

*The Brazilian Armed Forces:  
Current changes, new challenges*

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## Nota do Editor

Com a publicação deste artigo A *REST* homenageia o saudoso fundador do NEST, professor René Dreifuss falecido em maio de 2003, aos 58 anos de idade. René nasceu em 1945, na cidade de Montevidéu, Uruguai. Formou-se em História e Ciência Política pela Universidade de Haifa, Israel. Fez seu curso de Mestrado na Universidade de Leeds, Inglaterra, em 1974, e o Doutorado na Universidade de Glasgow, Escócia, em 1980, ambos na área de Ciência Política. Publicou seus trabalhos sete línguas: português, espanhol, inglês, francês, italiano, alemão e hebraico Escreveu vários livros, sendo logo o primeiro um *best-seller*, que vem merecendo sucessivas edições, *1964: A Conquista do Estado* (Vozes,1981). Seguiram-se *a Internacional Capitalista (Espaço-Tempo,1986)*; *O Jogo da Direita na Nova República (Vozes, 1989)*; *Política, Poder, Estado e Força- uma leitura de Weber(Vozes, 1993)*; e *A Época da Perplexidade (Vozes, 1996)*. Durante os últimos anos de sua vida, ao invés de se render à temível doença que o fazia sofrer dores intensas e que o levaria ao último momento, estudou e pesquisou intensamente sobre as relações entre ciência, tecnologia e poder. Deixou praticamente pronto um livro que, com mais de 600 páginas, foi terminado e editado pela sua mulher, Estrela Bohadana, que recebeu o título *Transformações: Matrizes do Século XXI* (Petrópolis, Vozes, 2004).

Cumpriu longa carreira, embora tenha nos deixado tão cedo. Foi Professor de Ciência Política da UFMG (1980/1984), membro-fundador do Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos da UNICAMP, pesquisador-visitante na área interdisciplinar de energia da COPPE/UFRJ (1984/1986), assessor-técnico da Fundação Escola de Serviço Público (FESP) do Rio de Janeiro, conselheiro *ad hoc* do Ministério de Relações Exteriores da República Federativa do Brasil, Coordenador do módulo “Mudanças de Paradigmas de Ciência & Tecnologia” do *Instituto Virtual Internacional de Estudos das Mudanças Globais* da COPPE / UFRJ. Desde 1986 até o seu falecimento, foi Professor do Departamento de Ciência Política da UFF, lecionando na graduação e na pós-graduação. Com apoio do Reitor José Raimundo Romêo da Universidade Federal Fluminense, tive a oportunidade, em 1986, de com ele fundar o Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos (NEST), sendo Coordenador-Executivo e eu, durante o período compreendido entre 1985 e 1991, o de Coordenador Adjunto. *ELF*

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## *I - A View of the World*

We are living through a variety of impressive civilizational configurations-in-process, actually intertwined and reciprocally sustained, interwoven in networks, open-ended and multi-oriented, based upon impacting and accelerated scientific irruptions and ruptures, as well as an intense growth of interlinked and superposed technological innovations. These configurations-in-process represent a constant systemic and spatial (re)articulation of innovative movements and sequences, all in unequal times and differentiated intensity, constituting transnational productive reestructuration, supranational command reformulation and institutional reorganization as well as existential (vivential and existence) metanational recomposition. Such mega-processes in content and forms - blurring long-standing accepted common senses, posing paradoxes and dramatic ethical and political question-marks - are the stamps of 'our' complicated and extremely short period of Time.

In such a context, we are facing major knowledge breakthroughs, while living through composite and multidimensional changes, expressed as:

a) Societal transfrontier manifestations and metanational cultural expressions, threading together a world society in real terms and virtual reality. A worldlization of patterns, values, references and costumes, while reaffirming diversity along homogeneity, singularity interacting with universality, and particularity outstanding within generality;

b) Tecno-productive and financial transnationalization, setting up new dimensions of incipient global management, procedures and senses of capital, work and product, inducing globalization and shaping a gaianomy (or geonomy) based upon a heterotopy of nations;

c) Administrative, institutional and strategic possibilities beyond national references pointing at the tenets for a planetary governmental reasoning – democracy and representation above sovereignty? An emerging supranational entity seeking the conditions

for the planetization of societal organizations, setting up heterarchies in the different fields of governing action, normative behaviour and regulation-oriented measures.<sup>1</sup>

Clearly, worldlization, globalization and planetization impinge a stress-strain-press syndrome upon the social and political fabric and practices in varied countries, raising a number of issues (and questions) that relate to the growing cognitive gap between the different parts of the planet. Stress imposed by parts and parcels of the productive and financial system, entoured by the diverse societal expectations, in their aim to define sense and directions. Strain within societal patterns of behaviour and expectations, attitudes and perceptions, culturally framed and value-oriented. Press upon state-policy formulation, implementation and follow-up in actual governance, once the state structure, governmental organization and institutions are being reorganized, not only in their ways and means, but in the definition of what would be their precipuous objectives and forms of action.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, South Americans are dealing with a new reality which severely undermines the possibilities of building effective representation. It renders as equally ineffective the premises of public policy accountability, once the federal guidelines are necessarily adjusted not only to internal games of power, but to international (and increasingly supranational) governmental and State directives. For many, national actions are rendered societally ineffective *vis-à-vis* transnational power centers, telematic jet sets, and their 'socio-market modelling'.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, this is marked by the lack of incipient democratic internetic representation in real time. This new possibility would allow for policy-awareness and critical participation, through multiple societal expertise power points. Thus, executive operations would be followed from a completely new perspective, by know-how resources transmitting-in-concentration. Furthermore, the so-called 'new economy' (if by *oikos* or domestic we think of the Earth) and concomitant new realities are set upon tecnobergs.<sup>4</sup> Such diversified and interactive changing infrastructure of knowledge

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1 On various terms and notions here underlined, see René Armand Dreifuss, *A Época das Perplexidades – Mundialização, Globalização, Planetarização: Novos Desafios*, Vozes, Petrópolis, 1996 (4th edition 2000)

2 Public enterprises – meant to service society, though not necessarily accomplishing it - show themselves increasingly inadequate, having been sold, in so many cases, to profit-seeking corporations.

3 Actions which, in perspective, seem as distant and lacking substance as the attempts by local (community and city) authorities to define policy-options for (or decide with) national governments and to set the goal, pace, and rhythm of national policy-making bodies and agencies in their own countries.

4 Such virtual 'technological mountains', configured in the socio-economic and cultural-scientific topography of certain developed countries are an acronym, putting together the initial letters of words or expressions that deal with initiatives, expertise and capacities. In their transformative interaction and creative interfaces

pursuit and gestation, as well as technology creation and management is constructed and centered around and upon the actions of *transnational strategic corporations*, configured by nations performing, mainly, though not solely, as:

\* Scientific and technological *inducting foci of knowledge and productive poles* (United States, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Switzerland etc), developing *gnoseonomies* in their territories, based upon knowledge-centered transnational strategic corporations.

\* *Technologically advanced productive motors* (Korea, China, Taiwan etc) creating *tecnonomies* in their midst through the action of techno-productive agents.

\* Primary, secondary and tertiary *outsourcing platforms of production* (Brazil, Mexico, Thailand etc) reinforcing *transnationally enmeshed economies*.

Emergent and growing gnoseonomies and tecnonomies, as well as remaining economies which define nations and characterize societies. Based on information/informatics/communication, such gnoseonomies and tecnonomies also perform as socio-cultural *poles of gravitation* of the process, with their economy counterparts reduced to copying and adjusting *productive-commercial platforms* and *complementary cultural-consumer-markets*. For those countries in the ‘outskirts’ of ‘metropolitan techno-economic power’, their shortcomings facing the new productive system and their inability to deal with the variety of new issues (including emergent non-governmental nor national matters, many of which express themselves across frontiers), underline the inadequacy of their own state formats *vis-à-vis* the leading ones.<sup>5</sup>

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tecnobergs direct the process of production of knowledge and its application. In an analogy with icebergs, they have (and are nourished by) a greater (cultural-civilizatory) underlying mass, beneath the ‘economic surface’. They are structured upon Tele-info-computronic satellite capacitating content complexes interacting with: Engeneering; Cognition, Nanotechnology; Optoelectronics; Biotics, Energies, Robotics; Genetics; Services. On my initial conceptualization of tecnobergs, strategic corporations, and telematic jet sets’, see René Armand Dreifuss, *Global Changes, Global Challenges: a view from the southern hemisphere*, Políticas Alternativas para o Cone Sul –PACS, Rio de Janeiro, Printed in Chile, 1991. On the use of my concept in its initial form, see Riccardo Petrella, in *Internationalisation, Multinationalisation and Globalisation of R&D*, in *Four Analyses of Globalisation of Technology and Economy*, (1989-1991) *Monitor*, Forecasting and Assessment in Science and Technology-FAST, Commission of the European Communities, December 1991. See also, *"Zur Aussöhnung zw. Ost und West, Beobachtungen a.d. Sicht des Südens"*, in *'Ost-West-Entspannung auf Kosten des Südens?'*, *Dokumentation EPD*, N° 33/90, Frankfurt am Main, August 1990, pp 10-17; *"Os Anos 90 Vistos do Sul: Desafios e Tendências"*, Textos para Reflexão, N° 24, *Pacs/Pries-CS*, September 1990, 30 p.; *"A Reconciliação Leste-Oeste - Algumas Perguntas do Sul"*, Work document, *Pacs/Pries-CS*, Rio de Janeiro, October 1990, 15p. For further use of these ideas, see R.A. Dreifuss, *A Época das Perplexidades: Mundialização, Globalização, Planetarização - Novos Desafios*, op.cit

## **II - Brazil: Wide Openings and No-Growth**

Specifically in the case of Brazil, additional difficulties have been imposed by the severe problems unfolding from the diverse inadequacies of the government's social and economic policies, growing unsolved problems and various recent financial crises.<sup>6</sup> On top of it, once the 1999 Seattle 'battle that never was' at the OMC became a footnote in history and the 2001 meeting at Davos a sheer memory, with its faint – for some, forlorn - summit counterpart in Porto Alegre, Brazilians were faced with many questions and few answers. More so, with some very disturbing certainties in relation to the worldwide administration of commerce, as accomplished by major transnational strategic corporations and by key national states, and the worrisome gnoseonomic and teconomic perspectives.

Not only does Brazil lack strategic corporations - bearers and propellers of globalization -, but transnational participation in the dynamic segments of the Brazilian economy has grown significantly and consistently over the past decade: in 1991, they had 25% of the share of the market; in 1992, 33%; in 1993, 35%; in 1994, 40%; in 1995, 41%; in 1996, 49%. Towards the end of the century, transnational participation reached close to 60% of the dynamic industrial sectors, rapidly growing in the financial segment.<sup>7</sup> Over the

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5 One and a half billion people are living in misery, (James Wolfensohn, World Bank director, quoted by Flávia Sekles, Jornal do Brasil, 23.04.99) Another billion attempt to manage with sparse means...

6 According to the World Bank, almost half of the ten million Brazilians who had emerged from poverty throughout the four initial years of existence of the *Plano Real* (stabilization with limited growth, harsh wage restrictions, state reformulation and anchored currency) returned to it in mere four months of crisis, between October 1998 and January 1999. (José Meirelles Passos, O Globo, 26.04.99) Such figures do not take into account the results of the crisis of January 1999, which unleashed depression and raised the contingent of unemployed to startling 19.9% in the Greater São Paulo área, the equivalent of 1.726 million people. (Maurício Palhares, quoting data from the Departamento Intesindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-econômicos (Dieese) and from Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de dados (Seade), Jornal do Brasil, 23.04.99) Nor does it consider the 30 million Brazilians who, according to Shahid Burki (vice-president of Bird for Latin America), survived with less than 2 dollars a day. Bird figures show that for each 1% of contraction of the GNP, another million poor emerge...

7 Overall figures show that foreign participation grew from 13,9% of the Brazilian GDP in 1996 to 20% in 1999. (Unctad figures, quoted by Eugenio Goussinsky, in Jornal do Brasil, 24.02.2000). US investments in Brazil amounted to US\$ 16 billion in 1994. In 1997 they totalled US\$ 25 billion, and were expected to reach the US\$ 50 billion mark at the turn of the century. Over four hundred of the top 500 US corporations operate in the country. By 1998, of the biggest 500 corporations in Latin America, 202 were transnationals (154 in 1995, 142 in 1990/92), while national private enterprises were 258 (279 in 1995) and state-owned enterprises were 40 (93 in 1990/92). Of the 100 biggest foreign subsidiaries in Latin America, 44 were from the US, 37 from the European Union, 5 were Swiss and 3 Japanese. (Jornal do Brasil, 26.06.99). Asia received US\$ 91 billion in the same period.

past decade, more than 1000 Brazilian key corporations were acquired by transnationals, 772 from 1995 to 1999.<sup>8</sup>

Brazilian share in world distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from 0,54% in 1990 to 4,46% in 1998, with an accumulated total of US\$ 69 billion.<sup>9</sup> By the end of 1998, total registered stock of foreign investment in Brazil was US\$ 95,72 billion.<sup>10</sup> That year, FDI reached US\$ 97 billion for the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, with US\$ 30 billion going to Brazil.<sup>11</sup> By the third quarter of 1999, total FDI in Brazil reached US\$ 115,64 billion, topping the US\$ 120 billion mark (for the decade) at the beginning of 2000, a year when liquid private foreign capital (multinationals, funds, banks, stock exchanges) was expected to reach US\$ 40 billion.<sup>12</sup>

Of the total entry and fixation of FDI, more than one quarter (26,14%), amounting to US\$ 30,26 billion, was a result of the sale of state enterprises.<sup>13</sup> More than half (US\$ 16,01 billion) was directed towards acquisitions in the telecommunications and electric sectors.<sup>14</sup> To catch another glimpse at this impressive process, one has to remember that in 1994, only 0,38% of the US\$ 2,1 billion in investments were used to take over Brazilian corporations. In 1995, this practice reached 27,3% of the US\$ 5,5 billion invested; in 1996, 29,5% of a

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8 These figures do not consider the hundreds of smaller, but important corporations that were acquired in the same period, nor the ongoing incorporations, agreements and associations. Meanwhile, in Argentina, more than 500 companies were acquired by multinationals, totalling US\$ 50 billion in this buying spree.

9 Unctad estimates, in Internet, March 8, 2000, and quoted by Paulo Uchoa, in *Gazeta Mercantil*, 09.03.2000. China received US\$ 247 billion in the same period (the US received US\$ 620 billion), although the form in which this capital actually arrived in the country is quite different from the Latin American experience. In 2000 China imported US\$ 149,8 and exported US\$ 250 billion.

10 IIF Research, quoted by Joelmir Betting, *O Globo*, 26.01.2000. From another starting point, it should be considered that between 1993 – some time before the beginning of the *Plano Real* - and the first semester of the year 2000, multinational corporations invested US\$ 95 billion in Brazil. Research by Sobeet, quoted by Joelmir Betting, *O Globo*, 26. 01.2000. It is worth noting that in 1992, Brazil had received US\$ 1,2 billion only; by 1995, it accumulated US\$ 40 billion.

11 Asia received US\$ 91 billion in the same period.

12 Chico Santos, *Folha de São Paulo*, São Paulo, 03. 10.1999

13 Such process of privatization was started in 1991, during the unfinished presidential term of Fernando Collor de Mello, but was taken full-speed ahead by the current government, who implemented it as an all-embracing and intensive master program throughout the past 8 years. In many cases, multinational corporations received financing for these privatizations from the National Bank for Economic and Social Development-BNDES, including the loan of half the resources from the Worker's Protection Fund (*Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador*); in other cases, their acquisitions were registered and considered as FDI.

14 Spaniards (18,7%), Portuguese (15,7%) and North-Americans (13,7%) hold most of the investments in the telecom sector. Close to 60% of the privatization transactions of the telephone sector were carried out by foreign corporations. Total participation of foreign capital in the sale of national state enterprises reached 43,5%, according to BNDES figures. In the privatization process of public companies of Brazilian states, including those of electric energy, foreign investment was close to 47,5%



total of US\$ 10,5 billion; in 1997, 55,5% out of US\$ 18,7 billion.<sup>15</sup> By 1998, the share of foreign investment to buy existing Brazilian corporations reached 74,1% of the US\$ 28,7 billion that came into the country as FDI.<sup>16</sup> In 1999, 67% of the total 309 operations of acquisition and incorporation in Brazil involved foreign-based enterprises.<sup>17</sup> Noteworthy the fact that services were the main target of FDI in 1999, representing 85% of the total flux, and reflecting, partially, the sale of state enterprises in the segments of telecommunications, electric energy and finance.<sup>18</sup>

However privatization, which in Brazil is intertwined with the transnational take-over of services and of the productive system (state and private enterprises alike), has not increased installed productive capacity nor has it facilitated exports. More: it has had no significant consequences for the promotion of neither technological capacities nor scientific excellence, and has had no positive impact in societal well-being. Quite the contrary, and not only because of marked increases in unemployment rates. The 'army' of Brazilian unemployed in the total world unenmployed has grown, year by year, from 1,81% in 1975 to 5,61 in 1999, while the working population has grown from 2,50% in 1975 to 3,12% in 1999. In sheer numbers, Brazil had 2.36 million unemployed in 1990 and 7,71 million in 1999.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, Brazil has an 'army' of 6,6 million children – half of them between the age of 5 and 11 years - and adolescents at work, with 870 thousand of them working in dangerous or unhealthy conditions.<sup>20</sup>

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15 In 1995, 6,322 foreign corporations, employing 1,45 million people, were based in Brazil. With a liquid patrimony of US\$ 106 billion and yearly sales of US\$ 223,1 billion, their share of exports was US\$ 21,7 billion. From 1994 to 1998, imports grew 77% and exports only 17%.

16 Folha de São Paulo, 03.10.1999; Paulo Uchôa, Gazeta Mercantil, 09.03.2000

17 Data of KPMG, cited by Sandra Silva, O Globo, 25.04.2000

18 In 1995, a majority (55%) of foreign investment was directed towards industry, while services took 43% (in the 1996-1998, 81,8% was concentrated in industry, while services took 16,1%). In 1999, only 13% of investments went to industry, until September of that year, while in the same period, 85% were directed towards services. Data from BNDES, quoted by Paulo Uchôa, Gazeta Mercantil, 09.03.2000

19 Sources: OCDE, Eurostate, FMI, OIT, worked by Marcio Pochmann, in Nice de Paula, Jornal do Brasil, 08.03.2002

20 The research also showed that in Brazil were 8,4 million children at work in 1992, although the fall into today's figures has to do not only with income programs, but with the fall of fiscalization and the advance of informal economy. The report points out that primary activities, such as agriculture fishing and animal handling occupy 70% of the youngsters. Another 9% are in industrial activities. Petty trade, hotels and restaurants are responsible for another 9%; domestic work, 6,5% and construction and mining handle 3%. Data of 1999, out of 'Um futuro sem Trabalho Infantil', OIT/UN, cited in Jornal do Brasil, with Agência Folha, 07.05.2002. The information comes from 75 countries. An estimated 170 million minors work in risk activities throughout the globe.

Brazil has lost, heavily, both with privatizations and with the governmental policies that have wide-opened its economy, rewarding foreign capitals and financial investments in a remarkable way.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, efforts conducting the major economy in the region through an intense and wide investment reception and trade opening policy, have made of Brazil – so well endowed in natural resources - a startling food importer. Quite clearly, the uncontrolled entry of foreign capital has placed an enormous pressure on the balance of payments, stressing deficit due to profit remittances and other forms of rewarding industrial and financial capital. On top of it, an overvalued currency in the first five years of the *Plano Real* induced transnational corporations to import from their own foreign network, instead of producing or buying locally, making good use of their devices for intra-corporate commerce.<sup>22</sup> Foreign currency reserves were at a rosy top of almost US\$ 75 billion (first half of 1998, when they became an important governmental piece of argument and justification), but plunged by more than US\$ 32 billion (US\$ 29 billion in only forty-five days) to less than US\$ 43 billion. At the end of 1999, they slugged down to a low US\$ 35 billion, reaching the 20-plus billion mark in 2000 and disappearing – as an issue – from the news.<sup>23</sup>

Foreign debt, including public and private passive, grew from US\$ 119,9 billion in 1990 to US\$ 237,9 billion in 2000, i.e. 9,55% of the debt of the whole emergent and development countries.<sup>24</sup> Imports reached US\$ 55 billion in 2000. Internal liquid debt was R\$ 153,2 billion in 1994; more than doubled by 1998 (R\$ 339 billion in June of that year,

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21 In 1999, less than half the resources of the FAT Cambial (US\$ 960 million out of a total of US\$ 2,3 billion) went to Embraer, the aviation industry. Other preferential clients (out of a total of 250 enterprises) for this line of credit for exports, the cheapest in the market (Libor rate of 6% a year, spread of 1%) were Chapecó Empreendimentos, Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista, Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, Alimbras, Perdigão, Ericsson Telecomunicações, and Nestlé. (Ana D'Angelo, Informe Econômico, Jornal do Brasil, 03.04.2000)

22 In 1999, the Brazilian government transferred 14% of the GDP to financial investors, as payment of public debt (*títulos*), while interest rates - having reached 40% in March - fell to 19% in December. Per year interest rates paid on credit cards range from 178% to 263,7% (8,9% a month to 11,9%); special checks (overdraft) charge yearly interest rates of 151,8% to 263,7%

23 If IMF resources are not taken into account, reserves were just US\$ 24 billion in that year.

24 World Development Indicators, Bird/WB, in Flávia Barbosa, O Globo, 23.04.2002. Foreign debt, according to the Economics Department of the Central Bank, was US\$ 209,9 billion in 2001, lower than the US\$ 216,9 billion of 2000. (O Globo, 26.04.2002). Still, other figures on foreign debt were US\$ 112 billion in 1993 and US\$ 280 billion in 1999, 70% of which was owed by private enterprises. External deficit (excess of expenses with imports of goods and services, as well as the payment of interests) in 1998 was around US\$ 33,6 billion; it reached US\$ 24,375 billion in 1999. Nominal deficit (sum of current public expenses with interests paid by the Treasury to the market), went from 4,7% of the GDP (July 1997) to 7,5% in July of 1998, reaching in September of 1998, a worrying 8%.

breaking the R\$ 370 billion bracket in October), reaching R\$ 523 billion at the beginning of the year 2000, corresponding to 47,2% of the GDP, and still growing at a rate of US\$ 2.000 per second.<sup>25</sup> In 1994, 71% of the total government debt was internal; by 1998 it reached 95%.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, profit remittance (US\$ 750 million in 1992) reached US\$ 4,3 in 1997 and US\$ 7,67 em 1998.<sup>27</sup> Such figures do not include other ways and means to transfer resources to the home-sites of the corporations (or to other corporations in the network) on account of various justifications (royalties, second-hand equipment acquisition, technical support, intra-corporate sales, leasing etc).

### **III - Brazil: Building Frustration**

Through the ‘looking glass’ of globalization, Brazil – always the hopeful ‘pull-pusher’ in the eyes of remaining Mercosulian beholders – is prone to show certain difficulties to reach a reasonable stage of societal uniform development and a per capita income (pci) equivalent to that of the United States – one of its ‘mirror states’. Before devaluation, Brazilian pci was close to US\$ 5000, while the United States had already reached US\$ 30.000. Brazilian pci in 1999 dropped to US\$ 3.396 (US\$ 4.792 in 1998, US\$ 5,037 in 1997, and US\$ 4,375 in 1996), reaching the same level of 1980, thus amounting to less than half the Argentinian pci and to one tenth of the US.<sup>28</sup> By 1999, US GDP was

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25 The Brazilian ‘net’ debt (*dívida líquida*) of the public sector, contracted in and out of the country, includes the debt in titles and contracts and has already discounted credits that the Union, states and municipalities have the right to receive as well as international reserves. Internal debt had amounted to 26% of the GDP in 1994 (28,5%, according to other sources); climbed to 34,6% in December of 1997, and reached 42,4% in December of 1998. See Vivian Oswald and Isabel Sobral, O Globo, 25.03.2000

26 Fixed rate funds had close to US\$ 9 billion a few years ago; by 1998, kept only US\$ 1,5 billion. Applications in the stock market, which were US\$ 45 billion in 1996, went down, in 1998, to US\$ 13 billion, of which US\$ 3 billion were of a more speculative nature rather than long term investment. (Celso Pinto, Jornal do Brasil, 18.09.98)

27 Joaquim Francisco de Carvalho, member of the Consultive Council of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Electric Sector, in his article “Quem Ganhou com as privatizações?” (Jornal do Brasil, 17.02.2000). As figures were registered in Brazilian reais, currency devaluation meant a drop in dollar terms from the US\$ 7,67 billion sent as profit remittance in 1998. Estimates are by Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização Econômica (Sobeet), in their Carta da Sobeet No 12, based on figures provided by the Central Bank (Monitor Mercantil, Rio de Janeiro, 13/14/15.11.1999). Interestingly enough, profit remittance had been expected to reach just US\$ 5,96 billion in 1999, about US\$ 6,50 billion in 2000, US\$ 7 billion in 2001 and US\$ 8 billion only in 2002.

28 Márcio Pochmann (University of Campinas), asserted that Brazilian economy had been growing at an average rate of 4,59% a year, from 1890 to 1980. Since then, it dropped to 2,01% a year, with an average increase in the per capita income of 0,04% in the same period. (Flávia Oliveira, O Globo, 13.02.2000)

coming close to US\$ 9 trillion (US\$ 10 trillion today) while Brazil was nearing the 1 trillion *reais* mark, which at the time was the equivalent of US\$ 850 billion, but with crawling devaluation over 18 months, fell close to US\$ 650 billion!<sup>29</sup> In 2001, the GDP reached 1.18 trillion reais, and by then it was an equivalent to US\$ 503 billion, with a real growth (discounting inflation) of 1,51% in relation to 2000!<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, just as a reminder, by 2030, the GDP of the United States would reach US\$ 30 trillion (pessimistic cenario) and US\$ 40 trillion in a fair one; and an awesome US\$ 120 trillion in 2050!!! Even growing 7% a year, while keeping its populational growth around 2%, it would take 100 years for Brazil to reach parity with the US indicators...of 2020!

Inflation, during the *Real Plan* had hit, by the end of 1999, an official national average of 85,39%.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, many basic items (food, clothing, medicines etc) accumulated price increases of 100% to 400% from 1994 to 1999. In that period, rent went up by 390,64%, telephone rates by 291,90%; gas by 208,18%, petrol by 129,28%, electric energy by 122,84%, educational expenses by 100,73%, health and personal care plans by 100,15%... In the past two years, up to 2002, stern price increases have to be added. The 100 most consumed medicines had an average increase of 145,14%, or 31,69% above inflation rates for the 1994-1999 period. The 20 most sought medicines had price increases that varied (from July 1994 to January 2000) between 109,16% to 331,45%.<sup>32</sup> Just to have a glimpse from another angle, the pharmaceutical industry registered a gross intake of US\$

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29 In the beginning of the *Plano Real* it was the contrary: one dollar was worth eighty-four cents of real.

30 The extinct Strategic Affairs Agency (*Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos - SAE*), who in the years 1997-1998 carried out a very interesting simulation exercise, concluded on the possibilities of three scenarios, starting from a GDP platform of about US\$ 800 billion. In the optimistic scenario *Abatiapê*, to reach a GDP of approximately US\$ 3,360 trillion, it would take 20 years. The intermediary scenario, *Baboré*, pictured a Brazil in the US\$ 2,330 GDP bracket, while the pessimistic scenario *Caaeté* - likely, considering the current circumstances - reached only US\$ 1,170 trillion.

31 The General Price Index 10 (IGP-10) showed a rise of 20,10% in 1999 (it was 1.3331,15% in 1994, 15,38 in 1995, 8,79 in 1996, 7,53 in 1997, and 1,66 in 1998). The IGP 10 is formed by the Consumer Price Index - IPC (weights 30% in the final index), the Retailer Price Index - IPA (60%) and the National Construction Costs Index - INCC (10%). The IPCA (Consumer Price Widened Index) of IBGE was 5,2% in 1997, 1,7% in 1998 and 7,4% in 1999, while the IPA-M, of FGV gave other figures: 7,4% in 1997, 3,3% in 1998, and 26,1% in 1999.

32 The average price of 300 medicines, researched monthly by the Brasilia bases Regional Pharmacy Council, registered an increase from US\$ 3,20 (July 1994) to US\$ 6,90 (December 1999). No wonder that Gesner Oliveira, president of *CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica)*, the governmental consumer protection agency, declared that there was strong evidence that cartelization of the economy was taking place and that an inadequate governmental structure created a "paradise of cartels", adding that the 'machine of the State is at the service of capital'.

3,2 billion in 1994; by the end of 1999 it was US\$ 13 billion, 90% of which was cashed by 70 foreign corporations, out of a total of 470 companies.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, Brazil has experienced steady price rises in what matters, in a society where public servants (school teachers and university professors, medical doctors and nurses, desk functionaries, forest guards, etc) had no salary adjustment since the beginning of the *Plano Real* (1994) until 2002, while more than half the working population of the country has, as monthly intake, the minimum wage which is about 75 dollars.<sup>34</sup> Military were treated as a special case within the public service and gained a variety of salary increases. Furthermore, Brazil is astonishingly smaller in dollar terms – the strong devaluation of the *Real* in the beginning of 1999 meant not only dearer prices and the devaluation of salaries and wages, but tremendous losses of savings and assets. In fact, topping some slow years, recessive in many respects, Brazil has suffered a generalized impoverishment of the population.<sup>35</sup>

Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Brazilian government pushed forward some tough reform measures, for which the population at large had to pay a high toll, and would continue to do so.<sup>36</sup> From another angle, a worrying adjustment in public accounts had been

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33 Susan George, *Monitor Mercantil*, 04.11.99; Ana C. Duarte, *Jornal do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, 16.01.2000

34 These are striking figures in a country where the minimum wage is only 180 *reais* (raised in 2001 to 151, was 136 in 2000); where the poorest 10% of the population earn an average of 63 *reais* and the richest 10%, an average of 2.539 *reais*; where the top 1% take 50% of the richness of the country and the lower 50% get 1%. Grim reality synthesized in São Paulo, where the real average intake of economically active people has dropped from 906 *reais* (January 1999) to 852 (December 1999), while in dollar terms it slumped from US\$ 800 to close to US\$ 400. In the same period, what was considered to be the basis for a realistic minimum wage – a non-existent base of 880.93 *reais* – should have been raised to 940.58 *reais*! Until 2002, the national average income was 535 *reais* per month, while 18% of the population lived in homes with an income superior to 10 minimum wages (1,500 *reais*). Furthermore, 2,011 million people are without income; 13.148 million people earn up to one minimum wage; 23,272 million earn from one to two; 19,962 million earn from two to three; 31.022 million earn from three to five; 34,084 million earn from five to ten; 18,738 million earn from ten to twenty and 10,889 million get over 20 minimum wages. In nine metropolitan regions (Rio, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Recife, Fortaleza and Salvador) live 36,951 million people (slightly over 22% of the total population), among whom is concentrated more than 70% of national income; where 3.3 million people access the World Wide Web. (PNAD 98/IBGE, quoted in Flavia Oliveira, *O Globo*, 19.03.2000). It is important to know that in Brazil, the poorest 20% keep 2,5% of national income and consumption. The northeastern region, with 30% of the population, concentrates 62% of the poor. (Report 2000, UNCED, cited by Ricardo Lessa, *Gazeta Mercantil*, 05.04.2000)

35 In Argentina - a crisis-ridden society since the Carlos Menem days -, out of a total 36 million inhabitants, 14 million were poor, 3 million lived in complete misery, 2 million were unemployed and 2 million sub-employed. (Marina Guimarães, *Jornal do Brasil*, 11.03. 2001) One year later, it was gruesomely worse.

36 A survey conducted in 1998 by the governmental Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), pointed out the fragility of the income distribution process that took place during the first two years of the *Plano Real* (1994-1995), when income participation of the poorest 10% receded to a 1986 low 1%, while the richest 10% experienced an insignificant reduction, from 47,1 to 46,8%. Recent IBGE data indicates that the gap between

carried out, by cutting expenses and investments for social means and ends, as in the most worrying case of public health. Meanwhile, in 1998, the growth rate of the economy reached 1/3 of the 1994 indexes, with the highest unemployment rate in the history of the country: 13 million people, and growing.<sup>37</sup> São Paulo, the industrial ‘motor’, banking ‘chassis’ and command ‘wheel’ of Brazil – responsible for about US\$ 148 billion of the total GDP - is in 2002 a state with an unemployment rate of close to 20% (1.838.000 people) of the working force.<sup>38</sup> In the main urban centers unemployment has steadily risen from 5,9% in 1990 to 8% in 1998 and to 8,5% in 1999.<sup>39</sup> The informal market (41% in the late 70s and early 80s) currently employs 82% of the total working force.<sup>40</sup> Analysts from the World Bank calculated that each fall of 1% in the GDP of Brazil throws 1 million people onto the line of poverty; each year about 1.200 million 18 year-old reach the market. According to them, almost half of the ten million Brazilians who had emerged from poverty throughout the years of existence of the *Plano Real* (stabilization with limited growth, harsh wage restrictions, state reformulation and anchored currency) returned to it in mere critical four months.<sup>41</sup> Poor showings indeed, after a decade of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which in 1989 prescribed a recipe - privatization, deregulation, liberalization of imports, tax reform, elimination of subsidies, interests and currency exchanges rates at

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rich and poor has increased in 1999, with workers’ income in the six largest metropolitan regions dropping by 5,5% in relation to 1998. The results of this survey were underlined by a report released by the World Bank in June of 1999, which indicated that Brazil was one of the countries with the highest degree of inequality in income distribution. According to the document, the poorest 20% of the population survived with only 2.5% of the national income, while the richest 20% kept 64,2%. (Jornal do Brasil, 01.03.2000)

37 This was according to *Dieese*, the inter-trade-union department of statistics. *IBGE* had other figures (7.9%) reached while reasoning that people were not considered as unemployed when their unemployment period was interrupted, even by one simple week of registered work.

38 Only 1% of the families in Brazil have a monthly income superior to R\$ 2.193 while one dollar is 2.35 reais in March 2002. (Cristovam Buarque, citing professor André Urani, UnB conference, O Globo, 25.03.2002)

39 Source: *Dieese*/Fundação Seade, quoted in Rejane Aguiar, Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 14.01.2000

40 “Crecimiento, empleo y equidad”, research of the Economic Commission for Latin America – CEPAL, offered to the public at the XIII Brazilian Congress of Economists and VII Congress of Economists of Latin America and Caribbean, September 13-17, 1999, Rio de Janeiro

41 Such figures do not take into account the 30 million Brazilians who, according to Shahid Burki, vice-president of Bird for Latin America, survived with less than 2 dollars a day. According to Bird figures, for each 1% of contraction of the GNP, another million poor emerges in Brazil, and one has to consider that an estimated 30 million people are not registered. All this in a country where 25% of the urban workers were already in the ‘informal sector’, participating with 8% in the GDP, numbering almost 9.5 million informal business concerns, employing 12 million people, with an average income of 240 reais, which, at the time, were 140 dollars and in the first quarter of 2001, mere US\$ 106). Data from: *Departamento Intesindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-econômicos (Dieese)* and from *Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (Seade)*, Maurício Palhares Jornal do Brasil, 23.04.99; “Economia Informal Urbana 1997”, IBGE, June 1999

market value, fiscal adjustment etc - followed by all Latin American states, each one hoping to prepare its own 'wonder-cake'.<sup>42</sup> Completing the picture, the Program for Development of the United Nations sounded the alert: if the same policies were kept, current population below the poverty line, which was 40%, would include 70% in the next decade.<sup>43</sup>

In short, a world-of-changes occurring in Brazil, in a changing planet Earth. Changes that also affect military perceptions of the social and political pictures seen by members of the BAF – from different angles, with various lights and shadows, and varied levels of understanding -, in a process that fertilizes a number of serious questions and stimulates a range – for the time being – of unstructured criticisms. Furthermore, thirty years ago, the military moved within a political-ideological paradigm impelling them to conceive underdevelopment as a product not only (nor essentially) of 'capitalist exploitation', but of insufficient capitalist development and concomitant feeble state action. Today, the crude realities of globalized productive reorganization make them wonder if there is a possibility of reaching development within the current capitalistic paradigm.<sup>44</sup> Preoccupations with the

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42 Poverty measured by homes fell from 41% to 36% between 1990 and 1997, only to put the region back at the level it was in 1980, of 35%. Poor people in the region were 50 million in the early 70s, 136 million in 1980, and 204 million in 1997. Miserable people in the region were 62 million in 1980, 93 million in 1990 and slightly less than 90 million in 1997 (Maria Clara R. M. do Prado, Gazeta Mercantil, Sao Paulo, 10-12.09.99). In spite of some localized recovery of economies in the region between 1990 and 1999, levels of poverty began to rise again from 1998 onwards, in face of a lesser growth rhythm and successive crises. (Data provided by ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin América), in their Report "Equality, Development and Citizenship", released in April 7, 2000. (Vivian Oswald, O Globo, 08.04.2000). Although devaluation and salary containment allowed for a recovery of the export sector – encompassing cheap labour and raw materials at low dollar prices -, the capacity for importing basic goods and equipments and to meet the price of services has been severely hit. Above all, it impaired the chances of Mercosul, by throwing regional partners into disarray, insofar as a painful national picture repeats itself on a regional scale. This is clearly evident from another set of ominous figures provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which characterize the 80s and 90s as two 'lost decades'. The region accumulated a growth rate of sheer 3,6% between 1991 and 1998, while per capita income grew at about 1% a year. In Brazil, the 80s saw an average rate of growth of 2,9% and 1,7% in the 90s.

43 Bernardo Kligberg, coordinator for Latin America of the Development Program of the United Nations (apud J.E. Saraiva Durão e Silvio Caccia Bava, "Um Proer para os pobres", Jornal do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 29.09.98)

44 On a preview of some of the arguments and points made in this article, see R. A Dreifuss, 'Rethinking the Brazilian Armed Forces: No Role in Sight, what Function Then?', in Armies and Politics (org. Evgeny N. Pashentev and Constantine V. Miniar-Beloroutchev, RPR, Moscow, 2002, pgs 89-113; R. A Dreifuss, 'Challenges and New Perspectives: Some thoughts on the Future of the Brazilian Military', Cahier Orhis No 5, Observatoire des Relations Internationales dans l'Hemisphere Sud, (org., Louis Balmond and Pierre Maurice), Université de Nice/Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Développement, France, 2000, pgs 277-312. On views of the BAF and military issues along the years, see R. A Dreifuss, 'O mar e a Marinha n contexto das tendências de estruturação do novo cenário mundial', in Premissas, Caderno 4, Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos/Unicamp, São Paulo, pgs 50-66; R.A. Dreifuss, "Sociedade Política Armada ou Força Armada

social situation, their perceptions of accumulated problems interacting with newly posed ones, seem to push worried officers of the Brazilian Armed Forces into serious efforts to gain studied appraisal of the current process, pushing many of them into responsible societally-inclined statism. The urge to define national interests, being able to reason within the vulnerabilities-possibilities arch, gains a new dimension, strengthening amidst the officers of the BAF the distinctions between truly military objectives, political power enabling to obtain resources for the forces, and the design of macro-policies translated into governmental strategies for development and resolution of social problems.

#### **IV - The Brazilian Military within a Changing World**

For the first time since the beginning of the XXth century, the BAF have found themselves without a role (nor a self-defined and clear perspective on such a possibility) in the national political theater. Roles have always been institutional acceptances of power-seeking goals and armed forms of enacting political functions, not of performing military aims. That has been the trademark of the BAF (and, not the least, in the whole of South America).

Concurrently, the BAF are also being shaped and defined by three interconnected and changing situations:

a) Stress from within the military institution, to discern and define – while they find themselves seeking - a goal, and not necessarily a role, in a nullifying context of efforts of local (national and regional) policy-making. Stress inside the political system, once it is realized that newly defined macro-policies are being formulated beyond the reach of the national state, in international and transnational organizations, answering the needs and possibilities of strategic corporations and pivotal states. As effective supranational mega-policy shaping is outside the administrative and territorial boundaries of subsidiary countries, national interests - a notion dear, but not clear, to the military mind

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*Societária?*, in *As Forças Armadas no Brasil*, Editora Espaço e Tempo, Rio de Janeiro, 1987, pp.101-144; R. A. Dreifuss, 'Nova República, Novo Exército?', em *Nova República: um balanço* (org. Flávio Koutzii) L&PM Editores, Porto Alegre, 1986, pgs 168-193; R. A. Dreifuss and O. S. Dulci, "As Forças Armadas e a Política", in *Sociedade e Política no Brasil Pós-64* (Bernardo Sorj and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, org), Editora Brasiliense, São Paulo, 1983, pgs 87-117



- become less and less recognizable, more and more blurred, though still largely proclaimed as a necessary reference by all quarters. Additional stress has been imposed by the severe societal problems unfolding since the financial crisis that took place between October 1998 and January 1999. Others crises came in 2000 and 2001, and others are yet to come...

b) Strain imposed by the political system and by the societal expectations to define mission (including objectives, aims, targets and ways of action), having in mind challenges of societal security and violence. Military strained by the political system and societal expectations of an aim without a name But also, strain on the ability of elected authorities and appointed officials, to perform *vis-à-vis* societal demands and satisfaction of needs and wishes - based on social variety - to 'go with the future'. In a certain way, due to the growing party inadequacy for policy exercises of a democratic character and representational pluralistic practices, together with worrying increased irrelevance of multifaced participation and expression in decision-making. On the other hand, a political system seen and felt as unable to answer demands of decades, such incapability harshened by the systemic, structural and conjunctural corruption and small-minded references of conducting elites. Thus, strain within the state structure and governmental policy implementation and instruments; strain inside the BAF, not only in their ways and means, but also on how to define what would be their precious and specific mission and how to deal with transnational power structures and their impact over the local polity.<sup>45</sup>

c) Press coming from outside the military (and, in many cases, from abroad), to redefine their function and reposition themselves towards new missions and targets, modifying the scope and sense of action of their institution. Consequently, military pressed as a whole, as supposed instruments of national power and as subsystems of the national state having to deal with transnational structures. Impacts felt inside the polity and pressures sensed upon the Armed Forces, perplexed *vis-à-vis* the changing dynamic of productive transnationalization, of redesigned strategic policy formulation and trans-statal operational execution. All this taking place while concomitantly facing supranational

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45 Military hope for governmental and institutional reorganization (even seek it) that enables them to deal with a multiplicity of societal and cultural strain expressions. Quite clearly, the ideological and impulsive process of privatization and the drastic reduction of their functional and regulatory capacities, have considerably diminished the possibilities of defining guidelines and principles of action, of setting goals and targets, and of effectively harnessing resources and providing adequate operational deployment.

content communication and manifestations, as well as systemic cultural metanationalization.

Thus, in the military field, a stress-strain-press syndrome expresses, portraits and questions the capacity for real decision-making of governments on wide questions and deep issues, stirring-up uneasiness amidst the BAF, who sense the loss of nation-state references.<sup>46</sup> Stress-strain-press underlined by the evident impact of social discontent, structural dislodging (coming as a by-product of the restructuring gaidonomy) and of historical marginalization (societally accumulated and superposed exclusions). Such phenomena turn urban settings into dangerous criminal powder-kegs, setting in disturbing feelings and raising worried questions, not only in Brazil, but throughout South America: is democracy conditioned to fail once more?<sup>47</sup> After all, South America's democratic path is not clear-cut, nor a forgone conclusion.<sup>48</sup> Not only did stakes get higher; they have changed substantially.

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46 I devised the stress-strain-press notion having in mind Alfred Stepan's strain-stress interpretation.

47 Highlights of the 90s: a decade-long Peruvian authoritarian government (though with easy transit among other governments of the region) of president Alberto Fujimori, renouncing while he was in Japan, where he established himself at ease without returning to Peru, while security and intelligence chief Vladimir Montesinos was imprisoned without public trial; recurrent parliamentary crisis in Ecuador (1997) and the presidential-military crisis (1999) with Abdala Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad; 'war' between Ecuador and Peru; the various recent crises in Paraguay (1997, 1999, 2000) including the assassination of vice-president Argaña, the resignation and flight of Raul Cubas, the incumbent president; continuous infighting in Colombia, between right and left and, in between, the narcotraffic power structures with their alliances; continuous political support and military protection in Chile for general Augusto Pinochet, coupled with the lingering ominous presence of the Armed Forces in the national public life; social acceptance first, election thereafter for the Bolivian presidency, and recent accepted resignation of retired general Hugo Banzer, who had been in power through a coup in the seventies, at the height of gruesome *Operation Condor*; crisis ridden Argentina, with five presidents in a row, during four weeks, in the last quarter of 2001; the uncertainties of the reform whims – officers' populist appeal for some, Bolivarian dreams and hopes *vis-à-vis* protracted societal despair for others - of Colonel Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, including his swift return to government, after being toppled in 2002; deplorable social and political situation in Surinam; continuity of a colonial territory in South America (French Guyana); worrying perspectives in decaying Guyana etc.

48 Interesting to note some of the remarks made by President Hugo Chávez, in his conference at the PUC, in 26.06.00, during his stay in Rio de Janeiro, participating of the Latin American, Caribbean and European Union Summit. His idea, based on the feeling of Bolivarian integration, emphasizes one America, Latin in character, though constituted by three main currents (indian, iberian and african), with many states, in some form of Confederation of Republics: "*o nos unimos o nos hundimos*" was his motto. This requires, according to Chavez, a Council of Heads of States of the Confederation and a Joint Military Command for Defense and Development, a project for the next 50 years. Other important tenets of his thought appeared as a tentative answer to the question he posed to himself and to the audience: "in what do the people actually participate", those people surviving outside summits, while facing a 'rotten Congress'? Thus, the urge to overhaul Congress (closing the present one down) through a Constitutional Assembly which actually should produce drastic change – '*rápido, acelerado y a fondo*' - in the political system and in the socio-economic structure. This would follow a five stage process: ideological (when the idea is born); motivational (the idea-force is sown among the people), encompassing (every segment, from the university to the poorest sections, and

Lacking hopeful horizons of *societal satisfaction* (and considering the possibilities of South America falling back into a void of substantial democratic perspectives), a reactive 'nationalism' to 'globalism' - socially 'salvationist' without being able to look into future societal systems and structures - seems set to become a meaningful political banner, as well as a day-to-day reference defining 'hearts and minds' of the population at large, and an economic 'reason' for defiant elites. A brand of *salvationist nationalism*, which - in spite of the striking absence of ethnic infighting, religious strife and racial conflict - might show itself as a rallying point for charismatic leaderships, for mobilization and legitimation of power in action, supported by traditional organizations or by newly structured political movements. This might hold true, especially if 'salvationist' stands are coupled with a rejection of the worn-out practices of congressional life 'as usual', seen and felt by a majority of the population as 'merely wasting public money' and a vehicle for 'seeking personal gains' of professional politicians making a questionable living, out of it. Together with all this comes the growing and stern condemnation of what is increasingly perceived as a governmental lack of social sensibility, coupled with the abundance of 'wheeling and dealings' and excess of cupid, personalistic attitudes in the Latin American political-party world.

In short, Latin American Armed Forces are facing crucial moments and identity problems. Their role and function is in the limelight, as well as finding themselves bearing a shady mission focus. Strategic conceptions are out of place, and in many cases, became ideologies. Technological instruments and new military means are out of reach; new forms of warfare and consonant training are a long way off; territorial distribution, including sea and space, is totally inadequate, while positioning is far away from new horizons. With all this, a growing discussion about the need for Armed Forces is installed.

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including 'all colors, nations and religions'), constitutional (a new Constitution, proposing Confederation,

## **V - Civilian-Military Relations in Redefinition**

Civilian-military relations have been traditionally focused on the complex problems and varied issues of ‘coexistence’ and ‘co-habitation’ of the armed forces with civilian actors within society and state, and their ‘subordination’ to political institutions within the legal boundaries. It becomes clear that, for some, the “essence of civilian objective control is the recognition of military professionalism; the essence of its antithesis - subjective civilian control - is the negation of an independent military sphere”.<sup>49</sup> In historical terms, “a demand for objective civilian control comes from the very military profession; a demand for subjective civilian control comes from a variety of civilian groups, anxious to maximize their power in military matters. Essential for any civilian control is to minimize the power of the military. Objective civilian control attains such results by military professionalization, turning them politically sterile and neutral; i.e., it produces the lowest level of political power of the military in relation to civilian groups. The highly professional officer-corps feels ready to support the aspirations of any civilian group that exerts legitimate authority inside the State”.<sup>50</sup> Thus, the issue of civilian-military relations has entailed considerations about the quality and limits of the regime, as well as the building, permanence, preservation, and/or breakdown of constitutional frameworks and the political-police role played by the military in this process, including the possibility of outright power take-over by the Armed Forces.<sup>51</sup> A return to barracks involved the major issues of military ‘subordination’ to political institutions within legal boundaries and a military reassessment of their attitudes towards citizens and citizenship and *vis-a-vis* human life conditions, political rights and freedom. Without the rigidity of past political-ideological paradigms and in the absence of linked confrontations, continuity in their

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changes in the political base, the system and the model); and a fifth stage which remained unmentioned.

49 Lieut. Brigadier (res) Murillo Santos, quoting his book, “O caminho da profissionalização das Forças Armadas”, in ‘O Comandante Supremo’, Jornal do Brasil, 14.01.2000

50 Idem.

51 In this context, it is important to remember that countries in the Southern Cone are still under the impact of the consequences of two decades of military regime, in particular the vivid memory of so many atrocities committed in its midst. Horrendous events, nowadays back in the news headlines, such as the revealing details of Operation Condor and the search for (the identity of) youngsters who, as new-born babies, were wrested from their mothers - women prisoners in clandestine concentration units and torture centers in the Southern Cone who were murdered after giving birth – and handed over for adoption to military officers, many of whom were considered as involved in the atrocities.

purported or self-assigned roles as political brokers seems no longer possible.<sup>52</sup> On the contrary, such roles are believed to be actually challenged by the purported strengthening of civil-military relation in the defense area.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, such roles are supposedly dismissed by the recently created – still on-the-making - Ministry of Defense (MD), a true governmental novelty – politically nor organizationally self-evident - in Brazil.

### **V.i - The Ministry of Defense**

With the creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD), the ministerial status of the commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force was ended and a General Staff of the Defense replaced the former General Staff of the Armed Forces, whose head also lost ministerial status.<sup>54</sup> Crucial questions arose (and are still around) about which civilians would be incorporated; from where would they be recruited, and in what capacity would they fill what posts. Furthermore, once the decision was reached on the need for the MD to have a separate intelligence agency, questions arose (and are still around) on how it would be organized and controlled, who would take part in it, and, especially, who and what would be the targets. In other words, for the first time in their history, the BAF faced the actual possibility of ‘losing’ to civilians their monopoly on military thinking and affairs inside the military orbit.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, it is quite clear that in the past ten years, the BAF have redesigned their relationship with the central agencies of government and with the political institutions of the country, putting in the limelight both the civilian (in)

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52 Worth noting the remarks made by general Oswaldo Pereira Gomes, member, since 1995, of the Commission on Disappeared Political Persons (*Comissão de Desaparecidos Políticos*). Appointed by general Zenildo Lucena, then minister of the Army, Gomes became one of the seven titular members of the Commission. It was general Gomes who advanced an uneasy observation about his belief that the military would launch another coup d'état, remarking that “it is our history, we are closing a cycle”. (Leandro Fortes, *Jornal do Brasil*, 19.05.2002)

53 Interesting to note that civilian control was never equated with party control of any kind, in spite of the political identification of so many commanders throughout the century. On the contrary, the century has shown the shortcomings of political parties in the military arena.

54 Created by presidential decree, it was finally sanctioned on the 10th of June of 1999. The commanders of the three forces - admiral Sérgio Chagastelles (Navy), general Gleuber Vieira (Army) and brigadier Carlos de Almeida Baptista (Air Force) - kept some of their prerogatives, such as the right to a privileged legal forum (Federal Superior Tribunal) and to take part in the recently created Military Council for the Defense.

55 Such monopoly had already been lost outside the military camp, with the creation, in the early 80s, of a small number of academic institutes of Strategic Affairs, which took to themselves the task of studying and discussing military matters and voicing informed, differentiated opinion, though accomplished within the academic limitations in Brazil.

capacity to deal with the military institution and the delicate problems of transparency, mutual trust, cooperation, and integration between civilians and military. The BAF have become ‘civilianized’ in a very singular way: instead of acting according to a set of rules defined by the civilian political forces, they have restrained and refrained themselves (though not retrained in perspective and perception) in the absence of such definition.

Although it was considered to be necessary for the MD to be headed by somebody with “decisional capacity, a good international understanding and a very good knowledge” of the BAF, lawyer Élcio Álvares, a regional politician, with no military experience whatsoever or specific understanding of the area became the first Defense Minister.<sup>56</sup> By January, 2000, Álvares was enduring hard accusations -- of having drug dealers among the clients of his lawyer’s office in the city of Vitória, capital of the State of Espírito Santo – as well as having to live through the uneasy situation of seeing Solange Resende, his long-time collaborator and special advisor, becoming a major target of a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (*CPI*), set up to investigate narcotraffic activities in Brazil.<sup>57</sup> Both left office.

With the appointment, in 2000, of lawyer Geraldo Quintão, who, until then, occupied the post of Attorney General of the Union, the discussion of what type of Armed Forces the country wished to have and how much it could afford to pay was started.<sup>58</sup> This was a very important matter. When Army, Navy and Air Force each had their own ministry, the military budget seemed quite limited. But now that the MD was under way, unifying figures of the three services, the global military budget for 2002 was R\$ 26,2 billion (US\$ 11 billion).<sup>59</sup> Anyhow, the planned budget figures meant 2,9% of the volume of resources expected by the US Armed Forces – US\$ 379 billion - in the fiscal year of 2003 starting in

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56 Elcio Alvarez, born in Minas Gerais, had been a federal deputy of the military regime’s Arena party between 1970 and 1974; ‘bionic’ governor (imposed by the military regime) of the state of Espírito Santo between 1975 and 1979; senator in 1990, when he commanded, together with senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães, the Senate task-force of president Collor de Mello, ousted in 1992. (Expedito Filho, “O Futuro Ex-Ministro da Defesa”, *Veja*, 19.01.2000)

57 Air Force commander Brigadier Walter Werner Bräuer gave public support for the *CPI*; for his remarks he was dismissed from office. Solange Resende, as a lawyer in the lawyer’s office of Álvares, was also charged with having defended drug dealers. In her case, there were added grievances coming out of military quarters: Álvares always took her along as a participant in the meetings with the commanders of the three forces, something which was not quite acceptable in the professional milieu.

58 According to colonel (res) Geraldo Cavagnari, co-founder of the Nucleus for Strategic Studies (NEE/Unicamp), “the way our Armed Forces are, they are expensive for the country and show distortions and privileges that need to be reviewed” (Alexandre Secco, ‘Militares para quê?’ *Veja*, 26.01.2000)

59 The military received 14 billion reais in 2000, almost 20% more than in 1999.

October.<sup>60</sup> Certainly, wholesome small figures on the Brazilian side, although the MD is getting 8,3% of the budget of the Union.<sup>61</sup> But the quality of the spending is also important: while most expenses in developed countries are with the acquisition of new equipments and training, the current MD spends, just with personnel, almost 14 billion *reais*, basically paying salaries, which was 40% more than what was spent with the payment of university professors.<sup>62</sup>

Another issue also involves figures. Brazil, without external nation-state enemies, in the region and its surroundings, for the past 140 years – *objective no-threat situation* and a *concomitant fading function* -, had 276.000 men in the mid-eighties, at the end of the last military presidency.<sup>63</sup> Fifteen years later, and after four civilian presidencies, the military in Brazil rose to 313.000. With the money shortage endured in the last few years, under the *Plano Real*, of the 200.000 men serving in the Army, only 20.000 are considered as receiving adequate training to prepare them for certain combat scenarios.<sup>64</sup> In any case, after two years of the new ministry, and in spite of all kinds of shortcomings, the three services continue to do their planning, training and buying, without a major synthesis within the MD or an effective Major Joint Command, as a would-be provider of points of reference and guidance for military initiative within the framework of governmental policy.

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60 In the year 2000 it became clear that the military budget (before the devaluation of the *real*) was the second largest of the Union: almost 20 billion *reais* (more than Education, equal to the Health Ministry, and only lower than the budget of the Social Security Ministry) although Brazil supposedly spent only between 1,5% and 2% of the GDP with the military.

61 Excluding expenses with the public debt, in a country where the estimates for the 2002 Union income, approved at the end of 2001, were of R\$ 320,7 billion (US\$ 134,7 billion). (Catia Seabra, *O Globo*, 06.02.2002)

62 One should notice that the expenses of the federal government with inactive personnel grew an average of 6,1% a year, between 1995 and 1998. In that same period, payments for retired reserve military grew an average of 13,2% a year, jumping from 13,5% (1995) to 19% (1998) of the total expenses of the Union with personnel. By the end of 1999, National Treasury expenses for the reserve military and their relatives represented 37,5% of all the expenses of the government with inactive personnel. Because the military contribute only 1,6% as pension, 3,5% for a health fund, and 1,5% for social assistance, while reserve military do not contribute in any of these categories, a real problem is here. Numbers produced by Ipea, cited by Fábio Giambiagi and Ana Cláudia Além, show that expenses with the military of the reserve represents 64,8% of the total expenses of government with military *soldos*. Furthermore, official data shows that, from the total retired of the public service (about 540 thousand people), 127 thousand are military. This means that 23% of inactive Union personnel answer for 37,5% of expenses with retirement pensions (Cristiano Romero, citing data presented by Fábio Giambiagi and Ana Cláudia Além, in their book *Finanças públicas no Brasil*, in his column 'Informe Econômico, *Jornal do Brasil*, 21.10.1999).

63 Interesting to register comments made by Admiral Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, for whom it should consider that the very existence of the BAF, in their various stages, ensured the no-problem scenario for the past 140 years, as they were able to play what could be considered as an important *disuassonary role*. (Interview, Rio de Janeiro, 04.06.2002)

In order to enhance its military capability, Brazil is shopping around, seeking to renew BAF equipment.<sup>65</sup> As part of this effort, the Navy acquired, in 2000, the plane-carrier Foch, from France (to substitute the 54-year old Minas Gerais), which would carry a number of the 23 Skyhawk A4, bought from Kuwait.<sup>66</sup> Besides being involved in the construction of a nuclear submarine (and conventional ones), the Navy has also developed the technology of production of nuclear energy, which includes the enrichment of uranium.<sup>67</sup> An agreement was signed between its Technological Center and the Brazilian Nuclear Industries (*Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil – INB*), for the construction of the first industrial unit of uranium enrichment, in Resende, state of Rio de Janeiro.<sup>68</sup>

Meanwhile, the Army has been involved in buying necessary (or price available) equipment - has recently bought Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and German Leopard I and American M-60 armoured cars, while modernizing its artillery -, as well as developing new ones, such as the MSS-1.2 missiles, concentrating on the electronic parts and system.

Finally, the Air Force decided to incorporate new equipment, such as the missiles being developed by Mectron Engenharia, as well as an anti-radiation system, important for electronic war environments, which can be employed in the destruction of radars. Mectron was responsible for the development of MAA-1, known as Piranha, the first intelligent weapon projected in Brazil - conceived to equip AMX and F-103 fighter planes, as well as the ALX training plane, which was adapted for light attack missions -, whose industrial

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64 Alexandre Secco, Militares para quê?, Veja, 26.01.2000. Army annual budget is around US\$ 500 million.

65 Planes range from US\$ 20 million to US\$ 60 million.

66 The São Paulo is as long as two and a half Maracanã fields (265 meters), can take up to 40 airplanes and helicopters (with a running field of 257 meters), and was bought for US\$ 12 million. According to admiral (ret.) Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, current consultant of Syndarma, the plane-carrier is important to keep the Navy adjusted in terms of new technologies (not necessarily equipment), in spite of low resources, once Brazil keeps specialized nuclei (naval mines etc) in all the naval war techniques. (Bernardo de la Penha, O Globo, 12.02.2001). The Navy paid US\$ 70 million for the Skyhawks from Kuwait.

67 The Navy was investing R\$ 750 million (worth, in 2000, about US\$ 380 million) in the submarine projects. The conventional ones, such as the Tikuna, had their construction stopped in 2001 because of lack of resources. Such amounts were announced by Admiral Marcus Vinicius de Oliveira Santos, director of the Technological Center of the Navy. The whole nuclear submarine project, which started in the 80s, is supposed to have spent R\$ 1.3 billion, and is to be ready by 2010. (Ramona Ordóñez, O Globo, 12.07.2000)

68 The project will use the technology of ultra centrifugation developed by the Navy in the 80s. Brazil enters into the selected group of only seven countries that enrich uranium in commercial scale. With this process, Brazil will become self-sufficient in the production of fuel for the nuclear energy plants, with 97% being produced in the country.



production has started in 2000.<sup>69</sup> Embraer was contracted to modernize F-5 fighters, as part of a program that aimed at strengthening the control of airspace. Actually, Embraer started in 2002 the process of production of the new ALX – conceived in 1995 to strengthen air control in the Amazonian region -, involving the sale of 76 units to the Brazilian Air Force.<sup>70</sup> But the Air Force is also set to buy combat planes from 2002 onwards, replacing the 30 year long use of F-5 Tiger and Mirages IIIE. The first stage is the FX Program, of US\$ 700 million, intended to buy between 12 and 24 planes.<sup>71</sup> In the meantime, Brazil is buying 15 Tiger F-5E airplanes (has already 48) from Switzerland, which were produced by the United States in the 70s, in a deal which involves technology transfer, though not necessarily only in aeronautics.

Bidding for the FX Program were several consortiums.<sup>72</sup> It is interesting to note that, if accepted, each consortium was ready to begin or expand its cooperation, with differentiated meanings and reachings. Thus, the Anglo-Swedish Gripen International (Saab and Bae Systems) was ready to set up a production unit of plane parts and to develop systems used by the fighter, while establishing partnership with Brazilian commercial airline Varig to guarantee its maintenance.<sup>73</sup> The Russians entered through Rac MiG, with the MiG 29 and through the exporting company Rosoboronexport, which promised that if its Sukhoi Su35 fighter plane –projected by Sukhoi and produced by Cnapo - was chosen,

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69 The Air Force hired Tectelcom Aeroespacial (cutting the agreement in March 2000) to develop and produce radars for AMX military planes. The Italian Officine Galileo, belonging to the Alenia Defesa group, produced components of the radars. The AMX are produced by French-controlled Embraer, in Brazil and by Alenia and Aermacchi, in Italy. The AMX was tested, in combat, in April 1999, by NATO forces against Servian targets. (Virginia Silveira, Gazeta Mercantil, 09.03.2000).

70 The contract, of US\$ 420 million with Embraer, received the green light thanks to a foreign loan of US\$ 156 million (other sources mention a joint loan of US\$ 248 million), led by the Deutsche Bank - credits were guaranteed by export credit agencies of Germany, Canada, Israel, such as EDC, Eximbank and Hermes - and approved by the Senate, to finance part of the ALX program,. The loan was destined to the shopping of components for the production of the *superTucanos* ALX, which should help in monitoring the full extension of Amazonia. The contract had another 23 buying options. Besides Embraer, the ALX program involves the participation of important furnishers, such as the Israeli Elbit (avionic systems and simulators), the Canadian Pratt & Whitney (motor) and Eleb-Embraer Liebherr Equipamentos do Brasil (landing system). Elbit also furnishes avionic systems for the AMX and F-5 fleets. (Virgínia Silveira, Gazeta Mercantil, 04/06.01.2002).

71 The Air Force wants to invest US\$ 3,5 billion buying aircraft and weapons until 2005, in its first phase (it was US\$ 3,3 billion up to 2003), as part of its Phoenix Plan, which extends until 2015. Its overall aim is to acquire 285 aircraft, a figure which includes new units and replacements and modernization of the AMX model. The Army was to invest US\$ 613.5 million, until the year 2000, buying last generation equipment.)

72 O Globo, 17.10.2001

73 This was accomplished with Varig Engenharia e Manutenção (VEM), a recently created subsidiary, to function as a 'strategic arm' in Brazil. Both enterprises aim at developing logistical support projects and

an industry for the production of missiles would be established in Brazil.<sup>74</sup> The Russians also offered support for the Brazilian space program, helping to develop satellite launching missiles and monitoring equipment that could be used at the base of Alcântara.<sup>75</sup> Meanwhile, French Dassault and Brazilian Embraer (with French participation), based on the successful Mirage 2000-5MKII, offered the Mirage 2000BR version.<sup>76</sup> The American consortium Lockheed Martin, offering the F-16 fighter, included furnishing air-air missiles, with the official support of the US Government to its proposal.<sup>77</sup> The US Department of Defense communicated to the American Congress that Lockheed Martin would receive the permission to offer 12 F-16C/D Block 50 equipped with AIM-120C AMRAAM air-air missiles.<sup>78</sup> According to Donna Hrinak, the US Ambassador in Brazil, choosing the American model would open the door of a greater collaboration between the two countries.

But by may of 2002, a cut of R\$ 937 million in the budget – 25% of the total budget of the MD - caused serious problems in the BAF: the Air Force was without resources to buy fuel, while half of their 750 planes and helicopters had no flight conditions. Restrictions hit also the Special Transport Group (*GTE*), responsible for the flights of the ministers of the government. The Army was studying a half-a-day regime in their sections, while the Navy was still analyzing what do do, although technical maintenance of their vessels and reduction of their functionaries was considered.<sup>79</sup> By mid 2002, the Navy decided to have one less working-day in the week, while the incorporation of 5,000

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technology transfer, including those that are part of the industrial cooperation program required by Brazil for the acquisition of new fighter planes. (O Globo, 07.06.2002; Leandro Fortes, Jornal do Brasil, 23.05.2002)

74 In January 2002, São José dos Campos-based missile and rocket producer Avibrás (Astro II, a launcher of artillery rockets is a known product, sold to the Persian Gulf, Asia and Latin America) signed a contract in Moscow, of technological cooperation, to produce the Sukhoi Su-35 in Brazil, in case this plane is chosen. (Evando Éboli, O Globo, 15.01.2002). Minister Quintão and General Gleuber went to Moscow, to sign cooperation agreements, visit military bases and visit the air industry. (Ricardo Boechat, Jornal do Brasil, 03.04.2002}

75 Francisco Leali, O Globo, 23.05.2002

76 The plane was to be produced in Brazil by Embraer, where Dassault has 5.65% of capital, the same percentage as three other French enterprises (EADS, Thales and Snecma).

77 The F-18 could be sold only without their major equipment (long range air-air missiles) and some instrumental adjustments

78 Marcelo Ambrosio, Jornal do Brasil, 26.04.2002. Costing US\$ 386 thousand, it is considered to be a “shoot and forget” type of missile, with BVR interception capacity (Beyond Visual Reach) that can be launched up to a 40/50 kilometers distance from the target. An F-16 normally carries two to four AIM-120 and can shoot them simultaneously against multiple targets. This offer meant the review of an American position, after it was confirmed that Peru had bought 30 Russian AA-12 missiles for their MIG-29.

79 O Globo, 29.05.2002

recruits, planned for the second semester, could be cancelled. In the Army, half-working day imposed on two days was to be extended to five.<sup>80</sup>

### **V.ii - Intelligence and Security: GSI and Abin**

There are two other dimensions - intimately related - of civilian-military relations which are specific to the Brazilian current reality and which are of the utmost importance. One has to do with governmental security and perception of military affairs out of a war context, including diverse questions: which agencies address (and how) issues of National Security; how can transparency in policies and their implementation be insured, concomitant to their reserve in formulation and decision-making; what kind of code of conduct can be established by and for military and police, in their attitudes towards the population etc. The other dimension deals with the contours of a possible new military function, to be constituted in counteracting illegal activities, specifically narcotraffic - which has become a very important political, cultural and economic societal fabric in Brazil - and urban violence, an intense and rapidly growing problem in the country. Both situations push the BAF into defining a new military function involving intelligence capacity for the support of the diverse police forces – military and civilian - in operation. In both cases, BAF and society at large will face test-situations in terms of civil-military relations. Especially since the issues of corruption and criminality, in their unconstant interaction and mutual demonstration of vulnerable and uneasy institutional workings, impose similar challenges as a certain ideological rationale imposed once on the interacting issues of security and defense.<sup>81</sup>

The first dimension is being dealt with the creation of the Cabinet for Institutional Security (*Gabinete de Segurança Institucional - GSI*), which replaced the long standing Military Household (*Casa Militar*). The *GSI* was established within the presidential cabinet, at a time when other military ministries (Navy, Army and Air Force) became subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.<sup>82</sup> The second dimension is dealt with the recently

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80 Jornal do Brasil, 01.06.2002

81 We are dealing with an effectively interrelated two-and-two perception, where diagonal connections are dreaded as possible.

82 Created in December of 1999. Its activities are disciplined by law, with 15 articles.

created Brazilian Intelligence Agency (*Agência Brasileira de Inteligência - Abin*), which is, in fact, the central intelligence agency of the government.<sup>83</sup>

By law, *Abin* is to work only in cases involving national interest and the defense of the State, as are considered to be various issues such as the development of narcotraffic or the ecological devastation in the Amazonian region.<sup>84</sup> For these activities, *Abin* - which is controlled by the *GSI* - receives support of the National Anti-Drugs System. In what seems to be an uneasy function, *Abin* is also the holder (not controller) of the cryptographic code of the electronic election boxes.<sup>85</sup> What really calls the attention is that *Abin* is - being followed in the news, watched from a distance, imagined in its composition and action - considered as an internal agent. But no serious discussion becomes public on what is really spent on intelligence, yearly; on how is data collection processed; how is 24hs-analysis being worked out; where (and how) is it dealt with counter-intelligence and covert action and with the fact that there are problems in controlling (or not) intelligence. In other words: what kind of information is power and who holds it; what kind of Congress oversight is possible etc. Summing up: who is having and will have (who is not) access to what information, when, where and how, in order to do or prevent whatever?<sup>86</sup> What is actually meant (and done) about 'controlling intelligence'? How do *spectator states* face *pivotal ones* in the field of intelligence, considering national fabrics and supranational dynamics? How are information warfare and cyberterrorism to be dealt with?

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83 *Abin* has about 1.740 functionaries, including 900 agents, distributed in 12 regional desks. Among its objectives, the monitoring of social tension, fight against corruption and political investigation. It is known that 226 of these agents belonged to the former National Information Service (*SNI*), created by the military regime in 1964 (Renata Giraldi, *Jornal do Brasil*, 02.12.2000, Policarpo Junior, *Veja*, 15.11.2000). According to other sources, *Abin* has 1,628 functionaries in all tasks and functions, of which 15,5% are remanent of former information services. (Denise Assis, *Jornal do Brasil*, 24.03.2002). Other personnel came from the *Subsecretaria de Inteligência - SSI*, created in president Cardoso's first term of government, and placed under the direction of Eduardo Jorge Caldas Pereira, former general-secretary of the *Planalto*. The *SSI* was to be subordinated to the *SAE*.

84 In practice, *Abin* has been involved in many other issues, such as the investigation of journalists and politicians.

85 When such function was questioned, by former president José Sarney, who insinuated the possibility of *Abin* having technical and political conditions to fraud the 2002 presidential and national elections, general Cardoso asserted that "the whole electoral process is in compartments. One of the compartments is the cryptographic program of the defense of secrecy of the electronic box, it's a program with cryptographic security. It is a program that, yes, was made by *Abin*...the program is with *Abin* because that is where it has to be, it is a reason of security. It is in the hands of the intelligence unit of the State". (general Alberto Cardoso, in interview to Jorge Bastos Moreno, *O Globo*, 24.03.2002)

86 The US are supposed to spend close to US\$ 28 billion a year on intelligence.

Under the umbrella of *Abin*, a Subsystem of Intelligence of Public Security (*SSI*) was created in mid-2000.<sup>87</sup> Its function was to help to identify and evaluate what were considered to be real threats or potential ones against public security.<sup>88</sup> Within a National Plan for Public Safety, a number of state-nuclei of the Subsystem were to be created in four capitals – Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Goiania and Brasília – with the aim of identifying possible foci and nuclei of conflict, related to “organized crime, to narcotraffic and connected crimes, to urban and rural violence, to structures of public security or potential threats to democratic institutions and to society”.<sup>89</sup> This was a very special target arch, once military personnel were suspected of being involved in narcotraffic, with the *Centro de Inteligência da Marinha (CIM)* looking into the matter.<sup>90</sup>

Interesting to notice that, through the *GSI*, the pressures to impress a new military goal upon the BAF were absorbed and processed: counteracting illegal activities, and, specifically, the very serious problems of urban violence and narcotraffic. Reinforcing this perspective, general Alberto Cardoso viewed the approval, by the Chamber of Deputies, of the project that allows the infiltration of police and intelligence agents within established criminal settings, as a powerful instrument that would allow the police to be at the same level, in terms of intelligence and operational structures, as organized crime.<sup>91</sup> However, the BAF and society at large would face test-situations of civil-military relations, once *Abin* action was interpreted by some as “not taking account of the State, but safeguarding

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87 The *SSI Council*, composed by representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Defense, National Integration, *GSI* and *Abin* itself, would be directed by colonel Ariel de Cunto, until he was dismissed from *Abin*, at the end of 2000, for not having dismissed an agent accused of torture during the military regime.

88 In mind were protests in places like Porto Seguro, during the festivities of the 500 years of Brazil; land invasion or occupation of public buildings, impelled by the Landless Workers Movement (MST); and truck strikes between 1999 and 2000. (Cristiane Jungblut and Adriana Vasconcelos, *O Globo*, 09.05.2000). According to its general director, colonel Ariel de Cunto, *Abin* keeps an eye on MST, enterprises, pressure groups, community activists, NGOs etc and looks into matters that affect national sovereignty (Rodrigo França Taves and Francisco Lealli, *O Globo*, 07.12.2000; Solange Ragazi Davi, *Gazeta Mercantil*, 14-16.04.2000)

89 The idea was also to stimulate the creation of similar nuclei in the states and in the municipalities. After those four cities, the system would be extended to Recife, Campo Grande and Victória and, until 2002, to Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Salvador, Fortaleza, Belém, Manaus and Belo Horizonte (Adriana Vasconcelos, *O Globo*, 09.06.2000)

90 Some military officers at the *Base Aeronaval de São Pedro D’Aldeia* were suspected of being involved, along with civilian and military police. (Ronaldo Braga, *O Globo*, 01.03.2002)

91 The author of this proposal - first legislative measure of the National Plan of Public Security – was general Alberto Cardoso. (Márcio de Freitas, *Jornal do Brasil*, 22.03.2000)

Government policy”.<sup>92</sup> And government was keen to involve the Army in patrolling frontiers and the Air Force in the identification of clandestine landing tracks, as well as making use of the Navy in port areas. Thus, it was no surprise that president Fernando Henrique Cardoso had to listen to criticisms - on the proposals to change the role of the BAF and adopt police functions - by Navy commander Admiral Sergio Chagastelles, who aimed at the attempt to refocus military function. He went as far as affirming that there is a sensation of security in the world, unfolding from globalization, but that Brazil would not leave aside the modernization of its defense.<sup>93</sup>

In spite of so many restrictions and rejections of a police function, the BAF were called in several times to serve as such – and did it.<sup>94</sup> Having this in mind, but focusing on an intromission into his area of action, Minister Quintão was quite worried, by May 2002, with the initiative of Rio de Janeiro governor Benedita da Silva and her team who established in official note which would be the attributions of the BAF in the task-force that was to be set up to fight criminality in the state. In the document, the Army would trace and catch illegal armament, the Navy was to watch the strategic points of the *fluminense* coast and the Air Force was to map and destroy clandestine airplane fields. For minister Quintão, the kind of support to be offered to the state of Rio de Janeiro in the fight against the intense urban violence that has been around over the past decade, gaining new harsh proportions from 2001 to 2002 had – and was - to be decided by the Armed Forces, through

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92 In what seemed a drastic evaluation, Guilherme Schelb (State attorney in the Federal District where Brasilia is located) considered that all the information currently held points to the *Abin* becoming a political police and a parallel power, with a sense of “authoritarianism which, perhaps not even the *SNi* had reached”. (Interview with Monica Torres Maia, O Globo, 17.12.2000)

93 Speech at the commemorations of the 135 years of the Naval battle of Riachuelo, in O Globo, 12.06.2000

94 Other participations of the BAF in the area of security were: a) May 30, 1992, when the Military Command of the East started an operation to guarantee the security of the participants in the Rio-92 Conference, when 15.000 men patrolled the streets until June 15; b) August 1994, when 400 Army soldiers occupied the favelas of Fubá, São José Operário and Campinho, in search of weapons, as part of a campaign of favela occupation that involved also Roquete Pinto, Borel, Mangueira and Vigário Geral; c) October of 1994, when Operation Rio I was announced, with the participation of 2,000 soldiers and intervention in the favela hills of Dendê and Mangueira; d) January 1995, when 4,200 military of the three forces circled the Complexo do Alemão favela, together with military police and municipal guards; e) April 1995, when Operation Rio II, with 20,000 men took place; f) April 6, 1999, when governor Anthony Garotinho, of Rio de Janeiro, sent off four-star general José Siqueira from his post as Security Secretary, placing instead military police colonel Josías Quintal, and closing down an era of Army officers taking care of the security of the state of Rio. (Antônio Werneck, Célia Costa and Evandro Éboli, O Globo, 17.05.2002)

the ministry. Furthermore, the decision over a military operation in Rio de Janeiro was exclusive of the president of the Republic.<sup>95</sup>

### **V.iii - GSI-Abin-MD: military, civilian and political police**

Through the *GSI* and the *Abin* set-ups, a complex front of civil–military relations has been opened, with some very hard immediate questions and very difficult answers, as well as some implicit (partisan infighting) and hidden (Armed Forces’ political-police role assumption) issues.

A major one involved the definition of the political limits of the *GSI* and of the intelligence agency *Abin*, not only because they were headed by the same person, general Alberto Cardoso, but also because this raised some additional intriguing issues, such as the consequences of having superposed functions of so different and worrisome, but potentially interactive units.<sup>96</sup> Interesting to note that the newly appointed national secretary for Public Security, was chosen after his name passed through the filter of the *Abin* - in fact, he was indicated by general Cardoso -, and with him, another issue was raised: the possibility of fusing military and civilian polices. Nevertheless, and in view of what general Cardoso considered to be the real picture of “crime more organized than the police”, he asserted that it was necessary for an immediate action of both police forces, instead of waiting for their reorganization and fusion.<sup>97</sup>

Another issue was centered on the question of who would assume the direction and control of narcotraffic combat policy and who (again, how) would be participating in

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95 “Rio can ask for help, but who defines the type of support and its density are the Armed Forces. In the same way nothing was talked over with me, I do not want rules to be dictated upon me”. ( Minister Geraldo Quintão, quoted by Ana Paula Macedo and Evandro Éboli, O Globo, 23.05.2002)

96 Worrisome, as it was still remembered that in the midst of the 1998 national election campaign, general Cardoso accused the Movement of Landless Peasants (supporters of opposition candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, against the reelection of incumbent president Cardoso) of being involved in the growing of *maconha* (marihuana) in the state of Pernambuco. Nothing was proven, but, by the time this became clear, the political damage had been done, harming the image of the Lula-led center-left coalition. (Maria Lima and Monica Gugliano, O Globo, 27.06.99)

97 As he put it: “if union of the various polices takes place, we run the risk of de-structuring ourselves”. Furthermore, he affirmed that the National Plan for Public Security (running since July 2000) could not eliminate violence in immediate terms, a social problem that took years to gain such density and reach the current situation. Thus, for him, the desired fusion of the two police forces would take place only five years later, following an immediate operational integration. Unfolding from this event, the fusion of the schools and

operations. This involved a delicate point: the relationship of the three military forces and their intelligence services (under the umbrella of the MD) with the Federal Police (Ministry of Justice) and with *Senad* (executive arm of the National Anti-Drugs System, subordinated to the *GSI*) whose head, general Cardoso, also presides over the National Anti-Drugs Council.<sup>98</sup> A triangular set-up with a multifaceted zone of conflict (not necessarily declared and purported) and intermittent cooperation was established, with all the actors having their own misgivings *vis-a-vis* the guidelines of the MD, who obviously lacked an enforcement structure.<sup>99</sup> More so, once the variety of non-military matters (or those dispensing a military solution) that configure possible scenarios of (in)security - substantially different from the themes of 'internal security' that marked the decades of 60 to 80 - are taken into consideration. In any case, *Senad* was to coordinate all the work in Brazil of US agencies involved in the combat of narcotraffic.<sup>100</sup>

A test case of this odd situation was observed in the circumstances surrounding (and following) the exit in the first trimester of 1999, of Vicente Chelotti, general director of the Federal Police, accused of having bugged authorities of the higher echelons of the federal government. After being cast aside, Chelotti asserted that he was under fire from the military because in his administration, the Federal Police stopped doing investigations of a political nature. Moreover, he asserted that he went further ahead, by dismissing all military posted within the Federal Police, while mounting a data bank of the criminal area, where no information on partisan activities were included.<sup>101</sup>

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the sole command of the police forces by a secretary of Security. (Conference, Superior War College, 01.11.2000, quoted by Martha Batalha, in O Globo, 02.11.2000)

98 In June 2000, *Senad* operational command was divided: the Ministry of Justice coordinating repressive actions, while those related to treatment and prevention of drug use would continue under general Cardoso.

99 General Cardoso explained the new *Senad* role, overshadowing Federal Police, as due to the fact that "Federal Police was, in practice, the only agency in charge of repression, exercising such repression as a judiciary federal police, but not having an optimized police role for lack of a global approach to repression" (Jorge Basto Moreno, O Globo, 06.06.99)

100 This agreement was signed in August 24, 1999

101 This, according to Chelotti, "began to disturb the guys of military intelligence, as they used our services to produce information". Then, he criticized general Cardoso, for his lukewarm attitudes in relation to the 'appearance' of tapes obtained by tapping conversations between several high officials and advisors - from the government's economic area, from the *BNDES*, from the private sector and the president himself - as they exchanged impressions and information about the process of privatization of public utilities, including the jacking up (or down) of groups disputing the telecommunication sector. In the case of the *BNDES* bugging, when military from *Abin* were accused of carrying out the operation, the military sided with the intelligence agency and the Military Household against the Federal Police. (Vicente Chelotti, Jornal do Brasil, 14.06.99; Helena Chagas, O Globo, 14.06.99; Elio Gaspari, O Globo, 14.06.99).



The newly appointed head of the Federal Police, João Batista Campello was supported by the Military Household and segments of the Armed Forces, against the explicit wishes of the Minister of Justice, Renan Calheiros, who supported the then incumbent sub-director of the Federal Police, positioned along Chelotti's line of continuity. However, Campello was accused, before taking office, of being instrumental in the torture of a priest, *Padre* José Antonio de Magalhães Monteiro, detained for political reasons by the military regime in the early 70s.<sup>102</sup> A couple of days later, amidst denunciations of an over-extended presence of US agents in Brazil, Campello was dismissed.

In his place was appointed Agílio Monteiro Filho, a civilian seen by General Cardoso with amiable eyes.<sup>103</sup> Quite interestingly, in October 2000, Chelotti came back to the top political circle, entrusted by the Minister of Transport, Eliseu Padilha, with the task of tracing a map of the robbery of loads and trucks in the country, while Campello became, in 2000, the Secretary of Security of the State of Roraima, in the upper corner of the Amazonian region, looking into Venezuela and the Guyanas. As for director-general Monteiro Filho, the policy to hire enterprises to service the Federal Police (started in Chelotti's administration) gained strength under his command. Interesting to note that Monteiro Filho, who was announced in the *Diario Oficial* as retiring in October 30, 2001, was reintroduced into active service the next day. This coincided with the proposal - by departing Minister of Justice José Gregory, appointed ambassador to Portugal - to create the posts of police *attachés* in Lisbon, Washington and Rome, and Monteiro Filho was considered as a serious candidate to go with his former chief. He didn't. Instead, he left his

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102 Another priest, Gilles Xavier Maupeou d'Ableiges, current Bishop of Viana, in the state of Maranhão (who had been a cavalry officer in Algiers) was also detained. Padre Monteiro sustained his accusations and a full investigation was demanded. Campello took office on June 15th, greeted by a 17-second short speech of the Minister of Justice, and minutes later, the decision to investigate the matter was taken. (Helena Chagas, *O Globo*, 14.06.99; Elio Gaspari, *O Globo*, 14.06.99; Edouard Bailby, "Sem licença para espionar", *Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo*, No. 210, Junho 1999, Rio de Janeiro, pgs 60-63; Márcio de Freitas, *Jornal do Brasil*, 08.08.2000).

103 Monteiro Filho signed, in August 2000, an agreement with the French government, under the name of *Programa de Modernização Tecnológica – Promotec* (Programme for Technological Modernization). Through *Promotec*, the Federal Police would receive US\$ 425 million (a budget to be repassed by the French bank BNP Paribas), along six years, destined to the acquisition of weapons, technological equipments of laboratories for investigation (including the area of informatics and technological crimes), cars, boats, airplanes, retraining of personnel, modernization of the National Academy of Police and construction of posts of the Federal Police. Together with the *Fundo Nacional de Aparelhamento e Operacionalização da Polícia Federal (Funapo)*, a national fund for reequipment and operationalization, the projects aimed at reorganizing the national security system, considering the Federal Police to be its main anchor. *Promotec* was linked to

function on April 2002, to run for Congress in Minas Gerais, through the party in federal government, the PSDB.<sup>104</sup> In his place entered Itanor Neves Carneiro, second in command, operational executor of the investigation within the Lunus enterprise, in São Luís. In this enterprise are involved Roseana Sarney, then governor of the state of Maranhão and PFL party member, as well as her husband. The PF action was instrumental in blocking the daughter of former president José Sarney, in her attempt to become a presidential candidate, leaving the PFL with no alternative but to seek alliances and recompose itself.

In 2001, the proposal of a provisory measure giving the BAF police power in exceptional cases, such as military and civilian police strikes provoked a rip in the government. The minister of Justice, José Gregori and the general-secretary of the Presidency, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, criticized the possible measure. Arguments counterposed by minister Quintão and general Cardoso, who defended the creation of a legal mechanism to guarantee that, in case the Armed Forces were to be used in the states, the troops would even have the power to imprison.<sup>105</sup> Meanwhile, president Cardoso gave lawyer-general of the Union, Gilmar Mendes, the task to prepare opinion that defines if the Armed Forces already have police power or if they need a new law to regulate (*regulamentar*) article 142 of the Constitution, which reads that they can act in the states when demanded, in defense of law and order.<sup>106</sup>

What is clear is that BAF involvement in direct combat against narcotraffic has been a new, non-desired operational function, which demands from the military their assumption of a non-political police role, so as to be able to deal with the incipient delinquent networks and the formation of diverse criminal social groups conducing to the emergence of a new stratum, involved in illegality.<sup>107</sup> Proposals like these, advanced by some politicians and opinion-shapers, as well as coming from the US, were unanimously rejected by generals, admirals and brigadiers. Taking on this kind of repressive function has been held as quite undesirable, allegedly because of the high risks of corruption and breach of discipline and

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*Pro-Amazônia*, having as its object integrated federal actions to repress illicit operations and increase environmental protection within the Legal Amazônia.

104 Leandro Fortes, *Jornal do Brasil*, 08.04.2002

105 Cristiane Jungblut and Evandro Éboli, *O Globo*, 26.07.2001

106 *Jornal do Brasil*, 26.07.2001

107 It has been difficult for the BAF to deal with premises and issues of a security agenda which requires a very fine and dynamic understanding of these new 'delinquent' classes, quite distant from the military regime considerations, reasoning and perceptions, set on the existence of an 'internal political enemy'.

disarray it implies, although important military action in support of specific anti-drug police measures has always been contemplated.<sup>108</sup> Other observers consider that BAF resistance to delve into those matters has to do with the possibility of losing completely its own military identity and leave, acutely highlighted in many respects, their inadequacy – even their irrelevance in some cases and issues - in strict defense matters within the current state structure and organization, in both the Brazilian and South American contexts.

The predominant view – to reject BAF involvement (and other South-American military) in direct repression of narcotraffic and combat of its financial and productive power structures - has stood firm over the past decade, despite intense US government pressure. Actually, for the Latin American military public, the US has portrayed as ‘threats’ a number of non-military issues (not only drug traffic), including their worries about the environment, large scale smuggling of heavy weapons, money laundering, and illegal immigration.<sup>109</sup> In US perception, these might seem fit and sufficient to ‘substitute for communism as the new continental threat’ and as a rallying point. In Brazilian military perception, South American countries having in their midst illegal ‘power foci’ (armed bands operating in some frontiers, internal urban and countryside terror, organized crime connected to their major counterparts in the so-called developed countries) did not justify the drug problem becoming a ‘banner for continental mobilization’ of a military nature, nor, as remarked by General Gleuber Vieira, could it be converted into a ‘politically satisfying’ issue. Quite the contrary!<sup>110</sup>

In spite of so many opinions against the involvement of the Armed Forces, president Cardoso left doors open when he analyzed the situation where the frontiers of the country could be threatened by “zones of instability” as a consequence of narcotraffic and other illegal trans-frontier actions.<sup>111</sup> This became quite clear in his speech to the new officer-

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108 Despite the fact that BAF were kept out of this matter, some active duty officers and former military members actually involved themselves with drug circles and organized crime. On such participation, general Cardoso suggested “the increase of work posts and the decrease of social injustices”. (Conference, Superior War College, 01.11.2000, quoted by Martha Batalha, in O Globo, 02.11.2000).

109 At the 1999 Rio Summit it was decided to establish an international treaty shared by Europeans and Latin Americans, attacking production and demand of drugs, though nothing was advanced on how it would be done.

110 For others, even the issues go beyond, considering finance in the States, deposits in Caribbean islands, protection structures in the consumer markets.

111 Defense minister Elcio Alvares had set as a priority, the goal of raising the level of military participation in the policies of fighting frontier narcotraffic, until then full responsibility of the Federal Police.

generals of the Armed Forces: “to the traditional mission of maintaining the integrity of the territory has to be added the challenge to preserve its unharmed condition...narcotraffic and other trans-frontier illegalities threaten our people and our sovereignty”.<sup>112</sup> But, threading cautiously, president Cardoso reaffirmed and pointed out to his “firm orientation not to employ the Armed Forces in the day-to-day of such combats, but in support of the police”.<sup>113</sup> With a different accent, general Bezerra Leonel voiced, some time before, what appeared to be the ‘military intention’ to engage in the repression of narcotraffic, contraband, money laundering and other forms of transnational crime. Such actions were considered to be a form of improving defense policy in ‘the widest conception of security’, which, in his view and understanding, extended from education to the control of frontiers. Moreover, the means of defense had to adjust to such new forms of threat, although general Bezerra Leonel recognized that there were ‘very strong political lines’ which considered the Armed Forces for ‘nothing else’ but conventional war, preserving territorial integrity and the aerial space.<sup>114</sup> In his view, the Armed Forces would provide logistical support, information, intelligence, transportation, lodging, and training for the various police forces (military, civil, and federal) and other governmental bodies, such as the ministry of Education or the *Senad*, accomplishing this by means of a “more differentiated weaponry” and exercising control over air space.<sup>115</sup> But, General Bezerra Leonel stressed, if “full force is needed”, the Armed Forces would also enter the fight, although “direct action” would “only be contemplated with an express order from the President”. Nevertheless, he was adamant about the nature of this kind of intervention in the struggle against transnational crime: the involvement would have to be an episodically defined effort, of short duration: “you do it, enter, and get out”, and “you do not take on the function”. His remarks, made before he left the General Staff and assumed his post as military advisor to the Brazilian delegation at the UN, seemed, to participant observers, an illusion. For some, still, it was a

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112 Presidente F.H. Cardoso, quoted by Fabiano Lana, *Jornal do Brasil*, 19.08.2000

113 Idem. In this, he was - apparently - threading the same line as general Benedito Bezerra Leonel, who had been the coordinator of the team that organized the blueprint of the MD and, during that period, served as head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces; a blueprint that had the accent of general Alberto Cardoso and the tone of former Civil Household minister Clovis Carvalho.

114 For him, the Armed Forces, one of the most valid instruments in the field of defense’, could not disregard these new forms of threat. (Interview to Renato Fagundes, *Jornal do Brasil*, 13.06.99)

115 Interesting to note that the Air Force bought an undisclosed number of *Tucanos*, to be used in air traffic control of small aircraft, which are responsible for a large part of the drug smuggling from Peru and Colombia, destined for Europe and the US, and to a lesser degree, to some of the main Brazilian cities.

dangerous precedent, attempting to enlarge the notion of defense - based on security ensured by anti-illicit action - and to find a role for the BAF which would preserve them within the political realm without assuming, openly, the new function. For others, instead, this was the necessary outcome of the significance void (and a significant one) in which the BAF were immersed within the new regional reality and planetary trends.

It is important to note that Brazilian military officers were keenly observing the political and organizational unfolding of the issues involved in the intersection of increased police functions, as expected by local and foreign actors, and what was considered to be by many as the alleged lack of strategic horizons of the MD, obviously reinforced by the ‘absence of an enemy’, which, in turn, strengthened the feeling of a creeping crisis of identity. A feeling that reinforced the need to examine strategic conceptions, past and present, or even their current ‘non-formulation’ and serious disjunction in relation to the immediate future. This urgent demand for a profound and clean conceptual and political-strategic discussion of defense questions (and answers) - placing them apart from the over-determinations imposed by the past political action of the military corporation – is, however, underlined by the enormous difficulties (in many cases, impossibilities) to visualize realistic options in the new political-strategic, technological, productive and cultural scenarios.

It seems that the Armed Forces are caught in the horns of a dilemma: to accept the role attributed to them of becoming some sort of ‘super-drugs’ police enforcement agency or, as it has been put, to “reject this option and continue in the development of research that could give them the potential to acquire professional capacity (including nuclear and missile capability), facing the risk of suffering possible sanctions by the UN”.<sup>116</sup> The government, in an attempt to break the stalemate, or to find a ‘Third Way’, came up with a beaten proposal: to offer the Armed Forces political-financial support to build a ‘capacity for action in the social field’ – as was to be the 2002 campaign to ‘defend’ the Rio de Janeiro population from dengue -, for which they were obviously not prepared nor equipped.<sup>117</sup> Such a ‘social’ involvement, which entails taking on tasks and actions usually

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116 Major-brigadier (reserve) Lauro N. Menezes (former chief of Joint Staff of Air Defense Command), “A Nova Ordem Militar e o Brasil”, O Globo, 16.06.99

117 Although some top echelon members think otherwise, precisely because of their unpreparedness (governmental and military) in the specific fields mentioned before

carried out by civilian agencies, presented the Armed Forces with an awkward role-assumption process, in which political involvement has always been the final – and sorry - outcome.

## **VI - Reorganizing the Armed Forces within Mission Redefinition**

One has to remember that clear cut military functioning in the past 50 years has been linked, in practical terms, to internal security in a political and ideological ambience, not to territorial defense nor national projection while, concomitantly, very much quested political sovereignty was never congruent with economic autonomy. This helps to understand several complex issues:

a) Ongoing discussion about the parameters of Brazilian National Defense Policy and, specifically, the views on the Amazonian region, due to its richness and the varied extension of national borders as well as to the diversity of external views in relation to its future. Parameters and views assured by the Brazilian military as a referential focus for designing defense policies and as a rallying factor to define political stands.

b) Current discussion on who is to take charge of institutional security and policing, both of violent urban situations as well as of social conflicts in the rural areas. After all, one has to consider that besides the Armed Forces, Brazilians have to deal with various Police forces: Military (based in each state of the Federation, amounting to 500.000 men), Civilian, Municipal and Federal, as well as 1.000.000 in private security affairs.<sup>118</sup> In this context, it is important to note that the Armed Forces are able to reason with the conditions and possibilities of their presence where the State is not able to be, thus marking, without concluding on the meaning, the distance between the State and the Armed Forces, which - in this case - are not visualized as part of the state instrumentality.

c) Political developments, within the State and inside the government, taking place after the creation of the MD; the external reconceptualization of strategic affairs in world scale, due to initiatives and reconsiderations by the USA, Russia, China, Germany, UK, France and Japan, and their respective networks or varied 'geometrical

interactions'; and the urgent search for *aggiornamento* of military conceptions.<sup>119</sup> After all, to continue reasoning within conventional dissuasion as a reference-guide for the complete arch of behavior – recruitment, training, disposition, search for equipment etc – is ill adjusted with the challenges posed and the capacities shown by others who mind within the planetary emergent – continuously changing – and power-shaped reality.

Recent productive transnationalization and ongoing major technological and political changes affect prerogatives and functions of national states, thus raising new issues in governability. In particular, they are contoured (and affected) by diverse phenomena, selectively and functionally supranational (political, strategic, judiciary) and meta-national (communication, consumption). Moreover, they impress an important and slippery question mark upon many Armed Forces, especially true in the sub-regional dimension of Mercosul, made up of countries where the military – immediately after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and until the very end of the eighties - grew accustomed to reason with three shared scenarios:

- \* World conflict between superpowers, which actually was taking place, though with nothing left to do for local (South American) actors;

- \* Suspicions about aggressive intentions of neighbouring countries – mainly between Argentina and Brazil (but also between Chile and Argentina) - which were thought as possibly leading to localized and limited conflicts;

- \* Need for control of internal political forces, seen as linked to superpower confrontation or as the result of an ideological spill-over, and their actual involvement in suppressing internal conflicts and organizations, whether in their own territory or in neighboring countries, through formal repressive alliances (in intelligence and operational terms, such as *Operation Condor*) throughout the Southern Cone.

This last scenario (and, in a certain degree, the second one) was determinant in terms of perception, education, training, preparation, equipment, territorial distribution etc. But

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118 Fifty thousand military police are in the State of São Paulo, where security affairs count on more than 83.000 individuals, an increase of almost 10.000 public agents in relation to 1995. (Flavio Freire, Jornal do Brasil, 30.03.2001)

119 By 'geometrical interactions' is meant an ensemble of triangles of various types that are constructed between the different states, in their power relations.

also of distortions and impasses.<sup>120</sup> However, in a globalizing world reaffirming planetary horizons and transcontinental political strategic pivots, national defense becomes a wholly different proposition. For some, it means new, different (or even no) frontiers and, consequently, new armed forces and different types of police. For others, it highlights the irrelevance of its own military structure and intrinsic capacity. In the case of Brazil, the multiple dimensions of wide-ranging changes already mentioned and the memories in society (affecting civilian-military relations) bring about a major difficulty: that of discerning and defining a new mission for the BAF, and the looming dangers of seeking – in the goal and mission void in which they find themselves – a new role for the military. A framework in which military police is here included, and, to a certain point, where question marks are posed about civilian, municipal and federal polices. It is clear that the current BAF reality shows a picture of wide inadequacies (between tasks and resources, needs and possibilities, organization and positioning), in addition to a marking fact: the inexistence of a self-evident and clear military component and variable, in the current situation or in the near future, among the problems and challenges that show, or insinuate, themselves to Brazil.

In the current context, of substantially different scenarios, Brazilian military witness (and live through) the bewilderment of the adjustment of the State to the action and demands of transnational power structures, although the country is seen as widely ‘unprepared’ for massive financial, productive and commercial openings, especially when the supposed similar movements of pivotal states are studied. The new challenges -- posed by selective gnoneconomic and tecnoneconomic synergy of strategic corporations throughout globalizing productive networks and worldlized-national consumption societies, coupled with governmental planetization of powerful key states in search of new forms, means and senses to begin to administer Earth -, demand and require, in turn, the functional overhaul of the BAF.<sup>121</sup> An overhaul - with all the concurrent problems of doctrine, strategy, budget

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120 Such is also the case of the BAF, who, in fact, have had a long and varied experience of mingling in political affairs (in and out of barracks), but very little to do with the hardware of military conflict, perhaps with the notable exceptions of their limited and focal participation in the campaign in Italy (IInd World War); arguably, during the intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965) and quite obviously out of place in the years of widespread repression of the very small number of civilians - mostly students, journalists, lecturers, party *quadres* -, hastily and naively turned would-be urban and rural guerrillas, during the early 70s.

121 All this in complex interrelationship with obvious or emergent oppositions and paradoxes in established nations, self-recognized cultures, and productive interest-groups.



and equipment - which exposes, in all its negativity, the current BAF inadequacies, in purely 'military-technical' terms, continuously counterpoised to their past readiness to assume political roles.<sup>122</sup> Thus, there is no way to discuss the current Brazilian defense issues without entering in the fine details of strategic (or non) formulation, of the political meanings (against whom, or what, is defense planned), and of the technological and budget supports (and lack of them). After all, to establish aims compatible with the budget possibilities might be a necessary answer for institutional continuity, not an adequacy to the new challenges that define mission

From another angle, political tradition in this country (and region) has made of the defense agenda a major instruction for internal security while, in turn, internal security has given the meaning for defense. Interesting to note that in the midst of a democratic regime, effectively installed in 1989, the Army is denounced as spying political parties, trade unions, social movements, student organizations and political-social manifestations in general. To accomplish this, agents infiltrate organizations, to obtain informations and documents, in silent missions and undisclosed military operations.<sup>123</sup> This was set up by then Army Minister Zenildo de Lucena, who created seven Intelligence Companies (*Companhias de Inteligência – Cia Intlg*) and 22 Highlight Groups (*Grupos Destacados*), subordinated to the seven regional Military Commands.<sup>124</sup> The Intelligence Companies replaced the Operational Subsections (*Subseções de Operações - SSOp*), who were the operational arms in the area of Intelligence, by almost repeating their structure.<sup>125</sup> The intelligence structure is directly linked to the commander of the Army, and the Center of Army Intelligence (*Centro de Inteligência do Exército - Ciex*) is part of the organogram of

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122 As recognized by Admiral Sergio Chagastelles, "the aggregating forces of economy and communications globalize the interdependence between the states, creating difficulties for the visualization of external concrete threats...in the midst of a circumstantial sensation of security". (*O Globo*, 12.06.2000)

123 In July of 2001, the Federal Public Ministry got hold of reports and leaflets of the Army that revealed an action by secret agents in the 23rd Infantry Brigade, a unit of intelligence operations in the small city of Marabá, in the state of Pará. Disguised as journalists, they monitored the region where, in the early 70s, the Araguaia guerrilla took place. Marabá was only one of the 29 sections destined for silent military operations in the country. (Raphael Gomide and João Pinheiro, *Jornal do Brasil*, 20.01.2002)

124 This was accomplished through Portaria No 081 – Res (reserved Act), of November 7, 1995, which defined that the 'general conception' of the Intelligence Companies is to 'create an operational military structure' that would serve 'as a guiding instrument of decision-making for the formulation of Strategic Planning in the Area Military Commands'. In addition, to provide intelligence support to the Area Military Commands. (Raphael Gomide and João Pinheiro, *Jornal do Brasil*, 20.01.2002)

the Army commander's cabinet. However, Ciex – which has its own team - coordinates national operations and centralizes information received from the diverse secret agents (*arapongas*).<sup>126</sup> The major units operate in the 2<sup>nd</sup> *Cia Intlg*, in Rio de Janeiro (Eastern Military Command), in the 3<sup>rd</sup> *Cia Intlg*, in São Paulo (Military Command of the Southeast) and in the 1<sup>st</sup> *Cia Intlg*, in Porto Alegre (Southern Military Command).

Thus, a major question for the military is: how to extricate themselves from the mental architecture established in organizational and institutional blue-prints and how to enter into the many-folded real-virtual training, computer-aided operation and computer-integrated weaponry use. Especially, since we are entering a phase in which an *ensemble* of international security and defense matters have no possible military solution, while others count only on such – highly sophisticated - means and ways. Amidst strategic uncertainties unfolding from a world in accelerated transformation, it is quite clear for the BAF that the multiple dimensions of change already mentioned, coupled with the new stages of hyper-tech costly weaponry which are being reached by important world actors -- with self-evident and objective military concerns --, confine the military of developing countries to a non-player condition in real terms, in spite of attempts to overhaul themselves. The most outstanding matter is the scientific gap in which Brazil finds itself, and the technological distance between the country and techno-productive motors, which not only affects the military capacity of placing itself – how, where, when and for what -, but the very potential for action. Clearly, in those impressive circumstances, there are not (and will not be) steady conditions for power projection – if that is (or will be) necessary. This means that one has to consider misadjustments, which on the other hand, draw away Brazilian potential, perpetuating a variety of societal forms: knowledgeable, misinformed, ignorant and uninterested.<sup>127</sup>

In the foreseeable future, because of its scientific commanding excellence, exuberant resources of all sorts (productive, financial, human) and extraordinary ability to develop

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125 Organogram inherited from the Destacamentos de Operações e Informações de Defesa Interna (Dói-Codi), information and repression organs of the military regime. (Raphael Gomide and João Pinheiro, Jornal do Brasil, 20.01.2002)

126 There were 541 mobilized agents in intelligence services. (Raphael Gomide and João Pinheiro, Jornal do Brasil, 20.01.2002)

127 Problems which are reproduced and visualized in the lack of resources and foul conditions of the universities – reduced spaces of knowledge - and in the alarming malfunctioning and impossibilities of their researchers, analysts, formulators and educators.

costly, sophisticated weaponry, no other country in the world comes close to the US in its capacity to fully engage in a strategy mounted on hyper-high tech and in the exercise of what could be dubbed as *techno-gaia power* – a complex and costly mix of coercive and persuasive resources – attempting to shape the new path of the planet.<sup>128</sup> Furthermore, within the worldwide military heterarchy, clenched together with a S&T hierarchy and a productive heterotopy – a wide and deep know why/know how/know when/know where/know what for set-up -, the United States continue to assert themselves as a systemic governing-strategic pivot, with unchallenged planetary reach and no effective counterbalance of power in the near future.<sup>129</sup> Defiant in its determination to preserve its own interests, this clearly involves the US taking unilateral action whenever deemed as necessary, considered as possible and esteemed as desirable.<sup>130</sup>

It is obvious where Brazil finds itself. Certainly, quite far from the highly differentiated second layer - Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, or India -, at a temporal and living distance, whether in technological development, financial resources, productive capacity and actual effective demand or weaponry state-of-the-art.<sup>131</sup> In the past decade - from the Kuwait restoration onwards, through the Bosnian conflict and into the Kosovo campaign – and, nowadays, through the conflict with the Afghan *taliban* regime, one became ‘media-accustomed’ with an impressive show of military strength based upon a varied display and large array of technological ‘wonders’. Hyper-high technology for military use is being translated from fiction into proposal and, in many cases, into projects that end up with a number of new effective instruments and resources coming into

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128 As highlighted by Admiral Mário Cesar Flores, “other countries can not ambition anything beyond a defensive strategy (of doubtful success if the opponent is the United States)...(or)...a geo-strategic proximate presence...(or the role of)...stabilizer of the regional order and, if as much, a contribution within the global order which, if subject to considerable reaction, will...(anyhow)...demand the presence of the United States... Brazil is inside the ‘bracket’ of the so-called ‘other countries’, with even greater restrictions than those suffered by England, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and China (*who are*)...better equipped...(in terms of)...technological development and financial resources».Admiral (res) Mário César Flores ‘Tendências do amanhã Estratégico’, in Jornal do Brasil, 04.02.98)

129 Chinese leadership see the country as consolidating itself in a megapower situation and condition by 2050.

130 On strategy of enlargement and unilateral, ‘sovereign’ action, see René Armand Dreifuss, “*Estados Unidos: esboço de uma nova perspectiva estratégica?*”, Premissas, NEE/Unicamp, Caderno N°7, pgs. 3-25, Campinas, August 1994

131 Admiral Flores acknowledges that there is no novelty in ‘order equated by power supported on technology’, although the fact is, nowadays, being dramatically highlighted. (Admiral (Res) Mário Cesar Flores, “Assimetria do poder e ordem futura”, in Jornal do Brasil, 13.05.99).

action.<sup>132</sup> And further up the pipe line, laser impelled space ships, robots with ‘elastic’ muscles instead of hydraulic systems, anti-matter motors etc. With such an emphasis on sophisticated, innovative capacities - aero-spatial and electronic power, instruments of sound and senses, laser beam bombers and cannons, anti-satellite artillery and sophisticated subs -, military reengineering is in the offing. And not only with infantry reduction, substituted by super-equipped new ground forces, and the hyper-specialization of certain areas (aviation, missiles, submarines), but with the creation of new, combined and integrated forces, which leave the traditional demarcation lines of air, sea and land services well behind. We begin to deal with scenarios where the combined landcopters, seaplanes and artilleries are to be integrated and jointly employed in training, concomitant in planning, resources, and synchronized action, requiring units composed of the various – once discrete - elements exchanging resources and habilities. In the expression of admiral Amorím Armando Ferreira Vidigal, military will be involved in airsealand operations, equipping and preparing the forces across their traditional functional perimeters. Very few countries will have a say in this new reality, which “divested of any whims and of any military corporate prejudices, points to the necessity of soberly defining our strategic preoccupations (there are no worrying threats) and to the convenience of being prudent with projects of a doubtful cost/efficiency ratio, or not clearly adequate to our limited and regional priorities. It points, finally, to the dependence on technological capacity and to the need to calculate defense in an integrated manner, within a context of organization and material modernity, in which dimension leaves its place to quality, and number to knowledge».<sup>133</sup> In the Brazilian perspective, new equipment is quite relative, considering real resources at the disposal of the military, their structural possibilities and technical feasibility. At the same time, for some strategic thinkers, such new, combined and integrated forces – functionally differentiated, in terms of continental airsealand scenarios, and still, nationally overseen – are a daring challenge and a possibility of substantial change for South American Armed Forces.

In such an age of uncertainties and perplexities, while it becomes adamant to reorganize the Armed Forces and establish strategic goals in order to meet new defense

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132 War by remote control, bombers from beyond reach, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) controlled by electronic operators, satellite reconnaissance, spy miniature robots etc.

133 Admiral (res.) Mário César Flores, ‘Tendências do amanhã estratégico’, in Jornal do Brasil, 04.02.98

requirements, it becomes - according to general Gleuber Vieira, current commander of the Army - 'difficult to estimate military sufficiency'.<sup>134</sup> This becomes especially hard when some actors in the international scene "try to preserve and manipulate power. Others struggle for a place under the sun. And there are those who merely try to survive".<sup>135</sup> Thus, the military are dealing with uncertainties, which allow for the perception and formulation of a very narrow conceptual margin, and they also face factual perplexities, which emphasize the convenience of having "adequate capacity to help dissuade, or quickly abort, the insane hypothesis" of conflict. This all indicates the need for a useful capacity "without boastful illusions", being able to indicate that pressures upon Brazil (in the context of the motives of the new order, such as environment, etc) will "have a cost above zero".<sup>136</sup>

It is interesting to note, however, some criticisms leveled by members of the military community against the current government, seen as having reached two goals which adapt themselves to the US strategy for Latin America. One of them is the implementation of a civilian-led MD. Another, the signing of Protocol 505 which is seen as the rebirth, both of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and of the 'Lend and Lease' (now called 'No Cost Leasing') program.<sup>137</sup> Under Protocol 505, negotiated for two years by Itamaraty, the US would provide their defense material in very special leasing conditions, including the handing over of certain equipment, which had been rented until then.<sup>138</sup> Without such donation, 4 counter-torpedo ships with the Navy and 93 M60 combat cars, used by the Army, would have had to be returned by the end of 2000.<sup>139</sup> However, what really emphasizes the feeling that something is to be considered in a more detailed form is the fact that, with the agreement in relation to Protocol 505, Brazil takes upon itself "to open its barracks, air force bases and naval units" to regular US inspections.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore,

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134 General Gleuber Vieira was, at the time he started with his observations, Chief of Staff. His remarks were made as Minister of the Army, in his Conference, at the 4th National Encounter of Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98

135 General (Division) Gleuber Vieira, "Perspectivas de um futuro sistema de segurança hemisférica", A Defesa Nacional, No 765, Jul/Set 1994, pgs 4-13, Rio de Janeiro

136 Admiral (res) Mário César Flores, 'Que Forças Armadas?', Jornal do Brasil, 26.06.2000

137 Major Brigadier (res) Lauro Ney Menezes, "As Forças Armadas e o Memo 505", O Globo, 01.09.2000

138 The negotiation of the agreement took two years (Anamaria Rossi, Gazeta Mercantil, 15.10.2000)

139 Anamaria Rossi, Gazeta Mercantil, 15.10.2000

140 The memory of the Agreement, signed by Getúlio Vargas in 1952 (and refused by General Ernesto Geisel, 25 years later, in 1977), held the flash back of the US inspectors installing themselves in a floor of the Esplanada dos Ministérios, in Brasília

material will only be put at disposal for employment in what the US government “considers appropriate”, which would explain the reason for periodical inspections.<sup>141</sup>

### **VII - New Planetary Realities and Sensitive World Issues**

Changing worldwide security environment highlights the inefficacy of international institutions, rendered incapable of dealing with conventional conflicts of a multiple and superposed composition. Ethnical, religious, groupal, political, ideological and social motives and justifications are blended into intractable situations with transnational and transfrontier new issues and emergent non-governmental nor national actors. Such situations of conflict -where decisions were, are and will be taken by few national actors with a worldwide or macro-regional projection - demand military intervention of powerful neighbours, regional military organizations, or planetary powers. A new, extremely fluid, state-of-affairs also underpinning political limitations and organizational narrowness of so many nation-states, whose institutional frameworks are incapable of representing the multiplicity of internal collective identities that proclaim their urge for full recognition of their singularity. All this cushioned by the existence of new weaponry suited for high and hyper-high-tech warfare, with new training requirements and suitable socio-cultural (intellectual, scientific, educational) capabilities to enhance such potential.

However, though the international scene shows a clear US national hegemony – nothing relevant seems to be done against their grand design, nor accomplished without their participation -, not only emphasizing their military capability, but their gnoseonomic, technonomic, economic and societal might the ‘political life’ of the planet is determined by an all encompassing trend towards metanational, transnational and supranational practices and references.

These new realities, structured and centered around the actions of strategic corporations, backed by nations performing as socio-cultural gravitational poles of the process, entail the recognition of diverse phenomena. Among them, the formation of transfrontier macro-markets coupled with the emergence or resurgence of nationally based macro-societies, but constituted across frontiers, without relinquishing their formal state

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141 Major Brigadier (res) Lauro Ney Menezes, “As Forças Armadas e o Memo 505”, O Globo, 01.09.2000

limits. Such processes imply, demand or allow the search for 'political' continentalization of contiguous national spaces and the assertion of emergent planetary and supra-continental 'political' and strategic pivots. Varied forms of creation, induction and management within an incipient planetary power-system that determines the course - with a pivotal function for the United States, interacting with complementary partners, alignments, and regional compositions -, while dealing with national and sub-regional recipients. For Condoleezza Rice, the US, as the most powerful nation in the planet ("and certainly throughout History"), has a special responsibility to help the world to become a safer place.<sup>142</sup> For Rice, one of the rediscovered truths over the current planet situation is the fact that a robust military power is important in international politics and for security.<sup>143</sup> For such endeavour, the US will show itself to be more assertive in many respects, including from a military point of view, to guarantee their supremacy, effectively assuming the mission and role to sheriff the world.<sup>144</sup>

We are living through processes built on immediate changes, concurring with incipient civilizational ruptures and realignments, comprising a whole range of new institutional, and societal challenges. Changes and challenges underlined by an astounding sequence of breakthroughs in science and constantly unfolding growth in technology, posing identity paradoxes and the loss, blurring or search of ethical references. Changes and challenges conditioned by (and determining the course of) belief antagonisms and the clash of aspiring minorities who are coming into assertive existence; expressing themselves amidst attempts to establish effective worldwide horizons for the preservation of (redefined) human rights and benefits, faced by varied ideological, legal, and material constraints. After all, and allowing for some looseness: what nationality is to be a human clone? Is it one clone, one vote?<sup>145</sup> And further down the science-fiction wide avenue, how

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142 Lecture, John Hopkins University, Washington (José Meirelles Passos, O Globo, 30.04.2002)

143 From now onwards, 'primordial energy of the US Armed Forces shall be devoted to more than administering civil conflicts and humane assistance', once it has been discovered by the United States that 'the best defense is a good attack', while 'inaction is not an option'. (Lecture, John Hopkins University, Washington, in José Meirelles Passos, O Globo, 30.04.2002)

144 Sheriff, the chief-law enforcement officer in a county, is a word coming out of the old English *scirgerefa*, from *scir* (Shire) and *gerefa* (Reeve). Ironically in these troubled times, Sheriff is close to Sherif, a descendant from Mohammed through his daughter Fatima and also the title of the governor of Mecca, coming from *sharif*, Arabic noble title accorded to any Muslim ruler.

145 How does it/his existence affect the intersection of kinship and norms, of emotions and politics, of basic beliefs and references, and its translation into legal rules, beyond anthropological considerations?

do we cope with the meaning of attempting the downloading of human memory? After all, we are in an Epoch when the History of Humanity beyond the limits of the Earth is beginning.

### **VIII - New Regional Realities and Sensitive Issues in Brazil**

In such an exciting worldwide context, Brazil is conditioned by challenge-imposing changes, deriving from varied processes: migration outbursts, caused by natural disasters and man-made conflicts; environmental aggression, by so many day-to-day desperate toils for survival and personal alienation, coupled with corporate action and governmental policy or aloofness; major dramatic ethical and political question marks and attempts to establish effective worldwide horizons for the assertion and preservation of human rights; clash of aspiring minorities against ideological, legal, and material constraints. And more: from commercial protectionism to rising structural unemployment; from disputes over water and energy resources to large scale traffic of armaments and organized crime; from growing ethnic affirmation to religious differences etc. But the country also deals with change-imposing challenges, confirming the need to recognize new supranational actors, as the emergent internet generation of NGOs and non-institutional actors (NIAs) seem to be.<sup>146</sup> Challenges that impose the need to overhaul existing national and international organizations and agencies, in order to identify new forms of cooperation and convergence and regulate new or different sources of conflict, which, in many cases, are not only a far cry from hyper and high tech strategic worries, but are no military issues at all. Challenges requiring clear understanding that, in spite of so many crucial changes, the super power and the great powers do not relinquish their national security interests, while politics continues to be – in its different forms and contents – a common procedure to all existing national states. Such interests define threats, while capacities - sought and accomplished by the acknowledgment of wants, possibilities, and preparation – define interests. After all, “great powers will never worry to take care of their own business only within their frontiers”.<sup>147</sup>

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146 Such as might have been the *Ejército Zapatista de Libertación Nacional (EZLN)* in Mexico

147 Condoleezza Rice, Lecture, John Hopkins University, Washington, in José Meirelles Passos, *O Globo*, 30.04.2002



Moreover, in such an astounding epoch of novelties and surprises, the need to rethink strategic goals amidst blatant military insufficiency is marked by *perceptive realism*. While facing the impossibilities of establishing realistic new defense requirements, one could add that for countries in the region it becomes difficult to formulate a viable, credible, sustainable strategic conception or doctrine, to define a precise function and envisage a clear ‘mission’, especially one which does not require, concomitantly or even instead, the imposition of the awesome task of finding a ‘suitable’ role for the Armed Forces. After all, the varieties of challenges and problems that affect most of the Latin American region and, in particular, Mercosul, and within it, Brazil, have no self-evident military component. They are strongly determined by social, economic, technological and cultural shortcomings and vulnerabilities and by the action of productive and financial actors from within and from abroad. Moreover, though Brazilian military view the international scene as marked by “instability and unpredictability”, Latin America is perceived as a region without strategic tensions nor effective conflicts, constituting, de facto, the most demilitarized region in the planet, with some of the most inadequate and unprepared professionals for effective operation.<sup>148</sup> These various considerations help to understand the wanted, but still shady, parameters of a National Defense Policy (NDP).

Three different state perceptions - diplomatic, military, and political-strategic – converged into the current NDP and can be discerned, in analytical terms, when discussing frontier policies in Brazil.<sup>149</sup> In spite of hardly being a conceptual innovation in military terms, NDP shows a distinct novelty: while stressing that it is geared towards external threats, it does not mention (not even in subsidiary form) the notion of ‘internal enemy’ nor

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148 Focusing on the American continent, general Gleuber observed that, as a consequence of the ‘power asymmetry’ favoring the United States, Latin America receives “quite a low priority in what relates to geo-strategic preoccupations”, because US interests are “directed, primarily, to their most important partners in the game of power as well as to extra continental threats”. As expressed by general Gleuber Vieira, in his conference at the 4th National Encounter on Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98

149 An effort to be accomplished in a unique way, insofar as the work-group that prepared the NDP document not only made good use of a ‘diplomatic and military patrimony’ of sorts, by way of orientations, practices and references deeply rooted and embedded within the Brazilian state and ‘projected’ by two institutional power centers - Foreign ministry and the Armed Forces, particularly, the Army -, but also added a ‘political-strategic view’, formalized within the realm of then-existing Strategic Affairs Agency. I have adopted (and adapted) the viewpoint of Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira (of a diplomatic and military ‘patrimony’ informing strategic conceptions), as developed in his paper “Política de Defesa Nacional e Relações Civil-Militares no Governo do Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso” (delivered at the seminar on “Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for the 21st Century”, Latin American Institute, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 03-05.11.1997.

does it dwell, as had been customary over the past fifty years, into matters of ‘internal defense’.<sup>150</sup> Once there is no enemy (or a clearly defined one), the Armed Forces target the development of potentialities and capabilities to obtain malleability and skills for effective deterrence, as required by technological innovation; a necessary minimum demanded by budget constraints and by the adequate geostrategic stature of Brazil to ensure its military defense, as well as the preservation of national interests and the chances for international projection.<sup>151</sup> Areas of interest (and therefore, priority areas) are South America and the South Atlantic, where the aim is to keep peace, and, if necessary, to act in search of re-establishing it, in alliance with other countries or under the aegis of suitable international bodies. In the specific case of sensitive and complex Amazonia, the military favor a *strategy of presence*, and a capacity for *strategic mobility*, covering the frontier zone, which lacks population density. Unfolding from such guiding principles (involving *strategies of deterrence* and *offensive action*), is a general conception of organization and articulation of ground forces in times of peace, aimed at keeping enough forces in the so-called strategic areas, to ensure the necessary strategic equilibrium in likely theaters of ground operations and the capacity for immediate defense of the territory.<sup>152</sup> Parallel to this view, is a changing role of the Navy – with a continuous presence (from transparent to deep blue waters and from coast to rivers across the continent) and of the Air Force, finally equipped to deal with the whole of the country. This all is taking place in:

- a) Amazon/Guyana and Amazon/Peru protruding arches, with an internal military and economic line sustaining the opening span of both curved structures;

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150 Though NDP is a far cry from actual policy planning, it certainly is an “umbrella under which military thought is to be developed”, thus turning external defense into a priority and major reference (general Gleuber Vieira, 4th National Encounter on Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98)

151 CA Luiz Sergio Oneto Araujo, Navy Sub-chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA) put it this way: «considering fluid, unforeseeable and diffuse threats, the guiding principles for defense have to be based upon capabilities, such as readiness, efficacy, efficiency, flexibility, versatility and mobility. And translated accordingly into a structure with military credibility, able to produce pre-emptive or deterrent effects». (Conference, 4th National Encounter of Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, Brazil 10/15.05.98

152 Two important conceptual bases for the employment of Army forces were *Doctrine Gama* (employment of ground forces in the Amazonian region), subdivided into *Conventional Gama* and *Resistance Gama*; and *Doctrine Delta*, which considers the possibility of conventional combat, in the context of a limited external conflict, in an Operational Area of the Continent, excluded the Amazonian strategic area. (Ministério do Exército. Estado-Maior do Exército. “Concepção Estratégica do Exército - Sipler-4, Extrato”). Brasília, s/d, pg. 11-12). Internal defense, guided by *Doctrine Alfa*, takes into account the «existence of multiple and varied threats, some of them with the possibility of occurring in a short lapse of time”. (“Missão do Exército, Sipler-1, Estado-Maior do Exército, Ministério do Exército. Brasília, n/d, pg. 3”).

- b) Center West inverted arch, with the frontier line going from one extreme to the other of the inside-looking curved structure, where the economic, cultural and military sustain is located;
- c) Plate-Uruguay-Paraná river basins, upon which three continuous, intertwined, projecting arches are to be considered in a region where three-folded frontiers, one between Brazil, Argentina and Paragua (*Tríplice fronteira*) and the other between Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, are defining references.

### **VIII.i - Amazonia: a Compilation of Sensitive Issues**

In times of hastened, widely ranging, political and technological changes, traditional geopolitical conceptions seem to fade away, although such concerns still inform the Brazilian military mind. Nowhere is this more emphatic than in relation to the Amazonian region, portrayed as a central security concern. A complex and diversified region – half the country in size -, where even the necessary introduction of different forms of aero-spatial power to cope with new problems deriving from so many forms of legal (but harmful) and illegal actions by private and non-governmental actors were not sufficient to implode conventional held views about the region.<sup>153</sup> Quite obviously, and in spite of major technological advances, Amazonian physical frontiers are still a basic reference in military terms.<sup>154</sup> Interestingly, at the *Conferência dos Exércitos Americanos*, which took place in Chile, a reserved document considered the MST and the student organization in Brazil as subversive movements inclined to terrorism, comparable to the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias da Colombia - Farc*.<sup>155</sup> Some time before, Indians of the *Macús* tribe, living in the frontier region with Colombia, in Cabeça do Cachorro, Alto Rio Negro, abandoned their malocas and asked for military protection (at the Army unit in Vila

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153 Anthony Hall (ed), Amazonia at the Crossroads – the challenge of sustainable development, ILAS/University of London, London, 2000

154 Having in mind geopolitical premises - open and empty spaces and sparsely populated areas in the frontier region, ill served by transportation and communication, as well as areas considered to be ‘sensitive’, because of important natural resources - it is clear to the BAF that they «should continue to act as an instrument of presence in the national territory, ensuring territorial integrity of the nation». (general Gleuber Vieira, Conference, 4th National Encounter on Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98)

155 Report by the Chilean newspaper La Nación, cited by Ricardo Boechat, Jornal do Brasil, 14.05.2002

Bitencourt) against alleged threats by Farc guerrillas who, according to Funai, had entered the Brazilian territory.<sup>156</sup>

Clearly, Brazilian traditional geopolitical thought and strategic perceptions have largely considered the extense perimeters of the country, its infrastructural deficiencies and the vulnerability thereafter.<sup>157</sup> National defense objectives mark military perception of the Amazonian region.<sup>158</sup> Among them, guaranteeing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the projection of Brazil in the international decision-making process, contributing to the preservation of peace and security. Such constant reassertion, in military discourse, of Brazilian territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty, in particular over the Amazonian region, has its historical reasons. Over the past 180 years, governments of many countries, international agencies, and diverse individuals have somehow felt (or it was alleged they did) that they were in their rightful state of mind when declaring their intentions on ‘what to do with Amazonia’, despite the continuous existence of a Brazilian government holding legal control of the region.

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156 Orlando Farias, *Jornal do Brasil*, 06.03.2002

157 From Oiapoque, in the north of the country, to Chui, in the south, the land frontiers stretch along close to 16.000 kilometers, touching upon 11 Brazilian states and 570 municipalities which make up 27% of the national territory. An idea of the dimensions of the region, is given by the distances between Manaus - major city in the heart of the Amazonian region – and other urban centers: Cruzeiro do Sul (1600 km by air and 4.333 by river), Tabatinga (1.115 km and 1.756); Ipiranga (1.050 and 1.698) ; Japurá (1.050 and 1.430) ; São Gabriel da Cachoeira (861 and 1.037), Cucuí (990 and 1.253). A line of international frontiers of 10.948 km contours Amazonia itself, four times the distance from Madrid to St. Petersburg.

158 The northern frontier is 6.068 km long, bordering French Guyana, 730 kilometers; Surinam, 593 km; Guyana, 1.606 km; Venezuela, 1.495 km; and Colombia, 1.644 km. This frontier region, with immense ‘empty’ spaces, particularly in the state of Amazonas, facing Venezuela and Colombia, and in the state of Pará, along the Guyana and Surinam borders, is very much isolated from the main cities of the countries involved. The main cities along the frontier with Guyana and Venezuela are Santa Helena de Guaiarem and Boa Vista, linked to Caracas and Manaus, by land, through the BR 174 highway. Along the frontier with Colombia, Tabatinga is the most important Brazilian district, with 28.000 inhabitants, followed by Santo Antônio do Itá, with 17.4 thousand inhabitants. A similar situation is to be found along the 2.995 km frontier with Peru, although two Brazilian highways, BR 364 (running from Brasilia into Rio Branco and Cruzeiro do Sul) and BR 317 (Rio Branco-Assis Brasil) offer possibilities for a dual projection into the Pacific, by means of the sub-regional integration with Peru and the southwestern portion of the Amazonian region. This is being consolidated through the pavement of the road between Fazenda Vaca Branca and Assis (Acre) and the recuperation of BR 317, between Rio Branco and Fazenda Vaca Branca. Finally, the Bolivian border, which shows a different reality, for steady colonization goes back to the beginning of the XXth century, when the Madeira-Mamoré Railway was constructed, with links reinforced by constant migration, due to the economic cycles of rubber exploitation and processing of the so-important – for nurture pleasure and for serious medical reasons - Brazil nuts.

### VIII.ii - A Compilation of Versions

Within the military milieu it is customary to run through a number of purported incidents and situations – under the common heading of ‘foreign greed and covetous design’, in which sovereignty over the Amazonian region has been seen as threatened. In this context, such perceptions and sensations have a starting reference in the legend of Eldorado, in the second half of the XVI century, and the concomitant incursion by Sir Walter Raleigh. From thereafter, military observers consider a string of interventions and attempts to mark foreign presence in the region. A colorful episode is reported to have occurred in 1817, when Navy captain Matthew Fontaine Maury proposed the ‘destabilization of the colony of Brazil’, in his ‘Most-Secret Operation Memorandum 157/1816’.<sup>159</sup> Such proposal amounted to a clear carving up of Brazil, separating the Amazonian region from the rest of the country, creating the Republic of Equator, on the Atlantic coast (which would have comprised the northeastern states of Brazil, exception made for Bahia, which was intended to become an autonomous province), and the sovereign state of Amazon, located between Great Colombia in the north (current Colombia and Venezuela), and delimited in the south by a straight line starting in São Luis – nowadays the capital of the state of Maranhão - and ending where Rondonia limits with

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159 Political scientist Don Gaylord has been studying this material, pointing out that “1. Although the document is from 1816 and the US military might have used different markings back then, in general, English-speaking military and civilians would classify a document as “Top Secret,” not “Most-Secret,” which sounds kind of odd; we don’t separate the words with a dash, either. 2. The subject line at the top of the map reads: “desestabilization of the cololony of Brazil.” There are three amusing typographic errors here: first, it should read “destabilization,” and the typo suggests that whoever wrote the word might have been Spanish or Portuguese-speaking, since destabilization in either language would begin with “des” rather than simply “de,” thus, *desestabilización* or *desestabilização*; moreover, the second misspelled word should be colony, not “cololony” 3. At the top right, it reads “Mape one: general view.” The word should be map, without an e at the end. 4. The middle of the map reads, “Soveiragny State of Amazon.” This is another typographical error, and should read “Sovereign State...” “... 6. The region of Peru would likely have been referred to by Americans of the time as “Upper Peru,” not “Higher Peru” . Fawry is considered to refer “in the memorandum that accompanied this map to “Desmobilization of the Colony of Brazil.” Again, in English the word would have been “Demobilization.” Thus, Gaylord concludes that “given the number of typographic errors in this map and memorandum... I would submit that we are dealing here with a forgery, and a fairly primitive one at that. ” This could well be the case, and I thank him for his observations, although one could also think about ill-written documents as a consequence of their typing into articles. Nevertheless, what remains important here is the fact that this kind of ‘information’ is transmitted within the military *milieu*, building opinion. (Email “Gaylord, Donald MR” <gaylordd@soc.mil> 07.03.2000)

Mato Grosso.<sup>160</sup> In 1823, the year young emperor Pedro I declared the independence of Brazil, international pressure is reported to have sought to turn the Amazonian territory into a Transatlantic Province of Portugal. In 1835, at the beginning of the *Guerra dos Cabanos*, French troops occupied Amapá and, immediately thereafter, a French fleet reached the port of Belém, proposing to incumbent governor Nogueira Angelim that, under the protection of France, he should separate Pará from the rest of Brazil. A year later, after English ship *Clio* had been sacked by local *caboclos*, John Hesbeth, the English consul, called for a fleet, kept in the Caribbean, to occupy Belém, “in the name of English traders of Pará”, while governor Angelim received the proposal to proclaim the independence of Amazonia. Still in the same year, German adventurer Robert Schomburck was ready to explore Brazilian Guyana, delimiting the frontier and expanding English dominion in the area. Matthew Maury, by then head of the Naval Observatory in Washington and member of the American Geographical Society, published in December 1849, again an article in the *De Bow’s Review*, in which he argued that the Amazonian region and the Gulf of Mexico were part of the same geographical complex. Following this perception, the idea that American hegemony should be exerted and extended towards the left margin of the Amazonas became a nodal point. Four years later, William Graham, secretary of the Navy, authorized a secret expedition to the Amazonian region, commanded by lieutenant William Lewis Hemdon, brother-in-law of Maury, who saw his trip as “the first link of a great chain that will end in the formation of the Amazonian Republic”.<sup>161</sup> In 1862, general James Watson Weber, in the name of the US government, as plenipotentiary minister of Washington to the imperial court of Dom Pedro II, emperor of Brazil, is said to have presented a proposal, suggesting the creation of a Free State for Black Americans, by organizing a company that would introduce emancipated slaves in the Amazonian region.

Towards the beginning of the 20th century, at a time when Bolivia and Brazil were in conflict over the territory of Acre, a ‘Bolivian Syndicate’ was created in the US, which considered the possibilities of establishing itself in the area, an intention which was foiled

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160 Later on, a rebellion attempted to establish the *Confederação do Equador*, on the northeastern coast.

161 These and other ‘events’ are listed by Army Colonel (reserve) Altino Berthier Brasil, in ‘A saga de uma cobiça’ (a résumé of an article published in the *Revista do Clube Militar*, January 1998), in *Poder – Revista Brasileira de Questões Estratégicas*, Ano 1, No 1, Brasília, January-February 1999.

by the action of Plácido de Castro and his rubber-plantation coalition.<sup>162</sup> Obviously, in this account, the grand design (and peaceful success) of Barão de Rio Branco is here belittled. In 1904, Victor Emmanuel III, king of Italy, in functional mediation, adopted a partition sentence which intended to divide a contested area, known as Pirara, with the western side (13.570 km<sup>2</sup>) to be retained by Brazil, and the eastern side, (19.630 km<sup>2</sup>) to be handed over to England. In 1937, Standard Oil executive Nelson Rockefeller made a three-month trip to the Amazonian region, defending the idea that the US, facing the rise of Nazism, should assure itself of having access to the immense regional richness. Three years later, the American International Association for Economic and Social Development was created, which began its activities in the Amazonian region.<sup>163</sup>

Towards the end of the 80s, Brazil came under strong attack from various sources in relation to its alleged role - through uncontrolled burning in the Amazonian region -, in dangerous global heating. In 1989, Al Gore was quoted as saying: 'Contrary to what Brazilians think, Amazonia is not theirs, but of all of us'. In the same year, Francois Mitterrand was said to state that 'Brazil needs to accept a relative sovereignty over Amazonia', reasoning with a *droit de ingèrence*. Three years later, it was the turn of Mikhail Gorbachov being cited: 'Brazil should delegate part of its rights over Amazonia to competent international organisms'.<sup>164</sup> Recently, general Patrick Hughes, head of the Intelligence department of the US Army (DIA) was reported as stating that: "in case Brazil decides to make use of the Amazonian region in a way that puts at risk the environment in the United States, we have to be ready to interrupt this process immediately".<sup>165</sup>

Needless to say that the letter, spirit or version of remembered and condemned events, invented actions, assumed statements, purported facts or disturbing fiction – coupled with

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162 Another important reference took place in 1876, when Henry Wickman took with him an enormous load of rubber-tree seeds, declared to be orchids, shipped to England from the port of Tapajós. Saplings obtained in London were then taken to Ceylon and Malaysia, thus beginning the giant Asian rubber plantations.

163 Almost thirty years later, the Hudson Institute came up with the shocking idea of transforming vast areas of the Amazonia into a giant lake, at a time when - under the military regime - the region was opened to investments and sale of lands

164 British Prime-Minister John Major was reported as saying that developed nations should extend the dominium of law to what was considered to be 'world commons'. Such quotations are to be found in Carlos Chagas, "Querem Internacionalizar a nossa Amazonia", *Manchete*, 05.07.97, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

165 His paper, "Possible threats to the United States until the year 2018", delivered at the MIT, in April 1998, was, reportedly, dealing with four major threats: nuclear terrorism, narcotraffic, scarcity of raw materials and aggressions to the environment with consequences for the US (Miguel Cançado, *Tiempos del Mundo*, Montevideo, Uruguay 23.04.98)

the recurrent ideas of joint military manoeuvres of diverse nations in the Amazonian region, the notion of 'national parks' under international supervision, the proposal for an inter-American military school to be based in the region etc - sparked for some and kept afire, for others, the fears of a possible foreign intervention in Amazonia. Fears that were certainly not cast aside after Lieutenant Jane Campbell, spokesperson for the once Panama-based US Southern Command (in the midst of its move to Miami) was said to have asserted in June 1999 that her government had set up a 'Green Group', in an already existing four-year long project to prepare its own task force aimed at guarding the Amazonian forest.<sup>166</sup> No wonder then, that in military perspective, foreign presence in the Amazonian region is a delicate issue. Thus, the preservation of Brazilian territorial integrity and unity is constantly reasserted as crucial.<sup>167</sup>

### **VIII.iii - Calha Norte: Military Policy-Action in the Amazonian Region**

Geopolitical perceptions, old and new, pushed the military's enthusiastic support for the creation of *Projeto Calha Norte*, drawn initially in 1985 - year of the transition from military to civilian government -, during president José Sarney's term of office. Actually a joint effort with civilian agencies of the federal government, *Calha Norte* was one of the ways and means by which BAF marked their conceptual overhaul, attempting to build renewed defense views, facing the considerable challenge of the Amazonian region, as well as seeking a suitable testing ground for their modernization doctrines.<sup>168</sup>

Corresponding to 14% of the national territory, this 150 kilometers wide and over 6.500 kilometers long land-strip (north of the Solimões and Amazonas rivers, from

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166 This prompted immediate reaction from Brig. Sergio Xavier Ferolla, (Minister of the Superior Military Tribunal and former head of the Superior War College), one of the most respected minds in the nationalistic camp of the Armed Forces, while Ambassador Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, in Washington, found himself having to assert that Brazil did not require "tutelage to preserve its territory".

167 For the Brazilian Armed Forces, sovereignty is preserved as long as possession and jurisdiction over the territory is guaranteed, along with its indivisibility and the possibility of «sustaining political actions that aim to preserve all national vital interests. Adamantly, for the military, «the "flexibilization" of the concept of sovereignty can not go beyond this limit...". "O Brasil e suas Forças Armadas", EMFA, Presidência da República, Brasília, 1996, pg. 19.

168 This 'North Furrow Project' was conceived as a governmental plan of action by the Interministerial Work Group, created for that purpose, and coordinated by the Ministry of Planning. It had the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the extinct General Secretariat of the National Security Council, of military ministries, Ministry of the Exchequer, Ministry of the Interior and Funai (Indian National Foundation).



Tabatinga to the mouth of the Oiapoque), encompasses 4 federal states and 74 *municípios* of the states of Amazonas, Pará, Amapá and Roraima, 39 of which are part of the frontier zone. Thus, *Calha Norte* was seen, by its military formulators from three different angles:

- a) as an indispensable set of resources to boost security and development in a region with enormous empty spaces (2.300.000 inhabitants within 1.219.098 square kilometers, many of them close to the frontiers with Venezuela, French Guyana, Suriname, Guyana and Peru), while
- b) aiming at enhancing the presence of the Brazilian state along the frontiers of neighboring countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Surinam, Guyana and French Guyana) and
- c) as an important tool in the intensification of bilateral relations, specially when considering.<sup>169</sup>

In addition to the worries about the internal instability of the neighboring regions, especially in the different cases of Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, the BAF considered that abundant - rare and common - mineral resources were an uncontrollable source of conflict, subject to unlawful action of national and international groups. Furthermore, the region showed growing degradation of its ecosystem (while biodiversity was subjected to constant transnational piracy and land conflicts became noticeable), worsened by environmentally aggressive *garimpo* action (individual and petty wild mining, or in enormous groups), which added to the consequences of erroneous governmental policies of colonization.<sup>170</sup> It was also felt that the area was wide open to growing illegal transit of foreigners, which gained a special meaning against the drug issue background.

Finally, internal and external pressures for the creation of Indian reserves in mineral-rich areas, and mostly located along the vulnerable frontier strips became quite intense. A

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169 Such presence included a number of interconnected goals: increasing local capacity for energy production, communication and road transportation; stimulating colonization and bringing poles of development into the interior. In military perception, this was to be accomplished by drawing on the pioneering action of the BAF, better suited both to lend protection to the indigenous populations (threatened by big ranchers and *garimpeiros*) and to intensify the rhythm of much needed frontier delimitation.

170 The *Research Company of Mineral Resources*, of the ministry of Mines and Energy, identified 336 landing strips (mostly clandestine) and two thousand wild mining sites searching for gold, in just 90.000 square kilometers, amidst River Tupelos and its affluents (Tropas, Crepori, Jamaxim, Rato on the right margin and Quatá and Batalha on the left margin). An area which has Cantagalo, Samaúma and Nova Brasília in the north; Matraca to the east; Porto Rico and Amada Mantel to the west and Centrinho to the south. (Carlos Franco, *Jornal do Brasil*, 14.06.98)

recent example involved the *Tucano*, in the Rio Tiquié Indian reservation, close to the Colombian frontier, where amethyst stones and tantalite (strategic mineral with high conductivity, used in the production of components for cellular telephones) were illegally being taken out.<sup>171</sup> Furthermore, within the Roosevelt reserve of the *Cinta-larga* Indians, in Rondônia, functions an illegal *garimpo* and within it, the largest diamond site.<sup>172</sup> This made 'diamond barons' out of 11 of the most influential *caciques* of the tribe – each one responsible for an area close to a particular tribal village - , with powers over more than 3,000 *garimpeiros* and a fortune in stones, which might be superior to US\$ 2 billion.<sup>173</sup>

In military terms, the existence of 170.000 Indians, belonging to 210 different ethnical groups, occupying reserves which amount to one million square kilometers (25% of the Amazonia Legal, or the size of France, England and Germany), exacerbated geopolitical preoccupations.<sup>174</sup> Many Indian reserves are located on the national frontier strips, including the *Ianomami* Park.<sup>175</sup> Fears that the '*Ianomâmi* card' could be manipulated in order to dismember the region and proclaim a binational Indian 'park' - according to certain perceptions inside the Armed Forces it could evolve into an independent indigenous State or some sort of international protectorate - seems to have been the most important factor to influence military determination not only to implement *Project Calha Norte*, but, thereafter,

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171 Jornal do Brasil, 10.04.2001

172 The *caciques* charge 20,000 reais for each extraction machine and a production percentage that varies from 20% to 50%. The control of each machine, which can extract up to 30 *quilates* per day is done with an Indian designated as *fiscal* (overseer), although there are various possibilities of getting away with all kinds of uncontrolled advantages, in a game of hide and seek.

173 Enriched by this diamond spree, the Indian chiefs roam through the streets of Cacoal and Pimenta Bueno in a fleet of imported vehicles, the majority of which are driven by non-Indian drivers, hired for the whole day. When going around with their women, they do it with security agents, fearing assaults and kidnappings. Many of the bank accounts are with *testas-de-ferro*. Comfortable houses with electronic security systems, TV internal circuit, the use of mobile (via satellites) phones etc are quite distant from the traditional pictures. (Jailton de Carvalho, O Globo, 05.05.2002)

174 According to sources (who do not take into consideration the large amount of individuals with Indian ancestry, whether close or remote) there are only 300.000 in the country. At least 50 tribes were never contacted by the Brazilian state or society. The scant presence of indigenous population, concentrated in the Alto Rio Negro (non delimited area, with 7.9 million hectares and no estimated population) and in Alto Solimões or Vale do Javari (non delimited area, reaching the Peruvian frontier, with 8.3 million hectares for a population of estimated 3.000 Indian people) only highlights the feeling of frontier vulnerability.

175 Considered to be the oldest ethnical group in South America, the *Ianomamis* also occupy more than 10% of Venezuela (96.000 square kilometers) and a large portion of the Brazilian side, comprising areas of Pará, Amazonas and Roraima, where an estimated 20.000 *Ianomamis* live in a 95.000 square kilometers reserve. IBGE estimates put this figure at 9.910 *Ianomamis*, in its Statistical Yearbook of Brazil. The Tumucumaque reserve (non-marked area in the state of Pará, is close to 27.000 square kilometers, for an estimated population of 344 Indians.

to keep the issue afresh in political analysis.<sup>176</sup> The issue reappeared in full strength in 2001, when the Army pronounced itself against the demarcation of large indigenous reserves in the frontier regions of Amazonia, fearing that the UN would recognize these areas as indigenous nations, giving a start to the unwanted internationalization of the Amazonian region.<sup>177</sup> This feeling supported the creation of the Uiramutá military unit, in an Indian village in the center of the indigenous reserve of Raposa-Serra do Sol (1.6 million hectares, with 12.000 *Macuxis*, *Uixanas*, *Trepangues* and *Igaricós* Indians), in Roraima, close to the Guyana frontier.<sup>178</sup> The maintenance of eight platoons in indigenous reserves, along the northern frontier, some of them in areas close to the *malocas*, was seen as a move forward.<sup>179</sup>

In its first decade, *Calha Norte* did not live up to expectations, whether in the wider role of regional supervisor, or in the narrower function of military defense, surviving for a number of years in a lukewarm mood. Along fifteen years, Calha Norte received a total of US\$ 168 million. Since the creation of the program, 1999 was the worst year in investments, with the equivalent to US\$ 676 thousand, against US\$ 47 million in 1989. When Minister Quintão assumed his post, the budget was close to zero.<sup>180</sup> On the political front, the first fifteen years of *Calha Norte* were tainted both by distrust and ill-feelings towards its proclaimed aims (seen by some as the main thrust to transform the region into

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176 Former ambassador Manoel Pio Correa, an important figure in the 1964-1974 period of the military regime, affirms that there is "a Ianomâmi government 'in exile, functioning in the territory of a European country, with an American president of the Ianomâmi Socialist Republic, a German vice-president and a 18-member Parliament, of which only one is Indian". According to him, the 35 biggest reserves total 410 thousand square kilometers, inhabited by close to 20.000 Indians. ('A república ianomâmi', in Jornal do Brasil, 18.04.2001). Such arguments are severely questioned by Jarbas Passarinho, former minister of Labor and minister of Justice in the military regime. He affirms that in no official document is there a "Ianomami nation", that there is no recognition of a sovereign Ianomami territory within the Brazilian nation; that there never was a UN meeting where a decision was taken to recognize Indian land as independent nations etc. (*Amazônia, ianomami e os equívocos*, in Jornal do Brasil, 01.02.200)

177 Actually "economic internationalization of the Amazonia, which is already underway" is the greatest fear of the Cimi (*Conselho Indigenista Misionário*), although its executive secretary, Egon Heck, also considers that it is an aggression against the Constitution "not to recognize the continuity of lands, while allowing the occupation by non-Indians of other areas"(Jailton de Carvalho, O Globo, 18.03.2001).

178 According to general Luiz Cesário da Silveira Filho, head of the Center for Social Communication of the Army (Cecomsex), "competes to the Brazilian Army to impede that any part of the Brazilian territory becomes internationalized". Furthermore, the Army sees "no reason for the territorial continuity in the demarcation of indigenous lands, once the Indian communities constitute population nuclei already established and perfectly fixed"" (on the territory). (Jailton de Carvalho, O Globo, 18.03.2001)

179 Important to notice that the Air Force keeps 75 helicopters in the region, in support of the ground troops, besides an Aviation Group, while the Infantry Brigade of the Jungle is composed, mainly, by Indians.

some sort of military protectorate) and by suspicion over supposed (and undisclosed) goals, as it involved views (and remnant personnel) linked to the programs and practices of former military governments. It was also heavily inclined towards the military, not only because of the almost natural involvement of BAF, but also because of slack civilian participation, traditionally feeble in these matters. Quite surprisingly, even nowadays, Amazonia has not been a major issue, or an elaborate one, in the programs of national political parties. Counterposed to this situation, and as part of the attempts to revive *Calha Norte* and establish a defense policy for the Amazonian region, minister Quintão came out in favor of the creations of the territories of Solimões and of Rio Negro, thus beginning to dismantle the giant Amazonia state in order to place its territory under more effective administration.

Despite all the considerations here mentioned, *Calha Norte* came into full existence once again, stimulated by the impact of suspected biopiracy and the increase in the region of unknown NGOs.<sup>181</sup> According to General Valdésio Guilherme de Figueiredo, commander of the Military Command of Amazonia (*Comando Militar da Amazônia – CMA*), worries are expressed over the presence of 300 NGOs in the region, most of them foreign and functioning through agreements with public institutions, apparently in legal form, but with many of their participants apparently in illegal or irregular situation.<sup>182</sup> Another issue, raised by Defense minister Quintão and by *GSI/Abin* General Cardoso, had to do with the fear that Amazonian rivers would be contaminated by biological weapons that might be used, among others, to finish off *papoula* (base for heroine) and *coca* plantations (cocaine) in Colombian territory.<sup>183</sup>

But *Calha Norte* gained a renewed dimension, responding to the launching (officially, in January 2001) of the *Plano Colombia*, a joint US-Colombian military effort to deal with the *Farc*, while neutralizing the narcotraffic network and their connected and unfolding

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180 Evando Éboli, *O Globo*, 09.07.2001. In 2000, *Calha Norte* received R\$ 24,9 million and *Faixa de Fronteira*, R\$ 9,7 million. (Márcio Pacelli, *Jornal do Brasil*, 19.05.2000)

181 In 1999, a NGO, supported by pharmaceutical multinationals, was denounced in the state of Acre for supposed biopiracy (Jailton de Carvalho e Marcelo e Moraes, *Jornal do Brasil*, 11.07.1999)

182 Lecture at the Seminar on the second stage of Project “*O Brazil que Nós Queremos*” (The Brazil we want), which took place at the Federation of Industries of the State of Pernambuco. The seminar was an initiative of *O Globo* and Fundação Getúlio Vargas, supported by Embratel and the Federal University of Pernambuco. (Letícia Lins, *O Globo*, 22.03.2002)

183 A super-agro toxic, developed from a fungus (*Fusarium oxysporum*) is found in coca and other plants

right-wing militias.<sup>184</sup> Worries were quite clear in relation to the possible (and some certain) *Plano Colombia* effects, including a feared internal war.<sup>185</sup> Preoccupations that considered the possibility of narcotraffic agents, guerrilla units and mere civilians crossing the frontier, making of Brazil a necessary space for manoeuvre.<sup>186</sup> On this issue, it was announced that Brazil would react militarily to any attempt to invade its territory – an advise given to all those involved in *Plano Colombia*, whether guerrilla, narcotraffickers or regular troops of any nationality.<sup>187</sup> Nevertheless, Colombian military manifested their clear demand that the “Brazilian government ceases protection of the Farc, blocking in the origin the traffic of arms and chemical products”.<sup>188</sup> Such a move would be considered as “great collaboration” in the struggle against the guerrillas, for the Farc were assumed to be producing cocaine with ingredients that were supposedly coming from Brazil.

So, there were enough motives for the meeting, in the last quarter of 2000, of general Cardoso with representatives of the area of intelligence of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Panama, to discuss the effects of *Plano Colombia*. As well as sufficient reasons when they decided to unite their anti-narcotraffic efforts and exchange intelligence information on a regular basis, although nothing came out on their positioning and attitudes versus the *Farc* or in relation to societal movements.<sup>189</sup>

Then, an “expected surprise” took place. In May of 2002, the BAF launched Operation *Tapuru*, a military manoeuvre – planned, designed and accomplished as an integrated operation of the three forces, the first under the current Ministry of Defense -, with a clear message (and test of themselves) of occupation and vigilance, accomplished by 4.000 men of the three forces in the Amazonian region, close to the cities of Tabatinga, Tefé, São Gabriel da Cachoeira and the area of Cabeça de Cachorro, by the frontier with

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184 Signed by Colombian president Andrés Pastrana and US president Bill Clinton in the year 2000.

185 Eliane Oliveira, *O Globo*, 31.08.2000. With Colombians and Americans preparing the infrastructure for action, general Gleuber Vieira called a meeting in Brasilia with all the officer-generals, intending to discuss *Plano Colombia* and its implications for Brazil and for South America, focusing on current incompatibilities and on foreseen and expected unfolding events. (*O Globo*, 04.10.2000)

186 In an interview to *Voz do Brasil* (Voice of Brazil, one hour-long governmental program, transmitted in all radio stations since 1940), General Cardoso said that in a first moment Federal Police action would be reinforced along the frontier with Colombia; in a second one, if necessary, military strategy for the area would be reviewed. (*O Globo*, 05.09.2000)

187 Counter-Admiral Hélcio Blacker Espozel, vice-head of intelligence of the General Staff of the MD (Vannildo Mendes, *O Globo*, 05.10.2000)

188 Major Camacho, *O Globo*, 06.03.2002

Colombia.<sup>190</sup> The military planned to photograph clandestine airfields, *garimpo* regions and vessels under suspicion.<sup>191</sup> Expected were possible encounters with Farc guerrilla units along the 1.500 kilometers of the frontier with Colombia and Peru. Instead, the BAF reported findings, indicating that the region was occupied by narcotraffic groups to which could be linked guerrilla units.<sup>192</sup> Whatever the meaning or the military reach – “we are doing an operation, we are to kill or to die”, according to general Valdésio de Figueiredo – minister Quintão communicated that Operation *Tapuru* was suspended because of the budget cut of May 2002. In its aftermath, Tucano patrol planes had to remain in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the Amazonian region, because of the lack of fuel.<sup>193</sup>

#### **VIII.iv - Some Responses to Future-Leading Questions – Sipam and Sivam**

As a preliminary and fundamental move in the complex scenario, and as an attempt to follow closely the evolution of *Plano Colombia*, the Brazilian government had created a Crisis-Management Group,<sup>194</sup>. In addition, a Tactical Patrol Group, in charge of overseeing, by air, an area of 200.000 square kilometers was also developed.<sup>195</sup> Lacking populational density and adequate logistical support, 22.000 soldiers were posted along the frontier zone with Colombia, in units 400 km apart from each other, formed by four interlinked jungle infantry brigades, 15 jungle infantry battalions and dozens of units for logistical support.<sup>196</sup> This was seen as quite insufficient by General Cardoso: “if the *Plano Colombia* is

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189 General Cardoso asserted that encounters of Latin American Defense ministers, to discuss the implications of *Plano Colombia*, would take place on a monthly basis.

190 The logistics of the operation involved 22 airplanes, 5 war ships, 4 helicopters and a hospital vessel.

191 Monitoring in 1998 showed, in one month alone, 300 unknown high altitude signs of air traffic over São Gabriel da Cachoeira, in the Amazonian region (part of the route of international drug dealing). Meanwhile in the southeastern region (states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo), considered to be the entry door for drugs consumed in Brazil - 1.200 clandestine airfields were spotted. (Lieut. Brigadier Marcos Antônio de Oliveira, general-director of the Civil Aviation Department, testimony at the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on Narcotraffic, O Globo, 16.06.99)

192 After persecution of a suspected vessel and subsequent shoot out, in the region of Belém de Solimões, a Navy military was hit and an Army sargeant disappeared.

193 O Globo, 29.05.2002

194 Composed by the Federal Police, *Abin*, MD, Ibama, ministry of Justice and ministry of Foreign Relations

195 To be added, a group of 6 Air Force helicopters and sixty men, as part of the Operation “Amazonia stay legal”, supporting the action of close to 360 men (Ibama agents and military), with an agreement signed with the Land Operations Command of the Army (Coter).

196 Battalions in Cruzeiro do Sul (Acre) still have to do their supply through boats (not being able to count on Air Force carriers because of the general situation) in operations that take up to three months. (Chico Otavio, O Globo, 03.09.2000)

unleashed today, the effectives that are there would not have the capacity to block our frontier, but would be suited to sound the alert, asking for reinforcements”.<sup>197</sup> Many of the units stationed in the area were geared towards surveillance activities and frontier control, lacking the level of readiness and operationality required for active defense, while other units having a suitable operational outline, were in no condition to engage in prolonged combat, facing, among others, logistical difficulties.<sup>198</sup> Still, and against all odds, some of the units were reaching a situation close to desired levels of excellence in training, in spite of small numbers and budget difficulties. Such views were reinforced by the opinion of general Valdesio de Figueiredo, for whom the effective units at the disposal of the BAF were not enough to defend one of the most ambioned forests of the planet. For general Figueiredo, “what we have is being robbed” and to stop this, more effectives were needed, “much bigger than the Army and much more expensive than the nation can offer”.<sup>199</sup>

Anyhow, such a complex reality, in spite of not involving conflicts between Brazil and other states (though facing zones of instability within states and across frontiers) reinforced military understanding that a strategy of presence was required - territorial, oceanic and fluvial and air surveillance – of units converging into a possible Rapid Deployment and Action Force, necessary to begin structure and options for strategic mobility.<sup>200</sup> Considering such vulnerabilities, BAF were, purportedly, developing such an action force, in a combined effort of the three services, which – was imagined - would

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197 General Alberto Cardoso, interviewed by Adriana Vasconcelos, O Globo, 31.08.2000)

198 On the military side, the project based a jungle infantry unit in Boa Vista, a frontier command in São Gabriel da Cachoeira, and 5 frontier detachments, in Iauaretê, Querari, Sao Joaquim, and Maturacá (AM) and Surucucu (RR), with other 5 units to be established in Auaris and Ericó (RR), Tiriós (PA) and Pari-Cachoeira and Tunuí (AM) - this one on the margins of river Cunuí, which comes from Colombia and runs into the River Içana, affluent of the river Negro. For the military, river Cucuí is one of the main entrance channels of cocaine, produced in the Colombian Caño Caforado region, at only 100 kilometers from the frontier. It also transformed three special frontier battalions into jungle infantry battalions, which joined the already existing three frontier commands in Tabatinga, Boa Vista and Macapá, the frontier company in Clevelândia do Norte and 5 frontier platoons in Ipiranga, Vila Bitencourt, Marco BV8, Bonfim and Normandia

199 Lecture, op.cit. in Leticia Lins, O Globo, 22.03.2002

200 With such goals in mind - “maintaining the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Brazil” – general Zenildo Lucena, former minister of the Army, reaffirmed the necessity of keeping fighting Army units in the whole national territory, with an adequate operational level. The Army aimed at building a Central Nucleus of Forces, “cell of the Army of the future”, to be constituted by professional soldiers and geared towards external defense, having as their various functions, characteristics of «rapid deployment and employment of force », as well as being the nucleus of a peace keeping structure and laboratory for experiencing new combat techniques and processes». “O Exército Brasileiro na atualidade”, conference by general Zenildo Zoroastro de Lucena, Minister of the Army, at the *Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército* (Command and General Staff School of the Army), in 23.2.94. A Defesa Nacional, nº 674, Abreu/Jalmeida 1994, pg. 7-13.

improve deterrence value, as well as increasing cooperation with neighboring countries. The clear perception of the undesired importance of having 1.600 kilometers - from Roraima to Amapá - without the adequate presence of the State which, in the view of the military, was like “going from Rio de Janeiro to Porto Alegre, and not seeing a thing”.<sup>201</sup> Counterposed, a desired presence of the State enhanced by the construction of BR-320, a strategic road running through *Calha Norte*.

It is clear from all this, that one of the most sensitive strategic areas of Brazil has been highlighted - in its clear vulnerability -, leading to the understanding that its defense cannot be reduced to military dimensions. In spite of a specific Military Command of the Amazonia, with 62 operational units, the region requires a wider protection umbrella, in order to deal with a very complex, varied and interconnected set of issues.<sup>202</sup> Among them: defense of the environment; protection of indigenous communities and preservation of their culture; breaking the drug traffic chain; containment of large scale biotech piracy; halting contraband of timber, rare minerals and biodiversity; controlling and supervising the use of land and soil; fighting forest fires and illegal mining; surveillance and frontier control, including air and river traffic; early warning of disease outbursts, control of epidemic situations and efforts to reduce endemic malaises; support for biotechnological and genetic engineering scientific parks; backing of centers for meteorological and climatologic research and experimentation (electromagnetic spectrum, pluviometer studies) etc. On top of all this, the absence of the State, “as an entity”, not only as a federal state in these remote zones, in the words of minister Quintão.<sup>203</sup>

A wide-range effort to face the immense challenges posed by sustainable development while beginning to set a comprehensive frontier policy is to be seen in the Protection System for Amazonia (Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia - *Sipam*), linked to the Presidency, which has three Centers for Regional Vigilance, regional bases (Porto Velho, Manaus and Belém) and a Center for General Coordination in Brasília. Interconnected with

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201 General Luiz Gonzaga Lessa, former chief of the Military Command of Amazonia (1998/1999) and, until the end of 2000, commander of the Eastern Region Army, based in Rio de Janeiro, in O Globo, 03.09.2000. Lessa would become, in 2002, member of the French Legion d'Honneur, homaging his performance as Military Commander of the Amazonian region.

202 In this sense and context, BAF see themselves as having an additional target, or mission: «cooperating with socio-economic development» (General Gleuber Vieira, Conference, 4th National Encounter on Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98)

203 O Globo, 24.05.2002



approximately 1000 diverse institutional (governmental and non-governmental) users/supports, intercommunicating by voice, text and image, it composes an important information and transmission network. *Sipam* is also an instrument for diplomatic approaches to the defense of the region, allowing for the integration of governmental agencies of the Amazonian countries, thus composing an international safety net, as well as facilitating transnational interaction of non-governmental regional actors. A large variety of actions became part of this integrated diplomatic and political-strategic effort in the sensitive Amazonian frontier, impelling states to seek a tentative macro-regional integration.<sup>204</sup> This would allow for the Amazonian region to become a platform reaching out into the Caribbean and the Pacific, by way of various cultural, productive, commercial and technological projections: from Belém and Manaus into Colombia and Venezuela, from Belém into the Guyana arch, and from Acre into Peru.

Under the umbrella of *Sipam*, the ambitious Surveillance System of the Amazonian Region (*Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia - Sivam*) is being implemented, having as its principal aim, to secure the effective development of the Protection System of Amazonia.<sup>205</sup> Important to notice that *Sivam* was considered, by president Cardoso, as an instrument to help Colombia in its attempts to repress drug traffic and could be used by other countries of the region, having in mind diverse goals.<sup>206</sup> This was shown by Brazil, to would-be partners in the region – Colombia, Guyana, Surinam and Venezuela -, in September of 2000, in Caracas, Venezuela.<sup>207</sup>

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204 Among such actions, sharing data banks, sensor systems for environmental surveillance, laboratorial and sensorial airplanes and cartography knowledge; developing joint efforts for nature preservation and joint ventures in the biotechnology field; deepening understanding for the protection of indigenous cultures etc

205 *Sivam*, launched as a project in 1994, started to function in July 1997 and was supposed to be ready by 2002. Its integration was achieved under the long-range view of the short-lived Ministry for Special Projects, which was created to cover for the extinct SAE. Some saw with mistrust the winning corporation for this project – Raytheon -, considering the possibility that through her, the project would be transmitting strategic data to the US government, although it presented the best financing conditions. In spite of several questions, the Brazilian government signed, in March 7, 1997, two contracts with the American Eximbank, on a total of US\$ 1.39 billion, for the implantation of *Sivam*, besides three other contracts: two in Washington, with Raytheon, on a total of US\$239 million and with Vendor's Trust, on US\$ 48 million, and one with EKN (Swedish Eximbank) for US\$ 91 million. Also important, *Sivam* would have a real total cost of US\$ 2.805 billion, against the approved US\$ 1.395 billion. ((O Globo Agency/Bom Dia Brasil-TV Globo, in Gazeta Mercantil, 06.03.1997; Gazeta Mercantil, 11.03.1997))

206 IVth Ministerial Defense Conference of the Americas, Manaus. The reason to convene the 26 ministers of Defense in the Amazonian region was political, to show the worries with environment, narcotraffic and indian population. (Abnor Gondim and Renata Giraldi, Jornal do Brasil, 18.10.2000)

207 Paulo Paiva, Gazeta Mercantil Latino-Americana, 11-17.09.2000

The aim of *Sivam* – to be launched officially in July 2002, unless budget constraints shape it otherwise - is to function as a ‘24-hour system’, allowing for scenario drawing in real time, through an infrastructure of technical and operational means mainly related to Air Force equipment.<sup>208</sup> The development of *Sivam* followed methodologies in similar patterns to those used by the US Department of Defense: such technologies as Corba, UML methodology and sophisticated geoprocessing systems and treatment of images.<sup>209</sup> A Center for Aerial Vigilance was constructed in Manaus and other bases were being built in 82 Amazonian localities, where close to one thousand people linked to the project would live.<sup>210</sup> This aerial dimension is quite important, once the Air Force was considered to be in a shaky situation by its commander, Brigadier Carlos de Almeida Baptista, who pointed out the lack of resources, allowing for the functioning of only 50% of the fleet of, approximately, 750 planes.<sup>211</sup>

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208 This infrastructure is made up of a remote sensing network, including, among others, includes eight meteorological and environmental satellites; five sensor-equipped Embraer ERJ 145 for aerial early warning, capable of registering images through the dense tree forest and providing information on the quality of the soil; three Embraer 145 RS planes for remote sensing, carrying Ericsson radars; 14 other planes; and 25 radar stations (rumours alleged that there were only 14 radars, reduced to 7 - coordinated by Cindacta, who already has five of them functioning to control air traffic. (Andrea Michael, Folha de São Paulo, 28.05.2002; Colonel Antonio Faria, *Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos*, Conference, 4th National Encounter of Strategic Studies, Unicamp, Campinas, 10/15.05.98) *Sivam* was also looking forward to receive 10 meteorological radars and 32 integrating VHS stations.

209 Ivo Michalis, in letter via *GloboOnLine*, 22.03.2002, published in O Globo, 23.03.2002. Meteorological radars were bought from Enterprise, an American corporation, after the Brazilian Tectelcom Aeroespacial was cut from the agreement. The minister-president of the Superior Military Tribunal (STM), brigadier Sérgio Xavier Ferrola, sent a letter to the DM Quintão, where he criticized the posture of the *Sivam* coordinators, favouring an American corporation in place of Tectelcom Aeroespacial. The president of the Commission that implements the *Sivam* project, brigadier José Orlando Bellon, said this was done because Tectelcom had neither technical nor financial conditions to produce the radars within the stipulated timetable. (Virgínia Silveira, Gazeta Mercantil, 19.03.2001)

210 The project received a loan of US\$ 110 million from the Deutsche Bank. (Mauro Teixeira, Gazeta Mercantil, 15-17.12.2000). See also, Anamaria Rossi, Gazeta Mercantil, 10.05.2000

211 Military programs gained 44% of the total spent in the Amazonian region, only behind the 54% spent on infrastructure and economic development. In absolute numbers, military budget for Amazonia raised from R\$176 million to R\$ 731 million, with only 7% not used. (Research conducted by Hécio Marcelo de Souza, of the *Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos-Inesc*, cited by Eliane Azevedo, Gazeta Mercantil, 29.03.2001; Cristiane Jungblut, O Globo, 26.10.2000) It is also interesting to note that, although in 2000, military expenditures surpassed budget planning in the Amazonian region by 314%, and these supplementary resources were directed towards *Sivam*, by the end of the year part of the budget had been cut.

### **VIII.v - Alcântara: From the Wide Vase into Space**

Another key issue in Amazonia, involving science, technology and security - besides monetary returns for services - is the existence of the launching base of Alcântara (*Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara*), in the State of Maranhão, 600 square kilometers and one of the five active launching bases in the planet.<sup>212</sup> Just under the Equator line, which eases the entry in orbit of the satellites, taking advantage of the Earth rotation, while diminishing fuel expenses (already by 30%) and raising on-board load, Alcântara has some other advantages. From the base, rockets can be launched both to the polar orbit and to the equatorial one, without endangering the nearby populations, while not facing problems with rigorous winters.<sup>213</sup> Furthermore, the two first parts that separate from the launching rocket, after the shoot up, fall directly into the sea, offering more security to the operation.<sup>214</sup>

Brazil decided to negotiate an Agreement of Technological Safeguards (*Acordo de Salvaguardas Tecnológicas*) with the United States, for the use of the base.<sup>215</sup> Seeking a contract with the American corporation Orbital Science, the US government established a number of restrictions for the Brazilian side.<sup>216</sup> Such restrictions and limitations were

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212 At the space base of Kourou, in French Guiana, the cost of launching varies between US\$ 60 million and US\$ 100 million. Brazilian offers begin at US\$ 40 million.

213 Andrea Guimarães, *Gazeta Mercantil*, 24.01.2002

214 Estimated launchings are around 250 per year and actual capacity is around 140, a reason for the urgent development of Alcântara, according to brigadier Lauro Ney Menezes, former director of the Centro Tecnológico Aeroespacial, of the Air Force, between 1980 and 1983. According to brigadier Menezes, US\$ 400 million were invested in Alcântara and with US\$ 200 million more, the base could become polyvalent, able for any type of launching. (Interview, *O Globo*, 16.03.2002

215 See Vilma Silveira, *Jornal do Brasil*, 19.04.2000; João Domingos, *Gazeta Mercantil*, 18/20.05.2001  
Francisco Leali, *O Globo*, 09.08.2001; Chico Otávio, *O Globo*, 30.09.2001; Andréa Michael, *Folha de São Paulo*, 28.05.2002.

216 The US Government considered as a basic condition of the agreement the effective restrictions to the access of people outside the American team, to the launching areas of the base, to the launching vehicles and to the locations where people and material were to be placed. Entering the country, bringing material and people transported and located, and after the use of the base, leaving Brazil without any checking at all was to be the practice. Brazil was not allowed to establish agreements of mutual cooperation in the area of launching of vehicles, while the resources obtained for the services, were not allowed to be applied in the financing of the Brazilian program that seeks to develop the Satellite Launching Vehicle (*VLS*). Actually, the ministry of Technology applied higher sums for this VLS in 2001.

considered nocive for Brazilian sovereignty, from various points of view.<sup>217</sup> Nevertheless, Brazil was inclined to seek an understanding with US security demands, once they are responsible for approximately 80% of the global satellite market.<sup>218</sup>

In this context, and from another angle, one should consider the efforts to launch both the Chinese-Brazilian Satellite of Earth Resources-CBERS, a joint enterprise with China, which is aimed at raising detailed information on natural resources and establishing vigilant action over drug trade in frontiers with Andean countries, as well as the Satellite for Scientific Application (Saci), to be used for experiences in space. Both will be controlled from China, although the agreement allows Brazil to control them a third of the time – equal to the investment proportion.<sup>219</sup>

Following diversified Brazilian efforts, a Frame-work Agreement of Cooperation in the Space Area was formalized in 1999 with Ucraina, when Science and Technology Minister Ronaldo Sardenberg was in Kiev for an official visit.<sup>220</sup> Afterwards, by January 16, 2002, an agreement was signed between the governments and space agencies of both countries, to be directed by the Brazilian Space Agency (*Agência Espacial Brasileira – AEB*) and the National Space Agency of Ucraina (NSAU). This would allow the Ucradians – who launched 250 times, since 1977 - to launch satellites from Alcântara, while both countries are preparing themselves to constitute a joint venture to explore business in that sector. The idea is to use Ucrainian rockets, from the Cyclone-IV series, one of the best satellite launching rockets. Together beyond space business, the two countries signed agreements for the exchange of technology in the energetic sector, foreseeing the

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217 For a critical view – political and academic - of the proposals, see Helio Jaguaribe, “O inacreditavel acordo de Alcântara”, in O Globo, 16.11.2001. Another opinion was that of brigade-general Helio Ibiapina Lima, current president of the Military Club, an officer with a marking presence during the military regime and an ideology which remains. He wrote articles in the newspaper of the *Grupo Inconfidência* and in the military newspaper *Ombro a Ombro*, considering the agreement as hitting Brazilian sovereignty and its territory. A similar view was that of Major Brigadier Pettengill, in his article in *Revista Aeronáutica* No 227/2001. Pettengill affirmed that Brazil had signed agreements of understanding with Fiatavio, Yazenof and Yosmasch, but it was impossible to operationalize them, because of US interference. He also made a point out of the differences to be considered between agreement and contract.

218 After some institutional and public discussion, the agreement was approved by the Commission on Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Deputies, at the end of 2001, with 11 ammdments and was, during the first semester of 2002, under the analysis of the Commission of Science and Technology, Communications and Informatics. Only after the approval in plenarium will the agreement go to the Senate.

219 André Lacerda, Jornal do Brasil, 02.10.1999

220 Paulo Paiva, Gazeta Mercantil, 18.04.2002

production of machinery to exploit Ukrainian petroleum.<sup>221</sup> Such moves were understood by president Cardoso as being “a growth of the Brazilian energetic matrix”.<sup>222</sup>

### **IX -The View of Composite Conflict**

Within the overall context raised up to now, BAF consider that the country is not free of risks, as the region is marked by “zones of instability that may contradict Brazilian interests”, although the focus of the uneasiness to be reckoned with is not to be found in the State policy of any of the South American countries, while no hard frontier problems with neighboring nations are on recent record. But, with the same pace that conflict hypotheses about the Southern Cone are not being considered, BAF will necessarily focus upon possibilities of *composite conflict*, in which political actors and militants, criminal organizations, paramilitary and economic power factors mingle and interact in formal alliances and associations or through circumstantial alignments – transnational in many cases - against local and national authorities and social movements, and against each other when needed. Again, nowhere is this clearer than in the Amazonian region, where irregular forces of local warlords linked to economic interests, paramilitary, *delinquent sub-systemic societies* and crime organizations, coalesce into threatening possibilities. Composite conflicts that might be concomitant to the ones taking place in Africa and Asia, where ethnic, economic, religious and political actors and factors collide and interact

Considering certain ‘mind marks’ - of Brazilian history and of the current social and political context -, military reasoning will be pushed into considering a number of conflictive situations which ‘bring together’ quite differentiated political actors. For one, private armed groups, confronting rubber-workers (*seringueiros*) on behalf of local businessmen and political figures (as is the case along the River Abunã, which links Peru and Brazil), or simply engaged in banditries and land-grabbing for illegal mining, in an operation which is called *grilagem*. To them should be added paramilitary groups serving ‘protection’ to large landowners, aiming at thwarting the attempts of the Landless Rural Workers Movement - *MST* to settle its numbers on untoiled lands.<sup>223</sup> It seemed,

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221 The participation of Petrobrás is being considered in the exploitation of petroleum in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov, while the Ukrainians would have a role as important producers of gas turbines for Brazilian thermoelectric units. (Luis Recena, Gazeta Mercantil, 17.01.2002

222 Jornal do Brasil, 17.01.2002

223 Furthermore, Spanish-speaking unidentified armed groups were reported in the state of Acre and their participation in armed robberies – apparently to secure resources for supposed and unidentified guerilla groups - has been registered. Another factor to be considered is the appearance, from time to time, of strange armed action groups, theatrical or seriously intended, that entitle themselves with appealing names, such as the Socialist Faction of National Liberation – *FSLN*.

from the undercurrents of the political and social process, in the rural areas of Acre and Rondônia, that there were forces interested in actually militarizing it, thus staving off the agrarian reform campaign, by playing in the hands of those who want the BAF involved in this scenario, which would then become a theater of military operations. Certainly, an option which is not in the interest of the *MST* and its policy of massive occupation of land – currently, there are 500 *assentamentos* (settlements), the ample majority of which were peaceful occupation of lands, involving close to 100.000 families.<sup>224</sup> Not by chance, governmental and conservative politicians sought General Cardoso, to study the issue and devise a strategy for sturdy action in the rural areas, thus confining the matter to a police-military camp, instead of seriously deepening the debate within Congress and discussing the problem as a major and urgent public policy question. So, following the traditional Brazilian saying, that ‘social issues are treated as police matters’, once more an uneasy framework of reference is made explicit, only enhancing the fears of an ideological spill-over from Peru and from Colombia, which might prompt BAF into action within a radicalized social and political environment.

In spite of the military not openly pronouncing themselves as possible agents for social and political order, coupled with an interesting process of internal exchange of ideas and reflections, which begins to consider the critical issues of society as theirs, BAF are reconsidering themselves as its full members from other angles. For them, the possibility of having to deal with public security is, perhaps, the greatest challenge in the short time period - availability, capacity and will to intervene in that context are serious questions with no easy nor simple answer. In this context, it is quite interesting to register General Cardoso’s comments after the MST invaded land in the region of Buritis, Minas Gerais, which belongs to the family of President Cardoso.<sup>225</sup> In spite of condemning the MST action, general Cardoso highlighted the social function of the land-less movement, stressing that they made clear the need for an agrarian reform in Brazil.<sup>226</sup> Anyhow, for general Cardoso, the MST should have transformed itself into a big NGO to work together with the government, a lost option in his view. Nevertheless, he discarded a violent answer against the MST, because “to act in a hard manner with social movement is a counter-sense”, although he praised the police that maintained the land-less activists lying down with tied hands and facing the ground.<sup>227</sup> Interesting to note that the government was allowed to ask, at any time, for troops of the BAF to

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224 *Jornal do Brasil*, 04.07.2000; George Alonso, *O Globo*, 27.06.99. Important to note that the MST has some dissident groups, such as the *Movimento de Libertação dos Sem-Terra – MLST*, created four years ago, having already another dissident group, the *MLST de Luta*. (Roselena Nicolau, *Jornal do Brasil*, 14.05.2001)

225 The invasion took place on March 23, 2002

226 General Alberto Mendes Cardoso, cited by Rodrigo Alves, *Jornal do Brasil*, 26.03.2002

227 General Alberto Mendes Cardoso, cited by Rodrigo Alves, *Jornal do Brasil*, 26.03.2002

guarantee security in the farm, an understanding based on the act of Minister Nelson Jobim, of the Supreme Federal Tribunal.<sup>228</sup>

Furthermore, contraband and narcotraffic organizations, seeking to preserve their sites, routes and commerce - in many cases, guarded by *guerrilla* units and armed political groups in neighboring countries, on the edge of the Brazilian Amazon - have to be seriously considered, in addition to less powerful, but large-scale illegal hunting and poaching gangs. This is the case of the *Farc*, as it had been with the once fearful Peruvian *Sendero Luminoso*, whose sparse remnants were supposedly noticed inside Brazilian territory.<sup>229</sup> One of the major narcotraffic dealers of Brazil, Luiz Fernando da Costa (known as Fernandinho Beira-Mar) was operating from Colombia, under the protection of the *Farc* which he provided with weapons in exchange of guarantees for his business – mainly the distribution of drugs for Europe and the US and armament for Surinam.<sup>230</sup> Beira-Mar bought coca directly from the peasants and paid the *Farc* to crystallize the pasta-base, and transform it into high purity cocaine.<sup>231</sup> However, the *Farc* command has been quite adamant: it does not intend to cross into any neighboring country, even if its units are persecuted by combat operations of the *Plano Colombia*.<sup>232</sup> In spite of such assurances, BAF worries were reinforced by a confidential document of the General Air Command of the Air Force, informing that Colombian petty miners and narcotraffic gangs linked to the *Farc* had invaded areas of the state of Amazonia.<sup>233</sup> An *Abin* report considered the existence of, at least, two active bases close to the

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228 Act of September 2000, when the MST had surrounded the farm of the sons of President Cardoso.

229 General Luiz Gonzaga Schroeder Lessa, at the time head of the Military Command of the Amazonia considered the possibility of the *Sendero* guerrilla being active in the region, while sources in the government deemed this as “more smoke than fire”. Worries were also aired about the possibility of the remnants of the Peruvian guerrilla establishing contact with the FARC, in the area centered around Tabatinga, in the confluence of Brazil, Colombia and Peru, (André Lacerda, *Jornal do Brasil*, 01.07.99)

230 *Jornal do Brasil*, 14.03.2001; According to Beira-Mar “they do not want to know of ideology, they are in that one for money. They transformed themselves into capitalists and only want to know of money, money, money” Still according to Beira-Mar, 90% of the money of the *Farc* comes from drug traffic, turning in about US\$ 10 million per month. Based on such assertions, the United States asked for his extradition, including that of two other drugtraffickers and the deportation of three *guerrilla* leaders – Tomás *Negro Acácio* Molina, Eugenio Vargas Perdomo, and Carlos Bolas. (*Jornal do Brasil*, 10.05.2002)

231 According to him, the kilo of cocaine in Brazil is worth US\$ 3,500 dollars – US\$ 500 for him, US\$ 500 for the *Farc* and another share for the Brazilian police. (*Jornal do Brasil*, 10.05.2002)

232 Moreover, Commander Joaquín Gómez, heading the southern command of the *Farc* (in the proximities of the Brazilian frontier), was adamant in assuring that entrance in Brazil, with military objectives, was sternly forbidden to any of his members. (Antonio Ximenes, *Jornal do Brasil*, 01.07.99). This was reinforced by Oliverio Medina, *Farc* representative in Brazil, who added that, although his guerrilla movement controls 42.000 square kilometers (almost a third of Colombia), this occurs in a region that is more in the middle of the country and not on the frontier with Brazil, which is mainly thick Amazonian forest.

233 Air-Brigadier Roberto Geraldo Pimenta Ribeiro signed, this document, prepared in October of 1999, dealing with Operation *Tapete Verde* or *Querari*, accomplished by the BAF in the northeast of Amazonia (Abnor Gondim, *Jornal do Brasil*, 20.10.2000). Operation *Querari* – from Tabatinga, on the Solimões, to Iauaretê, in Cabeça do Cachorro - involved 5,000 men and was under the responsibility of general Luiz Gonzaga Lessa, former military commander of the Amazonian region, who later took over the Army in the

frontier with Brazil, each one having about 200 guerrillas, to act in La Pedrera (a city on the margins of river Caquetá) and in the Putumayo village, cut by the river of the same name.<sup>234</sup>

The complexity of the situation, which interrelated the major cities and their organized crime with other countries, impelled the devise of *Cobra Plan*, specifically designed and aimed at preventing problems in the frontier with Colombia. Operation *Cobra*, was launched by the Federal Police, in September 2000, with 180 agents in the area to exert ostensive policing, counting on BAF logistical support. In any case, it was foreseen that BAF would assume control if the police action was considered to be insufficient.<sup>235</sup> Within the anti-narco campaign, other operations were started: Plataforma, dealing exclusively with the repression of narcotics, basically heroine and opium; Six Frontiers, destined to contain illegal trade of chemicals used in the preparation of drugs; and Aquarius, the combat of ecstasy.

Questions were also raised on what was going on along the Brazilian frontier with Paraguay, seen by the North-American DEA as a base for coca processing and as a center for the sale of arms to Colombian guerrillas. This led to joint manoeuvres of American river vessels and Paraguayan units, purportedly preparing themselves for concrete combat actions against narcotraffic and contraband of weapons.<sup>236</sup> Another experience took place, also in 2000, on the Bolivian frontier, where the Armed Forces of both countries had decided to participate in a joint operation to combat narcotraffic, with Brazilian military being part of a bilateral task-force, including Federal Police of both countries. Three main points to be attacked were the frontier between Guajará-mirim and Guayará-merín, in Rondonia; between San Matías and Cáceres, in Matto Grosso; and between Puerto Suárez and Corumbá, in Matto Grosso do Sul.

Such preparedness and actions can be related to the US perception of a worrying scenario in the three-country frontier (tríplice fronteira) between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, where terrorist activity – linked to extra-continental situations - was being followed. By 2002, Dick Cheney, vice-presidente of the United States was defending a collaboration of the three countries

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Eastern Region. The main objective of the BAF operation, involving the three forces, was to test the capacity for immediate answer of the BAF when challenged by an unexpected frontier problem. A center for electronic warfare was installed in the area of the CMA, with the overall supervision coming from the *Comando Operacional de Terra*, at Forte Apache, in Brasilia.

234 Vannildo Mendes and Janaina Figueiredo, O Globo, 27.09.2000; Abnor Gondim, Jornal do Brasil, 05.09.2000

235 The considerations about BAF action on top of the police were made by Counter-Admiral Hélcio Blacker Espozel, vice-chief of intelligence of the General Staff of the MD. (Vannildo Mendes, O Globo, 05.10.2000)

236 João Pinheiro and Marco Antônio Martins, “Estados Unidos ativam Plano Paraguay”, in Jornal do Brasil, 24.09.2000.



with the Americans in areas that go from “joint military operations and actions, so that the law is attended, to the sharing of intelligence information”.<sup>237</sup>

### **X-Continental Defense Policies**

Brazil has been seeking conceptual revision of security and defense, trying to discuss a new model by taking into consideration the understanding of the beginnings of grand planetary changes in the international conjuncture and looking into the proximate supranational future events. Quite clearly, minister Quintão is pushing for this long-needed perception, trying to occupy the strategic vacuum that has been discerned. But what is actually taking place, and what is expected, is part and parcel of the (un)desired MD-on-the-making, bolstered by misinformed intentions and daring positive perceptions. Concomitantly, in an assertive move, the Brazilian MD is seeking to become the articulator and central focus of a South American strategic perception, acknowledging the differences between security and defense, aware of non-military threats that might require use of Armed Forces and of challenges of the ‘new age’.<sup>238</sup> One of the basic objectives is to establish a defense profile adequate to the region, unbridled from irradiated US doctrines and from dysfunctional guidelines developed from the (miss)understanding of the 70s. Buying the French plane-carrier Foch, named São Paulo, was seen as part of this effort: to set the unit as a means to oversee plane-carried operations, mobilizational capacity, preservation of a structure of defense compatible with those of the neighbours and protection to Brazilian routes of navigation.<sup>239</sup> Brazil leads such a new stand -- the need to develop sub-regional (and South American) awareness leading to joint strategic thinking, while discerning common possible, or real, military threats - which is to be geared towards the adequate equipment, quality training, human quantity and localization needed by the various forces. In this context, the São Paulo will be used by Argentina, who is lacking plane-carriers – to train manoeuvres with their planes, something which was already being

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237 Jornal do Brasil, 07.05.2002

238 Reasons behind the Brazilian position, IV Ministerial Defense Conference of the Americas, October 2000.

239 Minister Quintão, at the reception of the plane-carrier São Paulo, in Jornal do Brasil, 18.02.2001. The Foch, with capacity to operate 37 planes – counting initially with 20 Skyhawk - was delivered without security

carried out with the former unit, Minas Gerais. After all, the actual dealing with any strategic consideration in the hemisphere has to take into account the fact that marked differences, of a strategic nature, exist between (and inside each of) the three Americas.

Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the US continues to be the most important dialogue partner of Brazil, but such intention will take place in a different level than what was usual up to now, not having to agree on every clear proposition, once geographic, political, techno-productive and social realities are so different and noticed. So much so, that it is difficult to imagine a unique, hemispheric – the Americas - security view, in spite of a possible interconnected practice. Though recognizing obvious US supremacy -- in South America, nothing relevant seems to be done against the grand design of the United States, nor looks as accomplished without their participation --, Brazilians reject what could be dubbed as neo-Pan American "pentagonism" which seems to characterize the underpinnings of a conceptual framework for hegemonic action.

In such a context, some observers in Brazil see it as the only South-American country able to perform as a link between the River Plate, Andean mountains, Amazonian streams and forests and Caribbean outlooks. This is in consonance with the lines of reasoning that envisage the strategic reach of Mercosul, despite its current worrisome shortcomings and fragilities. Brazil is also aware that it maneuvers within a complex set of intra-regional and supra-regional economic, political and cultural power relations, as well as conflictive (though not antagonistic) differences in the sub-continent. Thus, Brazil seeks to reinforce negotiation mechanisms in the region, in order to avoid armed conflict, if possible, or to tone it down swiftly and, at the same time, to improve its national defense instruments, including military capability for which the South American framework of reference seems a feasible option and limit of horizon. While strategic perspectives of the region are examined, it is important to keep in mind that the mosaic of countries and sub-regions composing both Mercosul and South America is quite varied, in spite of the appearance of certain similarities and, even, qualified homogeneities, thus requiring a multiple regional insertion, based upon a policy of harmonization of interests.<sup>240</sup>

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codes of communication and missile launchers. The A-12 São Paulo – *capitânia da esquadra* - will carry 1.200 sailors  
240 “Política de Defesa Nacional”, Presidência da República, Brasília, 1996, pg 5.

There is a growing understanding of the need to overcome the shady limits of ‘open regionalism’, unbalanced ‘area of free commerce’ or even a frustrated ‘sub-regional common market’ and delve into a locally-centered transnationalized techno-productive region, moving forward, in the direction of South American continentalization.<sup>241</sup> For South Americans, as crisis and stagnation become more obvious, it ‘is not only a question dealing with a continent, but with content’. For Brazil, quite clearly (and, increasingly, for the other three full members), the notion of ‘regional space’ extrapolates the physical and notion limits of Mercosul. And, in spite of being a country with so many different large internal sub-regions, Brazilians begin to envisage the whole of South-America, including the South Atlantic and its projection into the Antarctic region, as well as the gateways to the Caribbean and the Pacific. For all this, ‘internal substance’ is required – again, a national project is in the waiting.

Such a view of things, of a continental nature and South American image, is seen as having an important corollary: the creation of a regional and multilateral defense system; seemingly part and parcel of the proposals conducive to the constitution of a ‘Permanent Inter-American Peace Force’, geared towards intervention in crises. Counterpoised to such proposals, and in view of the power asymmetry and disequilibrium in the American Hemisphere, another option being floated around is to promote the constitution of economic or political “sub-regional associations”, capable of consolidating trust and mutual confidence feelings.<sup>242</sup> A consolidation of sub-regional associations (and routine-framing of their accomplishments) would be interlinked with approximations and integrations in the military dimension, seeking the build-up “of reciprocal trust”. Such policy would then be explained and explicated through efforts of cooperation in diverse

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241 Interesting tone of Brazilian speeches and proposal direction, on integration, infra-structure, diplomacy, world trade and crime combat, at the South American Meeting of Presidents, in Brasília. (Fabiano Lana, Jornal do Brasil, 02.09.2000; Adriana Vasconcelos and Ana Paula Macedo, O Globo, 01.09.2000)

242 See general Marco Antonio Felício da Silva, “Amazônia, prepotência e arrogância”, O Globo, 08.05.98, citing Thomas McLarty, President Clinton’s special envoy for Latin America, “Relações Hemisféricas”, in O Globo, 12.03.98. Without confronting nor attempting to substitute or preempt the OAS, these associations would have high level consulting mechanisms, convened periodically or in emergencies, «able to open channels of personal trust and to provide consultations and explanations when faced by threats common to two or more countries”, besides stipulating procedures for preventing or follow-up of crises (“*Posições e propostas do Exército brasileiro sobre: segurança hemisférica, vinculação JID-OEA e medidas para fomento de confiança e mecanismos de segurança no hemisfério americano*”, Brigadier-general Sylvio Lucas da Gama Imbuzeiro, official representative of the Brazilian Army at governmental experts’ meeting on measures to increase trust and mechanisms of security, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 14/18.03.94).

areas of intelligence, exchange of professionals in training centers, accepting observers in military maneuvers, periodical consultation at General–Staff level, meetings of military technicians, joint military exercises, short term courses and professional training for officers and sub-officers, systematic bilateral meetings, visits and sport competitions, joint social activities, joint operation of mixed services (navigation in international rivers, search and rescue operations, intervention in disaster areas, flight protection) etc. For all this, international joint preparation and training, adquisitions of equipment across service frontiers, and military complementary functions across frontiers, become a challenge.

### **XI - Regional Peace: Strategic Reference and Functional Value**

It is quite clear to observers that Brazilian military see eye-to-eye with diplomats in attributing a strategic value to peace in the region, especially when taking into account budgetary, technological and capacitating constraints within the processes of gnoseconomic and technonomic globalizations. But there are other good reasons (besides the not always so obvious major one, i.e., the value of human life), such as the existence of world-wide scarce and valuable resources - among which, water and biodiversity - and the prospects of widespread conflicts in areas of other continents, with a similar Nature profile. The challenge for government is to build around such diplomatic conception - peace as a strategic reference and functional value - while securing a non-conflictive continentalization of South America, with Brazil in the leading role. Certainly challenging. Although peace bridges are many, both through routine and active agenda-building among nations in the region (thus, overcoming the occasional flare up of irrational conflicts over frontier issues), conventional institutional structure and action show their shortcomings, while current societal realities raise signs of preoccupation as to their fueling capacity for composite conflicts.

To envisage the region as a necessary peace zone means to consider two different dimensions. For one, the need to seek and build upon ways and means to keep the region out of internal violent confrontations, coupled with the need to keep regional actors away from open clash situations external to the region. Confrontations and situations, which could carry the danger of internalizing a certain logic of behavior where conflict is the

reference. This means, obviously, to emphasize the creation of consulting mechanisms and procedures, internal to the region, and the renewal and consolidation of those already in existence, while avoiding participation in organizations that respond to states or power centers outside the South American perimeters. In other words, to be ready for: keeping, seeking, making and enforcing peace. The other dimension entails a growing awareness that regional integration has reached a *via crucis*, while the level of complexity and interrelation of the issues involved, shows, quite clearly, a *continuum* between the performance of the economic nerve centers of Brazil and the socio-economic and political state of affairs of the different countries in the area, with significant consequences for regional development.<sup>243</sup>

Bearing in mind such political and economic multiphacetic links and factors, and considering the urge to maintain the region as a non-conflict area, one could understand the need to establish some conditionality on the preservation of democratic credentials – more or less along the lines existing in the internal arrangements of Mercosul -, as reinforcement to the policies aiming at building a peaceful continentalization.<sup>244</sup> However, this certainly delicate and urgent issue, is not easily translatable into policy, and, unfortunately, one is left to wonder whether this is at all possible, in the present circumstances, considering the process of structural marginalization and selective inclusion that affects the South American region.<sup>245</sup>

The linear process of economic integration and cooperation has reached a point in which new regional goals have to be devised. Among them: the constitution of an effective Mercosulian parliament, able to design grand regional policy while meeting new levels or representational requirements, which in turn, will demand reforms in the countries

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243 Especially so, after the Brazilian economic crisis of 1998/1999, the energy crisis of 2001, and the extremely difficult situation of Argentina from 1999 onwards, reaching the 2001 major crisis and the 2002 pre-convulsion stage.

244 R. A Dreifuss, 'Mercosul: Regional Space for National Manoeuvres within a Globalised World or Nation of Nations?', in Organizations Régionales dans l'Hémisphère Sud et Relations avec les Puissances Extérieures, Cahier Orhis No 6, org. by Pierre Maurice and Robin Ghosh, Université Pierre Mendès France/Centre d'Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité Internationale, 2001, pgs. 99-156

245 For informed observers such as Admiral Mário César Flores, what remains is to thread "along the path of economic and social development, congruent with international economic interdependence – and not opposing it in a Quijotesque way –, which will naturally produce the increase of Brazilian presence in the construction of the new order. One should pay attention to the fact that the greater the success of Mercosul, the higher – and more efficient – will be the level of (Brazilian) intervention (in the macro process) (Admiral (Res) Mário Cesar Flores, "Assimetria do poder e ordem futura", in Jornal do Brasil, 13.05.99)

involved; the institution of a judicial system extending itself over the member countries; the establishment of military coordination among the nation-states (starting with a Joint Task Force) which should target greater efficiency, pulling together scarce resources, and the reduction of redundancy. At a certain point, the inception of a regional organization of the Armed Forces, clearly and firmly anchored on the democratic clause which sets the rules of behavior of the national governments *vis-à-vis* attempts to breach the constitutional framework. Complex engineering, no doubt, but certainly necessary, and, from a societal stand (and vantage) point, quite desirable. And, beyond the limits of Mercosul, the purported link-up with a Merconorte of sorts, encompassing Amazonian countries, preparing the ground for the continentalization of South America.

Nevertheless, coordination of Mercosulian Armed Forces under joint command (integration is still far away) has already been outrightly rejected by some quarters, as an impossible dream (or probable nightmare). Self-sufficient motives (national rationales and interests), ‘self-evident truths’ (historical arguments about necessary national identification of Armed Forces) and technical reasons are introduced to justify the absolute lack of interest or serious consideration for such proposals. Furthermore, the Argentinian tumbling of 2001/2002, with such Mercosulian disastrous shady perspectives does not offer close range possibilities. In spite of it, the Mercosulian states accomplished a military training with France, in April 2002. This prompted the US to exact from Brazil and Chile an exercise of air combat – named Águila 3 - to be accomplished in April 2003

But it is quite clear that if one is to advance this process, military re-engineering on a regional scale will have to be carried out. This certainly entails not only renewal of equipment and gaining knowledge of new one, but also enormous, drastic, profound changes in the military structure, mind and political behavior. It clearly requires, at least once and for all, a realistic strategic conception, for Brazil in particular and for the region in general, a point on which General Gleuber Vieira seems to have been accurately fixed upon. Quite obviously, the definition of who is the enemy (is there?) in military terms, or where does (or realistically might) the threat come from, is a set of questions that will have to be equated. Regional Armed Forces are in for a major overhaul in organizational terms, in form and structure of deployment, in availability and use of equipment and weaponry, in training and education etc. Not only cutting fat, or in specific cases, putting a lid and a

bottom plate to the pork's barrel, but actually targeting the very configuration of the military, their sense-objective matrix. In other words, dealing with new goals, not roles, within the accepted function, while wiping out non-sensical aims that prompt unacceptable task justification.

Finally, to advance along the path of deepening the measures of trust and confidence in the region requires a complex and laborious civilian-military integration, with institutional understandings whose frame of reference should be regional - along the model that could have been set by Mercosul -, but whose strategic reach should be the South American sub-continental space. To advance in the enlargement and deepening of the confidence measures requires also to focus upon the need to build a network of agreements that would give support to a regional articulation, beyond the economic and military dimension. Besides the effort to convince of the need of an institutional congressional space, through partisan and diplomatic measures, it is necessary to mobilize state, provincial and departmental governments, in order to stitch together agreements of intra-regional cooperation – perhaps beginning with a ‘technology axis’. Such views obviously also require that intelligence measures should be discussed and processed within a representative institutional environment - first national and then regional - of debate, formulation and follow-up to be added to the efforts of concatenation impelled by the Ministries of Defense. This would allow building the basis of a cooperative framework, which would overcome the mistrust and fears that the idea of a multilateral framework has raised, especially the mistrust about its subordinate dimension.