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Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence For Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Dr. Thomas Fingar

SEAN WOHLTMAN (Geospatial Intelligence Innovation Officer, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency): Good morning. My name is Sean Wohltman, and I am a United States Intelligence Officer. I stand here today as a direct result of the intelligence community's post-9/11 hiring blitz, a representative of the large percentage of our intelligence officers that are members of Generation Y. I'm 25 years old, and I came to the community directly after defending my master's thesis at Virginia Tech just two years ago.

Now, despite my extremely short term in this career, my peers and I are already beginning to inherit significant responsibility for the success or failure of the United States intelligence community. And if that fact scares you, I'm afraid the next piece of information may not sit well with you either. You see, the U.S. draws from a Gen-Y work force which consists of approximately 70 million citizens. That's nearly two-thirds less than the 200 million Chinese GenYers, and that's just China.

Our generation lives in an information and technologically dominant era, and is conditioned to the technology that are on the leading edge. We don't need to be sold on the tech. And furthermore, we don't need to settle on the technologies that we are comfortable with. Rather, we continually seek out the next best thing. We know we can always do better, we can do it in short order, and we can prove it.

Now, I came to work for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency following a call for patriotism, having known very little about what the intelligence and defense professions are really all about. And I'll never forget the disappointment and disillusionment that had presented itself to me within my first three months of my career.

Now, it wasn't that the privileged information, the capabilities, and brilliant minds weren't made available to me. They were and they still are. It was when I first logged on to what I expected to be a terminal from 24 CPU Command Center that I was instead driven to my agency's home page, which flashed information about an upcoming picnic, and links to fill out my health insurance, and not only that, it launched in Netscape. (Laughter.)

And it didn't get any better when I tried to fire up the flagship application for the field in which I got my degree. The application, which NGA is deeply invested in and dependent upon, it was three years behind the version which I had just used to program my thesis on. The new version is still being evaluated by IT and security, I was told. Oddly enough, both my university and my agency had identical enterprise licenses from the software vendor. They were both given the latest version at the same time. Well, the software wasn't that drastically different, I reasoned, and besides, I bet the data availability and day-delivery systems here are much better, right? No.

Now, the day-delivery systems at times required ordering CDs, which I would get delivered in a number of days. Now, right before I left school, the USGS had put a network of distribution in place for their data that was amazing. College students everywhere were given access to the best unclassified data around easily, over the Internet, with no authentication.

Worst yet, I started thinking, hmm, so this is just my agency's data. What about the information from the other 15 members of the IC? How do I connect to that? And just like that, it hit me: a cold sweat, a realization that this seemed familiar, something I had read about, seen a movie about. To me, it was like October 4th, 1957, all over again.

The world had just seen Sputnik and the United States of America was being embarrassed. But just like during the onset of the Cold War, there was a realization. And not just by me, thankfully, but by people with a desire to change, and those with the real influence and ability to make change like Dr. Fingar. America had fallen behind in an area in which it was expected to find the leading edge. And instead of one adversary, however, we know fight a war of technological supremacy on a world stage that is forever altered by the Internet and globalization.

But perhaps the most important thing to remember, though, is that a majority of today's innovation in this field comes from inside the United States, by people like those who are sitting in this room. They come to us for pennies on the dollars compared to our traditional program; sometimes they even come free of charge. And they're blogged (?) to us in the fullest detail in the name of business technology every day around the clock.

Now, we can't hire them all, but we can surely take advantage of their ideas and technologies and implement them in near-real time to put us back in this race, if not truthfully take the lead in it. If we fail to do this, our adversaries surely will. And we will have handed them this race on a silver platter of inaction.

And so began a shift: a grass-roots campaign of analytic transformation that was backed and encouraged by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Now, some bosses don't like it and don't understand it, and some pay a hefty price for taking this stance. I was blessed at NGA to have a chain of command that let me run with it and contribute what I could. Others haven't been so lucky.

It's fueled by those of us that cannot shut off, that cannot go to sleep at night just because there may be an up-and-coming technology that is being swarmed by the social network of dig.com, something which we could observe and figure out how to apply to our jobs as intelligence officers, or worse yet, that our adversaries will be awake to see the latest technology described in its fullest detail, and they will use it to defeat us in this race.

But all is not bleak. In the short term that I've been here I've witnessed tremendous change. Intelink, the fabric that ties all the intelligence agencies together, has grown from a hub of agency webmaster-driven content to a viable social network, driven by the work of analysts willing to share their information collaboratively. And it's been the simplest of things, taking Mediawiki and turning it into Intellipedia, bringing our own version of del.icio.us and dig.com social bookmarking online, our blogs, our forums, all for an unimaginably low cost in an unimaginably a short amount of time by government standards.

Now, our ultimate goal, our moon landing if you will, is to move the intelligence community to an analytic space, the so-called A-space, which is an agency and organization-blind environment. See, it's driven by topic-based, time-dominant analysis – the best subject matter experts working collaboratively, bringing the pieces of information that they analyze to the table to solve intelligence problems together, no matter what agency they're from.

Now, just like the space race before us, we have come a long way in the here-coined A-space race. But let's not laud ourselves too highly, for we have only put a man into orbit. NASA didn't reach their goal in 1969 by having risk-adverse government bureaucracy and standard practices stand in the way of what the rocket scientists wanted to do.

So if you want us to win this A-space race, give the analysts at the lowest level the freedom to exploit these cutting-edge technologies, and to install and configure whatever tools they think will help it succeed in the rapid time frames that they are willing to work under without having to explain the need to do that to their managers.

And sure, some missions may fail spectacularly on the launch pad, some just after take-off. As Dr. Fingar has said numerous times, well, this may work; it may not. However, he has convinced us that we have to accept these risks with a greater goal in mind. Because we want to make sure that the analysts from our next generation, Generation I, can look back at a time of transformation and point to a time in the very near future when we will have declared, Tranquility Base here, the Eagle has landed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored to introduce the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Dr. Thomas Fingar. (Applause.)

DR. THOMAS FINGAR: Good job, Sean. Good job. Is this mike on? Good.

Thank you, Sean, and thank you Tim [Sample]. Thank you, NSA, for co-sponsoring this activity. Let me begin by associating myself as closely as I can with both Tim and Sean's remarks. I think you're going to hear some of the themes that they raised repeated in my remarks, and those of others who will be speaking with you over the next two days.

This is a chance for imagination. I ask you to begin by imagining that I am an exciting speaker. (Laughter.) I had a boss who once described my emotional range as running from A almost to B. (Laughter.) But notice I am wearing a tie. People with ties can't be that dangerous.

Tim used the term revolution. That's what we're about. The kind of changes embodied in the term analytic transformation, if they're going to be successful, we'll be revolutionary. Now, we don't have time for evolution. I'll come back to that.

My task today is to describe the vision, to share the excitement and enlist your help. If I do my job properly, I will inform you, I will engage you, I will excite you, but I also will frighten you, for the number of the dimensions of what we are about are really quite daunting.

The vision, the task that we have of transformation boils down to enabling Sean and his colleagues, of whatever chronological age, to do what he sketched out as possible and implicitly demanded that we do. We have to take advantage of the opportunity that we have. It's an opportunity in part by the digital generation. It's in part because the Congress has given us a once-in-a-couple-of-generations opportunity to undertake meaningful and lasting change in a community that, as the WMD Commission Report noted, does one thing better than all others, and that is resisting demands to change.

The reasons for the resistance are not irrational: that there is an understandable fear of breaking a system that is critical to the security of our nation, that increasing is critical to the safety of our citizens at home as well as overseas. It's not about existential existence; it's about personal safety, but it is about national interest. There is an understandable concern for sources and methods, and not endangering the people in these systems on which we rely. But we can't be paralyzed here.

What I'm going to attempt to do in the next few moments is to sketch out briefly why transformation is necessary, why we need a revolution, what we have to do, as a part of that revolution, and finally where I need your help in order to do this.

I confess to being quite uncomfortable with the linking of my name to analytic transformation as if this were one man's vision; it's not. There are many, many colleagues in the ODNI, in the intelligence community, outside of the intelligence community who have helped to shape it. Indeed, some of you have been at previous NSA-organized events where I've been given the opportunity to use you as an audience to begin to pull together the ideas that have brought us to where we are in analytic transformation and make this possible.

As Tim indicated, this isn't a final blueprint; this is very much a work in progress. We are excited about sharing with you over the next couple of days where our thoughts have led, where your feedback has helped us, the kind of things that we are doing, and in recognition that there are many exciting ideas that have yet to occur to any of us, may have occurred to some of you. There is a receptive audience for those ideas, there is a will to implement them, and there is an imperative to do so. We cannot study this to death; we have to march out and make course corrections as necessary.

A couple moments on the why: Why do we have to do this? The world is different. I was thinking as Tim was speaking of one of the earliest experiences I had in the community in 1970. I was the translator for Sink-yowser (ph) and a senior in-German linguist for NATO. And we were in a little group in Heidelberg that every week did a threat briefing for all of the flag officers, 32 if my memory – who would assemble for this.

And in a conversation with young colleagues there – damn they had a hard job. And I said, what's so hard about your job? You're the graphics guys. You make U-graphs. He said, do you know how hard it is to describe exactly the same language – exactly the same situation using different slides every week? Nothing changes – (laughter) – and we have to depict it in ways that keep these people awake.

Now, that may be a little extreme, but we've moved from the slow-moving and predictable target to a situation in which they've got a lot more customers, a lot more targets, a lot more issues, a lot more complicated issues, where faster response are expected and demanded to these harder questions. There's a lot greater demand for insight today than there is for secrets.

The old paradigm of information being purchased or purloined in some fashion had made available to a group of analysts who were told to figure out what it means or explain it, to one where questions are coming at us from myriad directions, from well-informed individuals who demand useful responses on their decision timeline and not our research timeline. If we can't provide meaningful insight and useful input to the decisions that they have to make, they will turn elsewhere for that information. That might be the person they met at a party, it might be somebody they went to school with, it might be a favorite newspaper columnist, it might be an academic, it might even be one of us. They have to make decisions.

They can Google, they can use the vast resources that are out there as well as, or better, than we can. What is our value added? Decreasingly, what we bring to the table is secret, is unique. In certain areas it's absolutely critical. One can't imagine doing counter-terrorist work without highly classified, high-risk collection. But most problems, most of the time, don't require secrets; requires knowledge, genuine expertise, brought to bear to address a particular problem at a particular time.

Another reason that we have to transform here is that the missions that we support have changed, the people we support have changed in their attitudes, and the potential that we have all demand revolution. We have to do it. This isn't a nice-to-do; this is a necessary-to-do-it. More importantly, we can do it. I'm absolutely certain that we can take advantage of this opportunity.

Among the reasons that we really have to do it is a talented workforce represented by Sean, represented by others in the room, represented by thousands around the community because if we don't do it, we won't keep them, that the professional commitment is in part – national service, is in part to doing a good job. And if we make it hard for them to do the kind of work they believe necessary to make their contribution to national security, prosperity, and safety, they'll find other venues for doing it.

We are in a race against time. That both Sean and Tim made reference to the commitment of seniors in the community, the alignment across the community – many of us have been together for years or decades, and we do have a sense of they put the inmates in charge of the asylum for a while. We can now do those things

that we dreamed about doing, when we said, if only we had the authority, we would make some changes. We have that possibility, we have the imperative to do it, and we must get about it, and we have.

What are the specific things that we need to do in this? In order to address the kinds of question and issues and problems on the time frame that we operate in now, it seems to me we have no real choice or at least no prudent choice but to harness the capabilities, the talents, that we have across the intelligence community and beyond the intelligence community.

Connecting the dot – I'm with Mark, with Tim – as an analyst of 40 years, it's a very offensive concept. Machines can connect dots; dots are data. Data is not intelligence; intelligence is what comes out of the brain of an analyst. We have an awful lot of talent, because expertise is the – (inaudible) – of making a real contribution here.

Piling the data higher and higher doesn't make anybody smarter; it just makes them more tired. Finding the insights, gaining the understanding, requires deep expertise. That exists across the community; it exists outside of the community. We have to have a model that will enable us to tap the expertise wherever it is, to nurture the specialized expertise that is required to support a very, very wide array of missions, and I'll come back to that.

We must enable the intelligence community to function as a single integrated enterprise. On the one occasion in which I actually tried to prepare a PowerPoint slideshow for a lecture, I used a Washington Post cartoon of many years ago of the intelligence community, which was a jerry-rigged house that had rooms hanging off one another on a very, very shaky, stilt-like foundation.

We wouldn't build the community exactly as it exists today if we had the opportunity to start again. But the more I have been engaged in thinking about analytic transformation, the more I am convinced we'd probably come up with something pretty close to what we have today. That is a real change in my own thinking over the last couple of years. Because of the need for proximity not to one another in the chess pieces and change side but proximity to those we support, being in their minds, being in their shoes, being in their meetings, knowing what they need when they need it, how they need it, and staffing with people with the expertise tailored to those missions.

We evolved in a way that was a lot of special propos groupings most of the time done really well: the right kinds of expertise, the rights kinds of people, the right kind of structures, hence the fear to break it. It's working at a level that over time has proven to be quite efficient and effective. It made the intelligence community a hollow term.

Indeed, I am reminded – it's got to be 10 or 12 years ago – I went to a function at the National Archives, where a volume was rolled out as part of a day-long symposium on the origins of the intelligence establishment. And one of the people on the panel was somebody I had met in my early year in the community named Tom Thorn. I said, why establishment? He said, well, community is the term that came along later. It made it sound like we functioned as a single entity.

We knew at the beginning that this was going to be a shotgun marriage; this was going to be putting together components that didn't work with one another, didn't attempt to work with one another, didn't like one another, and saw one another as rivals. But we didn't think of it as a community and it didn't come a community until people began using the phrase.

Well, the phrase didn't make it a reality; we have to; we have to. If we are going to harness the capabilities, the talents, the expertise that are distributed across the community, we have to operate a single

entity. We still have too much of a legacy of where is the scoop, to beat somebody else at giving an analytical judgment before senior officials.

I confess that after two years of banging at the problem, I cannot understand the desire to be the first one to be wrong – (laughter) – and giving that sort of a higher priority than collaborating to be right, or at least to be less wrong in presenting information on which the leaders of nation, the military commanders in harm's way, and the law enforcement officers and other first responders sort of on the front line in our towns and cities make decisions.

Why would you not want to get it right? Why would you not want to consult with colleagues whose expertise may compliment yours, maybe in an area that enables you to reality check your own judgments. So an overwhelming priority for us must be to make the intelligence community an enterprise. Similar to the German – (in German). It shouldn't matter what the lanyard is; we should all think of ourselves as part of the same enterprise with the same broad mission.

In doing this, it becomes apparent that – (inaudible) – these network solutions, not monopolistic or mega agencies or centers, underscoring a point that Tim made. The goal here is not to take everybody, the 18,000 analysts and put them all in the same room. If they – (inaudible) – the cultural differences will fade away. It's not practical for a lot of reasons, not least of which is no room is big enough, but more importantly, it would take them away from the proximity to customers. It would take them away from the kind of hands-on, up-close, deep-down understanding of the problem for which we can make a contribution. So we have to find a better way to do it, a way that leaves people in their centers of expertise, in their separate mission-oriented arrangements.

If you haven't heard it, let me be the first to rehearse the recharacterization of stovepipes. Stovepipes of course is now a pejorative term of operating. Stovepipes now in some circles are known as vertical centers of excellence. (Laughter.) The dinosaurs; those who don't get it; we are the best. Well, we want you to be the best, absolutely to be the best at that area for which a particular organization, a component of an organization has primary responsibility.

In order to make the IC function as an integrated enterprise, we will be exactly as good as the weakest component. If we are networked, we are relying on one another, we have a division of labor, we are part of the same team, we just play around the bench – is our biggest vulnerability.

I think about this distributed networked arrangement in ways analogous to the data layers of GIS, geographic information systems, that as in GIS, where there is basic sort of foundation data, geography, economics, demographic data, political structural data, and so forth layered one on top of another, each one develops separately requiring different kinds of information, different prides (?) of expertise, but able to cumulatively provide insight, to demonstrate the interactive effects, that is the way in which we need to think about the analytic enterprise of the future, where people working on areas where they are knowledgeable, having insights to bring to the table, information to bring to the table that are not just theirs and not just their customers.

They are available to every other analyst-working problems, so that we get more of the ah-ha moments; now I see it; I couldn't see it before, or now I realize there is another way of explaining the phenomenon that I have been wrestling with. There are a number of essential components of this kind of networked transformed, single enterprise. And let me illustrate with some examples.

Starting point is the analyst. Now, it may have something to be with my being an analyst, but I really do think analysts driving collection, analysts at the center of the intelligence enterprise is the right way, and it starts

with the individual. It's not enough to have digitally savvy analysts; they also have to be smart; they have to be well-trained. We must improve analytic tradecraft. That is probably the most critical element in all of this.

And then over the last two-years plus, I think we have gone a long way down the road, of not just identifying what we have to do, but putting in place procedures, policies, guidelines, training programs, evaluation programs that will ensure quality work by the analysts. We are not where we ant to be, and this is a continually in need of grading and reinforcement-type problem. But if we teach, if we train, if we mentor, we increase the competence, and the confidence of our workforce.

Most importantly, or as importantly, if we gain recognition so that the individual analysts working across the community have been trained and tempered in the same high standards of tradecraft, you have got the basis for collaboration. Nobody wants to effect a division of labor with somebody in whom they lack confidence.

We have across the community lots and lots of little cells that have developed because either an agency didn't know who else was doing the work, or if they knew who else was doing the work, didn't trust the quality of the work because it was outside their command-and-control structure, or even if they have confidence in the quality of the work, they were unable to task them for little hobby shops of amateurs developed around core missions.

We are improving the capabilities of the workforce, and we can have confidence, and managers around the community are beginning to have confidence in the work done by their counterpart across the enterprise. The work has to be transparent. By this I mean in part reproducible, that there is not magic about analysis. There is a certain magic about thinking, but the sources, the identification of the gaps, expressions of the confidence level in the information that is there, the articulation of alternative explanations, all laid out for all to see – let it all hang out there so that it can be critiqued, so that it can be improved, but most importantly of all, so it can be understood and so that those who will make decisions on whether or not or how to use it will have confidence in the quality of what it has done.

There is an evaluative piece to this. We evaluation of the analytic work by the individual – part of the tradecraft: go back and question your assumptions, come up with alternative explanations. Our peers – any analysts worth his salt in my experience goes to those he or she respects for does this look right to you, a sanity check. As we moved into the era of wikis and blogs and Intellipedia, we have a ready-made way for peer review. I'll come back to that. Reviewed by agencies, reviewed by the community as a whole, reviewed by customers, and indeed reviewed by many of you in this room, and the opportunity.

How well are we doing? Where do we need work? What is already in pretty good shape? This should be common knowledge, that the old pattern of hiding the mistakes, the hiding the weaknesses has the incredibly corrosive effect of dampening enthusiasm and opportunities for collaboration. We have got to demonstrate what we do badly as well as what we do well so we can work on it and work around it.

Second critical information is the information, and you'll hear more about that over the next two days: simply knowing what we know, knowing how to get at it, not necessarily having more of it, although we are going to get more of it. The technology will bring us more of it, but knowing how to utilize it. Mike Wertheimer will say more about this I'm sure, but using the machines to do what machines do well.

Part of that is connecting the dots, part of that is linking it up, to utilize – use – again, the GIS imagery, having sufficient meta-data, which need not be a lot of data, that enables making things in space and in time, making individuals with a few elements so that they can begin to look for patterns and anomalies. Machines can do that, what the human being is trying to decide why it's happened, how it has happened, what it means. The library of national intelligence – (inaudible) – are programs that you will hear more about.

We don't simply need bigger databases. Some of you have heard me use the piling more hay on the haystack doesn't automatically mean there are more needles in there to be found. And yet, we need to link up all of the databases that we have. We have to have search capability across them all, simultaneously, better tools for organizing, better tools for linking, finding a pattern. I think we are now ready for that.

I upset a number of people a little over two years ago when I announced that I would not authorize a nickel for an analytic tool until I had every analyst linked to every other analyst in the community. If we couldn't harness the brainpower that we had, what the hell was the utility of having better toys for them to play with, that tools among the sort of more seasoned or grayer – is a dirty word.

One more thing that we had to learn and it didn't do anything for me, and it kept me from doing our job, that is part of the legacy that we must overcome. The digital generation, the analog generation, tools really can be helpful. They can be critical in handling the volumes of information.

We need a collaborative workspace. If we're not going to be put everybody in the same big room, we have to have a virtual workspace. Part of this is a space, or will be – mechanisms that enable analysts to work problems jointly, not necessarily simultaneously. My work of last month may influence somebody's deliberations tomorrow. I might not even know about it. I might not know the person individually. But we clearly have the capability for showing our work, making it easy to find what has been done, and who has done it – reputation, phone numbers, email address so that people can hook up digitally if not physically.

To make any of this work, we have to create an nurture what I call a community of analysts, people who work together because they are excited about the problems. They are eager to provide meaningful input to the decision-making process of our nation. This can't be competition between agencies. It can't be a my agency is bigger than your agency. It can't be you have no right to comment on that problem because it's outside the mission of your current assignment.

If people know things, they know it. I mean, there is one example that I think will illustrate that. People move around in our business. The job they do now is probably different than the job they did two years ago or five years ago. Which job do you think they know most about? The one they are in now, or the one they left? We have structured our community in a way that says, the five years of experience that you had on Mexico is no longer relevant because you've now been assigned to do Morocco. We have to find ways to tap what people know wherever they are, whatever the account is. If they know something, they know it. And then evaluate what their input on the basis of quality and peer review and formal evaluations.

I mentioned Intellipedia. This is a great tool. It's the beginning; it's not the end of any kind of a process here. It's the Wikipedia on steroids, because of the classification, and because it's not anonymous. We want to have people take responsibility for their contributions, for their critiques. We want it known who is really good. And I think most of our people really are good. We want peer review from anybody that is knowledgeable on the subject. This is a way to create living documents.

One of the repeatedly frustrating aspects of our business is having a dim awareness that sometime – maybe it was a year ago, or two years ago – there was a pretty good paper that went through my inbox on exactly the subject that we're working. I can't remember who did that or even which agency they were in. Maybe I saw it on one of their websites. Which one of the 16 do I start with?

We've got to produce documents that are the joint property of the analytic community that live on the web at appropriate levels of classification, so that the starting point for something done today is that which was done previously. Now, we have to go back and make sure they were done well at times and so forth. But if you know the people; you know the process; over time, these are going to be incredibly powerful capabilities.

Imagine having country profiles, military orders of battle that are always up to date, or can be easily updated, because you can find out who knows something about it as well as who has got the account today. The example that Tim used about when are supervisors brought in to vet and validate and format – that's a very real challenge for us today. As the Intellipedia has taken off so much faster than we anticipated, we now have the challenge of when is it authoritative. It's gotten written by analysts from across the community, and people don't most of them. So if you're a first-line supervisor, how do you know if this is good work? You can't pull the people into your office to talk it through.

We're working through what our evaluations – the equivalent review process to an agency starting on its file. But at what point does DIA or CIA or INR or DEA or whomever say that product is worthy of having the seal of my agency put on it – not for ownership purposes, but so that my primary customers can have confidence in it that what is there represents quality work. And how we have – if it's taken to that level by Treasury – and the State Department needs something a couple months later that's been updated – that the update is.

Leaping ahead, this is one of the areas where we need your help. How do we do this? How is it done outside of the intelligence community? I keep using the outside of the intelligence community – beyond the intelligence community. We've got a big challenge making the IC a single enterprise. But the vision that many of us share is an analytic community that transcends people wearing badges and having polys. There are an awful lot of smart people around our country and around the world who have things to contribute, if we make it easy to find them, to interact with them, to entrain with them, if you will, so we can draw upon them in a crisis requiring a very quick turnaround of answers to complicated questions.

There is certainly no monopoly of expertise in any agency or within the IC. What are the areas that we really should nurture for ourselves? What are the areas where we have to have enough inside expertise in order to ask the right questions and understand the answers when they come back from outside? How much should be put in place ahead of time in a formal way with corporations, with think tanks, and how much of it should be sort of developed as analysts putting together their own networks. And how do we regularize the informal networks so that we can call upon them when needed, and so they don't evaporate when somebody walks out the door and takes their Rolodex with them, metaphorically speaking.

That's the transition to where I need your help. We need your help. The vision is a work in progress. I think it's made a lot of progress in the last couple years. We'd like some buy-in. Even more, we'd like your critique. What's wrong with this picture? What's wrong with this vision? What's wrong with the approach? And even better, what will make it more achievable, achievable more rapidly, more effective, better in terms of its overall functioning? This is a vision that did not spring from anybody's head full-blown. This is not a utopian vision; it's a pragmatic and evidence-based approach to wrestling with the challenges that we face. You have much that you can contribute to this understanding.

I'd like your help with all three of the key elements that I identified here – with analysts, with the tools, and with facilitating collaboration – dealing with some of the mindset problems, dealing with some of the need to protect sources and methods problems. And I may very quickly run through a short list – it could be a long list but mine will be short.

For analysts, the training, continuous learning, online tutorials, that there are lots of ways to do this. There are some, but not enough opportunities to take people offline and put them in a classroom. We need to have many ways to do this and do it effectively. We're changing mindsets and cultures – to trust the work done by colleagues and counterparts in other agencies.

Division of labor comes out of the industrial realm. Some companies build everything, do everything. Most rely on others for some critical aspects of their work. How do you do that? How should we do it? What are the lessons we could learn about the quality control, about monitoring, about joint training, that would enable us to have the confidence in our counterparts that we need to make the IC a single enterprise?

Anticipating some of what I think Dale Meyerrose will say to you, we need to ensure that the tools – maybe special built for certain missions – is available to the entire enterprise. I have the metaphor here of only enterprise-wise licensing here. Not just for reasons of saving money, but for the point that Sean was making. If we make all of the capabilities known to and available to our workforce, they will find things to do with them that none of us ever imagined, that the designers didn't intend. And it would be foolish in the extreme not to make it broadly available to people who have no reason to have that capability. It's not a secret; it's not a matter of need to know. It's why would anybody in the State Department care about some GIS technology? Well, there are a lot of reasons that they might, and they'll find ways to use it and every component of the community will.

We really want off the shelf products. If you develop for us, special needs, we want you to have the burden of keeping them up to date. And more important for me in the beyond the IC element, we want our people and our capabilities to be fully compatible with what is going on in the world outside the beltway. If our workforce is going to move around in and out of government as I anticipate they will, as they interact with colleagues in the private sector, in other parts of the U.S. government, having things that are familiar – and this is said from the heart from somebody that was in that Sputnik generation.

I remember 1958 going from multiplication tables to set theory in about three months over summer vacation, and having to learn nine different ways of preparing documents as the computers and the software industries shook out. I can't learn another language for handling this. It is not necessary anymore. Interoperability is what we need to strive for.

We need help making data available while protecting sources and methods. Proprietary information in the corporate sector, financial information in the banking sector – hopefully our medical records, unless they're at the VA, is protected – (laughter). There are ways to do this through standards, by means of risk management. We need help. But unless you think as one of the bloggers has done – I think it was referenced in that New York Times article – that we are foolishly putting at risk lives and technology; we certainly don't want to, but we need help in ensuring that that doesn't happen unintentionally.

Movement of data across domains – we can go from down to up; we need to go from up to down. If we're going to operate with law enforcement agencies, universities, and think tanks, with journalists and people, we've got to be much more nimble at separating out what we can share and what we can't share – ways of highlighting it to those with the clearance so that they can interact with people across the community who may not have the same access, and with people who may not have any clearance at all.

I could go on, but I won't. I want to start responding to questions here. Let me close with an invitation to join the revolution. We can't get there without your help. But unless the goal is revolution, the generation that Sean spoke for that is not just the generation of our workforce; it is the generation of those we support – unless we transform ourselves rapidly enough to convince them that we are serious, that the people we support that we are still relevant, we'll lose good people and we'll become a very, very expensive anachronism, which will have a difficult time justifying why we are better than reading Wikipedia, Googling the Internet, and phoning a colleague. We can be. We are now; we can be even better, with your help. We're going to make this revolution. Thanks for your time and your attention. I'll field some questions. Tim, you're going to help me, pulling things off of the screens?

TIM SAMPLE (President, Intelligence & National Security Alliance [INSA]): I am. And let me just say, for those who either have not gotten hooked up or whatever, we do have some microphones around. So if you want to ask a question the old-fashioned way, raise your hand and a microphone will find its way to you. Let me take one of the first questions right off the bat. Tom, if we so urgently need to change the intelligence analytic community, then do we need a strategic plan that everyone can know about and understand?

DR. FINGAR: I'm a child of the '60s. Strategic plans boggle my mind. I think we need a vision. I think we need demonstrated achievements. I think we need a clear order of march. I think the strategic plan is something we will make up in retrospect. And I realize that sounds hyperbolic, and it is somewhat. We need to do a better job at communicating that aspect of it so people will know what's expected, know what to look for, know how to make demands and requests and other inputs. But a detailed blueprint, an overarching plan I viscerally believe would be counterproductive.

To illustrate sort of how I come to this, my first boss when I came back into government 20-some odd years ago was Dick Clark – the lovable, affectionate, easy to get along with, Richard Clark who I always did get along with. But Dick – I'd been there about a week and he said he wanted my work plan for the next month. I said what the hell do you mean, my work plan for the next month? He said, I want to know what you're going to produce over the next month. I said, I don't know what I'm going to produce over the next month, but I will produce useful things.

We went back and forth on this for about four weeks – (laughter) – with him harassing me for my work plan. So I finally handed it to him. I said, here is my work plan. It had one or more products every day from my division. He looked; he said, well, it's about goddamn time. What are you going to do? And he looked and said, you've already done all these things. I said, yeah, and I did it without a plan.

The question is a serious one; I don't mean to be flippant here. We would still be at square one if we were trying to design the comprehensive strategic plan. We've moved far beyond that. And as I've told a number of people two and a half years ago, after this job, I'm not smart enough – and I think the little band of us is not smart enough – to get this thing right, right out of the box. I hope we're smart enough to know when we're going in the wrong direction. And since I know I can't get it right, I'm not going to invest a lot of time in it.

We're going to start doing it. We're going to start moving. We're going to start making changes. And people will add to it, and it will get better collectively. Now, I really believe that is the way we have to go, and that's why you can be a part of designing what historians will declare to have been our strategic plan.

MR. SAMPLE: Tom, this one tends to go right to – before I go there, we have a question in the back. Yeah, go ahead.

Q: I'm working with DOD on open technology development effort, which is making sure that all the tools have open interfaces, and it's open platform. And my question is - because we discovered that openness is something you have to use a stick about with most contractors – in acquisitions, is the DNI forcing the vendors to deliver ATIs with these tools so that data can get out as well as in? Because our experience is everybody wants the roach motel for data where it gets in but it can't get out. And unless we force the delivery of ATIs, it just doesn't happen. So the question is what is the acquisition strategy for ATIs and openness in that regard?

DR. FINGAR: I just conferred with Dale Meyerrose. He is going to address this when he speaks. I don't mean to duck the question. It is a very serious question. It is a serious issue for the people in this room, and Dale will lay out, as part of his presentation, the approach to it. The short answer is, it's got to be open; it's got to be open.

MR. SAMPLE: I think we have a question right here.

Q: I was wondering, you often learn a lot from examples. What examples do you have where some of these Web 2.0 ideas have been applied in the intelligence community? What are we learning from the actual application that you see going on today?

DR. FINGAR: Let me give you two and refer to one. Right after this, you will see a demonstration of the avian flu sites, which is really very, very exciting in the way in which this is involved. I think I am not stealing his thunder on that. Bird flu is an Asian problem, at least right now in its genesis. Among those who are utilizing and contributing and following events on this website is a veterinarian in Hanoi. That's a hell of a lot more direct way to get access to information than a source of unknown reliability working for a friendly service; talk to a doctor someplace about a problem and be able to interact. So you will see more of that.

A second very different one is use of Intellipedia. We had that build it and they will come, and they came in droves. We thought of it as an analytic product, at least initially, an analytic undertaking. But what was it, Mike and Tony, maybe four months ago, somebody copied one of our staff on an email stream. After the chlorine-filled IEDs were used for the first time in Iraq, somebody said, we need a collection requirement for information on use of chlorine in IEDs. And over a period of about three days, if my memory is right, 23 people – some collectors, some analysts scattered around the world – put together, using Intellipedia, a perfectly respectable collection directive – what was needed. And it just happened. Nobody said use this tool. That's, I believe, what Sean was getting at. If we make it available, they will use it.

A third here is the lesson learned by somebody I've started calling Digital Johnnie. That's Johnnie Carson, for those of you, who know him, three or four-time ambassador. Other than Secretary Rice, he's the most senior African-American in the State Department. Johnnie is now the national intelligence officer for Africa. Johnnie has become absolutely enamored of the use of web-based tools for marshaling expertise around the world to work on one of the most neglected areas.

One of the things that has come out of this is with the lead from the Marine Corps intelligence activity, which is responsible for sort of the cultural affiliation, we've done about 48 websites, one for each of the African countries, where information can be input directly from analysts from their commands, from embassies – stuff like biographic information that used to go through the State Department and around into other parts of the community that can now – goes directly, lives on the web.

These have become living documents worked by people who we would not have thought of as collectors, who we would not have thought of traditionally as analysts. My God, it's got customers mixed in here. It's got people we support who actually had the meeting with an individual reporting on what happened in the meeting, as opposed to a second or third hand telling of it. Those are two in a partial illustration. Putting it out there, people find ways to use it.

MR. SAMPLE: Good, Tom. Let me see if there is any other – if we can go back to the chat room, here is one that goes right to the cultural mindset. Where do you start creating a break on the competition mindset? There is almost 60 years of history to compete with, and people who believe they are the best and don't want to divert. So how do we find a starting point for the mindset change?

DR. FINGAR: That was one of my last questions to you here in the way we need to engage you – don't have the answer. I have some elements of it though. And two are, continuing the tradition of wanting to be the best. But it's kind of redefining competition here. Reputation among peers, rather than first to publish – who contributed the most to this joint activity? Again, with a little bit of history – before I left academe to go into government, I published about 50 pieces. Just over half of them were jointly written; other people made me smarter.

Defining what is good in terms of contribution to collaborative products, as opposed to sort of a monastic scholarship, sat in a cave and produce the definitive tome, is something that we need to do. Again, it's harder to do with the graybeards than it is with the folks who are used to collaborating. Another element of this is getting the work requirements and the performance evaluations right. But we have to define the requirements in ways that foster collaboration and reward it. So we need something different than how many items did you have in the PDB; how many questions for the record did you get to answer for a congressional committee on this?

We know what we want to do. We don't quite know how to do this, and any experience that has got for rewarding an innovation team in industry where people get rewarded collectively, but individual achievement is also recognized. Again, we don't want people to think of themselves as uniformly of a single caliber where excellence is not rewarded, and incompetence is not penalized. I suspect we're going to have very few incompetents; I sure would like to have a problem of an excessive number of excellent expert professionals.

MR. SAMPLE: I'm going to grab a question that I think may be one of my favorite questions, because it does show the issue between cultures and the issue between yesterday, today, and tomorrow. And that is a question that came up on the site that said, what's the financial incentive for an IC agency to embrace sharing?

DR. FINGAR: That's an interesting question. It has been my observation over time that at least some analytic product seems to have as part of its justification and part of the value added, contributed as it went through the review chain, to demonstrate the security or the utility of a particular collection discipline. NSA tends to have SIGINT products; CIA tends to have more HUMINT kind of products. I mean, it's – (inaudible) – but at least an element of this is for budget justification. That is a fact of life, because the analysts are such – we're decimal dusts in the overall budget. So for the analyst, there is very little incentive to front this or that or the other thing. For agencies, there has been.

And one of the most interesting of the revolutionary changes going on now is involving analysts in the process of deciding on future collections systems, the integrated collection architecture rubric. And sometimes when the analysts are asked their opinion, they have views that don't go down well. How do I do this in here? A particular collection system that is actually very costly, when asked, most analysts – as we did – and then backed it up statistically, using CIA data, where they track excellently what sources are used in products – and I'm perfectly happy to use the agency as the surrogate for the larger community in this regard – said, you know, this thing is terribly expensive, and a big opportunity cost. Analysts don't care. A very small slice of the community finds this critical. War fighters find it very valuable. But analysts across the board, when you ask the opinion, say, give it up. We don't need that.

That's not very welcome news. As we move – and Mike will talk about the library of national intelligence – it will be automatically tracked what is being used on what subject by what analyst, that we will have an objective basis for deciding – (inaudible) – utilities. Now, we shouldn't have analysts being the only ones making the decision on this. But as we deal with breaking away from agency ownership, unit ownerships, vertical cylinders of excellence and mentality here, and get to the – what do analysts working collaboratively find most useful for them? What best enables them to get their job done? I think there are going to be budget implications of that. And that means that we will have bureaucratic fights; that means we'll have fights on the Hill about this. Again, we need your help in this.

I think the logic is compelling of not investing all of our money in things that provides a less bang for buck solution than others, while recognizing some missions absolutely must be supported. And decoupling those decisions from the what do analysts use, sometimes is appropriate; and sometimes, it's not.

MR. SAMPLE: In fact, at one point, if I could make a slight editorial concept, one of the things that we've been debating – some of us who have been on the Hill is whether or not we've gotten so far along in the oversight process where real oversight is not really being done anymore; it's all just a budget growth. And how do you transform – as you're transforming analysis – also transform the attitudes of Congress?

DR. FINGAR: At risk of shortening the number of questions, two little anecdotes here. One is when I had been nominated for assistant secretary in the State Department, then Senator – now Governor – Corzine from New Jersey asked to see me. It turned out it was the highest of political motivations. He noticed that I was born in New Jersey, and wanted to know if I still lived there.

But he was on the SSCI at the team. He said, what do you think of oversight? I said, I'd love to have some. And he said, that's not the answer I expected from you. I said, but it's a real answer. I said, because as analysts, we don't have very many venues in which we can get a good critique of our work. Within the executive branch, we have the feedback. Most people outside are not clear. You are. And that got a discussion going about how for fiduciary responsibility, most of the time and attention and the oversight went to the big ticket, big programs, which it should. We have to swing back a little to – again – the quality of what comes out at the analytic end of the spigot.

The second little anecdote was when a notification of change in reallocation of effort was made by an agency, which I will leave unnamed, in order to focus more resources on Iraq and Afghanistan, and a list of things that were going to be cut back. And the predictable kind of reaction out of my analytic core was, what, can't do that; didn't consult us in advance; how can they do this? I said, they can do it. They need to do it.

But even apart from anything else, this is a real-world test case. I said, I want put in place a mechanism that actually measures did it make any difference. What kind of a difference did it make? Again, not to embarrass anybody, but so we have a basis so that when it's possible to shift resources again, do we want to go back to the way they were before for some mindless reason, or have an objective basis for saying, it made a contribution in this and that area, and none whatsoever in others. But figuring out ways for analysts to monitor, measure, be aware of things – where it comes from out of the collection system – how well or poorly funded a particular information stream or tool for utilizing that stream happens to be. That is what needs to be part of the consciousness of analysts so that they can make meaningful input to the process.

MR. SAMPLE: Tom, I'm going to make this the last question. Actually, do we have a microphone up here, Frank? While Frank is getting over there, let me ask another question, because I think it goes to the – and I'll ask this one and that one will be the last one – but let me ask the question that has come up on the screen, because I think it goes to how you and the ODNI are approaching the issue. And it feeds off your comment about the new definition of stovepipes. And it's kind of two different questions. One is what are you doing to ensure the collaboration is facilitated among and between stovepipes, which seems to be a good fact, and probably ultimately a good functional arrangement for prosecutions of specific disciplines? And the other question that goes into that is who is the DNI office or team that can be appealed to when an agency or division refuses to share data? Who helps enlighten those who are not embracing the need to share?

DR. FINGAR: Three quick snippets – and I will be brief on this. One is facilitating collaboration that the big dog analytic product is the president's daily brief [PDB]. It's just now a community product. In fact, the CIA continues to produce about 80 to 85 percent of it. Again, that should be no surprise in terms of number of analysts, the mission the agency has, as well as the priority focus that has been put on that.

And that's actually where two years ago, I though that would be probably about as good as we could get. Now we're there, I know the important part of this is every month, an increasing number of pieces are done collaboratively, with input from analysts at another agency. Some of these are listed as joint agency – two

agencies did it – DIA and CIA or INR and DIA or whoever – but analysts working with colleagues elsewhere. That's what I pay attention to; not which logo is on the largest.

We're getting there and we're getting there for the commendable reason – it's not because I said do it; it's because the demands of the president and other senior officials who have now been at this for seven years – president, seven years – half the workforce, less than five years – making a contribution that gets over the bar for what the senior folks is hard. And the smart workforce is doing a smart thing – they're tapping their colleagues. And this old my agency versus this agency kind of impediment – even if it still exists in the minds of people higher up the fruit chain – analysts are abandoning it.

A second snippet has to do with the use – go back to Africa. The – (inaudible) – wants me – I won't offer why, except as an experiment; he wanted me to mandate it as policy – that all products on southern Africa be written on Intellipedia – not South Africa, southern part of the continent. Because the number of analysts across the community is pretty small, wanted to tap it all; it gives him visibility in it, quality control on this. And the reaction of most agencies is to greet it enthusiastically, because they know they don't have critical mass. They don't have an economist; they don't have a military guy in order to do this.

There are some who see this and think, how do I get credit? How does the agency get hit in the budget kind of game in this if we don't have our logo on it? That's one of the real world things that we have to do. I'll drop the third snippet in order to get to another question.

MR. SAMPLE: And the last question, sir?

Q: You have requested or are in the process of requesting response literally from around the globe for different issues, different analysts, What will be or is your procedure for vetting the quality of the responses that you will receive?

DR. FINGAR: Responses by way of the analysts or the input? Hiring or product?

Q: Well, the analysts first, because you indicated a minute ago, for example, you're going to have to sort between the wheat and the chaff so to speak. So what is the process for doing that so that you can evaluate the answer as to its validity and value?

DR. FINGAR: There are at least four elements in that question. Let me disentangle them. One is the who's good, who's bad question. The terminology we have used is an eBay reputation. There are no anonymous contributions to Intellipedia. Somebody weighs in with an editing change here, which are made – by the way – at the order of about 4,500 a day. Your peers, those who care about this issue, read it and comment on it. It's not going to take very many that's-the-dumbest-thing-I've-ever-read kind of a reaction before people will be likely to drop out or not likely to be taken seriously.

Conversely, that all of us in the analytic realm can cite examples of people we support saying, who wrote that because analysts have reputation for quality work, and – Harry did that, end of discussion. That was well done and it's demonstrative. So we know that works because it's out there.

Quality of the product, this is one where we are just coming to grips with it. Robert Cardillo [Deputy Director for Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency] may have something on this to say in the core knowledge on-the-line process of DIA is doing on this. They're probably further along than other parts of the community in wresting with this. We are wrestling with it. We wrote an NIE on Nigeria using the Intellipedia, where we've now put a senior analyst into the loop to bat this thing. We're wrestling and your insight in this would be helpful.

The question of how do you find and match up the people, what's the trade-off between – as NIC chairman I got to do a product on Peru. We sent out an announcement – each agency send your representative to come to the various meetings on this. Well, some agencies don't have anybody who does Peru. Some agencies don't have anybody but they like to play. So they send somebody along. Other agencies have a Peru analyst but we're doing a community product because it's a hot topic but the analyst has higher priorities assigned to him by the management so he can't get the number-one drafter that you might want to do this, the competition element of this.

One of the things that we really have to figure out are ways that guarantee that we attract the best analysts to the highest-priority activity, recognize it, reward it, that it's personally rewarding for this, that agencies can satisfy their production requirements, support the customers they do with a collectively produced product. This is a head problem. List of who's good, peer reputation – all of these kinds of things are pretty easy but my first choice is to do it collaboratively. Mindset doesn't exist nearly as widely as that.

Finally, there's a formal evaluation process and this one kind of links to the technology. That two years ago in June, I asked for a mechanism that would capture every analytic piece written. It's being done. It's now called the Executive Intelligence Summary. It grabs about 80 pieces a day. We have two years worth of examples in this. It took metadata changes and formatting changes and other kinds of things coming along the way. But we now have the capacity to step back and look at who's produced what on what topics. They are topics that six or eight agencies have written on. There's some that no one writes on all the time.

We can see, you know, pretty good product, but yours came out four days after these other ones and says exactly the same thing. Why didn't you just use theirs? Or you produced really good things on all of these subjects but you're very weak as measured by the evaluation staff that works for me. Maybe you've got a management problem; maybe it is a training problem; maybe you shouldn't do that anymore. We've got the capacity to compare within agencies, between agencies, analyst to analyst on this, in ways that, again, if we're transparent, we will be better. That the incentive in the past was to kind of hide your mistakes. If you want to limit the dissemination of something you didn't feel very good about, we want it out there because that's the only way we're going to make it better.

MR. SAMPLE: Tom, thank you very much.

DR. FINGAR: No thank you all. (Applause.)

The thanks to you is genuine because this, as you can imagine – a daunting challenge that I welcome, that others who speak welcome. We relish this chance to make the change but we know we need your help. I'll be here through the day. Unfortunately I have to go back tonight so that Director McConnell can be with you tomorrow. I get to go do the Hill on Iraq and he gets to be here with – (laughter) – you tomorrow. So if you want to catch me with questions you didn't get a chance to ask in the breaks and so forth, I'm delighted to hear from you. Thanks, Tim.

(END)

Remarks and Q&A by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Transformation & Chief Technology Officer

Dr. Michael Wertheimer

DR. MIKE WERTHEIMER: Good morning. Now that Brian has facilitated, my name is Mike Wertheimer. I'm a career NSAer, and now that Brian has got your settings right, I will be keylogging all your keystrokes during my talk. (Laughter.) And it is my intention, for those of you not paying attention, to embarrass you on the Internet.

Could we bring up the slides, please? In a nutshell, I think we've done something good here. And I'm going to try to be the first speaker to really get into some of the details. What I need is something great. And I'm asking everyone, take a good idea; make it great. And sometimes, a good idea isn't great because it's limited itself in some of the decisions and it stuck it good. I get a sense we may be a little stuck it good. And we're going to try and give you the kind of conference, the kind of open discussion that we think is absolutely required for you to make it great.

So let me get started. I know that this will be probably the number one section, the blogging. But the greatest evil entity in all of science fiction were the Borg. Now, I know you'll argue with me, but it's true; it's not a debate. It's the Borg. (Laughter.) And the reason it was the Borg is because there was wonderful ambiguity. Now, there's the old saying, if a committee designed a horse, it comes out as the camel. If the government were left alone to design perfect collaboration, it would be the Borg. A spaceship that is the perfect cube, doesn't look like any spaceship.

Now, if you remember what the Borg was, the Borg was the ultimate collaborative society. For those of you who are not Star Trek fans, quickly, it was a community of people who – it was called the collective and individuals in the collective were called drones. And what they would do is they would go into a new society and if that society on that planet or whatever was old, had nothing to offer them, they just moved on. But when they found a society that had some technology, something that they felt would enhance them, they would assimilate them. And what they would do is they would assimilate the science and technology, and they would take the people and they'd put implants in them, and they would be part of the collective. It was one huge brain where everything was done collaboratively. It was absolutely the perfect society, if you want. There was no strife. But there was no individuality.

Why I bring this up is we keep talking about a culture of transformation, a culture of collaboration, a culture that has information sharing. There is not a single person in this transformation that is trying to go from one culture to a new culture. What we're trying to do is create the environment in which we can have many cultures at the same time. If you follow how the Borg were defeated, it was the multiculturalism. It was their unanimity of thought that brought them down. Let's face it, the targets are changing faster than we are. We've got to create a baseline, an environment in which many, many, many cultures can thrive, and the bad ones die gracefully, and the new ones grow quickly. That's what we're after here. No uniformity of thought.

So let me go, this to me, is what transformation is about. It's like grabbing at water. I honestly believe, without any hesitation, that all the easy problems have been licked. And that the only way we're going to solve the hard problems – and we have many of them, of course – but my point here is, we optimized to the Cold War for SIGINT problems, and HUMINT problems, and imagery problems. And I'm telling you, within these individual disciplines, we've solved the problems they can solve. The ones that are leftover, the tough ones, over and over again, the evidence shows that it happens when people from different INTs come together. They have got to collaborate.

I am a mathematician by training. And all the great math breakthroughs of the past century have come when someone looked at a problem and said this is absolutely nothing about what it seems to be; it's a problem in this area. And they bring a totally different viewpoint. Collaboration is, for us, about hooking up people. And hooking up people has this queer thing about it – it scares folks, because security – we'll talk about why it scares people in security; we'll talk about why it scares middle management; and so forth.

You know what I take that to mean? I take it to mean that this must be a pretty good idea, because if it weren't, they'd ignore it. And number two, if the bringing of people and information together is such a threat, that must mean there is a tremendous amount of power, which would happen if we brought that together. So that's what collaboration is going to be about.

Now, I've put here a few things. The larger one is A-space and ONI. Let me tell you a couple words about them. Later, you're going to hear Roberd Cardillo talk about A-space. Someone who is running an analysis program at the DIA is going to talk to you about something very technological. But he is going to tell you how that technology is making a difference for analysts. Later, we're going to have – on the library of national intelligence, we're going to have a technologist talk about how it's making social difference. Do you see that very, very interesting partnerships are going to come and try and talk to you about these things in ways that we don't normally talk about them.

So what is this A-space? What is that ring of water going around? Here is what I think. We, as human beings, go home every day; we have a line. Every one of us, in our minds, has created a line of honesty, integrity, whatever it is, that below this line, you don't compromise. This is your basic; this is what you need to survive every day. And everything above that line becomes negotiable. It's where you have trade space, how you accomplish things. It's gray areas. It's what give you your strength. It's what's underneath, what give you your creativity is what above.

We as a community, as an intelligence community, and as part of a world community, have to have some baseline that we don't negotiate on. Honesty, integrity, tradecraft standards, how we do alternative sources, how we look at when someone disagrees with what we say that we highlight that, how we source our data, how we prove our case – we have really tried to take that on with tradecraft standards, sourcing standards that I'm not going to get into today. That's been a whole major thrust is to draw that baseline.

Now, above that baseline is where the creativity comes in. It's where we exercise problem solving. Now, from that baseline down, the worst crime we could commit – it seems to me – is number one, I don't have the technology to be able to do all those things. I can't source because I don't have access to the sources. I can't collaborate because I can't chat to that person. We've got to build the technological infrastructure that allows everything above that line to happen. We have to have management endorse these policies.

The second biggest crime to me is that we don't allow our people to reach their full potential. This is a society; this is a community that tamps down potential. We can't allow the structures, the policies, the technology – A-Space is about both of those things. It's about creating an environment – and we'll talk about it later.

It's a virtual environment that will link all 16 agencies using the authorities of our CIO and the DNI, about how the vision is going to go that you have a place on your browser where things can plug in, where things can be more obvious to you, where you can actually for the first time ever read not only your top secret email, but have your Internet mail fed up. It's one place, a web environment where you can see all your email. So you don't have to have five different computers under your desk for the five networks that you want to see and have to switch between them. Have one computer on your screen that all five are feeding into. It's that kind of an environment that we're going to talk about more specifics later.

What is this library of national intelligence? I want you to suspend belief for just a second, because I'm going to tell you something that makes absolutely no sense, but should get you excited. It's the roach motel of libraries; things get in; nothing gets out. It's a library in which you can't see the stacks in the early days. Absolutely nothing you can see in the stacks – what value is it?

We're going to take every disseminated intelligence product, everything that's disseminated – that means it left this agency and was distributed to another agency, to a customer – and a copy will be deposited in the library of national intelligence. Think of this virtually. Don't take me literally. But a copy will be deposited for no one to see. But along with that will be a whole metadata description like a card catalog. And it will be at a classification that everyone can see. And hopefully, we'll have a top secret one, a secret one, and an unclassified one.

And the key part of this library – and I'm going quickly – will be that each card has a service associated with it. Could be just a hyperlink to get to the actual content; it could be a hyperlink that says I'd like to request a copy of this. And for the first time ever, we'll measure how many people are requesting what documents. Now, they can come back with four answers, it seems to me – great question; you're clear to get it; here's a copy of the document. Number two – oh wait, you're actually not cleared to read this; I'm going to clear you to read it. Number three – well, you're not cleared, but I'm going to rewrite this in a way – I'm going to rewrite this in a way that answers your question without having to hit the clearance. Or number four, you can go pound sand – I don't think you need to know it and I'm not going to show it to you. But we're going to measure it for the first time.

And then, as attribute-based access matures and starts to solve problems, you'll be able to automatically go in and establish your bona fides, and say, yes, I'm in that area of expertise. I have this need to know. And you have this responsibility to provide it to me. And we can start to automate it. We can start having Amazon-like services – people who found this report useful found that report useful; why don't you look there. Why bother having the content if you're never going to see it? Machines can see the content. Think of all the entity extractions.

Think of all the ways you can mark up this data and have machines do cluster analysis and other kinds of analysis. Say these five documents all seem related, so when you do your search, all five documents come back, even though they don't obviously appear to be related. Things like that – the library is just the starting point for us to get a handle on what it is we think we know and exposing that to absolutely every single analyst in the whole community. It's big. For us, it's huge. Okay.

Other things I have – I-ped is our way of saying intellipedia. I'm not going to talk about the things in smaller print. We talked about that. The ARC is the analytic resources catalog. It's a White Pages and a Yellow Pages. That is where we are today of how every analyst sort of logs their name and expertise. We're going to have a live version in A-space. More of that social networking – how do we actually tap into expertise?

Some people – CIA is running a pilot where they study emails. And by looking at your emails, they find out what your expertise. Turns out to be remarkably powerful. Those are the kinds of ideas we want you to feed back to us. How do I, in an A-space, where nothing is anonymous, where people are actively working, can I actually capture expertise? There is a plus and a minus, right? If I can capture expertise, I should be able to capture the guy who is doing things he shouldn't be doing. It's two sides of the same problem.

Okay, can we go forward? Information – this is a really tough thing for us. There is a real information overload. Make no mistake about it. And as Tom said earlier, often, our solution to finding a needle in a haystack is to pour more hay on it. And that's right, because if you go into each of the individual components,

if they can't find – an NSAer thinks it's a SIGINT problem. And if he can't find the answer, he doesn't ask somebody else; he asks for more SIGINT.

So what we're doing is we're feeding a collection – each of these cylinders of excellence are just creating taller cylinders. How do we actually share information across? And A-space is going to one of the ways because one of the ways we don't do it today is, oh well, I have a firewall. And your firewall is over here and we have two completely different security policies on how we exchange information and those have to be negotiated. So, if you have 16 and as a mathematician you have 16, choose two, which if I do the math right is 120 possible ways you can all argue about how we're going to share information. (Laughter.)

We have authorities; we have the ability to set a standard for the whole community and I hope when General Meyerrose speaks later, he's going to talk about an even bigger vision for what this is going to be and how we're going to do it. So, collaborating means, can I have an A-space? Can I have some virtual – and I don't mean virtual, private network literally but it will have that kind of look to it – that can tunnel through all these different firewalls and actually connect data, connect people, connect ideas.

So, can we now actually have that I don't need – let me back up – this thing plays over and over. I go and talk to analysts who have come together, multidisciplinary analysts from multiple agencies are given a hard problem; they're facilitated; they're given nice spaces to work, and they get a hard problem, and they never solve it. And the reason is, they're all introverts, so what they do is what all societies do, is they look for what they have in common when they come in the room, not for where they disagree. And some of them come in with some very, very cool ideas. But they get – all the rough edges get sanded off because they're looking for agreement; they want to get along. So at the end they'll say, we just couldn't have enough data to all agree, like a jury, what the sentence is.

So I'll say to them, I'll ask these questions, and it comes back the same time. Number one: would it surprise you to find out that the information to your answer, to your question, the real answer is in someone's desk drawer somewhere, you just couldn't find it? And no one's had the courage to say anything other than, it wouldn't surprise us in the least. We believe it's likely, or it certainly wouldn't be surprising.

Then, it gets a little weird. I say, suppose I told you going into this exercise, it is; I hid it in somebody's desk drawer. Would it have changed your strategy of how you went about solving the problem? And they answer, no. Every problem has a solution; we think, we had the best answer; we had the best strategy to find it and if it was findable in someone's desk drawer, we would've found it. Or, if it was findable, maybe you hid in a place that wasn't findable. So, now I say, okay, let me get this straight: it's likely or at least it's believable it's in a desk drawer. Number two: you don't think you're going to – your strategy isn't to change and be more aggressive in finding it. What is your strategy? And everyone says, we'll task more collection.

So, now we're in this loop. And I did it back to the envelope calculation a couple years ago, and I think it's pretty close. Of the data we're collecting, that is genuinely intel, not fluff – it's already been filtered and selected – we're only analyzing about one ten-millionth of the data we're collected today; one ten-millionth. Now, that number could be completely wrong. I think I got the number of zeros right, and if I'm not right it was either right a year ago or it will be right in the next year. That's how fast it's growing.

So, we're thinking about these problems. Catalyst is our first attempt to take data and instead of applying 100,000 different meta-data tags, and believe me, this is how government does it. Oh I have to have this tag, and I have to this tag, and I have to have this tag. By the time it's done and everybody's happy, you've got this ugly camel with 24 humps on it. We're going to reduce it and we're going to look up on five or six tags: person, place, thing and we're going to dip – we have some specific problems we'd like to go after – and we're going to dip this problem into multiple databases, filtering out all the superfluous tags and seeing how

well would five or six tags be in taking this massive information overload problem and see if we can add value. Totally experimental, and that's just starting to get underway.

I talked a little bit of the library of national intelligence, you'll hear General Meyerrose later talk about a much more expansive view of how we're going to see the library as a meta-data repository for much more than just disseminated reporting. It's our way of cataloging and making available all the best search tools of massive stores of data. It's really quite remarkable.

And then I've already talked a little bit about A-space and how we're going to do this. I want to see an A-space – by the way, it's supposed to be out; A-space is being built, initial operating of the pilot is supposed to be complete in December of this year. We're looking to have the ability to search right down in the Internet, that's – we're keeping our fingers crossed. Web-mail coming all the way out; we're going to have all kinds of web services in there, and I don't want to steal any thunder from the later speakers. We're going to design this essentially service-oriented architecture; everything's web-serviced in-client; things should plug in, you'll hear in a second how we're going to help you do this. Go forward.

Let me set technology aside for a second. What about analysis itself?
Let me start on this little thing here that maybe you haven't heard a lot about: RASER – Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response. What is that? It's only about people. We are building – like Navy Seals, but they're analysts – Special Forces, analytics though, we have our first team. What we did was we took a group of young analysts one to five years; there's a saying in the military, they piss vinegar. What that means is they've been in the community just long enough to know how bad off it is, and they're really mad, but they haven't been here long enough to know it's hopeless. (Laughter).

So, I like describe you know, this is the famous thing: young people, seldom right but they're never in doubt. So, they haven't figured out that they can't solve these problems, so they're right at the perfect place in their careers. We're yanking them out. We just took eight – I think we have eight in the first year as an experiment. We throw them in them in the woods. We made them solve problems. It wasn't about paintball in the woods. It was about solving problems they'd never had to solve before and just being able to learn how you go about solving problems you've never solved before. And every problem was designed that you had to rely on a teammate.

So they've learned how to shoot weapons. They've learned how to jump out of a car. They've learned how to do defensive driving. You pick all that sort of thing. But mostly, they've learned how to do analysis in new ways – hyper-accelerated training. Our goal is to get that five years of training that they claim before you're a good analyst down to one to two years. That team spent six months in our boot camp, really, really exciting. You know, when you first talk to them they'd look at their shoes. They didn't look you square in the eye. Now they look you right in the eye. They can give you a briefing in five minutes. They are confident. They are not over confident. They stand up straight. They think big thoughts. It's really exciting. It's working.

And Renee Novakov (sp) came up from one of our deployments from SOUTHCOM and she's going to tell you what she thinks of the team. The team got six months boot camp, six months – they'll do two rotations here in the United States. One's in a major police department Intel unit. The other team is going down to SOUTHCOM and then we're going to rotate them through. And then they're going to go active in year two. We're already in the process of recruiting this year's team, which is orders of magnitude just in the quality of people of the breath of skills that are coming up. I don't mean to say that the folks on this team aren't as good as the folks coming in. I'm just saying we're getting a much better stand of people interested in doing this.

Young people want to be challenged. The young lady from – as I was told, from Los Angeles FBI, six foot one, world class athlete – I guess she played college softball – came in. Just absolutely – you know, you're

ideal of who would be a great analyst. And we said, well, why do you want to join this program? She said I love my job. I love what I'm doing but she told – same story. She says, I am just – don't feel that I get to reach my potential here. I have not been tested to reach my potential and I want a chance to do everything I'm capable of doing and to find out what it is I'm capable of doing. That's analytic transformation.

People are thinking that way. We have to create the opportunity. So you'll hear more about RASER. We're very excited. Sharp is our summer hard problem and I believe the panel that succeeds me will talk about that, four weeks off site. We put together some very, very distinct communities. We clear them at the secret level to work some hard problem. I don't want to steal their thunder. We've had three now, the last one being in Orlando. They'll talk about it. We put state, local, tribal together with analysts to worry how does a terrorist plot that might hatch overseas – and it's a foreign intel problem – become a criminal problem or law enforcement problem when it would migrate here? How do we do that handover? How do we have tradecraft that can talk together so that it's a seamless handover? And they've done some really, really clever stuff.

A-space, I talked about. The Smaller Print Analysis 101, our first community course for all new analysts. And I've talked a little bit about tradecraft standards that we've issued and sourcing standards that are about to come out. We've all researched. I think we did something good here. I'm embarrassed because I can't remember what RDEC stands for again. I forget my kids' names by 11 so don't beat me up. RDEC is our research and development network. What we're doing is, it exists today. It's in a network that spans the globe with terminals.

We are going to take RDEC, which is a closed network. They take real, live intel data. They put into RDEC. And then you can work on it any tool you want. It doesn't have to be certified. They reboot the system every day. RDEC and A-Space will merge into exactly the same architecture. What that means is any new tool can go into RDEC first with no security process whatsoever; see if the tool has utility. See if that tool makes sense. If people like it, if it has that viral effect that people run and grab it, then it's one-time certification and it pops into A-Space and it becomes a tool for the whole community. So you'll hear more about RDEC.

RDEC is actually going to be a piece of IARPA. That's our intelligence advance research projects and that's coming. We'll hear more about that. I want to say just a couple of words about those last two things before I wind down so you have time to ask questions. Digital native, digital complexity, worth talking about. You saw all of that before. Jan Carch (sp) showed me a paper called "Digital Native, Digital Immigrants." Keeps me up at night. What it says in there – it's the first pass at a new concept. It means that people entering college now, today – they did surveys – and on average they've spent about 5,000 hours reading books, 10,000 hours playing video games and about 20,000 hours watching T.V. And functional MRIs are showing that their brains – the synopsis in their brains are actually wiring differently than certainly my generation.

Their ability to process multiple streams of data – to watch T.V., listen to the radio, and do their homework at the same time while they're IMing – (laughter) – seems so foreign to many of us. We shut down the other streams. To them, it's natural and we don't teach in that – we keep teaching linearly. We keep expecting them to think linearly. That's not what grabs them. Table down here, our young guys. They've already uploaded videos from today's talk onto the Intellilink blogs. They're already blogging about this thing live. And took their own videos and they've already got them up there. When Claudine had trouble logging in, they're chatting with the Interlink – it's just an admin's thing. Why is this down? They've been doing that this whole time.

I'm convinced they screwed it up here so they could show off – (laughter) – which is good too, okay. I don't know – if they're right. If this research is right, there's a functional disconnect. There is a real step-function disconnect between how my generation and many generations like me interact with data and how the new people interact with data. And if we don't find a way to make them excel and give them the capabilities – Morgan Maginsky once told me, Mike, you will have succeeded when you become really hard to manage. I

really think part of A-Space and transformation is having an analytic workforce that turns out to be very, very hard to manage.

Complexity – I don't want to talk too much about it because I've run out of time. The point of complexity is there was a time in which you had rules. There's a lot of cool research that's keeping up at night that said, when you had processes by which you understood how to solve your problem, but it was complicated – building a car. What you do is you design rules and then you follow the rules and you have a nice – and the management structure that works for that is a hierarchy – just like we have now. Bureaucracy is very, very good for making cars.

But when it comes to innovation where there are very few rules of how you actually interact, it's something called complex. You have complexity. And when those rules change with time, it's called chaos. And complexity and chaos are in a death struggle here and the way you manage that is with – in the words of computer science – with object-oriented coding. What you do is you break things down into smaller processes, all of which can interact in unique ways. Mash-ups is a new word for that.

We have to think about mashing up how we actually run our community. It's a whole new concept, simplicity. I love this quote. "Make it just as simple as you possibly can but not too simple." Our efforts are low cost; they're high vision; low cost, lots of spiral development. I think that's part is very, very important. What is it – KISS. Keep it simple, stupid. When we start getting too complex where it demands too much training, too much interface, too much handholding, we've made a mistake.

Finally, security. I'll say one thing about security and it's simply put. We have need to know, which has been encoded in executive order. We have need to share, which appears for the first time in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. So you have need to share and need know at odds. And the way the director of National Intelligence has described this, he says, we have a responsibility to provide. And by that he means there's some creative tension between these two extremes.

What that means to me is the monkey on security is not on my back. We are going to share more. We are going to take risk. And for the first time, the challenge is not why we can't do it; it's how you're going to find a way to secure this. We will share more. We are going to break some glass. And the goal here is if we fail, it's because the security folks have not stepped up and found a way. I am a lifelong NSAer and I know that everything about security was designed to keep humans out of the loop, right? There's no such thing as idiot-proof software because they keep coming up with a better idiot. (Laughter.) Deal with it.

This is about raising the level of human being interaction. Humans must start to interact in new ways to solve our problems. Find some security solutions. And if we fail, it's not my failure because I'm willing to meet in the middle; it's time they did. Finally – (laughter) – okay. Why don't we move right to – I don't think I can top that picture. Okay, so we have – I have a few minutes for questions. I see some people have already done this, so let me answer the first ones real fast. No, I'm sorry. I am happily married. (Laughter.)

I'm very happy in my job and you probably couldn't afford me. (Laughter.) But wow, maybe you can. (Laughter.) Okay. It says, people live on JWICS not RDEC. How can you value what usefulness if the test tools are hidden behind the development environment? Great question. One of the things we're doing is RDEC is on the top-secret networks. We are already investing in building RDEC on the unclassified network. A copy of RDEC lower so we can get folks on intellinkyou (sp) and SIPR (sp) to start talking there. And that may not be the best idea all right because RDEC on the top-secret networks is a smaller community. Let's see if it works in a broader community. I think the problem is the way you use information is the same even if the problem you're solving maybe doesn't reach the highest levels. So that's the plan.

Okay. How did you go about finding the analyst that you had on the RASER teams? I'd like to give you a really nice story here and I can't. We have 16 components, only four of which are participating in RASER. Some just can't believe the world will continue to spin on its axis if they give up an analyst for two years. We pay for everything. You don't get an analyst in exchange; you give up the person. They come back to your agency but you don't get to backfill them. We pay for everything. And we just can't seem to break a barrier here.

So what I'm hoping is – what with the agencies are participating, we recruit by going with broad agency announcements. We send it out. We tell the leadership in each. I send letters to the directors of all the agencies. We send it out to the heads of analysis of all the agencies. We follow up with phone calls. We have on intellipedia major sites on the RASER team.

The sad part is not that people don't know about it. It's people are being told by their managers, you may not apply. Hopefully, we'll be so successful when this first team goes operational this December that people will want to join something that's that great. I wish I could be more positive. But by the way, we are getting women. We are getting men. We're getting people of color. We're getting every – the diversity of the group is exactly – it would really make you proud.

Well, what about us 40-, 50-somethings who have an awful lot to offer like that deep target expertise policy-savvy so forth? Where do we fit in? Well, I'm one of those guys. You know, I love being around young folks. I had a great talk this morning at breakfast with David Camin (sp), one of the really, really smart guys here. He says, Mike, you know, you're just so great. You're so different than most government guys. You're like 99.9 percent different than all this. You're great. He says, now let's tidy up that one-tenth of one percent and then he launched in to how I screwed up. I love that. He's way too big on the 99.9. I have not found a young person who does not die for someone with senior experience to help walk them through a problem.

What they don't like to hear is no, you can't do that. And for the 40-, 50-somethings this is a sweet time because you have more than half of the community hired since 9/11, more than half. They're dying for this expertise. Learn from them. I can't tell you how many times people say, well, I don't know about this intellipedia. I don't know how to do it. I haven't been trained. If half of the people around you grew up on this, just ask them to help. I'm always running out of my desk. How do I get on this blog? How do I get there? And some young person tells me. You got to meet them halfway in the middle and I guarantee you they are so thirsty and hungry for your expertise. Give them that chance. They're not looking to throw you out. They love the expertise in this community.

We sell them short. We sell all the young people short; not only in our expectations of them, the way we challenge them for their potential, but in a predisposition to think that they're only there to do things differently because they want to be different. It's just how they are. Their brains are wired differently. Let's respect that.

I'm sorry. I'm a little blinded. Go ahead.

Q: Curious on where a year from now, two years from now, what in your mind would make the DNI, the analysis community wildly successful?

DR. WERTHEIMER: I heard the wildly successful, the rest I didn't hear. So next? (Laughter.)

Q: A year or two from now, what would make, in your mind, DNI, the analysis group wildly successful where you could walk away or you could look back and say, that's exactly what I wanted it to be?

DR. WERTHEIMER: Yes, great question. I think when we have this conference next year, Tom Fingar is going to introduce Sean Wohltman (Laughter) And I am going to be introducing, and they are going to own this and you are going to own this and we're going to have young people up here telling us what it is they need. Instead of us talking down to them and saying here's some big vision we're building towards, that to me is if they take ownership and they feel analytic transformation is theirs and they're telling us what to do.

And believe me, we will have this conference again next year or the year after, whatever makes sense. And believe me, Tom will be the first – and I speak for him, but I think it would be his delight to introduce some young – to give a five minute introduction for someone who talks for an hour or 45 minutes and answers your questions just like we're trying to answer them today with confidence and certainty and excitement.

Q: Mike?

DR. WERTHEIMER: Is there another –

Q: Yes.

DR. WERTHEIMER: Yes, Mike.

Q: Tim asked the optimistic question this morning and that is what are the incentives to innovate? Let me ask the other side of that. Whether it is agencies that don't want to participate in RASER or security regimes that don't want to meet half way, when do the people resisting change start to feel pain? (Applause.)

DR. WERTHEIMER: Yeah, well – (laughter.) You know, I felt like I was a made man. You know, I don't for minute think I'm part of this young group here. That would be a fallacy. But when they blogged about me the other day, having read The New York Times article, and someone on the Intelink blog said, Mike Wertheimer – I guarantee he wrote – Mike Wertheimer will cause people to get killed over this, and then went on a real tirade about how this is a mistake. And you know what happened? It had almost the opposite effect. People said, if this is really the way people in security think, they've gone over the edge.

And I think the answer – I don't have a good answer, Bill. That's a perfect question. And I'm actually starting to sense that this young cadre is starting to become difficult to manage. And let me tell you, that's a lot of pain for a manager. It's a lot of pain chasing around folks who are actually innovating and collaborating and finding ways to not take credit, but to get to the right answer. I think that's the near-term answer. It's not a good one but when they take ownership and this is an entrepreneurial community here – they're going to take that risk. I think that's great. I still think the jury is still out on the notion of the office of the director of National Intelligence. In large part, we haven't had a principal deputy director so the DNI, the person who owns these authorities hasn't been able to give it the time that it needs. He just can't. It simple cannot. Physics don't permit it.

But I think in Director McConnell, I think in the new U.S. DI, General Clapper, it's like a dream team is coming together and I'm optimistic for a year. Let's see how creative they can be, how much they're willing to risk on our behalf. And it's about time they did.

I wish I could have said something better. I think I'm running over. Should I wind down now? I'm looking for some guidance. (Laughter.) All right. Here's one. Let me answer one and then really, I don't want to cut into the panel and definitely don't want to cut into lunch.

Who is asking security to meet us in the middle? Who is letting them know they aren't even close? (Laughter.) That question was asked by Dale Meyerrose. (Laughter.) Correct me if I'm wrong, I really think we are starting to do this and I will defer to General Meyerrose later. I don't think we've been as vocal about it.

I don't think we've been as prescriptive and right in their face. Times are changing. You will have to meet us in the middle. But who is asking? I can tell you everyone in the DNI is. There isn't a person in the office of the director of National Intelligence that isn't singing this song over and over.

I don't know. Ultimately each agency tries to pull back a little bit. The first reaction is to step back. If A-Space is successful – if we actually have people saying I need access, creating a demand. It's amazing to me, the iPhone. The most expensive phone – it's fantastic, right? There's an iPhone right there. It's fabulous. It's the stupidest investment ever, but it's so cool. I want one. (Laughter.) Right? Someone did this – it's like $2000 between all the fees and everything. It's so cool, so viral; it's actually changing the way people view phones. It really is. It's just like the iPod fundamentally changed the way we view music.

I'm from a generation that bought albums. Those are collections of songs. I'm looking at the table here – (laughter) – all put together by one artist. My kids look at me. Why would you do that? I'll take that song. I'll take that song. I'll take that song. When we create that – when people say I need that data, that data, and that data. Now find a way to give it to me. We're on the hook at ODNI. If we don't do that then Congress should come down on us and so should the American people. I mean, security better find a way to do it. You know what, at the end of the day maybe someone does get killed for this, but I read in the paper every day how many people are dying. And they're dying not to create an environment, which – they're dying. They're putting their lives at risk so we can create this environment.

People are dying today. And we can't afford the kinds of mistakes that we're making based on the way we're doing business today. It's just bottom line. We have got to leapfrog two generations ahead of everybody else just to get back in the game. So if I'm the first one to get killed, so be it. All right. And I do believe out of five holes on – (chuckles) – any given day. That's really more than I wanted to say.

We're capturing all these questions. I will respond to them. I'll be online to respond. Let's get to the panel. I'll wrap up at the end of the conference. I'll try to summarize all the questions we didn't get to. Thank you again for coming. Please, take something good. Please – I hope it's good and make it great.

(Applause.)

(END)

**Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director for Analysis,
Defense Intelligence Agency**

Mr. Robert Cardillo

MR. CARDILLO: Thanks, Jim. And I don't know if I'm thanking you, Tim, or Tony or Tom, for the vaunted first position after-lunch briefing. (Laughter.) But thank goodness it was a late lunch and the tortellini didn't have that much sauce and so – (laughter) – I did see people go back to the tiramisu. Jim, I saw you. And so as the blood launched the drop, you know, to the stomach digestion kind of track, I will try to keep your attention a little elevated here with my discussion about A-Space.

And in my main point, and I'll try to stick to it, is this is about connections and connecting. And I'll talk the various methods that I expect to see in this functionality and the benefit to the analytic community and our customers throughout the pitch. But let me start with tying a connection to Sean who did such a nice job of introducing Tom first thing this morning. Sean, I think, said he was 25-years old. So here's the connection. I'm in my 25th year in the intelligence business. So there, we have that in common, Sean.

You were hired by NGA two years ago, I think you said. Analysis and production, is that right? So I was the director of analysis and production, so I can take credit, right, for finding this talent (Laughter.) Thank you. And also, though, recall what John said how much disappointment he experienced when he went to his desktop and logged on. So I'm too, responsible for that. Sorry about that. But the truth be known, it's all the IT guys' fault, you know. (Laughter.) And, Grant, get ready because the really, really tough questions are coming your way.

Let's see. Seriously though, I'm very please to be able to participate in this conference. I'm very pleased to be a part of A-Space. Myself and Grant Schneider, the Deputy Director for Information Systems and the CIO at DIA, were partners with Tom and with Mike to make a difference in making connections between and among our workforce and our customer set. And to take the analogy that Mike spoke to earlier, we're talking about foundational capability here.

I'm going to add some things to the superstructure of that but this is about the basic connections. I mean, A-Space in many, many ways is exquisitely simple. It's bringing people and data together so that they can think better, differently about the problem sets and come up with more relevant and actionable conclusions or assessments for our customer set. And again, if nothing else, what A-Space does, it needs to increase the transparency, reduce barriers so that people can at least enable the potential that we talked about, about Sean and his colleagues that are coming in.

I think, Tom, you mentioned the 50 percent, you know, since 9/11. I'm actually at 61 percent. So 61 percent of my workforce has been in my organization for less than five years. And, yes, that's daunting and I also think that's just an enormously positive potential there. We really, now, are in the window in which we get to shape a generation of analytic capability for the future. And so while there's challenges they're in with mentorship and training and tradecraft development and IT applications and meeting expectations of the folks that are joining our business. The upside is huge and so I hope that A-Space is part of the realization of that upside.

So what I would propose to do is I'm going to walk you through an intelligence scenario as a way to explain the difference that I hope A-Space can make to the analysts on the floor. So it's going to be pretty generic given the environment in but hopefully you'll follow and understand where I think the potential value is.

So I'm an analyst. I'm sitting at my desktop. The network is up – thank you, Grant – and I will get an email or some kind of – you know, usually the tasking is very particular. It could be particular to your agency, all right; it could be particular to directorate, but somehow, you know, that light will go off and say you have a tasking.

Generally, we call these things requests for information and in my particular case, we have a customer in the Pentagon who wants to know about some regional aggression in a certain locale. And so, his question is relative to the intentions of a potential adversary in a particular region in the world – pretty generic questions; pretty realistic analytic challenge that we get day in and day out.

Well, the first question the analysts ask themselves is what do we know? Mike talked about it earlier but that's not as simple as it sounds. We literally don't know what we know when we start working that question. And so often, you know, you'll do your best to search your databases and your files and that desk drawer that Mike sent an answer in and all that. But more often than not, I can guarantee you that you have not set that context properly. So you're working from a faulty context to begin with because you haven't leveraged properly what exists. And I'm talking about exist in an unclassified and in a collateral and in a top-secret environment. It doesn't matter. So we're getting off on the wrong foot today.

The second piece is, you know, you understand what you do and then you need to start working through, okay, what gaps do I need to fill? And the comment was made earlier that all too often it's a knee-jerk response. Ah, collection, right. I need to write the collection requirement. And I will say that like a river, okay, or even like sheep, analysts will follow the path of least resistance. And it is really easy to submit the collection requirement, almost too easy.

And by the way, I used to be a collector so I can speak of one. I mean, there usually is that question upfront that people just kind of just check the box, you know. Have you searched the libraries? You know, have you researched the sources that exist and what not? And everybody just checks that really quickly and just says, bang, get me the new SIGINT, get me the new GEOINT, get me the new HUMINT.

So again, an inefficient application of the collection system. I will go out to Intelipedia or there's a reasonable chance I will. More and more of our population are comfortable doing that. And that will help in your research, okay, to the extent that the data might be there or you might come across other analysts but you'll be limited on a couple of issues. Classification is one. Mike spoke about the five terminals. So which level are you doing your Intelipedia search at? And who's on there and who's not? And so it is indeed a hit-or-miss proposition.

Now, let's just assume that that requirement that came in, you had some period of time. This wasn't give me an answer in an hour; it was, you know, end of the week or maybe even two weeks, so you have time. But with respect to collaboration, it's unlikely – it's unlikely that you would go to a chat room or that you would go to a community of interest. I'm not saying we don't have those and those don't work. They do when we focus our attention and effort. But more often than not, you'll put together a hypothesis, maybe some early conclusions, an assessment in draft form and you'll package that up in probably a word document and you'll send it to somebody via e-mail.

And who is that somebody? Well, that's somebody that you know, you've worked with before, you met in a prior job or it could be in a different agency. But in any one of those cases, it's who do you know and who do you trust. And that's, you know, above those foundation. And while A-Space is about connections, what we need to figure out how to do within that virtual space is how do we enable and grow and flourish, you know, that sense of trust and confidence.

I mentioned this is my 25th year. I can say, without reservation and I tell every new analyst that joins my organization that your value as an analyst to our business and to your customer is directly proportional to the depth and diversity of your network. All right, and no offense, not your IT network; your analytic network: who you work with, who you interact with, where you get expertise from, who you ask questions of. That was true when it was punch cards and acetate, okay, and it's true today.

So let's remember the tool we're talking about is just that; the tool is in fact a way to reduce those barriers, increase the confidence, build some trust, but at the end of the day, those analysts need to communicate. And Tom said we can't all get in one room. This is going to help us virtually get in one room. But on top of that application, okay, there needs to be increased emphasis on tradecraft development, on critical thinking, on structured analytical techniques. I mean, this is kind of a necessary foundational precondition but not sufficient.

So I put the report together, I email it out, I get some comments back, I feel pretty good about my response, I think it's ready to go, so I send it to my senior analyst. Okay, and whatever shop you're in, you need to get it cleared through some senior analytic review. Now, depending where you are, that might be a one-, two-, three-step process but there will be somebody that checks that. And let's assume it gets through with minor edits and what not and the it gets posted. Now, that could be posted on Intelink; that could get sent to the customer; that could get printed in hardcopy. It could be all those things.

As a matter of fact, it's most likely going to the executive intelligence summary that ODNI puts together everyday. But more than likely – and Tom raised this point – three or four days later or three or four days before there may well have been same region, generally the same question, but different agency, different perspective and the like.

And by the way, I start with the premise that my analysts, you know, they show up at work a day – they come to work each day not intending, okay, to segregate. They don't really want to put up walls. I get it. We're all introverted and all that. That's true. That's part our basic makeup. But this idea that they want to work in a dark room, you know, with no outside help is not right.

And I really believe that if we both enable the capability and then encourage the behavior – and that's a huge part of this too. We talked earlier about, you know, about how we recognize and reward. Look, all too often today, it counts. Okay, you had four PDB items this quarters. She had two. You're clearly the better analyst so, you know, you're going to get the new job; you're going to get the whatever.

We have to change, as managers and leaders, the behavior that we exhibit, okay, that tells them that not only is collaboration expected, that it will be recognized and it'll be rewarded and that you actually – you can advance much more quickly. Again, it goes back to your value, reflection of that network. So, that's kind of the as is, if you will, and I'll talk to you a little bit about what I think can be possible under A-Space. But first, I want to share some comments that I had that should be a cautionary note to all of us here.

I both had lunch with some of my analysts and then asked for some input on actually this presentation on my blog. And here's a couple of quotes: One, "we'll believe it when we see it." Okay, these folks are jaded. They've been through this before. They've been told X application was coming to save the day and this will change the way you do business. So trust me, they're going to have a chip on their shoulder a bit on this to prove that this is different.

And here's another quote: "I hope it doesn't become another tool that we throw money at that ends up not really helping the intended user, the analyst, only to become a high echelon briefing bullet." Okay, that's directed at me. And I get that; all right, I've been there and I've been on the other end of these expectations. So what I really like about our approach here, as I said earlier, is in its simplicity. I mean, A-Space needs to be

about connections, okay. It means about reducing those barriers and increasing that transparency so that that trust and confidence can occur and that people can make better calls.

So how do we propose that A-Space is different, okay, and it isn't the same old same old and it isn't just a briefing bullet? Well, I'm going to speak to four capabilities. One is that enabling of information sharing. Two is the lower barrier to increase that trust. Easing the process of analytic innovation. And finally, value to our customers, which we must keep in mind. If our customers don't see value in this, you know, then it just becomes a self-licking ice cream cone.

So anyway, let me speak to each of those objectives briefly. First, enabling information sharing. In a large extent, remember what I said, it's finding people. The one prerequisite, okay, for you to participate, okay, as an intelligence-commuting member within the A-Space world, is that you're registered in the analyst research catalog. It's not hard to do. This is yellow – white pages that was spoken about earlier. You need to put in, you know, what you're working on, what your background is, what your experience level is and the like. But that's it. So then you're in. But, again, it's only as good as those analysts that keep it up to date.

It also is our intent – but this is not going to be a mandated activity, all right; we think that would be the exactly the wrong message to send to folks. So this isn't going to thou shalt go into A-Space and do the following project or thou shalt do everything within there. As a matter of fact, I was stopped in the hall on the way in by a colleague of mine who's a manager of a large analytic organization. This is where he was – oh my god, what if they go in and never come out? You know, I mean, what if they're just chatting all day and not doing anything? You know, where is the report? And where is that, you know, that – how am I getting the inbox work down? Trust me, there's going to be real tension there. There is now.

I have folks of my generation that see it as a distraction, all right. That, again, goes to our leadership and our learning that we need to go through so that it is not, that it is in fact just a better way to build that and grow that network so that improved analysis can come out the other end.

So how do we lower the barriers? Like I said, it's once in, all in. Can there, should there be communities of interest within in A-Space? Of course there should. Should we be able to discriminate between opinion and expertise? Of course. Look, we're all living the post-WMD commission report. We all owe it to ourselves and to our customers a pedigree of information, all right: original source, vetting of that source, an assessment thereof and tying it down to the information, okay, that we're capturing, and then the conclusion or the assessment that we're making. So we've got to carry that forward. There's got to be a way to have, as I said, a confidence of what you're seeing in A-Space or having a discussion on. You can have some idea about the voracity.

So another quote that I got from one of my analysts: "The future in my mind is a tool in which the knowledge is available in its validity, virus, et cetera is plain for all to see." That's the key phrase: plain for all to see.

I'm a firm believer that, you know, if we're in that shared knowledge space, that the voracity of the information will speak to itself, okay. People will move to those analysts that have that expertise and that responsiveness. I'm not sure if the eBay model is going to be, you know, the way it's going to do it. You know, you're going to get scores and what not.

But let's face it, you know, any of you have been in an analytic environment and you know, there's 10 or 100 people in your office, you know who people go to. I mean, even if you don't have a computer, people go back to the senior analyst that can give them the relevant responsive answer. So how do we translate that kind of confidence that exist in human-to-human interaction with A-Space?

Easing analytic innovation. This goes to really the processes and procedures we use, the analytic techniques. Today, it's all through ad hoc – depends where you are and what the problem sets are, what classes you've been to and the like, what your boss will approve, what your senior analyst is familiar with. But our past practice of recording those techniques is very weak and so it's difficult as either a colleague – okay, a collaborator or as a consumer to understand, geez, I don't know how they got there, okay. I can see the pieces of data but there's a leap and, oh, by the way, there needs to be a leap to say what's next because let's not forget, our business isn't, you know, historical reporting; we're not telling our customers just what happened yesterday. We have to tell them what it means and what it means for them tomorrow. That's the essence of the intelligence function.

So there is going to be a leap but you have to carry the reader through and you have to have them – again, they have to have the trust and confidence in you. But then when you talk about value, which is what it's all about. We're only successful in A-Space, okay, if our customers, our policymakers, our war fighters, their decisionmakers make better decisions in their time cycle. And so we need to be careful that the metrics for A-Space isn't just about users and pages and counts and those kinds of things. We need to find a way – and this is bigger than A-Space – but we need to find a way to grab that metric from the customer side. So making it happen.

How will this all occur? I don't actually know, okay. That's why I have Grant on my – (chuckles) – side with respect to the technical applications. But functionally, let me tell you, there will be an access environment in A-Space, all right, which will do that connecting that I talked about earlier. Who's working on what? What background and experience do people have? There will be a questions form. Again, what questions do you have in your inbox or do you have, as an analyst, that your seeking knockdown a really hard target?

And I agree, Ambassador Carson's – the experience that we had with him on the Darfur problem was exactly that. He would come out of serious high-level, policy-level discussions and tell us what the questions were. And I know that may sound simple. Frankly, it's unusual to get that kind of input. But I got to tell you, when the analyst can see exactly what secretary for X wants or undersecretary, you know, needs for a negotiation or a tactic that makes all the difference because then you have much more energy and enthusiasm to get the right answer.

There'll be an emerging insights form. This'll be where we'll capture those techniques, those analytical procedures and processes so that we can share with one another what's working and what's not. Now, again, this isn't going to all happen in December; it's not going to all roll out at once. We will move into phase one in December to do begin this, and it where it will be a learn-as-you-go, which it needs to be. As a matter of fact, that's the essence, if you will, of A-Space itself.

So the true test is, as I said, does it facilitate the analytic process? And while I have high hopes for it, one other thing – and I stole this from General Cartwright in a prior speech he's given too – if it doesn't, okay, and if somehow it doesn't meet the kinds of expectations that I have or what not, we need to recognize that very soon as well. I have a saying. My workforce is going to vote with their mouse. You know, they're going to either go and they're going to find value in it, all right, and then they're going to return. I mean, it's like almost like any Internet application. You know, if you get utility out of that site, you'll return. You'll stay longer and the like.

But we need to be at least aware enough and cognizant enough that it might not work and we might have to try something else but the intent should be the same. So let me just say in conclusion that folks like, you know – analysts like you heard today like Sean are who we are talking about as they come into this workforce.

But as it was mentioned earlier, I've also have a very senior analytic workforce at the other end of my demographic that needs this capability as well. Now, their training, their cultural achievement, you know, their integration to the technical capability will be different. But if we can't bring those two together, we will have failed folks like Sean and reduced the ability to network and have that senior mentorship.

And let me just say as a slight aside to – since I have a captive audience – there is a piece in the middle that we're all, I believe collectively missing and that's middle management training and leadership. And, oh, by the way, they need to understand the value and the potential of this because the worse thing we can do is to take the Seans and send them off to A-Space training, get them excited, send them back to the office, right, and have the branch chief go – (chuckles) – we don't do that here. That's cute, Sean, but, you know, can you just, you know, practice that on your own because I've got, you know, this process that's tried and true. We got to keep up with the numbers or my division chief's going to get upset.

I'll tell you, we're letting down ourselves and that workforce, those branch and division chiefs, by not addressing this key training and education problem. And that's way beyond A-Space but I thought I would mention it.

So it is about connections. It's about freeing the potential of the workforce and the managers and our senior analysts. And so with that I will, I think, turn to this guy here and see if you all have any questions for the next couple of minutes at least.

Okay, the suit is Hugo Boss. The tie is Nordstroms' rack. (Laughter.) Mike, you already took that one didn't you? Let's see. I'll read these. "A-Space sounds good. Is there a set of technical parameters that ensure inoperability and capability among and between agencies and elements of the IC?" Grant, I just picked that one out of the air. I have no idea, okay. But that's why my business partner in this arrangement is Grant Schneider. I don't know if you want to address that or not.

GRANT SCHNEIDER: (Off mike) – we might talk about later today – (off mike).

MR. CARDILLO: Okay, the answer is there's not today, that it's certainly an issue that we need to work through because it can't be shared space unless we deal with those interoperability and capability issues and it could be that General Melrose will speak to this later.

"Is there a code of ethics for good community behavior on A-Space?" There's some, what do you – netiquette out there for Intelipedia interaction and the like. From my experience because you're attributed now, this is not an anonymous space. You know, bad behavior is kind of like life, you know. Look, are people going to be rude and insult and say something inappropriate at times? Of course they are. But we're going to do that over lunch and we're going to do that in our cubes. Will it happen on A-Space? I'm sure it will.

I happen to believe it'll be self-policing. I know an analyst who worried about being scooped. Hey, if I post my assumption before I write my report, that other agency, who isn't altruistic as I am, is going to get it out there and get it. And I told him, you know what, that's probably going to happen. You're probably right. Somebody is going to scoop you. But guess what? You know, they might quote when that short-term issue but what just happened to their network, all right? It just got minimized.

Who's going to participate and collaborate with that person, you know, who behaves that way? So I'd liked to think that, you know, if you're open with others that'll be returned. But we will see. Clearly you will be able to do this in DIA but what about CIA and others? Well, we'll see. I mean, again, this is not a forced march. I have a very good relationship with my counterpart, John Kringen at the CIA. As a matter of fact, the next speaker is from the CIA to talk about the Library of the National Intel. So we're all talking our piece here.

But I couldn't agree with you more. I mean, if this is about, you know, some kind of DIA optimization or NG optimization then we're wasting our time. So I'm serious. We will see.

"What tests have been done to demonstrate the utility of A-Space?" I don't know. I don't know that there have been, so good question. (Chuckles.) We'll try to figure that out. Okay, we're changing font size coming up on the screen. "How do we ensure trusted, cleared, state and local analysts are invited into A-Space?" I don't know. Other than it's – I mean, to the extent that we can figure out that plumbing problem, okay, that's the, you know, network-to-network issue between those kinds of entities, state and local, then I think this is easy.

Okay, what I said at the front end I know is very, very difficult. So while I said, you know, for the 18,000 that we know about, you know, that live at the SCI, you know, high-classification world. It's a very a low barrier. I appreciate that we've got other hurdles to clear for state and local. I'll ask it but I don't know. "Do you see a place for a second life-like concept in the IC?" That's where the people have these fictitious lives on the net, right? I don't think so. I'd hope not. (Laughter.) That goes to my manager's concern out there about analysts actually doing work and not wandering.

I have a question here.

Q: Two questions. One, how far do you see A-Space – (inaudible) – down to the actual level, down to the operational level or is – (inaudible) – going to be brought into this? And my second question is once we try and get this out to the various other organizations, is there going to be a sweeping – (inaudible) – that said, you guys – (inaudible) – for A-Space that we can just rubber stamp it or – (inaudible).

MR. CARDILLO: The question, in case you didn't hear is, you know, what's the expanse or the scope of A-Space? What's our target set and does it go to the tactical and command level? And then second one is kind of an application question. If we say it's good enough for A-Space, does that – if the CIO says it's good enough for A-Space, is it good enough for another network? To the first question, you know, in the pilot phase, we're certainly going to be living at the JWICKS/SCI level but it'll have to cascade.

Okay, let's assume success and we have value; it's got to move together levels. Classification dependence, for example, you know, you take tactical. You know, you go forward predominately living in a supernet world, all right. There should be supernet A-Space. And, oh, by the way, things that occur there should be extractable up and there should be a way, okay, that we can have things moved between those two barriers. But we shouldn't kid ourselves. We're not going to get rid of, you know, classification levels and access. So that will be a general barrier that we will have to and need to adjust accordingly.

To your other question, I don't know. As I understand the intent of the CIO – and, again, General Melrose could well be speaking to this today – is to deal with that issue of why each of us has to go through our own testing and approval process and why can't there be some kind of good housekeeping – I'm making stuff up. I mean, you know, seal of approval that we all could use. So I'll kick the answer later unless you want to answer it, Grant?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes, we're working towards that.

MR. CARDILLO: We're working towards it. That's what I heard. (Laughter.) Thanks. How, do we – okay, I'll do one more. Okay, "How do we convince managers that it's useful and creating positive environments for collaboration?" Well, it's got to come out in the value. You know, the metric can't be, hey, congratulations, Joe; you've got 30 analysts in A-Space; they all logged on today, okay. The metric can't be, you know, like I said earlier, that you have 1800 pages this month. How did you answer the question of the customer in a better and more timely relevant way?

Now, that's been kind of an age-old challenge. I'm not saying that's easy to do, that kind of grand metric, but that has to be the effect. And we have to find a way to keep ourselves grounded to that or else again, we'll just become enamored with, you know, the numbers on the chart and the page counts and all that. So we have to find a way to take that evaluation to the customer and have them tell us. And to me, that's the way you that you incentivize managers to continue.

Okay, I'll stop there because I think I'm a little bit over. But I appreciate your time and attention. I look forward to help. I know that's why you're here and if nothing else, you heard that it's about connections and you hopefully heard that we don't have all the brightest ideas. So I look forward to your input and your assistance. Thanks.

(Applause.)

(END)

(Applause.)

MR. MEYERROSE: Well, thank you very much. I feel like I've been set up if you've been here most of the day. Around Washington, D.C., they say that the number of times that somebody's name is mentioned in conversation is an indication how influential they are. My name's Dale Meyerrose and I'm happy to be here today. And I really thank Tom what's his name and Mike whoever it is for inviting me along. (Laughter.)

It is indeed my pleasure to be here. My pleasure to be outside of Washington, D.C., and enjoying the friendly windy city and the good weather, and also seeing lots of longtime friends. When you reach my age the word "old" kind escapes your vocabulary so, again, it's good to see so many folks here. And it's good to see about 15 of you who worked for me, who are the designated clappers for when I finish speaking. (Laughter.) (Applause, laughter.) Not yet, guys. (Laughter.)

I forgot to introduce – my name's Dale Meyerrose and I'm happy to be here. (Laughter.) I found a lot of the discussion, the questions and answers, the dialogue very interesting today. And some of the questions, you know, got differed to me just because Tom what's his name didn't want to answer them, and I guess that's okay. But I really expected better out of Mike Whosit. I thought he would surely answer some more of those questions than – but I make a good effort at trying to tie some things together. Again, talking about some of the things we've been talking about but maybe in a different light.

I found a question earlier this morning that said what are you doing for strategic plan to be an interesting proposition, and also, found Tom Whatsit his name's answer very interesting, too. I think that by and large, we're not molded and shaped by any of our strategic plans or intent. By and large, we are molded and shaped by disruptions in our society or in our community. It's not the planned event that rules the day. Think of all the disruptions in our lifetime. A couple of them have anniversaries of today.

Nineteen seventy-two, Munich. On this day terrorists took over a portion of the Israeli Olympic team. And for many of us that was our first exposure to extremist behavior or tactics and what folks were willing to do. On this day in 1975 there's an assassination attempt on our president in Sacramento, California. Gerry Ford was the president and Squeaky Fromme was the attempted assassin. And then 17 days later there was another attempt made on his life and by and large has set the stage for how we protect senior leaders and such.

And I would submit to you that much of what we do is not on the program path, not what the reasonable person would accept or expect to have happen as a consequence. In some regards, I don't find a lot of utility in having plans of the long-term nature. The act of planning is something that world-class organizations do. But that horizon is very, very important because a horizon picked too far in the future never materializes and never really molds and shapes your organization. And plans too close means that seldom do you aggregate the right factors and ensure that you're headed in the right direction.

My name's Dale Meyerrose and I'm happy to be with you today. Okay, you get a good rep. We'll go on. We've heard a lot about A-Space. With a little bit of literary license, let me give you my version about how A-Space came about. Well, about a year and a half ago, Tom Whatsit name came in my office and said, we're going to create an A-LAN (ph). And I thought, boy that's a bad idea. So I went to Mike who's it and I said, we've got to tell Tom Whatsit we don't want an A-LAN. It's the wrong perspective.

So Mike Whatsit comes back to me a little bit later and says, all right, we need an A-net. Okay. Well, I thought about it for a while. I said, no, I think we can do better. And so his guys and my guys and some other guys and gals got together and came up with A-Space. And you remember the law enforcement officials said, you know, if it doesn't look right – well, the first two didn't look right but the third one did.

But think about it just for a minute. From the inception, we need an A-LAN. We need an A-net. We need an A-Space. In essence, the problem never changed. The parameters, the challenges, all of those things associated with what we needed to do didn't change. So what changed? What are the paradigms associated with a LAN versus what are the paradigms and thought processes associated with the net and what are the paradigms and processes associated with space?

And in a very short period of time, I think we reoriented ourselves into a fashion, which would make what we do more relevant to the business of intelligence. And so the lingo that you hear us talk about with A-Space sounds all-modern. You know, Wikipedias and blogs and all those kinds of things. Well, I got to tell you, I believe that that is so 2006. (Laughter.) And while I'm not going to propose to Tom Whosits and Mike Whatsit to change the name, we need to continually remake ourselves and the idea of what is the possible, the probable, and the doable.

And maybe as we flush out the business of A-Space, we need to be thinking in terms of what's the next set of paradigms which will control our thinking. Is it a presence? Is it A-mash (ph)? But in this business if we don't continually remake ourselves with the idea of what the possible, the probable, and the doable is we will always find ourselves in the business of delivering something four years late that's seven years old.

And as we think about what A-Space is and should be – and, again, there are folks more eloquent than I already talked about that – I think there's a couple things that we ought to bear in mind. One is what's the goal? I believe that the goal is to make IT invisible to the analyst, that the analyst spends more time analyzing and doing the tradecraft of analysis and intelligence than the scratching-the-head craft of how does this thing work and why can't I get it to do this?

Boy, we got them all worked up next door, don't we? (Laughter.) I didn't know I was that powerful. (Laughter.) My name is Dale Meyerrose and I'm happy to be here. (Laughter.) So for the early part of this year I spent a good time analyzing how do we do this business of collaboration and what can I learn from what we do and what we know can be possible that might help us as we think about A-mash.

Well, the first lessons you learn is one that may not have been obvious to everybody here. But the business of collaboration takes a spark and you had a spark speak to you earlier this morning in Claudine Rowe (sp). And the passion she had for ensuring that her virtual family was connected, productive, informed, relevant, involved in every standing.

A lot of what I believe we do in collaboration in the business of intelligence today is formed by a man that I won't tell you where he works or what organization he works for but his handle is Collabman. You know, we studied this guy and we studied how many tools does he use, and the answer you find on one hand. They're not the most complicated and sophisticated tools that we have in our inventory. As a matter of fact, we have thousands of those kinds of tools for which we use the population for most of them you can almost count on one hand.

Collabman uses the tools that are intuitive and is useable by the broadest possible audience on his domain. Most of the collaboration that he does is set up by pre-associations. And, again, you heard a story this morning that reinforced that. As Claudine talked about how she established those pre-associations before collaboration took place.

The next thing I learned about how we actually collaborate today is that on an event-based, time-dominate collaboration there are 20-times more observers, listeners, and readers than there are participants in the collaboration sessions. And then they tree off. Ninety-five percent that are observers that are observers in one environment and then turn around and become the 5 percent in related collaboration sessions. And so the power of collaboration seen in those eyes is pretty tremendous.

I read a book a long time ago. The name of the author escapes me but the title was "Information's Power". And the author puts forth a proposition of naming the 100 most powerful people in the history of mankind. And the first five of these you would recognize and recognize very quickly. All debatable but I'll get to the point about information here in a minute. Through your curiosity, number one was Mohammed and number two was Jesus. Number three was Buddha. Number four was Confucius. Number five was Saint Peter.

The number six was really curious. The sixth-most powerful man in the history of mankind, according to this author, was Ts'ai Lun. In Ts'ai Lun in 3,000 B.C. invented paper. And the seventh most powerful man, according to this author was Gutenberg. And the point that all 92 rest of the people on the list of the most 100 powerful people in the history of mankind all came after movable type.

We need to study how we collaborate because collaboration is power and everything that we've got that shows how we do that is, in my mind, proof positive. And we need to think about that in terms of what A-Space is going to be in the future. Does A-Space going to connect to other things in the community? The answer is absolutely yes. Whether it's the tools, whether it's the standards for medidata and data, processes, all have to be found in A-Space, otherwise the IT becomes very visible to the analyst and sometimes dominating the analyst time from the more important element of the analyst tradecraft.

A couple other things I think we need to bear in mind as we look towards the future of A-mash. By the way, my name is Dale Meyerrose. I just copyrighted that term A-mash. Our work has shifted. How we do our work has shifted. Our work no longer takes place in skiffs and solely at workstations. And so the concept about what A-Space needs to do, what the Library of National Intelligence needs to do, and how it follows us and how we leverage it and how we use it has got to change because the work of intelligence is varied, it is far reaching, and it has many demands. So we need to have more than just the frame of mind, which says that we think in terms of collaboration as it pertains to a workstation, or as it pertains to someone sitting on a desk, at a desk, in a skiff.

Another thing that we need to consider as we talk through the elements of collaboration: not all intelligence is collected. Now, there may be some collectors out there that may want to tell you that all intelligence collected is done by collectors but the business of collection intelligence happens in many ways, in many forms. As many of our young analysts will tell you that unclassified, open sources, and all those kinds of things provide lots of context in intelligence that is important to how they do their job.

Not only that, but you heard examples this morning of first responders who create intelligence by virtue of doing their job. Operations creates intelligence that we need to know about. I would further say that the business of collaboration creates intelligence. So, as we think about our workspace and how we want to make it interactive within our business, I submit that we ought to consider all of those things in thinking about the future and keeping ourselves relevant.

We've talked a lot about the Library of National Intelligence. I can remember a year ago telling Mike that I hate that analogy. I hate calling it a library. The paradigms are wrong. It's not expansive enough. I grudgingly admit there is wisdom in going ahead in calling the Library of National Intelligence. But let's be mindful of where the paradigms breakdown. And as we think about the future of the Library of National

Intelligence in a very broad context, I submit that we ought to keep the following in mind. I believe the purpose of a library is very, very simple: Make all intelligence discoverable. Just what a powerful thing that would be.

And see, I'm differentiating between discovering something, having access to something, and that's a discipline that I think that we need to work on because I find that not just splitting hairs but a very useful, pragmatic way to go about solving the complexities associating intelligence or is it complicated. I forget, one of those two. To make all intelligence discoverable, all right. Now, again, we've talked about the early efforts of the library to be that finished product.

I think that's way too limiting. Where did I say we had sources of intelligence out there lying that don't qualify as finished product all over the place. And so the LNI ends up needing to be a federated discovery layer search capability that ferrets out – I didn't mean it really. (Laughter.)

The Library of National Intelligence needs to be that federated layer that searches out intelligence irrespective of source. And the nature of the library, again, conjures up the idea that I'm going to go to a building; I'm going to go to a card catalog; I'm going to discover what the NSN of the book or the author that I'm hunting for. I'm going to go back to a bunch of stacks. I'm going to pull out a book. I'm going to go to a librarian. He or she is going to check it out for me and I'm going to walk out the door.

And the book that I walk out the door underneath my arm is no longer available to anybody else who visits the library to check out, when in fact, in the Library of National Intelligence, every time a document is checked out that document is still in its original place to be used and now it's in a new place. That every time that document is used as a source document or a draft document or some other basis for doing some other intelligence work, it continues to multiply itself around the community.

So where if you happen to be an analyst and come across four citings of the same information or those four independent citings or four independent observations, or is that four replications of one citing, and to analysts that makes a difference. And so the pedigree that we need to add to our data and our discovery capabilities is huge and much more expansive than what our initial efforts are with the Library of National Intelligence.

But we've got to get started. We've got to start somewhere, and therefore, I found wisdom in Mike's approach for getting us started in the Library of National Intelligence. But we have a concept that it's going to take us months to produce the elements of the library and I think we need to cut that down by a lot in terms of standards that eliminates options and make things applicable to a wider number of folks because most of you know I work very hard at learning lessons from business.

There was a question this morning about software or IT acquisition development being shut out of markets; all those kinds of things. I think many of the policy speakers in front of me talked about open standards and we're very serious about that. But let me give you my framework for how fast we ought to go in some of this business. The best models, most complete, well-thought out of world class IT corporations' procurement of software looks like this: Let's say I make a procurement or decide I didn't need to make a procurement of something that's going to last – going to have a three-year shelf life.

The best practice models are out there that the company goes through concept prototype testing, fielding, and training in 75 days. Seventy-five days. And that the business case for much of the software they buy has a pay back period of 180 days. And then for the rest of the two-and-half years is the useful life of that software until it's replaced. How does that match up with our concept of bringing new technology into our business?

You know, the elements that say that it takes us six months to state the problem and figure out the as is and all those kinds of things I don't think is relevant. And I would submit that we need to help encourage those who support us to understand on how to help us change the business model. We already have thousands of tools and thousands more is that proverbial hay that Tom talked about earlier this morning.

World-class companies, corporations, global fortune 500 rely on enterprise services. A defined set of enterprise services available to every individual in the corporation. And I also find it interesting that most of the companies and the global fortune 500 that I've had the opportunity to spend extensive time with some of their leadership, they use collaboration in the business of coming up with their IT solutions. So if we were to apply those things to what we do, what are some of the underlying lessons?

The underlying lesson, I think, is that we need to solve community issues on a community-wide basis more and more, and less and less on an agency-by-agency basis, otherwise, we will never truly transform analysis, collection, collaboration, information sharing. And so we need to figure out how to, as a community, collaborate on solutions rather than solving each of the solutions separately and then wondering why they don't interoperate and then spend untold amount of money trying to make them integrated.

I know many of you have been watch very closely the director's 100-day plan and I'm sure that he'll report out to you some of that tomorrow night. And for sure, I don't want any of you tell him that I stole his thunder so I'm going to let him talk about that. But in that and the subsequent plans that we've got rolling out, he's got us focused on some of the underpinnings that will help us solve things more collaboratively as a community.

And so when you look under transformed collection and analysis, you'll see some elements about how we develop A-Space, LNI, all of those kinds of elements, and you'll see them printed out in your program. Those are good acronyms to learn because they will be real. Some of them are real right now. The discussion of if somebody won't let me have access to this information or that database or whatever, we're in fact addressing that in terms of dissemination and processes to expand dissemination of sensitive information across the community to include 24X7 processes for those tactical things in nature that are time dominate and the longer organizational sharing of things that are dominated by process.

I have a feeling you'll see in the subsequent plan that comes out a big emphasis on certification/accreditation, which many of you know I've been working for over a year. I've just signed the deal earlier this year with John Grimes, the CIO of DOD that says that we will settle on the following seven changes associated to certification/accreditation principles and are working out the details for the words that will actually show up in Intel and DOD policy. But there's an underlying element of that and the underlying element of that is, is that certification and accreditation is not solely a security equation.

And in fact, certification/accreditation is a balance of many things of which security is but one recommendation not determination. Things like mission. Things like risk. Things like cost. All of those things are important when you're in the certification/accreditation business. And in the past I believe we've been target-fixated on saying that it was pretty much a security process. It is not. It is a mission process, which has to get input from across the entire community, not just one part of our community.

And so, I'm absolutely positive you'll see those things. And I'm sure that the boss will talk through the elements of where we are in terms of the 100-day plan and the actions that are going to follow on after that.

My name is Dale Meyerrose and I'm ready take your questions. Okay. First question. Strategic plan is the wrong term. Okay. I've been chided. Better stated, do we have a strategic vision that can be used to tie the many complex efforts described herein and elsewhere under the banner of DNI together?

The answer is yes, okay. You'll find them in the following documents. For the community writ large, there's a national intelligence strategy, which we've not lost sight of. If you're looking for IT in particular, on the 19th of December last year, I signed out the strategic intent for IT for the intelligence community and it's been out there and it is still current. It is still relevant and it covers many of things and more of the elements who have been part of this. Okay. So that was that question.

Okay, how will the CIOs of the agencies be encouraged to buy into the vision? Let me introduce to Guido, Jr. No, no. (Laughter.) First of all, over the course of the past year and a half, we've worked very hard to communicate and work with each other as the group of CIOs. We meet regularly on a monthly basis. And in fact, we spend time in each of those sessions sharing solutions and we'll do this problem; you take that problem kind of idea.

But more so than that, we are finding out more and more that many of the CIOs were trying to solve some of these situations on a bilateral basis. And it took very little effort to change that from a bilateral between two agencies to being multilateral to include all the agencies and so we have several efforts that are associated with those kinds of things.

And in fact, the deliverables that we have in accelerating information sharing from the 100-day plan were elements all brought together under the rubric of the CIOs collectively. And the deliverables that we're looking for the next year-and-a-half follow the same pattern. Additionally, we've been given an additional tool that some of you are probably aware of.

In February Director McConnell is one the first documents he assigned designated me as the information sharing executive for the intelligence community and in turn, directed me to form the information sharing steering committee, which has a deputy from each of the agencies participate. And out of the 16, only two of them are CIOs. The rest of the folks that participate in the information sharing committee, in fact, are policy people or deputies of those organizations. So we have those things of collaboration working for us to encourage CIOs and agencies to work together.

We've got two other tools at our disposal. One ought to be really obvious and that is every National Intelligence program dollar comes through the DNI and so that's how people get paid. And so it behooves us to understand, you know, why the money is being given and what's being done with it.

And the last tool I'll talk on, again, is something that may not be obvious to everybody, but we do have a director of National Intelligence Inspector General. I always find it amazing how people's attitude change when somebody comes advises them of their rights. Of course, we've never done that. But the idea that says that we do have oversight functions and authorities within the director of National Intelligence is an important differentiation to – prior to IRPTA of 2004.

How often will the agencies be evaluated in their progress towards vision? There must be a CIO asking these kinds of questions? Every day. Now, again, there's not a stock answer there. Some of those are program by program. But always we try to aggregate those to make sure that we're not making finite one-off decisions that in fact don't lead to a greater vision. And so, in my mind, the mechanism that we've used over the past 100 days, if you will, were the deliverables, which came out over the course of the past eight weeks or so as benchmarks to how well we were doing.

What is the community form for collaborating IT solutions and tools? That is a very good question. And in fact, that's a question we hope to sort out under something that you're going to hear called this single information exchange environment. We have already several agency forms that folks send people to on a routine basis. We have one for enterprise architecture. We also have one for data. We have one for PKI, which was generated to solve a particular issue and problem. And so that is one of those areas where we will

continually remake ourselves in figuring out better ways to how we make collective solutions applicable to everybody.

How do you draw on business processes as defined by other parts of the DNI or agencies to drag DNI/CIO initiatives? Well, let me sort of turn the question on its head. If I don't have either the business process or the mission process from the other elements of the DNI or the community writ large then I become nothing more than a self-licking ice cream cone. The business of fielding new IT technology because it's there does not seem very productive nor a very good use of taxpayer money.

And so, you find us wrapped very tightly in the elements of what many, many – (inaudible) – in the OMB nomenclature of e-lines of business. We work e-lines of business within the intelligence community and the element of how we closely work together between us and analysis in working things like the Library of National Intelligence, A-Space catalyst, all of those – ICARS, all of those kinds of things is evidence that our reason for being in the CIO is in fact to support other folks. I had a question off here to the left.

Q: Oh, thank you. Before I ask my question, I was just very curious to see how many in here are currently working as analysts. My question is – I'm just wondering how much – if analysts are being urged to collaborate across agencies and industry is being urged to develop integrating systems, can industry design those systems without the input of analysts and can analysts collaborate using tools designed without their needs having been taken into account? And I'm wondering what is the plan for how these two groups can talk to one another assuming that a lot of people in industry may have been analysts before but as the whole process is changing, there's a lot that you need people who are currently analysts?

MR. MEYERROSE: Sure. Very good question and again, there's a myriad of answers. I will give you some concrete examples. Most of the elements we've been talking about here today about transforming analysis have user groups. The things for which I'm program manager for on behalf to he community, we have user groups that are part of the process of, not only evaluation, but the business of design and creation.

And when I say design and creation, I don't mean milestone one, milestone two. I mean the design is – and this is a concept development and here is a practical way of working through it. So we have a series of those. And in a larger context, if you think about it, the deputy director for analysis, in essence, represents all the analysts in the community. And they have the burden of making sure that that connection back to what is relevant to analysts today and what will be relevant to analysts tomorrow is very much a part of the responsibility that I know they shared and worked very seriously, which is why some of the elements and some of the underpinnings that we're putting in with regard to joint duty have become very, very important.

Joint duty, again, the concept that says that if you rise very far within the intelligence community, you have to be broader than just single agency in order to continue to progress in any one tradecraft or career field.

Okay. I'll take one more – how is the partnership at DOD/CIO bearing for – and I'll end with this. As many of you know, for the last year and a half I've worked very hard with the DOD/CIO John Grimes. He and I are long time friends and we were very conscious of the rift or perceived rift in the past between the intel community and the DOD. And he came on board about the same time I did and we made the pledge that we would work very hard to make sure that there was no daylight between us.

Now, John uses the phrase joined at the hip. It's a little close for me so I'm just comfortable with no daylight between us. And in fact, over the course of a year and half, we've seen almost a half-a-dozen agreements between DOD and the intelligence community on a variety of subjects. All the way from working information sharing for allies on classified networks to agreeing to a certification/accreditation construct, to creating unified cross-domain management office, to the point of we're going to adopt DOD enterprise service

standards. They're going to adopt intelligence community search and discovery standards. And the list goes on and on.

And in fact, we have several still in the works of how we can work more closely together. It's no secret that a large majority of people in the intelligence community also call the Department of Defense home. And so the degree that we can leverage each other, reduce workload, increase effectiveness, and reduce needless redundancy and cost I think is inherent responsibility that he and I share, feel in our pledge to support. And that is probably one of the most key relationships that I believe that we have. And as a temporary steward of that relationship, I intend to do everything that I can to make sure that there's no daylight between us. So with that, I'm Dale Meyerrose and thank you for your time.

(Applause.)

(END)

Remarks and Q&A by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Mr. James Clapper

JAMES CLAPPER: Well, it's a little daunting for a geezer like me to be up here with everyone wired, and laptops on the tables, and all of that sort of thing. A favorite saw of mine, and some of you've heard me use this before, but this conference seems to me to be so about transformation and change. And as you know, many of you know that we in the government sometimes have trouble transforming, or changing. And it seems to me that what this conference is really all about is, at least, you know, we recognize that, and we're out reaching and so good on the office of the DNI, the director of National Intelligence, and NSFR for putting this on.

But you know – and Jerry forgive me; you have heard this before, but I got to use it – the code of tribal wisdom says that when you discover you're riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount. But in government, we often try other strategies. We buy a stronger whip, we change riders, we say things like, this is the way we've always ridden this horse.

We appoint a committee to study the horse. We arrange to visit other sites to see how they ride dead horses. We increase the standards to ride dead horses. We appoint a Tiger team to revive the dead horse. We create a training session to increase our riding ability. We compare the state of dead horses in today's environment. We change the requirements, declaring this horse is not dead. We hire contractors to ride the dead horse. (Laughter.) We harness several dead horses together for increased speed. We declare no horse is too dead to beat. That actually is my favorite. (Laughter.) It's kind of a Beltway classic. (Laughter.)

We provide additional funding to increase the horse's performance. We do a cost analysis study to see if contractors can ride it cheaper. We purchase a product to make dead horses run faster. We declare the horse is better, faster, and cheaper dead. We form a quality circle to find best practices for riding dead horses. We revisit the performance requirements for dead horses. We say this horse was procured with costs as an independent variable. And my favorite of all is we promote the dead horse to a supervisory position. (Laughter.)

Anyway, I was just reminded of that. And for me, you know, as others in the audience would attest, it's always great to be away from Washington, particularly these days. Another one of my favorite saws, and is a – (inaudible) – Harry Truman, you may have read about him in the history books – you want a friend in Washington, buy a dog. And these days, that's kind of the way it is.

Secondly, I really wanted to be a part of this event for what turned out to be kind of an epiphany event for me, professionally since my fingerprints were on the famous, or infamous, national intelligence estimate which addressed the presence, or absence, of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

I was then serving, as Tim indicated, as the director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which is one of the members of what is now called the National Intelligence Board. And we all approved that national intelligence estimate, and I was one of the approvers. And so I think it kind of turned out, as many of you know, to be not exactly accurate. And I think this NIE was emblematic of many of our analytic weaknesses.

And of course it was the subject of an investigation by a blue-ribbon commission, co-chaired by Judge Silverman and former Senator Chuck Robb. And then having been a subject, or victim as the case may be, of this investigation and all the others conducted in the wake of 9/11, I've sort of become a proponent of the transformation of analysis in the intelligence community, particularly now from my current vantage as both undersecretary of Defense for intelligence within the Department of Defense, for the secretary, as well as, as

Tim alluded, the director of Defense Intelligence, which is a dual-hat designation, where I work for Admiral Mike McConnell, the director of National Intelligence.

As you may know, eight of the 16 components of the national intelligence community are in the Department of Defense. Four agencies – NSA, NGA, NRO, and BIA – and then of course, the four service intelligence establishments.

So I thought, I'd discuss from maybe a defense perspective, or maybe a personal perspective, perhaps – sort of intertwined here I guess – three interlaced issues or themes, which I believe are involved in transforming intelligence analysis. And they are – and I'm sure you probably heard about this yesterday – changing the culture; automating intelligently, no pun intended; and, one that sometimes we don't dwell on maybe as much as we should, which is managing customer or partner expectations.

And the format I'm going to use for each of these three themes is kind of how it was, harking back to, say, we'll just pick 2001, and kind of things that the community is trying to do. And it seems to me, what this is all about, and the feedback I've heard from yesterday's session has been very, very positive, is kind of outreaching to those of you who are not in the government, not in the establishment, so to speak, and how – you know, what else can we do, how can you help us.

So first, changing the analytical culture. Just by way of background, Tim alluded to this, but I retired from the Air Force in 1995, and my last job before I retired was I served as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for four years, went off to industry for six years, and I worked for three companies, but doing business back for the government. And then out of the blue, in the summer of '01, I got a phone call from a DOD headhunter asking if I'd be interested in coming back and serving as what was then called the director of the National Geomapping Agency. And my wife wasn't too pleased about it, but I said, okay, I'd do it, and so coincidentally I started as director of NGA two days after 9/11, which was a very sporty time to be trying to run an intelligence agency.

So I do have some, sort of stark images in my mind about how things were when I walked in the door after being away from the government for six years, and kind of where things are going now as a result of the trauma of 9/11.

Typically, in 2001 or before, analysts would get their position through a college education or military experience, some regional or functional expertise; would gain a clearance based on multi-generational American heritage. And by the way, parenthetically, Admiral McConnell and I are embarked on a effort to completely reform the clearance process in the government, which we all, I think, acknowledge badly needs help.

Then they would get journeymen on-the-job training, years of experience in one topic. And of course, there's a huge premium placed on mental databases of people, or the shoebox files of expertise. And normally, the history – the common practice – and this is certainly the case in, say, the early '90s, when I was director of DIA – a great premium placed on perishing or publishing – producing product, normally, without collaboration – normally not as a collective. It was individual product, and it was a great premium placed on analysts publishing and having their name on a report.

And that led to, of course, the rewards system. The way we appraise and reward people, which frankly hasn't changed a great deal, still I think places a premium on acknowledging, or recognizing, individual, as opposed to collective or collaborative, behavior.

So what we need, of course, are – and some of this I think is perhaps a little bit of motherhood and apple pie, but I think it bears stating. We need people who can think critically and creatively. I know when I was

director of NGA we went through a huge generational change, which is still going on, in fact throughout the entire intelligence community, which is actually a good thing, where our experience level has gone way down. I say ours – NGA's, and actually this is prevalent throughout the intelligence community.

And people used to, particularly congressional critics, would decry this, or rub their hands and worry about it. And actually I thought it was a good thing, because the younger generation – the younger generations coming on now assumes leadership positions in the community. That is what is in mind is really what is going to transform the community and change the culture, people who are brought up in a much different environment than geezers like me were. And I could see that change almost underneath our feet, if you will, at NGA. And I think that's a trend going on everywhere.

Of course, this also poses some leadership challenges, because in the atmosphere I grew up in, in the military, you know, it was, yes, sir; yes, sir, three bags full, unquestioning obedience, and you know, you don't do that anymore. In an environment with a lot of young people who have a tendency to question – well, why do we have to do that? And the response, well, there's no reason for it, it's just our policy, is not very satisfactory.

Using structured analytic techniques to mitigate bias and mindset – and of course this is something that kind of happened, crept into the aforementioned NIE. Seeking collaborative partners to leverage the diversity of skills and backgrounds to solve challenges. Diversity in the community is another sensitive subject to a certain extent. And I say diversity with a big D. To me that's important in the community because you could make the case that we need to – we, the intelligence community, need to look like the world, and we really don't, since that's our beat, if you will.

Engaging in professional development activities from entry to retirement. This all is always a huge challenge for management. You get a really good analyst; you want to keep them in the job because it really is painful if you let him go off for a sabbatical, or do training, or go get a master's degree or something like that. And invariably it's the people that you least want to part with, that you need to send through that. So there's always this pulling and hauling from the management standpoint about investing in the future, but it's absolutely crucial that we do that.

Now possessing a strong understanding of foreign culture through heritage – we're striving to develop it. This, too, is a big issue today with having an understanding of the Mid-East, and a lot of that understanding only comes from those who are from that heritage. That, of course, runs afoul of our current clearance processes and rules and policies, which of course are still Cold War born. So we have a dilemma there to resolve. And of course I always spoke to making our rewards system pay promotions, training, assignments, comport with doing business this way.

We're in the throes right now, in the intelligence community, of going to a pay-for-performance system, which is not the classical civil service, you know, you do your two years, you get a step increase, and you can expect promotions and all that sort of thing. This is going to be a very different approach for the intelligence community, and for that matter the Department of Defense is going to go that too.

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency has been doing pay-for-performance for about nine years now, and that is a very different way of doing, rewarding, and acknowledging performance of people through compensation increases or bonuses than we're used to. But again, if we're going recognize quality, and recognize the behavior that we really claim we want, then we're going to have to make the rewards system comport with that.

The second theme, then, would be efforts to change the culture – again training and education to support professional development over an entire career. Activities to develop an environment that focuses on quality as opposed to quantity. You know, how many names did I get my – how many reports did I get my name on last

year, sort of thing, as a way of, as opposed to, did I produce fewer reports which had greater impact. And of course that means changing the metrics to focus on quantity, and again to get away from this perish-or-publish business.

I think the promulgation of analytic standards, which we really hadn't had, by the offices of the DNIs is a big deal, and, again, this recruiting a diverse workforce. Doing things like this: Organized outreach, to leverage academic and commercial centers of information and expertise.

One of the things that is a standard practice now, with national intelligence estimates, just as an example, is before it's vetted at the National Intelligence Board, which is kind of the final stamp of approval from all the intelligence elders that sit around a table and – (inaudible) – at NIE, there's a deliberate effort to go out and seek outside readers who are not in the government, not intelligence professionals, if you will, who can read these national intelligence estimates, which are of course a key tool, intelligence tool, that the president and other policymakers use, and to get an objective outside reading, which we didn't use to do before.

I've been participating in one capacity or another, and the National Intelligence Board or its predecessors for, off and on for about 25 years, and we just never did that because we knew all the answers and we knew all the secrets. Well, as we found, the insight may not necessarily come from secrets. We sort of learned this the hard way.

Developing relationships with colleges and universities that have programs that provide the desired fields. All the intelligence agencies do this now. They engender partnerships with universities that are interested in and supportive of developing course curricula that prepare, from an academic standpoint, graduates for duty in those agencies.

I'll just cite one example, not too far away from here, is the University of Missouri of Columbia, which has an outstanding program to prepare, both at the bachelor's and graduate level, people for careers in geospatial intelligence analysis. They funded a SCIF, a class-five facility, on the campus to facilitate research in the geospatial intelligence. University of Redlands in California is another one. Virginia Tech is another one. Many of these colleges and universities sort of an interest in and are supportive of developing curricula to help us in the community.

Integration of intelligence discipline, physically and digitally, to improve available synergy. Fancy words, but what that really means to me is, you know, breaking down the stovepipes that we're famous for, although, I will say, you know, oftentimes the term stovepipe, way we're organized in the collection disciplines and that sort of thing, is used pejoratively. There's also an upside to stovepipes because that also is the font of our tradecraft.

So as you have signal intelligence stovepipe or a geospatial intelligence stovepipe or a human stovepipe, yes, that's bad because you know, we don't want to compartmentalize one another. But also, that is the reservoir, if you will, of the tradecraft for each one of those respective disciplines. And it is up to those stovepipes, at least the way we're configured today, to be the protectors, the nurturers, the advancers of that tradecraft. But at the same time, you want to take advantage of the complementary attributes of those disciplines.

I just did the obligatory tour through the AOR, the area of responsibilities as it's called, and visited Iraq and Afghanistan. And there are some eye-watering examples out there of the fusion, as I saw in both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the fusion, analytic – analysis on the fly if you will of the collection disciplines, of SIGINT and HUMINT particularly. And it's very gratifying, and flying back, you know, a lot of times you think on airplanes. I think, you know, how can we import this to the Beltway because there's really some

dramatic things going on out there. And I guess it's a factor of, you know, somehow when you're in combat that kind of has a tendency to focus your attention, and really makes people work together.

Insuring a balance of long-term production is protected from the demands of current intelligence. This is, classically, a huge issue in intelligence. We get consumed with the urgent, not the important. I remember I was on the commission that investigated the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, which was another epiphany experience, one of the most intense and controversial things I was involved in, in my 43 years of intelligence. And I, as it turned out, got to critique myself. The bombing occurred in June of 1996, and I just retired as director of DIA in 1995. So one of the things we did was a population survey: How many analysts are actually doing long-term research on terrorism? Now, bear in mind, this was 1996.

So I went to DIA, the agency I had just left as the director, and we had a grand total of four analysts who were devoted exclusively to long-term research on terrorism. Many times doing long-term research didn't directly contribute to doing reports, you know, current crisis-type, the things that are sexy and get everybody's attention, and everybody's interested in today – huge mistake, and it's the responsibility of managers in the intelligence community to somehow insulate people so they can be protected from the press of the day-to-day in-box, and be sheltered from that kind of pressure and be allowed to do long-term research.

So automation. You know, and this means, always meant to me, you know, not necessarily automating the continuation of dumb processes. So when I say, intelligently automate, I'm getting a north and south nod from Dale Meyerrose, the CIO for the community. That's always a good sign, thank you Dale. And of course this enabled us to operate across the intelligence community, supporting collection and analytic processes without interruption. That simple thing sounds great, but oftentimes when you're running a global enterprise, every time zone on the earth, seven by 24, all kinds of weather and environmental conditions, that's a tough thing.

Allowing the collector and the analyst to conduct searches and assess all relevant information to include unclassified information on one classified network. This is a big challenge, too. During my sojourns in industry, I have become a big believer and a proponent for the value of open-source information. And clearly, you know, I've learned – (chuckles) – the hard way over the years, the intelligence community because we've got the secrets, doesn't mean we have the insight. And many times, the most important insight, the most important and relevant information, is not in the secret material; it's open-source.

Interestingly enough, the Dutch government mandated, their parliament mandated, that their intelligence community would first resort to open-source before they would be permitted to do any kind of secret investigation. It's kind of an interesting concept. So we've got to capitalize on open-source, I think you've heard about developing A-space, which I think is a major improvement in the analyst's ability to collaborate with a wide and diverse group in a controlled environment.

Development of ALIEN (ph), an application allowing one inquiry to return all the relevant information on the network. Now, that sounds like a really simple thing, something you're used to doing. You're sitting at home doing the Internet. Well, that's a huge deal for us in intel. And a lot of this, I think, stems from the secret environment we've always existed in, where there was a premium placed on compartmentation, segmentation, and information. Well, there wasn't a lot of information to be had, and what little we had we wanted to protect it. And now, of course, we're inundated with information, very different paradigm.

Centrics, a synchronous distance training platform to improve course availability across the intelligence enterprise, this whole business of learning virtually. Great thing.

Finally, the last theme I'd talk about a little bit is – which we sometimes don't do, is managing customer expectations. I think first of all, our customers, everyone in the public has expectations based on television and

Internet speed, why can't we operate like CNN, sort of thing. And of course, customers expect a depth and understanding of intelligence assessments. And of course, again, this desire for speed in reporting is what drives people, what causes analysts to gravitate toward the timely, the urgent, not necessarily what's important.

So it's incumbent, I think, on intelligence, the community, and certainly its seniors, to be anticipatory as much as we possibly can, trying to understand what your customer wants, and then try to tailor things. You know, when I was director of NGA, we ended up sending, as did all the agencies, sending analysts forward to Iraq and Afghanistan so they could be there. You know, and if you've got your people, as I've found, as an agency director, we had our folks in the same time zone, and doing the same privations, understanding what the requirement was, is, of that division commander, brigade commander, or whatever it was, there's no substitute for that.

And then, our expert then could translate that into here's what we can do for you. You know, they didn't know what they didn't know. So that that dialog between the intelligence community and the people serving is crucial.

Another thing we need to do, and this is to customers, is demonstrating why it's a good thing if we don't put out as much products, numerically, as we have in the past. You know, fewer is better, if the quality's there.

Making sure – and this to me is crucial – making sure customers, the partners, the public, the Congress, understand the difference between mysteries and secrets. Secrets are things that are knowable, that somehow you could actually find out or glean if you devoted the resources to it. Mysteries, on the other hand, are unknown. The intelligence community, these are known only unto god. You know, what's Kim Jong Il going to do tomorrow? Well, he doesn't know, so how can we know?

Analysts, the intelligence community, basically, is in the business of uncertainty and trying to attenuate it. We're never going to eliminate it, but certainly, where we earn our keep is in our efforts to at least reduce uncertainty for a decisionmaker, whether the decisionmaker is sitting in the White House or a foxhole. But we're always dealing with limited information. And that's why it's important to make the intelligence process not a singular, unitary, linear thing, but a collaborative, collective thing, where you're bringing together all the best minds to be brought to bear on a problem. And of course the more diversity the better.

I always remember, when I was director of the IA General, when the secretary of State then, General Powell, was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his maxim to intelligence people was always tell me what you know, tell me what you think, and make sure you make the distinction between the two.

So that's really all I had to say this morning in the way of going over those three themes. So I guess with whatever time's available, be happy to try to address some questions.

And there's the first one. Let's see. What, if anything is being done to rationalize security requirements and standards between the DOD and NIC intelligence bodies?

Well, the aforementioned effort that Admiral McConnell and I are sponsoring, together with Mr. Clay Johnson, who's the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget – Office of Management and Budget actually establishes clearance standards for the entire government. Probably the intelligence community is the most demanding, has the most rigorous requirements in all that.

So Admiral McConnell and I have put together a team, a Tiger team, composed of experts and industry academics – are represented in this – on how we can rationalize the clearance process, capitalizing on automation. And what we're finding is, we can do a lot both in initial clearance actions as well as sustaining clearances after people are brought in through automation. And our objective, without prolonging this, would

be to make investigations, which are the long pole in the tent, often, is the exception rather than the rule. And if we get, we can develop a so-called clean case through automation sensors, so much of this information can then be made available, assuming the applicant gives us permission, that you can do this in a much quicker fashion.

This will literally save billions of dollars, man-hours, let alone untold frustration that exists with the current system, which of course is all borne out of the Cold War. So we are together on this, since, again, a large part of the DNI's domain is in the Department of Defense.

Let's see. What are – well, I think – let's see, the next one was the – launched an effort – the USDI has launched an effort to reinvent defense analysis. They – (inaudible) – is Sandy Barger – Deborah Barger actually. (Inaudible) – to ODNI's transformation effort being discussed here today?

Well, we're pretty much in sync on this. One of the purposes of this dual-hatting arrangement, which I had suggested both to Secretary Gates and Director McConnell, was to obviate some of these, and overcome some of these seams that have existed between the Department of Defense and the DNI.

And Admiral McConnell and I are old personal and professional buds. We go back about 20 years, and at various times have worked for one another. And, you know, he got his phone call, and I got mine, and he kind of said, well, if you'll do it, I'll do it. And so our commitment for the remainder of the administration is to try to work this as a seamless enterprise. So in all these efforts, whether it's clearance transformation or analytic transformation, we're trying to work this as a single entity.

Uh, let's see, regarding dead horses. Well, somebody at least heard that part of the pitch. Most of us here would like to ride a fresh horse, using our efforts to develop a saddle and bridle adequate to mount and ride the IC horse? And time being of the essence to see a lasting impact beyond this administration to the efforts you are putting forth today?

Absolutely. I wouldn't – nor would Admiral McConnell – we wouldn't be doing this – because neither of us campaigned for these jobs – if we didn't think we could make some lasting impact. And I thought the one thing that Secretary Gates said to me when we talked last December was what we can do as a team is to build a foundation for the next administration, whoever wins. When they come into office, that's precisely what we're trying to do.

These reforms require significant change in the workforce. We've heard about rewards for those who embrace change. What about disincentives for those who refuse to embrace change?

Well, I believe, frankly, that going to a pay-for-performance system is going to force management and the community to make qualitative distinctions between and among employees, in terms of incentive increases, bonuses, and things like that. And so, the kind of desired behavior – there will be the opportunity then to reward the behavior that we all want to see, and to disincentivize the behavior that we don't want to see. And of course, one of the – as I found at NGA during my five years there – one of the most effective management tools you have for transformation is attrition, if you get my drift.

Okay, let's scroll up here. What is the role of industry in analytic transformation? Are there opportunities for industry to invest in partnership with the IC with a reasonable expectation of return on investment? For example, is it possible for industry to sponsor – for example, pay for industry analysts to receive the same kind of training that government analysts receive?

That's a very good question, and that issue came up when I was at NGA. And I know we had some debates with lawyers about that, whether that was possible to provide the same kind of training the government

provided. And when I last left that movie, which – I haven't visited that issue in some time; that's actually, I don't think possible – I could be wrong; I'm just not up on that.

Your concerns about allowing time for some analysts to engage in the necessary long-term research resonate with this former S&TI analyst. The S&TI analytic community is in crisis. They don't have time to do their long-term analysis. They're doing what I call op intel on science topics. What are you going to do to address this issue?

That's a very good point. And I'm part of that crime, actually, because in the wake of the Cold War – some people forget history here. In the wake of the Cold War, I know when I was director of DIA in the early '90s, we were under a mandate to reduce our manpower at DIA by 22.5 percent. I distinctly remember that number; it wasn't 22; not 23; but 22.5 percent, the congressional mandate. And so, this was a very painful, traumatic thing for us to manage.

At the time, I was kind of happy that we were able to get through it, make that kind of reduction, and not riff anybody. Although maybe we should have; but we didn't. And of course, what that did was create a huge bathtub, since the way we did that was through attrition. We just didn't hire people. So we created a bathtub of about five or six years where there was very little hiring in the community. In fact, when I was arrived at NGA, all the agencies were on a down-slope. We were reducing people, facilities, all this sort of thing. And then 9/11 happens and all of a sudden, we're expanding again.

One of the casualties in all of that was S&TI, scientific and technical intelligence. There was a huge effort, of course, in the heyday of the Cold War, since we were facing a very formidable foe, adversary, in the form of the Soviet Union, which had a huge scientific and technical community of its own. Well, the demographics were that that S&TI workforce aged and left as a part of that drawdown post-Cold War.

So now, we are trying to reconstitute that. I believe Robert Cardillo was here yesterday. I've been working especially closely with Robert. And he's got some good efforts going to reconstitute S&TI using the collective capabilities of the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as the service production centers, meaning the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the Air Force production arm at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Suitland, and the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center at Charlottesville, Virginia. And using that as a collegium to reconstitute, restrengthen, and refocus on S&TI.

Let's see. Will we ever get to a point where the U.S. government has a single set of standards for security issues beyond clearances?

Certification and accreditation – that, as Dale Meyerrose can well attest, is a big issue. It's not exactly my compartment. But certainly I would like to see that. That is a constant complaint I hear, particularly from industry. And I just lost the rest of that question – my memory ain't that good anymore.

MR. SAMPLE: Jim, I think we have one question from the audience over on the side.

MR. CLAPPER: Oh, okay. I can't see, so you're going to have to help me.

Q: Hi, I'm wondering – there were changes that were made by your predecessor and his boss in terms of intelligence collection and HUMINT. And that resulted in not only some unhappiness between certain agencies, but a lot of tripping over people – one agency tripping over another in places that they didn't expect to trip over each other.; a lot of unhappiness. When the new director of the CIA came in, he created a new board for HUMINT management. Other steps were taken to try and deconflict the problems that had arisen. And I'm

wondering, now that you're in the Pentagon, what other steps are being taken to try and mitigate some of the tensions that –

MR. CLAPPER: First of all, I take some respectful exception to the thrust of your question. I think what this refers to is what I've found to be a lot of hyperbole in the media and other places. And I do have a little background on this, since when I was director at DIA, I was the founder of the defense HUMINT service. And so, then I came back as a contractor in the late '90s, was asked by DOD to do a study on the state of health of HUMINT in the department. And of course, this was all prior to 9/11.

In this capacity, since I've been in the job – well, I was sworn in on April 13th, Friday the 13th; I don't know if that's a good omen or not; but anyway – I have found that actually there have been some tremendous things done in the confluence of the agency, the Special Ops community, and HUMINT in general. And this was reaffirmed on my trip to Iraq and Afghanistan a week before last. And the cooperation, the teamwork out there is superb. We may have our little gun battles in the Beltway, but out where it counts, it's really an eye-watering, fantastic effort.

Now, that said, I certainly looked into all this. In fact, one of the marching orders that the secretary gave me was asked me to go away and look at all of that, because there's been a lot of change, which I think is quite appropriate. This has become a growth business, a growth industry, if you will, in the intelligence community; and well it should. And the secretary has asked me to go and look at that. Is what we're doing necessary, appropriate, legitimate? Do we need to make any changes in the oversight processes with the Congress? And I have a fairly high-level blue ribbon team, which is headed by a very distinguished Army three-star operator – not an intelligence guy – that is now examining this whole issue. But what I've found in practice since I've been on the job in April, that again, much of this is – I think – exaggerated hyperbole, redundancy intended.

Well, I lost my question; does that mean I'm done? Oh, okay.

As we move towards increased collaboration, what steps do we need to take to maintain the ability for analysts to look at the evidence and independently come to their own conclusions?

This is actually a very insightful question, because one of the challenges that seniors have is in protecting what I would call academic freedom of analysts. And you always have this thing in the back of your mind, as an intelligence senior that you're telling the facts, the unvarnished facts as best we know them to a policymaker, and you have to ensure that you protect against the politicization, if you will, of intelligence.

I'm, in the current job, particularly sensitive to that since it was – I got the wire brushing during my confirmation process from the Senate Armed Services Committee about this very thing. And there is no rulebook here. There is no formula. Politicizing intelligence and preventing it, it's someone like pornography; you know it when you see it.

Who will be your lead to start the process of rewarding new behavior in the government, taking risks, changing bad paradigms, rewarding performance and not time in service?

Well, I guess I am. I became a proponent of that, a practitioner of it, I guess, when I was director of NGA. Again, I think pay-for-performance is one way to change behavior.

Speaking on managing customer expectations, meeting or managing expectations is important. What needs to be done to exceed those expectations? Is this a goal of the collaboration effort we're trying to move forward? Well, I think it is.

I don't know. That's a tough question. What I've found over the years is when you can kind of get into the mind of the person you're trying to serve or the office or whatever your customer is, so that if you understand what he or she is thinking and what he or she is concerned about, and then hopefully that enables you to be, as an intelligence person, anticipatory and predictive.

Now, having said that, I'm reminded I served as a J-2, or director of intelligence for three of the war fighting commands. The first one was in Korea. And in Korea, basically, the intelligence setup was patterned after the U.S. Army, which is, of course, the dominant service out there. So they use the Army practice and staff practices. And one of the things that mystified me when I first got there – I was an Air Force guy basically doing an Army job – was that in addition to intelligence, I was also responsible for weather. So I had an Air Force weather squadron, had little detachments all over the Korean Peninsula. And why am I in charge of weather?

Well, I figured it out. It's because basically the commander's expectation is that both intelligence and weather people have got to be clairvoyant. (Laughter.) Next? Any other – I can't see if there are any other questions out there. Yes? Uh-oh.

Q: Jim, is this on? Jim, I'm asking this, because I know you have some very special expertise in this area. What do you think the academic community can do to support the recommendations that you're making?

MR. CLAPPER: Well, during my most recent brief sojourn out of the government, which lasted about six months, I taught at Georgetown, which was a fantastic experience; I really enjoyed it. Plus, what was cool about it is that every semester, I got a new group of people that hadn't heard any of the jokes or war stories, so I got to tell them all over again.

Anyway, what I've found is – and I sort of had known this before, but it was certainly reinforced by my Georgetown experience was – incidentally, I was sponsored in a chair by INSA. I need to mention that, which was great. And I think it was a stark reminder to me of really how little – there really isn't a lot of difference between what you can do in a class – what is known and can be done and discussed and analyzed and thought about and contemplated and considered in an unclassified environment versus a classified. There really is very little distinction there when it comes down to it. Maybe levels of degree, some spiffy spooky insight you might get from a secret, but by and large, particularly if you're trying to understand regions, countries, international phenomena, global trends, this sort of thing, the intelligence community doesn't has no monopoly on this.

So I think – just from the standpoint of the expertise that can be brought to bear from the academic world is huge. And this is why I think this is a great idea. And my view on this, I think, over the last 10 or 20 years has really changed about the value of interacting outreach to academic institutions. I spoke earlier about agencies having connections with colleges and universities, those that want to engage.

Now, you know, some places – college, university institutions – are not particularly interested in having any kind of connection with spies. Okay, that's fine. But there are a lot of others, and more so since 9/11, that are willing to engage with the community. So I'm all for clearing academics, having them available for consultant purposes, having institutions do research for the community – to the extent that you can get a college or university to allow students to do studies, master's theses, or PhD dissertations that we in the intelligence community can use this as a way of really extending our capability, our brainpower, manpower, out beyond the narrow confines of the government. So there is all kind of potential there and we certainly want to do it.

MR. SAMPLE: (Off mike) – one thing –

MR. CLAPPER: Give me the hook whenever.

MR. SAMPLE: No, no, we have plenty of time. We have more questions online. The one thing, especially for you old school guys out there, just so you know, if you're sitting out there thinking, no, I'll just wait and catch Jim at a break, Jim's got a meeting with the SecDef this afternoon. Jim doesn't have a break. So this is your opportunity if you've been sitting there waiting to talk to him after he's done and catch him in the hallway. His hallway time is from here to the car. So we've got more online questions and we'll turn back to those; but if you're thinking about asking him something, now is the time.

MR. CLAPPER: Let's see. To follow up on your comment, please talk to specifics of how the lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts will be collected and disseminated to the community. How will we recruit and train the veterans of the front where low intel and operations have been fused?

Great question. And one of my travel mates on this trip was Lieutenant General Jeff Kimmons who was the G-2 or the head of intelligence for the United States Army. And we both came to the conclusion that one of the things we absolutely, positively must do is to record and document from a doctrinal standpoint – which of course will influence training – the way the intelligence business is being done out there at the pointy end of the stick.

I'll just tell you one example, which is a whole new business for us, which is media exploitation. And by that, exploiting cell phones, laptops, and this sort of thing, and doing it in – (inaudible) – relevant manner, meaning doing it quick. Well, this is a whole new thing for us. There is a field – it's now called – the buzz term is human terrain. This is like the classical Army preparation of the battle space, only it's applied to the human dynamics. Understanding the dynamics of a village or neighborhood in Baghdad, who the good guys are, who the bad guys are, what are the political dynamics? And that is not something you're going to discern from our satellites and all this stuff. There is a degree of fidelity there that only – the best sensor is the two-legged sensor, the soldier on the ground that is there and understands that stuff.

So one of the challenges we have, another way we have to change, is how do we collect that kind of insight and data so that the next unit that deploys out there and replaces the one that just left don't have to start all over again. So that's a challenge we have to deal with. So there are a number of things here that have affected the classical way we do business.

You know, in the military, the classical arrangement, and in the Army – I don't mean this perjoratively – is the higher up the command food chain you go, the more intelligence capability you get in terms of analysts, computer capability, and all that. And as you go down the food chain, you get less and less. And really, that's upside-down, where you need the intelligence capability – the tactical intelligence capability is at the platoon or company level. They need translators; they need HUMINTers (sp); they need debriefers.

Another new thing out there I found is the assignment of law enforcement people down at the brigade level. What do they do? Well, in an IED – improvised explosive device – context, you know, a really valuable skill is the forensic investigation skills that law enforcement people have that we in the classical intelligence business don't have. And they look upon an IED event in a much different way than a classical intelligence analyst. Well, that's another thing we need to figure out. What's the doctrine for that? And so I met a couple of retired FBI agents brought back as contractors and – (inaudible) – assigned down to brigade level advising the intelligence and the commander of these brigades on avoiding IEDs. But all these things that we never did before that we much record, document, because that's what's going to affect how we train people in the schoolhouses.

What is your vision for the interface between homeland security, domestic law enforcement, national intelligence?

That is another great issue. It's also emblematic of another huge change for us in the intelligence community. Prior to 9/11, there was always this firewall that existed between our foreign intelligence establishment and domestic. You just didn't mix the two. I was a young pup at NSA, young captain back in the '70s during the Church Pike hearings, so I kind of went through that, about abuses – well-intended though they may be – involving surveillance of U.S. citizens.

Obviously, 9/11 changed all that. Terrorists don't respect nice, neat national boundaries and all this sort of thing. So that's been kind of a struggle for us, frankly, figuring out how do we bring to bear the tremendous capabilities of the national intelligence community always heretofore focused on foreign targets, and use that in a domestic context. And of course, that raises understandable civil liberties concerns. And so, we've had our challenges in sorting that out.

I will cite an example, because I know about it. I was involved in it personally, which was in the aftermath of Rita/Katrina. And bringing to bear the national technical means, our overhead surveillance systems in the domestic context to help rescue people, to help with the planning for reconstruction, rehabilitation, all that sort of thing, and using those resources. Locating, for example, the 6,000 drill rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, some of which had been moved, which of course poses a huge hazard to navigation. So using resources in that manner is an example, which had traditionally classically been used in the foreign context and bringing to bear in a domestic context.

I think the Department of Homeland Security has a huge critically important role in the intelligence arena, because I believe they need to be the filter, the broker, the interlocutor – if you will – between state and local, tribal people, all the others who have an interest and need for intelligence in a domestic context. But I think it must go through the Department of Homeland Security and then be levied on us.

Q: General Clapper, quick question for you. I'm right in front of you.

MR. CLAPPER: Turn off the interrogation lights, here. (Laughter.)

Q: So that's the reason I would ask you the question; look into the light. As one of the owners of a number of analysts out there, one of my biggest challenges is the competition with the civilian contracting community, as highlighted recently by the $1 billion offer on the table to hire more analysts by DIA.

MR. CLAPPER: Again, media hyperbole; that's untrue.

Q: That part I understand. But the real question is, I still have to compete to try to maintain at government salaries with the civilian community. And the former DNI, and I believe this DNI, are both looking at how we can wean ourselves away from that civilian contracting in and out door that we are competing against. Can you talk a little bit about that?

MR. CLAPPER: Well, first of all, I think in my discussions with a lot of the young people that I engaged with when I was director of NGA, this comes down to a very personal decision. You have to decide whether you want to continue as a government employee – and there are certain advantages in terms of influence and decision making that you will have, even though the financial rewards aren't as great as they could be, essentially doing the same line of work as a contractor. And people have to make that kind of decision.

Now, one thing we did do at NGA – because this happened on a couple of occasions where we hired people, got them cleared, which was a painful process to start with, ran them through our 17-week training program, and they quit and went to work for a contractor. So just like military academy and naval academy

grads, they go through and get a government education; they have a certain obligation – they've got to pay back the government. So that's one thing I would recommend we do as a way of forestalling that.

Now, having said all that – and I think there is still a spirit of patriotism in government service and all that that we're going to keep. As long as we can make government service satisfying and rewarding to people, they'll stay with us. I will tell you though, my own personal attitude about contractors and contracting changed a lot after I became one. (Laughter.) When I came back, I was out for six years as a contractor doing intelligence work for the most part, and then I came back to the government as an agency director. And my definition – my phrase – the sacred trust of the government got very small.

In other words, I think contractors can do a lot and are doing a lot and will continue to do a lot. In fact, if all the contractors didn't come to work tomorrow, the intelligence community would be out of business. And that's not all bad. I don't think this preoccupation with size of contracts or number of contractors, I think that misses the point entirely. The key thing is the government's ability to manage, oversee the work of contractors from a quality standpoint. So you must maintain sufficient competence in the government workforce to oversee the work of contractors and ensure that they are complying with their contractual obligations, and the government in turn is meeting its financial and fiduciary responsibilities. That is the key thing; not how many there are.

There are tremendous advantages to using contractor workforce because you can expand and contract that workforce a lot easier than you can the government. And I think if you bring to bear properly all the beneficial aspects of competition, creativity, innovation that comes from contractors, that's a good thing. But the key thing is the government's ability to oversee and manage and monitor what contractors do.

Back to this, okay. Out here? Oh, from here, well, let's find one I like. (Laughter.) Well, what's your view on the role of contractors to conduct analysis? Well, I just talked about that.

Is this an inherent government function? Where is the line? Well, that's a great question. Obviously, I think there are certain fundamental things in the government that must be done by government employees – legal advice, IGs, contracting offices, that sort of thing. I think policymaking positions, leadership positions should be government employees.

Let's see – that's a question I don't understand so I think I'll just skip that one. Who in the government needs to take the lead in trying to break down barriers by sharing sensitive databases between FBI, CIA, DIA, and local governments?

Well, I think that's a collective responsibility. Certainly, the DNI himself is crucial to that in establishing policies. But again, I would emphasize – repeat the importance of the Department of Homeland Security in being the federal level interlocutor, broker for fulfilling needs of state and local, tribal, and regional government entities.

For those of us in – (inaudible) – doing human factor, human terrain work, how can we help government in purchasing and procurement folks to understand what we do? Intel groups don't know how to define what we know and are providing others.

That's a good question. I understand the frustration involved in this. And this is something that while you – the asker of the question – certainly understands, gaining insight and understanding what the human terrain and human factors is all about – I mean, this is a new thing. And so you're going to have to, I think, bear with us. I certainly have personally gained a lot of insight in the potential for what we're calling human terrain.

Another area that I'd mentioned is biometrics. And the application here – many applications – in both intelligence and security, being used extensively in the forward area now. And again, we have to – of course, this has privacy and civil liberties concerns. It certainly poses a challenge to the concept of cover and operating undercover, since with biometrics, it's pretty hard to hide. And so maybe the concept is – the only way you're going to be undercover is to live it.

Will the cocons (ph) be obligated to embrace analytic transformation like A-space and other enterprise efforts, so there will not be impediments to sharing, collaboration between the Beltway organizations and the war fighters?

Well, the term obligated sort of connotes a sort of pejorative thing. I think they're going to want to engage in this. And not to worry, the gospel will spread, I'm convinced. And certainly if there are any bureaucratic or policy obstacles to that, particularly operating the defense intelligence establishment – meaning DIA and the intelligence capabilities of the commands – in fact, I've got a team out now looking at exactly that as we speak – will certainly do all we can to remove such obstacles.

This says no more online questions. So I guess I'm done.

MR. SAMPLE: I think that's it. Jim, thank you very much for your time. (Applause.)

(END)

Remarks and Q&A by the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Transformation & Chief Technology Officer

Dr. Michael Wertheimer

DR. MIKE WERTHEIMER: First of all, my thanks to the press for filling in. Rush Holt was our featured speaker, but he just couldn't get out of Washington because of the voting and they really stepped up to do an extraordinary job, a gutsy job too, and I really do appreciate that.

There is a slide that we're going to put up. Is that ready? Okay. that URL, if you go visit it right now or any time, you will find we have now captured every video, every slide show. You can now view them at this site. I'm told that as of Monday, they'll actually have downlinks for them for you to download. If you don't know how to download it from this point, go see this table right here. You'll know if you're Gen Y or Gen X or Gen W by whether or not that stops you from downloading what's up there. Go back and just leave that up. And that's going to stay up for at least a couple of weeks, I'm told. Is that right? A couple of week that will be up; you can see every single talk we've given, all the slides. We had promised that earlier.

Okay, it's late in the day; I know you're tired. I'm going to ask for your indulgence to talk about something, not about the delivery. I will get to that, I promise. But in exchange for your indulgence, I'll try and be brief. I will be brief. I wanted to know what's the last message you should think about about analytic transformation before we move onto what it is your role will be beginning tomorrow morning, when you start giving us questions, and then in October when you come back and actually give us feedback. What's the last message I wanted to leave you with?

And I thought really hard about it. I asked the guys around here, some of the younger folks, everybody, what do you think is the last message? I want to instead give you that message via a story. I think probably everyone, no matter what age you are, or what experience you've had, there's probably been a few events in your life that were really defining, helped bring things into focus for you, help establish what I talked about in my first talk about that baseline below which you don't compromise, that gives you your value system.

So let me tell you something that we danced around but we haven't explicitly talked about. If you recall, I joined the National Security Agency in 1982. I want to talk to you about 1990. In the summer of 1990, I was at what we called SCAMP. SCAMP is the crypto-mathematician's version of SHARP. We spent a summer working hard problems with academia and the like. So I was out on the West Coast working on SCAMP, and I can't really tell you what the target was, but it was a really fun cryptographic challenge. And if you recall, in the summer of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and we went into what we called Desert Shield.

Now immediately – the Scamp continued, remarkably, the commitment to the long-term RASER stayed, but a big chunk of the group, mostly the coders and those who were intimately involved with that problem, the cryptographic problems associated with Desert Storm and Desert Shield, flew back to Washington. So I continued to work that summer watching what's happening in the Middle East like everybody else, but really not playing in it.

When I got back in the fall, as you recall, there were diplomatic attempts early to get Kuwait liberated without force, and we were building up forces. And by the time I got back to NSA in the fall, I was sort of out of the group that was working that problem. But an opportunity came up to work shifts, because once the fighting started we had 24/7 and we had put together the cryptographic capability, the signals, and obviously we're collecting every signal we could in theater, and to spell the folks that were working so hard writing programs, getting all the systems together, those of us with experience but not on that target would volunteer.

So I started working, I think the first few times like 4:00 to midnight shifts. My goal was to sit – my job was to sit at a workstation, and as the communications would come in – occasionally the modulation would fail or something would fail, and I learned how to tweak the algorithms, re-set some dials and get it forward so the cuts, whatever kind of signals intelligence could be processed and so forth.

We had set up in this room monitors, television monitors, with CNN feeds. Now I don't know how many of you remember this; we were stationed largely forward deployed into Saudi Arabia at that time. That's why our jets took off from Saudi Arabian air bases. They'd fly over and do the sorties. Especially if you remember in Desert Storm, this is one of the first times we did a lot of heavy bombing before we put the ground troops forward.

So what would happen is the following – we would be sitting there at the computer, while the room was quiet and everybody is working around their computers. Computers aren't making noises, but I'd have screens and I'd see lines and lines of information. Another signal came in, a signal came in from over here, and it would be flashing through my screen. Then we'd look up on the wall, we'd see the planes taking off to run their sorties, and about 20 minutes later, however long it took for the plane to get over the area, then the screens would stop flowing data because the Iraqis, fearful that their communications would cause our bombs to have something to home in on – in other words, we could target them by virtue of their communication – would go radio silent. It would be dead silent on their side.

Now most of you think of war as an extremely – and those of you who have actually lived through it, it's an extremely loud experience. Jet bombers are deafeningly loud. I think they're meant to be. Bombs going off, bullets – it's a very, very, very loud and disturbing experience. The curious thing was that back at NSA, it was just the opposite.

When the war was going on, when the bombs were being dropped, it's a silent time; all the signals stopped. The screen kind of goes blank. And most people would get up and they'd go get – that's the time to go get their coffee, while the bombing was going on. Just what you'd expect. Because when the planes would now return, we'd know before they returned because we'd start seeing the signals starting to wake up. And then we'd look up on the screen and 10 minutes later, we'd see the planes land.

That experience profoundly affected me in a weird way, as if the silence had a certain quality to it. You'd sit there and it's quiet. There's nothing coming on your screen. There's no visual cues; none of your senses are being touched. And all you can think about is there are planes being shot at; there are bombs being dropped; there are people being killed; and there's a war being fought. And you're just sitting there in the peacefulness. It's the most contradictory kind of silence I ever experienced.

And it profoundly affected me that people were dying out somewhere and I'm sitting in a room and it's quiet. And when they were back out of harm's way, I got busy again, and it got loud and boisterous. And when it got loud and boisterous in the room, a couple of things happened. Now I was – I'd been there about eight years, maybe a GS-13 or 14 at this point. And it's the first time I had ever seen a country genuinely in a war, and I mean that. Haiti wasn't the experience; Panama, you can think of all the things that happened in between '82 and '90. This was the first time we were really at it.

I watched how people came together. There wasn't any drop of information that didn't flow. There wasn't anyone who took no for an answer. People stayed in other people's spaces until the answer was yes. Somehow the imperative that we had troops on the ground, the heroes who wear the uniforms, was so compelling that I saw people who hated each other, genuinely during the day just didn't like each other, working together on problems. I was shocked at that. And to this day it's a visceral kind of silence that I think about that day. I watched the passion in that room in silence.

And I want to tell you this story because the generation that we kept talking about, this 50 percent of the workforce and higher, they have never known peace. They came into our community with a community at war. They've never had a chance to know what it's like, how this community works, strategically and otherwise, when we're at peace. And the passion that we – what saddens me is that we've been at this long enough that people now are starting not to share all the time, that people are taking no for an answer again, that we've somehow, even in war we've become numbed to fighting the battles that we need to fight to save lives.

My message would be, when I walked out after 1990, ever since then, it's been that we ought to risk our lives for peace. We should have a passion for peace the way we have a passion when we're at war. We should be collaborating; we should be risking our lives to protect the peace, not sources and methods. We are so protective of our sources and methods. People should be willing to die to keep the peace.

And I'm trying to create an environment; I'm trying to articulate to you an environment that we all share, so that these young people can see that we can collaborate in peacetime as well as war. They've never seen what it's like when we fought strategically, when we took six months, a year, two years, five years to study a single problem. How about the Cold War, where we spent 20, 30 years to understand certain problems?

So the collaborative environment, A-space, the library; put them all aside. We're trying to create that environment that inspires young people to risk it all for peace, not just for the war-fighter. God forbid, peace is going to break out someday. And where are we going to be if we designed every single thing in our community, every piece of intelligence, every acquisition to fight wars?

So I want to leave you with that. I don't know that it inspires you or it depresses you. I think that everyone should walk home at the end of this conference and think, when the peace breaks out, what will we have left? What is the legacy? What are you going to do tomorrow to make it easier for them, to make it feel more comfortable when they go home?

I will tell you quickly, after 9/11, I was as despondent as the next person. I would never claim more. But I was pretty bad off. I was a senior executive at National Security Agency, and I very, very much felt that I hadn't fought hard enough for the things that might have made a difference.

I'll never forget my father pulling me aside. Here's this 80-year-old man for whom I had nothing in common any more. And he pulled me aside and he said, what are you doing? And he told me how he had lived through World War II; he'd lived through the Depression and Vietnam and all the other tremendous things that shaped the 20th century. He said, I don't hold you responsible. I need you back at work. I sleep better with you back at work trying to solve these problems.

And then he said something that really shocked me. He said, you're scaring your children. You're scaring my grandchildren. You're working – I used to come home for dinner and then I'd go right back after dinner, back to work. He says, you're not doing any good for your family. People are overseas fighting so that you aren't scaring your children, so that you should live as much a normal life. That's why we're trying to take the fight where the fight should be and not fighting it on our shores.

So from that day forward I sort of committed myself that these young people should grow up and live in an environment where they can do their work efficiently, can do it with a sense of purpose, with a sense that they can go home after eight or nine hours, whatever the day is. Some days it's 12, some days maybe it's four. But they feel, at the end of the day, they've accomplished something and that the children will see them happy and they won't be afraid to live in America that still has to fight a global war on terror. So if I can give you one piece of my heart, that is it. And everything else is just commentary of what we talked about.

Now, let me completely shift gears for you and say, what do I expect from you now, the folks who paid their money and have very, very patiently listened for two days of us spilling out to you what we think we want to do, and yet haven't told you how you're going to make money at it, how you're going to – more to the point – add creativity, go from the good to the great. DNI, the office of the Director of National Intelligence, is about reforming everything that we can possibly reform that's broken, but to do it in ways – let's not try to do it all at once.

So I hope you saw in General Meyerrose's talk that he sees analytic transformation as a way for him to do the transformation writ large. He's talking about A-space. I guarantee you – I guarantee – it will never be called A-mash, all right. (Laughter.) I will give an award to anyone who comes up with a better name, I'll take a better name, but it will never be A-mash. And I teased him about that too. It's the springboard. Eventually it will be I-space or whatever it is, Intelligence-space, and the library will be some way of how we think about all our data in time, good to great.

What do I need from you? Starting tomorrow morning at 9:00 a.m. –and you'll get the instructions on the sheet, you can start feeding in the questions that we haven't answered explicitly for you. We will load up those questions. The sooner you start providing them, the sooner we will be able to get you answers and more thoroughly give you answers. On the 13th of September, I think we're scheduled for four or five hours to be online and we will have the developers, we will have the thinkers, we will have everyone who has got a stake in this in the room, ready to answer your questions so you can get the baseline, so that if we're taking a technological or sociological path that will lock out some great concept that you have, that's the time to correct it. Get us straightened out and say, you made the wrong technical choice here for this reason. That's what we want to start you to think about.

Number two, come in October, what is the most important thing by October that we want from you? I would encourage you to do the following. Don't be tool-based; be concept-based. I want you to tell me, the library of national intelligence, if you build an object-oriented database, we can unleash the following possibilities for you. If you build a highly dimensional database, if you do a relationship database, whatever it is that you see as a vision to take this two levels beyond anything we thought, put that concept down. We'll give you sort of a template that we would recommend, but like the one-pagers in your book, try to synopsize the concept in a page of all the different concepts that you see the analytic transformation going.

Here's my commitment to you, is we will take all these one-pagers and we will listen to you on the 11th. We will stitch them together. We will take all the time that is necessary, fulltime if necessary. We will look at it right away. We will stitch these concepts together into a big tapestry of analytic transformation, all the concepts you gave us, one big picture. Remember, concepts, not tools. It's important.

I want to take a binder that's this thick or however thick of all your ideas and concepts and I want to take them and as we massage them and stitch them together into one big picture, I'll walk in to Al Munson, the senior executive for acquisition, who's talking about reforming acquisition. I'm going to say, sir, this is analytic transformation. How do we acquire it?

He's looked – I'm going to tell you flat out, we can't acquire it by taking every one of these little concepts, developing requirements, and have you all bid on it. That would take forever, and if you want to go through some existing vehicle today that cuts out too many of the small players. He keeps talking, how are we going to have fast, accurate, reliable acquisition? Let analytic transformation drive how we change doing acquisition in the DNI and for the community. The way I can do that is to stitch together your concepts and show him the possibilities and say, if we don't get it, it's your fault now.

I don't – if it's acquisition is the reason we can't succeed, I want to know it. And that will be the next arrow I take. But I will fight for you on that. You've got to give me the material by which I can go to the

system acquisition and say, this is what we need. You must be creative and compelling, and then when I say, here's the piece, here's the concept, advanced search, whatever it is, then you can compete on a level field because I, A, will have architected it in a way that you can compete. I've done that, right? That's through your feedback early, and you can compete like you should compete. And if you do it on the concept level, I don't have to get into too much of your proprietary technology.

Now, I want you to think about what I said because over – I'm sure you'll attack me at dinner, and I encourage you to, and I encourage you to attack me between now and September 13th on, I like this, I don't like this, let's do it this way;let's do it that way. So on the 13th we can have a little more clarity for you and we'll set up a template. Not requiring you to follow this; you may have an even more creative way.

I didn't want to take too much time. I wanted to challenge you to come back to me, and what is industry, private sector, public sector transformation on how I should go about mining what it is that you have to offer. Now I hope – are we on for the chat room? I'd really rather you asked the questions at this point.

MR. : Are there any questions? Right there, a microphone on its way.

MR. WERTHEIMER: No, not – Mark, what can I answer for you?

Q: I sat here for two days and I've listened. Here's my question. You are urging this transformation for an end that I do not understand. I've listened to all the piece parts and I've read the pamphlet – which I think is wonderful, by the way, in terms of explaining what you want to do. But I don't understand what's driving the transformation. This is like a Bob Simon (ph) kind of question, which Tim understands. There is a question at the end of it.

Collaboration is not an end in itself, to my mind. You want to do this, I think, if I heard what you said and what Tom said, to make analysis better. What does that mean? It means it would be faster; it would be more comprehensible; it would be more accurate more often. I don't think you have a way of knowing at the end of the day, like you said yesterday, when you get there. And I think unfortunately a lot of this is pandering to a bunch of commissions that have no understanding of what we do for a living, or the nature of our work, and to the workforce. And I don't think that's sufficient grounds for transformation.

So I'm left here wondering what's the end state, for what reason?

MR. WERTHEIMER: Okay, I suspect that no answer will be satisfactory because of the way the question was posed. I didn't mean that meanly. I mean, that's a hard question; and the way it's posed is why, and we always ask why. I've been here only two years since I came back into government from two years in industry, so in those two years I went around and talked to analysts and I've tried to figure out what are the hard problems.

You know, we have this national intelligence priorities framework. And –

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. WERTHEIMER: Of course, Mark knows. And I am struck by the fact that, for example, North Korea is considered a hard target. I'm not surprised. What surprises me is that North Korea's been a hard target ever since North has been an adjective that modifies Korea. (Laughter.) So I looked around. Who's thinking about this differently? And then I found a group of folks who took an extraordinary risk.

By the way, if you want to work some of these hard problems, there will be managers who will tell you it's a career killer to go because it's been plowed over so many times you won't get anywhere. And what they

did was, they picked the part of North Korea they wanted to – essentially what we call white board. In other words, erase – they started to look at what did we know about this. And they started to go back and they said, well, here's our baseline analytic. We all agree to this. This is the analytic part that got the stamp of approval.

And then they went to, well, what did you base that on? And then they started to trace the sourcing backwards. And eventually the sourcing dried up. In other words, they could not find anything for the original sourcing. It just seemed to keep going back. And when they finally got to the end of the trail, there was nothing there.

So they said, let's take old assumptions off the table. And they went and they said to NSA on this problem, do you have anything? Nothing we do is relevant because of this. And they said, well, the because we don't allow you to rely on any more. And little by little they started to stitch together and had some of the most spectacular breakthroughs on this problem we've had since North became the adjective in front of Korea; completely have rewritten the book.

And how did they do it? I just watched. They collaborated in ways that they never collaborated before. They shared information that was always in the past considered irrelevant to the problem. They took a completely contrarian view. And they were hard to manage. They pretty much said, we don't care what you tell us; we're going to try anyway. A lot of people took a risk.

I have about four of those stories. It's not enough to go on because hard problems are hard. Every one of them has these things in common. Big breakthroughs on what we thought were impossible problems, and those big breakthroughs came through from multi-agency collaboration, a clever use of tools that weren't designed for the problem that they were able to modify. The themes for the hard problems seemed to be the same. It's a small sample.

So what am I doing here? I'm spending a little bit of money to create a new environment for which if that's the model that works, this will be the environment in which not only it can work but can excel. That's about the best I can do for you.

And I won't apologize for trying. I won't apologize because I'm not saying to the community, analytic – there is one analytic transformation. As I said at the beginning, this is about allowing many, many cultures to exist simultaneously and cooperatively. I don't have to change what's working. There are people who don't need to collaborate. There are those rocket scientists who just need to be left in the room to work hard on a problem. So be it. Let's let many cultures survive.

What I don't like is the thought that transformation is changing something from the past to something new. Don't think of it that way. Transformation is creating an environment in which more things can happen than could happen in the past. It's liberating. Let's call it analytic liberation. And Mark, I'm sorry, that's the best I've got.

(Applause.)

Q: I just have a follow-on comment on that. I think that we've heard a lot about demographic shifts and a lot about demographic change, and I – like Mark, I've spent two days asking myself the same question. Have we lost sight of the question we were trying to answer with this, and started looking at a different question?

But I don't know that the alternative question is of any less importance. The demographic shift that's occurring in the intelligence community has meant that there are a lot of people with very little experience, and Jeffrey Cooper's excellent paper that came out recently on curing analytical pathologies, talked a lot about the problem of mentoring young analysts, and the fact that the way this used to be done in the intelligence

community during the Cold War can't happen now because we don't have enough gray-beards to do it. It used to happen over an extended period of time, where you learned your tradecraft at the seat of the master. Well, there's not enough masters left at this point, and there are increasing numbers of grasshoppers coming in looking for their guru.

As a result, I think that what this effort is giving is a way of leveraging the remaining experience that exists in the community. It does create some problems for those who have this experience because it's going to create more work for them, and that's a problem that's going to have to be addressed in terms of their own productivity. But I think that this is in the short- to medium-term an essential way of getting people up to speed on their accounts. And then in the long run, it addresses the way that these same people like to do business, and it gives them the environment in which to thrive that they're used to, that you've made very clear with some of the younger analysts.

So in this respect, although it may not be answering the question that I think I came in thinking it was looking at – and that is, how do we improve analysis – I think the question of how do we deal with the demographic change in the intelligence community is just as important.

MR. WERTHEIMER: Absolutely right. I think the numbers, the last I heard – and they seem to be growing, right? Forget what the 50 percent decide. Of the 50 percent who aren't newly hired, roughly half of those are within five years of retirement, is the demographic. So we've got half here new, one quarter is our middle – is the leadership, essentially. And the high quarter is getting ready to head out the door.

I know the mentoring stuff, and all I can tell you is, we've got to deal with it. Deal with the fact that maybe we go downhill for a little bit. Someone was saying – maybe it was Tom Fingar; he said this is the metaphorical notion of changing the wings on the airplane while it's flying. I think we can do it without crashing, believe it or not. I just think we're going to take a dive for a little while before we climb out of it.

We're going to have to make that investment. We simply are going to have to make a little bit of an investment there. I don't know if we can lower expectations reasonably, especially in a time of war. Maybe you guys can use, God forbid – remember, I've been trying not to say this is about technology. But maybe, maybe technology can lessen the blow in the near term in ways, if we're just creative enough to give it a try.

Our RASER team has absolutely convinced me that young people are capable of learning in one year what most take four to do. It took a lot of resources. It doesn't scale. Maybe it will never scale. It's cost us a lot of money, a lot of time, a lot of work to get in there, but it's possible. Now if we can find ways to do that better and cheaper, maybe this demographic becomes the opportunity we just haven't realized, even in the near term. But your point is spot on.

We have questions here. There are a lot of differing versions of LNI A-space and catalyst reported during the conference. Is there any way to get a written document for each program stating what requirements are needed for all three programs? This I think would help the tool providers.

We have intellipedia pages, and I think – I'm going to say this out loud but I want someone to correct me. The functional requirements for A-space, are they classified? Can we publish those?

MR. : (Off mike.)

MR. WERTHEIMER: Okay, so here's what we're going to do. The current functional requirements for all these programs are unclassified. We'll put them on the web site. Is that fair? I can do that? Which web site? Yes, but that's intel-link Q (ph) and they don't have intel-link Q, so we'll have to put it on the site, perhaps to load them up on the site that you're going to go to for the 13th. So let's do that.

Quite frankly, it's not a bad thing to have, for every three people, four different opinions about what this should be. At the end of the day, we have to make some decisions. Let's put the functional requirements on. If that doesn't get you far enough – and we'll get them up real fast – send us the notes on the site and we'll try and find if we can't take more of the intellipedia pages, declassify them, or make sure they're unclassified and load them up for you. We have many, many pages on off. Principles, pre-steps, functional requirements, con-ops, everything. So let's move that onto the unclassified network to the extent we can. I can do that.

Is acquisition going to be addressed only for DNI, or will the implications reach across the 16 agencies? Do cots (ph) products have to be tied to services, vehicles in order to get in the game?

The first half, is acquisition going to be addressed only for the DNI? Absolutely not. DNI is not seeking to become an acquisition organization. DNI established the acquisition organization. DNI's established acquisition policy for the system community members. I hope that's absolutely clear. It is not the DNI's job to run big programs and do major acquisitions. We have absolutely no plan to do that. You shouldn't want us doing it. It is the goal to set the policies for the community.

I don't know the answer about cots products being tied to service vehicles. If someone knows that answer, I'm happy to defer.

Okay, what's next? How can vendors get access to these user groups, FRD's, et cetera? I don't understand the question. What's an FRD? Functional requirement document? Not bad for a math guy.

So we're going to have it on that site, right? What happens is when you log into the sites for the 13th, there are folders. There's a catalyst folder, a library folder. We'll pop them in those folders. You'll be able to see documents in these chat rooms, so put all the functional requirements and stuff in the documents and I think we handed out a sheet of paper, is that correct?

If I don't answer your question, you can chirp up. You don't have to type it in again.

Please comment about the plans to integrate the many collaborative tools that have been presented. Seems that the DNI has made strides in thinking about that.

About technology, how can improved product and collaboration, but how will you proceed to make these tools and the intent behind them systemic? I'm going to give you an answer that might in the long term prove that I'm wrong. I think we may need to go, and I would like to encourage you to think about it. If the model is white, and this has to be a little more viral so that it isn't – if we don't make it viral – I just love Gen. Clapper's (ph) dead horse mentality. That was priceless. I don't want to make a dead horse.

So why can't we have five different tools that do the same thing and let them compete like they do everywhere else inside A-space, and the ones that get used we keep, and the ones that don't. Now what's going to make a tool get used more than another tool? The ease of use, the unnecessary training. Can they figure it out quickly? Does it have the look and feel of what they're comfortable with. And then you survive just like everything else.

So I claim if you have it, you're going to want to price it; you're going to want to think about how you put it in there to compete in the viral marketplace. It allows me to have all three competitors' tools working at the same time. If we do one-time certification, it's cheaper for you and it's cheaper for us. And I think I'd rather have – rather than have you worry about getting it certified for 16 different agencies, I'd rather have you get it certified once and do it for 16 tools that all do the same thing and let you fight over it. I'd just as soon –

my laptop's full of tools that do the same thing. It's just this one's a little better here and it's a little better there and I'm happy to do it that way.

That's the model I'd like to approach. I want to say – I'm going to go out on a limb. Gone are the days – this happens all the time. I'll back up. People say, oh, I've got this tool; it's wonderful; I love it. I say to them, yes, is it service-oriented? Yup. This tool, this tool. All plugs into ours, no problem. I say, does your plug into theirs? And the blood drains from their face. Everyone wants to own the baseline. That's been the model in the community forever. Get our infrastructure in and then we'll let others pile on top. Those days are gone. Not in the service-oriented architecture, not in web services.

Your stuff is going to have to collaborate with everybody else's and vice versa, and that's done for standards we're putting together at the CIO for how to do XML tagging and so forth and so on. And those are questions you should all be asking other people on the 13th.

You have an example of what a successful analytic process and product looks like, absolutely. Here's a notional example, Google Earth. How about Google Earth, where now I can provide special imagery or make special imagery? How about a sig-int plane I can put on top, which has emitters somewhere? How about a geospatial plane that has caves? I think I mentioned this last time. Multi-layers that I can build up my own mash-up would be a tool like that that allows each of these silos or these cylinders of excellence to create their own planes that we can overlay on top of each other.

So I have a sig-int process that asks – Claudine may have shown some of you. She does avian flu, so an outbreak here, she can overlay where the chicken farms are and where are the veterinarians and what's the density of population. I want to do that for even our most sensitive data. That's a visual application.

How about a signal processing package. How about machine translation at different layers. I could simply come in, does the first layer of translation, then an entity extraction, then a disambiguation engine. That's the kind of thing we need. Modular. Go for your sweet spot. Don't try to – the end-to-end thread is dead. We don't – if you try and pitch end-to-end solutions, I warn you, it's not going to fit.

One of the reasons we have to go web services, you don't want thick client solutions because then I've got to deploy them and hit the security policies in all those agencies and then have to put software on their computer. If I can put it on a web server, or multiple web servers and feed it as a web service, I don't have to fight that demon. Don't make me fight demons. It's a hydra. You cut off a head and two replace it. Make it easy on us to do that.

Will competing products in A-space have to be in RDEC to participate? Absolutely not, although we're trying to make RDEC something that you will be excited about, a place where you can test your tools on genuine data with genuine analysts in the identical environment as the classified network. So if it works there, it's plug and play in the other one. But you are not required to use RDEC by any stretch.

How long would such an evaluation period last before a buy decision is made? That's a great question. Let me put it back to you. For your model, for your business case, in order to play in RDEC, what is the turnaround time that you need to demand from me? Well, if you're telling my business model, says I can't have put it out and have you sit on it for 12 months, or I need to have some feedback within four months or six months, you've got to let me know and then we'll build it in the process. You should drive that answer, not me; and I will work to make that what's the right answer for you. I will work slavishly to make that happen on our end. That's a promise I should be able to make.

How do you envision engaging functions across ODNI that inherently or peripherally help drive analytic transformation, for example, human capital? That is really a great question. So I'm telling you I'm trying to drive acquisition, and I'm trying to drive IT. Now I have to drive HR. When's enough for you guys?

You know, I want you to talk some more amongst yourselves and with Reid and Renee about RASER. A little small thing, I think it's really working and we still can't sell it. We still just can't quite sell it yet. I don't know exactly why. The human component when you're trying to get others to embrace ideas that were invented elsewhere or conceived elsewhere; that's just a problem about society. The question isn't that. The question is, how do you give them ownership of a piece of analytic transformation? I am trying to give HR a piece of analytic transformation. I am trying to give the – I am not trying – they are embracing, taking a piece. I gave some to DIA, would you please help me on A-space. Take ownership, lead us. I asked CIA, take ownership of the library of national intelligence. That is our plan. We are going to plans and policy. We've gone to public affairs. We've gone to legislative affairs, and we're giving them ownership. We lose some control.

And part of the negative of losing control is that the vision gets watered down, or gets diverse. The reason there are many different views of A-space and the library is because we've given ownership to so many folks. I don't think that's a bad thing; that's the tradeoff. HR, for example, there's this joint duty requirement. Maybe you've heard about that. First group in the entire intelligence community to get joint duty credit is if you're on the RASER thing. We were the first ones to get sign-off. For the whole intelligence community, you join RASER, you've got your joint duty done for the rest of your career. That's the kind of thing we're – it's small, but that's the point.

That's about as specific as I can be because we haven't been successful enough for me to lay down more ideas. I've got to prove myself before you can take me seriously.

How am I on time? One more?

People mean very different things by the words web services. What is the standard?

Okay, by web services – the CIO folks here really do know more than I do, and I don't want to answer for them so I'll give them an opportunity. What I mean by web services, though, is something accessible through the browser that does not require hard software on your desktop. We want A-space and the interface to this collaborative environment to be through your browser. One of the reasons for that is, today I'm the Office of Director of National Intelligence has its network; we share it with the CIA. If I go to NSA, I can't log on, simply cannot log on. If I find a J-wicks (ph) terminal or one of these common network terminals, maybe I have a logon account, I want to make it so that if I can just get to the network and someone hands me a browser, I'm in. I can log in as me and my whole life appears. You'd think that's so simple to do but it's not. If you do web services, and we can consolidate some of these services through a DNI server, that's huge for us. That's what I mean by web services.

It may not get to the details of your question, but I apologize, I'm not the person to ask. There are CIO folks here and I know they would be happy to answer. And again, on the 13th that's a question to pipe in.

I think that was all the time I had, Tim.

I want to end by thanking you. You've been very patient; you've been very gracious, our friends in the media especially so, recently. You've taken the news that the director of National Intelligence not being able to make it very well, better than I have, surely.

I hope you appreciate that Tom Fingar turned right around and got on a plane because he did want to be with us. I think secretly he's kind of happy it turned out this way. He's going to be introduced this evening by yet another young, very exciting person. I teased him, he's now going to have to suffer through two introductions by young folks. I think we're still going to have a wonderful banquet tonight.

When you leave here, whether you're inspired, you're mad, you think we got it right or wrong, we laid it out. We laid our hearts out, our minds out. I hope you'll take it in that spirit. Feed it back. There is no pride of ownership; there is no ego here. Please, even if it's not good, make it great. Thank you. (Applause.)

(END)

Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence For Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Dr. Thomas Fingar

KATE PARSONS (Special Agent, Naval Criminial Investigative Service [NCSI]): Good evening, everybody. I'm here to speak to you about some of the things that I learned here at this conference. I'm also here to introduce Dr. Fingar.

My name is Kate Parsons, and I'm a special agent with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I'm pretty sure that many people out in the audience have seen the TV show, and I do want to assure you that the helicopter that was coming to pick me up to take me out to the ship, to run the investigation on the mysterious homicide, is not coming until tomorrow, so I'll be able to finish my comments. (Laughter, applause.)

I'm very pleased to be here tonight, and to be part of this symposium, and to be able to do this introduction. Analytic transformation, future focus, collaboration, and the overall efforts to incorporate better business practices is something that's very important to me, and I'll tell you why.

My mission with NCIS is threefold. As an agent, I'm an analyst; I'm an operator; I'm a law enforcement officer; I'm responsible for preventing terrorism, for protecting national secrets, and reducing crime as it pertains to the Navy and Marine Corps. That's a pretty diverse responsibility set. there's many of us out there doing it, and we're doing it well. But as everyone knows, we all need to get better at how we do our jobs.

Throughout my career, I spent nearly half of it in the Middle East and the North African region. In my experience, my mission with NCIS, as I described, has required an awful lot. It's required a lot of teamwork; and it's required a lot of research. It's required a lot of action.

For example, when I was in Iraq during the fall of 2005, I was working a hostile intelligence issue; that was the reason that I was there. Now, given that my community at the time was the western al Anbar province, and I couldn't easily get into a car and physically explore the whole of this new environment, I relied on the intelligence that was available to me. I studied intelligence reports, and I electronically interacted with the Marines that were out in the combat environment. Much like a law enforcement detective working a case, I'm talking to community members with firsthand knowledge, would be doing the same thing.

Before I knew it, the picture that was in front of me, based on these activities, showed not only was there an overarching counterintelligence issue, but that within this issue, two specific people were responsible for enabling the influx of terrorists, weapons and explosives into Iraq by virtue of semi-organized criminal activity. For us in NCIS, sometimes these things are a little more common than they might be to just somebody from the IC versus somebody from law enforcement. We're sort of used to dealing with this but, again, we need to get better at it. We all need to get better at it.

So how are we going to deal with this? What exactly is at stake? And what happens if we don't disrupt this activity right now? How long do we let this continue? On this case, the traditional lines between intelligence and law enforcement were blurred. The nature of the transformation that's envisioned by the ODNI, I believe, is going to help us be able to respond to these types of issues as they continue to surface, abroad and at home.

For me to be effective at carrying out my mission, there are a few things that I need to know. I need to know the environmental context in which I am working and I'm observing. I need to know the types of people

I'm interacting with, and I need to be seeking the 5 W's – the who, what, when, where, why, and of course the how. These I-need-to-know items are the same items that both law enforcement and the intelligence community must have a strong grasp on if we're going to be most effective.

I think this is fundamentally a people business. The bad guys that we're interested in leave evidence that their activity in their various environments. That can be overseas, in the States, or in cyberspace. Our communities are looking for the best way to detect these bits of evidence, interpret them, communicate them to the right entities, and determine what, collectively, we need to do next. Although the sought-after outcomes between law enforcement and intelligence collection and analysis might be different, our framework for inquiry is by and large the same. Tradecraft, meet streetcraft.

Trying to conduct my mission within the context of varied and diverse environments is a challenge. And it really speaks to why I absolutely need – I require well-trained, well-equipped analysts on my team as partners. I need more environment context; I travel a lot. I need more behavioral context; tell me about the people that I'm going to be dealing with. Analysts can arm me with the best possible information that they can gather, and the one that identifies and articulates what information they still need makes me an more effective agent when I'm out and about. And the more effective that I am, the better the information that the analyst is going to have when I return from my mission.

You heard about SHARP yesterday. I had the great opportunity to participate in this year's SHARP program. My distinguished colleagues yesterday, and a friend, rooting me on, I'm sure. I don't know if this came across, but we all had to apply for SHARP. It wasn't something that they sent people to that weren't going to be missed around the office. This was a really big deal. I was lucky to have the application come to me, and I was really lucky to be chosen.

When I arrived and I met my colleagues, I was so proud and so humbled at the same time. Because what it showed me was that there are still people out there that really, really care about this problem. They're passionate about it; we wanted to get to the bottom of signatures and patterns of terrorism so we could stop attacks. Now, what is it that we're missing? How do we do this job better? We wanted to be more excellent in our craft.

One of the most important takeaways from SHARP was this – if we're not armed with accurate and reliable information pertaining to what we know about the nature of the threat already, and how it manifests itself in our vastly diverse operating environments, we're going to miss JDLR – what just don't look right.

It is my honor and it's my privilege to introduce Dr. Fingar. He brought us together to unravel this problem through SHARP, which led us to identifying what we really needed to better carry out our counterterrorism and antiterrorism roles and responsibilities. This is very significant. It exhibits the future focus of the DNI. They're asking the questions, and they're seeking ground truth observations and experience. I think we're really being postured to win.

Dr. Fingar asked us to engage in the transformation process envisioned by the ODNI, and I think I can speak for all my SHARP colleagues when I say thank you, sir, sincerely. Thank you for your vision; thank you for not telling exactly what you expected at the end of 30 days, because what that allowed us to do is to reach our conclusions together, based on our experience, our interaction and our ground-level information sharing, and for allowing us to offer these conclusions for ODNI consideration.

The kind of multidisciplinary teamwork that I saw exhibited in SHARP is exactly the kind of teamwork I need when undertaking my mission downrange. Since being afforded this experience, I've continued interacting with my new partners, and I've brought a focus back to my own organization on ways that we can improve our team approach.

If you would, sir, I'd be honored if you'd join me here onstage, as I would like to present you with the NCIS coin on behalf of our director, Mr. Thomas Betro, and on behalf of all the men and women of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

(Applause.)

THOMAS FINGAR: Kate, I hope you realize that that applause is for you – (laughter, applause) – and your generation. (Applause.)

I've had the distinct, if unanticipated, pleasure of being introduced by two terrific younger members of our community over the last two days. They're special, but in many ways they are typical. They are our future; but the future's now, and this conference is about nothing if it isn't about enabling the best and the brightest of our younger colleagues to realize their potential and their ability to contribute to the security and the safety of our nation. So thank you Kate; thank you Sean for yesterday.

Many of you are probably disappointed to see me up here again. (Laughter.) If any of you were asleep today, I am not the DNI. (Laughter.) I can report, with all sincerity, that nobody is more disappointed at his inability to be here this evening than Mike McConnell. He has an extraordinarily hectic schedule. This is an event that he blocked out on his calendar a month ago; he really wanted to do it. That was clear this morning, when I got the phone call, that how would I like to get on the plane and come back to Chicago? If we had proper warning intelligence, I would have known this last night, before I got on the plane to go to Washington. (Laughter.) Yet another example to the litany of failure. (Laughter.)

But as I'm sure everyone in this room anticipated, it goes with the job for the DNI, that what he and we who support or are engaged in – worldwide activities and events have come together that require his presence in Washington. And I'm honored in this instance to substitute for him.

What I'm going to do this evening is to begin by reading the prepared remarks that Mike would have used as the point of departure for his own statement to you. I say point of departure because I've known him long enough to know that he would have improvised and ad libbed and expanded upon some of these points. But this is his text, and I will read it because it does represent at the core the message that he wanted shared with the participants in this symposium on analytic transformation.

I am now the DNI.

Thank you, Kate, for your opening remarks. (Laughter.) It's really great to see so many young people in the audience, and for the purpose of my speech tonight, convenient. You all have a huge role to play in transforming our analysis within the intelligence community.

Let's start at the beginning. How do you transform analysis? In my mind, it's about one word – attitude. You need people committed to collaborating, dedicated to speaking truth to power, and capable of bringing new and vital skills to the intelligence community.

Fortunately, we are seeing this in our new employees. More than 60 percent of our analytic workforce has less than five years of experience. I had a chance to meet with many of these men and women during a recent visit to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These young people aren't any older than many of the young people here today. The group included the CIA, NSA, DIA, and others, all in the same room. It was impossible to tell who the players were without a scorecard or reading their lanyards. They come together expecting to collaborate.

And as in this room tonight, there's incredible talent among these young people. Stop and chat with them. What's your background? Oh, says one, a Ph.D. from one of the best schools in economics. I have a natural language ability; I speak eight languages. Interrupted by a friend who says, that's not true – he speaks nine, if you count English.

We're dedicated and brave men and women within the intelligence community. When you ask them how they like their jobs – and we've done this in IC surveys – they'll tell you they love the work. They love the organization. Two things they object to, though. One, we don't reward the best people fast enough; and we don't hold the worst people accountable to weed them out. They're right.

Let me tell you how this problem has come to exist, how the dark side of our profession has evolved over time. As we get older and more comfortable and set in our ways, an aversion to risk sets in. If you never go out on a limb with an analysis, you can never be wrong. Your performance rating isn't endangered, and you go along to get along. That's exactly the wrong way for the intelligence community to operate. More than anything else, risk aversion precludes transformation of analysis.

Let me give you some examples of what happens when risk aversion sets in and dominates the process. Pearl Harbor, 1941. North Korea's invasion of the South and China's intervention in 1950. The Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow's deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba in 1962. The Tet offensive in 1968. The Yom Kippur war in 1973. Iraq's threat to invade Kuwait in 1990. The coup against Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991. The Indian nuclear tests in 1998.

What do all these events have in common? In each case, the IC failed to warn our policymakers with enough timeliness and specificity to prevent a crisis or take advantage of an opportunity. That's more than one major warning failure every decade. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the IC has not been good at warning of sudden moves by foreign dictators. This is more than a little ironic, since providing such warning was one of the reasons that we were created and built up in the first place.

We can console ourselves with the excuse that our track record is perhaps no worse than anyone else's, and with the fact that we usually supply excellent situational awareness in the resulting crisis. That's cold consolation indeed, especially in light of another warning failure, an attack whose anniversary we mark less than a week from today, 9/11. That's why we're all here. That's why my job exists.

Why did our analysis fail? Not because we didn't have enough tools to collaborate, but because we weren't willing to collaborate or, more importantly, to accept the risks that go with collaboration. Our analysis failed because of our attitude. We see this in the financial services industry where they do manage risk. They do it every day. They don't avoid it. And they make a pretty good profit doing it. We'll never get to that point, but we owe it to the nation to do a much better job in managing risk.

If we're going to transform analysis, we have to transform these attitudes. And through that, we'll be better able to capitalize on those tools, all the tools that we have at our disposal. More than just changing attitudes, we need some degree of tension, peer pressure within the community. We often refer to our younger analysts with a kind of a backhanded compliment – you're so wet behind the ears, so new that you can contribute new perspectives, implying that you can't contribute expertise. Well, let me modify that a little. We hired you specifically to challenge your superiors who have a tendency to get set in their ways. Our community's judgments must be built on a meritocracy and not a hierarchy. Ideas must speak for themselves and not be based on a job title or the GS level or the salary or the size of the agency that is making those ideas known.

I'm honored to be here tonight and happy to take any questions. Here ends the DNI's prepared text.

I know from being acquainted with Mike, working with Mike over many, many years, that he would have elaborated on this prepared text. I will, for a moment, try to channel the DNI and the kinds of elaboration that I think he might make. (Laughter.) The first is to balance the points being made about youth challenging age, of innovation and novelty challenging established patterns. I'm quite sure that he would balance this with, we need experience; we need perspective; we need all of the insight and the skill that our mid-level and more senior members of the community bring to bear.

Mike talked often about creative tension, tension between the executive and the legislature, tension between security and sharing of information. Here I'm sure he would elaborate on the tension between pressure to explore new ways of doing business, new questions, new ways of examining old questions, new ways of mining old data, and, on the other hand, the pressure and perspective that comes from those who have the benefit of experience, who have the benefit of greater familiarity with what customers need and customers expect, who know how to work with the community to network experts around the world.

This isn't a call for revolution that involves simply off with the heads of the gray haired troglodytes like me who may at times seem to be an impediment to progress, an impediment to collaboration. I think what he would say is, we all need to recognize that we've entered a new era, that we've entered a new stage of our development as a community, as a government, as a nation. We need to draw upon the best of what we know how to do and be open to better ways of doing what we must do to meet new challenges.

Everyone has a role to play in this effort. I think he would probably conclude by observing that the flip side, the more important side of the 60 percent have less than five years, which usually leads to a gasp, and an, oh my. And by the way, that means 60 percent of the workforce has less time on account than the president does, and the other senior members of the administration that we support, making the bar pretty high for us to strive to get over.

But he would observe that that means 60 percent of our workforce do not yet have bad attitude, have not been sort of acculturated in the vertical cylinders of excellence in ways that require beating bad ideas and bad practices out of their heads and out of their conduct. I will paraphrase Mao, although I doubt that the DNI would. We have a workforce that in some ways is a blank piece of paper. We can write onto it very beautiful poetry. We don't have to re-make the majority of our workforce. We have to make the procedures, the policies, the ways of doing business fully consistent with the needs of the future, the challenges of the present, and the potential of our workforce. If Mike were here, I'm sure he would be much more articulate than I, in this regard.

I'd now like to step out of the DNI role, since he gave me the wonderful opportunity to come back and join you again. And I mean that sincerely because it did mean juggling around some schedules and passing up the wonderful opportunity to excel before members of Congress. (Laughter.)

I told John Brennan as we were walking in to the table, I was on the phone with Steve Kaplan who got to substitute for me on the Hill today, two and a half hours of a closed session on Iraq. I said, what's the bottom line? He said, the bottom line from Secretary (sic) Rockefeller was, this was a really terrific hearing. Beat the snot out of us. Asked really tough questions, that all the members were there, and our people did great. Our people generally do a great job, that although I am gratified by Kate's remarks attributing some of what we have done to me, vision to me; this is not about Tom Fingar; this is about us. And the us is the community, the leadership of the community, and the larger group of associates, affiliates, supporters, of which INSA (ph) is in the forefront.

And John and Tim, I thank you very much for the opportunity you have created for us. We're shaping this vision together. My exchange with Pat Hughes yesterday, both directly and in terms of the vision and the strategic planning, the need to communicate clearly what we're doing absolutely. Not wishing to get locked in

too early into too rigid a set of the shift to Iraq benchmarks to be held against performance evaluation. We don't know in any precision precisely what we must do to facilitate the collaboration, to make the community function as a single enterprise. We know where we want to be. We know generally the directions that we have to go in order to reach that destination.

For those of you who haven't picked up on the imagery of the road in the table with the forks on it, we've got a road. We have a destination, but this is a process that will require continuous course correction. Corrections are triggered by observations within our workforce, from the customers that we support, from the companies that support us, work with us. If you take nothing else away from this symposium – and I hope you take away many of the things – it's that we want you and we need you on this journey to open up new opportunities for us, to suggest problems to the questions and the challenges, the issues that have surfaced here and the many others that we will contend with.

Let me take a minute and read something else. And for those of you who know me, reading is an unnatural act; I am used to just speaking. But I asked the folks who are monitoring the wikis and the blogs and all of the electronic attributes of this symposium to pull together some of the thoughts. I think this is worth sharing with everybody.

Wouldn't it be great to have a meeting with the intelligence community where all the participants operate in a completely open and transparent environment, use at least three different chat tools, use blogs, wikis, social tags, group editing software, and RSS feeds; create text based on reports and analyst generated video in near real-time; share the insights and the unfiltered knowledge instantaneously; adapt to technical and behavioral challenges on the fly; connect users in California, Washington, Illinois, Maryland, Florida and Virginia?

Well, we did all of this at this conference. At this conference we generated 366 pages of chat. The leading contributor was Lieutenant General Pat Hughes. (Applause.) Pat, I'm not picking on you; I'm thanking you.

For those of you who don't know, I got to know Pat really well when he sat next to me for an absolutely awful open session on the Hill on Bosnia, where I was the bayonet dummy and Pat was enlisted by two senators who I will leave unnamed here, who after just destroying me, since I was there in place of the secretary of State, asked Pat, how would the military do it? And of course the military would have done it much better than the State Department and AID did at the time. But Pat and everybody else who contributed, we thank you for how seriously you took this enterprise.

We have nine intel-link blogs posted from the conference. We linked 13 open source reports, wiki pages and blogs about the conference with a common tag for easy discovery via tag/connect, the intelligence community's social bookmarking service. In intellipedia, a new article was started at the conference, and it had 28 edits by four folks, three here and one in Cencom. The page included links to tags, videos, et cetera. The article had 83 views in two days and overloaded the hotel wifi at least twice. (Applause.) There is something quite symbolic about applauding for what doesn't work. (Laughter.)

This summary was generated at 6:19 p.m. tonight by five members of the IC – from CIA, NGA, DNI, and ONI, all connected to the same document, editing collaboratively via the laptops, wifi, and a beer in their hands. One key insight from this chain of events is the time-dominant, unprofessional quotes, video blog generated by Sean Waldman, immediately generated activity and interest from analysts on intel-link you. And thus had a 24 hour advantage over the professionally produced videos to solicit collaboration. It also demonstrated the willingness of interested analysts to make the necessary changes to the very inter-link fabric in order to transform the tools provided to achieve the desired result.

Transformation is more than a vision; it's a way of doing business. Good ideas can come from anywhere. Anybody can have an outmoded idea. Any idea can be improved through collaboration.

The old saw about two heads being better than one is demonstrated, I think, in the little summary I just read. But more importantly, demonstrated every day by the way in which we are beginning to do our work.

We have a lot of smart people in the community. We have incredible collection capabilities, analytic capabilities, tools to help us process that information. But the goal isn't to make us as individuals smarter. It's to make our nation smarter. It's to make our policy better. It's to make the deployments and the decisions of our military commanders better, safer, more effective. It's to inform and empower first responders around the nation, so that they can do what they want to do and need to do to protect our citizenry.

We can do it. We are doing it. There have been visions and sub-visions and ideas and half-baked notions and a range of interesting thoughts presented during the last two days. Some of these ideas that we're trying, they won't work. Others have been tried and look very promising. Some, with application of common sense clearly need to be realized. We can do it. I'm absolutely certain that we can do it.

We have to do it without breaking the community. We can't have a revolution that begins from leveling. We can't go back to square one. And yet, at the end of the day, two years, four years, five years from now, which is my timeline of what it will take to effectively transform what we do and how we do it; we will be a much better community. Our nation will be better prepared for the challenges that are ahead, better prepared to respond to the opportunities that are out there.

I could go on in an exhortatory fashion, but I'd like to close with some words of thanks. First of all, to the organizations represented up here. My colleagues in the ODNI who have helped create the opportunities that are symbolized by this gathering. The attitude – and it is at this point as much attitude as it is vision. I'll single out, to his embarrassment, Mike Wertheimer, my philosopher of transformation. John Brennan, Tim Sample, INSA, the organization with whom I had the privilege to be associated for several years. The support of the institution, the organization, and its individual members is noted and is needed. Please continue to back us and to help us.

And thanks to all of you here, those who are here from the community; those who are here because you support the community; and those who are here because you are curious about the community. I hope everybody goes away with a better understanding of what it is you are attempting to do. And the we begins with the ODNI and the analytic portion, but it's a series of concentric circles. It is the leadership of the intelligence community, my colleagues, my peers in all of the agencies. Those of you who have been in the community and moved on to other jobs but continue to serve our nation.

And most of all, to those of you who are beginning your careers with us, I really hope we will be worthy of a lifelong or career-long commitment of your talent. We need you. But we need to be worthy of your capabilities. Do not shy from telling us when you think we've got it wrong. And you other gray-haired guys in the room, you don't need to be shy about telling us when you think we maybe do something right, when our experience may be an appropriate guide. And from talking to the folks outside of this room, outside of the community helping us to spread the word, we want people to understand what we're doing. That does not mean we want applause, does not mean we want acceptance. We want clarity. We want transparency, and we want comment and critique and suggestions and help.

The two-day experience here, both that I've seen myself and what I've had relayed to me from today's session, indicates that we are getting it. This has been a phenomenally successful two days from my perspective, and I thank all of you.

And now recognizing that there are people who probably want to get to a bar or to the phone or their Blackberries, let me sort of end the formal session of remarks from the DNI and his surrogate by saying I'd be delighted to respond to questions, if people have them, or suggestions. People who want to leave may leave. I won't be offended. Indeed, with the glare of the lights, I won't even know it. (Laughter.)

But if there are questions, if there are observations, things that you want colleagues in the room to know, things that are not clear, things that have confused, where a foot stomp is appropriate – if I can figure who you are and where you are and find you – you'll have to yell – I'd be perfectly happy to respond to questions for however long you have them.

Before really beginning the questions, Mike or Tim or John, is there anyone else who should come up here and give benedictory remarks? Tim coming up?

MR. : Tom, I want to thank you for those remarks, but more importantly, the reason I'm up here is to tell you that when Mike and you and others came to us and said we need help, how do we do this, if we didn't believe – and I said this earlier this afternoon – if we didn't believe in what this was all about, we wouldn't be standing here today. And I think it really is – and I speak for many in the room – it's a testament to you, a testament to Mike, a testament to many people.

I said this earlier when you weren't here, but a testament to not only the young – and I specifically pointed out to the young analysts in the room, I had a conversation after the session, where somebody reminded me, you know, there's a lot of not so young analysts who have kind of been through some of this and have kind of said, okay, we tried. We ran against that wall and we're going to go on and do our jobs.

And the one thing that I would add is, for those who are out there who have been through this and are now looking at the attention paid to Sean and others and say, wow, they've been through this; we've been through this; they're going to learn, I think that what you're doing is presenting the opportunity to tell not just the young workforce, but the medium-aged – how about that – workforce that now is the time to stand up and now is the time to make change.

I cannot thank you enough for your dedication, I cannot thank you enough as now a somewhat outsider to the community and as an American citizen. It really does do my heart a great deal of good to see what you're trying to do in this effort. So I also join Tom in thanking all of you. Tom's been very generous in saying that he would take questions, and I encourage you to shout out because you really can't see from up here.

But I'm not going to get up again. I just want to tell everybody thank you, and have a very safe trip home. So with that, Tom, again, congratulations. Thank you, and I'll give you back the mike.

(Applause.)

DR. FINGAR: Tim's remarks actually remind me of a PJO workbook; age and guile will beat youth and a bad haircut any day.

Are there any questions? I cannot see, so you'll have to call out if you do. I can't see you, just yell out.

Q: (Off mike.)

DR. FINGAR: I do too. I worry about an essay yesterday implied we scare people with the term revolution, so we use transformation. Liberation does capture a portion of this. Sort of as a 40-year analyst, the idea of being unshackled from some constraints is quite attractive. But I think it's more than liberation. It's not simply removing the fetters that prevent people from doing what they would regard as their best work – too

many levels of review, too many constraints and controls. I think transformation means that, but it means more. It means more and better tools, more and better training, easier access to colleagues, easier ways to find complimentary expertise. Attitudinal change that will enable people to let it all hang out there for colleagues to see not just what one is thinking, but how one is thinking about the problem without great fear of being ridiculed by colleagues.

When we can get to the point where people are less worried about appearing the fool and being criticized by their peers than they are about making mistakes because they have failed to touch base with anyone, anywhere who might have something to contribute to understanding of the problem, then we will have reached the kind of intelligence community that I'd like us to be. So liberation is an important part of it, but it's only part, in my view.

(Off mike.)

(Applause.)

(END)