self-evident factors until the JFC has completed his mission analysis and is able to drive a more applied study. Frequent interaction between those conducting Steps 2a (commander) and 2b (staff) will assist tempo and focus.


263. **Objects.** An object is a person, group of people, or things to which a JFC's action is directed. This may be an opponent, an abstraction of the situation (such as campaign authority), or something physical (in a disaster relief operation this could be the environment). Where the purpose of a campaign is the defeat of an opponent, then object evaluation should focus on the opponent's capabilities and his likely, or most dangerous, CoA. Multiple opponents should be examined individually and in relation to each other. Object evaluation may help to identify potential CoGs.

264. **Factors.** Factors are not arbitrary collections of facts and observations, but judiciously selected issues from which valuable deductions can be drawn and a campaign derived. The JFC's COS has to instil a discipline and drive within the headquarters to focus staff effort on the essentials. The evaluation of factors supplements object evaluation and begins to explore the *art of the possible*. Staff examine circumstances, participants, surroundings and influences within the operating environment, to determine their impact on mission success. While earlier analysis of the situation had been intentionally broad, a JFC should now focus staff effort on specific aspects, facts or conditions, relationships between actors, or the detailed nature of a particular environment,<sup>26</sup> location or resource. Planning factors specific to

<sup>26</sup> Including not only geospatial factors, but also population distribution, industrial and agricultural factors, religious, language and ethnic distribution and centres of cultural importance.

each component, logistics<sup>27</sup> and information and communication services<sup>28</sup> are critical, should be thoroughly assessed for strengths and weaknesses.

### Step 2c – Understand the Problem (Commander’s Confirmation)



**Figure 2.14 – Step 2c – Commander’s Confirmation**

265. Step 2c provides the JFC with an important opportunity to consolidate the results of his analysis (of the mission) and that of his staff (concerning objects and factors), out of which numerous deductions may have emerged (regarding potential CoGs and other campaign planning concepts). He should be seeking to confirm: his campaign objectives and end-state (including their relationship to strategic intent); the CoG(s); the decisive conditions underpinning each objective, which will form the major building blocks of his campaign; the key objects of the campaign, together with those factors that will provide the freedom and constraints for how the joint force and other agencies might influence each object; his key themes and messages; and any factors that impact on the completion of the remainder of the planning process (time, events and so forth). This process could take the form of a cross brief between the Command Group and the staff culminating in a summary from the JFC, all of which could be usefully summarised as an authoritative record of the output.

266. The completion of Step 2c marks the point at which a JFC assesses that he has sufficient knowledge and information to develop one or more campaign big ideas. He

<sup>27</sup> See JDP 4-00 ‘*Logistic Support to Joint Operations*’. Logistic planning factors are identified in the *logistics minimum information set*. The key factors are destination, intensity, scale and timings. Destination – what are the likely locations of 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, & 3<sup>rd</sup> line and what restrictions are there on strategic lines of communication? Intensity – what is the combat activity profile? Scale - what force elements will be deployed and what is their likely lay-down? Timing – what is the deployment timescale, what is the desired order of arrival and what is the likely duration of the operation?

<sup>28</sup> See JDP 6-00 ‘*CIS Support to Joint Operations*’. The information exchange requirement is based on an evaluation of factors that determine the flow of information between organisations participating in and supporting the operation. This requires the identification of: what information the commander needs, in what timeframe (real-time, near real-time or higher latency); how is it presented, to what level of depth or detail, how accurate does it need to be; and who does it need to be shared with (multinational, host nation, OGDs etc)? This provides the foundation for developing the required information and communications services architecture and eventual network design.

will understand his theory of change; his *ways*. The essentials of the military problem; his *ends* are confirmed; his *means* may still be open to negotiation, although he will have a reasonable idea of the constraints in place. At this point he may consider it appropriate to issue a warning order to include the main deductions from planning to date.

### **Von Manstein's Big Idea**

Between the World Wars, France fortified its border with Germany at the Maginot Line. In 1939 the Allies expected a German attack through Belgium and possibly the Netherlands. Their plan was for French and British troops to deploy in Belgium along the River Escaut, allowing reinforcement of the Belgian Army if required, but also a link up with Dutch forces in the area of Bergen op Zoom. Belgium initially remained neutral so as not to provoke Germany. Allied reconnaissance was limited and there was no prior preparation of defensive positions along the Escaut.

The initial German plan did involve an attack through Belgium and the Netherlands. However, General Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army Group A, did not believe that the plan would be decisive. He directed his COS, Major General Erich von Manstein, to prepare an alternative plan.

Manstein's plan was radically different. He proposed a theatre-level shaping operation, intended to draw allied reserves north. The decisive attack would be a thrust through the area of Sedan along the Franco-Belgian border to cut off and encircle the allied forces. A second phase would then defeat remaining forces in France; with reserves destroyed, that should not be difficult.

The loss of a copy of the German plan on 10 January 1940 led to the adoption of an alternative plan based on Manstein's big idea. Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian had advised Manstein to strengthen the armoured spearhead of the attack from Sedan, and also to attack on a deeper axis along the line of the River Somme. The German CGS, General Franz Halder, had deleted a subsidiary thrust to the South, with which Manstein had planned to engage French operational reserves. Overall, however, the final plan reflected Manstein's big idea.

The result is well known. Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps seized crossings on the Meuse at Sedan on 13 May and reached the sea at Abbeville on the 20 May. That was the decisive operation of the war in the West in 1940.

### Step 3 – Formulate Potential Courses of Action



**Figure 2.15 – Step 3 – Formulate Potential Courses of Action**


267. In Step 3 a JFC formulates and develops his campaign big ideas. He may, for example, use outline campaign schematics to show the desired outcome, strategic objectives, campaign end-state (and objectives), operational CoG(s), key themes and messages and various options for decisive conditions. Possible lines or groupings of operation, phases and other campaign planning concepts may also become apparent (different ways of depicting these concepts are shown at Annex 2G). Derived from the JFC's theory of change and shaped by the narrative, the outcome should be one or more alternative ideas, articulated as distinct Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) showing *what* has to be achieved in order to reach the campaign end-state. Step 4, the development and validation of alternative CoAs, addresses in detail *how* each concept might be put into practice. In a Comprehensive Approach, this is where competing theories of change can be compared and weighed against each other.

268. Unless a JFC decides there is only one solution to achieving his mission, he is likely to develop a number of potential outline CoAs based on different combinations or sequencing of decisive conditions. The creation of decisive conditions (*all* of them and *only* them) should, by definition, achieve his campaign objectives and, hence, his campaign end-state. They should be distinct from, but consistent with, each other; in order to be practical, and thereby credible, they should also take due account of the various freedoms and constraints identified earlier in the estimate process.

269. Options may be required for an opponent's worst and most likely CoAs. Potential CoAs may describe wholly different ways of conducting the campaign; a JFC may, therefore, wish to consult the military strategic commander to ensure consistency with the broader strategic intent. While the desired outcome is always paramount, the ways and means by which it is reached (or the military contribution to reaching it) may also influence events in the longer term. Where the outcome is equivocal, for example uncertain impact on otherwise steady-state geopolitical relations, then the manner in which a campaign is conducted (and perceived to be conducted by others) may be significant. A JFC's big ideas, normally expressed as


outline concepts, stimulate Step 4. He may also express direction and guidance for developing supporting effects and activities.

**Step 4 - Develop and Validate Courses of Action**



**Figure 2.16 – Step 4 – Develop and Validate CoAs**

270. In Step 4, staff develop the JFC’s outline concepts. Potential CoAs, previously described in Step 3, are transformed into detailed *alternative* CoAs each of which meets the ‘feasibility, acceptability, completeness, exclusivity and suitability (FACES)-test’. Different combinations of decisive conditions (the *what*), supporting effects and activities (the *how*) provide the foundation for each alternative CoA – see Figure 2.17.



**Figure 2.17 – Generating Alternative CoAs**



271. **Course of Action Development.** The development of each CoA should be an iterative process. Subordinate commanders must be engaged; subject to Operations Security (OPSEC) constraints, so too should those OGDs and agencies engaged in a comprehensive response. The relationships between decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities, resources, time and space are examined taking account of the likely actions, reactions and influences of the enemy, opponents or other actors. Inclusion of the JFC's guidance on deception is important. Red teaming, wargaming and operational analysis offer significant value to this step. Risks, notably those resulting from limitations on resources and capabilities, should be captured and incorporated into each CoA.

272. **Course of Action Description.** CoAs should be described clearly and in detail for 2 reasons: first to enable effective evaluation (in Step 5) and second to facilitate subsequent contingency planning (where an alternative CoA, or part of one, provides a potential branch or sequel). A developed CoA should include:


- a. A summary of the strategic context – national strategic aim, national strategic objectives, military strategic objectives and the military strategic commander's intent.
- b. The campaign end-state and the information effect, described as the JTF's mission and campaign objectives.
- c. The JFC's theory of change (including operational concept).
- d. The strategic narrative and the JFC's key themes and messages.
- e. Identified CoG(s).
- f. The intentions of OGDs and other agencies.
- g. Assumptions (including those subject to any outstanding CCIRs).
- h. Key constraints, restraints, limitations and freedoms.
- i. The JFC's CONOPS: intent, scheme of manoeuvre, and main effort.
- j. Risks.

273. **Course of Action Tools and Techniques.** A JFC's staff will employ tools and techniques, in accordance with their respective headquarters' SOPs, to articulate each CoA:

- a. Campaign Schematics – see Appendix 2G2

- b. Decisive Condition/Supporting Effect Tables – see Appendix 2G3. (initial MOEs may also be formulated at this stage – see Section VII).
- c. Effects Schematics – see Appendix 2G4.
- d. Joint Action Tables – see Appendix 2G5. (initial Measurements of Activity (MOAs) may also be formulated at this stage – see Section VII).
- e. Joint Action Schematics – see Appendix 2G6.
- f. Joint Action Synchronisation Matrices – see Appendix 2G7.

### Step 5 – Evaluate Courses of Actions




**Figure 2.18 – Step 5 – Evaluate Courses of Action**

274. During Step 5, alternative CoAs are evaluated for feasibility and likelihood of achieving the specified operational objectives and coherence with the narrative (this may also lead to their refinement), and then compared for their relative advantages, disadvantages and associated risks. CoAs may also be compared against specific criteria, such as the principles of war or the operational framework. A JFC may develop his own questions, based on his understanding of the situation, experience and judgement. It is important to identify and assess risks at this stage, as these may indicate important strengths and weaknesses of particular CoAs (see Annex 2H). Where appropriate, each CoA may be assessed and compared against an opponent's most likely and most dangerous CoAs using, for example, comparative wargaming and operational analysis (Annex 2I).

275. A key aspect of CoA comparison is Campaign Effectiveness Assessment (CEA) and MOE. In selecting a CoA, a JFC will need to be confident that his plan can be subject to assessment. Progress towards decisive conditions and measuring supporting effects are important, albeit a means to an end and not an industry in its own right. Furthermore, it is the 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> order effects, difficult to predict with any degree of certainty and likewise difficult to measure, that may become decisive as the campaign unfolds. This does not preclude the selection of supporting effects and activities that are difficult to measure; it could be, however, a factor in CoA selection. This is a complex but essential aspect of campaign design; it must be incorporated into the operational estimate using sound military judgement and not pseudo-science. Step

5 concludes with the assessment of each validated CoA being presented to the JFC. In order to make an appropriate selection, it is important that the JFC understands the assumptions and risks associated with each CoA, as well as the proposed ways and means of achieving (and assessing the achievement of) success.

### Step 6 – Commander’s Decision



**Figure 2.19 – Step 6 – Commander’s Decision**

276. A JFC decides upon a particular CoA, or a combination of viable CoAs, and confirms his proposed way ahead with his military strategic commander. The timing of this decision may be explicitly linked to political and cross-Governmental deliberations. The selected CoA is then translated into a concise statement of the JFC’s decision – *what* the joint force is to do and *why*, explaining as appropriate the elements of *what* the joint force is to do and why, explaining as appropriate the elements of *when, where, who* and *how*. A JFC writes his own CONOPS and subordinate mission statements, which may then be disseminated immediately as a warning order. His staff focus on the production of supporting detail for the requisite directives, plans (including detailed Operation Plans (OPLANs) and CONPLANs) and orders (including Operation Orders (OPORDs)). This should include a clear articulation of his intent, concept of operations and main effort. Within this must also be the key themes and messages that flow from the narrative.

277. The translation of the selected CoA into actionable orders can occur in different ways, depending upon the scale and complexity of the campaign. The initial campaign plan may be immediately actionable, the requisite level of detail (down to component-level missions and tasks) and assurance having been achieved during Steps 3, 4 and 5. Alternatively, in more complex situations, a JFC may direct that a specific OPLAN be developed to action the first phase of his campaign. Steps 3 to 5 would then enable him to generate detailed alternative CoAs and a decision regarding his immediate actions. However, despite the detail that can be derived even at this stage of planning, a campaign plan is in essence broad direction for a large number of actors and it must never lose its clarity in its subsequent articulation.

278. CoAs pertinent to the detailed planning of a particular campaign phase (i.e. subject to an OPLAN, for subsequent inclusion within an OPORD), should include:
- a. A clear description of the period/stage/phase within the wider campaign that is being considered.
  - b. An outline mission and accompanying purpose for the JTF for this period/stage/phase.
  - c. A CONOPS, supported by effects schematics, to include: intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort.
  - d. Key themes and messages.
  - e. Component mission statements of task and purpose.
  - f. Risks.
  - g. Further information that may, for example, relate to task organisation, supported and supporting relationships, deployment, time and space, logistics concepts and operational level reserves.

A JFC's selected CoA can only be implemented successfully if it is communicated clearly and unequivocally to his subordinates. Written direction may be supplemented by mission rehearsals, orders groups, briefs and back-briefs.

## **SECTION VI – CAMPAIGN PLANNING PRODUCTS**

279. The operational estimate is the principal tool of campaign design; it acts as the foundation for subsequent campaign management. Once initial planning is complete, the campaign plan provides both an expression of campaign design and the means by which it is managed. Campaign management involves actionable directives and orders, the orchestration of capabilities and activities, and the assessment of progress. In much the same way that an operational estimate is kept under continual or at least periodic review, so too is a campaign plan. Throughout the estimate process a JFC issues warning orders to the joint force.

### **Warning Orders**

280. Warning orders indicate commander's intent to subordinates, who can then contribute to higher level planning and conduct their own informed planning. A JFC should strike a balance between providing too little information too late, and inundating subordinates with a succession of evolving, but potentially contradictory, directions. There is no prescribed format; warning orders are likely to become progressively more definitive as the planning process progresses.

## Campaign Plan

281. A JFC should have a single plan, albeit this may be nested within a broader Comprehensive Approach, including:

- a. Analysis of the background to the crisis, as well as its causes, and any assumptions and limitations upon which planning is based.
- b. The mission and CONOPS (intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort).
- c. The assignment of Force Elements between components and prioritisation of logistic effort.
- d. C2 and liaison arrangements for the joint force, and arrangements for comprehensive, inter-agency coordination.

282. **Directives, Plans and Orders.** The campaign plan is more likely to be conveyed in a series of documents rather than just one:<sup>29</sup>

- a. A **Campaign Directive** produced by J5 provides the joint force mission, and the JTFC's campaign CONOPS. A representative format is at Annex 2J.
- b. An **OPLAN** produced by J5 provides the detailed CONOPS for the near-term phase(s) of a campaign. It provides increased resolution and precision on selected aspects of the overall campaign. An OPLAN can trigger force preparation and the detailed synchronisation of activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) between subordinate commands and other agencies. The development of an OPLAN should identify any requirement for subsequent CONPLANS. A representative format is at Annex 2K.
- c. An **OPORD** is produced by J3 Future Operations (J35), in collaboration with CCs and, where appropriate, OGDs and other agencies. It provides detailed direction and authorisation for the execution of a phase, period or stage of a campaign, or a specific operation.
  - (1) Each OPORD is derived from an OPLAN (or CONPLAN) and includes: component missions and tasks (with associated purposes directly related to supporting effects); and a comprehensive CONOPS. A representative format is at Annex 2L.
  - (2) A FRAGO is produced by J3 Current Operations (J33) to achieve a specific purpose. Each one is related to and serves to amend a particular OPORD; a FRAGO cannot stand in isolation. An OPORD

<sup>29</sup> See the supplements to this publication for descriptions of other national and multinational planning documentation.

may remain extant for several weeks, or even months, during which time a series of FRAGOS may be issued to refine and alter it to address emerging issues and challenges.

d. A **Force Instruction Document** (FID) provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the joint force; it complements the campaign directive, and subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs. A representative format is at Annex 2M.

283. **Concept of Operations.** The JFC's CONOPS is the most important aspect of his campaign plan; it provides an enduring reference point to which subordinates can refer in order to confirm their understanding of commander's intent and to orientate themselves to their role in his overall scheme. In setting out his vision to subordinates, a JFC should also indicate to them what lies ahead, including the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans. Clarity is vital. As a guide, a JFC's concept of operation should run to no more than a side or 2 of A4 paper. While a JFC should have engaged with his superior commander throughout the planning process, he may nonetheless wish to confirm his proposed concept prior to promulgation, giving him an opportunity to endorse the plan formally and, if necessary, obtain political approval. A JFC's CONOPS is described at various levels: campaign directive (the *what*), OPLAN (the *how*) and OPORD (*task and purpose*). Each should include:

a. **Commander's Intent.** Intent is a concise and precise statement of how a JFC intends to achieve his assigned campaign end-state. It should demonstrate the enduring logic underlying the campaign. A JFC can usefully reinforce his intent by re-stating it on each occasion that he provides direction to his subordinates. Commander's intent should be broadly enduring, unless there is a significant change to the situation or the mission.

#### **Commander's Intent – US Marines in Iraq 2003**

1 Marine Expeditionary Force history indicates that US Marines in 2003 fought by widely understood commander's intent; a statement that reflected the commander's personality, intuition and sense of purpose, which was delivered to every marine and sailor in the Division. General Conway and his subordinates made distinct efforts to communicate their intent in person, wherever possible to every member of their command. Conway generally stayed forward to keep his finger on the operational pulse, but also to communicate directly. General Mattis worked similarly, but where he could not communicate directly, he also exploited daily postings on the Division's classified website. Short, plain English messages, 1 or 2 pages long, outlined the situation as Mattis saw it and the messages stated unequivocally what he intended to accomplish. Many officers began their day by reviewing the website. They felt properly empowered and the headquarters was efficient. Staff had a clear appreciation of how their commanders were thinking and, crucially, what they wanted to achieve.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** A Scheme of Manoeuvre describes how a JFC sees his campaign unfolding; it sets the missions assigned to subordinate CCs in a broader (and potentially multi-agency) context. It explains where, when and how the joint force is to achieve its purpose, so that subordinate commanders can understand their role in the overall plan.

c. **Main Effort.** A JFC declares his main effort to direct the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. Main effort indicates what a JFC considers to be crucial to the success of his campaign. This is given substance in a variety of ways:

- (1) Additional resources may be allocated to the component assigned to the main effort.
- (2) Other components may be assigned specific tasks to support the main effort either directly or indirectly.
- (3) Other steps may be taken, such as the narrowing of boundaries and economy of effort elsewhere, to concentrate fighting power.

d. Cognisant of the JFC's main effort and priorities, subordinates can use their initiative to take timely and independent decisions and action, thereby optimising tempo. A subordinate commander may declare his own main effort to support that of the JFC.

e. **Key Themes and Messages.** The key themes are the key ideas in the JFC's concept or intention that have been derived from the narrative. They are designed for broad communication across all target audiences and explain the overarching operational plan. They are supported by messages that are more narrowly focussed on specific target audiences.

284. **Mission Statements.** A JFC should write a mission – a clear concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose – for each of his subordinate commanders. There are 3 broad types of mission statement: single task; multiple task; and (usually for reserves) a list of contingent or *be prepared to* tasks.

a. Each mission statement contains task, purpose, and unifying purpose (the *in order to* or effect required in relation to the CONOPS). Subordinates' freedom of action and scope for initiative is made clear.

b. The sum of the purposes, of all the JFC's mission statements, covers all the scheme of manoeuvre (otherwise some aspect has been left untasked).

c. Mission statements are expressed precisely and unequivocally, using defined language. This is particularly important in multinational operations,

where orders are translated, and in multi-agency situations where military terminology has to be interpreted (abbreviations and jargon should be omitted).

285. **Missions for Reserves.** A JFC should distinguish between his reserve and echelon forces. Echelon forces are those that, while not committed initially, have an explicit role in the plan; they have a given mission. Reserve forces are uncommitted in the plan but retained to deal with unforeseen circumstances, to exploit unexpected success or guard against setbacks. They should be given planning tasks or options, rather than a mission within the plan. Once committed, they should be given a specific mission; and a further reserve generated.

## SECTION VII – PLANNING THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN

286. A campaign plan should be kept under review throughout its execution. This may be done by dedicated staff on a continuous basis or by a bespoke group or forum on a periodic basis. In either event, the JFC will wish to appraise campaign progress formally with a frequency that matches the tempo of his operations as well as meeting the reporting requirements of superior commanders (i.e. dictated by the strategic level battle rhythm).

### **Plans that Survive First Contact**

Moltke the Elder wrote that ‘no plan of action reaches with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main force’. Yet military planners have continued to try to plan in detail for events beyond first contact, and continued to be unsuccessful. War and conflict are inherently complex and unpredictable. The unpredictability increases as an adversary reacts to the situation. Successful armed forces tend to show the same pattern: they stop planning in detail; they do not expect the enemy to behave in a given way; and their orders become significantly shorter.

The US VII Corps landed in France on D-Day in June 1944. It and one of its divisions (9<sup>th</sup> Infantry) then fought continuously for several months. An analysis of its orders and records show this pattern. However, they also show how the 2 headquarters coped with the complexity and uncertainty of war.

Corps headquarters assessed and analysed the situation continuously. It produced periodic assessments roughly every second day. By September 1944 it and its divisions had a good working knowledge of the situation. Divisional staff also assessed and analysed the situation. At times, Divisional assessments varied from the Corps’; any such variance was noted and explored. These assessments were independent of orders and contained no estimation of the enemy’s likely or most dangerous courses of action. They merely listed the enemy’s capabilities and the courses of action open to him. Attempting rigidly to predict a CoA had left staffs unprepared when the enemy did something else.



As a result, the orders which the Corps and Division produced were not documents to be scrutinised and analysed. The deep analysis had already been done. Instead they were just a page or 2 of concise instructions. A Corps or Divisional operation order was typically 2 pages long, with a few annexes.

VII Corps and 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division fought a highly competent enemy, but were generally successful. They did not win every battle and engagement. They had, however, learned that long and detailed orders simply did not work. In such cases, failure was often written into the plan: it did not arise out of the situation or the enemy. The key to the production of short, timely and above all effective orders was the continuous assessment and analysis which their staffs conducted.

### **Rationale for Assessment**

287. A JFC reviews and adjusts his initial planning based upon the results of assessment, designed to: evaluate the execution of activities by the joint force, the effectiveness of those activities, and whether the situation is developing favourably. On this basis, he adjusts his plans and issues further direction. Assessment is covered in more detail in JDP 3-00, but it is also an important aspect of planning; assessment cannot be left as an adjunct or after-thought to the campaign plan. Defining the nature of success, and judging progress towards it, is a fundamental stage in any decision-action cycle. There are at least 3 more reasons why judgements on the design of an assessment regime are important aspects of campaign planning:

- a. **Validity of Tasking.** Determining how or whether the creation of particular conditions and effects can be measured may dictate whether aspirations can be translated into actionable objectives. A JFC should avoid tasking a subordinate to act in order to achieve an effect that is ill-defined or so imprecise that he cannot know when or whether he has succeeded.
- b. **Decision-Making.** Adversaries are invariably adaptive, and a JFC should expect to adjust his plan as events unfold. In order that this process of iterative decision-making can have some structure, he needs to have an idea of what information is required by when. This will help the JFC to anticipate rather than respond to events.
- c. **Practicality of Assessment.** Finally, a JFC needs to plan *for* assessment. There is a significant difference between recognising the potential benefits of assessment and designing and implementing a practical means of realising those benefits, within time constraints, staff resources and information available. In seeking the most efficient solution, a JFC should consider:

(1) The minimum requirement for assessment, weighing up the need to inform short-term decisions (principally regarding activities and current supporting effects) and to gather longer term trend information to inform broader aspects of his campaign (such as the achievement of the more fundamental decisive conditions).

(2) Not everything can be assessed all the time, but a JFC should be alert to the possibility of fruitless activity, wasting time and resources for no apparent effect, or even being counter-productive. Assessment contributes to the maintenance of the aim; lack of assessment undermines economy of effort.

### Conduct of Assessment

288. Assessment performs 3 functions: **Measurement of Activity**, the assessment of the performance of a task and its associated purpose; **Measurement of Effect**, the assessment of the realisation of specified effects; and **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment**, the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision making. Guidance on the derivation of appropriate measures, and the gathering of evidence, is contained in JDP 3-00.


289. Assessment is a means to inform decisions rather than being an end in itself. It draws upon military judgement to interpret events and to make sense of data. It is not a precise science. While assessment should draw upon a range of expertise and techniques, ideally from both within and outside the headquarters, an appropriate balance should be maintained between art and science, between subjective and objective factors. If possible, a JFC should meet the requirement in a Comprehensive Approach to have an assessment process that brings together the various agencies.

290. A JFC should be clear about what assessment can do for him; not least because its utility will influence the priority and resources afforded to it. Active assessment can be a potential force multiplier, enabling the most effective use to be made of time and resources, but it may also be a prerequisite for success (or at the very least enable a JFC to ascertain what remains to be done). Identification of a JFC's measures of campaign progress and eventual success must therefore be an integral element of campaign design. Assessment – both *what* to measure and *how* to measure it – should be incorporated (and kept under review) as part of the operational estimate process.

### Iterative Planning

291. Figure 2.20 provides an illustrative campaign rhythm, whereby a JFC can draw upon assessment to inform his decision-making, develop successive plans, and disseminate orders. This process is enacted through a series of boards and meetings.

In a UK JTFHQ, they include: the Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG); Operational Planning Teams (OPTs); the Joint Coordination Board (JCB); and Joint Effects Meetings (JEMs) (see JDP 3-00). It is crucial that a JFC does not get tunnel vision when considering the detail of an assessment process. While retaining an ability to put important detail quickly in its correct context, he must principally stand back and identify the major movements and trends, avoiding the temptation to micro-manage all detail. In considering the outputs of the process illustrated at Figure 2.20, he should focus on the shaded areas, namely the near term decisive conditions, which will indicate whether the campaign is travelling in the right direction on the right road, without trying to determine which lane he is manoeuvring within. A key insight will always be who has the initiative and whether an enemy is adapting to events faster than the JFC.



**Figure 2.20 – Assessment and Iterative Planning**

1. A JFC may review campaign progress on a rolling basis. Each review cycle begins with the selection of those decisive conditions and supporting effects potentially relevant to the next phase of the campaign (1a). Plans are then developed to achieve them (1b), and orders issued for the conduct of operations (1c). Thereafter, associated MOE and, where appropriate, MOA indicate how that phase of the campaign is progressing, informing future decisions (1d) – to continue as planned, or plan a variation.
2. A JFC may seek to create and maintain some conditions, such as cumulative effects upon one or more actors' will and/or understanding, over an extended period. Consequently, plans and orders may be developed, alongside the approach described above (1), to cover discrete aspects of the campaign (for example, relating to activities that endure between phases). Relevant MOE need to be both sophisticated and persistent, to generate accurate and credible information.
3. On occasions, individuals or supporting effects may merit specific assessment; for example, effects sought on an opponent's physical capability through high tempo, often largely kinetic.

### **Maintaining Agility and Initiative**

292. The key tenets of a campaign plan – the JFC's intent, campaign end-state (and objectives), CoG(s) and associated decisive conditions - are likely to endure, subject to changes in policy and/or strategy. Campaign effectiveness analysis provides an opportunity to review their validity, and reaffirm or adjust as necessary. Meanwhile, the scheme of manoeuvre (including supporting effects and planned activities) and main effort are likely to be refreshed more frequently as the campaign progresses and the JFC seeks to maintain the initiative. The operational estimate, and the audit trail of decisions made in the past, provides the framework for subsequent adjustment.

293. 'Failing to plan is planning to fail' may be true, but a JFC will use his judgement to decide how much planning is required in what level of detail. In multi-faceted crises, it may be counter-productive to over-regulate what is inherently complex and uncertain. JDP 01 describes some of the risks associated with reverse engineering success, based upon unrealistic assumptions of causality and predictability (including the compliance of other actors). Placing absolute faith in pre-determined and closely sequenced plans is unlikely to prove successful against an agile opponent. A JFC should maintain a balance between proactive contingency planning and timely adaptation to unforeseen events. Assessment-led decision-making and adaptive planning is underpinned by a mindset that seeks to exploit opportunities and reverse set-backs; the essence of mission command and the manoeuvrist approach. The flair and imagination of a JFC, coupled with a profound understanding of the situation, are core attributes of an operational level commander. A JFC should encourage initiative amongst his staff, such that opportunities to exploit unexpected changes in the situation are not overlooked or ruled out. Recognising how a situation is changing, identifying the implications, and exploiting opportunities as they arise, is the key to campaign success.

## SECTION VIII – CAMPAIGN CONTINUITY

“We don’t have twelve years’ experience in Vietnam. We have one year’s experience twelve times over”

John Paul Vann<sup>30</sup>

### The Problem

294. The relative importance of the principles of war<sup>31</sup> vary according to context. For enduring campaigns commanders’ should give special consideration to *selection and maintenance of the aim* and *economy of effort*. Selection and maintenance of the aim, the cardinal principle of war, provides the focus for coordinated effort and a reference point against which to gauge progress. The single aim selected should deliver unity of purpose across subordinate operations. Economy of effort guides the commander in the use of manpower, material and time in relation to achievement of his objectives. It is best expressed as *the right tools, in the right place, at the right time, leading to the right result*.<sup>32</sup> In practice, uncertainty, inadequate understanding of a situation, politics, individual personalities, force structures and equipment, tour rotations and staff turnover all generate risk against these principles. This risk is further exacerbated in multinational and multi-agency operations by different national and departmental ambitions and perspectives.

### Campaign Continuity

295. Campaign continuity seeks to mitigate these risks. It is defined as *the combination of strategy, campaign planning, force generation and training to deliver sustained, consistent and efficient campaign effort and deploy effective capability in-theatre in order to achieve campaign objectives*. Campaign continuity seeks to build and deliver operational effectiveness to support the achievement of national, host nation and coalition strategic objectives (*Ends*) throughout the campaign. This is achieved by: generating continuity of strategic purpose and command; generating understanding through developing operational and environmental knowledge; effective force preparation; ensuring a consistent approach and appropriate structures; enabling the delivery of coherent effects over an extended period; and sustainment of the campaign in the most efficient and effective manner. Over time this minimises the negative effects of formation and unit tour rotation, staff or equipment turnover and operational procurement (*Ways*). Campaign continuity is delivered by a combination of institutional agility, and organisational leadership. These must be enacted across all Defence Lines of Development, but in particular doctrine, personnel, equipment, training and financial resources. Campaign continuity may also include resources

<sup>30</sup> *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, by Neil Sheehan, New York 1988, Random House.

<sup>31</sup> JDP 0-01 BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition page 2-3.

<sup>32</sup> JDP 0-01 BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition.

committed both in-theatre and those committed out of theatre as part of the Direct, Prepare and Sustain effort (*Means*).

### **Command Requirements**

296. Commanders should consider the threats to campaign continuity during the planning process. Measures to mitigate the risks should be built into campaign design and management, operational plans and their execution. Commanders must provide clear military advice that informs the political decisions regarding the conditions on the ground and the feasibility of achieving the political aim given the military means available. Commanders will also need to balance organisational agility with durability within the force in order to maintain operational effectiveness.

297. On enduring operations commanders should appreciate that their period of command covers only a proportion of a longer campaign; one that cannot be broken down into discrete 6 to 12 month segments. Successful command in an enduring campaign should be judged in the longer term, and a degree of humility, collective rather than self-interest, and an understanding of the purpose and context for individual contributions is required. It should not be routinely necessary to re-design a campaign, operation or even tactical actions every time commanders and staffs change over or troops are relieved. Commanders must understand not just the output but also the original thought process that led to plans they inherit. This requires that assumptions and decisions that shaped the planning process be recorded to allow subsequent reviews to take place. Campaign continuity does not imply that changes of the operational concept, tactics, techniques or procedures should be avoided; not adapting to operational realities invariably results in defeat. Whilst reviews and adaptation are crucial tools for the commander to retain or gain the initiative they must be planned and based on the commander's understanding of the wider operational context. This ensures that any adjustments are coherent with overall campaign progression.

298. In a short campaign the most effective method for harmonising national and multinational aims, intents and chains of command is likely to be by appointing a Senior British Military Representative or Adviser (SBMR or SBMA). In many cases this will be in addition to the tactical formation commander. In an enduring campaign the requirements of continuity and consistency are likely to be met most effectively by appointing a NCC; with clear divisions of responsibilities between the NCC, PJHQ and MOD.

### **Headquarters**

299. Headquarters structures can support campaign continuity. In an enduring operation the establishment of a campaign headquarters within the theatre of operation is usually desirable, but must be conditions based. The relative merits of a campaign

headquarters must be judged against the intensity of operations, the phase of the campaign and whether the headquarters are managing specific geographical areas rather than being engaged in continuous manoeuvre. A principle advantage of a campaign headquarters is that it enables the development of a deep understanding of the operational environment, adversaries and partners. If this understanding<sup>33</sup> and intelligence is fused and synthesised operations become more coherent and training for operations can be tailored in a more consistent way. However, these structures can take time to develop, are difficult to establish in a non-permissive environment, and are dependent on a clear political appreciation of the likely longevity of a campaign. In less permissive environments, or without agreement on the enduring nature of a campaign, headquarters can be drawn on a rotational basis from standing deployable formations. This requires individuals and units to understand their place in, and contribution to, the overall campaign. To achieve this, consideration must be given to: the lessons process; intelligence sharing;<sup>34</sup> availability of classified communication systems; information management and exploitation;<sup>35</sup> doctrine; pre-deployment training; the use of continuity appointments; reconnaissance; and the conduct of the relief-in-place.

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<sup>33</sup> See JDP 04 '*Understanding*'.

<sup>34</sup> See JDP 2-00 '*Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*'.

<sup>35</sup> See JDP 6-00 '*CIS Support to Joint Operations*'.

## ANNEX 2A – POLITICAL/MILITARY INTERFACE AND DEFENCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

### Cross-Government Crisis Management

*‘We will continue to seek ways to work more effectively across government. The Cabinet Secretariats are currently being reviewed to examine whether improvements can be made to the way they are organised and work together, to deliver greater coherence and effectiveness across government, including support for the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development’.*

The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom –  
Security in an Interdependent World, Chapter 5  
Cabinet Office,  
March 2008

2A1. Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) is collectively responsible for taking decisions of national importance, including those on crisis management; the Cabinet is the primary forum for such decision-making. The Cabinet Office stands at the centre of government; its purpose is to ‘make government work better’ through 2 core functions:

- a. To support the Prime Minister – to define and deliver the government’s objectives.
- b. To support the Cabinet – to drive the coherence, quality and delivery of policy and operations across departments.

2A2. The Cabinet Secretariat’s overarching aim is to ensure that the business of government is conducted in a timely and efficient way and that proper collective consideration takes place when it is needed before policy decisions are taken. It is composed of 6 individual secretariats of which 4 provide the main support to Cabinet and its committees: Economic and Domestic Affairs; European; Overseas and Defence; and Civil Contingencies. It is the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, responsible for coordinating policy on a wide range of defence, security and foreign policy issues, which *coordinates* the government’s comprehensive response (military, economic and diplomatic) to crises overseas. This comprehensive response is *directed* through the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development, specifically its Sub-Committee on Overseas and Defence (NSID(OD)):<sup>1, 2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) has been superseded by NSID(OD).



- a. **Composition** of the NSID(OD):
- Prime Minister (Chair)
  - Secretary of State (SofS) for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (alternate Chair)
  - Chancellor of the Exchequer
  - SofS for Defence
  - SofS for International Development
  - Other Ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee and the Heads of the Intelligence Agencies may be invited to attend as required.
- b. The NSID(OD) **Terms of Reference** are ‘to consider issues relating to conflict, and defence, foreign and development policy; and report as necessary to the Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID)’.<sup>3</sup>
- c. The NSID(OD) provides the forum for **Political Strategic Analysis** through an understanding of: the crisis situation; options open to the international community; options open to HMG; and how the UK might utilise its assets already in the region, or deploy additional assets, and any associated risks.<sup>4</sup> The MOD is a vital contributor to the NSID(OD); through the iterative process that seeks to balance national policy and priorities with political-military realities, underpinned by recurring revisions to a series of **Political-Military Estimates** relating to crises areas of the world, it provides a leading influence from across all government departments.

2A3. The NSID(OD) is fundamental to the UK’s approach to crisis management; it maintains and directs both national policy and the national strategic objectives that underscore that policy. The Overseas and Defence Secretariat maintains a crucial role in securing timely decisions from the NSID(OD) and ensuring that the resulting direction, whether policy or strategy, is coordinated across government departments with the main interlocutors, under the auspices of the Stabilisation Unit, being the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). While each of these latter organisations has its own approach to strategic planning, cross-departmental coordination, resulting from the government’s drive for a Comprehensive Approach, is improving. The reality is, however, that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for cross-

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<sup>2</sup> Remaining sub-committees include: NSID(EU) – Europe; NSID(OD)(A) – Africa; NSID(OD)(T) – trade; NSID(E) – extremism.

<sup>3</sup> The NSID, whose membership equates to the Cabinet, is charged with ‘considering issues relating to national security, and the Government’s international, European and international development policies’.

<sup>4</sup> By way of example, the Iraq Strategy Group and the Afghan Strategy Group, *ad hoc* bodies set up to develop national strategy as their names imply, report to the NSID(OD).

government integrated planning; bespoke arrangements, drawing from existing departmental approaches, capacity and experience, and heavily influenced by personalities, are adopted on a case by case basis.

### **Ministry of Defence Roles and Responsibilities**

2A4. The MOD has a dual role as both a Department of State and a Military Strategic Headquarters. As a Department of State, the MOD develops policy, allocates resources and procures capability. The Military Strategic Headquarters conducts military planning and advises on the allocation and deployment of forces on operations. It translates political direction into military strategy, to be enacted by its subordinate military headquarters (the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)).

2A5. CDS provides military advice to SofS for Defence and the Prime Minister. The Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, chaired by CDS, is the principal forum through which military advice is garnered, from across Defence, and through which CDS discharges his responsibility for the preparation and conduct of military operations.<sup>5</sup> The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), as senior adviser on Defence policy, attends COS Committee meetings, as does a senior official from the FCO. Others in attendance may include Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff, the Policy Director, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), Director General Media and Communications (DGMC), and other agencies such as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).

### **The Defence Crisis Management Organisation**

2A6. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is a virtual organisation formed by CDS, single-Service COS, MOD Security Policy and Operations staff, and PJHQ, supported by the Front Line Commanders (FLCs), Director Special Forces (DSF) and CDM. It performs a monitoring, directing and planning function before and during crises, and throughout enduring operations. It also provides a mechanism for routine liaison with Other Government Departments (OGDs), allies, coalition partners, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The DCMO spans the strategic and operational levels, acting as the conduit for briefings to ministers and for the rapid dissemination of direction through PJHQ (or the Standing Joint Commander (UK) to deployed commanders. CDS provides military advice to SofS and the PM.

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<sup>5</sup> COS(R) meetings review routine matters; Op-COS discusses current operations; and Strat-COS considers longer-term issues relating to ongoing campaigns.

## **MOD Security Policy and Operations Area – Command Group**

2A7. The MOD Security and Policy Area is headed by two 3-Stars, one civilian and one military, each with discrete responsibilities, but with their subordinate 2-Star directorates working as one team. The paragraphs below set out the principal responsibilities for the Command Group at 3 and 2-Star level and also list the subordinate 1-Star appointments within each area.

2A8. **Director General Security Policy.** Director General Security Policy (DG Sec Pol), in conjunction with Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)), provides ministers with military and political advice for operations. DG Sec Pol receives the political context from ministers for UK strategic planning and the direction of current and contingent operations. Responsible for Defence international relations, DG Sec Pol also leads the MOD contribution to Government-wide security policy and is the MOD lead on counter-terrorism policy.

2A9. **Director International Security Policy.** Director International Security Policy (DISP) is responsible for advice on the conduct of defence international relations with NATO, the EU and the UN. With DG Sec Pol, he engages on the cross-Government approach to security. DISP is responsible for Head of NATO and Europe Policy (NEP) and Head of Counter Proliferation and Security Cooperation (CPSC).

2A10. **Director International Acquisition Policy.** Director International Acquisition Policy (DIAP) is responsible for drawing up the policy framework for strategic guidance on the acquisition aspects of international security policy, with particular emphasis on UK dealings with the US, France, the EU and NATO. DIAP is responsible for Head of International Acquisition Policy.

2A11. **Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (International Security Policy).** Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (International Security Policy) (ACDS (ISP)) is responsible for advice on the conduct of defence international relations, relations with the African Union and engaging with OGDs as part of a cross-Government approach to security. ACDS (ISP) is responsible for Head of International Policy and Planning (IPP) and Head of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Policy (CBRN Pol).

2A12. **British Defence Staff United States.** British Defence Staff United States (BDS (US)) is a stand-alone 2-Star directorate based in Washington DC reporting to DG (ISP) and DCDS (Ops).

2A13. **Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations).** DCDS (Ops) supports CDS in commanding military operations worldwide. In conjunction with DG Sec Pol, he provides ministers with military and political advice on operations and takes a cross-Government approach by engaging with OGDs. He maintains a 24 hour a day

capability to manage crises and support ministers. DCDS (Ops) conducts operational planning and assessment in coordination with OGDs out to 5 years.

**2A14. Director Operational Policy.** Director Operational Policy (D Op Pol) is responsible for formulating advice, advising ministers and giving direction on all aspects of policy relating to current military operations. D Op Pol shares with ACDS (Ops) a responsibility for the Operations Directorate, including Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (CT&UK Ops), Head of Counter Terrorism and UK Policy (CT&UK Pol), Head of Special Forces and Legal Policy (SF&LP), Head of Overseas Operations (Overseas Ops), Head of Iraq Policy (Iraq Pol) and Head of Afghanistan Policy (Afghan Pol).

**2A15. Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations).** The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS (Ops)) supports CDS in commanding military operations worldwide and manages current UK and overseas operations and crises through the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. ACDS (Ops) shares responsibility with D Ops Pol for the Operations Directorate and has additional responsibility for Head of Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) and Head of Joint Capability (JtCap),

**2A16. Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations).** Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations) (ACDS (Log Ops)) provides support to DCDS (Ops) in the DCMO and, within the Defence Equipment and Services structure, is responsible for the strategic planning and direction of logistics for current and contingent operations. ACDS (Log Ops) is responsible for Head of Defence Logistic Operations (Def Log Ops).

### **Other Elements of Strategic Planning**

**2A17. Director General Strategy (DG Strategy)** is responsible for departmental strategy that includes the equipment programme. His Strategy Unit interfaces with CDS, PUS, Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the Second Permanent Under Secretary (2PUS) and provides strategic context, strategy choices and longer-term strategy for Defence white papers. 1-Star Heads of Operational Capability and of the Tribunals and Inquiries areas work within the Security Policy and Operations area, but do not engage directly in crisis planning.

**2A18. Chief of Defence Intelligence.** CDI provides ministers, COS and the MOD policy and operations staffs with focused collation, fusion and dissemination of operational and crisis-related intelligence, and the management of strategic indicators and warnings.

**2A19. Chief of Joint Operations.** CJO at PJHQ routinely acts as UK Joint Commander (Jt Comd). Appointed by CDS, he exercises operational command of

forces and is responsible for the deployment, direction, sustainment and recovery of forces on deployed operations overseas. CJO also supports DCDS (Ops) and DG Sec Pol to formulate, and where necessary review, defence policy and strategy.

**2A20. Defence Crisis Management Centre.** The MOD's Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC), in Whitehall, provides working and briefing facilities, living accommodation and secure communications for the DCMO. The Chief of Defence Staff's Duty Officer monitors world events around the clock from within the DCMC. The DCMC also enables interaction with other cross-government crisis management centres, such as the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), the FCO Crisis Centre, and DFID's Humanitarian Operations Centre.

### Operational Staffs and Structures

**2A21. Permanent Joint Headquarters.** CJO plans and executes joint, potentially joint and UK-led multinational operations from PJHQ. As Jt Comd, he exercises Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to national and multinational operations. He gives direction and advice to commanders in theatre,<sup>6</sup> deploys, sustains and recovers forces, and monitors and reports to CDS on the progress of campaigns. He is responsible for the Permanent Joint Operating Bases<sup>7</sup> and a variety of other headquarters and staffs deployed on missions world-wide. He is supported by:

- a. **Chief of Staff (Operations).** COS (Ops) is responsible for the planning and day-to-day running of current operations, including deployed logistics issues.
- b. **Chief of Staff (Joint Warfare Development).** Chief of Staff (Joint Warfare Development) (COS (JWD)) is responsible for the orchestration of future operational readiness, including the training of nominated commanders and their staffs.<sup>8</sup>

**2A22.** PJHQ, as an integral part of the DCMO, provides operational level military advice to the MOD. Close contact is maintained with the FLCs to ensure that single-Service views are woven into any overall response.

**2A23. Joint Task Force and Other Deploying Headquarters.** The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), an integral part of PJHQ, is the UK's permanent operational-level headquarters at readiness to conduct joint and multinational command and

<sup>6</sup> CJO does not have responsibility for defence of the UK or its territorial waters, for the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, for NATO Article V (General War) Operations or for certain maritime operations for which OPCOM is delegated to Commander-in-Chief FLEET.

<sup>7</sup> Gibraltar, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Ascension Island and British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT) (Diego Garcia).

<sup>8</sup> Such as the standing pool of potential Joint Task Force Commanders (JTFCs), from which UK national and multinational JTFCs, and National Contingent Commanders (NCC), are drawn. His staff also train some deploying operational, and indeed tactical, headquarters.

planning. Once a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)<sup>9</sup> is appointed, JFHQ becomes a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). If the JFHQ is not available, or if another type of headquarters is required, alternatives are drawn from the single-Services (or the Standing JFLogC may be used if available and suited to the crisis), who adapt their processes.

2A24. **Supporting Commands.** The 3 single-Service FLCs, together with CDI, CDM and DSF, provide force elements for joint and multinational operations. When these forces are placed under the OPCOM of a nominated Jt Comd<sup>10</sup> (normally CJO), the FLCs are referred to as Supporting Commands.

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<sup>9</sup> 'The operational commander of a nominated Joint Task Force'. New definition developed for this publication and for future UK doctrine.

<sup>10</sup> 'The Jt Comd, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of Operational Command (OPCOM) of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployment, sustainment and recovery'. JDP 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'.

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## **ANNEX 2B – REPRESENTATIVE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF’S PLANNING DIRECTIVE**

Issued by: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Chiefs of Staff (COS)

Issued to: MOD Directorates

CINCFLEET

CINCLAND

CINCAIR

PJHQUK

DSF

Copy to: Other Government Departments (OGDs) as required

### **CDS’ PLANNING DIRECTIVE OP [\*\*\*\*]**

#### **PREFACE**

1. **Review.** *[Who will review the Directive (usually Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)) and when].*
2. **Scope.** *[Indicates the bounds of the Directive and whether it supersedes a previous version].*

#### **SITUATION**

3. *[Brief description of current political/military situation and what has been/is being done to address it. This may be broken down into background and current situation].*

#### **APPOINTMENT**

4. CDS has confirmed the appointment of [\*\*\*\*] *[Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) or 4\* as appropriate]* as Joint Commander (Jt Comd) *[or designate]* for this operation *[potential operation].*

#### **THEATRE OF OPERATIONS**

5. Defined as the land, sea and air space of .... *[A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (JFC) (termed the Joint Operations Area (JOA)), within which he conducts operations].*



## DIRECTION

6. **National Strategic Aim.**<sup>1</sup> [*‘the Government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome’. The desired outcome is ‘a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence’. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. The National Strategic Aim (NSA) provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations].*

7. **National Strategic Objectives.** [*‘a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim (NSA)’. Note the difference between a desired outcome being reached and objectives being achieved; there can be no assumption of necessary causality. Not the effects, nor conditions, nor the outcome ultimately sought, can necessarily be created as desired – although the achievement of specific objectives can contribute].*

8. **Military Strategic End-State.** [*‘the successful completion of the military contribution to the desired outcome, reached when all the allocated military strategic objectives have been achieved’].*

9. **Military Strategic Objectives.** [*‘goals to be achieved by the military instrument of power in order to contribute to the achievement of the National Strategic Aim’. Their successful completion indicates the achievement of the Military Strategic End-State].*

10. **CDS’ Intent.** [*A succinct articulation of CDS’ Military Strategic intent, including the strategic effects military forces are to realise, or contribute to, in collaboration with OGDs under a Comprehensive Approach].*

## PLANNING

11. You are to work with MOD HQ Current Commitments Team (CCT) to prepare a Military Strategic Estimate for...

12. In consultation with MOD HQ and the CINCs, you are to recommend:

- a. What, if any, immediately available forces should be directed to move to the likely area of operations [*Operational Command (OPCOM) arrangements of these forces to be considered prior to the issue of the CDS Directive].*
- b. The appropriate level of Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).

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<sup>1</sup> This may be referred to as HMG’s Strategic Aim.

- c. The size and shape of the Joint Force.
13. You are to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) to *[region/country]* in order to *[purpose of the OLRT – see Chapter 3]*.
  14. **Assumptions.** *[The strategic assumptions on which military planning is to take place]*.
  15. **Constraints, Restraints, Limitations and Freedoms.** *[To include legal, political, diplomatic, cultural, military (if known)]*.
  16. Further instructions to follow.

## EXECUTION

17. In your capacity as Jt Comd you are to....
18. **Coordinating Instructions.** *[This paragraph may be issued separately if required]*. To include:
  - a. **Legal.**
  - b. **Political/Rules of Engagement.**
  - c. **Intelligence.**
  - d. **Targeting.**
  - e. **Information Strategy.** *[Issued here or separately by the Information Strategy Group. This should include Media policy as appropriate]*.
  - f. **Force Protection.**

## RESOURCES

19. **Task Organisation.** *[If known at this stage]*.
20. **Impact on Current Commitments and Future Availability of Forces.** *[This section records the MOD HQ decision on the replenishment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) pool and adjustments in readiness of remaining JRRF elements available in the pool]*.

## LOGISTICS

21. **Statement of Logistic Capability.** *[To state any sustainment and training requirements, and provide indication of the availability of critical assets (if known)]*.

**COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

22. **Command.** The Jt Comd is to exercise command from Permanent Joint Headquarters *[or other designated headquarters]*.
23. **Codeword.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET.
24. **Signals.** All message traffic on Op [\*\*\*\*] is to bear the SIC [XXX], in addition to subject SICs.

**REPORTING**

25. An executive summary of the Military Strategic Estimate and proposed Strategic options is to be submitted by [\*\*\*\*].

DTG Z

Chief of the Defence Staff

[Original Signed]

Authenticated  
DOps

## **ANNEX 2C – REPRESENTATIVE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF’S DIRECTIVE**

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S  
GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE  
PERMISSION OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CDS No/Year

Copy No.....of.....Copies

**This template (updated 3 June 2008) is for guidance only; deviations, where appropriate, are permitted.**

**The CDS Directive No. is obtained from the CDS-Desk Clk1 (Ext 87690)**

**The final document for CDS signature should be in Arial – Font 12. Acronyms are to be avoided as this document is circulated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.**

**Formats and font size for Signals should be as required by the signal software.**

**Experience has shown that, when drafting a Directive, it is often better to draft as per SD and then convert to Signal Format.**

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**

**CDS [OPERATIONAL] DIRECTIVE [CAT 1, 2 OR 3] [TO] FOR [SUBJECT]  
OPERATION [NAME]**

**[A very short abstract paragraph outlining the scope of the Directive to be drafted by the author. This is used by the registry for filing purposes].**

Signature Block  
COSSEC – ASec(Cts)  
for SECCOS  
MOD HQ, Floor 5, Zone F  
82019MB  
DII: COSSEC ASEC (CTS)

Ministry of Defence  
WHITEHALL  
SW1A 2HB  
Date: DD/MM/YY

CDS No/Yr

## DIRECTIVE TO BE COMPLETED THROUGH PARALLEL STAFFING CHAIN TO 3 STAR LEVEL

**For Operational Directives this is normally through CJO and DCDS (Ops) chains of Command. The process culminates when DCDS (Ops)-MA2 forwards the Directive to SECCOS for approval. Until the draft leaves DCDS (Ops)-MA2 – or equivalent – the document is being drafted for the appropriate 3 Star’s approval. On leaving the 3 Star’s office, the Directive is ‘confirmed ready in all respects for signature by CDS’.**

*This template is illustrative – the author may alter sub-paragraph headings as required however the order of the paragraph headings should be maintained to ensure a logical flow. Where headings are inappropriate or not required, they should be omitted.*

*In order to generate tempo for an immediate response to short notice crises, it may be recommended to CDS, through DOps, that a number of paragraphs or annexes are deferred until a later date. This will be initiated by the DJC CCT leader in consultation with the Joint Commander.*

### CDS [OPERATIONAL] DIRECTIVE [CAT 1,2or3] [TO] FOR [SUBJECT] OPERATION [NAME]

References:

A. *[Only include References referred to within main body]*

#### GENERAL

1. **Review and Responsibility.** This Directive supersedes [previous Directive] and gives my direction to you, [the Joint Commander (Jt Comd)/as required], for planning the UK’s future military commitment [to / in ...]. This Directive will be reviewed by [Author] no later than [Date].<sup>1</sup>

2. **Appointment.** *[Nomination of Jt Comd and broad illustration of responsibilities. Example: You are appointed Jt Comd for Op xx and you are to exercise Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned to the operation from Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Northwood. Within your area of responsibility (AOR), you are responsible to me for the conduct of operations of all*

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<sup>1</sup> The Review Date will be retained against the Directive for monitoring purposes by COSSEC / CDS Registry, but it is the responsibility of the author to review the document and to propose any changes/updates required. The author may also propose the directive to be cancelled.

*assigned UK naval, land, and air forces, including their intelligence, logistics, communications, administrative, and medical support].*

3. **Direction.** I shall provide strategic direction for operations through Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)) *[or alternative commander]*.
4. **Task Organisation.** UK forces assigned to this operation are detailed at Annex xx. Any recommendations for proposed change should be made to MOD where appropriate.
5. **Military Options.**
6. **Consultation and Management of Expectation.**

## CURRENT SITUATION

*[A brief description of nature of the problem and what has been/is currently being done in mitigation. This section is often broken into political and operational paragraphs but could be broken down into sub-headings of background and current situation, if required].*

7. **Political.**
8. **Military.**
9. **Humanitarian.**

## HMG's STRATEGIC AIM

7. *[National intent and position as articulated by Cabinet Office in consultation with Other Government Departments (OGDs)]*

## HMG'S OBJECTIVES

8. HMG's objectives are as follows:
  - a. **Political Objectives.**
  - b. **Military Strategic Objectives.** *[Derived from National Strategic Objectives, these Objectives define criteria for success – their successful achievement indicates the Military Strategic End-State].*

## CDS INTENT

My intent is to *[This is the part in which CDS will take the greatest interest, therefore it must accurately reflect what the military is expected to have to achieve.*

- *It should be succinct, clear and offer subordinates an understanding of their role to enable them to achieve his intent.*
- *It must reflect military-strategic level intent avoiding, where possible, operational and tactical level direction, be in effects based language and incorporate the comprehensive approach if required.*
- *With directives dealing with major campaigns there may be benefit in articulating intent through a CDS' Military Strategy paragraph, which should include Intent, Approach and Main Effort.*

## **EXECUTION**

10. *[This specifies the detailed effects to be achieved by the Jt Comd and subordinate commands as appropriate. The Strategic Planning Directive and Summary of Options from the military strategic estimate will form the basis for this paragraph and should reflect the mission statement and tasks generated by the Jt Comd].*

## **CONSTRAINTS and/or ASSUMPTIONS**

11. The following are additional constraints:
- a. Joint Area of Operations.
  - b. International and Domestic Law.
  - c. *[as required]- could include: Detention, Other Operations, Political*

## **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

12. The following instructions apply:
- a. Rules of Engagement (ROE).
  - b. Intelligence and Security.
  - c. Information Strategy.
  - d. Media Operations and *or Incident News Management.*
  - e. Training.
  - f. Force Protection (FP).
  - g. UK Special Forces (SF).

## SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

13. *[Detail should be kept to a minimum and if necessary reflected in the appropriate Annex]. Headings might include:*

- a. Logistic Planning – Logistic Governance – Sustainability.
- b. Movement.
- c. Medical.
- d. Financial Accounting and Host Nation Support.
- e. Welfare and Personnel.
- f. Management of Casualties.
- g. Repatriation of the Dead.
- h. Welfare and Personnel.

## COMMAND AND SIGNAL

14. The following arrangements will apply: *[Layout below is illustrative and could be used for a multinational operation]*

- a. **Relationships.**
  - (1) **National.**
    - (a) **Strategic.**
    - (b) **Operational.**
  - (2) **NATO/EU/UN.**
- b. **Command and Control.**
  - (1) **National Command.** All UK forces remain under national command.
  - (2) **Full Command.** CINCS retain Full Command of all forces assigned. Director Special Forces (DSF) retains Full Command of all assigned SF.
  - (3) **Operational Command.** You are to exercise OPCOM of UK assigned naval, land, and air forces.



- (4) **Operational Control.** You may delegate Operational Control (OPCON) of UK assigned forces in Theatre to the Joint Force Commander (JFC), once the JFHQ is established. OPCON of submarines will remain with CTF311. OPCON of SF forces will remain with DSF unless D Ops directs otherwise.
- c. **Signals.** All message traffic on OP XX is to bear the SIC XXX/XXX in addition to subject SICs.
- d. **Information Management Plan.** DII(HO) is the MODUK Information System (IS) of choice for the transfer, publishing and filing of strategic information up to UK SECRET. Documents will be published by the Current Commitments Team (CCT), Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) or PJHQ on the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) website under OP XX using the team site hosted on DII.
- e. **Communications Security (COMSEC) / Computer Security (COMPUSEC).**

## REPORTING

15. *[Reflect strategic and military strategic battle rhythm requirements: example - until further notice; you are to keep MODUK HQ informed by Daily Brief at 0600z.]*

## CODEWORD

16. The codeword for [subject] is [Op Name] in response to. Its meaning is [CLASSIFICATION].

Day/Month/Year  
CDS No/Yr

Chief of the Defence Staff

## Annexes:

*[Example only - Requirement to be determined by the author – list below is illustrative]*

- A. Task Organisation
- B. ROE
- C. Intelligence
- D. Targeting
- E. Info Ops
- F. Media Ops
- G. Logistics
- H. CIS
- I. SF
- J. Personnel and Administration
- K. Medical
- L. Communications and Information Systems
- M. Strategic Movement
- N. JIC Assessment

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# ANNEX 2D – REPRESENTATIVE JOINT COMMANDER’S MISSION DIRECTIVE

## THE JOINT COMMANDER’S MISSION DIRECTIVE

**ISSUED BY:** [*The Joint Commander (Jt Comd)*]

**ISSUED TO:** [*The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), National Contingent Commander (NCC), or other subordinate commander as appropriate*]

**AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER DIRECTIVES TO:** [*Reference to other extant Directives to subordinate commanders within the same Joint Operations Area*]

References:

### SITUATION

1. [Describes the generic circumstances leading to the requirement for the operation including:]
2. **The Legal Basis for Operation \*\*.**
3. **Operational Situation.**
4. **Her Majesty’s Government’s Strategy.**
  - a. Strategic End-state.
  - b. Political Objectives.
5. **Coalition Strategy.**
  - a. Coalition Strategy.
  - b. Coalition Strategic Centre of Gravity.
6. **UK’s Military Strategy.**
  - a. **Chief of Defence Staff’s Intent.**

### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

[*Chapter 3 provides further guidance on the articulation of a Concept of Operations. As described in Chapter 2, Section II, the Jt Comd may provide an outline concept for the deployment, sustainment and recovery (DSR) of a Joint Task Force (JTF), or more detailed instructions as appropriate*].

7. **Joint Commander's Intent.**
8. **Joint Commander's Interim Operational End-state.**
9. **Joint Commander's Operational End-state.**
10. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** [*As appropriate, covering DSR*].
11. **Main Effort.**
12. **Policy Context.** [*The Concept of Operations will be directed by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) within a developing policy context articulated by MOD UK through*]:
  - a. Strategic Guidance.
  - b. Engagement with the other nations' governments [*as required*].
  - c. Engagement with UK Other Government Departments.
  - d. Engagement with a Coalition Chain of Command
  - e. Strategic Presentation.

## **MISSION**

13. [*A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose*].

## **SPECIFIED TASKS**

14. [*Listed by Component Commander*].
15. **Command of Forces Assigned.** [*The UK command and control architecture is described here with the detail usually reflected in an Annex, with forces assigned listed in the Theatre Reference Document (TRD)*].

## **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

16. **Operational Timings.**
17. **Intelligence.** [*Chief of Defence Intelligence will retain overall direction for Defence Intelligence. Specific instructions are contained in the TRD*]
18. **Information Strategy.** [*Adheres to UK Information Strategy and covers Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Media Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation*].
19. **Force Protection.** [*Direction at Annex D*].

20. **Rules of Engagement and Targeting Directives.** [*Guidance at Annex D*].
21. **Financial Accounting and Policy Advice.** [*Financial accounting instructions and policy advice are detailed in the TRD*].
22. **Detainees and Prisoners.** [*Direction at Annex D*].
23. **Deployment of Civilians.** [*Details of all civilians and MOD employees deploying on Operations are passed to PJHQ. Instructions for deployed contractors are contained in the TRD*].
24. **Status of Forces.** [*Reference to legal status is governed by the Annex to relevant United Nations Special Representatives*].
25. **Lessons Identified.** [*As directed by PJHQ SOP 7033*].
26. **Media.** [*Contained in the TRD*].

## LOGISTICS

27. **Logistic Direction.** [*Contained in the TRD*].
28. **Personnel.** [*Personnel issues are contained in the TRD*].
29. **Medical.** [*Medical instructions for UK forces deployed are contained in the TRD*].
30. **Visitors.** [*Theatre visits policy*].

## UK COMMAND AND CONTROL

31. **Command and Control.** [*UK command relationships are shown at Annex B, with tabulated command relationships at Annex C. This paragraph will specify the supported command*].
  - a. **National Command.** [*All forces remain under national command or otherwise as determined here*]
  - b. **Full Command.** [*Commanders-in-Chiefs retain full command of UK assigned forces*].
  - c. **Coalition Management.** [*PJHQ, working within MODUK's policy direction, has the responsibility for operational liaison with national capitals on Coalition force levels and operational matters*].

- d. **Maritime Forces.** [*Outlines the promulgation method for changes of OPCOM of Maritime forces between CINCFLEET and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)*].
  - e. **Senior British Military Representative.** [*OPCOM CJO or as otherwise directed in CDS' Directive*].
- 32. **COMBRITFOR.** [*Nominated here*].
  - 33. **National Veto.** [*CJO's direction on national veto policy*].
  - 34. **Liaison.** [*Assigns a coordinating authority and guidance for matters that cannot be resolved in theatre*].
  - 35. **Reporting.** [*Timing and issues of importance requiring report*].
    - a. **Routine Reporting:**
    - b. **Incident Reporting.**
    - c. **Post-Operation Reporting.** [*Including the requirement to capture lessons*].
  - 36. **Codeword/SIC.** [*The codeword is usually RESTRICTED; however its meaning is SECRET*].
  - 37. **Communications and Information Systems Plan.** [*Outlines the responsibilities for UK national and Coalition Communications and Information Systems*].
  - 38. **Information Management.** [*Details the requirements to keep records. Specific Information Management instructions are contained in the TRD*].

Jt Comd [Name].

Date

Annexes:

- A. Legal Basis for Op \*\*.
- B. Op \*\* - UK National C2.
- C. UK Command State Table.
- D. Supplementary Coordinating Instructions.


Enclosures:

- 1. Op \*\* Theatre Reference Document.

## ANNEX 2E – CENTRES OF GRAVITY

### Types of Operational Level Centres of Gravity

2E1. At the strategic level, a Centre of Gravity (CoG) is often an abstraction such as the cohesion of an alliance; at the tactical level, it is usually a capability or strength that can be affected through defined engagements over limited time-scales. Identifying an operational level CoG depends on the context, circumstances and anticipated military activity. Even where there is no obvious single CoG, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) may still find the concept useful to ensure that he remains focused, in potentially complex and multifaceted crises, on what is *militarily* important to the desired outcome.



**Figure 2E.1 – Types of Operational Level CoG**

- a. **Bipolar Centres of Gravity.** Each side engaged in a bi-polar conflict should identify, and then attack and protect respectively, their enemy's CoG and their own. Force is then applied offensively against an opponent's vulnerabilities (in order to undermine his CoG, restrict his freedom of action



and frustrate his aims) and defensively (to safeguard one's own CoG against reciprocal attack).

b. **Multiple Centres of Gravity.** In other situations, there may be no simple bi-polar construct. The identification and analysis of CoGs may nonetheless help a JFC to understand the critical aspects of the situation, most notably the characteristics of key actors.

c. **Non-Opponent Centres of Gravity.** In situations where there is no particular enemy, and no obvious value to be gained by focusing effort on any one actor, a more abstract CoG may be useful. For example, during peace support operations where a range of belligerents may be fighting each other, defeat of one or more of them may not be appropriate. Similarly, during disaster relief operations in an otherwise benign environment, there may simply not be a discernible CoG.

d. **Focal Centres of Gravity.** In particularly complex situations, involving a multitude of actors engaged in a hybrid of major combat, security operations to enable stabilisation, and other peace support activity, a JFC may seek to encapsulate as a CoG either:

- (1) The most significant factor preventing him from reaching his end-state.
- (2) One that appears predominant amongst (or common to all) other participants in promoting their own antithetical aims.

This may prove a useful focal point for his subsequent planning.

### Centre of Gravity Analysis

2E2. Analysis indicates, in relation to a particular CoG: its ability to do something important (capability(ies)); what its effectiveness or strength depends upon (requirements); and through what its strength may be neutralised (vulnerabilities).

a. **Critical (Cap)ability.** Critical capabilities (or abilities) indicate what an actor can do by dint of the CoG. It may, for example, provide an opponent with the ability to defeat our defences or block our attack. Alternatively, it may be the most important factor in gaining influence, such as political primacy or control of wealth distribution.

b. **Critical Requirements.** Critical requirements are those resources, facilities, or competencies required to generate or apply critical (cap)ability.

- c. **Critical Vulnerabilities.** Critical vulnerabilities indicate potential ways of defeating a CoG by interrupting or denying critical requirements, or alternatively undermining the application or efficacy of critical capabilities.

<b>CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX</b>	
<p><b>1 – CENTRE OF GRAVITY</b>  <i>A characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, alliance, military force or civil/militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight.</i></p>	<p><b>2 – CRITICAL (CAP)ABILITIES</b>  <i>What does the CoG allow the nation, alliance, military force or civil/militia grouping to do? Is it providing freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or the will to fight?</i></p>
<p><b>4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</b>  <i>What are the weaknesses related to the essential conditions, resources, means, characteristic(s), capability(ies), or influence(s) through which the CoG may be neutralised or influenced?</i></p>	<p><b>3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS</b>  <i>What does it need to be effective as a CoG – essential conditions, resources, means, characteristic(s), or influence(s)?</i></p>
<p><i><b>Opponent CoG</b> – exploit critical vulnerabilities</i>  <i><b>Friendly CoG</b> – satisfy critical requirements; protect critical vulnerabilities</i>  <i><b>Focal CoG</b> – influence decisively</i></p>	

**Table 2E.2 – CoG Analysis Matrix**

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## APPENDIX 2E1 – EXAMPLES OF CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS

2E1. **Example 1.** Country ‘A’ has invaded friendly Island ‘B’. Country ‘A’ has a strong navy, which is identified as its key strength and Centre of Gravity (CoG). What makes the navy Country ‘A’s’ CoG is its ability to control sea lines of communication (LoC), and therefore prevent Island ‘B’s’ liberation: this is Country ‘A’s’ critical capability. However, in order to operate effectively, Country ‘A’ needs to retain ports for shelter, logistics and repair: a critical requirement. A critical vulnerability of the ports is their susceptibility to attack. In short Country ‘A’s’ CoG is its navy (key strength) and the way of neutralising their CoG is to attack the ports, which are vulnerable to such attack (key weakness).

<b>CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX</b>	
<b>1 – COUNTRY ‘A’ CENTRE OF GRAVITY</b>	<b>2 – CRITICAL (CAP)ABILITIES</b>
The Navy.	Dominate sea LoC of Island ‘B’ and therefore resist the liberation of this island by friendly forces.
<b>4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</b>	<b>3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS</b>
Vulnerability of ports to attack.	Retain ports for shelter, logistics and repair.


**Table 2E1.1 – Analysis Matrix for an Opponent’s CoG**

2E2. **Example 2.** Country ‘X’ is at the point of civil war, and joint forces are to intervene to restore stability. The ability to govern is identified as something over which most influence must be exercised, and is therefore a CoG. This may be the only means to regain control of the country and ensure lasting peace: the critical capability. It requires a secure environment, accountable governing structures and representative political processes, all underpinned by sustainable and equitable economic growth: critical requirements. The critical vulnerabilities are the threat of inter-faction violence; immaturity of current governing structures; potential that the political process could collapse; economic imbalance across the country.

<b>CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX</b>	
<b>1 – COUNTRY ‘X’ CENTRE OF GRAVITY</b>	<b>2 – CRITICAL (CAP) ABILITIES</b>
The ability to govern.	Provides a means to regain control of the country and ensure a lasting peace rather than simply a cessation to current violence.
<b>4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</b>	<b>3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS</b>
The continuing threat of inter-faction violence, the immaturity of current governing structures, the potential for collapse of the political process and the economic imbalance across the country.	A secure environment, accountable governing structures and representative political processes all underpinned by sustainable and equitable economic growth.

**Table 2E1.2 – Analysis Matrix for a Focal CoG**

# ANNEX 2F – OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES



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## APPENDIX 2F1 – EXAMPLE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

### THREE-COLUMN FORMAT

Factor	Deduction	Output
Oilfields on Island 'Y' provide main source of economic wealth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Must capture/retake the oilfields intact – oilfields must not be 'blown'</li> </ul>	<p><b>Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)</b> Enemy presence on/around oilfields? What are the enemy intentions on the oilfields in the event of an attack? How could I mitigate the risk of oil-wells being 'blown'?</p> <p><b>Planning Guidance (PG)</b> Look at planning options to retake the oilfields intact?</p> <p><b>Supporting Effect (SE)</b> Oilfields secured</p> <p><b>Risk (Ri)</b> Toxic hazard from burning oil-well</p>
Known threat from a subversive group (YLP) sympathetic to 'X' Country's intent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential irregular activity (IA) threat</li> </ul>	<p><b>CCIR</b> Is there a militant wing to the YLP? If so, what are their intents and capabilities?</p> <p><b>SE</b> Threat from YLP diminished</p>
Country 'X' has known strategic and operational reserves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Democratic / political stability must rapidly follow military intervention</li> </ul>	<p><b>CCIR</b> What reserve forces? – at what readiness? – where (back in Country 'X')?</p> <p><b>Clarification (CLR)</b> Extent of the Joint Operations Area (JOA)?</p> <p><b>Focused Question (FQ)</b> How might I mitigate the potential for Country 'X' to deploy its reserve?</p>
Majority of roads across the island are impassable to vehicles over 1 ton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Movement restricted to Support Helicopters (SH) and foot</li> <li>Logistics Supported (distribution) reliant on SH</li> </ul>	<p><b>Constraint (C)</b> Mobility, and firepower, rely on SH and air</p> <p><b>Limitation (L)</b> Sustaining combat supplies for the Logistics Component Commander (LCC) likely to be key factor throughout early phases</p>



Factor	Deduction	Output
'X' Land Forces dominate major ports and airfields	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Presents difficulties in establishing a point of entry for ground forces</li> </ul>	<p><b>CCIR</b> What are the enemy's strengths and dispositions around the ports and airfields?</p> <p><b>FQ</b> Where is the enemy vulnerable across Island Y's ports and airfields? Where might he be attacked in order to establish a point of entry for joint forces?</p>
Killing of President 'Y' – no obvious party nor leader to fill vacuum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military activity to remove threat from 'X' conventional forces may be succeeded by political, and perhaps tribal, power struggle – threat to longer term stability</li> </ul>	<p><b>CLR</b> What diplomatic efforts are planned to address the political stability on Island 'Y'?</p> <p><b>Restraint (R)</b> Initial military engagement in governance</p> <p><b>Decisive Condition (DC)</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated</p>
'X' Land Forces are light and airmobile – equipped with large number of SH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SH are the enemy's potential Centre of Gravity (CoG)</li> </ul>	<p><b>PG</b> Conduct CoG Analysis on 'X' SH</p>
Country 'X' backed by neighbouring nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Both diplomatic and, potentially, military threat that will reassure Country 'X'</li> </ul>	<p><b>Ri</b> Military intervention from neighbouring 'other' nations</p> <p><b>SE</b> Guard against military intervention from neighbouring 'other' nations</p> <p><b>CLR</b> Rules of Engagement against 'other' nations</p>
'X' naval forces have notable naval gunfire support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Threat to own ground forces operating across the island</li> </ul>	<p><b>SE</b> Early control of the seas around Island 'Y'</p>
Notable disruptions to key infrastructure – particularly water and power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Winning consent, and mitigating impact of political power vacuum, will be reliant on limited, yet effective, military reconstruction activities</li> </ul>	<p><b>DC</b> Potable water provided and electric power restored</p> <p><b>CCIR</b> Where is key infrastructure relating to water and power?</p> <p><b>FQ</b> What resources are required to conduct reconstruction on power and water?</p>

## APPENDIX 2F2 – EXAMPLE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE COURSE OF ACTION FORMATS

### Option 1

Step 4 – Develop and Validate Courses of Actions	
<p><b>Course of Action (No/Name):</b></p>	<p><b>DCs/SEs (as appropriate to aspect of Campaign covered by Course of Action):</b></p>
<p><b>Mission(s):</b></p>	<p><b>Other CPCs (phase, etc):</b></p>
<p><b>Concept of Operations</b></p> <p><b>Intent:</b></p> <p><b>Scheme of Manoeuvre:</b></p>	<p><b>Joint Action</b></p> <p><b>Fires:</b></p> <p><b>Manoeuvre:</b></p> <p><b>Influence Activities:</b></p>
<p><b>Main Effort:</b></p>	<p><b>Supported/Supporting Commanders:</b></p>
	<p><b>Logistic/Deployment Concept:</b></p> <p><b>Operational Reserve:</b></p>

**Option 2**

Step 4 – Develop and Validate Courses of Actions					
Campaign End-State:  Mission:	Strategic Risks:	Object Op CoG	Critical Capabilities	Own Op CoG	Critical Capabilities
Concept of Operations  Intent:  Scheme of Manoeuvre:	Operational Risks:	Critical Requirements	Critical Vulnerabilities	Critical Requirements	Critical Vulnerabilities
Main Effort:	Deployment Concept:	Deception Plan:	CoA MOEs:		Staff Validation Check:
Logistic Concept:	Force Levels:	Op Reserve:	Spare:		Feasibility:  Acceptability:  Completeness:  Exclusivity:  Suitability:

## APPENDIX 2F3 – EXAMPLE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE COMPARATIVE FORMAT

<b>Step 5 - Evaluate Courses of Actions</b>			
<b>Comparative Criteria</b>	<b>Course of Action (No/Name)</b>	<b>Course of Action (No/Name)</b>	<b>Course of Action (No/Name)</b>
Comparative Criteria 1			
Comparative Criteria 2			
Comparative Criteria 3			
Comparative Criteria 4			
Comparative Criteria 5			

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## ANNEX 2G – SCHEMATICS/TABLES/MATRICES


### Introduction

2G1. Throughout the planning process, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his staff need to clearly communicate and comprehend intent and scheme of manoeuvre (both in Course of Action (CoA) development and for the selected plan). There are a number of tools and techniques, many using the campaign planning concepts, that offer effective ways to present aspects of a CoA or plan.

- a. A common set of campaign planning concept **symbols**, for use in schematics, is an essential aid to understanding – Appendix 2G1.
- b. Various options for drawing up **campaign schematics**, describing the CoA (or plan) through a series of decisive conditions that will achieve the campaign objectives (and hence the campaign end-state), are offered at Appendix 2G2.
- c. Analysis of decisive conditions lead to the supporting effects necessary to create them. **Decisive condition/supporting effect tables**, an example of which is at Appendix 2G3, provide a useful means of depicting these relationships and visualising the contribution required, by both the joint force and other non-military organisations.
- d. Supporting effects are an important part of the planning process and the development of CoAs; they also form the foundation of a JFC's Scheme of Manoeuvre included within Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs). One or more **effects schematics** are a useful technique to describe, by time and/or space, the intended effects – Appendix 2G4.
- e. A vital yet complex part of the planning process is the identification of activities that will support the achievement of each supporting effect. The use of **Joint Action tables**, to determine the range of activities across the joint force and, where appropriate, by multiple agencies to meet each supporting effect not only captures the extent of the effort required; it also stimulates alternative activities and is key to the early identification of risk. An example Joint Action table is at Appendix 2G5.
- f. Clarification of intended activities is aided through the use of **Joint Action schematics** to describe one particular aspect of the CoA (or OPLAN/OPORD) – see Appendix 2G6.
- g. Synchronising activities is key to mission success. The Joint Action table will drive the development of Joint Action synchronisation matrices – see Appendix 2G7.

2G2. Any single schematic, table or matrix can only communicate a finite amount of information. A combination of several of the tools and techniques listed above, and described in greater detail at the appendices to this annex, may be necessary to convey the complete picture of what might be planned. These tools and techniques are not prescriptive; selection and adaptation of one or more to best suit the context, and predominant types of military activity, faced by a JFC is encouraged.

# APPENDIX 2G1 – CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS – SYMBOLS





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## APPENDIX 2G2 – CAMPAIGN SCHEMATICS


2G2.1. The campaign planning concepts provide a ‘toolset’ from which campaigns can be planned and communicated. Whilst there is an agreed and defined set of campaign planning concepts, there is no similarly finite rule to campaign schematics. A campaign schematic is used to aid better understanding in the planning and execution of a campaign. It is of use to a Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the development and expression of his operational or campaign big ideas. It is of use to the staff in transforming operational ideas into viable Courses of Action (CoAs). Finally it is of use in the monitoring and review of campaign progression. Hence, its utility extends across operational design and operational management.

2G2.2. Creativity in the use of campaign schematics is encouraged and variations will emerge dependent upon the nature of the crisis and the personal preferences of key commanders and staff. This Appendix provides a number of examples of campaign schematics. They serve to offer alternative options and to stimulate the development of schematics best suited to a particular set of circumstances.

- Schematic Option 1 – Lines of Operation/Bi-Polar Centres of Gravity (CoGs)
- Schematic Option 2 – Groupings of Operation/Bi-Polar CoGs
- Schematic Option 3 – Lines of Operation/Focal CoG
- Schematic Option 4 – Lines/Groupings of Operation/Focal CoG
- Schematic Option 5 – Groupings of Operation/Focal CoG


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### Option 1 – Lines of Operation/Bi-Polar CoGs




Campaign End-State The Withdrawal of Country 'X' Invading Force from Island 'Y' and the Re-Establishment of 'Y' Host Nation Authority			
Campaign Objective A	Campaign Objective B	Campaign Objective C	Campaign Objective D
Defeat 'X' Conventional Forces	Secure 'X' Withdrawal	Restore Essential Services	Re-Establish HN ('Y') Authority
<b>Dc1</b> 'X' C2 Neutralised <b>Dc2</b> Air Superiority Gained <b>Dc3</b> Seas Denied <b>Dc4</b> 'X' Land Forces Defeated	<b>Dc5</b> Air Control Established <b>Dc6</b> 'X' Land Forces Repatriated	<b>Dc7</b> Potable Water Provided <b>Dc8</b> Electric Power Restored	<b>Dc9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted <b>Dc10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated

**Option 2 – Groupings of Operation/Bi-Polar CoGs**




<b>Campaign End-State</b> The Withdrawal of Country 'X' Invading Force from Island 'Y' and the Re-Establishment of 'Y' Host Nation Authority			
<b>Campaign Objective A</b> Defeat 'X' Conventional Forces	<b>Campaign Objective B</b> Secure 'X' Withdrawal	<b>Campaign Objective C</b> Restore Essential Services	<b>Campaign Objective D</b> Re-Establish HN ('Y') Authority
<b>Dc1</b> 'X' C2 Neutralised <b>DC2</b> Air Superiority Gained <b>DC3</b> Seas Denied <b>DC4</b> 'X' Land Forces Defeated	<b>DC5</b> Air Control Established <b>DC6</b> 'X' Land Forces Repatriated	<b>DC7</b> Potable Water Provided <b>DC8</b> Electric Power Restored	<b>DC9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted <b>DC10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated

### Option 3 – Lines of Operation/Focal CoG




Campaign End-State		
Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country 'X' to generate mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance		
Campaign Objective A	Campaign Objective B	Campaign Objective C
Provide Security across County 'X'	Establish Governance across Country 'X'	Restore Country 'X' Infrastructure
<b>DC1</b> Secure Environment Maintained <b>DC2</b> Self-Sustaining Security Established	<b>DC3</b> Interim Governance Provided <b>DC4</b> Self-Governance Established <b>DC5</b> Electoral Process Reformed <b>DC6</b> Elected Government Empowered	<b>DC7</b> Key Infrastructure Restored <b>DC8</b> Sustainable Infrastructure Established

### Option 4 – Lines/Groupings of Operation – Focal CoG



**Option 5 – Groupings of Operation/Focal CoG**




Campaign End-State		
Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country 'X' to generate mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance		
Campaign Objective A	Campaign Objective B	Campaign Objective C
Provide Security across Country 'X'	Establish Governance across Country 'X'	Restore Country 'X' Infrastructure
<b>DC1</b> Secure Environment Maintained <b>DC2</b> Self-Sustaining Security Established	<b>DC3</b> Interim Governance Provided <b>DC4</b> Self-Governance Established <b>DC5</b> Electoral Process Reformed <b>DC6</b> Elected Government Empowered	<b>DC7</b> Key Infrastructure Restored <b>DC8</b> Sustainable Infrastructure Established



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## APPENDIX 2G3 – DECISIVE CONDITIONS/SUPPORTING EFFECTS TABLES

### OPTION 1 – SUMMARISED TABLES


<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 Neutralised	<b>SE 1.1</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised	<b>SE 1.2</b> Key 'X' Communication Nodes Destroyed	<b>SE 1.3</b> 'X' Radar/Early Warning Nodes Destroyed	<b>SE 1.4</b> 'X' Operational Level C2 Nodes Destroyed	
<b>DC 2</b> Air Superiority Gained	<b>SE 2.1</b> 'X' Airfields Denied	<b>SE 2.2</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised	<b>SE 2.3</b> Air Policing Established	<b>SE 2.4</b> Own Airfields Protected	
<b>DC 3</b> Seas Denied	<b>SE 3.1</b> 'X' Ports Blockaded	<b>SE 3.2</b> Sea Control Established	<b>SE 3.3</b> Own SLOCs Protected		
<b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land Forces Defeated	<b>SE4.1</b> 'X' ISTAR Destroyed	<b>SE4.2</b> 'X' Lt Bde Contained	<b>SE4.3</b> 'Y' Capital City Seized	<b>SE4.4</b> <i>Amphibious Assault 'Y' Capital Port</i>	<b>SE4.5</b> <i>Interdict 'X' LOCs</i>
<b>DC 5</b> Air Control Established	<b>SE 5.1</b> Air Policing Maintained	<b>SE 5.2</b> Air Space Control Measures Established	<b>SE 5.3</b> Own Airfields Protected	 <p><b>SEs related to dormant CONPLANS</b></p>	
<b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land Forces Repatriated	<b>SE 6.1</b> 'X' Land Forces Disarmed	<b>SE 6.2</b> 'X' Land Forces Redeployed			
<b>DC 7</b> Potable Water Provided	<b>SE 7.1</b> Sufficient Water Sourced	<b>SE 7.2</b> Filtration Systems Established	<b>SE 7.3</b> Appropriate Water Storage Established	<b>SE 7.4</b> Water Distribution System Established	
<b>DC 8</b> Electric Power Restored	<b>SE 8.1</b> Sufficient Electric Power Generated	<b>SE 8.2</b> Electricity Grid Storage Established	<b>SE 8.3</b> Power Distribution Established		
<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted	<b>SE 9.1</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Regrouped	<b>SE 9.2</b> 'Y' Police Force Regrouped	<b>SE 9.3</b> C2 of Armed Forces and Police Re-Established	<b>SE 9.4</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Equipped and Trained	<b>SE 9.5</b> 'Y' Police Force Equipped and Trained
<b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated	<b>SE 10.1</b> 'Y' Ministries Empowered	<b>SE 10.2</b> 'Y' Presidency Regained	<b>SE 10.3</b> 'Y' Democratic Process Re-Established	<b>SE 10.4</b> International Community Re-Engaged	

Joint Force Only    
  Joint Force Supported / OGD Supporting    
  OGD Only    
  OGD Supported / Joint Force Supporting

**OPTION 2 – SEs SEQUENCED OVER PHASES**

<b>DC</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>Phase 1 - Shape</b>	<b>Phase 2 - Attack</b>	<b>Phase 3 - Transition</b>
<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 Neutralised	<b>SE1.1</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised			
	<b>SE1.2</b> Key 'X' Communication Nodes Destroyed			
	<b>SE1.3</b> 'X' Radar/Early Warning Nodes Destroyed			
	<b>SE1.4</b> 'X' Operational Level C2 Nodes Destroyed			
<b>DC 2</b> Air Superiority Gained	<b>SE2.1</b> 'X' Airfields Denied			
	<b>SE2.2</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised			
	<b>SE2.3</b> Air Policing Established			
	<b>SE2.4</b> Own Airfields Protected			
<b>DC 3</b> Seas Denied	<b>SE3.1</b> 'X' Ports Blockaded			
	<b>SE3.2</b> Sea Control Established			
	<b>SE3.3</b> Own SLOCs Protected			
<b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land Forces Defeated	<b>SE4.1</b> 'X' ISTAR Destroyed			
	<b>SE4.2</b> 'X' Lt Bde Contained			
	<b>SE4.3</b> 'Y' Capital City Seized			
<b>DC 5</b> Air Control Established	<b>SE5.1</b> Air Policing Maintained			
	<b>SE5.2</b> Air Space Control Measures Established			
	<b>SE5.3</b> Own Airfields Protected			
<b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land Forces Repatriated	<b>SE6.1</b> 'X' Land Forces Disarmed			
	<b>SE6.2</b> 'X' Land Forces Redeployed			
<b>DC 7</b> Running Water Restored	<b>SE7.1</b> Sufficient Water Sourced			
	<b>SE7.2</b> Filtration Systems Established			
	<b>SE7.3</b> Appropriate Water Storage Established			
	<b>SE7.4</b> Water Distribution System Established			
<b>DC 8</b> Electric Power Restored	<b>SE8.1</b> Sufficient Electric Power Generated			
	<b>SE8.2</b> Electricity Grid Storage Established			
	<b>SE8.3</b> Power Distribution Established			
<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted	<b>SE 9.1</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Regrouped			
	<b>SE 9.2</b> 'Y' Police Force Regrouped			
	<b>SE 9.3</b> C2 of Armed Force and Police Re-Established			
	<b>SE 9.4</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Equipped and Trained			
	<b>SE 9.5</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Equipped and Trained			
<b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated	<b>SE10.1</b> 'Y' Ministries Empowered			
	<b>SE10.2</b> 'Y' Presidency Regained			
	<b>SE10.3</b> 'Y' Democratic Process Re-Established			
	<b>SE10.4</b> International Community Re-Engaged			

**OPTION 3 – SUPPORTING EFFECTS SYNCHRONISED OVER TIME**




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## APPENDIX 2G4 – EFFECTS SCHEMATICS

2G4.1. Supporting Effects (SEs) make up a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) scheme of manoeuvre; they form the foundation of the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Effects schematics provide a useful means to visualise and communicate the scheme of manoeuvre, or at least one aspect, by time or space, of it. They can be generated throughout the planning process, in the development, evaluation and selection of Courses of Action (CoAs). They can also be included within OPLANs and Operation Orders (OPORDs) in order to aid subordinate understanding.

2G4.2. The supporting effects included on campaign schematics need not be confined to those from the physical domain; a schematic is enriched by inclusion of supporting effects to be achieved in the virtual and cognitive domains.



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## APPENDIX 2G5 – JOINT ACTION TABLE

Partially complete to demonstrate the tool and reinforce the relationship between Decisive Conditions (DCs), Supporting Effects (SEs) and activities, and the importance behind establishing supported/supporting command relationships.

Decisive Condition	Supporting Effect	Fires	Manoeuvre	Influence Activity	Supported	Supporting
<b>DC 1</b> 'X' C2 Neutralised	<b>SE1.1</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised	Conduct SEAD			JFAC	JFMC
	<b>SE1.2</b> Key 'X' Communication Nodes Destroyed					
	<b>SE1.3</b> 'X' Radar/Early Warning Nodes Destroyed					
	<b>SE1.4</b> 'X' Operational Level C2 Nodes Destroyed					
<b>DC 2</b> Air Superiority Gained	<b>SE2.1</b> 'X' Airfields Denied					
	<b>SE2.2</b> 'X' Air Defence Neutralised					
	<b>SE2.3</b> Air Policing Established					
	<b>SE2.4</b> Own Airfields Protected					
<b>DC 3</b> Seas Denied	<b>SE3.1</b> 'X' Ports Blockaded					
	<b>SE3.2</b> Sea Control Established					
	<b>SE3.3</b> Own SLOCs Protected		Interdict 'X' naval forces		JFMC	JFAC
<b>DC 4</b> 'X' Land Forces Defeated	<b>SE4.1</b> 'X' ISTAR Destroyed					
	<b>SE4.2</b> 'X' Lt Bde Contained					
	<b>SE4.3</b> 'Y' Capital City Seized			Reassure indigenous population	JFLC	JFAC
<b>DC 5</b> Air Control Established	<b>SE5.1</b> Air Policing Maintained					
	<b>SE5.2</b> Air Space Control Measures Established					
	<b>SE5.3</b> Own Airfields Protected					
<b>DC 6</b> 'X' Land Forces Repatriated	<b>SE6.1</b> 'X' Land Forces Disarmed					
	<b>SE6.2</b> 'X' Land Forces Redeployed					
<b>DC 7</b> Running Water Restored	<b>SE7.1</b> Sufficient Water Sourced		Secure key water sources		JFLC	DFID
	<b>SE7.2</b> Filtration Systems Established					
	<b>SE7.3</b> Appropriate Water Storage					




<b>Decisive Condition</b>	<b>Supporting Effect</b>	<b>Fires</b>	<b>Manoeuvre</b>	<b>Influence Activity</b>	<b>Supported</b>	<b>Supporting</b>
	Established					
	<b>SE7.4</b> Water Distribution System Established					
<b>DC 8</b> Electric Power Restored	<b>SE8.1</b> Sufficient Electric Power Generated					
	<b>SE8.2</b> Electricity Grid Storage Established					
	<b>SE8.3</b> Power Distribution Established					
<b>DC 9</b> 'Y' Armed Forces and Police Re-Asserted	<b>SE 9.1</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Regrouped					
	<b>SE 9.2</b> 'Y' Police Force Regrouped					
	<b>SE 9.3</b> C2 of Armed Force and Police Re-Established					
	<b>SE 9.4</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Equipped and Trained					
	<b>SE 9.5</b> 'Y' Armed Forces Equipped and Trained					
<b>DC 10</b> 'Y' Governing Authority Re-Instated	<b>SE10.1</b> 'Y' Ministries Empowered			Broadcast ministerial announcements	FCO	JFLC
	<b>SE10.2</b> 'Y' Presidency Regained					
	<b>SE10.3</b> 'Y' Democratic Process Re-Established					
	<b>SE10.4</b> International Community Re-Engaged					

## APPENDIX 2G6 – JOINT ACTION SCHEMATICS

2G6.1. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) uses Joint Action as a framework with which to plan, coordinate and synchronise, and then execute activities to realise supporting effects. He should exploit the full range of available capabilities, joint and multinational, and orchestrate fires, influence activities and manoeuvre together to optimise their coherent impact. He should consider, where appropriate, those multi-agency activities which, while not under his control, might be coordinated with his own military activities in order to better achieve his supporting effects. He may establish supported/supporting relationships between his Component Commanders for each effect, while delegating the maximum practicable freedom of action as to how these activities are conducted.


2G6.2. Joint Action Schematics are a useful means by which planned activities can be described and communicated. It is unlikely that a single schematic could depict the entirety of a campaign. More likely is that respective Operation Orders (OPORDs) (and associated Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs)) will use Joint Action Schematics to depict the key activities involved in a particular phase or period of a campaign.



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## APPENDIX 2G7 – JOINT ACTION SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX

Partially complete, using those limited activities derived in previous appendices, to demonstrate the tool.



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## ANNEX 2H – MILITARY RISK

2H1. JDP 01 ‘*Campaigning*’ provides a commander’s perspective on military risk, defined as ‘the probability and implications of an activity or event, of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences, taking place’. Risk indicates the *likelihood* of something going right or wrong, and the *impact*, good or bad. The potential adverse consequences of any event (or risk) are generally referred to as threats, and potentially beneficial consequences as opportunities; many events present a combination of the 2.<sup>1</sup> Risk has different implications at different levels of warfare:


a. **Strategic Risk.** Events that impact upon or change the overall strategic context may have strategic implications, *in extremis* jeopardising the achievement of desired strategic outcomes. Strategic risks are often associated with national standing, and the ability to exert influence at home and abroad. There may, for example, be an overly optimistic assessment of what the military instrument can achieve, undermining the credibility and potentially even the feasibility of (continuing) military intervention. Alternatively, any perceived lack of legitimacy may undermine political and domestic resolve, and support from the international community, including any necessary approval or cooperation from an indigenous population. Amongst partners in a coalition, any lack of cohesion – whether political or military – may also give rise to the risk of discord and, potentially, to dysfunction.

b. **Operational Risk.** Risk at the operational level is associated with the characteristic gearing between strategic objectives and tactical activity. It may manifest itself in at least 2 different ways. First, the risk may arise due to an act of campaign planning – such as the selection of an inappropriate Centre of Gravity (CoG) or decisive condition. Mis-planning of this sort may threaten a JFC’s achievement of his campaign end-state. Alternatively, creating a particular decisive condition – even an initially ill-judged one – may present an unforeseen opportunity that can be turned to a Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) advantage. Secondly, even a JFC’s best-laid plans may not preclude risk arising during campaign execution, either through external events or influences (such as a change in political circumstances) or through the performance of the joint force (which may include unexpected successes as well as unwelcome reverses). The most likely consequence of operational risk is that a JFC’s freedom of action is curtailed (or an opportunity presented for it to be exploited), thereby causing the joint force to pause or culminate (or, alternatively, to gain tempo).

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<sup>1</sup> The expression ‘risk’ will be used to encompass both threats and opportunity, unless it is relevant to distinguish between them.

c. **Tactical Risk.** Tactical risk arises from the effects of both planned activity, and other anticipated events, and the entirely unplanned and unforeseen (events of chance). That which is planned or foreseen may have both intended and unintended (foreseen and unforeseen) effects, which may be favourable or unfavourable. The former, whether intended, unintended or even unforeseen, represents opportunities to be seized. The latter, in turn, represents potential threats. Clearly some of these risks can be addressed through contingency planning, but those that are unforeseen, or arise from activities or events that are themselves unforeseen, are the most difficult to mitigate. Figure 2H.1 illustrates how activities, events and resulting effects may give rise to opportunities and threats:



**Figure 2H.1 – Tactical Risk**

d. **Linkage between Levels of Risk.** In the same way that tactical events can have strategic repercussions, and strategic decisions can have tactical implications, so too, risks at the tactical level can have consequences at both the operational and strategic levels. Those managing risk (described below) should always be cognisant of this broader perspective, when assessing likelihood, impact and ownership in particular. Indeed, it may be appropriate for strategic, operational and indeed tactical commanders to compare their assessments of risk, to identify those that are likely to cascade down the chain of command, as well as those that could percolate up.

2H2. **Risk Appetite.** Military commanders have always practised risk management in military decision-making, but their appetite for risk and their approach to it may vary widely depending on their level of training and experience. Recognising the factors that affect his own and others' perceptions of risk is an important aspect of a JFC's leadership. The perceived level of risk is often related to potential losses and

gains, and a JFC should apply his judgement to weigh, in so far as is possible, the estimated cost against the potential benefits with regards to achievement of the end-state. The right attitude of mind is important; one that sees risks not only as threats, but also as potential opportunities to be exploited. Risk analysis and management supports the taking of calculated risks, rather than gambles, while avoiding unduly cautious decision-making, and missed opportunities.

**2H3. Multinational Operations.** In multinational operations the difficulty of risk assessment is compounded as a result of the number and range of potential variables. Two common areas of risk often associated with multinational operations are:

a. **Strategic Cohesion.** Just as the UK's National Strategic Aim and Objectives are sometimes difficult to discern, so too establishing a multinational aim and associated objectives can prove challenging. Unless there is a clear collective purpose, such as provided by a NATO Article V, different national interests, domestic politics (including changes of Government), and interpretations of international propriety and obligation, are all likely to impinge. In such a dynamic strategic context, perhaps devoid of an agreed strategy, a JFC should navigate through a series of national interests and 'red cards'. Accordingly, some of the most significant risks a JFC may encounter are those associated with multinational cohesion at the strategic level.

b. **Multinational Risk Appetite.** Each nation determines how its personnel are employed, normally based upon their own acceptable levels of risk. Moreover, as the threat is unlikely to be uniform across the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and may be subject to frequent change, risk reduction and mitigation measures are unlikely to be uniform across a joint force.

**2H4. Multi-agency Operations.** While Other Government Departments (OGDs) and other civilian partners<sup>2</sup> can, and do, work in highly hazardous situations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge that a lack of security is preventing them from working effectively. Accordingly, a JFC should appreciate the risk appetite of civilian partners, determine their commitment of resources and personnel, and address as an integral part of his planning the consequences of their support being periodically or conditionally unavailable.

## **Risk Analysis and Management**

**2H5.** Military risk analysis is complementary to the operational planning process. It seeks to identify and quantify expected risks, and to pursue those that maximise the potential for military advantage without prejudicing the overall military position.


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<sup>2</sup> For example, non-military departments of multinational partners, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations.



While subordinate commanders should also conduct local reviews, ultimate responsibility for assessment and coordination of risk resides with a JFC, who dictates the overall risk posture accordingly. Risk analysis is an ongoing process, subject to continued review and adaptation in response to the constantly changing situation.

2H6. Risk analysis identifies those activities and events that may give rise to significant risk, assesses their likelihood, potential impact and ownership. Risk management implements plans and activities to reduce the possibility of the events occurring, to mitigate their consequences should they occur, and exploit the opportunities they may present. Risk analysis and management form a continuous process (Figure 2H.2), and one that cannot be addressed separately or in isolation from operational design. They are intrinsic to planning as their results lead to refinement and adjustment of the campaign plan, and to a series of indicators to be monitored and contingency plans that may be implemented, requiring ongoing operational management. Risk analysis and management techniques are described in Appendix 2H1.



**Figure 2H.2 – Risk Analysis and Management**

## APPENDIX 2H1 – RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT

2H1.1. Military planning is invariably based on the premise that things will, as a rule, go according to plan – that is to say that planned activity will have (at least) the favourable effects intended. Consequently, risk analysis and management tends to focus on the ‘what if’ things do not go to plan, or unplanned things go off, to unfavourable effect. While the rest of Appendix 2H1 addresses this aspect of risk, an equally important consideration is how best a Joint Force Commander (JFC) can capitalise upon activities or events whose effects are more favourable than anticipated. An appetite for risk is as much to do with seeing fleeting opportunities as it is about preparing for possible setbacks.

### Identify Risk

2H1.2. Risk identification generally involves recognising what could go wrong, and how it could happen, and should begin from the onset of campaign planning. All the steps of the operational estimate can be used to identify risk (see Chapter 2, Section V), however:

- a. Steps 1 (Understand the Situation) and Step 2a (Mission Analysis) may be used to identify strategic risk, and any consequent operational risks.
- b. Steps 2b (Evaluate Objects and Factors) and Step 2c (Commander’s Analysis and Guidance) may be used to identify operational and tactical risks.
- c. Further risks may also be identified during Step 3 (Formulate Potential Courses of Action (CoAs)), Step 4 (Develop and Validate CoAs) and Step 5 (Evaluate CoAs).

### Assess Risk

2H1.3. Having identified risks, the next stage is to assess them, which should be conducted in parallel with the operational estimate and especially the development of CoAs. Risk assessment seeks to understand the likelihood of the activity or event occurring, the potential severity of the outcome, and to ascertain who owns each risk (that is to say, who is impacted upon). While risks should be analysed individually, it is also important to understand their collective impact across all levels of command. For instance, an activity may be deemed to have minimal impact at the tactical level but to have significant implications at the strategic level. Even though the likelihood of its occurrence may be small, measures of mitigation should be put in place.

2H1.4. **Likelihood and Impact of Risk.** Any potential risk should be assessed, in terms of its *likelihood* and its *impact*, using all available objective and subjective methods and techniques. The importance or weighting attributed to each risk assists

the prioritisation of measures to mitigate or reduce their impact, and aids the development of potential exploitation options:

a. **Risk Matrix.** The risk of any particular event occurring may be plotted on a matrix, such as that at Figure 2H1.1, showing likelihood versus impact. An activity or event may, for example, be classified as high likelihood of occurrence, and high impact – overall, a high risk score. To aid his subsequent management, a JFC may draw his own risk tolerance line, to provide broad guidance rather than a prescriptive ‘rule’ to be followed. In particular, the acceptable threshold may need to be adjusted to the political situation or context. For example, in Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and similar operations, there may be political imperatives that require the risk to UK citizens and forces to be reduced to a greater extent than might be necessary in warfighting. However, no matter what the nature of the operation, the threshold should not be set to such an extreme that the plan itself becomes risk averse. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission; a JFC should always balance the level of acceptable risk with the context of the campaign.

Impact	Likelihood				
	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
Very High	E	E	H	H	M
High	E	H	M	M	M
Medium	H	M	M	L	L
Low	M	M	L	L	L
Very Low	M	L	L	L	L

**Risk Tolerance Line**

**Key**

**E** Extremely High Risk; Mission likely to fail.

**H** High Risk; Inability to accomplish all parts of the mission.


**M** Moderate Risk; Mission accomplishment likely but possibility of reduced capability.

**L** Low Risk; Little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission.

**Figure 2H1.1 – Risk Assessment Matrix**


b. **Probability Impact Graph.** Risk may also be plotted using a Probability Impact Graph, an example of which is at Figure 2H1.2. This builds on the matrix approach, by plotting each risk in terms of its impact and

likelihood, within environmental or thematic areas. This allows the most severe risks to be highlighted, and predictions of trends to be forecast.



**Figure 2H1.2 – Probability Impact Graph**

c. **Risks as Opportunities.** While these analytical approaches treat risk predominantly as a threat, they can also be used to better understand any opportunities that might present themselves. Each risk can be analysed both for adverse outcome, but also for the likelihood and impact of favourable advantages that might be gained. For example, weather may present a threat to friendly forces, but may present an even greater threat to potential opponents, thereby providing an opportunity to be exploited. Figure 2H1.3 illustrates one such approach, whereby each event is plotted for both the threat it could represent, as well as the opportunity it might generate, using side-by-side matrices. A JFC is likely to be particularly interested in events that present the greatest opportunity, or a threat to his plans (denoted by the triangular area).



**Figure 2H1.3 – Threats and Opportunities**

d. **Risk Analysis and Decision-Making.** The techniques described above provide a JFC with some potential frameworks for his deliberations on risk and risk taking. There are other risk models available, many software based. While a JFC is free to use any process which aids his thinking, he should be wary of placing too much stall in their outputs. As in all aspects of campaigning, it is a JFC’s skill and judgement that remains of absolute importance when decision-making in relation to risk.

2H1.5. **Ownership of Risk.** Identifying where risk consequences are likely to be felt, and the most appropriate level of ownership and management, is an important aspect of risk analysis, but not necessarily a straightforward one – even if a risk impacts most severely at one level of command, its effects may also be felt at others. A JFC should gain an understanding of the relationship between risks at the tactical, operational and strategic level, and how the impacts of each may cascade down or percolate up the chain of command. Tactical risks generally deal with the physical cost in terms of life and equipment. While these risks clearly impact upon component commanders and their subordinates, they may also have operational, or indeed strategic, implications. Under democratic systems, military operations are necessarily linked to political decisions, with a natural tendency for risk to migrate upwards, particularly in complex, multinational or multi-agency operations. Consequently, a JFC should assess whether, and to what extent, tactical risks (whether singly or compounded) could unduly constrain his freedom of action, and therefore where the ‘ownership’ of such risks best

lies. Equally, political risks – a feature of adversarial, democratic systems – are owned by the Government, but their impacts may cascade down to a JFC. He may not necessarily exercise any control of events associated with them, but they may nonetheless affect the conduct of his campaign.

## Plan for Risk

**2H1.6. Risk Reduction, Mitigation and Exploitation.** Having identified and assessed likely risks, a JFC and his staff should develop measures to reduce their likelihood, mitigate unfavourable outcomes, and exploit opportunities that may arise. This occurs throughout the operational estimate, and specifically during the formulation, development and validation of CoAs (Steps 3 and 4). Associated risks should be amongst the comparative criteria when evaluating differing CoAs (Step 5), and feature in the decision brief given to a JFC (Step 6). Operational risks should be prioritised, so that attention can be focused on mitigating the most severe first. A JFC may decide to deal with risks in a variety of ways:

- a. **Terminate.** Removing a risk entirely is always the preferred option wherever possible. Termination may be achieved by changing the plan so the risk no longer presents itself, or through treatment (see sub-paragraph b) to the point where the risk no longer represents a threat. Alternatively, the situation may change such that the risk is overtaken by events.
- b. **Treat.** Treating a risk to reduce its impact, or mitigate likely adverse outcomes, is the next best option. Balancing, or trading-off, the various constituent elements of each risk requires considerable skill on the part of a JFC, for military risk-taking can never be considered an exact science. Risks may have arisen through uncertainty, which may be reduced through the answering of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), or through the development of Indicators and Warnings to enable timely decision-making. The better the situational awareness and control of the variables, the more precisely a risk can be assessed and treated. A JFC may also direct his staff to prepare and issue contingency plans to address any consequences associated with foreseeable risk. At its most extreme, risk treatment may lead to a change in the existing plan. Risk treatment should always consider the opportunities to be exploited by any risk situation.
- c. **Tolerate.** Provided a risk falls below his personal tolerance line (see Figure 2H1.1), a JFC may decide to tolerate it without attempting treatment, by changing plans or re-directing resources.
- d. **Transfer.** Where a risk cannot be treated, and a JFC is unwilling to tolerate it, he may seek to transfer the risk up the chain of command, or sideways to partners; both require considerable negotiation.

**Manage Risk**

2H1.7. Once a CoA has been selected for development into a plan (Step 6), risk mitigation options are further refined to a point where they may be managed effectively during the campaign. Each risk should be articulated clearly in the operational staffwork (directives, plans, and orders). It is essential that ownership, potential impacts, assessed likelihood, Indicators and Warnings, and any plans to reduce, mitigate and /or exploit them, are clearly understood by subordinates. The implications and impact of each risk is likely to vary through the course of the campaign. Revisiting risk assessments and plans, included as part of campaign effectiveness assessment, is an important ongoing remit.

## ANNEX 2I – RED TEAMS, WARGAMING AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

### Introduction

2I1. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his planning staff focus on determining potential solutions to their perceived problem and developing plans to execute the selected Courses of Action (CoAs). In so doing, they should be alert to the possibility of planning becoming distorted through human and organisational fallibility. Probably most significant in this respect is ‘groupthink’, described as a ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’.<sup>1</sup> To that end, the Chief of Staff (COS) should consider nominating a separate Red Team, with responsibility for developing alternative (red) perspectives to that of the main (blue) planning team. This approach culminates in traditional wargaming, to help develop, select or refine a JFC’s CoAs. Both red teaming and wargaming are intrinsically adversarial techniques; their purpose is to deliberately pitch planners and their ideas against each other, with the objective of scrutinising planning assumptions, discovering weaknesses in the plan, and thereby improving the validity of the final campaign plan. CoA development and wargaming should also be supported by modelling techniques such as Operational Analysis (OA), wherever possible, as a means to better quantify potential outcomes.

### Red Teams

2I2. **Purpose of Red Teams.** A red team is ‘an enabled cell, discrete from the main staff, which develops opponent, neutral, and other contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived norms and assumptions of the commander and his staff’. Traditionally, red teams have represented the opponent, his tactics, doctrine and culture, and likely actions and reactions. This remains entirely apposite for major warfighting. In other types of military activity, however, consideration should be given to not only an opponent(s), but also to any other actor or group who could influence completion of a JFC’s mission.<sup>2</sup>

2I3. **Structure of Red Teams.** Accordingly, there can be no prescription regarding the exact composition of a red team, which should instead be determined on a case-by-case basis to reflect the nature of the situation. If a red team has already been established (see JDP 2-00 ‘*Intelligence*’), it should logically form the core of the red team for planning, suitably enhanced with J5 and other planning staff. As no

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
<sup>1</sup> Janis, I. J. ‘*Victims of Groupthink*’, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (1972), Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin.

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, some multinational partners employ not only red, but also, white and green teams in acknowledgment of the range of perspectives they seek to consider. The UK has retained the single title, broadened to encompass more than one view.



headquarters has a surfeit of staff, however, the COS should allocate numbers as appropriate to the perceived benefits of red teaming. Ideally, members should be dedicated to a red team and have no other staffing responsibilities, which might detract from, or conflict with, their core task. Where appropriate, a red team should draw upon any external subject matter experts affiliated to the headquarters, as well as Other Government Departments' (OGD) representatives.

2I4. **Red Team Process.** Drawing on the same analysis data as the main (blue) planning team, the red team should conduct their own red estimate in parallel with the operational estimate, and produce a discrete red plan.<sup>3</sup> Where there is more than one significant actor to consider, it could be appropriate to conduct a number of red estimates, time and resources permitting. Figure 2I.1 indicates the approximate sequencing of a red estimate, and production of a red plan, in relation to an operational estimate. As the figure implies, careful synchronisation between the 2 is essential.



**Figure 2I.1 – Sequencing of Red and Blue Planning**

<sup>3</sup> Where feasible, a red team should use opponent doctrine, and apply culturally relevant planning assumptions.

2I5. The degree of interaction between a red team and the rest of the staff needs careful management. While a red team should be aware of the general nature of a JFC's potential CoAs in order to respond to them, this should not colour their own thinking to the point where they cease to provide an independent red function. Accordingly, it is generally appropriate to coordinate the interaction of red and main planning teams at specific points in the estimate process. Thus, a red team may be called upon to offer views and question deductions during Step 1 (Understand the Situation), Step 2c (Commander's Analysis and Guidance), and Step 5 (Evaluate CoAs), as a JFC or COS deems fit. A red team should also be involved in wargaming as required from completion of Step 3 (Formulate Potential CoAs) onwards (see paragraph 2I10).

2I6. Experience has shown that a red team leader needs to execute his role with tact and sensitivity, particularly if he is less experienced than the JFC.<sup>4</sup> While there is general agreement that red teaming adds value, few enjoy the criticism, explicit or implicit, that it brings. A red team should, therefore, focus on significant issues to materially improve the JFC's planning (that is to say that a red perspective is not an end in itself). The COS should select the red team leader carefully, bearing in mind that the views of junior staff may be ignored by a JFC, while an overly robust approach may also prove unhelpful. Equally, however, having elected to use a red team, a JFC and COS should remain open to the alternative perspectives that they bring.

### **Wargaming**

2I7. Wargaming is used to examine CoAs during the operational estimate. It is focused on the coordination of capabilities and activities at component level and, in particular, with the orchestration of their respective efforts to realise combined effects. It addresses all the various facets of Joint Action (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre), as well as the activities of other military and civilian actors, within the operating space. Due to the potential number of manoeuvring elements at the operational level, a JFC, or more likely his COS, should consider the degree of aggregation, and consequently the span of activity, that can practically be wargamed (see Appendix 2I1).

2I8. As an adversarial technique, wargaming plays friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify any shortcomings in potential or selected CoAs. The interaction between friendly elements can be represented from within a JFC's staff, supported by components, while the actions and reactions of opponents requires a duly enabled red team. Wargaming at the operational level should also identify any broader implications of military activity, across the international community for example,

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<sup>4</sup> Increasingly, the UK is using mentors, usually previous military commanders, to assist JFCs. It may be appropriate, at times, for such figures to act as spokesmen for the red team.

which should then be notified to the appropriate national or multinational military strategic commander. Wargaming can vary in scope and complexity, from informal discussions around a map to the use of sophisticated computer simulations; time and availability of resources are likely to limit what can be done. Regardless of which techniques are employed, wargaming should provide:

- a. A thorough understanding of the likely actions and reactions of friendly, neutral and hostile actors within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and, where appropriate, beyond.
- b. An indication of the likely effects of military activity, and the associated risks – threats and potential opportunities – that such activity might generate.
- c. A specific assessment of any friendly CoAs versus those of an opponent.
- d. Refinement and development of CoAs, including the detailed determination of relevant timings, force (re-)deployments and logistic implications.
- e. ‘Bullet-proofing’ of a JFC’s chosen CoA.

2I9. Wargaming can be used as part of the planning process, to ensure that staff resources are used in the most efficient and effective manner and to highlight issues for further analysis. The time and level of effort devoted to wargaming depends upon the priority assigned by a JFC. Thus while it might be desirable to compare fully all CoAs under consideration, this may be unrealistic. At the very least, however, the selected CoA should be tested and refined through wargaming.<sup>5</sup>

2I10. **Wargaming Methodology.** The conduct of wargaming is described at Appendix 2I1. A JFC or his COS decide when during the operational estimate wargaming should occur. Three potential points, illustrated in Figure 2I.1, are:

- a. **Step 4 – Develop and Validate Courses of Action.** Wargaming can help to visualise an embryonic CoA, indicating in particular the art of the possible and enabling impractical CoAs to be discarded at an early stage. Early wargaming should yield a better understanding of a proposed CoA (see paragraph 3E8), including any relevant planning considerations, such as correlation of forces, relative strengths and synchronisation.
- b. **Step 5 – Evaluate Courses of Action.** Wargaming can be used to compare each friendly CoA with appropriate opponent CoAs, and any other relevant factors, to determine the likelihood of success. Wargaming at this stage provides information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each

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<sup>5</sup> This is separate and discrete from Mission Rehearsal (the US refer to ROC Drills (Review of Concept)), undertaking to check and confirm subordinates’ understanding of a JFC’s plan, prior to implementation.

individual CoA, for evaluation against a JFC's CoA selection criteria, but such comprehensive wargaming requires a considerable commitment of time and staff resources to be conducted effectively.

c. **Step 6 – Commander's Decision.** Once the JFC has selected his CoA, wargaming can contribute to its refinement, including identifying his key decisions, and any further Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). In addition, wargaming assists in the production of coordinating instructions (such as the Joint Action synchronisation matrix), indicates specific requirements for battlespace management, and highlights potential tasks and associated readiness for an operational reserve. Wargaming may also identify potential unplanned or unfavourable effects, and hence the requirement for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS). It is arguably at this stage in the planning process that detailed wargaming can add most value.

2I11. **Participants.** Potential wargaming participants include:

a. **Blue Team.** The blue team, who have developed the JFC's plan, should include key J5 or J3/5 planners, J1/J4, J6, component headquarters staffs, J3 operations support staff and other contributors to Joint Action, such as Joint Force (JF) Engineers, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) staff and the Political Adviser (POLAD).

b. **Red Team.** Either the full red team (see paragraph 2I3) participates or, if preferred, the team leader or a mentor represents their views (see paragraph 2I6).

c. **Chairman/Referee and Secretary.** The chairman/referee, empowered to exercise authority during the game, should have had little part to play in the conduct of either the operational or the red estimate. He can, therefore, act impartially, as well as providing an honest broker in situations where opposing sides lose sight of the purpose of the event – namely, to test the JFC's plan, not to beat each other. A secretary records the output of the game and should be sufficiently familiar with all of the plans to catch the emerging issues logically and succinctly.

d. **Subject Matter Experts and Other Government Department Personnel.** Available Subject Matter Experts and OGD personnel should support wargaming, sharing their time between red and blue teams where necessary.

e. **Supporting Staff.** Depending upon the wargaming technique(s) being employed, a variety of specialist staff may be required. Some, such as Operational Analysis staff, provide substantive input (see paragraphs 2I13 and

2I14), while others, such as computer simulation experts, simply enable the wargaming process to run smoothly.

f. **Joint Force Commander.** A JFC may wish to attend the wargame personally for the greater insights he can bring. These benefits, however, should be balanced against other effects that may be realised by his presence; for example, his staff may be uneasy about criticising those elements of the plan they assess as unsatisfactory. A JFC may, however, judge that for reasons of efficiency (when time is short) or effectiveness (when his personal perspective is vital) he should attend the wargaming. Under these circumstances, he may provide guidance, reject unwanted concepts, and assist in keeping the staff focused. If a JFC attends the wargaming of multiple CoAs, he may rapidly identify which CoA he favours.

2I12. **Approach to Wargaming.** Wargaming may require considerable time and staff resources, at a point when the HQ is already under pressure to confirm and disseminate a plan. It may also be seen as a protracted and cumbersome process, of only marginal benefit. If prepared for fully, trained for regularly and resourced appropriately, however, wargaming should form an essential part of a JFC's planning repertoire. As with other aspects of the operational estimate process, how it is done is very much up to a JFC. He may wargame with a small team (as he might conduct his mission analysis) or he may involve a wider group (for their mutual benefit).

## Operational Analysis

2I13. **Purpose and Characteristics.** Operational analysis is 'the use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision makers to resolve problems'. Operational analysis delivers quantitative rigour and objectivity to operational planning and decision-making. Operational analysis specialists draw on mathematical techniques and modelling to: examine or test a developing plan; estimate or simulate assumptions regarding likely changes as a consequence of a plan; and present data and information to realise better-informed decisions. Operational analysis is characterised by its:

- a. **Independence.** Operational analysis is impartial, and analysts should not have a vested interest in any aspect of the plan or its implementation.
- b. **Credibility.** Operational analysis provides a JFC with justifiable advice, based on quantitative, systematic examination.
- c. **Clarity.** Operational analysis should be presented in a way that is meaningful, comprehensible and useful to a JFC and his staff.

2I14. **Tasks.** During the planning process, operational analysis may provide:


- a. **Course of Action Evaluation.** Assistance to risk analysis, wargaming support, and calculations of relative probability of success.
- b. **Correlation of Forces.** Assessments of relative capability and force ratios.
- c. **Combat Resolution.** Estimates of combat duration, personnel casualty, combat equipment losses and remaining combat effectiveness.
- d. **Logistics Planning.** Support to deployment, sustainment, movement, equipment support, medical and other logistic planning.
- e. **Campaign Assessment.** Support to the identification and development of Measurements of Activity (MOA) and Measurements of Effect (MOE).
- f. **Scientific and Technical Advice.** Technical advice, for example, on equipment capabilities, and a conduit for further assistance from the scientific research community and industry.

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## APPENDIX 2I1 – WARGAMING

### Stage 1 – Select the Event to be Wargamed

2I1.1. The first task is to identify the event(s) to be wargamed, based on what a Joint Force Commander (JFC) wishes to achieve, or needs to know, in the time available. As Figure 2I1.1 illustrates, when deciding what to wargame, a JFC should consider both the aggregation of forces (or resolution), and scope of the event(s). There is no preferred approach, and indeed it is important to be flexible and to adjust the wargame to the issues to be resolved. For example, a JFC may wish to take an overview of the campaign, or a phase thereof; he may look at single or grouped decisive conditions or supporting effects or instead, concentrate on specific activities requiring detailed synchronisation between components. The event(s) should be those a JFC believes to hold most risk, either due to vulnerability to opponent action, or perhaps the complexity of coordination required. Opponent Courses of Action (CoAs), usually the most likely or most dangerous, should also be considered.



**Figure 2I1.1 – Wargame Options**

### Stage 2 – Structure the Wargame

2I1.2. **Stage 2a – Determine the Time Available.** The Chief of Staff (COS) should use the staff timeline to ascertain the time available for the wargaming.



2I1.3. **Stage 2b – Select the Technique(s) and Format of the Game.** The COS, in conjunction with the chairman/referee, should select the wargame technique(s) to be used, the number of game turns possible within the time allocated, and thus the length of each turn. In addition, he should specify the (notional) start time for the wargame in terms of the operations or activities under review.

2I1.4. **Stage 2c – Choose the Method to Record and Display Game Results.** The output of the wargame should be captured as a narrative, a work or record sheet, or as a Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix (see Appendix 2G7), the timescale of which is determined by the length of the game turns.

2I1.5. **Stage 2d – Identify the Players.** The structure of the wargame determines the extent of player participation, this being dependent on the stage of the operational estimate during which wargaming is being carried out.

### **Stage 3 – Gather the Tools, Materials and Data**

2I1.6. The wargaming area should be formally arranged, with seats designated for players, usually with the blue team on one side and the red team on the other, with an additional seating area made available for other participants. The chairman/referee should direct the assembly of appropriate aids, and, depending upon the complexity of the game, conduct rehearsals (especially where heavy reliance is placed upon computer support).

### **Stage 4 – Brief Staff to Allow Preparation**

2I1.7. The chairman/referee's pre-brief is key to enabling the necessary preparation by players and participants. It should cover:

- a. The technique(s) and format of the game.
- a. Timings (including breaks).
- b. Player appointments and other participants.
- c. Aids required and responsibilities for their preparation.
- d. Recording system, wargame output, and responsibilities.
- e. Final staff products and responsibility for their delivery.
- f. Wargame rules.
- g. Red team review and update (as required).
- h. Blue team review and update (as required).

## Stage 5 – Conduct Wargame and Assess Results

2I1.8. **Stage 5a – Review.** The chairman/referee should open with a review<sup>1</sup> of the strategic guidance, a JFC's direction, any assumptions, and the conduct of the wargame. Players then confirm that their forces have been set-up in accordance with their CoA at the game start time.

2I1.9. **Stage 5b – Wargame 1 (Red Courses of Action versus Blue Course of Action 1).** Comparison of CoAs should proceed using an action, reaction, counter-reaction methodology:

- a. **Red Force Start-State.** The red team opens with a short explanation of the opponent(s) strategic and operational intent and force dispositions. Their detailed scheme of manoeuvre should be left for the game turn itself. They should also outline any key neutral or other actors, their dispositions and any critical issues.
- a. **Blue Force Start-State.** Components, followed by joint force enablers, open with a short explanation of their intent, capabilities and initial dispositions.
- b. **Game Turn 1.**
  - (1) **Action.** The side holding the initiative, which is designated by the chairman/referee, describes the intended activities of its forces, including missions, tasks, and coordinating measures, within the time period specified for that game turn. Players, having spoken, move pertinent units (or aggregates thereof).
  - (2) **Reaction.** The side without the initiative then describes its reaction, whilst moving the pertinent forces.
  - (3) **Counter-Reaction.** The side with the initiative describes its counter-reaction.
  - (4) **Remainder of Players.** Other players analyse the game turn within their area of expertise, providing comment as appropriate.
  - (5) **Judgement.** Based on the different actions, attrition is applied and players agree to the new unit locations and strengths to be used in the next game turn. Operational Analysis (OA) may inform this process, and the chairman/referee's judgement is final should there be any disagreement. Although the most likely outcome should be accepted, a

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<sup>1</sup> The depth of this scene-setter will depend upon what was covered during the pre-brief, to whom and how long ago.

possible worst case should also be examined if the outcome may influence subsequent actions or decisions.

(6) **Recording.** Capturing data, decisions, coordination or synchronisation instructions and subordinate missions/tasks and groupings is essential to extract full benefit from the wargame. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) should be captured as they emerge. The chairman/referee should continuously assess the feasibility of the CoA and begin to compile its advantages and disadvantages. Key issues and points should be submitted, as they arise, to J5 and J3 staffs, but should not be resolved during wargaming; instead, they should be captured for subsequent refinement of the plan. The secretary compiles the wargame record sheet. In particular, he should note any requirement for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS) (whether branches or sequels), any amendments or additions to the Decision Support Matrix (DSM) (see JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*'), any changes to the Joint Force Task Organisation (TASKORG), or the composition, tasks, location, and Notice To Move (NTM) for the reserve. In addition, the secretary should consider the accuracy of time and space considerations, and coordination measures, and capture amendments to the Joint Action synchronisation matrix, highlighting areas of particular risk.

c. **Game Turn 2.** The wargame continues through as many turns as required for the wargame's purpose to be achieved. When completed the chairman/referee summarises the results, and associated staff actions.

2I1.10. **Stage 5c – Wargame 2 (Red Course of Action versus Blue Course of Action 2/3).** If necessary, forces should be relocated and start states identified for the next set of CoAs. The cycle, described above, is repeated as many times as necessary.

2I1.11. **Stage 5d – Conclusion.** At the conclusion of the wargame, the chairman/referee, or if appropriate the COS, highlights the key points and issues that have arisen, and the required follow-on staff actions, including:

- a. For all wargaming:
  - (1) Generation of additional CCIRs.
  - (2) Implications for Intelligence Requirements Management, including adjustments to the Intelligence Collection Plan (see JDP 2-00 '*Intelligence*').
  - (3) Identified risks requiring further analysis and management (see Annex 3D).

- (4) Preparation of CONPLANs.
  - (5) Adjustments to campaign schematics.
- b. For evaluation wargaming (conducted as part of Step 5 of the operational estimate):
- (1) Completed evaluation sheets for a JFC's subsequent CoA selection.
- c. For refinement wargaming (conducted at and after Step 6 of the operational estimate):
- (1) Adjustments to Joint Action Synchronisation Matrices and timelines.
  - (2) Adjustments to component missions, tasks and coordinating instructions.
  - (3) Adjustments to DSMs.

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## **ANNEX 2J – REPRESENTATIVE JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE**

*[Document Reference]*

See Distribution

*[DTG]*

### **OP [\*\*\*\*] CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE**

References:

- A. UK National Cross-Government Strategy.
- B. CDS’ Directive(s).
- C. Jt Comd’s Mission Directive.
- D. Multinational Commander’s Directives.
- E. Jt Comd’s [Theatre] Reference Document.
- F. UK National Information Strategy and Regional Information Plan.
- G. Multinational Information Strategies/Plans.
- H. OPORD 001/XX *[often the first OPORD is issued concurrently]*.
- I. Force Instructions Document for Op [\*\*\*\*] *[if issued in parallel; more often it follows]*.
- J. INTSUM.
- K. JSP 465.

Time Zone Used Throughout this Directive: [ZULU]

### **PREFACE**

1. The Campaign Directive: describes the nature of the crises from both strategic and operational level perspectives; sets out the strategic intent for the campaign; and provides the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) intent in terms of what is to be achieved in order to successfully reach the campaign end-state. The Campaign Directive is ‘owned’ by the JTFC although it will be influenced by others, particularly the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) and the Military Strategic Commander. It is the core document from which should stem all subsequent planning and execution by the Joint Force.

2. The Campaign Directive provides the JTFC’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS); this is founded on those decisive conditions deemed necessary to achieving the campaign objectives. Subsequent Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs) will address the supporting effects and activities (missions, tasks and purposes) that are required to achieve each of the decisive conditions.

3. The campaign directive is supported by a Force Instructions Document (FID), which contains supplementary instructions and supporting information – an example of which is at Annex 2M. **[J5 to complete]**

## SITUATION

*[This section is derived from the Analysis executive summary (see Chapter 1) and Step 1 of the Operational Estimate – Analysis products may be included as Annexes].*

2. **Geo-Strategic Background.** **[J2/J5 to complete]**

3. **Critical Actors.** **[J2 to complete]**

a. **Opponents.**

b. **Neutrals.**

c. **Friendly.** *[Including multinational forces and any aligned indigenous forces].*

d. **Current Postures.** *[Including capabilities and dispositions (Orders of Battle (ORBATs) for conventional forces, organisational structures for irregular actors) and status of neutrals. This may be deferred to OPORD 001 or a separate INTSUM and simply referenced here].*

e. **Assessed Strategic Intent.**

f. **Assessed Operational Intent.** *[Opponent Operational Courses of Action (CoAs) can be described in a table (as below – repeated for each major group or amalgamated as appropriate) or in free text. If lengthy, it may be decided to include the detail as an annex with only ‘Most Likely CoA’ included in the main body. If already issued as an INTSUM/Warning Order, reference here].*

	<b>CoA A – Most Likely</b>	<b>CoA B – Least Likely</b>	<b>CoA C – Most Dangerous</b>
<b>Outline Concept</b>			
<b>Opponent’s Operational End-state</b>			
<b>Land</b>			
<b>Maritime</b>			
<b>Air</b>			
<b>Time &amp; Space</b>			
<b>Indicators &amp; Warnings</b>			

## APPOINTMENTS

4. The following appointments have been confirmed by..... **[J5 to complete]**
  - a. **Joint Commander.** The Jt Comd is [*Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)*].
  - b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC is [*name*].
  - c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) is [*name*].
  - d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is [*name*].
  - e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is [*name*].
  - f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** The Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) is [*name*].
  - g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** The Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) is [*name*].
  - h. **Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems.** The Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (Comd JFCIS) is [*name*].
  - i. **Commander Joint Force Engineers.** The Commander Joint Force Engineers (Comd JFEngr) is [*name*].
  - j. **Force Elements/Troops.**

## DIRECTION

5. The following direction has been received: **[J5 to complete]**.
  - a. **Strategic Context.** *HMG's overall strategy is to ....*
  - b. **National Strategic Aim.**
  - c. **National Strategic Objectives.**
  - d. **Military Strategic End-state.**
  - e. **Military Strategic Objectives.**
  - f. **Chief of Defence Staff's Intent.**



- g. **Campaign End-state** *[described through Campaign Objectives, if known at this stage].*
- h. **Joint Commander's Intent.**

## JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

- 6. **Operations.** Depicted at Annex A. The Joint Operations Area (JOA)<sup>1</sup> for Op [\*\*\*\*] is the territory, territorial waters out to XX nm, and airspace of XXXX.
- 7. **Intelligence.**
  - a. The Jt Comd's Area of Intelligence Interest (AII) is [....].
  - b. My Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) is [....].

## MISSION

- 8. The JTF is to....*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the force and its purpose]* [J5 to complete].

## PLANNING

- 9. **End-state Analysis.** [J5 to complete] End-state Analysis is at Annex B. *[End-state analysis should clarify and confirm a JFC's understanding of the direction he has received, validate his campaign objectives, and establish the foundations on which to determine military activities].*
- 10. **Centre of Gravity (CoG) Analysis.** [J5 to complete] CoG Analysis is at Annex B. *[Detail Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities as appropriate].*
  - a. **Opponent Centres of Gravity.**
    - (1) **Strategic.**
    - (2) **Operational.**
  - b. **Friendly Centres of Gravity.**
    - (1) **Strategic.**
      - (a) **UK.**
      - (b) **Coalition Partner(s).**

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<sup>1</sup> 'An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission'. (JDP 0-01.1)

(2) **Operational.**(a) **UK.**(b) **Coalition Partners.**

11. **Multi-agency.** *[Outline overall multi-agency context of the campaign and intentions of key partners. This should be linked with end-state analysis where appropriate].*

a. **Other Government Departments.**

(1) **UK.** *[Intention/plans of UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), Stabilisation Unit etc, intentions for coordination/collaboration, role/authority of any deployed cross-Government planning/coordination bodies].*

(2) **Other Nations.** *[Intentions/plans of Governmental organisations from other nations, including intentions for coordination/collaboration].*

b. **International Organisations.** *[Stance/reaction of UN/NATO/EU, regional organisations such as the African Union].*

c. **Non-Governmental Organisations.** *[Stance/position of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)].*

d. **Private Military and Security Companies.** *[Role/status of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), including prevailing policy on recognition and interaction].*

12. **Assumptions. [J5 to complete]** *[Including details of any outstanding Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) that may affect assumptions on which plan is based].*

a. UK forces will be deployed for up to [?] months.

b. Other....

13. **Constraints, Restraints, Limitations and Freedoms. [J5 to complete – to include those imposed by superior commanders and those deduced during the Operational Estimate].**

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS [J5 to complete]**

14. **Joint Task Force Commander's Intent.** My Intent is .... *[This should focus on what it is that the Joint Force is to achieve in order to reach the campaign end-*

*state – set in the context of the desired outcome. It should be a concise and precise statement, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. It provides the enduring logic behind all subsequent products of campaign design].*

15. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** See Annex B. *[This should describe how the JTFC sees the Campaign Plan unfolding, in terms of ‘what’ it is that is to be achieved; the ‘how’, directing activities to achieve supporting effects, is provided in subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs. In this manner, component commanders can anticipate their role inside the Campaign Plan and play an active role in developing appropriate OPLANs and OPORDs. The Scheme of manoeuvre within the JTFC’s Campaign Directive should be enduring; it will be subject to periodic campaign effectiveness assessment. Campaign schematics (see Annex 2G) provide a useful means to articulate Campaign Schemes of Manoeuvre].*

- a. **Campaign End-state.**
- b. **Relationship of Centre of Gravity to Campaign End-state.**
- c. **Decisive Conditions.** Decisive conditions and their associated Supporting Effects are tabulated at Annex C.
- d. **Lines/Groupings of Operation.**

16. **Main Effort.** *[Main Effort is the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. It is the principal method by which a JTFC makes his overall intent clear to his subordinates and is usually supported by the allocation of resources in order to give substance to that which he considers crucial to the success of his mission. Aware of a JTFC’s main effort and priorities, subordinate commanders can take timely and independent action in fast-moving and changeable operations, thereby optimising tempo. A JTFCs main effort is likely to change over time. In his Campaign Directive, a JTFC may wish to highlight those decisive conditions that, above others, will attract ‘main effort’ status].*

## **RISK**

17. **Risk Analysis and Management.** [J5 to complete] The details of risk analysis and management are at Annex 2H.

- a. **Identified Strategic, Operational and Tactical Risks.**
- b. **Risk Analysis.** Ownership, impact and likelihood.
- c. **Risk Management Plans.**
- d. **Risk Indicators and Warnings.**

## EXECUTION

*[See JDP 3-00, 'Campaign Execution' - Joint Action].*

18. **Joint Action Targeting. [J3 Tgts to complete]** Targeting is to be conducted in accordance with the Targeting Directive at Section xx of the FID.
19. **Information Strategies and Plans. [J3 Ops Support to complete].**
  - a. **Information Strategy – Target Audiences, Themes and Messages.** *[Relevant extracts from the National Information Strategy and Information Plans].* Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.
  - b. **Multinational Information Strategies/Plans.** *[Key deductions].*
20. **Influence Activities. [J3 Operations Support to complete].** General detail for the synchronisation of component Influence Activities, including deception planning, is detailed in Section xx of the FID *[JDP 3-00 gives further details].*
21. **Battlespace Management. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.

## ASSESSMENT

22. **Measurement of Activity. [J3 Ops Support/Tgts to complete]** General descriptions of Measurement of Activity (MOA) are at Section xx of the FID. Procedures for collation of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) are contained in the Targeting Directive at Section xx of the FID.
23. **Measurement of Effect. [J3 Ops Support to complete]** Details of Measurement of Effect (MOE), including associated metrics and subjective data sources, baselines, success criteria and threshold levels, are at Section xx of the FID.
24. **Evidence Gathering. [J5/J3 Ops Support to complete]** Evidence gathering is to be conducted collaboratively with components, civilian and military partners. The range of evidence to be used for assessment *[as required from J2, BDA, J3 reporting, Human Factors Research (HFR) and Media Output Analysis]* is described at Section xx of the FID. The evidence gathering plan, including allocated resources and supporting liaison architecture, is detailed in the MOE assessment sheet at Section xx of the FID.
25. **Evaluation. [Operational Analyst to complete]** Statistical, HFR and other analytical techniques are detailed at Section xx of the FID.
26. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment. [J5 to complete]** The timetable and mechanisms for campaign and OPORD review are at Section xx of the FID.

27. **Multinational Assessment.** Assessment procedures of multinational commands, and any associated UK responsibilities, are at Section xx of the FID.

## COORDINATING AND SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS

*[As required from the following headings]*

28. **Legal. [J9 LEGAD to complete]** Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.

a. **Use of Force.** *[Including Law of Armed Conflict, guiding direction, applicable UNSCRs (mission specific and general)].*

b. **Status of Deployed Personnel.** *[Regular and reserve forces under Law of Armed Conflict, medical and religious personnel, civilian contractors, Other Government Department staff)].*

c. **Jurisdiction.** *[UK Service Discipline Acts and domestic law, relevant Host Nation law, responsibilities and arrangements for investigation, charge and disposal of offences].*

d. **Liability.** *[Relevant Status of Forces Acts (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and other arrangements/agreements in place].*

e. **Captured Persons.** *[Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees].*

f. **Coalition Partner Legislation.** *[Any differences of domestic law and interpretation of International laws or mandates exercised by coalition partners].*

29. **Political/Rules of Engagement.** The Rules of Engagement (ROE) profile is at Section xx to the FID.

30. **Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. [J2 to complete]** Further detail, including Areas of Intelligence Interest and Responsibility, is at Section xx to the FID *[including details for language and translation capabilities].*

31. **Operational Level Reserve. [J5 to complete]** *[Units, Notice to Deploy/Move, location, committal authority, and potential options if known although more likely to be in OPORD 001].* As the campaign develops, adjustment in the size and provision of the Operational Reserve are directed by the JTFC.

32. **Force Protection. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Further detail, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), and Combat Identification, is at Section xx of the FID.

33. **Engineer. [Joint Force Engineer to complete]** General description including priorities. Further detail is at Section xx of the FID.
34. **Financial Accounting. [J8 to complete]** Financial accounting instruction is at Section xx of the FID.
35. **Joint Personnel Recovery, Conduct after Capture, and Escape and Evasion. [J3 Ops Coord to complete]** Procedures and policy are detailed at Section xx of the FID.
36. **Deployment of Civilians. [J1 to complete]**
37. **Personnel, Administration, Honours and Awards.** *[Including procedures for Operational Location (OPLOC) tracking and the provision of an Operational Welfare Package (OWP)]*
38. **Visitors. [J1 to complete]**

## RESOURCES

39. The following forces ....*[This is written to include forces assigned to the JTFC, and may therefore exclude Strategic forces (such as SF) and SSGNs, and arranges forces in accordance with the TASKORG].*

## LOGISTICS [J1/4 to dictate headings and complete – reference relevant Annexes of Section xx of the FID].

40. **Logistic Scheme of Manoeuvre.** *[Note that there should not be a separate logistic intent but that this should reflect the JTFC's Intent above. The logistic concept is based on the Logistic Estimate conducted by the Logistic Planning Team (LPT)].*
41. **Logistic Main Effort.** *[Derived from the Logistic Estimate to support that of the JTFC].*
42. **Deployment and Recovery of the Force.** *[Produced by the J4 Joint Mounting Cell].*
43. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration.** *[This involves the J4 led Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) process together with the J3 led Integration process].*
44. **Sustainment.** *[Based on the Sustainability Statement (SUSTAT) produced for the campaign.]*

45. **International Cooperative Logistic Support.** *[Including the appointment of a Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistic Role Specialist Nation (LRSN) and any contributions made by Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) or as a result of other multilateral or bilateral logistic arrangements].*

46. **Medical.**

## COMMAND AND SIGNAL

47. **Locations.** [J5 to complete]

a. **Joint Commander.** The Jt Comd will exercise command from the [PJHQ].

b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC will command the force from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) located in ..., which will include Liaison Officers from....

c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The JFMCC will be established at [location].

d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The JFLCC will be established at [location].

e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The JFACC will be established at [location].

f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** The JFSFCC will be established at [location].

g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** The JFLogCC will be established at [location].

h. **Force Elements/Troops.**

48. **Alternate Joint Task Force Commander/Joint Task Force Headquarters.** [J5 to complete] *[Appointment (name)/HQ].*

49. **Command & Control.** [J5 to complete] An overview of the Force Command and Control (C2) arrangements, along with the detail of Component C2, is at Annex ....

a. **Joint Commander.** [CJO] will exercise OPCOM of all assigned UK forces less ...

- b. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC will exercise OPCON of all assigned UK forces less.....
- c. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements, e.g. TACOM of the forces at paragraph ... to Annex ... are delegated to the MCC/MCC is to exercise TACOM over the assets listed at ...]*
- d. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*
- e. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*
- f. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*
- g. **Joint Force Logistics Component Commander.** *[Detail command arrangements].*
- h. **Force Elements/Troops.** *[Detail command arrangements for e.g. Joint Force Engineers, JHC and Jt CBRN Regt].*
50. **Alliance, Coalition and National Responsibilities and Relationships.** **[J5 to complete]** *[Including national command issues and responsibilities (NCC/COMBRITFOR)].*
51. **Liaison.** **[J35 to complete]** The Liaison Matrix is at Annex G.
52. **Communications and Information Systems.** **[J6 to complete** - detail how Comd Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (JFCIS) staff intend to support the campaign]. Further detail, is at Section xx of the FID.
53. **Codeword/SIC.** **[J5 to complete]** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

Acknowledge:

[NAME]  
[Rank]  
JTFC

Authenticate:

[NAME]  
[Rank]  
COS



Annexes:

- A. Joint Operations Area.
- B. Campaign Schematics, Centre of Gravity and End-State Analysis.
- C. Decisive Conditions Tabulation and Analysis.
- D. Risk Analysis.
- E. Forces Assigned to Joint Task Force Commander.
- F. Command and Control.
- G. Liaison Matrix.
- H. Geospatial Information.

Distribution:

Action:

JFMCC  
JFLCC  
JFACC  
JFSFCC  
JFLogC  
Force Elements/Troops

Copy to:

MOD - Op XXXX SPG Leader  
- Op XXXX CCT Leader  
PJHQ - Op XXXX OT Leader  
- Op XXXX CPT Leader  
CINC FLEET  
CINC LAND  
CINC AIR  
DSF  
CDM  
[Allies/Coalition Command HQ]  
[HH Mil HQs]  
[Other Government Department Representatives as Appropriate]

## ANNEX 2K – REPRESENTATIVE OPERATION PLAN

Document Reference

See Distribution

[Date]

### OPLAN 00X/AA (Year) – OPERATION [\*\*\*\*]

References:

- A. Campaign Directive.
- B. Force Instructions Document.
- C. OPORD 00X/BB *[detail of current Operation Order (OPORD) in force if not the first Operation Plan (OPLAN) of the campaign]*.
- D. Current Intelligence Summary.
- E. OPLAN 00X/CC and/or CONPLAN 00X/DD *[detail of any related OPLANs and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) also in development]*.

Time Zone Used Throughout: ZULU.

### PREFACE

1. **Scope.** Overarching Direction for the campaign is provided in the Campaign Directive and Force Instructions Document (FID) (Refs A and B respectively). This OPLAN provides notification of intentions for *[the forthcoming period, stage or phase of the campaign]*, subsequent to the execution of OPORD 00X/BB (Ref C). In particular, OPLAN 00X/AA provides:
  - a. The effects the Joint Task Force (JTF) will focus upon in the next *[period/stage/phase]* of the campaign.
  - b. Any specific direction regarding the development of Joint Action plans to realise these effects. Executive direction for the conduct of operations will follow as a sequential OPORD.
2. **Period.** The *[period/stage/phase]* covered by this OPLAN is.....*[it may not be possible to give an exact time period covered by the OPLAN. Instead, the OPLAN should articulate the nature of the period, stage or phase (e.g. ‘this OPLAN covers the period of JTF deployment to region A, and subsequent establishment of a secure operating base in country B’)]*.

## SITUATION

3. The current situation is.....*[or refer to the latest Intelligence summary (INTSUM) (Ref D)].*

## MISSIONS

4. **Joint Task Force.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* the JTF will ... in order to ...*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose].*

5. **Initial and Outline Component Missions.**

a. **Joint Force Maritime Component.** ... in order to ...

b. **Joint Force Land Component.** ... in order to ...

c. **Joint Force Air Component.** ... in order to ...

d. **Joint Force Logistics Component.** ... in order to ...

e. **Joint Force Special Forces Component.** ... in order to ...

## CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6. **Joint Task Force Commander's Intent.** During this *[period/stage/phase]* my intent is to ...*[if specific to the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC's Intent provided in the Campaign Directive].*

7. **Supporting Effects.** I intend to realise the following supporting effects during this *[period/stage/phase]* *[list supporting effects chosen to be the focus of this period/stage/ phase of the campaign and their priority/order].*

8. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** My scheme of manoeuvre for the forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* is...*[how supporting effects will be sequenced in time and space. Can be done in the main body of the OPLAN or in an Annex. Supporting effects schematics can be used to illustrate this (see Appendix 3C3 and 4)].*

9. **Main Effort.** My main effort for the forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* is ... *[e.g. priority supporting effects he wishes to realise].*

## EXECUTION

10. **Influence Activities.** Influence activity target audiences, themes and messages supporting this *[period/stage/phase]*, including deception plans, are at Annexes B.

**LOGISTICS****11. Logistic Concept of Operations.****COMMAND AND SIGNAL****12. Command and Control.****13. Liaison.****14. Communications and Information Systems.**

**15. Codeword/SIC.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

*[NAME]*

*[Rank]*

JTFC

Annex:

A. Op [\*\*\*\*] – Supporting Effects Synchronisation *[including Supporting Effects Schematics]*.

B. Influence Activities – Target Audiences, Themes and Messages.

Distribution:

PJHQ

JFACC

JF Elements/Troops

JFMCC

JFLogCC

JFLCC

JFSFCC

Copied to:

Other Government Department Representatives *[as appropriate]*.

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## ANNEX 2L – REPRESENTATIVE OPERATION ORDER

Document Reference

See Distribution

*[Date]*

### OPORD 00X/AA (Year) - OPERATION [\*\*\*\*]

References:

- A. Campaign Directive.
- B. Force Instructions Document.
- C. Originator OPLAN 00X/AA *[the Operation Plan (OPLAN) from which the Operation (OPORD) derives]*.
- D. Current INTSUM.
- E. Extant OPORDs (if campaign underway).

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

### PREFACE [J35 to complete]

1. **Scope.** This OPORD gives executive direction for the conduct of operations during the immediate and forthcoming *[period/stage/phase]* of the campaign. It describes the totality of effects the Joint Task Force (JTF) is to focus upon, and the details of synchronised Fires, Influence Activities and Manoeuvre (Joint Action) to realise those effects, as well as supporting and coordinating considerations. The OPORD also describes how the JTF will operate with allied and coalition forces, and with relevant civilian partners. This OPORD updates the Campaign Directive (at Ref A) and is supported by the Force Instructions Document (FID) (at Ref B).
2. **Period.** The *[period/stage/phase]* covered by this OPORD is.....*[it may not be possible to give an exact time period covered by the OPORD. Instead, the OPORD should articulate the nature of the period, stage or phase (e.g. 'this OPORD covers the period of JTF deployment to region A, and subsequent establishment of a secure operating base in country B')]*.

### SITUATION

3. The current situation is ....*[or refer to the latest Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) (Ref D)]*.
  - a. **Updated Geo-Strategic Situation.** *[J2 / JF Engr]*
  - b. **International/Regional.**

- c. **Political.**
- d. **Opponent/Friendly/Neutral Actors.**

4. **Threat Assessment.** A detailed assessment of the Op [\*\*\*\*] threat is at Annex A. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) pertinent to this [period/stage/phase] are at Annex B.

## MISSION

5. During this [period/stage/phase] the JTF will ... in order to ...*[a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose]*.

## EXECUTION

6. **Joint Task Force Commander's Intent.** During this [period/stage/phase] my intent is to .....*[if specific to the period or phase, or in any other way different from the JTFC's Intent provided in the Campaign Directive. This is developed from originator OPLAN]*.

7. **Supporting Effects.** I intend to realise the following supporting effects during this [period/stage/phase] *[list supporting effects chosen to be the focus of this period/stage/ phase of the campaign and their priority/order, transferred/updated from originator OPLAN]*.

8. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** My scheme of manoeuvre for the forthcoming [period/stage/phase] is *[how the JTF's activities, synchronised in time and space, and coordinated with multinational and multi-agency partners, will realise the desired effects. Can be done in the main body of the OPORD or in an Annex. Joint Action Schematics and Synchronisation Matrices can be used to illustrate the detail (as shown at Appendix 2G6 and 7)]*. See Annexes C and D.

9. **Main Effort.** My main effort for the forthcoming [period/stage/phase] is ... *[e.g. priority SE he wishes to realise]*.

10. **Component Missions and Tasks. [J3 to complete]**

- a. **Component Commands.**

- (1) **Mission.** *[copied/updated from OPLAN]*

- a. **Joint Force Maritime Component.** ... in order to ...

- (2) **Tasks.**

Tasks	Supporting Effect
BPT...	
BPT...	
BPT...	

b. **Supported and Supporting Relationships.**

11. **Other Activity. [J3 to complete]**

a. **Other Government Departments.** Activities conducted by Other Government Departments (OGDs) will contribute to the realisation of supporting effects by...

Activity	Supporting Effect

12. **Coordinating Instructions. [J3 to complete]**

a. **Timings.**

b. **Rules of Engagement.** See Annex E.

c. **Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR).** [J2 to complete]

d. **Influence Activities.** See Annex F.

e. **Battlespace Management.** See FID Section 9. Specific measures required for this phase are at Annex G.

f. **Operational Reserve.**

g. **Force Protection.** See Annex H.

h. **Engineers.** See FID Section 3.

i. **Inter-agency Coordination Measures.** See Annex I.



**RESOURCES**

13. See Annex J.

**LOGISTICS** *[J1J4 to complete]*

14. **Logistic Intent.**

15. **Logistic Scheme of Manoeuvre.** *[including medical]* See Annex K.

16. **Logistic Command.**

**COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

17. **Command and Control Concept.** See Annex L. *[J3 to complete]*

18. **Communications and Information Systems.** *[J6 to complete]* See Annex M.

19. **Liaison.** See Annex N.

20. **Codeword/SIC.** The codeword for this operation is [\*\*\*\*]. This codeword is RESTRICTED; however, its meaning is SECRET. SIC [XXX] is to be used on all signals relating to Op [\*\*\*\*].

*[NAME]*

*[Rank]*

JTFC

Annexes:

- A. Threat Assessment.
- B. CCIRs.
- C. Joint Action Schematics.
- D. Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix.
- E. Rules of Engagement.
- F. Influence Activities *[including Target Audiences, Themes, Messages and Media activity, and deception planning]*.
- G. Battlespace Management.
- H. Geospatial Information.
- I. Force Protection.
- J. Inter-agency Coordination Measures.
- K. Forces Assigned.
- L. Logistics and Medical.
- M. Command and Control.

- N. CIS.
- O. Liaison Matrix.
- P. Spare.

Distribution:

PJHQ	JFACC	JF Elements/Troops
JFMCC	JFLogCC	
JFLCC	JFSFCC	

Copied to:

Other Government Department Representatives (as appropriate)

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# ANNEX 2M – REPRESENTATIVE FORCE INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT

Document Reference

See Distribution

*[Date]*

## OP [\*\*\*\*] – FORCE INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT

Reference:

A. Campaign Directive for Op [\*\*\*\*].

1. This document provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the Joint Task Force. It therefore complements the Campaign Directive issued to Component Commanders for Op [\*\*\*\*] (Ref A), and subsequent Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs) issued by the JTFHQ hereafter. It is subject to reviews and updates, as required, in order to ensure that all components receive the appropriate instructions and information required to fulfil their responsibilities.

*[NAME]*

*[Rank]*

COS

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## CONTENTS of Force Instruction Document

Section	Subject	Where Issued <sup>1</sup>	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
LM	Cover Note, Contents and Distribution.				
1.	Task Organisation.		A. Maritime Command and Control (C2). B. Land C2. C. Air C2. D. Logistic C2. E. Special Forces (SF). F. Joint Force Elements/ Troops.		
2.	Intelligence.		A. Analysis Executive Summary. B. Specific Analysis Studies and Systems Analysis Products. C. Intelligence Estimate. D. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPE). E. Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).		1. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Intelligence Directive. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Such as: Attached; Not To Be Issued; To Follow; Limited Distribution (LIMDIS).

<sup>2</sup> The term Intelligence Directive has replaced Intelligence and Security Management Plans.

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
3.	Targeting Directive.				
4.	Influence Activities.		A. Information Strategy extract, including Target Audiences, Themes and Messages. B. Influence Activities.		-
5.	Theatre Engineer Directive.		A. Engineer Intelligence. B. Geographic (GEO) Support.  C. Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD) Policy. D. Infrastructure Support.  E. Engineer Logistics.	1. UK GEO Structure. 2. Authorised Mapping. 3. Standard Digital Geographic Dataset Matrix. 4. GEO Task Requisition Form. 5. GEO SITREP Format.  1. Infrastructure Management Policy Statement (IMPS). 1. Engineering Unit Operational UINs.	

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
6.	Force Protection.		A. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence. B. Combat Identification. C. Operations Security (OPSEC).		
7.	Logistics.		A. Division of Logistic Responsibilities. B. Logistic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Schematic. C. Detailed Deployment Plan.  D. J1 (Pers). E. J4 Medical.	1. Joint Force Element Table/Joint Desired Order of Arrival. 2. Coupling Bridge Directive. 3. Strategic Movement Instruction. 4. Load Allocation Table.  1. Medical Force Protection Issues. 2. Med Log Schematic. 3. MEDSITREP Format.	



Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
			F. Sustainability Statement. G. Priority Progression Instruction. H. International Cooperative Logistic Support.  I. J8 (Finance). J. Logistic Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Instruction. K. In-Transit Visibility Instruction. L. LOGASSESSREP.	1. Host-nation Support 2. Contractor Support to Operations 3. In Country Resources  1. Weekly Log Sustainability SITREP.	
8.	Joint Communications Information Systems Instructions (JCISI).  Covering Note to include apportionment of Key CIS responsibilities, Force EMCON Policy, JFCIS – Reports and Returns (R2), and		A. JTF C2. B. JTF Liaison Matrix. C. Joint Information Exchange Requirement. D. Task Organisation. E. Core Network Laydown. F. Services Delivery Plan. G. Interoperability Matrix.	1. J6 ASSESSREP.	

Section	Subject	Where Issued	Annexes	Appendices	Enclosures
	Incident Reporting Procedure.		H. JFCIS Risks. I. Restoration Priorities. J. Engineering Recovery Plan. K. Formal Messaging Plan. L. Joint Mission Essential and Critical CIS Equipment.		
9.	Legal.		A. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Profile. B. ROE Zone Map. C. Specific legal issues.	1. Instructions on handling PWs, Internees and Detainees. 2. Investigations policy statement, instructions for handling of disciplinary cases.	Where specific differences need to be highlighted multinational partner ROE should be included.
10.	Escape and Evasion, Conduct After Capture, and Joint Personnel Recovery.				

<b>Section</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Where Issued</b>	<b>Annexes</b>	<b>Appendices</b>	<b>Enclosures</b>
11.	Assessment		A. Measurement of Activity. B. Measurement of Effect. C. Assessment Evidence.  D. Operational Analysis Techniques. E. Review Cycles. F. Multinational Assessment.	1. Measures of Effect Assessment Sheet.  1. Campaign Rhythm.	
12.	Battlespace Management.				
13.	Special Forces.				
14.	Lessons Identified.		A. Format for reporting Lessons Identified.		
15.	Language capabilities and requirements.				
16.	Spare.				

## CHAPTER 3 – DEFENCE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Chapter 3 addresses, as part of UK Defence Crisis Management, the development of strategic direction and the planning and management of the military contribution to national, multinational and multi-agency operations:

Section I – Introduction

Section II – Crisis Response Planning

Section III – Contingency Planning

Section IV – Current Operations Planning

Section V – Multi-agency Crisis Management

Section VI – Multinational Crisis Management

Annexes are used to illustrate the relevant processes and planning outputs; the summary at Annex 3A may usefully be studied in conjunction with the main text.

### SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

301. As part of the process of crisis prevention, containment and, where necessary, resolution, the Ministry of Defence's (MOD's) Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) (described at Chapter 2) conducts 3 types of planning, invariably as part of a cross-Government or comprehensive approach and, very often, in concert with alliance or coalition partners.

- a. **Contingency Planning** based on a mixture of intelligence and assumptions regarding potential involvement in future crises; it does not though imply an endorsed intent by Her Majesty's Government (HMG)/MOD. It may be impractical to gauge with any certainty the likelihood of a contingency plan being enacted but, especially where resources need to be expended to reduce or mitigate risk, the potential impact of a crisis should be assessed to inform prioritisation.
- b. **Crisis Response Planning** to determine, often at short notice, an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crises.
- c. **Current Operations Planning** to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain military activity. Such planning tends to follow crisis response planning, when military activity is (or is envisaged to be) prolonged. It may also involve elements of contingency planning to address potential changes in the situation, and will conclude with termination or transition planning on achievement of the desired, or acceptable, outcome.

302. Because crisis management cuts across organisational structures, in the MOD and elsewhere, a variety of task-organised, multifunctional groups are used to monitor

potential and emerging crises, plan appropriate responses, and then manage those responses through to their conclusion. The principal Crisis Management Groups are described at Annex 3A (with their detailed procedures being covered in DCMO Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)).

303. The next 3 sections describe the functions of the DCMO, and associated crisis management groups and forums, in relation to: crisis response planning; contingency planning; and current operations planning, including campaign termination and transition. The key players involved at each stage and for each type of planning, together with their main outputs, are summarised at Annex 3B.

## SECTION II – CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING

304. Crisis response planning is invariably complex and requires a process that is sufficiently agile to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and change. Appendix 3B1 provides guidance on how the principal players and groupings interact dynamically to produce, often under significant time pressure, the major planning outputs required.

### Planning at the Strategic Level

305. **Political/Military Estimate and Political Strategic Analysis.** A crisis can arise, or change in nature or seriousness, at short notice; or it can develop more slowly, monitored by the Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG), with time for a Current Operations group (COG) to form and deliberate (it may, therefore, be the subject of contingency planning). The MOD engages in cross-Government Political Strategic Analysis to consider options for how the UK might respond (a political decision, ultimately for the Prime Minister and Cabinet). The Political Strategic Analysis should, therefore, provide: an understanding of the crisis situation; options open to the international community and options open to HMG; how the UK may utilise its assets already in country or deploy additional assets and any associated risks. In the case of a rapidly emerging crisis, however, an early Political/Military Estimate, conducted by a nominated Strategic Planning Group (SPG), is used to identify possible (but as yet unformulated) desirable outcomes and to evaluate potential military contributions and associated risks, for consideration by the Director of Operations (DOps)<sup>1</sup> and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

306. **Chief of Defence Staff's Planning Directive.** Having conducted the Political Military Estimate, and subject to the outcome of the Political Strategic Analysis, the SPG drafts CDS' Planning Directive, (see Chapter 2), to initiate the Military Strategic Estimate. In the early stages, especially in a complex or particularly fluid situation, guidance to planners may be heavily caveated, and liable to change as circumstances and political choices mature. CDS' intent, articulated within his Planning Directive,

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<sup>1</sup> Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS(Ops)).

provides a useful headmark and a form of ‘unifying purpose’ for those engaged in concurrent but potentially discrete planning activities across the DCMO. Significant assumptions may be required, in order to maintain planning momentum, and these are confirmed or updated as the situation evolves. The inclusion, from the outset, of all interested parties including Front Line Commands (FLCs) provides environmental and functional contributions to the planning process and also enables concurrent planning by subordinates. To enable the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to progress the Military Strategic Estimate, a Planning Directive – issued as early as possible – provides:

- a. **Strategic Direction.** Strategic direction should include, either in draft or final form, the National Strategic Aim, potential National Strategic Objectives, perhaps the Military Strategic End-state and/or Military Strategic Objectives, CDS’ Intent, and relevant extracts from the National Information Strategy.
- b. **Assumptions and Constraints.** The planning assumptions, agreed in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) where appropriate, and any relevant operating constraints and freedoms, to ensure that effort is not wasted in re-exploring possibilities already discounted.
- c. **Planning Direction.** Any specific planning direction, such as authority to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) or, subject to Operations Security (OPSEC), to engage with the Defence industrial base.<sup>2</sup>

307. **Military Strategic Estimate.** On receipt of CDS’ Planning Directive, a Military Strategic Estimate is conducted by the PJHQ (J5 led) Contingency Planning Team in conjunction with the MOD’s SPG (D Strat Plans led) and Current Commitments Team (DJC led). Inputs to this process include: CDS’ Planning Directive; a summary of the Political Military Estimate; outputs from cross-Government planning; or the relevant National Information Strategy. The purpose of the Military Strategic Estimate is to scope the feasibility of a military contribution to crisis response, and to evaluate options for submission via Chiefs of Staff (COS) to Ministers. It uses techniques such as illustrative campaign planning, risk analysis and Operational Analysis (see Chapter 2) to test options. The Military Strategic Estimate provides a critical opportunity for military planners to indicate to political decision makers: how events might unfold, what forces might be required (and the opportunity costs involved in their committal), what casualties might result, financial costs, and the prospects of success or failure. The Military Strategic Estimate should be periodically re-visited during operations, including during multinational operations where the UK

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<sup>2</sup> See JDP 4-00 ‘Logistics for Joint Operations’.

may not have the lead in planning but may be able to exert influence based upon rigorous analysis and cogent deduction. A summary of the Military Strategic Estimate, briefed through the COS Committee, is used by the Secretary of State (SofS) and CDS to advise Cabinet on the practicality and implications, immediate and longer term, of a military contribution to any response. The identification and communication of strategic risk is an important element of the Military Strategic Estimate process.

308. **Chief of Defence Staff's Directive.** Where the Prime Minister and Cabinet decide to commit military forces, CDS issues detailed direction by means of a CDS' Directive drafted by the CCT (see Chapter 2, sometimes referred to as his Operational Directive to distinguish it from his earlier Planning Directive). It includes:

- a. **Strategic Direction.** Confirmed strategic direction (National Strategic Aim, National Strategic Objectives, Military Strategic End-state and Military Strategic Objectives), CDS' Intent and any constraints on operational planning.
- b. **Force Composition and Conduct.** The Directive details available Force Elements (FEs) to the Joint Force, designates the Theatre of Operations (TOO), and provides guidance on anticipated duration, sustainability, and any legal issues including Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Directive may also outline strategic risks identified by the Military Strategic Headquarters, and any threats or opportunities these may present to operational level planning (see Chapter 2).
- c. **Command and Control.** Command appointments, command relationships, including guidance on coordination with the FLCs (CINCFLEET, CINCLAND, CINCAIR, Director Special Forces (DSF) and Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM)), allies, Other Government Departments (OGDs) Host Nations, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); Command and Control (C2) arrangements should also be articulated.

309. CDS may issue an initial, or even a draft, Directive on a limited distribution before all the necessary detailed information is available; he may also delegate the issue of certain sections, such as Coordinating Instructions. CDS may give authority to proceed with military action or permit only preparations, either overt or covert, prior to a Ministerial decision to act.

### **Planning at the Operational Level**

310. **Joint Commander's Mission Directive.** CDS will nominate a Joint Commander (Jt Comd); this is normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). The Jt Comd, with authority from CDS' Directives, issues a Jt Comd's Directive to empower the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and direct the enabling functions of deploy,

sustain and, if applicable, recover. Key issues such as command authority, deployment plan, targeting delegations, ROE, intelligence, force protection, training, logistics and medical will feature in this directive. A representative Jt Comd's Directive, incorporating the Theatre Reference Document, is at Chapter 2.

311. **Collaborative Planning.** Crisis planning should take place collaboratively between the CJO/PJHQ and the assigned JTFC/Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) or equivalent. The latter should conduct its own planning in parallel, and contribute to PJHQ processes as the crisis unfolds, for example, by participating in the CPT. The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) establishes a Situational Awareness Group (SAG) at an early stage to facilitate this engagement (see JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*'). Once a JTFC is appointed, Liaison Officers (LOs) from contributing components, and where appropriate liaison officers from the Stabilisation Unit and OGDs, who are likely to have already been involved in PJHQ/JFHQ planning, should be drawn into the JTFHQ (and likewise assigned from the JTFHQ to the same organisations) for the remainder of the campaign.

312. **Planning the Deployment.** Planning for the deployment of the force, including headquarters and augmentees, should commence at the earliest opportunity in order to identify any constraints, establish the broad deployment timeline, and enable lead times for civilian charter/ships taken up from trade to be met. Such planning should remain covert, until a formal announcement has been made to commit forces, and must always be subject to OPSEC. PJHQ orchestrate force deployment, although the JTFHQ will shape much of the planning to ensure that it meets the JTFC's Intent; JDP 3-00 has the detail.

313. **Planning the Military Campaign.** Military campaign planning, in support of any integrated cross-government or multinational planning, may be completed before deployment planning begins but they frequently overlap (catered for by JFHQ participation in the PJHQ CPT and the establishment of a SAG). An illustrative planning sequence is as follows:

a. JFHQ/JTFHQ staff are represented on the PJHQ CPT from the outset in order to keep the JTFC informed on progress and to represent the JTFC's views at the strategic/operational interface. The JTFC begins to formulate his plans in parallel with the CPT. He may issue a Warning Order to subordinate commanders.

b. The JTFC and/or members of his staff may conduct a reconnaissance to theatre, normally as part of an OLRT (see paragraph 314). The Jt Comd should outline the aim of any reconnaissance and any constraints, such as duration, limits on movement and liaison authority. The exact nature, size and duration of the reconnaissance party may vary but should include allies or coalition partners, potential host nations and OGDs as appropriate.



c. The JTFC undertakes his operational level planning (see Chapter 2) in collaboration with subordinate commanders and, ideally, drawing in OGD, International Organisation and NGO representatives as required. There should be a continuous exchange of information between strategic, operational and tactical headquarters to ensure that the most recent information and assumptions are available to all planning teams.

314. **Relationship with the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** A deployed OLRT may satisfy information and intelligence requirements emerging from both the Military Strategic Estimate and the Operational Estimate, while it may also generate new issues for clarification up the chain of command. Although an OLRT should not be an alternative planning element in its own right, it may become the core of the JTFC's deployed headquarters, should he decide to deploy forward with appropriate staff.

### SECTION III – CONTINGENCY PLANNING

315. Contingency planning addresses potential military involvement in future crises (see Appendix 3B2). The SCOG sets priorities for intelligence collection and planning, concerning areas of potential instability that are likely to affect UK interests. CDS directs CJO to develop contingency plans, in the form of generic Joint Planning Guides (JPGs) and more specific Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs), in order to reduce the time taken to produce detailed plans in the event of a crisis.

#### Joint Planning Guides

316. JPGs comprise generic planning data for a particular country, region or theatre, or for the military contribution to a particular type of operation, such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) or a Disaster Relief Operation (DRO). The requirement for a JPG may be identified by MOD, PJHQ, the FLCs or OGDs, but should be approved by, and communicated to, CJO via the SCOG. CJO then instructs PJHQ J5 to compile a JPG, outlining the planning parameters, likely objectives, timelines and any political or military constraints.

317. A CPT is formed and planners identify any extant OGD or Stabilisation Unit plans for that area. A reconnaissance may be conducted in conjunction with the relevant British military representative, or Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO), and any OGD representatives in theatre. Although not necessarily covert, JPG reconnaissance is normally carried out discreetly by a small team. On completion of the reconnaissance, the CPT circulates a draft JPG to all interested parties including OGDs, proposed Supporting Commands, and relevant Embassies/High Commissions via the Consular Division of the FCO. Once their comments have been incorporated, and the JPG has been approved by CJO, it is maintained by PJHQ.

## Joint Contingency Plans

318. In addition to the generic planning data contained in JPGs, JCPs contain more information on the military capabilities required to conduct specified operations, and relevant deployment options including readiness states and associated risks. As with a JPG, the requirement for a JCP may be identified by MOD, PJHQ or the FLCs, but is ultimately triggered by a CDS' Planning Directive.

319. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)), under advice from the SCOG, orders the formation of an SPG to conduct a Political Military Estimate, engage with OGDs, and draft a CDS' Planning Directive (see Annex 2B). Upon its receipt, a CPT is formed within PJHQ, in concert with the MOD, Supporting Commands, and other specialist staffs including OGDs as appropriate. The CPT conducts a reconnaissance, undertakes a Military Strategic Estimate and drafts the JCP. Depending on the intended operation, the final JCP may be submitted to the COS for approval or, via CDS and the SofS, to the Cabinet (with the SPG staffing any necessary Ministerial submissions). The JCP is then issued and maintained thereafter by PJHQ.

## Indicators and Warnings

320. Implicit within contingency planning is the need to develop Indicators and Warnings – key events or signs which alert planners to an imminent crisis. Indicators and Warnings should be selected to provide sufficient notice for the activation of contingency plans or, if necessary, the development of new plans in time to pre-empt, rather than simply react to, an emerging situation. The Cabinet Office's Countries at Risk of Instability list forms the basis of Indicators and Warnings assessments. Within the MOD, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) is responsible for monitoring Indicators and Warnings and for national links into other security organisations such as NATO.

## SECTION IV – CURRENT OPERATIONS PLANNING

321. Campaigns may be short or continue over months or years; they may be continuous or intermittent; the military contribution may fluctuate in importance compared with that of the other instruments of power. Irrespective of length, intensity, or character, the organisations and processes outlined above provide an adaptive framework for the planning and management of current operations, described below.

322. The detailed conduct of operations (Campaign Management rather than Campaign Design) is covered in JDP 3-00. There are, however, 2 aspects of planning current operations that merit discussion here: campaign review, and campaign termination and transition. The first is relevant because it involves communication, interaction and understanding between commanders and headquarters at all levels (as

well as non-military actors). The second is relevant because it involves an aspect of operations, with potentially strategic implications, that again requires extensive planning beyond the JTFC/JTFHQ alone.

### **Campaign Review**

323. DCDS (Ops) is responsible to CDS for monitoring current operations and keeping ongoing campaigns under strategic review. The DCMO, and associated operational planning and management processes, provide the information necessary to validate objectives, confirm or modify plans for their achievement, and adjust capability and resource allocations accordingly. This continual process of review, illustrated at Appendix 3B3, takes place at different stages.

324. **National Strategic.** The Government's Political Strategic Analysis, the consequent cross-Government strategy or plan, and associated National Strategic Aim and Objectives, are all kept under periodic review through policy, strategy and senior officials' groups; regular revisions to Political-Military Estimates feed this review process. Any re-appraisal of the Government's intended role for the military, informed by appropriate reviews, may result in new direction being issued and the requirement for a review of the Military Strategic Estimate.

325. **Military Strategic.** The output of cross-Government review, ongoing monitoring by the COS, assessments of risk and opportunity from the Jt Comd at PJHQ and the JTFC in theatre, informs the overall assessment of current and projected progress towards achieving assigned Military Strategic Objectives. This process is sometimes referred to as Strategic Campaign Review, the form and conduct of which varies from one campaign to another. It may result in a review of the extant CDS' Directive, and/or a Force Level Review to confirm or adjust the balance of forces between commitments. Where the situation is judged to have changed significantly, or political intent has altered, an SPG may be required to refresh or conduct a further Political Military Estimate, a revised Military Strategic Estimate and so on.

326. **Operational.** Both CJO and deployed Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) should keep ongoing campaigns under review, using Assessment (see JDP 3-00), risk analysis, and by periodic stocktakes.

### **Termination and Transition**

327. Termination and transition are invariably complex and can represent periods of significant strategic, as well as operational, risk and should be factored into plans from the outset of a campaign. The pertinent planning issues, covered in Supplement 1, include:

- a. Affording appropriate weights of effort, to different types of military activity, as the nature of a campaign changes over time, including, where appropriate, ensuring military/defence support to ongoing stabilisation efforts.
- b. Pre-empting the cessation of hostilities with contingency plans to undertake, at least in the immediate aftermath, essential post-conflict activities.
- c. Making adequate provision, in advance, for force roulement and any necessary changes in Presence, Posture and Profile.
- d. Planning comprehensively for campaign transition/termination to ensure: enduring security (which may necessitate forces in over-watch) and effective transition from military to civil primacy (involving thorough civil-military collaboration).

## SECTION V – MULTI-AGENCY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

328. **Departmental Processes and Cultures.** Working across departmental boundaries may present challenges to the military planner. Different time-lines, planning capacity, priorities, culture and risk appetite make each department unique. Levels of authority, experience, technical ability and understanding of the personnel within civilian organisations may not always correspond to those in the military; equally, it should not be assumed that a military approach is universally acceptable. These differences may introduce frictions, misunderstandings and uncertainties if not appreciated from the outset. Supplement 2 provides an overview of FCO, DFID and Stabilisation Unit practices and culture. The military will often be major players, particularly in the early stages of an operation where conditions are non- or semi-permissive for civilians. Wherever the military becomes the de facto leader, its commanders must use plain, ‘jargon-free’ English and recognise that certain words can be laden with hidden meaning and values (Supplement 2, Planning with OGDs, contains specific advice). Nevertheless, commanders should be prepared to act as the campaign integrator, which on the one hand will impose the inevitable drag inherent in a Comprehensive Approach, yet on the other hand it will improve campaign cohesion.

329. **Multi-agency Leadership.** A comprehensive response to any situation is most likely to succeed if a single figure, ideally formally empowered, draws together and orchestrates the activities of the various agencies involved. How the role is agreed, and the formal authority that the leader is granted, varies on a case-by-case basis. For UK national campaigns, an Ambassador or alternative, bespoke political appointee, or a military commander, may be appropriate. In multinational operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN), the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is likely to be the multi-agency leader. On other occasions, particularly where there is no single nation or International Organisation orchestrating

events, it is not uncommon for an individual to emerge, often by force of character, as the accepted leader.<sup>3</sup>


330. **Cross-Government Bodies.** Departmental coordination within the UK is enhanced through cross-Governmental bodies, often facilitated by the Stabilisation Unit, with both strategic and operational responsibilities, which may include:

- a. Facilitating inter-departmental strategic planning, when so directed by the Cabinet, to develop strategies and policies to deal with specific crises. A body of this type may, for example, develop National Strategic Objectives, having been given the National Strategic Aim by Cabinet.
- b. Coordinating departmental contributions to the cross-Government strategy and monitoring national progress.
- c. Providing liaison and coordination for JTFCs and OGDs in theatre.

331. **Comprehensive Planning at the Operational Level.** There is no universal template for collaborative planning between military and non-military organisations at the operational level. The appropriate processes are dictated by the nature of the situation, the variety of actors and the extent of their involvement, and the role of the military in the anticipated operation. Figure 3.1 illustrates possible variations in inter-departmental collaboration, using 3 illustrative scenarios in which the military act: alone (A), or in loose cooperation with OGDs as part of a multi-agency operation (B) or, finally, with close inter-agency collaboration under a unified cross-Government plan (C). While all 3 models envisage a single National Strategy, military planning may be developed: in relative isolation from other departments (A), or in coordination with them (B), or subordinate to an agreed cross-Government strategy (C). Current experience suggests that the effort is increasingly shifting towards model C.

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
<sup>3</sup> For example, Lord Ashdown in Bosnia.



**Figure 3.1 – Models of Comprehensive Planning at the Operational Level**

332. **International and Non-Governmental Organisations.** Military operations frequently need to be coordinated and harmonised with those of other agencies, including International Organisations, NGOs, donors and regional organisations. The onset of operations usually acts as a catalyst for coordination, under loose or more formalised frameworks. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for instance, normally establishes a Humanitarian Operations (or coordination) Centre (HOC) in any major humanitarian crisis. UN agencies and NGOs usually attend coordination meetings hosted by UN OCHA but there may be other NGO forums where various stakeholders address common issues and concerns. Dealing with these humanitarian organisations needs tact and sensitivity. Each is likely to have a distinctive culture and specific aim, and some may resent and dispute the suggestion of coordination with, let alone by, military forces (or even to be seen to cooperate with them). Additionally each organisation should be treated separately, requiring individual approaches, rather than as a block. A JFC should, therefore, be sensitive to disparate perspectives, and may need to adopt unfamiliar working practices to facilitate collaboration. He should aim to create a broad dialogue, listen to different perspectives, seek advice and benefit from the expertise and insights of different organisations, many of whom may have been present for years in a particular operating environment and have unique and valuable experience and insights.

333. **Inter-agency Collaboration.** There is no template by which a JFC may support a Comprehensive Approach. Figure 3.2, however, offers 3 models, each increasingly collaborative and comprehensive.



**Figure 3.2 – Models of Interagency Working at the Operational Level**

- a. **Multi-Agency.** At the lowest level, the JTFHQ coordinates with OGDs, multinational partners, International Organisations and NGOs working in the same area. In such circumstances, a Comprehensive Approach is enabled through Civil-military Co-operation (CIMIC), without the establishment of firm relationships. This approach allows coordination or de-confliction, but does not enable a collaborative approach with agreed outcomes.
- b. **Multi-Agency and Inter-Agency.** Greater unity of purpose is achieved through inter-agency working, where military and OGD staffs establish long-term collaborative practices. Such arrangements may be self-established, or prescribed. This approach is enhanced by collocation. Multinationality and the presence of International Organisations and NGOs make this more demanding.
- c. **Predominantly Inter-Agency.** Greatest collaboration is achieved where the majority of national and multinational partners work to an agreed strategic plan, ideally with an empowered leader. Some agencies will remain unwilling or unable to operate in this way, and aspects of multi-agency working remain challenging.

334. **Private Military and Security Companies.** At an early stage, a JFC should consider coordination, or at least deconfliction, with Private Military and Security

Companies (PMSCs).<sup>4</sup> The majority of PMSCs are multinational and provide a range of armed and unarmed services, including risk management, governance and development activities, security provision, force and close protection, and specific military training to Government, corporate and NGO clients. PMSCs also contribute to the delivery of Security Sector Reform (SSR), particularly in multinational operations on behalf of donor governments.

## SECTION VI – MULTINATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

335. **UK Commitment to Multinational Operations.** Multinational campaigns and operations may be carried out within an established alliance framework or in a coalition. Coalition operations are normally facilitated by the selection of a Lead or Framework Nation, in many cases under the mandate of the UN or other recognised International Organisation. When the UK is considering whether to contribute to a multinational operation, the MOD provides advice on the level of any UK military commitment and appropriate Military Strategic Objectives.

336. **Permanent Joint Headquarters in Multinational Operations.** In multinational operations (non-NATO Article 5), CDS delegates Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces to a nominated UK Jt Comd (normally CJO), who may further delegate Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Command (TACOM) or Tactical Control (TACON) to a subordinate UK or multinational commander:

- a. **UK-led Operations.** When the UK is the Lead/Framework Nation, PJHQ forms the nucleus of the Multinational Headquarters, augmented as necessary by staff from other participating nations. The UK also provides staff to form the nucleus of a deployed Multinational JTFHQ.
- b. **Non UK-led Operations.** When the UK is **not** the Lead/Framework Nation, CJO acts as UK Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions (CSCF). As such, he coordinates the activities of the FLCs in deploying, sustaining, and recovering UK forces assigned to the operation. He may also provide staff, from PJHQ, to a Multinational Headquarters. CJO will specify national caveats.

337. **Joint Task Force Commander in Multinational Operations.** As early as possible, a JTFC (or National Contingent Commander (NCC)) should be briefed on the terms and conditions under which national contingents have been provided and, thereby, gain a feel for the political effect his actions may have on coalition cohesion.

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<sup>4</sup> The term applies to all PMSCs wherever they are registered or based, and to their local subcontractors. It does not apply to Defence industry contractors, if their activity is regulated through existing export controls, an export licence has been issued, or the commercial proposals are wholly within the terms of that licence. Additionally, unarmed contractors providing logistic support on operations to the MOD and covered by JSP 567, and private security companies that operate solely in the UK domestic market are not classified as PMSCs.



CJO, acting as CSCF, should ensure that multinational objectives complement those of the UK, and that the proposed UK contribution is feasible within available capabilities. JDP 01 '*Campaigning*' provides guidance on issues to be considered. The same procedures for planning the C2, deployment, sustainment and recovery of the UK contingent should be applied as in national operations. Other nations' liaison officers based at PJHQ, and reciprocal UK liaison officers based abroad, provide valuable links with other nations' military planning headquarters.

## **NATO Operations**

338. When the UK elects to contribute to NATO crises response, the process described in Section II ensures that the UK's participation is in accordance with the Government's intent, and that appropriate and timely contributions are made to NATO planning (see Supplement 3). In all circumstances, the MOD is responsible for liaison on strategic issues, both with NATO Headquarters (through the UK Military Representative (UKMILREP)) and with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE also functions as Allied Commander Operations (ACO). For NATO-led operations, the DCMO should both respond to, and proactively support, the NATO planning process. The DCMO may wish to influence the North Atlantic Council (NAC)<sup>5</sup> early in its considerations, prior to the issue of the Activation Warning (ACTWARN), and in such a way that the UK's intended participation is made clear before NATO confirms its force generation plans. The SPG/CCT is likely to be the principal vehicle through which the UK contributes to NATO planning, and responds to Force Preparation (FORCEPREP), Transfer of Authority (TOA) and Activation Order (ACTORD) instructions.

339. PJHQ is responsible for liaison and coordination on operational matters, with SHAPE where applicable, relevant NATO JFCs,<sup>6</sup> and with deployed UK forces. The high political profile of some operations may require the MOD to become involved in aspects of detailed planning normally carried out by PJHQ, thereby blurring the division of responsibility between MOD and PJHQ, and underlining the importance of CJO's role as CSCF, described earlier.

## **European Union Operations**

340. The European Union (EU) planning process is described in Supplement 4. In EU-led operations, the EU's permanent military elements – the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) – provide the principal points of coordination for the UK MOD. During the early stages

<sup>5</sup> NAC is the highest level of NATO decision-making.

<sup>6</sup> NATO defines a JFC as a general term applied to a commander, authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a Joint Force', Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C) '*Allied Joint Operations*'. It uses the term JFC for 2 of its 3 operational level commands (Brunssum and Naples), and Joint Command (JC) for the third (Lisbon).

of a crisis, the DCMO functions as normal in its national capacity. EU crisis management procedures, however, envisage the EUMS drawing upon planning expertise from either EU Member States and/or NATO (under Berlin Plus arrangements) as the crisis unfolds. For the UK this expertise is likely to be provided by the MOD and PJHQ. DCMO activity should focus on the UK's contribution to any proposed EU response, while maintaining oversight of any additional planning support likely to be required by the EUMS. UK national links with the EUMC mirror those with NATO's Military Committee (MC), and the UKMILREP attends both.

341. The EU has 3 alternative models for Operational Headquarters (OHQ), described in Supplement 4. The implications of each for UK planning are:

a. **EU-Led Operations *with* Recourse to NATO Assets.** If the EU were to call upon NATO assets and capabilities to respond to a crisis, the relationship between the DCMO and the EU would be comparable to the NATO model. NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) (in ACO - J5) would provide planning support at the request of the EU. Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) would be the likely choice to fulfil the functions normally performed by SACEUR, as the Military Strategic Commander, for NATO-led operations. The dual hatted UKMILREP would form the link with both NATO HQ and the EU.

b. **EU-Led Operation *without* Recourse to NATO Assets.** If NATO assets were not employed, one nation is likely to act as a Framework Nation using one of the 5 designated OHQs.<sup>7</sup> If PJHQ is selected as the OHQ, specific EU Multinational Headquarters procedures are activated. If another OHQ were chosen, some PJHQ staff and additional augmentees would deploy there. The JFHQ could also become the core of a deployed Force Headquarters (FHQ).

(1) **Key Nucleus Staff.** Pre-nominated and trained staff, drawn mainly from PJHQ/JFHQ, and immediately available for the EU role.

(2) **Primary Augmentee Multinational.** Pre-nominated and trained staff, including civilian/military staff from the EUMS, and other EU Nations, at 5-days notice.

(3) **Primary Augmentee Parent Nation.** Nominated and trained UK staff from other headquarters at 5-days notice to augment the Multinational Headquarters.

(4) **Additional Augmentees.** Multinational staff, not pre-nominated, to be made available, if required, within 20 days of activation.

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<sup>7</sup> Located in the UK (PJHQ), France, Germany, Italy and Greece.

- c. **EU Operational Centre.** The EUMS maintains the capability to form an OHQ,<sup>8</sup> to which PJHQ may contribute personnel on request.

342. If the UK is the Framework Nation, the decision to appoint an Operational Commander (Op Comd) should take into account CJO's role in concurrent operations, the availability of alternative commanders (possibly drawn from the Joint Command Group), and the staff required to support a UK national contingent. It is at this point that the roles and tasks of CJO and the PJHQ may split along EU and national lines, such that CJO may act as: Op Comd and Jt Comd, Op Comd only (with CDS selecting another Jt Comd) or Jt Comd only (with CDS selecting another Op Comd).

343. When the UK provides the JFHQ as the core element of the EU FHQ, the designated Force Commander answers to the EU Op Comd, whether UK or not. In the latter case, a separate NCC is required for the UK national link to PJHQ. Where the UK provides the OHQ, then it is responsible for the provision of communications to the FHQ. Similarly, where JFHQ provides the framework of an EU FHQ, it has the responsibility for provision of communications down to subordinate commands.

### United States-Led Operations

344. **US-Led Coalitions.** The UK recognises that in committing forces to future crises it may often operate within a US-led coalition. The US command and planning structures, detailed in Supplement 5, differ significantly from those of the UK. The President of the USA (POTUS) is, by statute, the Commander-in-Chief of all US forces, assisted by the Secretary of Defense (known as SecDef). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises them but does not enjoy a separate level of command equivalent to the UK MOD. Instead, the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) have a direct link to POTUS and the SecDef.

345. The UK national process for planning in such circumstances should be similar to that of a NATO or other non-UK led operation. The MOD and the DCMO remain the focus for national planning, linked through the British Defence Staff United States and the US Joint Staffs, with PJHQ initially deploying a small staff to liaise with the relevant Combatant Commander. A Senior British Military Adviser (SBMA) or NCC, is likely to deploy to assist the Combatant Commander in developing options for any UK involvement.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Particularly where there is a civil/military aspect or where no national headquarters has been identified – '*EU Principles for EU HQs*', agreed by the EUMC 2 June 2005.

<sup>9</sup> PJHQ and the SBMA/NCC should coordinate closely to ensure that the Combatant Commander (CCDR) receives coherent UK advice.

## United Nations and Other Multinational Operations

346. **UN Operations.** The role and organisation of the UN is described in JWP 3-50 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) ‘*The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*’.<sup>10</sup> UN operations may be mounted by a single nation or on a multinational basis, either as a coalition or by an alliance on behalf of the UN. C2 structures vary depending on the nature and scale of operations; the UN does not normally form Operational Headquarters but instead forms Theatre/Force Headquarters, as required, from amongst contributing nations. For operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, the military Force Commander acts in support of the civilian Head of Mission, normally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) although, in simple operations, the Force Commander may be appointed Head of Mission. The Head of Mission’s planning staff is responsible for developing coordinating plans that reflect international consensus, and should be continually reviewed against mission objectives and the changing situation on the ground.

347. **Cooperative Operations.** UK forces may deploy on a national basis alongside other national contingents who then agree to de-conflict, or even cooperate, outside the framework of a recognised multinational command structure. These cooperative operations are most likely to occur during operations such as NEO, where each nation has individual national imperatives, objectives and responsibilities. UK involvement in cooperative operations invariably demands the appointment of a JTFC with a JTFHQ to conduct in-theatre liaison between national forces.

## Multinational Planning Considerations

348. **Doctrine.** Multinationality presents UK JFCs and their staffs with additional planning challenges. Doctrine varies between nations, although the UK intent is to work within a recognised multinational planning framework wherever possible (see JDP 3-00). Nevertheless, UK planners should anticipate some disparity. The supplements to this publication provide an overview of different national and multinational procedures, indicating where new approaches may be expected.

349. **Influencing Allies.** In addition UK JFCs and staffs, acting in multinational roles, should seek to exert national influence:

- a. **National Interest.** UK commanders and staff should represent and promote the national interest, either as an explicit planning priority or objective or, more generally, in shaping multinational intent.
- b. **Unique Capabilities.** The UK may have been asked to contribute unique capabilities, or particular staff skills, which should be exploited fully.

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<sup>10</sup> Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1(A) ‘*Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*’ is under development.

- c. **National Caveats.** UK JFCs and staff should seek to develop trust and close working relationships with other national representatives, as part of their role in a Multinational Headquarters. While there is a tendency to adopt the norms and standards of a surrounding culture, they should always act within UK national guidelines. To engender a pragmatic, rather than ‘lowest common denominator’, approach, where appropriate, it is preferable to be frank about national caveats or other reservations, and to seek out areas where the UK’s positive contribution could benefit the multinational force. If in doubt, UK JFCs and staff should seek national guidance.
- d. **Multinational Cohesion.** Maintaining cohesion across the international community is a strategic priority in any multinational operation. It builds and maintains Campaign Authority<sup>11</sup> and increases the likelihood of future force contributions. Building and maintaining partnerships and trust may occupy significant amounts of a JFC’s time and effort. Additionally, it may be appropriate to monitor multinational cohesion as part of Campaign Assessment.
- e. **Risk.** Risk in multinational operations is described in Chapter 2.

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<sup>11</sup> Campaign Authority is ‘the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation.’ New definition developed for this publication and future UK doctrine. It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors: the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action; the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively; the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate; and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

## ANNEX 3A – CRISIS MANAGEMENT GROUPS

### Monitoring

**3A1. Security Cooperation and Operations Group.** The Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG), jointly chaired by Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)) and the Director General Security Strategy, comprises the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) supported by 2\* membership and representation from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The SCOG meets approximately 3 times per year to determine priorities for security cooperation activities, Defence intelligence effort, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) contingency planning; these are promulgated through the Operations Tasking List and Security Co-Operation Priorities List. The SCOG responds to emerging strategic risks, focusing on those areas in which the UK has actual or potential interest; it is not specifically involved in crisis response. The SCOG is supported by the 2\*-chaired Operations and International Security Co-Operations Board which advises on changes in country priority and directs the allocation of Defence resources to meet those priorities.

**3A2. Defence Crisis Management Organisation Brief.** The DCMO (in particular the Directorate of Strategic Planning (D Strat Plans)) monitors world events continuously, taking inputs from across the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Other Government Departments (OGDs) and the national intelligence and security agencies. Information and views are exchanged at a twice weekly morning brief, attended by staffs from the MOD and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), as well as representatives from the FCO, Department for International Development (DFID), the Stabilisation Unit and the Cabinet Office. The brief includes a regional intelligence update, followed by an analysis of political and operational events, including their significance to the UK, to assist DCDS (Ops) to decide upon appropriate responses.

### Response to Emerging Crisis or a Change in Strategic Circumstances

**3A3. Current Operations Group.** A Current Operations Group (COG) is chaired by DCDS(C) (as Director of Operations (DOps)), or Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations) (ACDS (Ops)) in his absence, and attended by selected staffs from across the MOD. A COG may be convened in response to an emerging crisis, or to study a particular aspect of a current operation (such as a change in strategic direction). In the case of the former, its purpose is to provide situational awareness, orientate the DCMO to the crisis, and consider the utility of (as well as any risks involved in) military intervention, to inform the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and hence Ministers.

**3A4. Strategic Planning Group.** A Strategic Planning Group (SPG) is led by D Strat Plans, and includes members from across the MOD as required; PJHQ J5 and relevant OGDs are also usually represented. An SPG may be formed, prior to a COG,<sup>1</sup> to initiate a Political-Military Estimate to inform cross-Government political strategic analysis. Subsequently, once a decision has been taken to initiate more detailed planning, an SPG drafts CDS' Planning Directive to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd).

**3A5. Permanent Joint Headquarters Contingency Planning Team.** A Contingency Planning Team (CPT), led by J5, includes staff from across PJHQ, the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and, where appropriate, the Front Line Commands (FLCs).<sup>2</sup> A CPT may form in parallel with the associated MOD Current Commitments Team (CCT) (see paragraph 307).<sup>3</sup> Leadership and membership varies according to the priority, scale and complexity of the planning task (which may involve either contingency or crisis response planning). On receipt of CDS' Planning Directive, the CPT conducts a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE), or contributes to one led by a CCT. A CPT may also (re-)form to address longer-term issues as part of current operations planning.

## Management of Commitments

**3A6. Current Commitments Team.** A CCT, formed under a Directorate of Joint Commitments (DJC) lead (at 1\* or AD level), includes staff from across the MOD; it liaises with PJHQ, FLCs, OGDs and, where required, with multinational partners. CCTs are formed at the onset of a crisis, or on the issue of CDS' Planning Directive. It remains in being throughout a crisis, providing a strategic focus for the DCMO. The CCT coordinates advice to CDS, the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and Ministers, and interprets policy decisions into clear and unambiguous direction and guidance for the conduct of operations. Accordingly a CCT, in conjunction with the associated SPG, formulates relevant military objectives in relation to the outcomes sought, prepares ministerial submissions and responses to parliamentary questions, and develops CDS' Operational Directive to the Jt Comd (see Annex 2C). Thereafter, a CCT focuses on current issues, concerning the deployment, activity, sustainment and recovery of forces.

**3A7. Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Team.** Once CDS' Operational Directive is issued, an Operations Team (OT) - led by PJHQ J3<sup>4</sup> and drawing upon

<sup>1</sup> For smaller operations, and/or due to time constraints, a COG may not be formed and D Strat Plans may simply form an SPG himself. For larger operations the formal planning process may commence months in advance of deployment.

<sup>2</sup> Fleet, Land, Air, Director Special Forces (DSF), Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).

<sup>3</sup> In fast moving crises, a CPT may form before a CCT to maximise planning time. In any case, for emerging crises and situations, the CCT and CPT work as a single entity, aided by video conferencing.

<sup>4</sup> This may be an entirely new Operations Team (OT), or an existing one whose area of responsibility is relevant to the new operation.

other expertise as required - develops the Jt Comd's Mission Directive (see Annex 2D).

**3A8. Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** An Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) despatched to a theatre of actual or potential operations, at the outset of an emerging crisis or as part of contingent planning, adds significantly to situational awareness and facilitates planning. The JFHQ has the core of 2 OLRTs on permanent standby, comprising a team leader and core intelligence, operations, logistics and communications staff. Where required, staff from PJHQ, the FLCs, Special Forces (SF), the Stabilisation Unit and OGDs may participate, to inform decision making at the strategic and operational levels. Where this wider representation is not possible, core OLRT members should take checklists, provided by those excluded from deploying, to ensure that the requisite information is acquired.<sup>5</sup> Where possible, an OLRT should integrate with in-theatre UK Diplomatic structures. Reconnaissance should utilise Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILOs) (if deployed), UK military training teams (if applicable), Embassy or High Commission staffs and other in-country sources such as International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international commercial organisations. Increasingly, OLRTs will be integrated teams to support cross-Government analysis, including personnel from MOD, FCO, DFID and Stabilisation Unit as required.

**3A9. OLRT activities may include:**

- a. **Liaison.** Liaison with host nation authorities, allies, potential coalition partners and other important agencies and organisations already present in the area of interest.
- b. **Reconnaissance.** Detailed reviews of, for example, appropriate locations for Command and Control (C2) elements, requirements for Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), existing or new Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), or the need for Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO).
- c. **Review of Existing Plans.** Review of existing contingency planning.
- d. **Advice and Reports.** Reporting through PJHQ, the OLRT either returns to the UK to back-brief their findings or it remains in theatre to facilitate Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) (or equivalent) entry and bolster any advance elements.

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<sup>5</sup> While ideally there should be a separate reconnaissance at each level (strategic, operational and tactical), pressures of time and practical constraints imposed by the host nation may dictate that they be conducted concurrently.



## Crisis Management Group Relationships

3A10. **Strategic Planning Group/Other Government Departments.** Links between the MOD and OGDs are formalised in SPG meetings, COGs and through a variety of other cross-Government engagement, but considerable *ad hoc* liaison is achieved during routine staff discussions and other contacts.

3A11. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Operations Group.** The SPG Leader is usually a member of the COG. Other members of the SPG may also be present at COGs, albeit as capability directors or specialists rather than as SPG members.

3A12. **Strategic Planning Group/Current Commitments Team.** In the early stages of a crisis, an SPG is committed to developing plans and then, as events unfold, refining them in conjunction with PJHQ J5. During this process, the SPG/CCT secretariat is responsible for raising submissions to Ministers, through the Director General Operational Policy (DG Op Pol), on matters requiring their decision or attention. An SPG has no active involvement in the coordination of current operations, which is the remit of the CCT. The presence of an SPG member within the CCT ensures that current operations remain harmonised with strategic aims and helps the CCT to produce CDS' Operational Directive. As the crisis develops, the SPG member also provides forward planning insights to the CCT.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For example, in enduring operations the SPG may conduct Termination Planning while the CCT is engaged in current operations planning.

## ANNEX 3B – PLANNING AT THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Crisis Management Group	Crisis Response Planning	Contingency Planning	Current Operations Planning
<b>MOD</b> Chiefs of Staff Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Principal crisis and commitments management body</li> <li>▪ Strategic coordination with Other Government Departments (OGDs)</li> <li>▪ Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) advice to Ministers</li> <li>▪ Military Strategic Direction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides Strategic direction</li> <li>▪ Approves Joint Contingency Plans (JCP) or pass to Ministers for approval</li> <li>▪ Military Strategic direction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reviews commitments against National Strategic Objectives</li> <li>▪ Balance of forces across commitments</li> <li>▪ Directs future strategy and force levels</li> </ul>
<b>Crisis Monitoring Groups</b>			
<b>MOD</b> Security Co-Operation Operations Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identify emerging crises</li> <li>▪ Advice to 2* Operations and International Security Co-Operations Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Prioritises contingency planning</li> <li>▪ Sets intelligence priorities</li> <li>▪ Gives direction on intelligence activity</li> <li>▪ Gives direction on contingency planning</li> </ul>	
<b>MOD</b> Defence Crisis Management Brief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision-making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision-making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish common understanding</li> <li>▪ Assists decision-making</li> <li>▪ Enables exchange of views within MOD and with OGDs</li> </ul>

Crisis Management Group	Crisis Response Planning	Contingency Planning	Current Operations Planning
<b>Crisis Response Groups</b>			
<b>MOD</b> Current Operations Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provides Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS (Ops)) with appropriate expert advice</li> <li>▪ Provides initial briefing to CDS and Chiefs of Staff (COS)</li> <li>▪ Decides on formation of Strategic Planning Group (SPG)/ Current Commitments Team (CCT)</li> </ul>		
<b>MOD</b> Strategic Planning Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political/Military Estimate</li> <li>▪ Long-term planning (MOD J5)</li> <li>▪ Liaison with OGDs</li> <li>▪ Interaction with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)</li> <li>▪ Produce Military Options paper for DCDS (Ops)</li> <li>▪ CDS' Planning Directive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political/Military Estimate</li> <li>▪ CDS' Planning Directive<sup>1</sup></li> <li>▪ Submissions to Ministers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refine/revise Political/Military Estimate</li> <li>▪ Maintain long-term planning</li> <li>▪ Contribute to cross-Government strategy/plan</li> <li>▪ Updated CDS' Directive</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ</b> Contingency Planning Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Close liaison with MOD</li> <li>▪ Conducts Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) with SPG/ CCT</li> <li>▪ Summary of MSE</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MSE</li> <li>▪ Joint Planning Guides (JPG)</li> <li>▪ JCPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reviews/refines MSE in liaison with CCT</li> </ul>


<sup>1</sup> For Joint Contingency Plans.

Crisis Management Group	Crisis Response Planning	Contingency Planning	Current Operations Planning
<b>Crisis Orchestration Groups</b>			
<b>MOD</b> Current Commitments Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitoring of current ops and issues (MOD J3)</li> <li>▪ Staffs MSE (in conjunction with PJHQ Contingency Planning Team (CPT))</li> <li>▪ Liaison with OGDs on current issues</li> <li>▪ Ministerial submissions</li> <li>▪ CDS' Directive</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coordinate reviews</li> <li>▪ Liaison with OGDs and allies</li> <li>▪ CDS' Directive Review</li> <li>▪ Force Level Review (FLR)</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ</b> Operations Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Expanded from CPT (J3 Lead)</li> <li>▪ Run current ops for Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)</li> <li>▪ Jt Comd's Mission Directive (in conjunction with CPT)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support CDS Directive reviews</li> <li>▪ Initiate PJHQ review process</li> <li>▪ Update/reissue extant Jt Comd's Mission Directives</li> </ul>
<b>PJHQ/JFHQ</b> Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Theatre reconnaissance</li> <li>▪ Potential forward planning nucleus for deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ)</li> <li>▪ Inform/ conduct initial campaign planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Theatre reconnaissance</li> <li>▪ Review/ develop contingency planning</li> </ul>	
<b>JFHQ<sup>2</sup></b> Situational Awareness Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Monitor the development of crisis</li> <li>▪ Initial and deployment planning</li> </ul>		

<sup>2</sup> Or equivalent from alternative deployed operational headquarters.


<b>JFHQ<sup>2</sup></b> Planning Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Conduct Operational planning</li><li>▪ Conduct deployment planning</li><li>▪ Campaign planning</li><li>▪ Deployment plans</li><li>▪ Subsequent orders and plans</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Conduct campaign Assessment</li><li>▪ Iteratively refine Operational planning</li><li>▪ Issue subsequent orders and direction</li></ul>
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# APPENDIX 3B1 – CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING



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
## APPENDIX 3B2 – CONTINGENCY PLANNING





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# APPENDIX 3B3 – CURRENT OPERATIONS PLANNING



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## SUPPLEMENT 1 – TRANSITION AND TERMINATION

*This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the considerations associated with campaign transition and termination planning as at December 2008.*

### Nature of Operations

1S1. The contemporary operating environment does not encourage the classification, or labelling, of discrete types or phases of military intervention(s), such as Counter-Insurgency (COIN), or Stabilisation Operations. Two complementary models can be used instead to indicate the different *contexts* within which military action may be required and, building on that foundation, the different *activities* to which a commander may attribute varying weights of effort during the course of a campaign.

1S2. **Context.** Major warfighting, characterised by, for example, large-scale deliberate intervention or, in extremis, the use of strategic weapon systems in a war of national survival, is likely to be identifiable as such. But combat may also be required in other circumstances, including during security operations and stabilisation, which will see conditions ebb and flow between permissive (for other agencies' development work) and non-permissive environments. There will rarely be the clear erstwhile distinction between combat and peace support operations.

1S3. **Activity.** Military activities undertaken during a campaign include: (major) warfighting, the countering of irregular activity, security operations and stabilisation; ongoing peacetime military engagement may also contribute. The relationship between these types of military activity (or military contributions to comprehensive, multi-agency activity) will vary over the course of a campaign, and a commander should focus his resources accordingly as a situation evolves. See JDP 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) '*Campaigning*', Chapter 1 for more detail.

### Campaign Transition

1S4. As emphasis shifts between different types of military activity, so a campaign changes in character and transitions from one state to another. Different combinations of military activities, and weights of effort afforded to different activities, require different force structures and postures. The cessation of hostilities represents a particular transition, indicating the beginning of a move from military to civil primacy. This requires agility on the part of a Joint Force Commander (JFC), and planning in advance for the immediate aftermath of hostilities (including any transfer of responsibilities to indigenous forces or civilian agencies), and subsequent changes in force structure and posture. When all campaign objectives have been achieved, a campaign is said to terminate (although this may not mean the end of all military involvement, as explained below). Perceptions of campaign transition and termination are likely to vary between contributing nations involved in multinational operations,

and between military and other actors engaged in multi-agency operations. Friction may be alleviated by a JFC sharing his thinking with other stakeholders, and planning collaboratively with them where appropriate, rather than assuming that they will all necessarily share his perspective on changes in the nature of the campaign.

### **Actions in the Immediate Aftermath of Hostilities**

1S5. **Cessation of Hostilities.** Hostilities may be brought to an end by:

- a. **Capitulation.** Capitulation or surrender occurs formally at a particular time, within defined geographic boundaries, and affects specified units (who may be obliged to give up occupied territory, for example). A JFC should be prepared to initiate or participate in negotiations of surrender, to receive surrendered forces, or to handle prisoners (depending upon the situation).
- b. **Cease-fire.** A cease-fire, which may be declared unilaterally by one side, temporarily suspends the use of arms. It may also initiate a lasting settlement.
- c. **Peace Settlement.** A peace settlement may be drawn up between belligerents who either reconcile their differences or decide to pursue their interests by alternative, peaceful means (perhaps perceiving that their losses may outweigh the likely gains).
- d. **General Truce.** A truce, often arising from a stalemate, provides an opportunity for a negotiated settlement.
- e. **Transition to Peace.** Even in the absence of a cease-fire or other declaration, a general transition to peace may still occur. Without formal terms, however, this may be a fragile or temporary arrangement.

1S6. **Stabilisation.** In the immediate aftermath of hostilities the process of stabilisation begins. This may encompass: preventing or reducing violence, protecting people and key installations, promoting political processes, which lead to greater stability, and preparing for longer-term development and non-violent politics. Stabilisation activities will be delivered by a range of Other Government Departments (OGDs), International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and indigenous groups (as they increase), as well as the military, and must be planned collaboratively from the outset. They may see the military in either a **supporting** or **supported** role and close coordination with relevant civilian agencies will be critical. Multi-agency involvement will, however, only be possible within the context of adequate security and a permissive environment. The core military role is, therefore, to enable non-military efforts by contributing to the delivery of a safe and secure environment. Until this is achieved, the military might assume initial responsibility for a broader range of activities, which might best be undertaken by civilian organisations. In this instance, the JFC's actions must be coherent with longer-term

development aims. The 4 principal areas of military contribution to stabilisation activities are:

- a. **Security and Control.** Activities to achieve security and control should be at the core of the military role, in order to provide an environment within which other agencies can operate. They may be conducted without the assistance of indigenous security forces initially but every effort should be made to transfer authority as they become available.
- b. **Support to Security Sector Reform.** Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective and accountable role in providing security for their citizens, under the control of a legitimate state authority, and to promote stability. It covers not only the Armed Forces, but also policing, judiciary and penal systems. Military involvement in SSR should be applied to specific areas as part of a Comprehensive Approach, with the process for transfer of responsibility planned in advance.
- c. **Initial Restoration of Essential Services.** Initial restoration of essential services, which includes infrastructure, is primarily the domain of military engineers, logisticians and medical services. They must be able to mitigate the impact of the likely civilian capacity void during, and immediately after, hostilities. Tasks may be in direct support of own troops, such as route and airfield repair, but may also support the operation by generating beneficial effects for the local population and other agencies; helping to restore health, building consent or limiting political problems through averting humanitarian disaster. While this type of activity might initially be in support of military objectives its potential effects may also contribute to longer-term reconstruction.
- d. **Interim Governance.** The provision of a coherent and credible system of national, regional and local government is central to the task of establishing authority and restoring order. In the absence of an effective civil administration, the military may assist international agencies and indigenous actors in establishing an interim administration, normally through local engagement with indigenous leaders and opinion formers. Particularly close liaison and contact needs to be maintained with local civil government and their associated organisation, which may demand collocation.
- e. **Stability Tasks.** The 4 principal military stability activities can be further broken down into military tasks, as shown in Table S1.1.

<b>Stability Activities (Illustrative)</b>		
<b>Security and Control – Military Tasks</b>		<b>Support to Security Sector Reform – Military Tasks</b>
Supervision of cease fire Airborne surveillance Space surveillance No-fly zone enforcement Prisoner/detainee handling Enforcement of ORBAT areas Separation of hostile forces Observation and monitoring	Conflict containment Route protection Refugee movement Sanctions and embargoes Protection of civilians Freedom of movement Denial of movement Control of the sea	Disarmament of belligerents Demobilisation of belligerents Reintegration of belligerents into civil population Selection & recruitment of future security force Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility
<b>Initial Restoration of Services – Military Tasks</b>		<b>Interim Governance – Military Tasks</b>
Provision of mobility on roads, railways and waterways Restoration of airfields, harbours and ports Provision of essential water, fuel and power Restoration of essential health infrastructure and services Restoration of essential public buildings and services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Limited medical assistance/advice Support to humanitarian assistance Securing critical national infrastructure		Rule of law - specifically against criminal activity Services - refuse, health, customs Support to elections Support to humanitarian assistance

**Table S1.1 – Examples of Military Tasks with Stability Activities**

### **Force Structure and Posture**

1S7. **Roulement of Forces.** Roulement enables both straightforward relief in place but also the introduction of differently configured forces. New forces in theatre can provide capabilities that are more appropriate to a changed situation, as well as signalling a change in force posture, from invasion/occupation to stabilisation/reconstruction and departure (perceptions of which may be important to sustain

Campaign Authority). Roulements can, however, threaten continuity and should be planned in detail to make them as seamless as possible. Any (real or even perceived) capability vacuum, or loss of tempo, may increase the vulnerability of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and risk exploitation by opponents (including those temporarily vanquished). Sequencing handovers, exchanging liaison officers between Headquarters and formations and units, and retaining the Campaign Plan at a higher level Headquarters, can all help to mitigate risk.

**1S8. Presence, Posture and Profile.** A JFC, in conjunction with the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), decides upon the appropriate presence, posture and profile of his forces during a campaign. The cessation of hostilities is likely to cause a specific review. Adjustments to *modus operandi*, including Rules of Engagement (ROE) and relations with other actors, such as former opponents, are likely to be required. These may be introduced separately from, but are likely to be most effective after, a post-hostilities roulement of forces.

### **Campaign Termination**

**1S9.** Planning to *end* a campaign is part of planning its *conduct*, especially as termination is likely to be reached gradually rather than as a single event. The handover of responsibilities to indigenous forces and structures requires careful coordination. Enduring operations can establish precedents and generate expectations in terms of security, physical presence, resources and financial support, which cannot be sustained indefinitely. Outstanding liabilities to those who have provided service and support during a campaign should be met in full, but not to the prejudice of, for example, local market forces or political progress.


**1S10. Terminating Military Involvement.** Even after initial campaign objectives have been achieved, there may be a continuing requirement for military involvement, either to provide direct support to indigenous forces (either specific capabilities such as engineer or logistic personnel, and/or capacity-building Military Training Teams), or in the form of over-watch.

**1S11. Overwatch.** Some form of over-watch may be retained where it is considered that, while there is no longer any requirement for a JTF to be actively engaged in-theatre (indeed it may be counter-productive for it to do so), the developing indigenous capability is insufficient to ensure security. A reserve force is, therefore, retained until the situation is deemed sufficiently stable, or the indigenous capability sufficiently well-developed, to allow it to be drawn down. Overwatch can be provided at different levels, as shown in Figure S1.2:

- a. **Tactical Overwatch** – available in theatre at immediate notice, for example in local barracks.



- b. **Operational Overwatch** – available in theatre, at short notice.
- c. **Strategic Overwatch** – positioned outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA), but available at notice to intervene if required.



1. Indigenous Security Forces increase in size and capability. 2. Visible Multinational Force Levels on the ground decrease as indigenous forces increase to avoid culture of dependency. 3. Potential Security Vacuum could arise (Transition Challenge). 4. Overwatch Forces provide reserve capability for indigenous forces; overwatch drawn-down in stages (Tactical, Operational and Strategic) as indigenous capability increases. 5. Total security force levels remain acceptable, mitigating risks of Transition Challenge.

**Figure S1.2 – Levels of Overwatch**

## SUPPLEMENT 2 – PLANNING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

*This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the latest guidance for cross-Government crisis planning as at December 2008.*

2S1. **Understanding Other Departments.** A guiding principle of a Comprehensive Approach is that ‘institutional familiarity will enhance collaborative working and trust between entities’.<sup>1</sup> Just as acquaintance with relevant doctrine could enhance conduct in multinational operations, so too, an understanding of Other Government Departments (OGDs) may enhance cooperation and planning. This principle has equal applicability when operating with International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Of the principle government departments involved in crisis planning in the context of conflict (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), with the Stabilisation Unit), each has its own unique way of doing business. Generally, the causes of these differences may be understood in terms of:

- a. **Size and Structure.** The FCO (with 16000 personnel) and DFID (with 2500 personnel) are much smaller than the British Armed Forces (with approximately 196,000 military and civilian personnel). Inevitably, this makes their associated processes less bureaucratic and complex.
- b. **Culture.** The military culture, based on authority and discipline, is often directive. Civilian practice, however, is frequently more inclusive and less hierarchical.
- c. **Crises Orientation.** The British Armed Forces have traditionally been orientated, resourced, prepared and trained as a contingency against future crises, which, when they occur, usually attract further funding from the Treasury. Conversely, most OGDs view crises as but a continuum of ongoing, day-to-day business to be managed within existing funds.
- d. **Planning Approaches.** Due to the characteristics of military crisis response, and the planning resources available, the British Armed Forces use an objective approach to planning. Some OGDs follow broadly similar lines; however, this structured form of planning is not suited to all situations. Consequently, other Departments take a more incremental, or ‘political’ approach, in which policy and decision-making are seen as progressive and iterative.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) ‘*Campaigning*’.

e. **Risk Appetite.** The covenant to undertake operations, unquestioningly, in conditions of mortal danger is unique to the Armed Forces. While other Departments can, and do, work in hazardous locations, they will withdraw their personnel if they judge the situation too dangerous.

2S2. **Understanding Ourselves.** Military planners engaged in multi-agency operations should recognise that military practice can appear alien to civilian partners. While other Departments recognise the military's competence, they often have difficulty recognising where and how they can engage effectively. Military processes are sometimes seen by OGDs as cumbersome, labour intensive and introspective. In particular, civilian planners often cite the sense of 'unstoppable momentum' that characterises the military response to a new crisis, which, while a key characteristic of the 'can do' spirit of British Armed Forces, may not be conducive to influence by OGD representatives.

### **Department for International Development**

2S3. **Purpose.** DFID's primary focus is poverty reduction, including work towards achievement of the United Nation's (UN) Millennium Goals for poverty reduction, which is reflected in the Department's objectives and targets. The UK, along with most western countries, is a signature to the Paris Declaration. This calls on donor nations to work with the Governments of states in crisis, as partners, in the development of poverty reduction strategies. DFID will always seek to draw representatives of afflicted states into its planning processes. In order to deliver sustainable development, DFID must work with other donor nations, International Organisations, NGOs and the agencies of the crisis state, to ensure a coherent international development effort. Consequently, DFID give priority to working with such partners.

2S4. **Processes.** DFID has developed objective and structured analysis and planning methodologies, which are often conducted by in-country DFID offices (which tend to have greater devolved power than other departments deployed representatives):

a. **Country Assistance Plan.** A Country Assistance Plan (CAP) is compulsory for all countries or regions where DFID works (where a threshold of £20M of funding has been reached), and considerable weight is placed upon gaining a detailed understanding of the situation before the plan is written. A number of assessment tools have been developed to help achieve this, some of which – including the 'Country Governance Assessment' and 'Fiduciary Risk Assessment' – are compulsory. Others, such as the 'Strategic Conflict Assessment' and 'Drivers of Change' assessments, will only be done where and when needed. Country Assistance Plans should provide a long-term strategy, and are usually reviewed every 3 years.

b. **Logical Framework Analysis.** Once developed, Country Assistance Plans could be broken down further into separate sectors, for example into education, health or governance, and addressed through a collection of programmes and projects. An important tool when developing these projects is 'Logical Framework Analysis', or 'Logframe'. This should lay out the hierarchy of objectives within the project, identify key assumptions, state means of objective verification, and highlight any indicators of progress, thereby capturing the logic in the plan.

2S5. **Rapid Onset Disasters.** Whereas the responsibility for dealing with chronic, or prolonged, crises tends to lie with the regional leads in DFID's country offices, rapid onset disasters (crises) are dealt with by DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) Department. The relationship between DFID and the MOD in Disaster Relief Operations is described in JDP 3-52 '*Disaster Relief Operations*'.

### **Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

2S6. **Purpose.** The UK's foreign policy objectives are articulated as Departmental Strategic Objectives, including 4 policy goals which, in those areas where the FCO leads the UK's international engagement. The policy goals cover; countering terrorism and weapons proliferation, prevention and resolution of conflict, promotion of a low carbon, high growth global economy and supporting the development of international institutions.

2S7. **Diplomacy.** The FCO is not resourced for significant crisis response, and instead treats each situation within the context of an ongoing dynamic of international diplomatic relations. As a result, the FCO tends to focus on immediate issues, in what is, frequently, a rapidly changing situation. With the exception of Civil Contingency Plans,<sup>2</sup> detailed contingency plans are of limited utility to the Department, as they can very quickly become out-of-date and may limit future flexibility. Furthermore, the tools of diplomacy tend to involve the fostering, and subsequent exploitation, of personal relationships. Diplomacy, therefore, is a far more individual process than the task orientated activities carried out by either DFID, or the MOD, requiring few formal strategies and plans. Instead, it is more usual to find the UK's diplomatic position articulated within an amalgam of 'lines to take', Ministerial briefing papers, policy statements and 'e-grams' from ambassadors. These are usually the outcome of intense dialogue between regional desks, policy departments, UK missions (to the UN or European Union (EU)), and embassy staffs, as well as with appropriate OGDs. This results in an agreed view that is then taken forward by FCO staff in Whitehall and the network of embassies, high commissions and other diplomatic posts overseas. The

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<sup>2</sup> Described in Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*', to be revised following publication of a forthcoming Service Level Agreement between the MOD and FCO.

FCO is currently developing a more structured approach to planning, but it is unlikely to reflect that of the military.

## **Stabilisation Unit**

2S8. **Purpose.** The Stabilisation Unit was established in 2004, as a tri-Departmental unit of the MOD, FCO and DFID, to provide Her Majesty's Government (HMG) with integrated, and common, analysis of crisis stabilisation priorities.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the Stabilisation Unit provides a deployable, comprehensive, analysis and planning capability. The Stabilisation Unit's aim is to strengthen the UK's ability to foster stability in those countries that are emerging from conflict. Note that the Stabilisation Unit does not act independently; it works under the guidance and direction of 'parent' Government Departments.

2S9. **Facilities.** The Stabilisation Unit has developed the facility to:

- a. Support cross-Government analysis of unstable countries.
- b. Support integrated strategic planning across Government.
- c. Provide suitably experienced personnel to work in unstable countries.
- d. Identify and share National and international best practice.

2S10. **Processes.** The Stabilisation Unit's Joint Stabilisation Planning process is an amalgam of both DFID, and military, planning approaches. The Joint Stabilisation Planning process could form the basis of stabilisation planning, although Stabilisation Unit staff could also draw from a wide range of other assessment and planning approaches. The Joint Stabilisation Planning comprises 3 steps: assessment, planning and review. Assessment is an ongoing activity, although more focused Joint Stabilisation Assessments could be conducted, where necessary, to inform the development of stabilisation strategies. Periodic reviews test, and refine, plans prior to implementation, and thereafter in the light of experience and improved understanding of the situation.

2S11. **Joint Stabilisation Assessment.** Joint Stabilisation Assessments comprise 3 stages: conflict analysis; future projection of conflict; and identification of key issues for stabilisation planning:

- a. **Conflict Analysis.** Conflict analysis should combine an understanding of the underlying societal structures, with an analysis of stakeholders, and an assessment of local capacity and resilience. This could include political and governance issues, security, and socio-economic concerns. Each should be

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
<sup>3</sup> The SU currently has capabilities in governance, security and justice, and is developing expertise in infrastructure and livelihoods.

assessed for its impact at local, national, regional and international level. Stakeholder analysis should, as appropriate, examine interests and ideologies, capacities, locality, track record, relationships and linkages between indigenous and regional actors. Conflict analysis should be completed with an examination of the society's ability to manage, and resolve, conflict peacefully. Issues considered could include: the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state; the nature of the relationship between the state and society; and the level of political will to address the issues at hand.

b. **Future Projection.** Future projection should assess likely conflict outcomes, identify possible short-term triggers, and outline plausible scenarios under which the conflict could evolve.

c. **Planning Issues.** Previous analysis should then be reviewed, extracting those issues that are pertinent to subsequent planning, including relative priorities, and any areas requiring further specialist assessment.

2S12. **Joint Stabilisation Planning.** Planning should begin with an articulation of a Strategic Vision; a statement of (realistic) aspiration, describing a desired future over the medium to long term (approximately 10 years). From this, a Stabilisation Strategy and an Implementation Plan will be developed, as depicted in Figure S2.1.



**Figure S2.1 – Stabilisation Unit Joint Stabilisation Planning**

a. **Stabilisation Strategy.** The Stabilisation Strategy outlines the overall Stabilisation Concept, Stabilisation Aim and Stabilisation Objectives. This

should, normally, be formed collaboratively between Government Departments, and where appropriate with multinational partners. Initially, the Stabilisation Concept could take the form of intervention options, to be presented to Ministers. Once approved, the Stabilisation Aim and Objectives are developed. The Stabilisation Aim should be a medium term (1 to 3 years) policy goal, and is therefore owned by all Departments. Stabilisation Objectives are shorter term, and should lead to the achievement of the Stabilisation Aim. These objectives should form the basis for subsequent planning groupings, and are expressed in terms of the outcome (effect) to be realised.

b. **Implementation Plan.** The Implementation Plan should be developed in-country, by a team drawn from across the main crisis response Departments. The plan should break-down each Stabilisation Objective into Operational Objectives, Operational Outputs and Activities. Operational Objectives are also outcome statements (effects) and tend to be focused in the 6-12 month timeframe. Again, outputs refer to the desired outcome (effects) of activities.

2S13. At each stage of the planning process, planners should identify the key risks and assumptions, possible measures of performance and effectiveness, the timeline, dependencies and resource requirements. Responsibilities should also be identified.

2S14. **Disseminating the Plan.** While there is no set format for the plan, it should contain an overview, and a series of more detailed annexes. The overview could be used to brief officials, desk officers, and in-country representatives. It should, usually, include: the Strategic Vision; an executive summary of the Joint Stabilisation Assessment; an overview of the Stabilisation Strategy and Implementation Plan; a summary of key assumptions and risks; and an articulation of management and reporting responsibilities. The annexes should, as required, provide actionable detail.

## **SUPPLEMENT 3 – NATO PLANNING PROCESS**

*This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the NATO planning process as at December 2008.*

### **Political Military Interface**

3S1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) enduring purpose, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. The Alliance uses both its political influence and military capabilities to achieve this purpose. It is an inter-governmental, rather than supranational, organisation in which member nations retain their full sovereignty and independence; it serves as a forum in which member nations can consult and take collective decisions on matters affecting their security.

3S2. The Alliance's durability is founded on the solidarity guaranteed by a consensual decision-making process requiring that all decisions be unanimous. This process ensures full respect for each and every member nation and, following a decision, the full backing of each member nation.

3S3. NATO is headed by a Secretary-General who is appointed for approximately 4 years. To facilitate consultation, each member country is represented by a permanent delegation at NATO's political headquarters in Brussels. This delegation consists of a permanent representative (with Ambassador rank), and a military representative.

3S4. Separate civilian and military structures have been established within NATO to deal with the political and military dimensions of Alliance work. Both structures support the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's highest decision-making body. The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) deals with most defence matters. It provides guidance to NATO's military authorities (NMA). NATO's military structure is overseen by the Military Committee (MC). The MC is the highest military authority in the Alliance but remains under the political authority of the NAC and the DPC. The MC comprises member nations' Chiefs of Defence, who are represented by their respective national military representatives.

3S5. The MC is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for collective defence. It provides direction and advice on military policy and strategy; it directs the NATO Strategic Commanders (SC); and it is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the NAC. The MC assists in developing strategic concepts for the Alliance and, in times of crises, advise the NAC and DPC on military options.




3S6. In the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP), the MC meets regularly with EAPC and PfP partner countries to ensure military cooperation. Similar meetings take place with Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the European Union (EU).

3S7. The MC is supported by the International Military Staff (IMS). The IMS is responsible for planning, assessing and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC; they also ensure that MC policies and decisions are implemented by the SCs.

### Strategic Command Structure

3S8. **NATO Command Structure.** The NATO Command Structure (NCS) has 2 Strategic Commands (SC):

- a. **Allied Command Operations.** Allied Command Operations (ACO) is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). His headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), is near Mons, Belgium. SACEUR's focus is on the planning and execution of NATO operations. Its subordinate, and permanent, Headquarters are illustrated below:



**Figure S3.1 – Allied Command Operations**

- b. **Allied Command Transformation.** Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)<sup>1</sup> whose Headquarters, HQ SACT, is based in Norfolk, Virginia, USA. SACT's role is functional, focused on the transformation of NATO's military capabilities over the full range of military missions and levels of ambition.

3S9. **NATO Force Structure.** With the exception of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, NATO has no armed forces of its own. Most forces available to NATO remain under full national Command and Control (C2) until they are assigned by the member countries to a NATO mission. The NATO Force Structure

<sup>1</sup> SACT is dual-rolled as Commander US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

(NFS) is composed of allied, national and multinational forces placed at the Alliance's disposal on either a permanent or temporary basis under specified readiness criteria. While the NCS provides for C2 of joint operations; the NFS provides additional, but single environmental, C2 capabilities.

## **Control of Operations**

**3S10. Overview.** Both NATO Article 5 (self-defence), and (non-Article 5) Crisis Response Operations (CRO) are met by a combination of NCS,<sup>2</sup> and NFS elements.

**3S11. Strategic Level.** At the strategic level, Allied Joint Forces are employed within a Pol-Mil framework, agreed by the MC, and endorsed by the NAC, in support of the Alliance's strategic objectives. SACEUR is responsible for the strategic planning and direction of all operations, including routine operational activities, and other non-operational tasks, as appropriate. He should assume overall strategic command of the operation, issuing military strategic direction, through ACO, to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). SACEUR should also coordinate multinational support, including reinforcement, and designate supported and supporting commands.

**3S12. Operational Level.** During a NATO operation, the designated JFC should exercise his responsibilities through a standing Joint Headquarters. The Alliance has 3 standing operational level Joint Headquarters in Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon. Between them, they are able to meet NATO's Level of Ambition – to conduct 2 Major Joint Operations,<sup>3</sup> and 6 Small Joint Operations:<sup>4</sup>

a. **Joint Force Commander Headquarters.** Each of the 2 JFC Headquarters (JFC Brunssum, Netherlands, and JFC Naples, Italy) has the capability to conduct a Major Joint Operation, or an operation larger than a Major Joint Operation in the initial stage, from their static location. In addition, either one could provide a land-based CJTF Headquarters, drawing from one set of deployable equipment.

b. **Joint Headquarters.** The third Joint Headquarters, located in Lisbon, Portugal, has the same responsibilities as the JFCs, but without permanently-assigned forces under command. It is capable of commanding a Major Joint Operation, either as a land-based CJTF Headquarters, or sea-based using a command platform currently provided by the US that operates out of Norfolk, Virginia. When the sea-based CJTF Headquarters is deployed, the Joint Headquarters' remaining ability is limited to routine functions.

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<sup>2</sup> Note that a Peacetime Establishment Review of the NCS is ongoing (December 2008).

<sup>3</sup> The definition of an Major Joint Operation is provided in MCM-131-02, MC Input to MG 2002, 25 October 2002. It equates to a Corps level operation.

<sup>4</sup> This equates to a Brigade level operation.

3S13. **Tactical Level.** The NCS Component Command(er)s (CC) are directly subordinated to SHAPE. To fulfil operational requirements, CCs could be tasked by SACEUR to provide a C2 capability under the command of any of the 3 joint commanders. These tactical headquarters have 3 roles: to provide CCs for Major Joint Operations/Small Joint Operations; as deployable headquarters for component orientated Small Joint Operations; and to offer specialist expertise to the JFCs. In principle, the operation should dictate C2 structures and formations deployed. CCs exercise their responsibilities from static or deployed headquarters, depending on the characteristics and requirements of the operation.

- a. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The NCS has 2, static, Joint Force Maritime Component Headquarters (JFMCHQ), at Northwood, UK, and Naples, Italy. Both JFMCHQs have the capability to command maritime forces from their static location, both within their Joint Operations Area (JOA), and in support of joint campaigns beyond it. Deployable maritime component C2 capabilities should normally be provided by High Readiness Force (Maritime) (HRF(M)) Headquarters for a Major Joint Operation, or by Headquarters STRIKFORSOUTH for larger than Major Joint Operations.
- b. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The NCS has 2 Joint Force Land Component Headquarters (JFLCHQs), at Heidelberg, Germany, and Madrid, Spain. They normally deploy to command one land operation larger than a Major Joint Operation<sup>5</sup> in the initial stages, while drawing on the same set of deployable, commonly funded, equipment. The High Readiness Force (Land) (HRF(L)) Headquarters from the NFS are normally employed as JFLCHQs in Major Joint Operations.
- c. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The NCS has 2, static, Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (JFACHQs), at Ramstein, Germany, and Izmir, Turkey. Both JFACHQs have the capability to command, simultaneously, the air component of a Major Joint Operation from their static locations. Between them they could provide one deployable JFACHQ.

## NATO Planning Categories

3S14. While the broad principles of NATO planning are similar to the UK's operational planning process, there are differences in terminology, the initiation and approval process.<sup>6</sup> A broad comparison of the terms used in UK and NATO planning is shown at Table S3.2. Within NATO, there are 2 planning categories, Advance Planning, and Crisis Response Planning.

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<sup>5</sup> For Land operations larger than Major Joint Operations must be understood as larger than corps size.

<sup>6</sup> Details of NATO Planning are found in the SHAPE Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The GOP is under review (December 2008) and is planned for promulgation in 2009.

Activity	UK	NATO
Contingency Planning	Joint Planning Guides	Contingency Plan
	Joint Contingency Plans	Standing Defence Plans
Crisis Response Planning	Political Military Estimate	Political Military Estimate
	Military Strategic Estimate	Military Estimate
	Operational Estimate	
	Campaign Plan	Operation Plan
	Operation Plan (OPLAN) Operation Order (OPORD)	Supporting Plans
Directives	CDS' Planning Directive	
	CDS' Directive	NAC Initiating Directive
	Joint Commander's Mission Directive	
		Execution Directive

**Table S3.2 – Comparison of Terms Used in UK and NATO Planning Process**

3S15. **Advance Planning.** Advance planning should be conducted with a view to preparing the Alliance to deal with possible future security risks, either Article 5 or non-Article 5, and calls for 2 distinct types of plan. These are:

- a. **Contingency Plan.** A Contingency Plan (COP) is designed to cater for a possible future security risk, either Article 5 or non-Article 5.
- b. **Standing Defence Plan.** A Standing Defence Plan (SDP) is designed to cater for an enduring, but short notice, Article 5 potential security risk.


3S16. **Crisis Response Planning.** Crisis response planning should be conducted in response to an actual or developing crisis, both Article 5 or non-Article 5, and calls for the development of an Operation Plan (OPLAN). If a crisis was foreseen, the OPLAN could be developed from an appropriate COP. An OPLAN should be a detailed, and comprehensive, plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and all the necessary preparations undertaken for successful execution of the assigned mission. OPLANs should be endorsed by the MC, and approved by the NAC.

3S17. **Supporting Plans.** Depending on the complexity of a plan (whether COP, SDP or OPLAN), there could be a need to develop a series of Supporting Plans (SUPLANs).

### **NATO Planning Methodology**

3S18. **NATO Planning Process.** The NATO planning process is based around a process of rational planning. Situational understanding and mission analysis instigate the identification of various Courses of Action (CoAs). Once a preferred CoA is selected, a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is then developed. The CONOPS

provides a clear and concise statement of how the military commander intends to accomplish the assigned mission, including the desired military end-state, and is forwarded to the initiating/superior authority for approval. A CONOPS normally consists of: a situation overview; a mission statement; an outline concept for execution, including the Commander's Intent, conduct of operations, and force and capability requirements; an outline service support concept; and key C2 arrangements. Figure S3.3 provides an overview of the NATO planning processes. The main difference from that used by the UK is that NATO plans are initially developed without firm force commitments from the Alliance nations. The NATO estimate therefore includes 2 stages of validation: Concept Development (Stage III), which precedes the force activation process; and Plan Development (Stage IV), that proceeds in tandem with force commitments by nations.



**Figure S3.3 – The NATO Operational Planning Process**

### NATO Planning Responsibilities

3S19. Within NATO's operational planning process, there should be a clear division of responsibility for initiation, development, approval, execution and cancellation of operations and OPLANs. These responsibilities are divided between the NAC (or DPC<sup>7</sup> as appropriate), the MC, SHAPE and subordinate NATO commanders within the NCS.

<sup>7</sup> As France is not a member of the integrated command structure, she is represented at the NAC but not at the DPC.

- a. **North Atlantic Council.** The NAC, as the senior political authority within the Alliance, is responsible for the initiation and approval of all OPLANs developed in response to current operations or developing crises. In the course of the Political-Military Estimate, the NAC could select one or more Military Response Options. Should the NAC decide on the requirement for military intervention, it could issue a NAC Initiating Directive (political guidance), that instigates detailed operational planning. The NAC is also responsible for issuing a NAC Force Activation Directive, and a NAC Execution Directive.
- b. **Military Committee.** The MC is responsible, during the planning process, for assisting the NAC in its deliberations, including the submission of potential MROs for their consideration. Should the NAC decide on a requirement for military intervention, the MC is responsible for translating NAC political guidance into military direction to SACEUR. The MC is also responsible for endorsing the CONOPS, and subsequent OPLANs, in response to that direction, prior to it being forwarded to the NAC for approval.
- c. **Supreme Allied Commander Europe.** SACEUR is responsible, when directed by the NAC, for assisting in the further development or refinement of potential Military Response Options during the Political Military Estimate process. SHAPE is responsible for the development of a strategic level CONOPS, which when approved by the NAC, is developed into subsequent OPLANs. SHAPE is also responsible for force generation, activation and deployment, when directed by the NAC.
- d. **Joint Force Commanders.** The JFCs, together with the CCs where necessary, are responsible for the development of hierarchical subordinate plans.

**3S20. Operation Plan Execution.** In order to execute an OPLAN it is necessary to activate and deploy the forces required by the OPLAN during the force generation process. On receipt of an agreed CONOPS, the JFC is tasked to develop a Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR), which when agreed with SHAPE, provides the Minimum Military Requirement (MMR) against which forces are generated on receipt of the NAC Force Activation Directive.

### **NATO Force Activation Process**

**3S21. North Atlantic Council Force Activation Directive.** The first step in the force activation process is the issue by the NAC of the Force Activation Directive, which should direct SACEUR to initiate force activation. The earliest point at which the NAC could issue the Force Activation Directive is coincident with CONOPS approval.

**3S22. Activation Warning.** Upon receipt of the Force Activation Directive, SACEUR should commence the formal force activation process by means of the

Activation Warning (ACTWARN) message, together with the provisional CJSOR. Nations should respond to the provisional CJSOR with informal force offers. These offers provide SHAPE with an early indication of the probable formal offers, prior to the Force Generation Conference. Following release of the ACTWARN, formal negotiations should commence between SHAPE and nations.

**3S23. Force Generation Conference.** DSACEUR instigates a Force Generation Conference with all potential Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). The output of the Force Generation Conference is the draft CJSOR, which reflects nations force offers, and details the proposed force package for the operation. The provisional force offers against the CJSOR could result in constraining factors to the developing plan.

**3S24. Activation Request.** Following the development of the draft CJSOR, SACEUR should issue the Activation Request (ACTREQ) message to nations. The ACTREQ should formally request nations to commit to the force package in the draft CJSOR.

**3S25. Force Preparation Message.** Upon receipt of the ACTREQ, nations should provide SACEUR with a Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message, which is the formal commitment of National contributions to the draft CJSOR. Nations should also use FORCEPREP messages to state National caveats on the employment of their force contributions.

**3S26. North Atlantic Council Execution Directive.** Once the OPLAN is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the NAC should issue an Execution Directive to initiate mission execution.

**3S27. Activation Order.** Upon receipt of the NAC's Execution Directive, SACEUR should issue the Activation Order (ACTORD) message to all participating TCNs, which initiates mobilisation of National forces and the release of necessary NATO common funding.

**3S28. Transfer of Authority.** To ensure the properly coordinated deployment of forces in theatre, nations should authorise Transfer of Authority (TOA) of all forces on arrival in the JOA, or to a point specified in the ACTORD. In cases where the NAC may have authorised the earlier pre-deployment of Enabling Forces, the issue of the ACTREQ initiates release of these Enabling Forces and TOA to SACEUR, as well as authorising their deployment.

## **SUPPLEMENT 4 – EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY PLANNING**

*This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the EU military planning process as at December 2008.*

### **European Union Capability**

4S1. The European Union (EU) has the capacity to conduct EU-led operations should the Council of the EU elect to do so. The Council exercises overall responsibility for planning and conduct of EU led operations, either civilian or military, delegating political control and strategic direction to the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

4S2. EU-led operations could involve a range of instruments of power, including diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and civil, as well as military, and therefore the requirement for coordination at every level is paramount. The EU is therefore able to have a comprehensive approach to crises. The EU, especially the EU Commission, could already be engaged in areas where UK national or coalition military operations are being considered. Alternatively, the EU could become engaged either militarily, or in other ways, in crises where the UK has a strategic interest.

### **Permanent Military Structures**

4S3. Permanent military structures are provided by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) who are located in Brussels. Their roles are:

- a. **EU Military Committee.** The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice, and recommendations, on all military matters, and for exercising direction of all military activities within the EU's remit. The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) acts as the primary point of contact for the Operational Commander (Op Comd)<sup>1</sup> during EU-led military operations.
- b. **EU Military Staff.** The EUMS provides early warning, situation assessment, and conducts planning at the Political and strategic level for Petersberg tasks, including identification of appropriate European national and multinational forces. This could include the development of Military Strategic Options, the preparation of an EUMC Initiating Military Directive to the Op Comd, and the coordinating of military planning with the EU's Commission and Parliament.

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<sup>1</sup> The EU title assigned to the officer performing the (broadly) equivalent role of the UK Joint Commander.



4S4. In the event of a crisis, the EU assesses options, usually in consultation with nations and other International Organisations (IOs), especially NATO. Military aspects of the crisis should be examined by the EUMC, drawing on the expertise of the EUMS.<sup>2</sup> At an appropriate juncture, following the development of a Crisis Management Concept, the Council should approve a general political assessment and a cohesive set of options. Thereafter, the EUMC should issue a Military Strategic Option Directive<sup>3</sup> to the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), formally inviting him to draw up one or a series of Military Strategic Options.

4S5. Once the Council has decided to take action, and a Military Strategic Option has been selected, an Op Comd should be appointed, a chain of command designated, and an Operational Headquarters (OHQ)<sup>4</sup> selected. There are 3 options available:<sup>5</sup>

a. **EU-Led Operations *with* Recourse to NATO Planning Assets.**

NATO's ACO - J5 planning staff generate initial planning support for the EU, and provide planning staff and facilities thereafter. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) would be the likely choice as Op Comd.

b. **EU-Led Operation *without* Recourse to NATO Planning Assets.** If NATO planning assets were not to be employed, one nation could elect to act as the Framework Nation,<sup>6</sup> utilising one of 5 potential EU OHQs (located in the UK (Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)), France, Germany, Italy and Greece).

c. **EU Operations Centre.** The EUMS maintains the capability to form an OHQ in Brussels, drawing on nations as required.<sup>7</sup>

4S6. The selection of a Force Commander, and Force Headquarters (FHQ),<sup>8</sup> could occur simultaneously or, if alternatives are available, await the appointment of the Op Comd. The most likely Command and Control (C2) template, based on a Framework Nation model, would have both the OHQ and FHQ formed by the same nation,

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<sup>2</sup> EU crisis management procedures envisage the need for the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to draw on operational planning expertise from either EU Member States and/or NATO.

<sup>3</sup> These terms differ from NATO terminology since the EU structures and way of handling crises are different from NATO. Wherever possible, however, NATO terminology has been adopted.

<sup>4</sup> Broadly equivalent to PJHQ.

<sup>5</sup> EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) Standard Operating Procedures, version 4.0, dated 8 June 2006.

<sup>6</sup> The EU defines a framework nation as 'A Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which EU exercises political control. A Framework Nation provides the Op Comd/OHQ and the core of the military chain of command, together with its Staff support, the Computer Information Systems and logistic framework, and contributes with a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Although EU concepts and procedures remain applicable, procedures may also reflect those of the Framework Nation'. EU Framework Nation Concept 11278/02, dated 25 July 2002.


<sup>7</sup> Particularly where there is a joint civil/military aspect or where no national HQ has been identified; 'EU Principles for EU HQs', 2 June 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Equates to the UK's Joint Task Force Headquarters; EU Force Headquarters Standard Operating Procedures, version 3.0, dated 30 June 2006.

although other C2 combinations are possible. Where a Framework Nation model is used, other EU nations, as well as EUMS personnel, could be expected to provide personnel to fill posts in both the OHQ and FHQ.

4S7. Following a Council decision to take action, the EUMC should issue an Initiating Military Directive to the Op Comd, which directs him to begin operational planning.<sup>9</sup> The EU planning methodology is very similar to that of NATO (see Supplement 3), and the outputs include a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plans (OPLANs), and ultimately the generation, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a Joint Force. The EU process is, however, initially more ‘linear’ than NATO’s, which can conduct operational planning in parallel at various levels; this is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate that of NATO. Hence subordinate levels of command have to be established for a particular operation before planning in parallel can commence. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by early designation of an Op Comd and OHQ, are used as much as possible.

4S8. Although exact C2 arrangements for any EU-led military should be mission-dependent, they normally encompass 3 levels of command, as shown in Figure S4.1.



**Figure S4.1 – EU Command and Control Arrangements**

<sup>9</sup> On some occasions, the Op Comd may not be selected until after the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) has been issued. This is less preferable, as early appointment allows this commander to engage fully in the planning and direction process.

4S9. **Comprehensive Approach.** EU planning for EU-led operations takes into account the EU Comprehensive Approach to crises management. Such planning cannot be conducted in isolation. The tools available to the EU in times of crisis are wide ranging across its institutions and policy areas and comprise political and humanitarian, as well as military, actions. This Comprehensive Approach leads to an important principle in EU military headquarters at all levels, which is the development of links, dependent on the mission, to ensure coordination with: Governments and authorities in the crisis area; authorities of force contributing nations; EU representatives and bodies (for example the EU Police Mission); International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); supporting headquarters; and national intelligence organisations.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *EU Principles for EU HQs*, 2 June 2005.

## SUPPLEMENT 5 – UNITED STATES MILITARY PLANNING

*This Supplement to JDP 5-00 details the US military planning process as at December 2008.*

### US Strategic Organisation

**5S1. Commander in Chief.** Under the United States (US) Constitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief of all US forces. By statute, together with the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), he directs US National effort, and ensures that strategic objectives are clearly defined, understood, and achievable. Beneath the President and SecDef, Joint Forces are assigned to various Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), that are broadly equivalent to the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), although they also perform functions that in the UK would be undertaken by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The chain of command runs directly from the President, and Sec Def, to the Combatant Commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),<sup>1</sup> the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), advise the President and SecDef, but they do not constitute a level of command in the same manner as the UK MOD.<sup>2</sup> The delineation of responsibilities, and planning processes, that link National strategic direction to Joint Operational planning is illustrated in Figure S5.1.

**5S2. National Security Council.** The President is advised, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, by the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and SecDef, through the forum of the National Security Council (NSC), which directs the formulation of National security and Defense strategy, the strategy for homeland security, strategic planning, security cooperation, and contingency planning guidance.

**5S3. Support to the National Security Council.** The CJCS and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) serve as statutory advisers to the NSC. Additionally, the JCS, senior officials of the OSD and Department of Defense (DOD), the individual Services, Combatant Commanders, and Defense agencies could also be called upon for advice and support.

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<sup>1</sup> The broad equivalent of the UK's Chief of Defence Staff.

<sup>2</sup> The President may direct that communications to the Combatant Commanders be transmitted via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but this is not obligatory.



**Figure S5.1 – US National Strategic Direction**

## Joint Planning Systems

**5S4. Joint Strategic Planning System.** The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which Joint strategic planning, and consequent direction to the US Armed Forces, is conducted.<sup>3</sup> The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system that is used to provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces and resources, as reflected in such documents as the National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. These provide direction for strategic planning by the Combatant Commanders, as well as on other categories of military planning.

**5S5. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) formally integrates the planning activities of the Joint planning community, in advance of, and during, crises. While spanning a number of organisational levels, JOPES is primarily focused on decision-support to the President and SecDef, and is the principal DOD system for preparing Operation Plans (OPLANs),<sup>4</sup> Operation Orders (OPORDs),<sup>5</sup> and other planning documents in response to Presidential, SecDef, or CJCS requirements.

<sup>3</sup> It is equivalent to the UK's Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO).

<sup>4</sup> 'Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies.' (Joint Publication (JP) 1-02)

<sup>5</sup> 'A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.' (JP 1-02)

## Joint Command

**5S6. Levels of Joint Command.** Joint Forces are established at 3 levels; Unified Commands (the Combatant Commanders), Subordinate Unified Commands and Joint Task Forces (JTFs). The Combatant Commanders are established by the President, through the SecDef and exercise Combatant Command (COCOM)<sup>6</sup> (Command Authority) over assigned forces, for the conduct of Joint Operations. Combatant Commanders are established on either a geographic<sup>7</sup> or functional<sup>8</sup> basis. When authorised by the President and SecDef, Combatant Commanders may establish Subordinate Unified Commands for specific ongoing missions or purposes.<sup>9</sup> Combatant Commanders could, in addition, establish JTFs for the conduct of specific, (usually temporary) Joint missions and tasks.

**5S7. Combatant Commanders.** The geographic Combatant Commanders develop and coordinate plans and policies, in their Area of Responsibility, for the use of the military instrument of power in support of US strategic policy. Functional Combatant Commanders should develop and coordinate plans and policies to support the geographic Combatant Commanders, and in response to other requirements from the President and SecDef.

**5S8. Combatant Command J-5.** The COCOM (organisation) J-5 (typically named Director, Plans and Policy Directorate) should, on behalf of the Combatant Commander lead in the preparation of OPLANs, OPORDs, and other planning documents. Specific responsibilities vary between COCOMs, but will typically include:

- a. Development and issue of planning guidance to the headquarters of Service and functional component commands, supporting commands, the Subordinate Unified Command headquarters (if formed), and JTFs (if formed).
- b. Interagency coordination, with US and other national civilian Departments, and with International Organisations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
- c. Providing political-military oversight for all aspects of operations in conjunction with the Combatant Commander's political adviser.

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<sup>6</sup> COCOM is the authority to perform those functions of command involving the organisation of forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives and direction to all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish assigned missions. The US recognises COCOM, Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON), although US OPCON and TACON are more equivalent to the standard NATO definitions of OPCOM and TACOM (see JDP 3-00 '*Campaign Execution*').

<sup>7</sup> NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, are the current geographic Combatant Commanders, as illustrated at Supplement Annex 5A.

<sup>8</sup> STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, JFCOM and SOCOM are the current functional Combatant Commanders. JFCOM has responsibility for US Joint Doctrine. Commander JFCOM is dual-rolled as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) – see Supplement 1.

<sup>9</sup> For example, US forces in South Korea or Japan come under Subordinate Unified Commands.

- d. Coordinating multinational forces.
- e. Developing, revising, and coordinating OPLANs and OPORDs to accomplish assigned missions.

5S9. **Joint Planning Group.** Typically, the J-5 establishes a Joint Planning Group (JPG) to facilitate integrated planning efforts. A JPG should include representation from all principal and special staff sections, components, agencies, multinational partners, NGOs and International Organisations as required.

5S10. **Combatant Command J-3 and Joint Operations Centre.** The COCOM J-3 (typically named Director, Operations Directorate) should assist the Combatant Commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, from planning through to completion of specific operations. The J-3 should participate in the, J-5-led, contingency and crisis action planning. J-3, typically, forms a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which serves as the primary focal point for the synchronisation of effort across the COCOM staff, during all phases of Joint operation planning and execution.

### **Types of US Planning**

5S11. US military planning consists of:

- a. **Security Cooperation Planning.** Security cooperation is the means by which the DOD encourages, and enables, countries and organisations to work with the US to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation planning links Combatant Commander's activities with the SecDef's security cooperation objectives.
- b. **Force Planning.** Force planning is primarily the responsibility of the Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). At the Theatre Strategic (Combatant Commander) level, force planning encompasses all those activities performed by the supported Combatant Commander, subordinate component commanders, and support agencies to select, prepare, integrate, and deploy the forces and capabilities required to accomplish an assigned mission.
- c. **Joint Operation Planning.** Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides Combatant Commanders, and subordinate Joint Force Commanders in developing plans for the employment of military forces, in order to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. The 2 types of Joint operation planning are: Contingency planning and Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

5S12. **Contingency Planning.** The SecDef has a statutory requirement to provide the CJCS with written guidance, covering the preparation, and review, of Joint

OPLANs for possible contingencies. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provides this direction, from which CJCS should develop plans to carry out specific missions.

**5S13. Levels of Planning Detail.** US contingency planning should prepare for possible contingencies, based upon the best available information, and in this respect is similar to UK contingency planning. The process relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political, and military, circumstances that could exist when the plan is implemented. Contingency planning is conducted, principally, in peacetime to develop Joint OPLANs for contingencies identified in the CPG and other strategic planning documents. Planning products are prepared under JOPES procedures, and in prescribed formats in one of 4 levels of planning detail:

- a. **Level 1 Planning Detail – Commander’s Estimate.** This level of planning usually involves the least amount of detail, and should focus on producing a proposed Course of Action (CoA). Outputs could include a CoA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or memorandum. The commander’s estimate provides the SecDef with military CoAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the supported commander's analysis of different potential CoAs, as well as his recommended CoA.
- b. **Level 2 Planning Detail - Base Plan.** A base plan should describe the Concept of Operations, major forces, concept of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes, or Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).
- c. **Level 3 Planning Detail - CONPLAN.** A concept plan (CONPLAN) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that could require considerable expansion or alteration if it is to become an OPLAN or OPORD. It should include a base plan, with annexes and TPFDD as required.
- d. **Level 4 Planning Detail - OPLAN.** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed Joint operation plan that should contain a full description of the Concept of Operations, annexes, and a TPFDD.

**5S14. Crisis Action Planning.** JOPES provides additional CAP procedures, for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs in response to a crisis. CAP is broadly equivalent to the UK crisis response planning. CAP should encompass the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. CAP should follow prescribed procedures, which can be grouped as situation awareness, planning, and execution.

- a. **Situation Awareness.** An event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognised, reported, and assessed to determine whether



military action may be required. This component of CAP has 3 parts, situation development, crisis assessment and iterative action.

(1) **Situation Development.** A Combatant Commander should issue an operational report to advise the chain of command of the developing situation. This report provides the President, SecDef, and CJCS with as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis.

(2) **Crisis Assessment.** The CJCS, in coordination with the JCS, and the Combatant Commander, should provide an assessment of the situation to the President and SecDef. The supported Combatant Commander should continue to report on significant actions taken within existing ROE, and his assessment may include a recommended CoA(s).

(3) **Iterative Action.** Situational awareness is continuous throughout CAP. Options include: continue monitoring; increase reporting; gather additional information; publish a CJCS Warning Order to initiate more detailed planning; or return to pre-crisis situation monitoring.

b. **Planning.** Planning should normally begin with the issue of a CJCS order, indicating that a threat to National security exists, or a response is warranted. Planning includes CoA development and selection. The approved CoA becomes the basis for the Concept of Operations, which: defines the Joint operation phases (see Table S5.2) and transition criteria; aligns missions with force requirements; and provides termination criteria.

Phase	Purpose of Phase
01	Interagency assessment and preparation.
02	Rehearsal, pre-positioning of enablers, strategic deployment and civilian/military activity build-up.
03	Initial entry operations.
04	Stability/political transition and restoration operations.
05	Post-conflict peace building, transition and military force restructuring.
06	Durable peace.
07	Self-sustaining peace.

**Table S5.2 – US Phases of Mission Implementation**

(1) **Course of Action Development.** CoA development should begin when the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options. The supported Combatant Commander develops, and submits, recommended CoAs to the CJCS, SecDef, and President. CoA

development consists of 5 activities: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander's estimate, and CoA selection. The focus of CoA selection should be Presidential (and SecDef) approval of a CoA, and the initiation of execution planning.

(2) **Detailed Plan Development.** Detailed plan development should commence upon receipt of an alert or planning order. The supported Combatant Commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders, should develop an approved, or directed, CoA into a detailed OPORD, and resourced TPFDD, by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing an OPORD from scratch when there is no pre-existing OPLAN.

c. **Execution.** The execution phase should begin when the President and SecDef decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis.

## Campaigns

5S15. US doctrine defines a campaign 'as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space'.<sup>10</sup> Campaigns are often the most complex and extensive Joint operations in terms of time and other resources. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Joint operation planning encompasses: planning for any type of joint operation, such as small-scale, short-duration strike or raid; an operation that typically does not involve combat such as nation assistance; and large-scale, long-duration campaigns. Campaigns are Joint, and Service components plan and conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Combatant Commanders should prepare a plan for a campaign in OPLAN format, either during contingency planning or CAP.

## Adaptive Planning

5S16. Since 2005, the US has transitioned towards Adaptive Planning, a Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly, and systematically, as circumstances require. Although aspects of the required technology are in development, certain Combatant Commanders<sup>11</sup> are pioneering these changes, and could use features of AP in future planning within which the UK is involved. Adaptive Planning should occur in a networked, collaborative environment, requiring the regular involvement of senior DOD leaders, and should result in plans containing a range of viable options.

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<sup>10</sup> US Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 'Joint Operation Planning'.


<sup>11</sup> Notably CENTCOM, which has published 'AP Guide', version 1.6, undated.

5S17. **Unified Action.** Like the UK, the US recognises the need for a comprehensive response, drawing together the different instruments of National power, to achieve common National strategic objectives. The US term for this is Unified Action, defined as ‘a wide scope of actions (including the synchronisation of activities with Other Government Agencies, International Governmental Organisations, and coordination with NGOs and the private sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs to achieve unity of effort’.<sup>12</sup> The concept of Unified Action emphasises the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power, and includes the actions of civilian agencies as well as military forces.

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<sup>12</sup> JP 1 ‘*Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*’.

**SUPPLEMENT 5A – UNITED STATES COMBATANT COMMANDERS GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (NOVEMBER 2007) (INCLUDING POTENTIAL AFRICOM AREA)**



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## LEXICON

This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. Many of the terms and their definitions detailed in Part 2 are either *new* or *modified* following a recent review of this and other Capstone/Keystone doctrine.<sup>1</sup> The source of each term is shown in parenthesis. For fuller reference on all other UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the current edition of JDP 0-01.1 ‘*The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*’.

### PART 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABO	Access, Basing and Overflight
ACDS (ISP)	Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (International Security Policy)
ACDS (Log Ops)	Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations)
ACDS (Ops)	Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)
ACO	Allied Command(er) Operations
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACTORD	Activation Order
ACTPRED	Activation of Pre-Deployment
ACTREQ	Activation Request
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
AML	Augmentation Manning List
AOO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Adaptive Planning
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BDSUS	British Defence Staff United States
BM	Battlespace Management
C2	Command and Control
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CBM	Command and Battlespace Management
CC	Component Command(er(s))
CCA	Counter Command Activity
CCDR	Combatant Commander (US)

<sup>1</sup> This Lexicon also includes new/modified Terms/Definitions and Acronyms/Abbreviations extracted from JDPs 01 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) and 3-00 (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition).

COCOM	Combatant Command (US)
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCT	Current Commitments Team
CCTL	Component Candidate Target List
CDI	Chief of Defence Intelligence
CDM	Chief of Defence Materiel
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CDSDO	Chief of the Defence Staff Duty Officer
CEA	Campaign Effectiveness Assessment
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (DFID)
C-IA	Countering-Irregular Activity
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CinC	Commander in Chief
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CIVPOL	Civil Police
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (US)
CJFLogO	Commander Joint Force Logistic Operations
CJFO	Commander Joint Force Operations
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CJPS	Combined Joint Planning Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CJTFC	Combined Joint Task Force Commander
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirement
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CoA	Course of Action
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
COCOM	Combatant Command (US)
COD	Concise Oxford Dictionary
CoG	Current Operations Group
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CoI	Community of Interest
COMBRITFOR	Commander British Force
Comd JFCIS	Commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems
Comd JF Engr	Commander Joint Force Engineers
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
COS	Chief of Staff
CPC	Campaign Planning Concept
CPT	Contingency Planning Team
CRI	Countries at Risk of Instability
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CSCF	Coordinator of Supporting Command Functions

CT	Counter-Terrorism
DC	Decisive Condition
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DCDS(Ops)	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)
DCJO(Ops)	Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations)
DCJO (Op Sp)	Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations Support)
DCMC	Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
D CT & UK Ops	Directorate of Counter-Terrorism and United Kingdom Operations
D DEF Log Ops	Directorate of Defence Logistics Operations
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DE&S	Defence Equipment and Support
DFID	Department for International Development
DGMC	Director General Media and Communications
DG Op Pol	Director General Operational Policy
DG Sec Pol	Director General Security Policy
DGIC	Director General Intelligence Collection
DIAP	Director International Acquisition Policy
DIAS	Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authority
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
DISP	Director International Security Policy
DJC	Directorate of Joint Commitments
D Jt Cap	Directorate of Joint Capability
DLID	Defence Lessons Identified Database
DOC	Directorate of Operational Capability
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
DOLSU	Defence Operational Language Support Unit
DOps	Director of Operations
DPO	Defence Press Office
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DRO	Disaster Relief Operations
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
DSCOM	Defence Supply Chain and Operational Movements
DSF	Director Special Forces
DSM	Decision Support Matrix
D Strat Plans	Directorate of Strategic Planning
DTIO	Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations



EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EGM	Effects Guidance Matrix
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Device(s)
ES	Equipment Support
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FACES	Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness, Exclusivity, and Suitability
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDA	Functional Damage Assessment
FE	Force Element
FGC	Force Generation Conference
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FID	Force Instruction Document
FLC	Front Line Command
FLR	Force Level Review
FOC	Full Operating Capability
FORCEPREP	Force Preparation
FP	Force Protection
FPDA	Five Powers Defence Agreement
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GCHQ	Government Communication Headquarters
GEO	Geographic
GOP	Guidelines for Operational Planning
HFR	Human Factors Research
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Centre
HoM	Head of Mission
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host-Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
IA	Irregular Activity
ICP	Intelligence Collection Plan
IO	International Organisation
IOC	Initial Operating Capability
IM	Information Management
IMPS	Infrastructure Management Policy Statement
IMS	International Military Staff (NATO)
IMD	Initiating Military Directive (EU)

INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IR	Intelligence Requirement
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
I&W	Indicators and Warnings
JASM	Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix
JCB	Joint Coordination Board
JCG	Joint Command Group
JCISI	Joint Communications Information Systems Instructions
JCMB	Joint Collection Management Board
JCP	Joint Contingency Plan
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JEM	Joint Effects Meeting
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCG	Joint Force Command Group
JFCIS	Joint Force Communications and Information Systems
JFE	Joint Force Element
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFLogC	Joint Force Logistic Component
JFLC	Joint Force Land Component
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFPG	Joint Force Planning Group
JFSFC	Joint Force Special Forces Component
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JIPE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Center (US)
JOINT NETCEN	Joint Network Centre
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (US)
JOP	Joint Operating Picture
JPC	Joint Contingency Plan
JPG	Joint Planning Guide
JRRF	Joint Rapid Reaction Force
JSA	Joint Stabilisation Assessment
JSP	Joint Stabilisation Planning
JSOR	Joint Statement of Requirement
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System (US)
Jt Comd	Joint Commander

JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
LEGAD	Legal Adviser
LI	Lesson Identified
LO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authorities
MACC	Military Aid to the Civil Community
MACP	Military Aid to the Civil Power
MAGD	Military Aid to Government Departments
MAS	Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet
MC	Military Committee
ME	Main Effort
MEDIA OPS	Media Operations
MILO	Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
MJO	Major Joint Operation
MOA	Measurement of Activity
MOE	Measurement of Effect
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MMR	Minimum Military Requirement
MNHQ	Multinational Headquarters
MRO	Military Response Options
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
MSO	Military Strategic Options
MSHQ	Military Strategic Headquarters
MTT	Military Training Team
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAI	Named Area of Interest
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NCHQ	National Contingent Headquarters
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NFS	NATO Force Structure
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
NLO	National Liaison Officer
NMA	NATO Military Authorities
NRF	NATO Response Force

NSA	National Strategic Aim
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NSE	National Support Element
NSID	National Security, International Relations and Development
NSID (OD)	National Security, International Relations and Development (Overseas and Defence)
NTM	Notice to Move
OA	Operational Analysis
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGD	Other Government Department
OHQ	Operational Headquarters (EU)
OISG	Operational Intelligence Support Group
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OMP	Operational Mounting Process
Op Cdr	Operational Commander
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPLOC	Operational Location
OPORD	Operation Order
OPS Coord	Operations Coordination
OPSEC	Operations Security
OPS SP	Operations Support
OPT	Operational Planning Team
ORBAT	Order of Battle
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense (US)
OT	Operations Team
OWP	Operational Welfare Package
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PJOB	Permanent Joint Operating Bases
PME	Peacetime Military Engagement/Political-Military Estimate
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company(ies)
POLAD	Political Adviser
POTUS	President of the United States of America
PSA	Political Strategic Analysis
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSE	Psychological Operations Support Element
PUS	Permanent Under Secretary
PW	Prisoner(s) of War

QCJWC	Quinqueparatite Combined Joint Warfare Conference
QSTAGS	Quadripartite Standardisation Agreements
RFI	Request for Information
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RSOM	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
RTL	Restricted Target List
RTLPL	Recognised Theatre Logistic Picture
SA	Situational Awareness
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAG	Situational Awareness Group
SBMA	Senior British Military Adviser
SC	Strategic Commanders
SCIAD	Scientific Adviser
SCOG	Security Cooperation Operations Group
SDP	Standing Defence Plan
SE	Supporting Effect(s)
SecDef	Secretary of Defence (US)
SF	Special Forces
SFSG	Special Forces Support Group
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SI	Support and Influence
SIE	Specialist Intelligence Element
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
SITCEN	Situation Centre
SITREP	Situation Report
SJC(UK)	Standing Joint Commander (UK)
SJO	Small Joint Operations
SMBA	Senior British Military Adviser
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
SofS	Secretary of State (US)
SOP	Standard/Standing Operating Procedure
SOSA	System of Systems Analysis
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STANAG	Standardisation Agreements
SUPLAN	Supporting Plan

SUSTAT	Sustainability Statement
Sy	Security
Sy Svc	Security Service
TA	Target Audience
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TASKORG	Task Organisation
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TD	Targeting Directive
TG	Task Group
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOO	Theatre of Operations
TPFDD	Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (US)
UCP	Unified Command Plan (US)
UKMILREP	UK Military Representative
UOR	Urgent Operational Requirement
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command (US)
USUCOM	US Special Operations Command (US)
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

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## PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

### **Agency**

A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1)

### **Allotment**

The temporary change of assignment of forces between subordinate commanders. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having OPCON (i.e. JTFC). (JDP 0-01.1)

### **Analysis**

The examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **Analysis**

In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AAP-6)

### **Apportionment**

The quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort, in relation to the priorities which are given to the various air operations in geographic areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6)

### **Area of Operations**

A geographical area, defined by a Joint Force Commander within his Joint Operations Area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a Component Commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. *See also Joint Operations Area.* (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **Area of Interest**

The area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his Joint Operations Area/Area of Operations and adjacent areas. *See also Joint Operations Area and Area of Operations.* (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **Assessment**

The evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision making. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

### **Battlespace**

All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which military activities take place subject to Battlespace Management. *See also Battlespace Management and Joint Operations Area.* (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)



**Battlespace Management**

The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. (JDP 3-70)

**Campaign**

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a Theatre of Operations or Joint Operations Area, which normally involves joint forces. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Authority**

The authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors:

- the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate;
- and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

**Campaign Design**

Campaign Design develops and refines the commander's (and staff's) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign End-State**

The extent of the Joint Force Commander's contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Effectiveness Assessment**

Evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Fulcrum**

The point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly; one side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. (JDP 5-00 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Management**

Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Objective**

A goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Plan**

A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a Joint Force Commander's intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Campaign Rhythm**

The regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Civil-Military Cooperation**

The process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives. (JDP0-01.1)

**Centre of Gravity**

Characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Coalition**

An *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Command**

The authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions.

**Note:** It comprises 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Commander's Intent**

A concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Components**

Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Comprehensive Approach**

Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Contingents**

Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Contingency Plan**

A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

**Contingency Planning**

Planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Control**

The coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Countering-Irregular Activity**

The coordinated measures, incorporating military activity with the other instruments of power within a Comprehensive Approach, that deal with the threats to security from irregular activity, while building governance and authority and addressing the underlying causes. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Crisis Management**

The process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Crisis Response Planning**

Planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Culminating Point**

A joint force reaches its culminating point during a campaign when current operations can be maintained, but without the prospect of further progress. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Current Operations Planning**

Planning to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain the necessary military activity to achieve the desired outcome. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Decisive Condition**

A specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Desired Outcome**

A favorable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Directive**

A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)

**Domain**

There are 3 Domains:

1. **Physical Domain.** The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability.
2. **Virtual Domain.** The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding.
3. **Cognitive Domain.** The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** The internet is part of the virtual domain.

**Fighting Power**

The ability to fight, consisting of conceptual component (encompassing the thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment of operational capability. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Fires**

The deliberate use of physical means to support the realisation of, primarily, physical effects. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Framework Nation**

Forces generated under a 'framework nation' are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the HQ. (JDP 3-00 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted.

**Influence Activities**

The capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behavior of someone or something. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Information Management**

The integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance**

The prioritised integration, coordination and synchronisation of capabilities and activities to acquire, process and disseminate information and intelligence, to support the planning and execution of operations. (JDP 3-00 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Interoperability**

The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (AAP-6)

**Irregular Activity**

The use, or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** IA could include a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder.

**Joint**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

**Joint Action**

The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on other actors' will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Note:** It is implemented through the coordination and synchronisation of Fires, Influence Activities and Manoeuvre.

**Joint Commander**

The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Coordination Board**

The Joint Coordination Board (JCB) is an operation synchronisation meeting used to promulgate the JTFC's guidance and objectives to component commanders. It is his method of ensuring unity of effort. The board will review the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL) to ensure that it reflects the JTFC's Campaign Plan and is in line with HMG objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Effects Meeting**

The Joint Effects Meeting is a staffing board whose role is to ensure that the Joint Fires process (which includes targeting) takes full account of the JTFC's prioritised objectives within the overall campaign plan. It is also responsible for the coordination and de-confliction of JTFC controlled assets. It will produce the daily Target Nomination List from the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for later approval by the Joint Coordination Board. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Enablers**

Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are likely to be discrete lines of operation in achieving the end-state. Their principle purpose is to enable other activity to take place. (JDP 3-70)

**Joint Force Planning Group**

The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Force Commander and normally chaired by his COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Force**

A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Force Commander**

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List**

A prioritised list of targets, approved by the Joint Task Force Commander and maintained by a joint task force, which includes the Component Commanders' requirements. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Integrated Target List**

A list of strategic and operational targets, coordinated by the PJHQ, to meet the Joint Commander's objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Joint Operations Area**

An area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Lead Nation**

Forces generated under a 'lead nation' are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 3-00 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Lines or Groupings of Operation**

In a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking Decisive Conditions, and hence Campaign Objectives, in time and space on the path to the Campaign End-state. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Main Effort**

The concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Manoeuvre**

Coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Manoeuvrist Approach**

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Measurement of Activity**

Assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Measurement of Effect**

Assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Military Risk**

The probability and implications if an event of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences taking place. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Military Strategic End-State**

The extent of the Military Strategic Commander's contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim, reached when all the Military Strategic Objectives have been achieved. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Military Strategic Objective**

Goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Mission Command**

A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Multi-agency**

Activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Multinational**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. *See also Joint.* (JDP 0-01.1)

**National Strategy**

The coordinated application of the instruments of national power in the pursuit of national policy aspirations. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**National Strategic Aim**

The Government's declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**National Strategic Objective**

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Non-Governmental Organisation**

A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP 0-01.1)



**Operational Analysis**

The use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision-makers resolve problems. Facts and probabilities are processed into manageable patterns relevant to the likely consequences of alternative courses of action. (JDP 0-01.1)

**Operational Art**

The orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Operational Level**

The level of warfare at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation. (BDD 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition)

**Operation Order**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

**Operation Plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

**Operating Space**

All aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. *See also Joint Operations Area.* (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Red Team**

An enabled cell, discrete from the main staff, that develops opponent, neutral, and other contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived norms and assumptions of the commander and staff. (JDP 5-00 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Security Sector Reform**

The reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate authority and to promote stability. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Situational Awareness**

The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

**Strategic Objective**

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Supporting Effect**

The intended consequence of actions. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

**Supported Commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. *See also Supporting Commander.* (JDP 0-01.1)

**Supporting Commander**

A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. *See also supported commander.* (JDP 0-01.1)

**Theatre of Operations**

A geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations. (JDP 01 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)

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