The Making of Modern Ukraine:
The Western Dimension

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More than fifty-five years ago, in February 1948, the British historian Lewis Namier (1888–1960) delivered a lecture commemorating the centennial of the European revolution of 1848.[2] His lecture has been published many times since then as "1848: Seed-plot of History," in, among other places, a volume titled *Vanished Supremacies*.[3]

Namier's choice of 1848 as a point of departure was well founded. There is a tired cliché that 1848 was a turning point in history when history failed to turn, but that is wrong. The year 1848 saw the first European revolutions: France was at the center, and there were also revolutions in Palermo, Naples, Vienna, Berlin, Buda, and Poznań, to name a few. It was also the year of nationalist revolutions in Central Europe and the year of publication of *The Communist Manifesto*, which predicted that an international proletarian revolution would abolish capitalism, the state, nations, and nationalism.

In 1848, as Kathleen Burk writes in her study of A. J. P. Taylor, the Austrian, or Habsburg, Empire "was a German as well as a Balkan Power, the keystone of the Concert of Europe; there was the German nation, but no Germany; there were Italian states, some of which belonged to the Austrian Empire, and two Italian kingdoms, but no Italy; France was still perceived by all the others as the most powerful, or at least the most threatening, of the continental Powers; and Russia was predominantly a European, not an Asiatic, Power . . . ."[4]

A central theme of Namier's lecture was that "every idea put forward by the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848 was realized at some juncture, in one form or another" during the next century. Namier concluded: "1848 remains a seed-plot of history. It crystallized ideas and projected the pattern of

things to come; it determined the course of the following century. It planned, and its schemes have been realized: but—*non vi si pensa quanto sangue costa*."

According to Namier, the solution of the German Question—that is, "What is Germany?"—was and would remain the central national problem in Central and Eastern Europe for the next hundred years: beginning in 1848 and continuing through World War I and World War II, the history of Germany defined the entire region's history. It is clear from Namier's formulation that other cases he named and reviewed (Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Ukrainian) were directly related to the German story. As one of the nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy that put forward their programs in 1848, Ruthenians or Ukrainians were also a part of Namier's scheme. West Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovina) was the easternmost extension of the European revolutions of 1848–1849, and for modern Ukrainian history 1848 was a turning point.

I choose Namier's "German-centered" schema as a point of departure for the Ukrainian nation-building story because his approach helps to see better the larger stage on which Ukrainian history was made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Namier draws the attention of the historian of Ukraine to the fact that at the very core of the Habsburg monarchy there grew and intensified a conflict—a "dialectical contradiction," to use a popular Marxist phrase—between the dynasty and its principles, on the one hand, and *German* nationalism, the German national question, on the other. The tension and conflict between "Empire" and "Germany," as I shall show, influenced how the imperial government treated other nationalities, Ukrainians included. (Something similar can be said about the Ukrainians under the Russian Empire, which was also being challenged from within by its dominant nationality as it was dealing with its non-Russian nationalities.)

I will outline Namier's ideas about Germany and then expand on them to discuss the emergence or the making of Ukraine as part of an international, historical process, one involving the German Question as well as the programs of other Central and East European nationalities. Ukrainians should be seen as actors in a number of international plots—and not only as an object of actions by others. My main focus will be on that historical juncture or conjuncture when traditional empires and other premodern polities (the system of Agraria, to use Ernest Gellner's terminology) began to face the challenges of nationalism, and the process of modern nation building began.[5] Bringing the German story into a Ukrainian narrative will allow us to correct the common view that presents Ukrainian nation formation as a delayed or retarded process, while tacitly assuming that the Germans were among the advanced cases. A closer look at the German story as presented by Namier makes one wonder whether the Germans qualify for that distinction.

Before proceeding with my story, I will make a brief digression in order to clarify my use of certain concepts, such as nation, nationalism, and nation building, by drawing on the relevant ideas of several scholars.

John A. Armstrong defines nationalism as

> the contention that the organizing principle of government should be the unification of all members of a nation in a single state. Although not unknown in earlier centuries, as a dominant credo and organizing principle this principle did not become salient until the generation of 1775–1815. These dates therefore constitute, in my opinion, the single decisive watershed in the historical development of ethnicity and nationalism.[6]

Armstrong's work helps me to set my story in time. The time frame he marks (1775–1815) corresponds to the end of old Poland (the partitions) and the birth of a new Polish nationalism. In order to understand Namier's story about what happened in 1848, I will need to go back half a century in time to this period when the stage was set for the developments that entered the public arena in 1848. This background will be especially important for a proper understanding of the Ukrainian case: the late eighteenth century saw two events that defined the course of Ukrainian history for the next one hundred and fifty years. The first was the abolition of the Hetmanate's autonomy in the Russian Empire, which occurred at virtually the same time as the beginning of a Ukrainian cultural and literary revival there. The second was the partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795. In the first partition (1772) Austria took Galicia, of which the western part was Polish-speaking and the eastern part Ukrainian-speaking; Prussia took Poland's Pomerania, and Russia took what is now Belarus. In the 1793 and 1795 partitions Russia took Right-Bank Ukraine, Lithuania, and the rest of Belarus, whereas Prussia and Austria divided between themselves the remaining core Polish territory (Warsaw went to Prussia; Kraków, to Austria). The former Polish territories that now found themselves in Russia formed the stage on which the Ukrainian movement would coexist and compete with both Polish and Russian power.

Among many other definitions of nationalism, a point made by Adrian Hastings will also be important for my arguments. In clarifying the relation between nation and state, and answering the question "When does a nation exist?" Hastings proposed this definition: "Even when it is the state which has created the nation, it is not a nation until it senses its primacy over and against the state."[7] Hastings' point is very important for a better understanding of the Russian nation-building case, and I shall return to his idea in the closing part of this essay.

Finally, I feel that it is especially helpful—in view of the extraordinary complexity in the process of modern Ukraine's formation (and no less with regard to the Czech, German, Russian, or Polish nations)—to cite Eugen Weber, who in his work *Peasants into Frenchmen* stresses that the nation is not "a given reality" but "a work in progress."[8] The story of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries substantiates Weber's idea.

<center>THE SEED-PLOT IN BRIEF</center>

Germany played the most important role in Namier's scheme. He wrote that during the revolutions of 1848 four different models of Germany had been proposed and each of them was realized, at one time or another, between 1848 and 1945. After the Habsburg defeat of 1848–1849 came (1) the Greater Austria of 1850; (2) in 1866, after the Prussian-Austrian war, a Greater Prussia emerged (Germany being partitioned in 1866); this was followed by (3) the Lesser Germany (Klein-Deutschland) of 1870–1871; and, finally, (4) Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany created in 1938–1939—a Germany that included Austrian and Czech provinces and that was one of the radical ideas of the 1848 revolution (and Karl Marx's preferred German state).

According to Namier, several other nationalities of the Habsburg Empire realized their ideas in the century following 1848. The Hungarians' 1848 program was achieved in the Compromise of 1867, which transformed the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary. That arrangement constituted a defeat for the "non-historic" peoples for whom the Greater Austria of 1850 had promised a better deal. The Italians also had some of their claims satisfied during 1866–1867: Vienna was forced to give up most of its Italian possessions to the new Kingdom of Italy. The Poles also gained: Galicia became autonomous in 1868, and the Polish nobility there became its real master, though under a constitutional regime. Thus, the removal of Austria from Germany—which David Blackbourn has rightly called "the partition of Germany"[9]—had immediate negative consequences for the Galician Ruthenians, who were the losers in Vienna's deal with the Poles. After 1866–1867, Vienna granted to Galicia certain rights, especially in the educational sphere, that no other land of the monarchy enjoyed. It was after (and largely because of) what happened in 1867 that many Ruthenians, feeling betrayed by the monarch in Vienna, adopted a pro-Russian orientation.

"In 1918–19 came the time for the subject races of the German and Magyar spheres," Namier continues. The Czechs and Slovenes won their independence from the Germans; and the departure of the Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs reduced the Greater Hungary of 1867. I add to Namier's account the facts that Hungary's Ukrainians became citizens of Czechoslovakia, and twenty

years later, after the Sudetenland crisis in 1938, Prague granted autonomy to Czechoslovakia's "Ruthenian" province, which at the same time began to call itself "Carpatho-Ukraine." The events of 1938 and 1939 (when Hungary annexed that area with Hitler's approval) illustrate the connection between the unfolding of the Namierian German agenda and Ukrainian history.

The post-World War I period was also "the time" for the Poles: they and the Italians fully realized the goals they had set while living under the Habsburgs. In 1918–1921 the Poles were able to assert their power by taking physical control of Ruthenian territory in Galicia and claiming all of Galicia as Polish. The Italians were able to do the same with respect to the Yugoslavs—meaning Slovenes and Croats. (Namier says Yugoslavs: in 1948 Yugoslavia's survival seemed secure.)

The last act of the 1848 drama for Namier took place in 1939–1945, when "the time came" for the Yugoslavs and Ruthenians. The Ruthenians completed their 1848 agenda with respect to the Poles, and the Yugoslavs completed their agenda in the Italian sphere. In consequence of World War II the Ruthenians finally disentangled themselves from the Polish bond—a legacy of 1848 and 1918–1919. Namier did not elaborate on the meaning of the term "came the time" as it applied to Ruthenians. Although Polish rule over Ukrainians ended by 1945, national independence did not follow; thus, the 1848 agenda was *not* realized in 1945.

Namier's story ends in 1948, but I will continue it to 1991. I will also expand on his schema and provide a background to 1848. For a historian of Ukraine, Namier's lecture serves as a very clear point of departure for a review of Ukraine's European or Western connection. Germans were involved in Ukrainian affairs after 1914 and again after 1939; and in 1991, only one year after German unification—the concluding act of the German story from my point of view today—Ukraine finally gained its independence.

German Nationalism and the Habsburg Empire

In 1797 the German poets Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller asked the famous question: "Germany? But where is it? I do not know where to find such a country." Without answering it, they proceeded to explain what the source of their difficulty was: "Where the cultural [Germany] begins, the political ends."[10]

Fifty years later, in 1848, Germans remained deeply divided about the question of what Germany was. In 1848 the German nationalists' program was to create a unified Germany as a nation state that would embrace all German kingdoms and principalities. The "Greater Austria" that emerged in 1850 dominated politics in all German lands, but it also included such countries as

Hungary, which German nationalists were not ready to accept. Namier's listing of different models of Germany is a useful reminder that the German nation, which some old-style studies classify as a "historic" and thus well-defined nation, was itself undergoing complex processes of making, remaking, and unmaking during its transition to the age of nationalism. The new idea of a single, united German nation state was revolutionary: it called for the destruction of the historic states of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and dozens of others, and it challenged the integrity of the hereditary dominions of the House of Habsburg that lay within the Holy Roman Empire.

We can understand why the partitions profoundly influenced Polish, Ukrainian, and German history. They transformed Prussia and Austria and thus helped to "de-Germanize" these two states by adding substantial Polish populations and territories. The Polish question became a problem in Prussia's internal politics, and the inclusion of Polish territories into the Habsburg monarchy moved Vienna's center of attention east into the Slavic world. Thus, post-1815 Austria was less German than it was before 1772. This shift influenced the balance between the Germans and Slavs in favor of the latter.[11]

When Austria took Polish territories (Galicia), it had to deal with a Polish nation that was more advanced in nation building than the Germans. Compared with Polish developments German nationalism was still largely an intellectual phenomenon, not only in Napoleon's time, but even after 1815 and until 1848. Polish nationalism had inspired wars and uprisings in 1794, 1807, 1809, 1812, and 1830. Even when there was no Poland on the map, no Polish poet—let alone two!—would have answered the question "Where is Poland?" the way Goethe and Schiller answered the question about Germany. According to Armstrong's definition, therefore, the Poles were ahead of the Germans (as well as the Russians) in nation building at this time—a fact that would also greatly influence Ukrainian nation formation, since the Poles constituted a major part of Ukraine's "Western dimension."

Some Polish historians have claimed that Vienna practiced a "Germanization" of Galicia after 1772, but that is not true. At the time the Habsburg Empire was engaged in building an imperial Austrian nation. The addition of Galicia to the empire fostered the de-Germanization of Austria because it further diverted Vienna's attention from the German national scene into the Slavic world. Any Germanization that the Habsburgs practiced was motivated by bureaucratic needs and not a part of German nation building. Vienna did not tell the Ukrainians (or Czechs, Slovenes, and others) that they were really German. And, as I noted earlier, German nationalism came into conflict with the Habsburg monarchy: by 1848 German revolutionaries wanted to dissolve it.

Not only Germans were divided and confused about what their country was or should be. Other nationalities had problems deciding how to define their countries. The Czech historian Jiří Kořalka has shown that Vienna wanted to create a multiethnic "imperial people," in opposition to German and other ethnic nationalities. Kořalka writes that the Czechs faced no less than five concepts of nation by 1848: Austrian, Pan-German, Slavic, Bohemian, and Czech. He notes the efforts of the Josephinian system "to create an Austrian state nation, whose main support was to come from the enlightened *homo austriacus* (Austrian man) in the Austrian state administration and school system, in the army and in the church, guided by the state."[12] Kořalka distinguishes two forms of "Austrianism" *(Rakušanství):* supraethnic and multinational, or multiethnic. Until approximately 1860 Vienna was still trying to create an Austrian imperial national identity, which was just as anti-Czech or anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish as it was anti-German.[13]

The Ruthenians (or West Ukrainians) in Galicia were also confused about their identity in 1848. Ruthenians had had a long relationship with the Poles. Galicia was the first Ukrainian-inhabited area to find itself under Polish kings and was under their rule uninterruptedly from the middle of the fourteenth century until 1772. Following the 1772 partition, Germany [as "Austria"] entered into the Polish-Ukrainian connection in Galicia as a third force during a period of intellectual and political revolution. Galicia was drawn into the world of German problems, and the imperial government began to participate in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

The empire's policy aimed at creating a homo austriacus explains why even though Austria's entry into Ukrainian lands made possible the rise of a political community, Ruthenian peasants and Greek Catholics (Uniates) there did not become "Ukrainians." Their first political consciousness was imperial—that is, what Thomas Masaryk, writing in the late nineteenth century, ironically called "Viennism." (Masaryk used this term to describe the continuing loyalty of the Czechs to the monarchy.) In general, even after subjects of the monarchy had adopted a modern national self-identification (as Czechs, Ukrainians, Slovenes, and so forth), as a rule they retained their loyalty to the emperor until the end of the monarchy.

At the time of the partitions Austria failed to carry out its centralizing enlightenment-influenced reforms in Hungary and Bohemia, but it was more successful in Galicia. In the long run it was the Poles who benefited most from the reforms. Ruthenian Galicia became integrated with the other ex-Polish regions now under Vienna and acquired an even more Polish character. Despite its loss of independence after the partitions, Poland remained a key presence and powerful factor in Ukraine's history, and its relative strength increased

during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Polish nobility continued to dominate the Ukrainian peasantry by controlling the relations of production and information (culture and education). Until the revolution of 1848 the Poles had generally believed, as did most politically aware Ruthenians, that Ruthenians were Polish. The dialect spoken by ethnically Polish peasants in Western Galicia was different from that spoken by the peasants of Eastern Galicia, but nationhood was considered a matter of politics, not ethnography. Choosing to be Polish meant choosing the Polish heritage as one's own, regardless of one's ethnic or religious background. In this connection Jerzy Jedlicki speaks about "the metaphoric understanding of heritage": "it . . . encompassed the adopted members of the national community. Thus the Polish peasant, the Polonized Jew, Ruthenian or German became the heir of the Polish nobility and of the entire history of the Polish-Lithuanian Common-wealth."[14]

The Polish nation-building project was helped by the fact that for a long time the Ruthenians maintained their loyalty to the monarchy and had a theo-logical outlook. When some of the more educated Ruthenians abandoned their faith in the imperial state and adopted modern ideas, they did so by becoming Polish. Becoming Polish at that time and place was the only way for educated Ruthenians to be European in the new post-1789 sense. Before 1848 the Greek Catholic Church played an enormous role in preserving the distinct identity of Ruthenians, but it did not offer any modern or secular political alternative to Polonism. That alternative to Polonism would eventually be inspired by cur-rents coming to Galicia from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire and to some extent from Prague. The publication in 1837 in Buda of *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, a slim collection of folk songs and poems written in the vernacular, was a landmark in the history of Galician Ruthenians, but as its contents reveal, its authors had been inspired by their East Ukrainian brothers. The young men who put it together were consciously looking to East Ukraine and at the same time were responding to the Slavic revival among the Czechs and Southern Slavs within the Habsburg monarchy. But this was a slow process—we can better understand this slowness when we remember how much trouble the more highly educated Germans had with choosing their own national identity. Not only in 1848, but for many years later, most Ruthenians were not thinking in terms of a Ukrainian nation.

For Austria's Ukrainians relations with the Poles were the key issue in 1848. Their national revolution was a declaration of secession from the Polish nation and was not directed against the monarchy; it was a break with "Polonism," not with "Viennism," let alone with any of the currents of German nationalism. The Poles, in contrast, were in conflict with the monarchy because of their goal

of independence or at least autonomy for Galicia, which they considered a Polish land, and also with the German nationalists who wanted the Prussian-held ex-Polish provinces to belong to a future united Germany. Since the monarchy for its own reasons also opposed German nationalism, it became possible for it to make a deal with the Poles after Prussia's defeat of Austria in the war of 1866—a deal in which the Ruthenians proved to be the losers.

During the revolutionary year of 1848, even though they were still torn between different national alternatives, some Ruthenians appeared for the first time on the stage of modern European history as Ukrainians. Vasyl Podolynsky, whose national self-identification before becoming a Ukrainian had been Polish, in a short Polish-language book printed in 1848, titled *Słowo przestrogi* (A Word of Warning), identified and examined four national orientations current among his Ruthenian compatriots in 1848: Ruthenian/Austrian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian.[15] Thus, although Namier was right to speak of the events of 1939–1945 as marking the realization of the Ruthenian program of 1848, had he been historically accurate he would have said that 1939 marked the realization of *one* of the four national orientations the Ruthenians had professed in 1848.

The Ukrainian option was not the only one that the Ruthenians entertained in 1848. Some Ruthenians remained loyal imperial subjects; others thought that their future was with Poland, and still others looked to Moscow and St. Petersburg for their national identity. Indeed, there would be periods between 1848 and 1918 when the pro-Russian option dominated, and there were always times when educated Ruthenians, without making any declarations about what they were doing, were becoming integrated and assimilated into the Polish nation.

Nevertheless, one of the main goals of a small group of Ruthenians in 1848 was to become accepted as a distinct Slavic nationality. In 1848 these Ruthenians declared that they were not Polish or Russian and that their nationality was not confined to the Austrian Empire. While proclaiming its full loyalty to the emperor, the Ruthenian Main Council proclaimed national unity with their co-nationals who lived in the southern part of the Russian Empire. In their vision, their homeland extended as far east as the Don River. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak has noted that the Main Council declared the Ruthenians of Galicia to be part of a larger nation numbering fifteen million, one that was "distinct from both the Russians and the Poles."[16] However, as Yaroslav Hrytsak points out, an earlier draft by the Main Council cited a different number: "We belong to the Galician-Ruthenian people which numbers two and half million." The assertion could mean only that the Ruthenians were a nation also different from Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. Only upon the insistent demands of Yulian Lavrivsky, a member of the council who was

not a clergyman, was the declaration revised to state that the Galician Ruthenians were a part of a fifteen-million strong Little Russian (Ukrainian) nation.[17]

The fact that Lavrivsky was not in the clergy was very important: one needed a secular view of politics to be able to declare that the Greek Catholics of Galicia belonged together with a nation that was overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox. But when one remembers how the Czechs were torn between different political loyalties and national identities—not to mention the conflicting German answers to the question "What is Germany?"—the confused state of the Ruthenians is understandable. In the end, which came only in the early twentieth century, the Ruthenians opted for the Ukrainian answer. They did not replicate the nation-building model of the Slovenes or the Croats, who rejected the idea of a common South Slav nation that would also embrace the Orthodox Serbs. The idea of a Ukraine existing across historic political, cultural, and religious boundaries (the unity of Ruthenians in Austria with Ukrainians in Russia) was one thing, however, and the actual realization of unity another.

Because his lecture was limited to the centrality of the German Question, Namier left out the Russian dimension in the making of the Ukrainian nation, a dimension with its own Western connections. The transition from Ruthenia in 1848 to Ukraine in 1939–1945 had a Western dimension beyond the frame of "Vienna." Ukrainian nation formation was an internal, but not self-contained, Ukrainian process; and it reflected the Russian-Ukrainian relationship as well as the Polish-Ukrainian one in Galicia. The Ukrainian culture that the Galician Ruthenians had adopted from Ukrainians in Russia had itself taken form in the encounter of East Ukrainian awakeners with Polish culture in the Russian Empire. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship was not self-contained either: (1) it took place within the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian nexus in the space the Russian empire acquired after the partitions of Poland, and (2) it was a reflection of Russia's direct relations with Europe (that is, apart from the Polish link). Thus, even Russia was part of Ukraine's Western dimension during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In order to understand the Ruthenian declaration of unity with Russian Ukraine in 1848, then, we need to look at intellectual and political developments in the Russian Empire prior to 1848—in particular, the larger Polish and Ukrainian schemes in their connections to what I call the "seed-plot of Russian history."

BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND POLES: UKRAINIANS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

While the Ruthenians of Galicia entered the European stage in 1848 through their experiences in that revolution, their ethnic kinsmen in the Russian Empire participated in a very different kind of opening to Europe that was launched

during the reign of Peter I (1689–1725) and continued under his successors, most notably Catherine II (1762–1796). From the perspective of Ukrainian history, Russia's "Europeanization" fostered the acculturation and assimilation of "Little Russia" into a common imperial culture and polity. This story has been covered extensively in historical literature. However, as I shall argue in this essay, the processes that were making Russians European—while turning "Little Russians" into European Russians—also created conditions that facilitated the emergence of the modern idea of a distinct Ukrainian nation. In other words, those who embraced the Ukrainian idea did not want to go to "Europe" the Russian way but to follow their own route. Eventually they managed to draw their own road-map and even persuade the Ruthenians in Galicia to join them.

For help in explaining the complex problem of how the Little Russian-Russian split arose during the process of Russia's Europeanization and territorial expansion westward during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I shall turn to the works of Liah Greenfeld and Martin Malia. In her study of nationalism, Greenfeld argues that Russian nation formation was a direct consequence of Russia's opening to the West, and she offers a theoretical-comparative perspective in which to interpret it. She asserts that in order for nationalist ideas to spread (a prerequisite for nation-building projects), "a supra-societal system," or shared social space, has to exist. "Borrowing presupposed the existence of a shared model, and such a model could exist only for societies which were explicitly relevant for each other. It is probable that initially such shared social space was created by Christianity and, perhaps, the Renaissance."[18] Considering that from the eighteenth century Russia's rulers were trying to define their state in a European context, Greenfeld's concept of "shared social space" (perhaps in considering the role of ideas in the history of nations, it would be better to say "shared cultural or mental space") supports Russia's inclusion in Europe.

This does not mean that in the end Russians were successful in winning such a recognition from the Europeans (or, for that matter, were being supported in this venture by all of their own subjects). The question of "Russia versus Europe" has remained on the political and cultural agenda to the present day, and scholars have offered a variety of proposals on how one might approach it. Writing in the 1990s, after the collapse of Soviet communism, Martin Malia argues that the "possibility of a new convergence with Russia" was related "to the problem of Europe's own essence." He states that it is misleading to view Russia, as it has been common to do, as an entity in opposition to another entity called "Europe." Instead he proposes "to transcend habitual essentialist thinking," which "presents geographic Europe" as "two cultural zones—a West and an East," suggesting that instead of doing this one should view Europe "as a

spectrum of zones graded in level of development from the former to the
latter." For support he refers to German historians who, in their attempts to
situate Germany in a broader European setting, developed a concept of "*das
West-ostliches Kulturgefälle*, the West-East cultural gradient or declivity." In
his own study of Russia, Malia says he is following "this perspective . . . with
Russia at the bottom of the slope to be sure, but part of Europe nevertheless."[19]
Malia explains that not only Germans view "modern Europe in terms of such a
gradient; it comes quite naturally to citizens of any of the nations between the
Rhine and the Urals, from the Czechs and Hungarians to the Poles to the
Russians."[20] While agreeing with Malia that Russia should be considered part
of Europe, I feel that he does not go far enough in defining the different
gradients. He fails to recognize the existence of the "Ukrainian gradient"
between Poland and Russia—a failure that I regret. For many Western experts,
however, Ukraine remains a *tabula russa,* an *unsuspected* nation, in part be-
cause the space where Poland and Russia once co-ruled has been ignored.

As a case study of nation formation Ukraine provides especially convincing
evidence to support Dominic Lieven's broader statement on the role of ideas in
the realm of power politics. According to Lieven, "the rise and fall of empires
has much to do with the history of ideas: it is very far from being the mere story
of power defined in crudely material terms."[21] When imperial Russia first
opened itself to the West, then, it was reasonable to expect that "Little Russia"
would become integrated in the new St. Petersburg-centered and Europe-
oriented state and society that was then emerging. Marc Raeff has summed up
the dynamics of Ukraine-assimilation as an aspect of Russia's European en-
gagement:

> The more successful and dynamic Enlightenment culture, in direct contact
> with the world of European ideas, had its center in Russia proper; the educa-
> tional and cultural institutions of St. Petersburg (and to a lesser extent those of
> Moscow) set the tone and pace: it was they that now influenced the Ukraini-
> ans. All seemed to conspire to bring about the integration of the Ukrainian
> elite and its culture into that of the empire, leading, in fact, to russification,
> since Russian political culture had achieved dominance and monopoly in the
> empire.[22]

Raeff's formula is supported by concrete data about the behavior of mem-
bers of the Ukrainian educated class. In her study mentioned above, Greenfeld
notes the high proportion of natives of Ukraine among the educated elites in the
Russian capitals during Catherine II's reign. This was understandable because
Ukraine had a much better developed network of schools during Catherine's
reign, and educated individuals from Ukraine were willing to serve in St.
Petersburg in various governmental, educational, and other institutions. They

were among the most enthusiastic participants in the construction of an imperial Russian national identity. I might add that the Ukrainians were becoming "russified" because that was also a way for them to become European.

There were limits to Russia's Westernization or Europeanization, however. Russia's state-sponsored "opening" to Europe was closely controlled and very selective and did not provide for the adoption of modern political ideas and institutions of the West, such as representative government, an independent judiciary, or freedom of the press. This refusal by the tsarist state to evolve in the Western direction became especially evident during the final phase of Catherine II's reign and under her two immediate successors, emperors Paul (1796–1801) and Alexander I (1801–1825). All doubts on this score were removed during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) with its declaration of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and *narodnost'* as the fundamental principles of Russian statehood. If one accepts Hastings's definition of nation as an entity independent of the state, then the tsarist ideology and policies opposed the formation of a modern Russian nation.

For self-evident reasons this turn in the empire's evolution was especially unwelcome in that area from which so many enthusiasts of Russia's Europeanization had come two or three generations earlier. The upper class of "Little Russia," or Left-Bank Ukraine, constituted a social stratum that in some respects was similar to the Polish nobility—even though it consisted largely of descendants of Cossack officers who had fought against Poland in the seventeenth century—in that it thought of itself as the carrier of Little Russia's traditions and liberties. These traditions and institutions, needless to say, were a heritage of Ukraine's past under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Ukraine did not share them with Great Russia or "Muscovy." Thus, even after its submission to the tsars Little Russia retained a system based on a rule of law, and many of its offices were at least formally elective. Catherine's modernization brought an end to this tradition when she extended the Russian administrative system to the area. Despite these changes, the Little Russian elite remained loyal to the state and adopted the official, imperial Russian identity, but it was individuals belonging to that social class—members of its cultural milieu—who in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries produced the idea that Ukraine was a nation and as such was equal to Russia and Poland. This development took place precisely during the decades in which Armstrong places the beginning of the age of modern nations and nationalism. During the late eighteenth century, in John LeDonne's apt phrase, while "the autonomy of Little Russia was indeed being curtailed, . . . a larger Ukraine was coming into being. . . ."[23]

Perhaps it would be more precise to say that at first the *idea* of a larger Ukraine was being formulated. But thoughts about a Ukraine that was much larger than the just dissolved "Little Russia" were finding support in the geopolitical changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Thus, from the perspective of Ukrainian history, it is possible to conclude that after Russia annexed Right-Bank Ukraine, by subjecting many parts of the Commonwealth to Russian rule, the tsarist state unintentionally created conditions that helped the Ukrainian national cause. The partitions of 1793 and 1795 brought Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine together under one government. In Kyiv, which until then had been a border town and after the partitions again became a central place in which the Left- and the Right-Bank elites could meet, Ukrainians from beyond the Dnipro once more found themselves face to face with the Poles, although this time the Poles were the tsar's subjects. Members of the emergent Ukrainian intelligentsia established direct and even personal contacts with Polish cultural and political activists. They discovered that besides the window to Europe represented by St. Petersburg, there was a *shorter* road to Europe via Poland. Moreover, unlike the partly Europeanized Russia under traditional tsarist autocracy, the Poles included Western liberal and democratic ideas and institutions in their program. (Russia's conquest of the northern coast of the Black Sea also provides material for thinking about Ukraine, but this is a theme outside of our agenda.)

The Poles were not simply one of "the nationalities" in the multinational Russian Empire. John LeDonne writes that

> Poland was not a frontier but a core area—this alone renders inept the often made comparison between Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. As a core area, Poland was an irreducible social, religious, and cultural complex possessing remarkable energy and restrainable only by the application of superior force.[24]

LeDonne's argument is convincing, when one remembers that whereas the so-called Kingdom of Poland—created in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna out of parts annexed by Prussia and Austria in 1795—could be compared to Finland, the Polish-dominated social and cultural space extended far to the east, up to the 1772 border of the Commonwealth. In the case of Kyiv, which underwent a "Polonization" of a kind *after* 1795, Polish influence moved even beyond the old border. Not only Vilnius, with its Polish university, but also Kyiv was in many ways a Polish city under tsarist rule: its university, which the tsarist regime founded in 1834 to promote de-Polonization, had more Polish students in the middle of the century than Russian and Ukrainian students combined. Even the university in Kharkiv, which was founded in 1804 with the help of

Adam Czartoryski, maintained contacts with Polish and other European schools and libraries, thus forming a direct link to Europe that bypassed St. Petersburg.

These examples may serve as concrete illustrations of LeDonne's point. Although Russia's annexation of so much Polish territory brought it closer to "Europe," that did not help Russia's "Europeanization." Vera Tolz has noted that in consequence of the incorporation of Polish lands, Poland became "Russia's internal 'West.'" The Russian-Polish conflicts within the state complicated Russia's own problems and tended to reveal the differences between Russia and Europe.[25]

By the 1820s the new ideas of nationality, increasingly popular in German and Slavic lands under the Habsburgs, were also being promoted by Polish writers and scholars in places such as Warsaw and Vilnius. One consequence of this new trend was the birth of interest in the Lithuanian and Belarusian languages and folklore, as well as history, and this led some to the conclusion that the Belarusians and Lithuanians were separate nationalities and not branches of the Polish nation as the Poles believed. Thus, the presence of the Poles may well have stimulated the rise of nationalism among those peoples of the Russian Empire who lived in the area contested by the Poles and the Russians. I tend to agree with the Polish historian Aleksander Gieysztor, who calls the Ukrainians and other non-Polish peoples along with the modern Poles the "successor nations" of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[26]

One may certainly say that the Ukrainian national "awakening" took place in an area that both the Poles and the Russians, each for reasons of their own, considered to be Polish or Russian, respectively. The emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia rejected the Polish claims to Ukraine as a land that was to become part of a restored Poland one day, just as it refuted the similar Russian claims; however, it was receptive to Polish—that is, Western or "European" — ideas. This was most notably the case in Kyiv, where the first significant Ukrainian intellectual and political circle, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, existed in the mid-1840s. The Brotherhood embraced many of the ideas circulating among the Poles, and it was very much in sympathy with the ideas Adam Mickiewicz was preaching in exile in Paris. Its activities would end with the arrests of its leaders, including Taras Shevchenko. The main message of the Brotherhood—the most subversive from the viewpoint of imperial ideology—was that within the Slavic community of nations, which also included the West and South Slavs beyond Russia's borders, there existed a Ukrainian nation that should be recognized as an equal of the Poles and Russians.[27]

At the same time, there were limits to how far the early Ukrainian activists could open up to the Poles. As I noted, the Poles did not accept Ukrainians as a

separate nation, and they wanted to restore Poland in its pre-partition borders. This was something Ukrainians found unacceptable, even if they were disillusioned with what Russia had to offer. And even though Russia had taken Poland's commanding place in the former Commonwealth territory, for all practical matters in daily life Polish rule continued over Ukrainians—as it did in the territory taken by the Austrian Empire. Polish landlords continued to dominate the masses of Ukrainian peasantry (a surviving element of the declining world of Agraria). In due course the Ukrainian-Polish national conflict would emerge there, with a strong social component (peasants against landlords). While recognizing the severity of the social and national antagonism, I agree with the Polish historian Jan Kieniewicz when he argues more generally that

> The Polish-Ukrainian conflict, it seems, reaches as far as the eastern expansion of Europe, and the prejudices that arise on both sides make it hard to recognize the nature of this conflict. In particular, both sides find it hard to see that the conflict is taking place *within* the same civilization. Owing to the nature of this geographical area, the parties in the conflict are inclined to view each other as members of an alien civilization [Poles and Ukrainians see each other as alien and not behaving as Europeans] . . . . The dramatism and emotional tension of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict are thus also a consequence of its intra-European character.[28]

The Ukrainian-Polish case as interpreted by Kieniewicz supports Greenfeld's argument that nation formation takes place in a shared social (I added cultural) space, and it brings a corrective to Malia's remarks on the Polish and Russian "gradients." If Kieniewicz is right, one also needs to recognize a Ukrainian gradient between those two.

Let me turn now to the Russian side of the Ukrainian "gradient." As is well known, for much of the nineteenth century Russian officials and Russian-educated society viewed the Ukrainian phenomenon, or *ukrainofil′stvo,* as a regional, cultural phenomenon, and this view was consistent with the common treatment of "Little Russians" as a branch of a greater Russian nation that also included Great Russians and Belarusians. It was not until the 1860s, during and under the impact of the Polish 1863 insurrection, that ukrainofil′stvo was officially recognized as an attempt to break the unity of Russia.[29]

Some Russian enemies of tsarism recognized much earlier, however, that ukrainofil′stvo carried a political message even though it was disguised as an interest in local history, folklore, music, and literature. Among those Russians who saw "Ukrainianism" as a vehicle for the promotion of political values that the tsarist state had suppressed was Kondratii Ryleev (1795–1826), one of the leading members of the Decembrist conspiracy and uprising. Ryleev lived for

some time in Ukraine and developed an interest in Ukrainian history and ethnography, and his writings include a poem titled "Mazepa." The émigré historian Nikolai Ulianov, the author of a polemical work exposing Ukrainian nationalism that was published in the 1960s, refers to the Ryleev case in order to make a broader generalization on how "Russian cosmopolitan liberalism was transforming itself on the Ukrainian soil into local autonomism": "The Decembrists were the first to identify their cause with Ukrainianism and created a tradition [in this respect] for the Russian revolutionary movement that followed." To support his argument Ulianov quotes the Ukrainian scholar and activist Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), who wrote that "the first attempt in poetry to link European liberalism with Ukrainian historical traditions was not undertaken by Ukrainians but by the *velikoross* (Great-Russian) Ryleev."[30]

If Ulianov and before him Drahomanov have interpreted Ryleev's position correctly, then we may conclude that for the Decembrists—and we may presume even more so for the "Ukrainophiles"—the Ukrainian "project" was a Ukrainian "road map" to Europe, a map that had been drawn in intellectual encounter with the Poles and that constituted an alternative to the official position on Russia's relations with Europe.

Gradually, the "European" theme became dominant in Ukrainian discourses on the nature of Ukrainian distinctiveness from Russia. The thesis that the Ukrainians' historical ties to "Europe" distinguished them from the Russians became an article of faith in Ukrainian national ideology. In his essay "The Ukrainian-Russian Debate over the Legacy of Kievan Rusʹ, 1840s–1860s," Jaroslaw Pelenski reviews the writings of leading spokesmen of the Ukrainian position and cites the statement of Mykola Kostomarov, according to whom "the basic differences between Ukrainians and Russians rested more on sociopolitical factors than on ethnicity, language or religion." (As one would expect a historian to do, Kostomarov believed that those differences had already been apparent in the Middle Ages, but he also admitted that the Novgorodians—that is, one branch of the Great Russians—had had more in common with the Ukrainians than with the other Great Russians who preferred "centralized rule.") As Pelenski notes, in his historical reflections Kostomarov employed the concept of society that in Western terminology is known as an open society—or even civil society. In this respect, Kostomarov not only laid the foundations for the Ukrainian-Russian political dialogue from the Ukrainian perspective, but also initiated the modern analysis of the differences between the traditional socio-political systems of the two countries.[31]

Ukrainian intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even when they disagreed on many political questions of the day, retained views formulated by their predecessors in the 1840s–1860s. Thus, the leading

spokesman of Ukrainian populism, Drahomanov, to whom I referred earlier, stressed that "the preponderance of national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century Ukraine was more closely bound to Western Europe," and the conservative ideologue Viacheslav Lypynsky insisted that

> The basic difference between Ukraine and Muscovy is not the language, nor the tribe [ethnicity], nor the faith . . . but a different political system which had evolved over the centuries, a different method of organizing the ruling elite, a different relationship between the upper and lower classes, between the state and society—between those who rule and those who are ruled.[32]

The first decades of the twentieth century created situations in which arguments of intellectual historians and nationalist thinkers could be tested in political practice. There is room in this brief essay only for mentioning the most basic facts of Russian history at that time: the preparations for the Great War, the war itself, the fall of the tsar and rise of the Provisional Government, the fall of that government, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, and their victory in the civil war. For the meaning of what happened, however, I shall turn to several authoritative interpreters who put those events in a broad historical and comparative perspective. The contemporary historian Dominic Lieven offers a concise formula that may serve as an epitaph to the story examined by scholars such as Greenfeld and Malia: "Even in 1914 the Russians were not really a nation."[33] Early in 1918, Thomas Masaryk reached the same conclusion as he observed the unfolding Russian events. Of both the Russian revolutionaries and the Russian masses Masaryk said: "They rid themselves of the Tsar, but they have not yet ridden themselves of tsarism."[34] In 1935, Petr Struve, who was a leading ideologist and advocate of Russian nation building along Western lines and an active participant in politics before and after 1914, described the revolution of 1917 as "the *political suicide of a political nation*" and called it "the most *destructive* event in world history."[35]

This wide-ranging "detour" from Namierian Galicia in 1848 provides a broader context in which to view the Ruthenians' move toward a common nationality with Russia's Ukrainians. Conversely, it also offers a perspective on the failure of the Russophile project in Galicia. Between 1848 and 1914 there were times when a majority of nationally aware Ruthenians professed their desire to be members of a nation that was to be composed of Great Russians, Belarusians, and Little Russians. To note their defeat does not imply that it was historically inevitable. In light of my discussion, one of the causes of the eventual defeat of the Russian option in Galicia may have been the fact that the autocratic tsarist state sought to prevent the formation of a Russian nation

that was liberal, Western, and "European." Internal Russian politics had its repercussions in Austria: supporters of the Russian idea there depended on the support of Russian official circles; therefore they had to abstain from criticizing Russia's autocratic regime. The Russophiles were constrained to promote the idea of a Russian nation that was dependent on the tsarist state and its official church, and such a national project became increasingly outdated and less attractive to Austria's Ruthenians, who were becoming accustomed to living in a constitutional and liberal Austria. The outcome of the struggle between these two national projects in Galicia may have been significantly influenced by what happened, or better still, what did not happen, in St. Petersburg in 1825, or in the 1860s, or even in the 1880s. Would things have turned out in Lviv the way they did had Russia acquired an elected parliament in the 1860s rather than after the revolution of 1905, or if the Russians *had* become a nation by 1914, perhaps even *before* 1914?

Paradoxical as this may appear, in 1914 the "stateless" Ruthenians of Galicia were a nation in a sense in which the Russians in "their own" empire were not. By then it was evident that a Ukrainian subject of the Austrian monarchy enjoyed more personal and political freedom than a Ukrainian, as well as his *Russian* counterpart, did in Russia. The Ukrainian national idea and the political ideas of the Ukrainophiles were compatible with the legal and political system and values of "Europe" as exemplified by Austria: what the Ukrainians wanted was more of "Europe"—further democratic reforms, greater national rights, especially the grant of autonomy to the Ukrainian part of Galicia, and certainly not the introduction of autocracy, even if it was *Russian* autocracy.

Choosing the Ukrainian identity meant that the Galician Ruthenians declared themselves not to be a nation in their own right but a part of a much larger nation, one whose main body lived in Russia. By so doing they recognized the intellectual lead of the East. They adopted the conception of Ukrainian history formulated by "Easterners" as their historical legacy. As Serhii M. Plokhy puts it, the idea of Ukrainian nationhood was based "on two main myths: that of Ukraine as the direct and only successor to medieval Kievan Rus′, and the myth of the Ukrainian Cossacks." It was the "East Ukrainian" Mykhailo Hrushevsky who was especially influential in making these two myths central elements of Ukrainian history, says Plokhy, and I might add to this that the Kyiv University graduate Hrushevsky wrote his most important works when he was a professor at the University of Lviv in 1894–1914.[36]

While they were open to the ideas and leadership coming from the East (before Hrushevsky, Drahomanov had exerted great political influence among the Galicians), the more the Galicians advanced in their own region, the more

they wanted to reciprocate by helping their compatriots within the Russian Empire. Their contributions were especially appreciated after the 1905 revolution, when the East Ukrainians finally were able to establish their own press, various cultural societies, cooperatives, and so forth. After the outbreak of the war in 1914, "Ukrainian-Ukrainian" relations achieved a qualitatively new level, especially after the fall of tsarism and then the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1917. It seemed for a brief moment, between March and November 1917, that the forces of Russian democracy and the advocates of Ukrainian autonomy would be able to reach a modus vivendi satisfying both parties. Had this happened, one may speculate further, the Ukrainian part of Galicia would have joined Russian Ukraine after the fall of the Habsburg monarchy (which would have been caused by the Allied victory), and together they might have either become an autonomous member of a democratic multinational federation with Russia or perhaps achieved independence as a sovereign Ukrainian state.

But a democratic Russia did not survive. It committed "suicide" according to Struve, and in the civil war that followed both the "Reds" and the "Whites" fought against the Ukrainians. In the end, the Reds defeated the Whites and the Ukrainians. The Poles occupied all of Galicia by the summer of 1919, and the border established after the 1920 war between Soviet Russia and Poland left Galicia on the Polish side. It is possible to argue that the outcome of the Polish-Ukrainian war over Galicia in 1918–1919 had been greatly influenced by the events in Petrograd in November 1917: the Russian "suicide" contributed to the Ukrainian failure to win independence and thus prevented the unification of Galicia with Russian Ukraine.

Whereas for Russian liberals "1917" stood for Russia's break with "Europe" and its turn toward "Asia," for the Communists the same year represented Russia's assumption of leadership in humanity's march toward a new communist civilization, the realization of another "seed-plot" of 1848—the one formulated in *The Communist Manifesto*. Instead of catching up with Europe, Russia became a model for Europe to emulate. The dissolution of "Russia" as an empire and a nation in the bourgeois sense was more than adequately compensated by the creation of a new historical community, what during the final decades of the Soviet system the official ideologists called "the multiethnic Soviet people." In the long run, however, over the course of seven decades the Soviet system repeated the failure of its imperial predecessor. According to Johann P. Arnason, the Soviet "counter-paradigm of modernity, arguably the most important of its kind," failed to realize the Marxist grand design and instead "brought the imperial order back to life in a new shape." In the course of its history it also reactivated the empire's "self-destructive dynamic."[37]

THE LAST ACT OF "1848": 1945–1991

Over seventy years had to pass for Communism's "self-destructive dynamic" to run its course, and it was only concurrently with the collapse of the Soviet "counter-paradigm of modernity" that the former "Ruthenians" of Habsburg Galicia—by then quite sure that they were Ukrainians—could freely declare their wish to live together with their compatriots in the east in an independent state called Ukraine. They did this on two occasions in 1991. First, in March, in the popular referendum about the future of the Soviet Union that Mikhail Gorbachev organized in order to save the Soviet Union as a single state, the three West Ukrainian regions constituting the Soviet part of once-Austrian Galicia overwhelmingly voted for Ukraine's independence. (In March 1991 an option to vote for independence was not available to voters anywhere else in Ukraine.) These regions confirmed their choice in the Ukraine-wide referendum of December 1, 1991, in which all of Ukraine could vote for or against independence— that is, secession from the USSR. (Overall, more than ninety percent voted for independence.)

More than seventy years separate the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the dissolution of the USSR (and thus also the Russian Empire). What appeared to Namier as the realization of the Ruthenian program of 1848 was in reality the result of a secret deal made in August 1939 by Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's "Greater Germany," a deal that in its basic features was subsequently ratified by the Soviet Union's wartime allies and was finally confirmed in the Soviet-Polish border treaty of 1945. None of these arrangements was an expression of the wishes of the people living there.

Namier had been right to think that "1945" inaugurated a new era in European history. Indeed, the post-1945 era *was* a new epoch, and the German Question and matters related to it evolved in a new historical setting. On the one hand, the process of European unification began with the Community of Coal and Steel, the Common Market, NATO, and most recently the European Union. On the other hand, there was the Soviet Bloc, the "Socialist Commonwealth." However, not only the Ukrainian but also other "questions" inherited from 1848 remained after the defeat of the "Greater German Reich," and of these the most important was the German Question. As we shall see, the history of Ukraine remained linked to the history of Germany until the last decade of the twentieth century.

The post-war German story is well known. Germany suffered huge territorial losses to Poland and to a smaller extent the USSR (Königsberg becoming Kaliningrad). On the ruins of Gross-Deutschland there was at first something one might call "Kein-Deutschland" under a joint administration of the four

great powers, and then even that remaining Germany was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet-controlled "German Democratic Republic." There was also a divided Berlin, and Austria was restored as a separate country after its seven years as a part of Hitler's Germany.

It took almost fifty years for this new version of the "German Question" to be solved to everybody's satisfaction. This time the solution was directly connected to political change within the USSR and the processes of internal liberalization in Eastern European states and their emancipation from Moscow's control. In 1990, the GDR dissolved and its "lands" joined the Federal Republic. The famous question "What is Germany?" received an answer nobody had anticipated in 1848, but it seemed that finally everybody was happy. Those pleased certainly included Poland and Czechoslovakia because the Federal Republic recognized the 1945 borders, thus putting an end to Polish-German and Czech-German conflicts of the past. While the postwar dependence of East and Central European states on the USSR was being covered up ideologically by invoking their shared commitment to building socialism and communism and their membership in the "socialist camp," another, more persuasive argument was often heard: at least the Soviet Union protected Poland and Czechoslovakia from the threat of "West German revanchism." When the Federal Republic renounced any "revanchist" claims prior to German unification, it became easier for the Poles (and others) to press for democracy at home and for independence from the USSR. But the end of the German threat did not guarantee the survival of all states we might with some justification call successors of the Habsburg monarchy. The unification of Germany was soon followed by the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and in both cases it is possible to see echoes of 1848.[38]

It is certainly possible to see a continuity between the events of 1848 and those of the late twentieth century in Ukrainian history. Ukraine's independence followed the unification of Germany within one year. Whereas Germany had played a very negative role in Ukrainian history in 1941–1945, the "intersection" between the histories of Ukraine and Germany in the late 1980s–early 1990s proved to be helpful to the Ukrainians. All agree that the resolution of the German Question was made possible by the politics of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR in which Mikhail Gorbachev played a central role. There is less clarity, to quote Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, on "how to weigh the role of the unification of Germany in the collapse of the Soviet Union." Zelikow and Rice agree, however, that Gorbachev's German policy undermined his political base at home and emboldened nationalists throughout the USSR, and that this policy in turn helped to end the Soviet Union's control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union fell apart shortly after the dissolution of

the Warsaw Pact, and the Russian Federation found itself within the "approximate frontiers of Peter the Great's Russia."[39]

Along with the newly independent Russia and thirteen other new post-Soviet states there was an independent Ukraine. As they watched this new entity's first months, some Western (and Russian) analysts and scholars were predicting that Ukraine would break up the way Yugoslavia had. They pointed out several fault lines along which the break might occur: one possibility was along the old boundary between Austria-Hungary and Russia; another, following the divide between the mainly Catholic West and the Eastern Orthodox East ("the clash of civilizations" school of thought drew attention to this element of Ukrainian disunion); and, finally, a break into Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking regions, reflecting the widely held interpretation of the Yugoslav conflict as one based on "ethnicity." (Some observers expected Crimea to break away first, with the Donbas and Odesa region to follow.)

None of these scenarios materialized. Admittedly, the Ukraine that became independent in 1991 was hardly a well-integrated country. It included, besides Galicia, two other territories that the Soviet Union annexed after World War II: the so-called "Trans-Carpathian Ukraine," for twenty years a part of Czechoslovakia (and before that of Hungary), and the northern portion of the old Austrian province of Bukovina, under Romania between the two world wars. Their populations had lived for several generations under the Habsburgs and then for another twenty years under their successors—who, despite their many shortcomings, differed markedly from Stalin's Soviet Union in the 1930s. Although Lviv and Uzhhorod and Chernivtsi found themselves in the same Soviet republic as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Poltava, the eastern and western parts of Ukraine had little in common. The making of Ukrainians into one nation, first placed on the agenda as a Romantic idea in 1848, would have been a complex, painful, and challenging process under the best of circumstances, but after 1945 Ukrainians were not free to work on it. Instead, they all became objects of Sovietization. While the war was still on, in anticipation of such a situation even before the Soviets occupied all of Ukraine, one Western observer, William Henry Chamberlin, acknowledged the "strong sentimental and cultural ties between these two branches of the Ukrainian people," and asked whether the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina would become Sovietized or whether the Westerners' "stubborn adherence to nationalist and religious ideals" would "cause embarrassment to the Soviet rulers and perhaps affect their blood brothers, the Soviet Ukrainians."[40]

It took many years before we got an answer to the Chamberlin question. The Western regions of Ukraine became Sovietized to a greater extent than their people perhaps like to admit, but they also "affected" the eastern part of the

country, and without any doubt they caused "embarrassment to the Soviet rulers" during the final years of the USSR when they voted for secession. There was a remarkable unity of action at least between Lviv and Kyiv in 1989–1991, and this certainly mattered when the independence question was on the agenda.

Among other significant factors that helped to shape Ukrainian events during the period of the USSR's breakup and the unification of Germany, one must include the changed Polish-Ukrainian relationship. Long before 1991 the democratic forces in Poland had decided to support Ukrainian national aspirations. It is most unlikely that Stalin—or his successors—could have imagined that the USSR's territorial gains of those parts of pre-1939 Poland populated by Ukrainians would make it possible to end the old historic relationship between these two nations and would one day make it possible for the Poles to support the Ukrainians in their resistance to Moscow. Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence—just one day after the referendum of December 1, 1991—and Poland also supported the Lithuanians and Belarusians in their striving for independence despite the memories of past antagonisms between these "successor nations" of the Commonwealth. For many years Polish politicians and writers complained about how fatal was their country's geopolitical situation: by the early 1990s, they saw Poland in a wholly redrawn geopolitical setting, as all of the states Poland had had as its neighbors until then were gone. For Ukraine the change was no less dramatic: not only was it independent, but it found itself for the first time in several centuries with a friendly power on its western border. The historic transformation of the Ukrainian-Polish relationship into one of good neighbors placed the Ukrainians in an unprecedented position versus Russia: for the first time, Ukraine did not have to be concerned with a threat from another power when it faced Russia.

AN EPILOGUE—AND A PROLOGUE?

Let me recapitulate the argument about "the European dimension" of the emergence of modern Ukraine and explain why this essay focuses on the Austrian or "Viennese" connection whereas the other two elements of what I call the "European dimension" receive a more cursory treatment. Ukraine's Russian connection is widely known—who has not heard about the "three hundred years" of Ukraine's being part of Russia?—and to a lesser degree the Polish connection is also known. I do not need to point out in this essay that in reality only a small part of Ukrainian territory was connected to Russia for so long, and I have noted earlier that even after most of Ukraine had found itself within the Russian Empire the Polish presence survived and extended to a much wider territory than is commonly acknowledged. The early formulation

of modern Ukrainian identity began under the Russian Empire, in the historic "Hetmanate" or "Little Russia," and continued not only in the Russian- but also in that Polish-dominated cultural and social space. However, while it acknowledges the role of St. Petersburg and Warsaw, this essay argues that Ukraine's "Vienna" connection to Europe deserves more recognition than it usually receives and that the legacy of 1848 is not merely a matter of history but has a special relevance for Ukraine today, in the early years of the twenty-first century.

The Habsburg monarchy was not simply an anachronistic continuation of an even more antiquated "Holy Roman Empire." Students may be amused when they learn that the emperor of Austria also called himself king of Hungary, king of Bohemia, king of Croatia, archduke of Austria above Enns, *and* archduke of Austria *below* Enns, not to mention that he was also margrave of Moravia and grand duke of Kraków, and more. Some Ukrainians may think it very odd that until the end in 1918, the Austrian monarch styled himself also "king of Galicia and Lodomeria"—that is, the successor of medieval princes of Halych and Volodymyr. But these medieval titles bore some relation to the modern realities. When we look at the map of Europe in the 1840s, we see that Bratislava and Prague, Buda and Pest and Zagreb, Dubrovnik and Kraków, Ljubljana and Lviv, Venice and Ternopil, Milan and Chernivtsi—I call them by their current names, some of which in 1848 were still to be invented—were all governed from one center, though, admittedly, not all in the same uniform way.[41] A resident of Chernivtsi who could afford it was free to go to Milan or Venice without crossing international borders. While not many Austrian Ruthenians went to La Scala or the Dalmatian coast, we know that one, Yuri Feďkovych (1834–1888), "wrote his first poem in Ukrainian" when doing his military service in northern Italy. "Up to that time he wrote in German," the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* informs us.[42] Would one be mistaken to think that the founder of modern *Ukrainian* literature in Austrian Bukovina was inspired to switch to the language of Kotliarevsky and Shevchenko by his encounters with Italians? If such was the case, then his biography illustrates what Greenfeld and Malia tell us about those wider social and cultural spaces in which people were developing modern national consciousness.

Turning from geography to history, we are reminded that in 1848, when serfdom was finally abolished in the monarchy, Austria's Ukrainian serfs were also freed, and that Ukrainians, including those freed peasants, voted in 1848 to elect the constituent assembly of the monarchy, the *Reichstag*. Indeed, among those they elected as deputies were several former serfs. They voted together with Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Slovenes, Germans, and Italians, for all of whom this was also their first experience of this kind. However critical one

may be of the actual conditions under which they lived after 1848, until the end
of the monarchy the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina knew the rule of law
(the monarchy was a *Rechtsstaat*), were free to develop their own associations
of all kinds, including political parties, participated in politics at local, provin-
cial, and state-wide levels, and their language was recognized by the state in
education, administration, and the courts of justice. In short, for those Ukraini-
ans Europe did not mean just abstract and noble ideals but was, however
imperfect in practice, something they experienced in real life. One example
will help explain this point. Whereas under the repressive tsarist regime Rus-
sian populism was increasingly turning to violence and revolution,
Drahomanov, born and educated in Russian Ukraine, was able to win support
for his ideas in Galicia where his disciples were free to apply his "Euro-
Populism" in social and political activities and to build social and cultural
institutions.

It should be evident by now that it is not my intention to suggest that the
Ruthenians of Galicia and Bukovina were somehow better Europeans or better
Ukrainians than their cousins in Ukraine under Russia. On the contrary, I argue
that the transformation of "Ruthenians into Ukrainians," the formation of their
Ukrainian national identity—which also meant their self-definition as a Euro-
pean nation—was the result of an interaction across imperial borders in which
Poltava, Kharkiv, and Kyiv had played the role of initiators and, for a time,
leaders. Because they knew this, as they looked at Galicia on the eve of the war
of 1914, Ukrainian activists in the tsarist state treated the achievements of their
Austrian compatriots as their own too. They attributed the differences between
the condition of the two Ukraines to the fact that one of them was part of a
European state. They expected the eastern core of their country would do just
as well if not better if given an opportunity. But, as we know, "1917" and its
aftermath brought not only the destruction of a "European" Russia but also the
defeat of a democratic Ukraine.

The subject of this paper, I would like to suggest, is not only of historical
interest. The anti-communist revolutions of 1989–1991 and the collapse of the
Russian/Soviet empire gave the nations of East Central Europe the opportunity
to join a new kind of Europe, the European Union, which Western Europe has
been building since the end of World War II. They responded to this chance
eagerly. All of those nationalities about whom Namier wrote, and also several
others who were not under the Habsburgs in 1848 (Bulgaria and the Baltic
states), are scheduled to become members or are recognized as candidates for
the European Union. Leaders of Ukraine also profess their country's "Euro-
pean orientation," and many people, especially but not only in the old "Aus-
trian" areas, would like their country to go to Europe via the route that is being

taken by Ukraine's neighbors. But this is not the only, or even the prevailing, view in Ukraine today. Some other people oppose Ukraine's European ties, whereas still others insist that unlike the Poles or the Lithuanians the Ukrainians should go "to Europe—with Russia." It is not only people who are engaged in the practice or study of politics and international relations who are participating in these controversies. As a Warsaw scholar, Ola Hnatiuk, shows in her recent book *Farewell to Empire: Ukrainian Debates on Identity,* the cultural elite, in particular writers and scholars of literature, are also engaged in highly charged debates about Ukrainian identity, in which one of the major themes is post-Soviet Ukraine's stand versus Europe. As Hnatiuk rightly points out, the Ukrainians are trying to find their way in the post-imperial world.[43]

Perhaps the advocates of the "to Europe—with Russia" option do not believe that Ukraine has left the empire for good. They do not explain why it is necessary for Ukraine first to attach itself to Russia and only then to try joining Europe. Why not go to Europe directly, as all the other nations? Those familiar with the history of both Ukraine and Russia can easily recognize in this slogan something that Ukraine experienced three hundred years earlier, when Peter I opened his famous "window to Europe" by building St. Petersburg. They also know that Russia's love-hate relationship with Europe ended in the catastrophe of 1917. So one may ask whether the call for Ukraine's closer ties with Russia is motivated by a desire to help both nations join Europe or whether it represents something different, namely an attempt to restore the old imperial pattern in Ukraine-Russia relations, in short, to deprive Ukraine of its independence.

One's answer to these questions depends in large part on how one diagnoses the present condition of Russia. Geoffrey Hosking argues that while "Britain *had* an empire . . . Russia *was* an empire—and perhaps still is." For the British people the empire was distant from the homeland (Ireland was the exception), so when the time came for the empire's end they were able to detach themselves from it "without undue distress," says Hosking, but for the Russians, the "Russian empire was part of the homeland, and the 'natives' mixed inextricably with the Russians in their own markets, streets and schools—as indeed they still do."[44] In 1991 it seemed that the Russians would follow the British and accept ("without undue distress") the breakup of their empire. The leaders of the Russian Federation played a crucial role in the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and Ukraine's gain of independence. It seemed then that the post-Soviet Russians had become a nation in a sense in which they were not a nation in 1914. Moreover, a dozen years ago Russia as a free nation and a democratic state recognized Ukraine's national independence. However, can one confidently say today that the Russian nation is sufficiently independent of the state to satisfy Hastings's definition of what makes a nation a nation? Can one say

today that the leaders—and the people—of Russia do not want to restore the empire, in some form or another, that they not only have abandoned the goal of imperial restoration but also have rejected an authoritarian form of government for Russia? As we saw, it took plenty of "distress," over more than one hundred and fifty years, before the Germans gave up their imperial ambitions and became a "normal" European nation. Have the Russians freed themselves from their imperial outlook, and do they now agree that Russia should be a "normal" nation state, not an empire? And, finally, do the Russian state and Russian society want *Russia* to join Europe?

It is too early to answer these questions about Russia with any degree of certainty. Russian history has its own dynamics, its own dimensions, as one would expect of a country extending from the Baltic to the Pacific. For the time being, however, regardless of what Russia does or says, in Ukraine the cultural elite and the political class need to bear in mind Ukraine's direct cultural and political connections to Europe in the past. Is it naïve to hope that if Ukrainian intellectuals and policy makers reflect on the actual record of the Ukrainian experience in Europe, they will agree that Ukraine's future should be with Europe?

NOTES

1. The first version of this paper was given as an address at the Omeljan and Tatiana Antonovych Prize ceremony in Kyiv, June 21, 2001. Later versions were given as lectures at the University of Cambridge, February 28, 2003, and at the University of Naples, May 12–14, 2003.

2. Namier was born Ludwik Bernsztajn (Bernstein) in what was then the Russian partition of Poland. The family bought an estate in eastern Galicia in what is now the Ternopil region of Ukraine and changed its name to Niemirowski. Although his father was a fervent Polish nationalist, young Ludwik, who spent his childhood among Ukrainian village children, would later take the side of Ukrainians during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. After a brief period at Lviv University, Namier moved to Lausanne for one term and from there went to Balliol College, Oxford, beginning his studies there in 1908 and graduating with a first-class degree in history in 1911. See Mark Baker, "Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23.2 (Winter 1998): 59–63, for an outline of Namier's biography to 1914. Cf. Julia Namier*, Lewis Namier: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 31: "But Ukrainian was to him [Lewis's father] no language at all. To make this clear he strictly forbade his children to pick it up from anyone, especially from the servants whose native language it was. [Lewis] traced to those years his passionate siding with the 'Ruthenians,' or Ukrainians . . . in 1919." For some important biographical facts and for Namier's views on the nationalities question, see Amy Ng, "Nationalism and Political Liberty: Josef Redlich, Lewis Namier, and the Nationality Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe" (Ph. D. thesis, Oxford University, 2001).

3. "1848: Seed-plot of History, " in Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies*: *Essays on European History, 1812–1918* (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 21–30.

4. Kathleen Burk, *Troublemaker: The Life and History of A. J. P. Taylor* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 270.

5. For a full exposition of Gellner's view on the transition from Agraria to Industria, see his *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). I speak of junctures or conjunctures in the sense in which Leon Wasilewski uses the word *konjunktura* in his book *Kwestja Ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe* ("The Ukrainian Question as an International Problem"), in which he argues that for a stateless nation trying to win independence it is not enough just to fight for it: what is also indispensable is a favorable international "conjuncture." See Leon Wasilewski, *Kwestja Ukrańiska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe* (Warsaw: Ukraiński Instytut Naukowy, 1934), pp. 142–3. I quote relevant passages from this book in *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), pp. xli and xlviii–xlix.

6. John A. Armstrong, "The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 29.

7.   Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 25.

8.   Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977), p. 493, quoted by Hastings, *Construction of Nationhood*, p. 26.

9.   David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. xvi: "What we call the unification of Germany was actually a partition."

10. For reference to this Goethe-Schiller "epigram" and its English translation (but without the last part), see James J. Sheehan, "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the *Nation* in German History and Historiography," *Journal of Modern History* 53.1 (March 1981): 1. Klaus von Beyme, "Shifting National Identities: The Case of German History," *National Identities* 1.1 (March 1999): 39–52, also includes the post-1945 period in his discussion of the German problem, treating the reunification of Germany in 1990 and later. (The original version of the Goethe-Schiller quotation reads: "Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es? Ich weiss das Land nicht zu finden. Wo das gelehrte beginnt, hört das politische auf.") David Blackbourn, who quotes the two authors and discusses their question, observes that "unification meant that there was now a Germany on the map as well as a Germany in the head" (*The Long Nineteenth Century*, p. xvi). As we know, the post-1871 Germany on the map did not correspond to the Germany in *everybody's* head, as demonstrated by the rise of the Third Reich.

11. Horst Glassl, *Das österreichische Einrichtungswerk in Galizien (1772–1790)* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1975), pp. 9–18, criticizes those German historians who have neglected the impact of the incorporation of Polish territories such as Galicia on the empire's administrative system and on the course of German history itself.

12. Jiří Kořalka, *Češi v habsburské říši a v Evropě 1815–1914. Sociálněhistorické souvislosti vytváření novodobého národa a národnostní otázky v českých zemích* (Prague: Argo, 1996), p. 20.

13. Kořalka, *Češi*, p. 19. Because the imperial response to ethnic nationalisms in the long run failed to produce an "imperial-Austrian" nationality, this should not mean that it was a total failure: after all, whatever their nationalist declarations may have been, many if not most subjects of the emperor remained loyal to his state until almost the end. The Austrian counterpart of the "Official Nationality" doctrine in Russia under Nicholas I appealed to the historical experience of the peoples in a common Habsburg state, rather than to ethnicity and language. Special institutions were established, such as the Institute for Austrian History at the Academy of Sciences and at the University of Vienna, to promote the study of *vaterländische Geschichte,* literally "history of the Fatherland." (Its later Soviet counterpart was called *otechestvennaia istoriia*.) That history was meant to prove that Greater Austria was "a providential necessity." For how serious these imperial "nation-building" efforts were, see Walter Leitsch, "East Europeans Studying History in Vienna (1855–1918)," in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds., *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South-East Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

14. Jerzy Jedlicki, "Heritage and Collective Responsibility," in Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore, and Peter Winch, eds., *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 53–76. The quoted passage is on p. 55.

15. Vasyl Podolynsky (1815–1876) was a Greek Catholic who before 1848 had belonged to a Polish secret society and in 1848 supported the Hungarian revolution, but he opted for Ukrainian nationality and wanted Ukrainians to be a member nation of the Slavic federation.

16. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (Philadelphia: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), pp. 29–30.

17. Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny. Formuvannia modernoï ukraïns'koï natsiï XIX–XX stolittia* (Kyiv: Heneza, 1996), p. 52.

18. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 495. It is to be regretted that Greenfeld does not consider the Polish case, which is surprising given the importance of the Polish factor in the history of Russian nation formation and Poland's role in the history of nationalism in general.

19. Martin E. Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 12–3. For a discussion of Malia's ideas by a number of American and European scholars, see Catherine Evtuhov and Stephen Kotkin, eds., *The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

20. Malia, *Russia*, pp. 439–40.

21. Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (London: John Murray, 2000), p. xvi.

22. Marc Raeff, "Ukraine and Imperial Russia: Intellectual and Political Encounters from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century," in Peter Potichnyj et al., eds., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: CIUS, 1992), pp. 69–85; quoted passage is on p. 78.

23. John P. LeDonne, *Ruling Russia: Politics and Administration in the Age of Absolutism, 1762–1796* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 305.

24. John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 76.

25. Vera Tolz, *Russia* (London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 88–9. In making her argument, Tolz includes the opinions of nineteenth-century Russian commentators.

26. Aleksander Gieysztor, "Imperia, państwa i narody sukcesyjne w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej," in *Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine: The Foundations of Historical and Cultural Traditions in East Central Europe,* Jerzy Kłoczowski et al., eds. (Lublin: Institute of East Central Europe; Rome: Founda-

tion John Paul II, 1994), pp. 7–16. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) offers a broad synthesis of the Polish "dimension" of Ukrainian and East European history extending to the beginning of the post-communist era.

27. Some of the more acute observers abroad noticed that between the Poles and Russians there were Ukrainians. Thus, the Czech writer and journalist, Karel Havlíček-Borovský, in an article entitled "The Slav and the Czech" (*Slovan a Čech*) criticized the Russian oppression of the Poles, and he was also critical of the Poles, stressing that "the main bone of contention which has divided every generation of Poles and Russians is the possession of the Ukraine." In Havlíček's opinion the Russian-Polish conflict over Ukraine was "a fable of two wolves": "If there is a lamb in the picture, it is the Ukrainian." See Karel Havlíček, *Politické spisy*, ed. Z. Tobolka (Prague: n.p., 1900–1903), 1:70; quoted in Barbara K. Reinfeld, *Karel Havlíček (1821–1856): A National Liberation Leader of the Czech Renascence* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1982), p. 25. What the Czech journalist knew in the 1840s, the leading British statesman was totally unaware of in the 1860s. In his long essay entitled "Poland," published during the Polish insurrection of 1863, Lord Salisbury argued that the European public was one-sided in its support of the Poles in their struggle against what it perceived, mistakenly in the lord's opinion, as Russian oppression. What Europe did not see, Salisbury said, was that the Poles were not simply fighting for the freedom of their own people, but were also attempting to annex purely Russian lands and thus to destroy Russia as a nation. Those purely Russian lands were, of course, what we now call Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. But there is no sign in the long essay that its author considered it possible that the eastern territories he denied to the Poles might one day declare themselves to be neither Polish nor Russian. See "Poland," in *Essays by the late Marquess of Salisbury, K.G., Foreign Politics* (London: John Murray, 1905): pp. 3–60.

28. Jan Kieniewicz, "Polska-Ukraina: dialog w strefie pogranicza," *Przegląd Powszechny*, no. 10 (1996): 65–73; quoted passage is on pp. 67–8.

29. For a recent study of the subject focusing on responses to the Ukrainian phenomenon from the side of government and society, see Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003). The title of the earlier Russian edition of this work reveals more accurately what it is about*: "Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* (St. Petersburg: "Aleteia," 2000).

30. Nikolai Ulianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskogo separatizma* (New York: n.p., 1966), p. 156. The quotation from Drahomanov is on p. 146.

31. Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Ukrainian-Russian Debate over the Legacy of Kievan Rusʹ, 1840s–1860s," in *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998), p. 222.

32. Viacheslav Lypynsky, cited in Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'*, p. 223.

33.   Lieven, *Empire*, p. 384.

34.   Thomas G. Masaryk, *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*, W. Preston-Warren and William B. Weist, eds. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1972), p. 123.

35.   Petr Struve, quoted in Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 301. Italics in the original.

36.   Serhii M. Plokhy, "Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute," in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 150–1. By accepting "the Cossack myth" as a constituent element of their identity, and thus agreeing to forget what the Cossacks' relations with the Uniates had been, Galician Ruthenians were practicing what Ernest Renan said about the important role in nation building of not only shared memories but also of a mutual agreement to forget the past: "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century." (Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* [London: Routledge, 1990], p. 11.) Benedict Anderson says that according to Renan's wording "every French citizen" is *"obliged to have forgotten"* the Saint Bartholomew massacre and comments that "in effect, Renan's readers were being told to 'have already forgotten' what Renan's own words assumed that they naturally remembered!" (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. [London: Verso, 1991], p. 200). History provides examples of how the memories of religious conflict carried their power to divide into the age of nationalism—in other words, how certain people refused "to have forgotten." The result was either a profound political crisis that took time to solve or a break into separate nations along religious lines. For the former kind of crisis, see David Blackbourn's reminder that in Germany after 1871 the Kulturkampf was "literally a struggle of civilizations" (*The Long Nineteenth Century,* p. 261). Hastings cites the case of "Holland [which] was created in its separateness by a religious struggle." He adds that "once established, nationalism largely took over from religion" (*The Construction of Nationhood,* p. 28).

37.   Johann P. Arnason, *The Future That Failed: Origin and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 87–8. In other words, the Soviets repeated the story of their tsarist predecessors about whose efforts Simon Dixon wrote: "The more Russian rulers tried to modernise their state, the more backward their empire became" (*The Modernisation of Russia 1676–1825* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], p. 256). In comparison with Russia, the Habsburgs were more successful at modernizing, but they too failed to create a monarchy-wide nationality.

38.   According to E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789. Programme, Myth, Reality,* 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 164: "In Europe, the outburst of separatist nationalism has even more specific historical roots in the twentieth century. The eggs of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are

still hatching . . . . The explosive issues of 1988–92 were those created in 1918–21." The same point is repeated on p. 165: "The simplest way to describe the apparent explosion of separatism in 1988–92 is thus as 'unfinished business' of 1918–21." In my view, it is the "eggs" of the 1848 revolution that were still hatching in the 1990s. For a curious view of Ukraine's path to independence, see Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 166: "Ukraine . . . did not *resign itself* to separation until after the failed coup of August 1991 destroyed the USSR" (italics—RS).

39. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Trans-formed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 369. Elsewhere Zelikow and Rice write that the Soviets were opposed to German reunification, believing that it "would rip the heart out of the Soviet security system" and undo all the gains of World War II (pp. 125–6.) (The Soviets were right.)

40. William Henry Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 83–4.

41. Indeed, today, when Brussels is the capital of the European Union, which Ukraine says it eventually hopes to join, it is interesting to recall that between 1772 and 1797 both Lviv and Brussels were under the authority of Vienna: Brussels, as the capital of Austrian Netherlands; Lviv, as the capital of Austrian Galicia. (This ended in 1797, when Napoleon occupied the former, but, alas, not the latter.) Whether this bit of information will impress anyone in Brussels is another matter.

42. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984–1993), 1:871.

43. Ola Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium: Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003).

44. Geoffrey Hosking, "The Freudian Frontier," *Times Literary Supplement*, March 10, 1995, p. 27.