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THE NET THAT COVERS THE WORLD*

By E. H. COOKRIDGE (Pseudonym)

Published by Henry Holt and Company,
New York, 1955

315 Pages

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The author, whose real name is Edward SPIRO, is by his own definition a "special correspondent for British and American newspapers between the Wars." This book deals extensively with the functions of the First and Second Directorates of the MVD, and also presents accounts of individual Soviet espionage agent cases. The author appears to have taken much of his data from documents of unspecified origin as well as from the Canadian and Australian Royal

*Other editions:

British (original): *SOVIET SPY NET*, published by Frederick Mueller, Ltd., London, 1955, 264 pp., index.

German: *ZENTRALE MOSKAU - DIE MACHT DES SOUJETSCHEN GEHEIMDIENSTES* (Moscow Center - The Power of the Soviet Secret Service), published by Sponholtz, Hannover, 1956, 416 pp., index.

Spanish: *EL SERVICIO SECRETO SOVIETICO* (The Soviet Secret Service). published by Editorial AHR, Barcelona, 1955, 408 pp., index.

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Commission Reports,* on the GUZENKO and PETROV revelations. He also seems to have acquired considerable information from personal experience [unspecified]. He mentions two hundred and sixty-two persons as being connected, to a greater or lesser degree, with Soviet intelligence as staff members, agents, collaborators or targets.

In discussing the MVD directorates, the author says that the First Directorate is an intelligence organization in the Western sense. The Second Directorate functions in a more "sinister" sense, that is, kidnappings, assassinations and terrorism at home and abroad. In this connection so-called special centers, "Mobile Groups for Special Tasks, the "Avanposts" (outposts, says the author, a spy ring comprising usually two or more networks abroad), and the work of special inspectors are discussed. Attached to this memorandum is a breakdown of the organization and functions of the two directorates as of 1954 as presented by the author.

One chapter is devoted to a near obsession of the Soviets with indexing, and two chapters to the recruitment and training of agents, primarily those slated to become staff members of the MVD. Commissars of the MVD exist in all government institutions to spot and recommend candidates who in turn undergo three different levels of training before being assigned to minor posts on the border for further testing.

*See CD-633 and CD-707 respectively.

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The so-called atomic espionage case in the U.S. (Dr. Allen NUNN-MAY, Klaus FUCHS, and Julius and Ethel ROSENBERG) is discussed from the point of view of Soviet intelligence operations. Also of interest is the author's account of the ruthless stalking and final assassination of Ignace REISS in 1937, after REISS had written an abusive letter to Stalin and had left the Cheka.

Throughout the book the author refers to the directorates of the MVD and to most of their predecessors as the Cheka for continuity and because their functions have remained basically the same in spite of many reorganizations and changes of title. Attached to this memorandum is a chronological list of these organizational changes until 1954.

Organizational Functions (1954)

The (First) Directorate of Counterespionage

1. Foreign Division: Intelligence research, collection and dissemination. Controls secret agents, sets tasks and targets, and collates incoming reports from networks abroad.
2. Operative Division: Organizes and directs operations of the secret service. Appoints resident directors, selects agents for work abroad, controls networks, looks after communications and takes measures in case of exposure.
3. Information Division: Studies every aspect of human activities outside the USSR. Scrutinizes newspapers, sifts rumors and gossip, monitors broadcastin, and maintains a "descriptive central index".
4. Secret Division: Has sepcimens of genuine documents from every part of the world. Produces forged documents, passports, and seals for secret agents and couriers. Invents aliases, codes, and ciphers, and arranges accommodation addresses and post office boxes.
5. Recruiting and Training: Responsible for all aspect of recruiting and training.
6. Communications Division: Carries out the routine business of maintaining communications with the networks and deals with any special transportation problems that arise, such as the escape of Soviet Gerhard EISLER from the U.S.

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The Second Directorate for Positive State Security

1. Propaganda Division: Aims at the destruction of capitalist countries. Maintains secret contact with Communist parties abroad, with the main object of creating fifth columns.

2. Special Division: Responsible for the execution of individuals and groups at the order of the government. Includes "Section Nine" which is concerned with individual murders and kidnappings abroad.

3. Individual Division: Supervises the reliability of Soviet citizens at home by prying into private mail and monitoring conversations by telephone taps. Surpervises the activities of all Soviets aborad, whether diplomats, officials, members of trade delegations, or individuals sent abroad for special purposes. Special agents watch ordinary state security staff members.

4. Allied Division: Deals with Soviet satellites and Communist countries. Plans state security officials in governments of such countries and attempts to control such countries' ministries of state security.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES [until 1954]

1917	December 20	CHEKA (all Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting of Counterrevolution and Sabotage) Chairman Feliks Edmundovich DZERZHINSKY)
1922	February 11	GPU (State Political Administration) Chairman DZERZHINSKY Vice Chairman M. A. THILISER Vice Chairman J. UNSHLIKHT
1923	November 15	OGPU (United States Political Administration) President DZERZHINSKY until his death 20 July 1926 succeed by Vyacheslav MENZHINSKIY until his death 10 May 1934, succeeded by Genrikh YAGODA
1934	July 10	NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs) Commissar YAGODA
1935	October 8	NKVD now includes a special department for State Security. Commissar YAGODA until his arrest in June 1936
1936	September 27	NKVD Commissar Nicolay YEZHOV until his disappearance in December 1938
1938	December 8	NKVD Lavrenty BERIYA appointed Peoples' Commissar for Interior and State Security

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1941 February 3 NKVD and NKGB
BERIYA in supreme control.
NKGB headed by Vsevolod MERKULOV

1946 March Commissariats resumed "Ministries"
NKVD MVD Ministry of Interior
NKGB KGB Ministry of State Security
BERIYA in supreme control
MVD under Sergey KRUGLOV
KGB under Vsevolod MERKULOV until
1950
KGB under V. A. ABAKUMOV after
1950

1953 March 8 MVD and KGB merged into Ministry
of Internal Affairs and State
Security under S. N. KRUGLOV as
Minister and A. I. SEROV as
Vice-Minister

1954 After execution of BERIYA, a
Board of State Security was
established to coordinate the
internal security services under
the chairmanship of A. I. SEROV.
S. N. KRUGLOV remained in charge
of MVD

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THE WORLD'S GREATEST SPIES

By Charles WIGHTON

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319 Pages

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The author presents fifteen short narratives about spies whom he considers to be the greatest in the world. Six of the narratives concern Soviet intelligence activities and primarily involve the following cases or persons: Ernest WOLLWEBER, Richard SORGE, the Red Orchestra, atomic spies Dr. Allan NUNN MAY, Dr. Klaus FUCHS, and David GREENGLASS, the case regarding Colonel Rudolph ABEL and Lucy from Lucerne.*

*Analyst's Comment: The author presents bizarre speculations about facts which are not contained in other sources. The speculations are discussed in each chapter, as pertinent. Wighton apparently used other books as source material.

Ernest WOLLWEBER

WOLLWEBER was a veteran of undercover activities in Western Europe. He was born in 1898, the son of a poor miner, and served as a stoker in the German Navy from the time he was eighteen years old. In 1918 he took part in the mutiny of the High Seas Fleet at Kiel in the Baltic Sea. In 1920 he joined the German Communist Party in Hamburg. In the early 1920's, Dmitriy Zakharovich MANUILSKIY, a Soviet member of the Comintern who was at that time visiting Germany, persuaded WOLLWEBER to go to Moscow for training in political studies at the Lenin Institute. WOLLWEBER did so, and after graduation received intelligence training in undercover operations abroad. He then became an agent of Soviet state security. He returned to Germany and rose to a high-ranking position in the Party. In 1928 he was elected to the Prussian Parliament and in 1932 became a member of the Reichstag.

From the time of his return to Germany he began to organize a maritime sabotage group under cover of the Communist-dominated International Seamen and Harbor Workers' Union. At the time Hitler came to power and the Party was outlawed, he began forming the nucleus of the underground Communist movement. He worked both as a member of the Comintern in Western Europe and as a resident of Soviet state security in Germany. His sabotage network was composed of Germans, Danes, Swedes, Dutchmen, Belgians, and one British subject and the organization expanded rapidly. The network's centers were in Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Riga. In 1937, WOLLWEBER barely escaped arrest by the Gestapo, at the time when about a dozen of his collaborators in Hamburg were seized

in a police raid. He moved to Copenhagen and continued his work from there. In 1940, after the German occupation of Denmark, he established his headquarters in Stockholm. According to a 1941 report by RSHA (German Security Headquarters) chief Reinhard Heydrich, WOLLWEBER's organization was responsible for the successful sabotage of a total of twenty ships, of which sixteen were German, three Italian, and one Japanese.

As a result of German diplomatic pressure, the Swedish authorities agreed to arrest WOLLWEBER and his accomplices. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The German authorities made the claim that WOLLWEBER, as a German citizen, was wanted for numerous acts of sabotage against German shipping, and requested his extradition. The Soviets then intervened on his behalf, because his network was of high value to them. Through diplomatic channels the Soviets put forth the claim that WOLLWEBER, as a Soviet citizen, was wanted in the USSR for the misappropriation of large sums of state funds. The Swedish Government yielded to the Soviets and released WOLLWEBER in 1944. He was transported by air to Moscow.

After the war, WOLLWEBER, was appointed head of the shipping directorate for the Soviet zone of Germany (i.e. East Germany). This assignment provided him with cover for further organization of sabotage activity. Some postwar acts of sabotage in the U.K., France Germany, and Canada have been attributed to his organization. In 1953, after the riots in East Germany, he succeeded ZAISSER as Minister of East Germany's state security. According to the author, ULBRICHT did not like him, and almost immediately ordered him fired, after threatening him with arrest. Moscow intervened in the matter

however, and WOLLWEBER was able to retain his post and to carry on his maritime sabotage work. As of 1962 he was still holding that post.

Richard SORGE

The author's account of the case of Richard SORGE appears to be based primarily on information in Hans Otto MEISSNER's book *THE MAN WITH THREE FACES*. WIGHTON's account contains some allegedly new information and, at the same time, differs from other overt sources.

Analyst's comments on a comparison of
WIGHTON's book with other sources:

1. WIGHTON repeats MEISSNER's conjecture that SORGE may still (1962) be alive and says, "Some well informed Western experts believe that. If he is, then he is certainly one of the top figures of the Soviet espionage service." Chalmers A. JOHNSON, in his book, *AN INSTANCE OF TREASON*, rejects this speculation.

2. WIGHTON and JOHNSON cite the date of SORGE's departure from Germany for the USSR as 1925. MEISSNER, who is customarily vague concerning dates, cites 1920. According to the Hearings before the

Committee on UN-American Activities,
House of Representatives, Eighty-
Second Congress, First Session,
August 9, 22 and 23, 1951, p. 1173
entitled "Hearings on American Aspects
of the Richard Sorge Spy Case" the date
was 1925.

3. In describing SORGE's travels
as a Comintern agent before 1929 neither
WIGHTON nor JOHNSON make mention of
SORGE's stay in the U.S. MEISSNER
maintains that he spent some time in
Hollywood, California ca. 1928. The
Hearings cite SORGE's confession as
having been in the USA in 1933 and
1935.

4. Both WIGHTON and MEISSNER
misspell the names of Soviet Generals
BERZIN and URITSKIY, which they give
as BELDIN and ULITSKI.

5. According to WIGHTON, the
clandestine radio operators assigned
to SORGE were WEINGART in China and
BERNHARDT in Japan during the first
year. According to JOHNSON, BERNHARDT
was the operator during the entire
period. MEISSNER makes no mention of
either WEINGART or BERNHARDT.

6. According to WIGHTON, Agnes
SMEDLEY was a GRU agent. JOHNSON
repudiates this assertion.

7. WIGHTON and MEISSNER maintain
that Max KLAUSEN joined the SORGE group
in China. According to WIGHTON, KLAUSEN

was in a Soviet internment camp from 1933 to 1935 as punishment for inefficiency. He does not mention that SORGE was accused of having a love affair with a White Russian, anti-Soviet emigre. According to JOHNSON, KLAUSEN did not join the SORGE group until 1934. Other variations between sources in dates of KLAUSEN's activities are: MEISSNER cites him as having been in Shanghai in 1930 and as having been recalled to Moscow in 1933. According to the Hearings, KLAUSEN was in Canton in 1931 and in Harbin in 1932.

8. Concerning SORGE's employment by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, WIGHTON says that SORGE was appointed correspondent for that newspaper with the help of Agnes SMEDLEY. JOHNSON states, on the other hand, that SMEDLEY was fired from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* immediately after Hitler came to power. It therefore seems unlikely that her recommendation would have been of assistance to SORGE. MEISSNER does not mention SMEDLEY in connection with SORGE's employment by the newspaper.

9. According to WIGHTON and MEISSNER, SORGE applied for NSDAP (Nazi Party) membership in 1933 while he was in Germany. JOHNSON and various Soviet press reports say that SORGE joined NSDAP after his arrival in Japan.

10. WIGHTON suggests that SORGE had a protector in the Nazi hierarchy, but provides no name or identifying data. (See page 15, paragraph 3, for a reference to WERTHER.)

11. According to WIGHTON, German Ambassador OTT in Tokyo appointed SORGE to the post of Press Attache in the Embassy. JOHNSON says that the German Foreign Ministry offered the post to SORGE but that he refused to accept it on security grounds. Soviet news accounts state that SORGE was the Press Attache, but make no reference to the manner in which he procured the position. The Soviet news accounts add that in that post he had had access to the Embassy's secret files.

12. WIGHTON's version of the detection and arrest of the SORGE group agrees in all detail with that of MEISSNER, and both state that the head of Japanese counterintelligence and a beautiful nightclub dancer played the main roles in the denouement. JOHNSON, on the other hand, says that SORGE's downfall was precipitated by MIYAGI. A former landlady of MIYAGI's in 1932 in Los Angeles and member of the Communist Party of the US, arrived in Japan in 1940. An arrested Japanese Communist [unnamed] turned police informant and denounced the former landlady as a Communist and a spy. She was placed under surveillance for a year and finally arrested. When

interrogated concerning Japanese nationals who had lived in the US and had returned to Japan, she named MIYAGI, among others. MIYAGI, who was on a police list of persons associated with OZAKI and SORGE, was placed under surveillance and eventually arrested.

The Red Orchestra

WIGHTON appears to have depended upon Wilhelm F. FLICKE's book, *SPIONAGE GRUPPE ROTE KAPELLE* (Espionage Group Red Orchestra) as his main source of information for this account, although in WIGHTON's condensed version key facts and persons involved in the case are omitted.

WIGHTON begins by recalling the background and says that in 1937 GRU networks in Western Europe were almost nonexistent. Most of the GRU's leading operatives were at that time recalled to Moscow and disappeared in the purges. Most of the agents in the German Communist Party were liquidated by the Gestapo. Moscow decided to revive the espionage system in Western Europe as quickly as possible and to direct operations from Belgium, Holland, France, and Switzerland, border nations of the Third Reich.

According to WIGHTON, Leopold TREPPER, whose true name was DOME, was selected to be the GRU resident. He had formerly been a Comintern agent with experience in Poland, Palestine, and France. He had transferred to the GRU, studied for two

years at the Lenin Institute in Moscow, and, after graduation, received thorough training in intelligence. In March 1939 he went to Brussels and, assisted by several subordinates, immediately began to organize a network. He expanded the net to Holland and France, where Leo GROSSVOGEL, his longtime friend and a former Comintern agent, became his chief collaborator. TREPPER set up a cover firm called the Simex Company which, at the same time, carried on a legitimate business and had branches in France, Belgium, Holland, and Sweden. Through this firm, his agents were able to penetrate the German occupation administration in France and Belgium, and also Todt, the Nazi construction combine. Communications with the Moscow Center had already been arranged through the use of couriers and by clandestine radio. The radio communications channel was to be activated only on orders from Moscow. The order came in the late 1930's, at the time the Germans began the concentration of their forces on the Soviet border.

The net supplied the Soviet high command with information concerning strategic plans of the German high command, and the operational plans of the German Air Force, including reports on the movement of German units and on bombing targets.

Several years before the German attack on the Soviet Union, the GRU operative in Berlin had organized an espionage network. Its key members were Arvid HARNACK, a high official in the German Ministry of Economy, and Harro SCHULZE-BOYSEN, an officer in the German Air Ministry. The group, which began to be expanded in 1939, had an excellent potential and was of great interest to the Moscow Center. After the Russo-German war began, the group ran into communication difficulties with Moscow. The Center ordered TREPPER to detail an expert from Brussels

to Berlin to alleviate the situation. The radio message containing the instructions to TREPPER included the names and addresses of HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN. The order was carried out, but the elementary violation of security committed in the cable was later to prove fatal to the Berlin group.

The beginning of the end for the Red Orchestra group came in the second half of 1941. Contributing factors were the perseverance of the radio detection surveillance mounted by the Germans, and the phenomenal number of security violations in the messages between the Center and the groups. The Gestapo raided the clandestine radio establishment in Brussels, arrested several accomplices, and seized sufficient material to decode some of the messages. Among the messages was the one concerning the Berlin group containing the names of HARNACK and SCHULZE-BOYSEN. The Berlin group was broken up immediately, and the Belgian and French groups were similarly dealt with in 1942. The last member of TREPPER's group was arrested in Marseille.

TREPPER himself was arrested in Paris in 1942. He made a full confession and for a period cooperated with the Germans. He eventually escaped from German internment, fought with the Maquis, and in 1945 was recalled to Moscow.

Atomic Spies

This short narrative concerns Dr. Allan NUNN MAY, Dr. Klaus Julius FUCHS, and David GREENGLASS. According to the author, NUNN MAY, a British subject was probably recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1937 when, after graduating from Cambridge University, he visited the Soviet Union and spent some time in Leningrad. Later, in 1939, he became a professor at the University of London. In 1942 he worked with a group of physicists at the Cavendish laboratory in Cambridge. In 1943 he joined the first group of British scientists delegated to the United States to cooperate with American scientists on the atomic bomb project. In 1945 he spent some time at the Argonne laboratory. As a result of the revelations of Igor Sergeyeovich GUZENKO, the Soviet defector in Canada, suspicion fell on NUNN MAY as having possibly been the atomic scientist working for Soviet intelligence. NUNN MAY was watched by the Special Branch of Scotland Yard and was arrested on 4 March 1946. He confessed to having been a Soviet agent, but refused to name other collaborators in the U.K., the U.S., or Canada. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

FUCHS was born in Germany where he grew up to become a member of the German Communist Party. In 1933, at the age of twenty-two, he fled from Germany to England. He studied at universities in Bristol and Edinburgh. In 1940 he was put in an internment camp on the Isle of Mann with other German citizens and later transferred to a similar camp in Canada. In 1941 he was released, went briefly to Edinburgh, but soon accepted a job in Birmingham at the atomic research center ther. According to the author, it was during this period that he was recruited by

KREMER, a member of Soviet military intelligence. From that time he delivered to the Soviets on a regular basis valuable atomic energy data to which he had gained access in England and the U.S. Until 1947 he managed to conceal his Party membership.

In August 1943 FUCHS became a naturalized British subject and, after successfully passing a routine security check, became a member of the tube alloys organization which had been set up to coordinate the work of the British atomic energy research teams. In 1943 he was selected to be a member of the British team of scientists visiting the U.S., where he remained until 1946, spending most of his time at Los Alamos. Before his trip the GRU had arranged for him to be contacted in the U.S. by a special operative who had been sent to the U.S. for that purpose. When FUCHS returned to England he became head of a department of theoretical physics at the new atomic energy center at Harwell, where he worked both as a scientist and as an espionage agent until the last half of 1949.

In January 1950, he was arrested and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. In the early 1960's, he was released and went to East Germany. In 1962 he was allegedly deputy director of the East German Nuclear Energy Research Center in Dresden.

GREENGLASS, a GRU agent at Los Alamos, is mentioned only briefly in the book, in the context of his also having had Harry GOLD as his contact man. The ROSENBERG's are mentioned in this chapter only in connection with the fact that Ethel ROSENBERG was GREENGLASS' sister.

Colonel ABEL

The book contains comments about ABEL's personal and family background, but does not indicate the author's sources. The author says that some [unspecified] sources have maintained that ABEL was born in the White Russian town of Minsk, the son of a printer. According to WIGHTON, other sources have speculated that he was born in southern Russia ca. 1900, the son of a wealthy Jewish intellectual. ABEL's father had to flee from Russia to Switzerland in 1906 because of his leftwing connections, and there he allegedly met Lenin. The family then moved to Germany and settled in Leipzig. After the Russian Revolution the family returned to Moscow.

In 1923 young ABEL became a member of the Communist Party. He studied for three years in Berlin at the technical university. After graduation, he returned to Moscow and underwent intelligence training. Using the alias AVOLKIN, he was assigned to Berlin as an Assistant Commercial Attache in the Soviet Embassy. For a period he also posed as a German engineer in the Zeiss optical works in Jena. After taking additional intelligence training in Moscow, he was again sent to Germany to undertake an intelligence mission and operated in the Berlin-Dresden-Leipzig area. Due to the fact that he was of a Jewish appearance, he did not blend into the Nazi environment, and was transferred first to Palestine and later to Switzerland. In Switzerland he allegedly met RADO, the local resident. At the end of 1944 he was said to have been in Tehran. After the war he spent eight months in East Berlin engaged in conducting a series of missions directed against West Germany, France, and, on occasion, England. He was then recalled to Moscow for the

purpose of preparing himself for an assignment to Canada and the U.S.

In 1948 ABEL arrived in Montreal using the alias Andrew KAYOTIS. He then moved to New York, where he assumed the identity of Emil R. GOLDFUS, a photographer.

WIGHTON provides little data about ABEL's intelligence activity in the U.S. He mentions only one contact with the COHEN couple in 1950 in New York. The contact then stopped because the COHENS, who were part of the ROSENBERGS' ring, had to leave the U.S. in haste due to the fact that they had been compromised by the arrests and confessions of FUCHS, GOLD, and GREENGLASS.

WIGHTON's condensed version of ABEL's detection through the defection of HAYHANEN, his deputy, and ABEL's arrest, sentence, and exchange for POWERS, the U-2 flyer, agrees in detail with the more ample version given by James Britt DONOVAN in his book, *STRANGERS ON THE BRIDGE*.

[ABEL died on 16 November 1971. On 22 August 1972 a *Washington Post* dispatch from Moscow reported that Western newsmen had stumbled across ABEL's grave marker in a Moscow cemetery, engraved: "Fisher, William Genrykhovich-Abel, Rudolf Ivanovich." The dispatch also reports from a "reliable unofficial source" that he "was born and raised in England."]

Lucy from Lucerne

This account concerns a Soviet espionage network in Switzerland during World War II, called by the Germans the Rote Drei (Red Three).* The main protagonist of the story is Rudolf ROESSLER, called Lucy, the most valuable member of the net. RADO, the resident director, and Alexander FOOTE, his deputy, play only minor roles.

According to WIGHTON, ROESSLER had been a member of Czech intelligence before his arrival in Switzerland. He adds that ROESSLER probably fought with the Czech legions in Siberia in 1917-1918 and against the Hungarian Communists in 1918. He maintains that Czech intelligence was in contact with Soviet intelligence beginning with the revolutionary period of 1918.

WIGHTON speculates on the identity of WERTHER, Lucy's most valuable source within the German high command. He suggests two identities: one, the Catholic organization with access to the German military inner sanctum; or two, a Communist in the highest echelon of the Nazi Party. WIGHTON suggests two possibilities if Lucy's source was a Communist at the top of the Nazi Party: one, that Richard SORGE had had a protector in Germany, and that

**Analyst's Comment:* It would appear that WIGHTON took the essentials of his narrative from the book *HANDBOOK FOR SPIES*, by Alexander FOOTE, although in the first two editions of his book FOOTE misidentifies Lucy. He has added conjectures and speculation of his own. (Published by Museum Press, Ltd., London, 1949, 1953, 1964, 190 pp., no index -- see CD-652.)

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that protector could be WERTHER; and two, that if Martin BORMANN, Hitler's deputy, was a Communist, as has been alleged by Rear Admiral Wilhelm CANARIS, then BORMANN might have been WERTHER.

WIGHTON's version of the uncovering of the Swiss net agrees with FOOTE's version in *HANDBOOK FOR SPIES*, although WIGHTON's story is in such a condensed form that it lacks discussion of direct or indirect reasons and causes behind the net's successes and downfall.

ROESSLER was arrested in 1944 and eventually released as a result of the intervention of the Swiss General Staff, with whom, according to the author, he had cooperated closely. He was, however, again arrested in 1953 on suspicion of working for the Czech intelligence service. He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and died in 1958.