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**The Expulsion of the ‘German’ Communities from
Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War**

Edited by

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Introduction

Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees

In his latest work *Im Krebsgang* (Retrogression) Günter Grass, the Nobel prize winning author, tackled a taboo subject regarding German historical memory: the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from eastern Europe.¹ Grass tells the story of the Wilhelm Gutsloff, one of the largest cruisers of the Nazi 'leisure fleet'. The cruiser, named after a Nazi high official killed in 1936, was torpedoed by a Soviet submarine on January 30th 1945, with around 9000 refugees on board, 4000 of whom were children. Grass, known as a polemic left-winger, a strong supporter of Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" and critic of the German reunification, addressed a topic that had been left since the mid-1960s to the extreme right or to associations of ethnic German exiles. *Im Krebsgang* has become one of Grass' biggest successes.

In the 1950s, insurmountable problems seemed to follow from the expulsion and the exiles found themselves at the centre of much interest and discourse in West Germany. In the 1953 elections, the exiles' own party, the BHE (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten - the Union of the Refugees and those Deprived of their Rights) gained, in Alliance with the Deutsche Partei, 9.2 per cent of the vote. In autumn 1949, a "ministry for the exiled" (Bundesministerium für Vertriebene) was created in order to address the problems of displaced ethnic Germans and to facilitate their integration into the German state. The ministry financed an extensive historical research project to collect testimonies and evidence about the expulsion and to record acts of violence experienced by Germans in Eastern Europe – the famous "Ostdokumentation".² This was the biggest research project of the German Federal Republic's early years, and its aimed not only to establish historical truth, but also to provide German politicians with material for a potential peace conference. Furthermore, hundreds of exhibitions, books, leaflets and monuments remembered the expulsion.

By the mid-1960s, however, the atmosphere changed dramatically, and not only because of the successful integration of the exiles. With the Auschwitz trial of 1963-65 a large portion of the German public became aware of the indescribable crimes committed in the name of the German Reich. Notably, this public consisted more and more of younger Germans who were weary of stories about the sufferings of their parents, a generation responsible for Hitler's

seizure of power, the outbreak of the Second World War, and all kinds of crimes during this war. In particular, the generation of 1968 claimed that their fathers should not be permitted to complain about their own misery during and after the war. When Chancellor Willy Brandt's famous "Ostpolitik" sought reconciliation with the Eastern European states after 1969, the exiles, still laying claim to the German borders of 1937, became an anachronism.

Only after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the maturation of a third generation and with the impact of broadcast images of war refugees in the Balkans, was the expulsion of 12 million fellow citizens from eastern Europe after 1944/45 resurrected in Germany's collective memory. The fact that Günter Grass, who has always insisted that one "who reflects about Germany has always to consider Auschwitz", now has addressed this matter constitutes a strong indication of a shift in German public consciousness. Probably more significant for reaching a wider public was a documentary tv-series about the expulsion, produced by Germany's most famous television historian, Guido Knopp, and a series on the topic in the highest-circulation newspaper *Bild*. The celebrated analytic weekly paper *Der Spiegel*, considered centre-left, also dedicated an edition to Germans expelled from Eastern Europe, followed up by a whole series on the topic. Günter Grass summed up this change in historical perception in a accurate, though literal, way in *Im Krebsgang*, where the author himself appears in the role of the wise old man, indirectly enlightening the reader about his emotions:

Actually, it would have been the task of his (wise old man) generation to give expression to the misery of the refugees, the winter treks towards the west, the death in the snowdrifts, the croaking by the roadside and in the holes of the frozen lagoon [...]. One should never have remained silent about that suffering, leaving the topic to the extreme right, just because one's own guilt was so enormous and one's remorse was predominant and pressing.³

In this context of public rethinking of one element of post-war German history, interest among historians has grown towards a topic barely touched since the above-mentioned "Ost-Dokumentation" project. In addition to several cross-border conferences, new scientific research has been done, such as the work of Philip Ther on the expulsion of Germans and Poles from their homelands,⁴ Manfred Zeidler's book on the crimes committed by the Red Army⁵ and the collected articles edited by Eisfeld and Herdt on Germans in the Soviet Union,⁶ just to mention a few. Previously, historical research into these kinds of subjects had been left to authors and publishing houses supporting revisionist or even negativist ideas. It is

still hard to tell if this new tendency to address the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe can be seen to offer a logical reappraisal of a “removed” item of historical reality. It could, of course, also merely mark a shift in the epic status of the Germans as the “bad guys” to the Germans as the victims – as some might fear when research on German suffering seems to provide an author with a large audience. In this vein, one can cite the work of Jörg Friedrich on the Allies’ strategic bombing of German towns during the Second World War,⁷ which met with remarkable popularity.

The expulsion of Eastern Europe's German speakers in comparative perspective

From the thirteenth century onwards German communities migrated eastwards, establishing settlements, sometimes with the active encouragement of local lords and monarchs. By the start of the twentieth century there were German speaking communities spread across Eastern Europe, from Prussia along the Baltic littoral, with large German towns such as Danzig and Königsberg, and sizeable settlements within the Austro-Hungaria empire (in what was to become Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia), and with German communities (the Volga Germans) planted in the depth of the Russian Empire. In many of these societies the German speakers occupied prominent positions as landowners, clerics, officials, whilst others were farmers and artisans. Remnants of these communities survive in many of these countries today.⁸

The position of these German communities underwent a profound transformation with the First World War and the Versailles Treaty. This saw the collapse of the old multi-ethnic empires, the reordering of state boundaries and the creation of the new nation states of Central and Eastern Europe. These new states were far from being ethnically homogeneous. The experiment in liberal democracy in most of these states came to an end in the late 1920s. In this trend towards the rejection of liberal democracy Czechoslovakia was the outstanding exception. The turn towards authoritarianism in these states was partly shaped by an attempt to hold together the fissiparous national elements in their composition. State authoritarianism was spurred by the crisis of the Great Depression. The insecurity of these states was compounded by the growing influence of Nazi propaganda and the political resurgence of Germany under Nazi rule after 1933 and Hitler’s rejection of the terms of the Versailles settlement.

The Second World War brought even more dramatic changes in the position of the German communities. The destruction of the Versailles settlement, the establishment of German hegemony over Eastern Europe, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, and the Holocaust all set their seal on this fundamental change. The Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943, were the prelude to the fall of Berlin in 1945 and the collapse of the Third Reich. In the Red Army's wake pro-Soviet governments were established in Eastern Europe. From 1944 to 1948 at least 12 million 'Germans' were expelled from Eastern Europe and resettled. This figure includes those in Western and Eastern Germany as counted in the censuses of the early 1950s. It does not include those who settled in Austria, the USA or other parts of Europe.⁹ Of these some 11.5 million were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia. A further estimated 2 million died in the process as a result of hunger, disease and violence (the estimates of those actually killed varies between 10 and 30 per cent of the total).

Norman Naimark in a recent study of ethnic cleansing and genocide relates this phenomenon to the rise of nationalism and the creation of the modern state. On this basis Naimark explores a series of cases studies of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century; the genocide of the Armenians; the Holocaust, the deportation of the Chechen and Crimean Tartars under Stalin, the expulsion of the Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia at the end of the Second World War and the process of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.¹⁰ Zygmunt Bauman relates it to the notion of modernity, of rational organisation of the state and society, the intolerance of those who fail to fit into the modernising states conception of what is permissible.¹¹ Ernst Gellner associates the modern nation state with a striving to bring into conformity its borders and those occupied by particular linguistic/ethnic culture, through education, assimilation, resettlement, expulsion, or by elimination.¹²

The ethnic cleansing and genocide of the twentieth century by definition belong to the modern age, and in most instances was inspired by a virulent form of ethnic nationalism. But the ethnic cleansing and genocides of the twentieth century are not dissimilar to older, primordial patterns of political behaviour. The logic behind such forced expulsions is clear; the removal of those categories of the population that are deemed alien, or disloyal to the state. It may be driven by the state itself, or it may be generated by popular initiatives, or both in combination. The objective is the creation of a homogeneous social entity, within a territory that is defensible.

The cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide of the twentieth century can be related to specific factors within states, and their interaction with neighbouring states. The forced resettlement of certain social groups within the state's territory, or their expulsion or forced exile outside of that territory, is found in all epoch of history. Various categories of groups have been subject to such treatment, and different criteria have been applied, from religious criteria (the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, the expulsion of the French Huguenots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) to tribal, class and national criteria. The modern state and modern nationalism may have given these processes a particular character, but the similarities with the ethnic cleansing and genocide of pre modern societies is striking.

Forced expulsion have been associated with particular upheavals; the occupation of territory and the expulsion of the existing inhabitants in colonial situations; the conduct of war and civil war, when particular groups may be expelled, eliminated or interned as a threat to the state. In the latter case it is related to actions to punish and expel the defeated (the exodus of Loyalists from the American colonies in 1780s to Canada). Elsewhere it has been part of the process of the national liberation struggle and decolonization. In the case of war and civil war the forced expulsion of populations cannot be isolated from wider actions of punishment of particular groups; terrorisation, dispossession, rapes, incarceration, etc.

The fate of the German communities of Eastern Europe in the first four decades of the twentieth century were rooted in very particular historical circumstances. It was related to the reorganisation of Central-Eastern Europe after the First World War with the creation of the new nation-states, albeit nation states with very large ethnic minorities. This principle of territorial organisation was 're-elaborated' by the Nazi regime before and during the Second World War. The expulsion, resettlement and forced "Eindeutschung" ("germanisation") of 9 million non-Germans under Nazi rule set the precedent for the expulsion of the German communities after 1944. The concept of nation state (and under the Nazis the racial state) was the decisive criteria here.

The charge laid against the German population in the East European states was of disloyalty, and of supporting the destruction of the states of which they were members and of collaboration with the occupying German forces. In this the settler German community was deemed to share the collective guilt for acts perpetrated by the German Nazi state.

Significantly it was the communist regimes of central and eastern Europe who after 1945 sought to reorder their states on the basis of greater national homogeneity.

On the other hand from the perspective of the German minorities it might be said that they were incorporated after 1918 into states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) for which they felt little allegiance. As members of a privileged German settler community, often substantial property owners and people who had held high office, they felt aggrieved and disadvantaged by the policies of the new states, particularly the way in which land reform was carried out. On the question of the rights of ethnic minorities, and the relation of that minority to another state made up of the same ethnic group, a delicate question is raised. How far can a state interfere in the internal politics of another state in protecting the rights of that national minority? Providing assistance, financial, cultural, diplomatic may be one thing. Encouraging defiance of their own state, encouraging autonomist or secessions movements is another.

In Central and Eastern Europe we can identify three very distinct situations, which underline the problems of securing the statehood of these new states. Firstly, in the case of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany's support of these minorities was the prelude to the destruction of statehood. Secondly, in Hungary and Romania, with substantial German minorities, statehood survived in a compromised form under German tutelage. Thirdly, in the Baltics, there was a more complex situation, with these states from 1938 to 1946 oscillating from independence, to Soviet rule, to German rule, and after 1944 back to Soviet rule.

Variations between states in terms of the size of their German population, its concentration and its political weight, also influenced developments. The new Czechoslovak state that emerged from the Versailles Treaty was vulnerable because of the large, concentrated community of Germans in the Sudetenland, bordering directly onto the German state. The new Polish state was left vulnerable, sandwiched between Germany and East Prussia. There were sizeable German communities elsewhere. The important Banat German community of the Danube plain straddled the new states of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. This created a tension between minorities who desired secession and states committed to protecting the integrity of their borders. Similarly there was the tension between the desire of these new states to achieve social cohesion and political unity, and the desire of German and other communities to protect their own interests. The weakness of mechanisms, provided by the

League of Nations, to safeguard the rights of minorities within these new states, or to provide a mechanisms to resolve questions relating to borders, created a fertile ground for discord. These matters were left to be resolved by the states themselves or through agreement between states or by outside intervention by one state in the affairs of another.

The relations of the German communities to their own states in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia was undermined by their growing identification with Nazi Germany, and by the belligerence of the policies of Nazi German towards the states in which these minorities resided. The German minorities in Eastern Europe who looked to Nazi Germany as the best guarantor of their rights and interests, could not then, in the face of its military defeat, expect much account of its views to be taken, in the redrawing of frontiers that were more secure, or in securing the rights of minorities, which it had sought to protect through unilateral actions that destroyed the Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav states.

The growth of Nazi influence amongst the German communities in Eastern Europe in the 1930s was pronounced. During the war these communities provided large numbers of recruits for the Wehrmacht and the SS. Members of these communities were often involved in the atrocities perpetrated by the occupying German forces. But Nazi influence was by no means confined to the German communities. In many of these countries, strong anti-Semitic, anti-communist feelings and xenophobia against other ethnic groups provided willing recruits and volunteers for the German Wehrmacht and SS and for home-grown fascist organisations amongst the native population. This was particularly the case in Croatia, the Baltic states and in Ukraine.

In the various countries from which the German speaking populations were transferred during and at the end of the Second World War different factors were at work. We can distinguish between the forced expulsion of the German speakers from Poland and Czechoslovakia: in the former case a consequence of the redefining of the western territorial boundary of the Polish state and providing space for Poles to settle, some of whom had been displaced from the eastern territories, which had been taken by the USSR; and in the latter the expulsion and confiscation of the property of the German minorities whose hostility to the Czechoslovak state in the 1930s had been a major factor in its downfall. In the case of Poland and

Czechoslovakia the expulsion and dispossession of the Germans was hailed by Eduard Benes and Klement Gottwald as revolutionary acts.

The cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in many regards parallels the situation in Romania, and to a limited extent also Yugoslavia. Here the German-speaking population was evacuated through the actions of the occupying German authorities, and then resettled in Poland, as an act of ethnic consolidation, albeit on territory that had been cleansed of its former inhabitants. In the case of Czechoslovakia, and Poland the motive of revenge against the German population loomed large in the actions of states and by the public. In the case of Hungary this was much less evident. The expulsion of the Germans from Hungary was dictated from outside, in particular by the USSR, but it also served the purpose of providing space for the Hungarian minority that was expelled from Slovakia.

A reappraisal of the German expulsions from Eastern Europe became possible after 1989 and the collapse of communism. This contributed to a willingness on the part of eastern European societies to remember the events of 1944 to 1948. An increasing and fruitful collaboration between Germany and the “affected” countries in the east was reflected in growing political contacts and in scholarly exchanges.¹³ The present working paper reflects on this new openness and is the outcome of a workshop held at the European University Institute (EUI), Florence. The aim of the working paper is limited to presentation of the state of work in progress on the German expulsion.

The paper is divided into seven chapters. Six chapters provide case studies of individual countries or groups of countries: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states and Romania. In terms of the numbers of German speakers expelled the cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia are clearly far more significant than the other countries considered. But in examining all these countries together the aim is to explore the domestic and external factors that shaped the pattern of forced resettlement across Eastern Europe, and to bring out significant differences in the experiences of each of the German speaking groups in each country. The seventh chapter looks at the way this issue has been presented in school history textbooks

¹ Günter Grass, *Im Krebsgang. Eine Novelle*, (Göttingen 2002)

² Theodor Schieder et. Alt. (Ed.), *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, (Bonn 1954 ed seq). For a detailed description of the “Ostdokumentation“ (archive which stores the large documentation: Bundesarchiv Bayreuth – Lastenausgleichsarchiv) see: *Das Bundesarchiv und seine Bestände. Bearbeiter:* Gerhard Granier, Klaus Henke, Klaus Oldenhege, *Schriftenreihe des Bundesarchiv*, Volume 10, 3.Edition, (Boppard am Rhein, 1977). As a comment on the sources: Mathias Beer, Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Das Grossforschungsprojekt “Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa“. In: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 46 (1998), S. 345-389.

³ Grass, *Im Krebsgang*, p. 99.

⁴ Philip Ther, *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene. Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945 – 1956*, (Göttingen 1998).

⁵ Manfred Zeidler, *Kriegsende im Osten. Die Rote Armee und die Besetzung Deutschlands östlich von Oder und Neisse 1944/45*, (Munich,1996)

⁶ Alfred Eisfeld and Victor Herdt, *Deportation, Sondersiedlung, Arbeitsarmee. Deutsche in der Sowjetunion 1941 bis 1956*. (Cologne, 1996).

⁷ Joerg Friedrich, *Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945*, (Berlin 2002)

⁸ Stefan Wolff, *German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging*, (New York and Oxford , 2000).

⁹ Gerhard Ziemer, *Deutscher Exodus: Vertreibung und Eingliederung von 15 Millionen Ostdeutschen*, (Stuttgart, 1973).

¹⁰ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, (Cambridge Mass., and London, 2001). Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing*, (London,1996).

¹¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Ithaca, 1989)

¹² Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, (New York, 1997)

¹³ “Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950”, Edited by Alfred J. Rieber (Selection from Papers from the Conference on Population Transfers, Deportations and Resettlements in Central Eastern Europe, Central European University, Budapest, 1996) *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 16 March/June 2000

The Expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia.

Piotr Pykel

The case of the expulsion of the Germans, the Sudeten Germans (Sudetendeutsche) from Czechoslovakia is probably better known than the similar cases of expulsion which took place in the other East European countries after the Second World War. The nation-state ideology adopted by the Czechoslovak state after the war, the implementation of harsh administrative measures towards the German speaking population in this period, and especially the application of the concept of a collective responsibility of the Germans for the war crimes, have been seen as an example of human rights and minority rights violation. The Beneš decrees have often been indicted as symbolising these violations. In 2002 this issue was brought to Brussels, becoming one of the possible obstacles to the admission of the Czech Republic into the European Union. The question of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia was also debated during the electoral campaigns both in Germany and in Czech Republic in 2002.

1. German speakers in Czechoslovakia.

The term Sudetendeutsche refers to the German speaking population that lived until the end of the Second World War on the territory of Bohemia and Moravia. These Germans began settling in these regions in XIII century creating a belt along the northern, western and southern borders of modern Czechoslovakia, which extended beyond the Sudeten land proper. From the XIX century onwards they constituted a permanent element of the demographic structure of the Czech and Moravian lands.¹

When the independent Czechoslovak state was proclaimed on 28 October 1918 the decision was opposed by politicians who represented the German speaking population of Bohemia. They proclaimed the separation of the territories inhabited by Germans from the new state and the creation of an autonomous region, which they wished to be incorporated into German Austria. Only the Saint Germain Treaty in 1919, which sanctioned the formation of the new Czechoslovak state, put an end to this situation by confirming Czechoslovak jurisdiction over these territories.

In the period between the two world wars the German minority in Czechoslovakia constituted more than 20per cent of the total number of inhabitants of the country and more

than 30 per cent of the inhabitants of the Czech lands. The first census made in Czechoslovakia in 1921 recorded 3 123 568 German speakers (23,4 per cent of the total population). In 1930 the German speaking population reached 3 231 688, (22,3 per cent). The biggest group lived on the Czech territory (Bohemia- the traditional Czech fatherland) - 2 271 000 and constituted 32,4 per cent of the population. There were three main areas inhabited by German speakers *Česká Rudava /DeutschBohmen/* - 1 500 000; Sudeten - 800 000; and the southern border */Bohmerwaldergau/* - about 500 000. The remaining part of the German speakers lived in various enclaves within the country, including Brno, Olomouc and elsewhere.²

The Czechoslovak Constitution, approved on 29 February 1920, guaranteed the same civic and political rights for all citizens regardless on their race, language or religion.³ All the nations living on the Czechoslovak territory had a right to use their own languages in private contacts, commercial relationships, in public gatherings and religious ceremonies, as well as in the local press. Special regulations were created with regard to the territories inhabited by the national minorities. Article 131 of the Czechoslovak Constitution stated that in the territories, where the minorities represented more than 20 per cent of the total population, the teaching program in the language of the minority would be ensured. The German minority also had a right to use its language in contacts with public authorities.

The twenties were marked by the growing political and cultural activity of the German minority, whose representatives played a very important role in Czechoslovak politics. Moderate German forces, the so-called activists parties, tended to accept the proposals of co-operation with the Czechoslovak government, while two intransigent nationalist parties rejected this option, submitting demands that the Czechoslovak authorities could not possibly meet. The so-called activist were represented by the Social-democrats (DSAP, *Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*), the centre-right Agrarian Party (*Bund der Landwirte, BdL*) and the Christian Democrats (*Deutsche Christlich-soziale Volkspartei, DCVP*). The two intransigent parties were the right-wing nationalist German National Party (*Deutsche Nationalpartei, DNP*) and the nazi DNSAP (*Deutsche Nazionalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei*). Notwithstanding their nationalist and anti-Czech demands and programs, both the DNP and DNSAP operated legally until October 1933, when the DNSAP was banned by the Czechoslovak authorities for spreading nazi propaganda and for disseminating national hatred. DNP closed down shortly before the Czechoslovak authorities decided to declare its activity illegal.

The moderate German parties co-operated with the Czech authorities entering the governing coalition in 1926. Five German politicians took part in the Czechoslovak governments in the period up to 1938. In comparison with the other Eastern European countries, with considerable German minorities, only Latvia saw such involvement in government by its German minority. This policy seemed to be successful. In the elections held in 1929 75 per cent of the votes of the German speakers went to the activist parties. The alliance between Czech and German social-democrats made them the leading political force in the country, the German Social-Democratic Party became also the leading force among the German minority. The elections marked a decisive defeat for the German nationalist parties.

This situation changed at the beginning of the 1930s. The world economic depression affected the young Czechoslovak state. The country's industry was disproportionately concentrated in the areas inhabited by the German speakers and they suffered more than the rest of the country. This increased the popularity of the rightist populist movements, the German National-Socialist Party and German National Party, whose leaders sought support from the new emerging force in the Weimar Republic Party - the NSDAP and its leader Adolf Hitler. In 1933 the German nationalist formed the pro-nazi political party, Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront /SHF/, which two years later changed its name into Party of Sudeten Germans /SdP/. Its leader Konrad Henlein won growing support amongst the German speakers living in the borderland. From the Spring of 1934 Henlein's party was politically and financially supported by the NSDAP, which helped the SdP to increase its political influence among the Sudeten Germans. The parliamentary elections of 1935 confirmed its dominant position within the German community in Czechoslovakia. More than 65per cent of Czechoslovak Germans voted for the SdP. Henlein's party got 44 seats in the Czechoslovak Parliament becoming the second largest political force, obtaining only one seat less than the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party.⁴

The efforts made by the Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, together with the moderate German parties, to limit the SdP's popularity failed. The SdP systematically rejected all the proposals from the reforms of the status of the German minority. Henlein instead demanded full political autonomy, as a step towards secession of the Czechoslovak lands inhabited by Germans and their annexation to the Third Reich. Henlein demanded territorial-political autonomy for the Sudetenland; the formation of a system of local government which would be entitled to take decisions, free from the jurisdiction of Prague, in all areas except financial policy, foreign affairs and national defence. Henlein also demanded the formation of a local police force which would be subjected only to the local Sudeten government. All the

governmental institutions, including the Office of the President and Presidium of the Council of Ministries, he demanded, should be divided into national sections; and the same procedures should be applied to the courts. The national budget would be divided on the basis of the nationality, however, in the first period Germans had to receive compensation for, what Henlein called, the discrimination, which they had suffered from the Czech authorities. Subsequently he demanded legal guaranties for the free diffusion of nazi ideology and the formation of a German National assembly independent of Prague.

2. The Munich Agreement and German Occupation Terror.

The Austrian Anschluss strengthened Henlein's position. In the Summer of the 1938 the SdP was supported by 88-91 per cent of the German electors in Czechoslovakia and the party's membership soared to 1 200 000 members (the whole German speaking population in Czechoslovakia numbered just 3 230 000 people). On 15 September 1938 Henlein, under the influence of Hitler's speech at the Nuremberg Party Rally, stated that the only solution for the Czechoslovak crisis was the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Third Reich.⁵

During the Munich Conference, held in September 1938, the dismantling of the Czechoslovak state was sanctioned. The Munich Agreement was signed by Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France on 29 September, without the participation of the Czechoslovak government. It set up the new borders for the Czechoslovak state, fulfilling Hitler's and Henlein's demands concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Third Reich. The decision allowed no possibility of appeal. The Third Reich obtained 28 971 square kilometres, that meant 40 per cent of the territory of Bohemia and Moravia. This territory had 3 500 000 inhabitants - 2 800 000 Germans and 700 000 Czechs. On the territory of Bohemia and Moravia there remained 440 000 German speakers. The incorporated territory received a name of Sudetengau. Konrad Henlein was nominated by Hitler as its gauleiter. In 1939 the Czechoslovak state was finally dismembered, with the establishment of the German Protectorate in the remaining Czech lands, and the creation of a new Slovak puppet regime.

The post-war position of the Czechoslovak authorities with regard to the expulsion of the Germans was conditioned by the aggressive behaviour of the SdP at the end of the thirties, but especially by German occupation terror from 1939 to 1945. Initially the German policy on the Czech territories was softer than in neighbouring Poland or the Baltic states. This situation changed with the nomination of Reinhard Heydrich as reichsprotector of the Czech and

Moravian lands. Heydrich, the former Chief of the Central Security Office of the Third Reich, replaced the more moderate Konstantin von Neurath and from the very beginning implemented new drastic policies. He declared a state of emergency on the majority of the Protectorate territories, the immediate arrests of 4 000 - 5 000 people and the executions of 400. By the end of 1941 the Czech underground structures were crushed and the politicians, who remained in the country, were arrested. Heydrich's policies were marked by methods previously unknown in Czechoslovakia, but very well known in the other occupied countries, especially in Poland.

On 27 May 1942 Heydrich was killed in a bomb attack, that was organised by the Czech resistance. The consequence of this assassination was a campaign of terror, co-ordinated by the Gestapo. Hundreds of Czechs were condemned to death and executed without trial. The culmination of the German terror was the extermination of the whole population of two Czech villages, Lidice and Ležaky.

These acts of terror and the fact, that so many Sudeten Germans served as Gestapo functionaries, provoked a further radicalisation of Czech public opinion. The shift was remarkable for the hatred vented against the occupation forces, and this was extended to hatred against all Germans. The notion of collective responsibility of the German people for the Nazi crimes was well established by the end of 1942.

The occupation terror provoked also the radicalisation of the Czech resistance movement. This was subsequently reflected in the outlook of politicians in exile, notably President Beneš, who was based in London, with regard to the solution of the German issue, once the war was ended. The Czechoslovak authorities from the end of 1941 stressed continually that, in order to secure the stability of the Czechoslovak state and the whole region after the war, the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia would be necessary. Moreover, in reconstituting the Czechoslovak state, it was proposed also to expel the sizeable Hungarian minority from Slovakia (see section by Apor on Hungary).

The idea of expelling the German minority from Czechoslovakia initially failed to win the support of the Western powers. However, when Stalin recognised the Czechoslovak government in exile and expressed himself in favour of the transfer of Germans, both the United States and Great Britain changed their positions, accepting Beneš's plans for the transfer. The idea of the nation-state without the minorities took shape in the period 1942-1943 through the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Beneš. In the summer of 1943 he achieved his aim, when Great Britain first, and subsequently the United States and the Soviet Union approved the idea of the transfer of the Germans from Czechoslovakia. The Soviet agreement

to Beneš's plans was obviously a part of Stalin's plans regarding the domination of the Soviet Union over Central-Eastern Europe in the post-war period. The stance taken by the Soviet dictator prompted a change in the position of the Czechoslovak Communists. Initially they had rejected this solution; now, having understood that this question would be crucial in the post-war struggle for power, they became the most zealous advocates of the idea of total expulsion.

3. Wild Expulsions, The Potsdam Treaty and Definitive Transfer of German Population.

The first public statement of the Czechoslovak government on returning from exile, was the program announced in Košice on 5 April 1945. Chapter eight of the Košice Programme was dedicated to the German question. The Czechoslovak government reserved to themselves the right to grant Czechoslovak citizenship to German speakers, that meant to decide who were good and who were bad Germans. The German speakers would be deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship, with the exception of those who had held the citizenship before the Munich Agreement and were able to prove their anti-fascist activity during the war. As anti-fascists and anti-nazis the program defined those Germans who before the signature of the Munich Agreement had struggled against Henlein and his party; who suffered persecutions because of their anti-nazi views and loyalty to the Czechoslovak state; and those who had been forced to escape from Czechoslovakia by the German occupation terror. All remaining Germans would be deprived of citizenship - they would be allowed to apply again for it, but the decision to grant them Czechoslovak citizenship would be at the discretion of the Czechoslovak authorities. The program also stated that those Germans who would be tried for crimes committed during the war would lose Czechoslovak citizenship forever. The German speakers who moved to the Czech Protectorate after Munich would be immediately expelled from the country under condition they had not to be tried for war-crimes.⁶

From the end of the war Czechoslovak politicians stressed the notion of collective responsibility for war crimes which were ascribed to the whole German population. The authorities stressed that the expulsion of the Germans was the consequence of the crimes committed by them during the war and the action was a state priority. The Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister and one of the leading figures of the Communist Party, Vlado Klementis, stressed, that "until this issue was dealt with, none of the other important social, economic, and institutional problems of the country could be addressed".⁷ On 10 June 1945 speaking in Lidice, President Beneš held the whole German nation responsible for Nazism.

The Czechoslovak press conducted a mass propaganda attack against the Germans, recalling the crimes committed during the occupation. Anti-German sentiments were also strengthened by the presence of the Red Army. The actions of the Soviet soldiers against German civilians were legitimated by de-nazification which was identified with de-germanisation. Then the Potsdam conference sanctioned by its Final Act the expulsion of the Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The period before the Potsdam Conference is known as *wild odsun*, wild expulsions. In this period the Czechs showed particular brutality in dealing with Germans ignoring all existing regulations protecting the minorities.

There are varying figures for the number of German speakers on Czechoslovak territory at the beginning of May 1945. They range from 3 200 000 to 4 000 000 (the majority of sources give 3 300 000 - 3 400 000). By the time of the Potsdam meetings 700 000 to 800 000 Germans had already left or been driven out of the former Sudetenland.⁸ While the central government was preparing the organisation of the transfer in the areas inhabited by the German speakers the real removal had already started. The new provisional legislation concerning the Germans was set up and subsequently implemented. In May - June 1945 the borderland cities and their environs were subject to ethnic cleansing. The authorities started to confiscate the property of the German speakers. The local authorities opened internment centres and labour camps in which tens of thousands of Germans were gathered. In the borderland new regulations were instituted which obliged the German speakers to work (men from 14 to 60 and women from 14 to 55). In the atmosphere of confusion, fear and witch-hunt members of the democratic German parties, who had struggled against Nazism before Munich, German clergy and Czech citizens married to Germans, were all treated as criminals and incarcerated in labour camps. In the camps food was rationed and the health care was seriously inadequate. There were cases of illegal executions of arrested German SS-functionaries, well-known Nazi officials, members of Nazi associations and also of ordinary Germans. The attempts made by some Czechs to stop the violence and to help Germans for humanitarian reasons were usually despised and criticised by the local press.

The organisation of the expulsions was peremptory and harsh. The Germans had to leave their houses within a very short period of time, often only 30 minutes, and were allowed to take with them only personal belongings. They were not allowed to take luggage exceeding 60 kilos. They were allowed to take food enough only for 3-7 days. During the wild expulsions the majority of Germans was sent to the Soviet occupation zone. The conditions of the transport often resembled those of the German transports to the concentration camps. Mortality caused by diseases was high as well as deaths by the suicides. We do not have

available figures with regard to the suicides in the first, wild period of expulsions. The data for 1946 (the Czech statistics) speak of some 5 558 suicides of Germans during this year.

The anti-German atmosphere is dramatised by particular incidents, involving localised massacres of the German population. On the night of 18-19 June 1945 in Přešov in the Moravian lands the Czechs organised a pogrom of the German population. 71 men, 120 women and 74 children were killed. On 30 May 1945 30 000 Germans from the second biggest Czech town, Brno were forced to leave their homes. During the death march to the labour camps, located close to the Austrian border, they were brutally beaten. We do not know how many died during this march, however the estimates speak of several hundred people.

Another violent incident took place on 31 July in Usti nad Labem. It was triggered by a series of explosions in the local munitions warehouse, that killed twenty-eight people and wounded 39. The explosions were blamed on Werwolf organisations - gangs of German youngsters who allegedly sabotaged Czech installations and plotted to assassinate Czech officials. Although there were no proofs confirming this thesis, the Czech militia and civilians initiated a real massacre in the town. Some women and children were thrown off the bridge into the Elbe River and shot.⁹ Estimates of the numbers killed vary widely, even today, from 30-50, through to 200-400, and even as high as 600-700 civilians.

During the summer of 1945 the local and regional authorities introduced new regulations limiting the civic and personal freedoms of the Germans. Some of them were modelled on the laws implemented by the Third Reich on Czechoslovak territory during the war. The Germans were forced to wear white armbands, marked with an "N" (Nemec, German in Czech). They were prohibited from sitting on park benches or walking on the sidewalks. They could not organise public gatherings. They were not allowed (except when travelling to work) to use public transport and trains, or use telephones. They had to deposit the radio broadcasters. They could not frequent restaurants or go to cinemas and theatres. Their letters were censored.

The number of Germans registered on the Czechoslovak territory on 17 July 1945, when the Potsdam conference began, was 2 811 000 and at the moment of its end about 2 500 000. (On 19 August 1945 the Czech official data spoke of about 2 478 024 Germans). In the borderland the figures were following: 2 206 146 Germans (64 per cent of the total population) and 1 243 117 Czechs.¹⁰ The official position taken by the Czechoslovak authorities after the Potsdam conference was made public on 16 August 1945. It was addressed to the American, British and Soviet diplomatic representatives and planned *odsun* (expulsion) of 2 500 000

German speakers within one year (that meant 200 000 per month). 750 000 German speakers would be removed to the Soviet occupation zone and 1 750 000 to the American occupation zone. Germans would be allowed, according to this document, to take with them their personal property. Sufficient foodstuffs for 4 days had to be ensured for each transferred person. The expulsions which took place after Potsdam were based on the decree of the Czechoslovak President Beneš (the first from the series of Beneš decrees which would become a symbol of anti-German policies) issued on 2 August 1945, depriving the German speakers of their Czechoslovak citizenship.¹¹ At the same time the Presidential decrees “regulated“ the question of German property - all German associations (COMPANIES-BUSINESSES??) were dissolved and their property was confiscated.¹² The same fate befell German non-agriculture property.¹³

A majority of foreign observers and scholars dealing with the expulsion question assert that, following the Chapter XIII of the Final Act of the Potsdam conference, which sanctioned the expulsions, the conditions of the German speakers removed from Czechoslovakia did improve. This regards the quality of transports, the fact that the transferred population was allowed to have sufficient foodstuffs and that the health assistance was ensured by the Czechoslovak authorities. However, there were still numerous cases of abuses committed by Czech officials and citizens. Czechoslovak public opinion supported the expulsions. The notion of collective responsibility for the German war crimes was accepted by a majority of the Czech population. The voices protesting against the abuses committed during expulsion and against bad conditions, which the German population suffered during the transport and in the labour camps, were criticised by the communist and nationalist press and defined as anti-Czech.

The regular transfers began on 24 February 1946. Thereafter two transports were sent to the American zone on a daily basis (2 400 people) and from 1 April 1946 4 transports (4 800 people). In the second half of the year regular expulsions to the Soviet zone were initiated. From 21 June the Czechoslovak authorities sent there 3 transports daily (3 600 persons) and from 1 July this number increased up to 6 transports daily (7 200). Until 30 September 1946 the Czechoslovak authorities removed 1 685 226 Germans: 1 076 873 to the American occupation zone and 608 353 to the Soviet occupation zone. At the end of October 1946 the transports were stopped mainly because the Americans asked for a break being afraid of diminishing capacity of the area under US control to receive the Germans. The Minister of Interior, V. Nosek declared that the transfer was basically ended, nevertheless the Czechoslovak authority still counted on some additional transports which would be sent to the

American zone. According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, by 8 October 2 165 135 Germans had been expelled: 1 415 135 to the American zone and 750 000 to the Soviet zone.¹⁴ The symbolic act “officially“ ending the post-Potsdam organised expulsions was “celebrated“ on 29 October 1946 at the railway station of Karlové Vary (Karlsbad). The end of the regular transfer was accompanied by a ceremony in the local theatre with the participation of leading members of the Czechoslovak cabinet. The number of the German speakers who remained in Czechoslovakia was estimated at about 300 000. By 1948 most of them decided to leave Czechoslovakia and go to Germany fearing further persecution following the rise to power of the Communists.

¹ Piotr M. Majewski, *Edvard Beneš i kwestia niemiecka w Czechach*, (Warsaw, 2001), p.14

² Ibid., pp.34-35

³ Jindřich Dejmek, *Historické kořeny tzv. Sudetoněmeckého problému v českých zemích do roku 1938*, (Prague, 1998), p.13

⁴ Majewski, op. cit., p.104

⁵ Henlein's statement was broadcast by Leipzig Radio. On the same day he dissolved the SdP and escaped to Germany. Majewski, op. cit., pp.169-170. See also Dejmek, op. cit., pp.17-18

⁶ Tomáš Staněk, *Odsun Němců z Československa 1945-1947*, (Prague,1991), pp. 50-1

⁷ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. (London, 2001), p.113

⁸ Naimark, op. cit., p.111

⁹ Staněk, op. cit., pp.74-6

¹⁰ It is impossible to give the exact figures with regard to the German speakers who left Czechoslovakia from the end of the world until the Potsdam conference. They left the country in different ways - through evacuation, escapes, local expulsions, etc. Estimates speak of about 400 000 - 500 000 people. President Beneš in an interview, given on 21 July 1945, declared that 200 000 Germans had already left Czechoslovakia stressing that the expelled were the most active Nazi and Henleinists. If we want to include the last months of the war in the treated period (that means to include the German speakers who had escaped before May 1945) the sources speak about 550 000 - 650 000 Germans removed to Germany and 150 000 removed to Austria. Staněk, op. cit., pp. 90-6

¹¹ Dekret č. 33/1945 Sb, Staněk, op. cit., pp.99-100

¹² Dekret č. 81 Sb 25.09.1945. Staněk, op. cit., p.120

¹³ Dekret č. 108 Sb 25.10.1945. Staněk, op. cit., p.122

¹⁴ Staněk, op. cit., pp.172-223

The Expulsion of the Population Categorized as 'Germans'
from the Post-1945 Poland

Tomasz Kamusella

Ethnic nationalism has been the main foundation of nation and nation-state building in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the twentieth century. The logic of nationalism proposes the one-to-one correspondence between nation and state. From the civic vantage it means that the nation-state is only for its citizens, which entails that the given citizenry equals the nation. The ethnic sort of nationalism, however, adds another requirement. One has to prove one's appropriate ethnicity. Only then assessed as of the nation, one is eligible for citizenship of the nation-state. In a nutshell, in civic nationalism citizenship is nationality, while in ethnic nationalism, however defined, ethnicity equals nationality. In the latter case citizenship is secondary to nationality.

The very logic of ethnic nationalism requires cleansing of the nation-state from those who do not conform to the officially espoused ethnicity of the nation. This can be executed with various instruments that range from assimilation and administrative pressure to flagrant discrimination, expulsion and genocide. All of them have been applied in the course of the construction of the nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe. Understandably, the sudden increases in ethnic cleansing in this region are related to the formation of the nation-states. The first wave of nation-state building sparked by the First World War unfolded after 1918. The Second World War overhauled the framework of nation-states, first, in agreement with the interests of Germany and the Soviet Union, and, then, with those of Moscow and the Western Allies.

Within the framework of the ethnically defined national cause, millions of people were expelled and killed in the course of both the World Wars and immediately after them. It should not be forgotten, however, that expulsions in the guise of less or more forced emigration continued throughout the inter-war period as well as between 1945 and 1989/1991. The latter caesura of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and of the break-ups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia marked the renewed process of nation-state building that triggered off further rounds of expulsions and genocidal killings. With the end of warfare in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo/a, Moldova, Georgia, Karabakh, and Macedonia the

intensity of post-Soviet/post-communist cleansing has subsided. But the process has not stopped altogether as evidenced by the continued war in Chechnya, immigration of Russian-/Slavic-speakers from the non-Slavic post-Soviet nation-states to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and by the unresolved conflicts that loom over the future of Kosovo/a, Transnistria, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Adjara or Karabakh to enumerate the most significant points of ethnonational tension.

In order to focus on the period of the Second World War and its aftermath, let us remark that in the years 1939 through 1943 15.1 million people were permanently or temporarily resettled, while in the period 1944-1948 -- 31 million. What is more, another 16.1 million people perished during the war because of military, political, or racial policies. These numbers add up to the staggering total of 62.4 million people. In this context the expulsions of Germans are significant but a part of the overall history of wartime and post-war ethnic cleansing. To illustrate this: in 1939-1944, on the basis of bilateral treaties 432 thousand ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) were 'returned' to Germany from the enlarged Soviet Union, Italy, Romania and Croatia. Another 360 thousand Germans were transferred from the lands that came under the control of the German military or that were ruled by countries allied to Germany. In 1944-1945 no less than 5 million people escaped westward from the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (*deutsche Ostgebiete*) before the advancing Red Army. They were joined by half a million of compatriots from the Polish lands incorporated into the Third Reich, 100 thousand from Romania and several tens of thousands from Hungary. In early 1945 the Soviet occupation administration rounded up 165 thousand Germans and sent them to the Soviet hinterland, whereas in the years 1946-1948 3.325 million Germans were transferred from Poland's share of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* to the occupation zones of Germany, 3 million from Czechoslovakia and 250 thousand from Hungary. On top of that the exodus from the Soviet zone of occupation (later East Germany) to the western zones (later West Germany) amounted to 985 thousand before the border was sealed in 1952. These numbers do not pretend to be exhaustive.¹ They just sketch the magnitude of the process and its devastating impact on the life of individuals and the very relations between them as well as variously defined human groups.

The malleable concept of Poland

Poland as a nation-state was established in 1918. Most of its territory came from the defunct empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary. These gains were not much contested though Warsaw fought over border areas with Lithuania, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. These were followed by the Soviet onslaught, but Moscow's objective was not to adjust national borders but to spread communist revolution to Western Europe. On the other hand, Poland's lands acquired from Germany were territorially insignificant though economically of crucial importance for this new nation-state. Poland obtained the majority of the Province of Posen (Poznań) (Wielkopolska), one-third of Upper Silesia and most of West Prussia. In result Germany lost most of its Upper Silesian industrial basin as well as the vibrant port of Danzig (Gdańsk) overhauled (together with its environs) into the Free City of Danzig. This Free City together with Poland's section of West Prussia cut East Prussia off the German hinterland. The 'Versailles dictate' (as the treaty was known among the Germans) was most painful in the sphere of German-Polish relations.

Not surprisingly then, the post-1939 reversal of this arrangement besides the scaling down of France to the Vichy state meant the total liquidation of Poland. In line with the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Berlin and Moscow partitioned Poland. All the pre-1918 German territories were reincorporated into the wartime Germany together with the adjacent areas that before the First World War had belonged to Russia and Austria-Hungary. From the homogeneously Polish area extending from Warsaw and Cracow to the Bug River the German colony of the Generalgouvernement was formed. The Soviet Union annexed Poland's eastern territories (*Kresy*).

Following the defeat of the Third Reich the territorial shapes of the post-war Poland and Germany were completely re-arranged unlike those of other Central European nation-states, where usually the largely unchanged inter-war borders were re-established. All the *deutsche Ostgebiete* together with Danzig, and the city of Stettin (Szczecin) west of the Oder (less the northern half of East Prussia incorporated to the Soviet Union) were granted to Poland. Simultaneously, the Western Allies tacitly agreed that the *Kresy*, gained by Moscow on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, should stay within the Soviet Union. The curious recompense in the form of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* made the post-war Poland a hostage of Moscow because only the Soviet Union had at its disposal the military clout to reinforce this

arrangement. This decision severely truncated Germany and was not recognized under international law, as the final status of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* was to be decided at a peace conference that never took place. Therefore, after 1945 these territories were *de facto* Polish and Soviet, but eventually they became *de jure* parts of Poland and the Soviet Union only after the Two Plus Four Agreement (1989/1990) and the German-Polish Border Treaty (1990).

The changing understanding of Germandom

The national in Germany's national socialism was expressed in the novel ideal of *Volksgemeinschaft*, this is, the cohesive and completely homogenous national community not divided even by regional or dialectal differences that had been the hallmark of the German nation-state since its foundation in 1871. This ideal was to be achieved through the policy of *Gleichschaltung* (homogenization). Apart from the Generalgouvernement, designed to be the colonial repository of Polish slave labour, other Polish territories (together with the Free City of Danzig) incorporated into Germany were to be germanized. This entailed the gradual expulsion or assimilation of the population defined as 'Polish' or 'non-German' as well as the prohibition on the use of other languages and dialects than standard German.

The ethnic groups of the Szlonzoks in Upper Silesia and the Kashubs around Danzig proved to be a hard issue for Berlin. These groups, speaking their own Slavic dialects and/or Slavic-Germanic creoles, were distinctively non-Polish and non-German. In church they often used standard Polish, while they contacted the authorities in German before 1918 and, later, in German and Polish depending on the fact in which state they happened to reside. Before the war Berlin claimed those groups for Germandom labeling them as *eigensprachige Kulturdeutsche* (non-German-speaking Germans united with the German nation through the shared German culture). This rhetoric worked pretty well in conjunction with the relative economic success of the national socialist Germany *vis-a-vis* higher levels of unemployment and the lower standard of living in Poland.

In the course of the war the Szlonzoks and the Kashubs were deemed as germanizable and as such they were inscribed onto the *Deutsche Volksliste* (DVL, German National List). The DVL's four groups reflected the progress of those inscribed on their way toward full absorption into the monolithic *Volksgemeinschaft*. The vast majority were included in the

groups I through III and as such they were granted with German citizenship (the DVL group IV embraced 'renegades of Germandom', this is, conscious Poles usually with spouses classified as belonging to other DVL groups). Due to this move the males became eligible for military service when Germany was acutely short of manpower after the opening of the eastern front. The DVL was also extended to ethnic Germans without German citizenship, who lived elsewhere in pre-war Poland. Additionally, German citizenship was extended to all the citizens of the Free City of Danzig unless they were leaders or active members of pro-Polish organizations.

The new Polish nation and its novel nation-state

In 1918 the Polish nation-state came into being as a compromise between two visions. Józef Piłsudski and his proponents wanted to reconstruct the eighteenth-century Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a federal Poland. A Polish nation-state where besides the Poles as the *primus-inter-pares* nation there would be social and political space for the coexistence and development of the nations of the Ukrainians, the Lithuanians and the Belarusians. Roman Dmowski staunchly opposed this vision propagating the ideal of the ethnically homogenous Polish nation-state, where 'non-Polish elements' would be either assimilated or expelled. At least one-third of Poland's inter-war population was non-Polish. They were increasingly alienated *vis-a-vis* the Polish state when Dmowski's camp of Polish ethnic nationalists began to take the upper hand in the 1930s and especially after Piłsudski's demise in 1935.

The unfolding events of the Second World War decided about the official espousal of the ethnic ideal as the basis for the post-war Polish nation-state. The new communist leaders time and again repeated the official line encapsulated in the statement *Chcemy Polski narodowej a nie narodowościowej* (We want an ethnically homogenous Polish nation-state and not a nationalities [this is, multinational] state). This went hand in hand with Joseph Stalin's nationality policy that predicted the creation of national republics within federations (as in the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia) or ethnically homogenous nation-states within the perimeter of the Soviet bloc. In agreement with classical Marxism, Stalin saw nation- and nation-state building as a necessary step toward the creation of fully developed national societies (complete with masses and upper strata). Without that the emergence of class struggle would

not have been possible on the road to the unified worldwide communist proletariat-cum-peasant society that would transcend the national.

With the privilege of hindsight, we know that this policy was a fallacy that led to the strengthening of existing nations and to the creation of new ones. However, in the case of Poland it helped pacify Polish anticommunists in the country and abroad through implementing the Dmowskian program of the ethnically homogenous Polish nation-state. First, Adolf Hitler's policy of *Endlösung* cleansed Poland as well as Central and Eastern Europe of Jews. Second, the Soviet annexation of the *Kresy* significantly decreased the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian national minorities in post-war Poland. Third, in the years 1944-1946 Moscow in cooperation with the Polish communist authorities, organized the transfer of over half a million Ukrainians (including Lemkos, Boykos and Rusyns), Belarusians and Lithuanians from west of the Bug River to the Soviet Union. Fourth, in 1947 some 150 thousand Ukrainians (including Lemkos, Boykos and Rusyns) from Poland's southeastern corner were dispersed in the Polish section of the *deutsche Ostgebiete*.²

The expulsion of Germans

The singularly most difficult task of ethnic cleansing faced by Poland were Germans. They had to be expelled because of several reasons. First, to make possible the full national integration of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* into the post-war Polish nation-state. Second, to recompense the Polish nation for the expulsion of ethnic Poles from the *Kresy* seized by the Soviet Union. Third, to satisfy the general anti-German feeling after the war, and also to re-direct the hatred of Polish nationalism from the Soviet Union/Russia toward Germany. Fourth, to make the Soviet Union the sole guarantor of the existence of the post-war Polish nation-states *vis-a-vis* the predicted German efforts to reverse the post-1945 political arrangements at the obvious expense of the Poles. Fifth, to 'prove' the *ur-Polishness* of the incorporated *deutsche Ostgebiete*, and thus to 'justify' their annexation. And, last but not least, to make room for 1.721 million Polish expellees from the *Kresy* who arrived in the years 1944-1946, for 55 thousand ethnic Poles from Western and South-eastern Europe who came in 1946-1947, and for 3.5 million settlers from overpopulated and devastated Central Poland.³

The idea of expelling Germans from the post-war Central Europe had been present in the discussions of the Allies at least since 1943 (probably planted by Eduard Beneš and other

Czechoslovak politicians and intellectuals in exile). The Soviets were only too eager to take it up. They hoped that through swamping the western zones of occupied Germany with millions of German refugees and expellees Western Europe ravaged by war would be destabilized and ripe for the globalwide spread of communist revolution under Moscow's guidance. At the Potsdam Conference (August 1945) all the Allies agreed to the 'transfer' of Germans from the *deutsche Ostgebiete*, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to the occupation zones of Germany beginning in January 1946 and finishing in 1948. Even prior to this decision Moscow allowed for the so-called 'wild expulsions'⁴ of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet zone of occupation. This happened in blatant breach of the Geneva Convention because, at least, until the Potsdam Conference the *deutsche Ostgebiete* were under *de jure* Soviet occupation. This entailed that Moscow should have protected the inhabitants from any forms of expulsion and expropriation.

In order to carry out the expulsion the Polish authorities had to define who were Germans to be expelled and who were Poles to be retained. The devastation of the Polish economy and elites (the latter, additionally, engaged in the post-war death-and-life struggle between communists and anticommunists) made this task anything but easy. On top of that, while all the Polish government was taking decisions in relation to Central and Eastern Poland composed from the pre-war Polish territories, the administration of Poland's *deutsche Ostgebiete* was handed over to the Ministry of the Recovered Lands (*Ministerstwo Ziemi Odzyskanych*, MZO). The activities of the MZO were complicated by the presence of Soviet administration in the *deutsche Ostgebiete* (until 1946), and of the Red Army administration that gradually dwindled in number but remained in this area⁵ until the final withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops from Poland in 1993.

Roughly speaking (though it varied from area to area) the population suspected of Germanness was divided into the following groups. First, into the 'indubitable Germans'. This rubric contained pre-war German and Free City of Danzig citizens of German ethnicity (language) and their descendants as well as pre-war Polish citizens of German ethnicity (language, or bilingual but clearly not identifying with ethnic Polishdom) and their descendants. All of them were slated for expulsion with the temporary exclusion of 'indispensable Germans', this is, technical specialists and their families.

Another group was formed from 'autochthons', this is, the Szlonzoks, the Kashubs and the similar Slavic-Germanic ethnic group of the Mazurs from Germany's southern East Prussia. From the legal viewpoint the Mazurs were German citizens. The Kashubs were citizens of Germany or the Free City of Danzig who became German citizens. Most of those who prior of 1939 were holders of Polish citizenship acquired German citizenship via the DVL. The Szlonzoks were either German citizens or Polish ones who acquired citizenship of Germany through the DVL. Warsaw sought to retain all the autochthons apart from those few inscribed into DVL Group I ('real Germans'). The Polish authorities saw them as 'polonizeable' or 'unconscious Poles' that needed to be reminded of their 'dormant Polishness'. At the pragmatic plane, the retaining of the close to 3 million autochthons helped to repopulate the *deutsche Ostgebiete*. It was rightly predicted that the number of the incoming Polish expellees from the *Kresy* and settlers from Central Poland would be lower than that of the Germans who fled or would be expelled. And, most significantly, the *ur*-Polish autochthons were to 'prove' the primordial Polishness of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* and to 'justify' the incorporation of these territories into Poland.

In 1945-1948 most of the autochthons with German or Free City of Danzig citizenship were 'nationally verified' as Poles. The parallel process of 'national rehabilitation' was applied to those who acquired German citizenship via the DVL. Few were eventually expelled. The basic instrument to sieve 'indubitable Germans' from the rest was the 1946 census. It was the only one in communist Poland in the course of which the question about one's nationality was asked. And it was not a question about any nationality, but solely on the fact if one was a German or not. The census returns were the basis for compiling the expulsion lists. Obviously, autochthons, even if they wished so, they were not permitted to declare themselves as Germans.

Before the final expulsion those considered to be Germans (along with numerous autochthons) were herded into urban ghettos and concentration (pre-expulsions) camps. Many were also interned in the whole galaxy of various forced labours, punitive and internment camps inherited from the national socialist administration and the NKVD. They ranged from establishments housing thousands of inmates to secret cellars with less than ten prisoners. Simultaneously, a hardly coordinated stream of legislation unfolded that served several functions in relation to the Germans slated for expulsion. First, such acts incorporated the *deutsche Ostgebiete* into the Polish state and subjected them to the unitary administrative

structure. Second, they expropriated the German population of this area. Third, in the case of the pre-war Polish territories, these acts excluded Germans from Polish society and stripped them of Polish citizenship prior to expropriation. Fourth, they formed the legal and practical basis for the expulsion. It is estimated that in the course of 'wild' and legal expulsions (1945-1948) some 7 million people were transported from Poland's share of *deutsche Ostgebiete* to the zones of occupied Germany. They were joined by 700 thousand more from the pre-war Polish territories included in post-war Poland.

The aftermath

Millions of Germans died fleeing the *deutsche Ostgebiete* and being expelled in the death of winter without appropriate provisions. High mortality ravaged urban ghettos and camps where Germans did not have access to reasonable medical and food supplies. However, the fate of the Poles was not much different in this sphere until their situation started improving in 1946 and 1947. Germans awaiting expulsion had to share their 'degermanized property' (houses, flats, farms) with new Polish owners that in the atmosphere of the anti-German feeling often led to acrimony, humiliation, and even to murder and lynching. No schooling or equal salaries and food provisions were supplied to the retained 'indispensable Germans' and their families until the beginning of the 1950s. On the other hand, they were not allowed to leave for Germany until 1956. The same restriction applied to the wives and children of German males who after the war found themselves in Germany. Administrative measures were undertaken to compel such 'abandoned wives' to seek divorce. They were allowed to emigrate in order to join their husbands only in 1950-1952. The almost 165 thousands Germans rounded up to the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1945 (where most of them perished), were permitted to 'return' either to West or East Germany (and not to their homes in the *deutsche Ostgebiete*) only after 1955. While in Germany, the expellees were humiliated and ridiculed by the locals, who considered them as 'aliens' impinging on the slim food and accommodation provisions. The standard of living of the expellees in Germany was much lower than of the local population until the mid-1950s. In West Germany expellees were indemnified for their lost property and allowed to form various organizations and political parties, whereas in East Germany the subject of expulsion became a taboo.

The official end of expulsions in 1948 did not stem further emigration from post-war Poland especially to West Germany. Throughout the time of communism Warsaw claimed that there

were no Germans left in Poland apart from the 'indispensable Germans' who had virtually left by 1960. Contrary, Bonn maintained that millions of Germans still lived in Poland basing its estimation on the number of people (and their descendants) who had German citizenship in 1945 but were granted with Polish citizenship. In the years 1950-1991 hundreds of thousands of *Aussiedlers* (resettlers) continued to stream from Poland to West Germany. Mostly autochthons. In the course of this emigration the Mazurs disappeared.

The more or less forcefully retained autochthons suffered as second-class citizens in Poland. They did not know standard Polish and their sound command of German was something to be ashamed of. Although officially recognized as Poles, the authorities and Polish neighbors treated them as 'crypto-Germans'. They had no chance of any meaningful professional or political career in communist Poland. Therefore so many of them did whatever they could to leave for Germany⁶. This only reconfirmed the rife Polish preconception that they were 'crypto-Germans'. When successful in their efforts to emigrate, they soon discovered they were not really welcome in West Germany, where they were dubbed as 'crypto-Poles' or *Wasserpole* (Polacks). However, the second generation of *Aussiedlers* fully integrated with West German society. On the other hand, numerous of those autochthons who chose to stay in Poland or were not permitted to leave, instead of getting polonized, either chose Germanness or continued to persist in their ethnic (Szlonzokian, Kashubian) identities.

Conclusion

Departing from the exclusively ethnic understanding of nationalism Warsaw acknowledged the existence of (usually non-German-speaking) Germans in Poland with the ratification of the Polish-German Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborliness (1991). Bonn allowed them to (re-)obtain German citizenship without the need to leave Poland for Germany. Eventually, the *Kriegsfolgebenebereinigungsgesetz* (Act on the Consolidation of the Consequences of the War, 1992) limited the right of ethnic Germans to German citizenship to those persons who were born prior to January 1, 1993. Last but not least, Poland's first post-communist Constitution of 1997 redefined the concept of the Polish nation as all those who are citizens of the Republic of Poland irrespectively of ethnicity, language, religion or race.

¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe*. (Seattle WA and London, 1995), pp. 164-8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 165.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁴ The period of 'wild expulsions' lasted until the Potsdam Conference. But Moscow allowed for further expulsions of Germans till December 1945 in the breach of the Potsdam Agreement as the official expulsions were to commence only in January 1946.

⁵ After the final pullout of Soviet military advisors from Poland in 1956, the Soviet army ceased to exert any direct influence on the Polish administration of the *deutsche Ostgebiete* excluding the *de facto* extraterritorial areas of the Soviet military bases.

⁶ The Soviet bloc states sealed their borders and restricted any travel abroad let alone emigration.

The Expulsion of the German Speaking Population from Hungary

Balázs Apor

In terms of numbers the expulsion of German speaking people from Hungary after World War II was not as significant as either the Polish or the Czechoslovakian cases. The estimates of the total number of Germans expelled in the period of 1945-1950 vary between 180,000 and 200,000, far less than the millions who were forced to leave Poland and Czechoslovakia. When viewed from the perspective of post-war international diplomacy, however, the situation becomes much more interesting. The fact that the expulsion of Germans from Hungary was decided, quite unexpectedly, at Potsdam and was thus treated as the same issue as that of the expulsion of the larger German populations from Czechoslovakia and Poland, lends certain significance to the whole procedure and makes a more detailed study worthwhile.

The famous Article XIII of the Potsdam Treaty mandated that

the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken¹.

The decision by the Allied Powers to treat the question of German minorities in each of these countries as one and the same, despite all of the evident differences, was one that surprised many at the time, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, Hungary, as one of the last allies of Nazi Germany, was a “loser” in the war, unlike Czechoslovakia or Poland who were, officially, on the winning side. The country’s sovereignty was limited as it was occupied by the Red Army, and it was under the strict supervision of the Allied Control Council. (At that time, the president of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary was Stalin’s right-hand man, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov.) In Hungary, the Potsdam decision represented the starting point of the expulsion process, whereas for Poland and Czechoslovakia the Allied Powers’ decision – more or less – gave official recognition to the ethnic cleansing that had been carried out.² Moreover, Hungary, unlike the other two countries, had never demanded a total expulsion of her Germans and did not start to expel the German speaking population after the end of the war.³ Furthermore, the Hungarian Government resisted the idea of collective responsibility, for as long as it could,

even despite some heated internal political debates on the matter.⁴ The idea was supported mainly by the communists – in accordance with Stalin’s plan of creating new nation-states without minorities – and the National Peasant Party that demanded redistribution of the Swabian’s estates among the poorest peasants. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, by contrast, there was no significant political disagreement on the issue of expulsion. Lastly, the Hungarian population was, like the government, broadly against the idea of expulsion. Despite the fact that Hungary had been occupied by Germany in March 1944, and the disastrous moral and economic effects of Ferenc Szálasi’s “arrow-cross” puppet-government in the last few months of 1944, Hungarians in general were not seeking revenge after the war. The German minority was not considered to be a potential political threat to the state as it was in Czechoslovakia or in Poland.

As it seems that there were more arguments militating against the expulsion of Germans from Hungary than in favour of it, it is worth investigating the reasons for it becoming an issue in Potsdam at all. The main factor that brought the expulsion of Germans from Hungary into focus during the treaty negotiations was the Czechoslovakian proposal of expelling the Hungarian-speaking population from Slovakia together with the Germans of the Sudetenland.⁵ As early as 1943, President Beneš demanded the expulsion of Hungarians alongside Germans from Czechoslovakian territory and he had the full backing of the Soviet Union in this matter.⁶ (His original plan was to expel 600,000 Hungarians, around 90% of the total Hungarian population at that time.) According to his argument, the removal of half a million Germans from Hungary would have freed up enough space for the resettlement of the whole Hungarian-speaking population from Slovakia. Beneš’ proposal was not, however, supported by either the United States or Great Britain. Nevertheless, due to the diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union, the expulsion of Germans from Hungary became an issue at Potsdam, and the treaty itself imposed an obligation that the country was bound to fulfil. At the same time, the treaty of Potsdam created a moral basis for the Czechoslovakian government to treat its own Hungarian minority in the same way that Hungary dealt with its Germans.

The close connection between the expulsion of Germans in Hungary and the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia needs to be emphasised, because the Beneš-argument repeatedly resurfaced in the diplomatic exchanges of the post-war period. It was the Czechoslovak government that urged most strongly the expulsion of the Germans, but the

ambassador of the Soviet Union in Hungary, G. M. Pushkin, and Marshall Voroshilov, president of the Allied Control Commission, also constantly brought up the expulsion project after Potsdam. The same reasoning was adopted again at the Peace Treaty negotiations in September 1946 by A. Ya. Vyshinskii, who demanded the expulsion of 500,000 Germans from Hungary in order to create space for 200,000 Hungarians from Slovakia.⁷ At the same time, some Hungarian politicians objecting to the expulsion (i.e. the Smallholders Party and the Social Democrats) repeatedly insisted upon the need to maintain the moral “high ground” on the issue, in order to be able to better defend Hungarian minorities abroad (particularly those in Czechoslovakia and Romania). The threat that the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary would create a moral basis for neighbouring countries to remove their Hungarians was the main reason for the heated political debates within the government and the government’s strong objection to the collective responsibility principle.

The situation of the German speaking population before Potsdam

The German speakers in Hungary, who suddenly became the targets of expulsion in Potsdam, were commonly called Swabians (Schwabens), or more precisely Danube Swabians (Donau Schwaben), indicating their place of origin in Germany. The term, however, could be misleading, as only a small proportion of Hungary’s German population had settler ancestors that came from Schwaben; a considerable number of the newcomers originated from other, distant parts of German territory (Lorraine, the Mosel region etc.).⁸ Three great waves of German migration can be distinguished in Hungary before World War I.⁹ The first two waves of settlers arrived to the Hungarian Kingdom in the middle ages (11th and 13th centuries) and formed the core of the burghers of the few towns in Upper Hungary (the so-called ‘Cipser’ towns, now in Slovakia) and in Southern Transylvania (‘Siebenbürger Sachsen’ or Transylvanian Saxons). These communities were granted special rights and privileges when they were settled and acquired an autonomy-like status later on. The third, and at the same time the greatest, German migration was the result of a deliberate settlement policy of the Habsburg government after the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Hungarian territory in the late 17th century. The settlement procedure, frequently referred to as ‘The Great Swabian Migration’ (‘Der grosse Schwabenzug’), was promoted by three Habsburg emperors in a row (Charles VI, Maria Theresia and Joseph II) and lasted for approximately 70 years (1718-1787). The Habsburg settlements, that were initiated primarily to make up for the population loss in the previously Turkish occupied regions, had four target areas: The Buda environs,

Southwest Hungary (also called ‘The Swabian Turkey’ after the settlements), the Banat, and the county of Szatmár in Eastern Hungary. As a result of the Austrian migration policy, the number of the German speaking population in the Carpathian-basin doubled, rising up to 2 million inhabitants just before World War I. The post-war peace-treaties, however, detached those areas that were most densely populated with Germans (the Banat and Transylvania) and left approximately 450,000 German speaking people within the new borders of Hungary (primarily in the Budapest environs). They were those who became the subjects of the population transfer after World War II.

Although the expulsion of Germans from Hungary was decided in Potsdam in August 1945, no official preparations were undertaken to carry out the population transfer until December. Certain discriminative measures, however, had been introduced well before Potsdam by the Hungarian Provisional Government and by the invading Soviet Army, as well. The advancing Red Army, referring to ‘security reasons’, deported about 600,000 civilians and prisoners of war from Hungary, of whom 40-65,000 were Germans.¹⁰ On top of this, a great number of Germans, mostly members of Nazi organisations, who felt threatened by the unpleasant prospect of spending the rest of their lives in Siberia, fled from Hungary as well (approx. 60-70,000).¹¹ As regards the measures introduced by the government in the immediate post-war period, they did not target the German population as a whole, but only German war-criminals, members of the *Volksbund* (the pro-Nazi organisation of the German speaking minority in Hungary) or other Nazi-organisations and members of the Waffen SS. According to the armistice of Moscow, 20 January 1945, the Hungarian Provisional Government ordered the arrest of war criminals, the dissolution of Hitlerite and Nazi organisations and the internment of those Germans who were the citizens of Germany.¹²

The first punitive measure initiated against the Germans was incorporated within the land reform of 15 March 1945. Articles 4-5 of the governmental decree ordered the expropriation of land of *Volksbund* members and those who

served the political, economic and military interests of German Fascism at the expense of the Hungarian people in these ways: through voluntarily enlistment in a German Fascist, military or security unit; through passing information to German military or security places or acting as informer at the expense of Magyardom; through the readoption of one’s German-sounding surname.¹³

Confiscated holdings and lands were given to new settlers, which created a great number of social and economic problems (conflicts between new and old settlers, arbitrary land-expropriations by local commissions, technological backwardness of newcomers etc.). At the

same time, the Hungarian government established the so-called *Népgondozó Hivatal* (Resettlement Authority) in May 1945, charged with controlling and managing the settlement of the waves of Hungarian refugees from the neighbouring countries.¹⁴ On 1 July 1945, the authority's competence was extended and from that date on its primary task was to investigate the German populations' loyalty to the nation.¹⁵ Local commissions had been established in four German-populated districts of Hungary to carry out the investigation process. The commissions began its work in September and they were dissolved in January-February 1946 when the mass expulsions began. The commissions examined approximately 70,000 people and exempted around 30 % of them.¹⁶ The real significance of these commissions, however, was that through investigating individual cases they avoided basing their actions on the ground of collective responsibility, which clearly shows the Hungarian government's attempt to reject the principle. It soon became apparent, however, that this attitude could not be maintained any longer.

The effect of the Potsdam decision on Hungarian policy

The fact that Hungary received the text of the Potsdam decision in Russian was a clear sign of post-war power relations in the region, but it also indicated the limits of the political latitude allowed to the Hungarian government.¹⁷ Due to the pressure of the Allied Control Council, but mostly the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers convened a special meeting dedicated to the issue of expulsion. (As early as one week after the Potsdam conference, Lieutenant General G. V. Sviridov, vice-president of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary (ACC), already demanded the removal of 450,000 Germans.)¹⁸ The Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Gyöngyösi, asserted that the concept of collective responsibility had been Hitler's idea, and that, if accepted, Hungary would lose the moral basis necessary to defend its own minorities abroad. The leader of the Communist Party, Mátyás Rákosi, demanded total expulsion and pointed out that the expulsion was a Soviet order that had to be carried out. After a heated debate on the principle of collective responsibility, the government accepted the idea of expelling the Swabian population from Hungary. There followed by a number of governmental orders restricting the rights of the German speaking population. The decree of 15 October suspended the autonomy of many German villages and restricted the authority of their local governments. The same decree also suspended the political rights of German nationals (e.g. deprivation of voting rights).¹⁹ Nevertheless, no orders were passed to prepare the grounds for the population transfer. Moreover, on 20th November the inter-

ministerial meeting of the Hungarian government sharply rejected the principle of collective responsibility again. In vain, however, because on the very same day the ACC accepted a proposal from Voroshilov, that demanded the expulsion of 500,000 Germans to the US zone of occupied Germany. Voroshilov's demand astonished the Hungarian government, as the number of German nationals in Hungary at that time was considerably less. According to the official Hungarian statistical accounts of October 1945, that were based on the census of 1941, there were altogether 477,000 citizens in Hungary who claimed themselves to be of German vernacular, out of which 303,000 declared themselves to be of German nationality as well. Approximately 100,000 of those who claimed to be of German nationality were either under the age of 12 or over 60 (33 %) and 155,847 were women (51 %).²⁰ The figures of the census also included a remarkable number of Jews of German mother tongue. It should also be noted that the census of 1941 was carried out when the influence of Nazi-Germany was at its height in Hungary, right before the country joined the war. As a result of the war, the total number of Germans decreased considerably, as many Germans fled to Germany and a large number were captured by the Red Army and was transported to the Soviet Union (approx. 100,000-170,000). (Not to mention, of course, the many casualties in the war itself.)

After receiving Voroshilov's demand, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry sent several memoranda to the ACC and the US and British governments in which they objected to the collective responsibility principle, basing their arguments on the above mentioned figures. They claimed that the maximum number of Germans that could be expelled was not more than 250,000. The ACC rejected the Foreign Ministry's figures and the reasoning. However, due to the intervention of the ACC's US representative, William Key, the total number of Germans to be expelled was reduced to 300,000-400,000 which was still more than the actual number of Germans present in Hungary at that time.²¹

Under the growing pressure from the ACC, the Council of Ministers again put the issue of expulsion on its agenda on 22nd December, 1945. Gyöngyösi once again insisted on taking a firm moral stance on the issue, in order to be able to defend the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Despite the strong objections of the Hungarian Foreign Minister and some other ministers, however, the government accepted the collective responsibility principle after a heated debate. The Council of Ministers accepted that native German speakers, people of German nationality, those who re-germanised their names and members of the SS and the *Volksbund* had to be expelled from Hungary. The governmental decision also set limits on the

number of possible exemptions: 10 % of the local German population in every German inhabited district. At the same meeting, commissioners were appointed, whose task was to organise and carry out the transfer of the Swabians to Germany. The scope of their authority was, however, only very vaguely defined, and their competence remained more or less unrestricted.

The implementation order of the government's decision was issued by the Ministry of the Interior in January 1946. The ministry was led by the communists (László Rajk), who fully supported the total expulsion of the German speaking minority, consequently the implementation order ignored the Foreign Ministry's proposals.²² Thus, the treatment of those Germans who took part in the loyalty movement in the war remained unregulated, as was the treatment of Jews of German mother tongue. Likewise, the order did not touch upon the question of those Germans who joined the SS under coercion and those whose mother tongue was German but claimed themselves to be of Hungarian nationality. Furthermore, the authority of the commissioners remained unrestricted, and the absurd quota of possible exemptees remained in force.

The expulsion process

As no practical preparations had been made by the Hungarian government before January 1946 and the ACC required the first transport to leave for Germany that very same month, the whole expulsion process was hastily prepared and remained rather chaotic and disorganised. In January, the local commissions investigating 'loyalty to the nation' were wound up, as under the ACC's pressure there was no time to wait for the end of the investigation process. Furthermore, with the acceptance of the collective responsibility principle, the ground for investigating such individual cases was lost.

The first transport to the US zone of occupied Germany left on the 19th January collecting the Germans in the vicinity of Budapest (from the Buda hills and the Pilis) and by July approx. 120,000 Germans had been expelled from Hungary. (See table 1 for details.) (A village in the Buda-hills, called Budaörs, is the place from which the family of Joschka Fischer, comes.)

The overwhelming majority of Germans that were expelled lived in the countryside, consequently the urban population of Hungary was not strongly affected by the transfer. The

Hungarian authorities closed down the villages that were designated for deportation – they were sometimes encircled at night – in order to prevent the escape of the Swabian residents. The German inhabitants were then transported to one of four internment camps, established by the government, where they underwent medical examination. The transports for Germany left from the internment camps after enough people had been gathered there. One transport train normally consisted of 40 coaches, each carrying 25 people. Every train had at least one doctor and two nurses on them. Each expellee could carry 20 kg food and 80 kg clothing.²³

As noted earlier, due to the lack of legal regulation and proper preparation, the expulsion process was very badly organised. The commissioners and the expulsion authorities operated free of control, and there were many examples of violence, thefts and looting. The task of the Hungarian authorities was further complicated by the ambiguous attitude of the Allied Powers towards the expulsions. According to the Soviet-dominated ACC's request, the expulsions should have been finished by August 1946 and the Hungarian government was expected to carry out the deportations as quickly as possible. However, the US authorities tried to slow down the expulsion process by continually holding up the transports of German expellees at the borders. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry also received several half-official notes from US diplomats arguing against the necessity of expulsions.²⁴ The contrasting demands to both speed up and slow down the transports put the Hungarian government under a double pressure that made it difficult to foster an acceptably 'humane' management of the expulsion process. The delays resulted in rising tension in the internment camps where German nationals waiting for transportations were amassed with quite inadequate facilities. In German populated villages the situation was much more tense, as the new settlers taking the confiscated lands of the Germans sometimes had to move in together with the old inhabitants, as the previous occupants had not yet been evicted by the authorities.

Due to the growing number of difficulties concerning the population transport, the German expulsion became a heated political issue again. The Smallholders Party wanted to suspend the expulsion process, whereas other political parties argued for the exemption of favoured social groups. (The communists, for example, wanted to retain miners and industrial workers of German nationality.) On a micro level, local authorities also tried to exempt as many people as possible. Furthermore, in order to avoid transportation to Germany, the Germans themselves employed a number of different survival strategies. In seeking protection many of them joined one of the political parties of the coalition or changed profession in order

to become a member of a privileged social group (e.g. miners). Some, more 'traditional' survival methods were employed as well, such as marriage with Hungarians or simple bribes.²⁵

The general attitude of Hungarian society towards the expulsions is illustrated by the growth in the number of demonstrations of sympathy with the Germans. Apart from spontaneous local manifestations of popular discontent, organised protests also took place. The most active organisation, that regularly criticised the deportations of the Germans to Germany, was the Catholic Church. For example, Cardinal Mindszenty, the Head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, who strongly disapproved of the action, wrote several critical letters to the Hungarian government concerning the expulsion of the German speaking people.

As the government was unable to cope with the accumulated problems related to the German expulsion, the Ministry of Interior introduced a series of modifications to the decree that ordered the population transfer. One of these, issued on 10 May 1946, limited the number of people to be expelled. (Only those Germans who were members of the SS and the *Volksbund* in WWII or those who had re-Germanised their names remained the subjects of expulsion).²⁶ Another decree, passed the same month, exempted those Germans who joined the SS under coercion. The government's efforts to handle the wide range of problems of the expulsion, however, turned out to be futile and by June 1946 it became apparent that the ACC's request to complete the expulsion of 400,000 by August could not be fulfilled. (By June only 25% of this number had been deported to Germany. See tables for details.) Furthermore, on 1 July, the US government that was permanently complaining about the physical state of the expelled people suspended the expulsions.

The official reason of the US for suspending the population transfer was the general poor condition of the transports arriving from Hungary. The main motivation factor behind the decision was, however, the extremely high costs of the resettlement of expelled Germans in the occupied territories. In order to decrease the expenses of the process the US demanded the improvement of the general material and physical conditions of the expelled people.

The sudden suspension of the population transfer by the American authorities served to further heighten tensions in the German populated areas and in the internment camps. The Hungarian government was not able to cope with the expulsion of the German population, the

resettlement of Hungarian refugees from the neighbouring countries and the redistribution of confiscated properties at the same time. Moreover, there were still 100,000 settlers and a great number of Hungarian refugees waiting for available estates and resettlement. Due to the general high social tension and the serious financial and economic problems that accompanied the resettlement process and the suspension of the population transfer, the Hungarian government decided to restart the negotiations with the US government concerning the expulsion of the German population. As a result, a new agreement was made, in which the Hungarian government accepted the requirements of the US. The agreement between the governments of the US and Hungary, signed on 22 August 1946, forbade the separation of expelled families and raised the amount of luggage each expellee could carry to 100 kg. It also limited the number of transport trains that could leave every month for Germany to 20. The most difficult requirement for the Hungarian government set up by the agreement was, however, the obligation to provide every expellee with a 500 Reichsmark allowance.²⁷ (According to the Prime Minister, Ferenc Nagy, the project would have cost as much as 1/3 of the country's gold resource.) Despite its high costs, the expulsion of the German-speaking population recommenced in November 1946, in accordance with the principles fixed by the inter-governmental agreement. The process, however, was suspended again by the USA after a few weeks.

In order to resolve the social problems caused by the effects of the government's internal resettlement policy and the second suspension of the German expulsions, the Hungarian Council of Ministers decided to resume the population transfer. (There were no major political debates on the issue this time, as the Hungarian Communist Party had managed to get rid of its most influential political opponents by then). An official request was sent on 11 June 1947 to the ACC asking for the admission of expelled Germans from Hungary to the Soviet zone of occupied Germany. In their reply, the Soviet Union agreed on the resettlement of 50,000 people in the territory controlled by the Red Army. On 19 August the expulsions recommenced again, and by the end of the month 10,381 people of German origin were expelled. As the transports were heading for the Soviet zone this time, the number of escapes increased sharply (6720 escaped out of the above-mentioned figure).²⁸ Apart from the large number of escapes (sometimes even whole villages escaped), the second wave of the expulsion process, in general, was more chaotic and disorganised than the first. There was no influential political force by that time to speak up for the Germans, thus, the second wave of the expulsions became less controlled and the number of thefts and violent actions increased.

As the main reason for expelling the Germans was to confiscate their lands and redistribute the estates among the poorest peasants, only the wealthy Germans were deported. It thus seems that the expulsion process was deeply integrated in the wider Communist project of the fundamental restructuring of Hungarian society. Nevertheless, due to the high maintenance costs of the internment camps and the increasing difficulties of organising the transports (the Soviet zone was further away and the government had to negotiate with the Czechoslovakian authorities as well etc.), the government also attempted to raise the exemption quota. On the 10th October 1947, for example, a decree was issued that exempted those, whose mother tongue was German.²⁹ The order also exempted certain privileged social layers (e.g. miners, craftsmen, industrial workers etc.) for obvious economic and political reasons.

The expulsion of the German minority from Hungary ended in June 1948. The governmental decree of the 15th June stopped the process, but the confiscation of German property remained a common sentence even after that date.³⁰ According to several estimates, the German community in Hungary had lost approximately 200,000-250,000 people during the war and as a result of the expulsions (German official statistics: 213,196). The total number of Germans expelled from the country in the period of 1945-1948 is approximately 180,000 (US official statistics: 175,591; Fehér(1988): 177,000-186,000), out of which approximately 35,000 had been deported to the Soviet zone of Germany. Scholars normally regard the expulsion of the German speaking people from Hungary as a process that was less ruthless and violent as it was in Czechoslovakia or in Poland. Nevertheless, the population transfer had a far-reaching effect on the socio-economic position of the Germans in Hungarian society, and it also shattered the self-image and identity of the German speakers. Despite the fact that a governmental decree of 25 March 1950 gave the possibility to the expelled Germans to repatriate and it declared all expulsion orders to be void, only 22,445(!) people claimed themselves to be of German nationality in the census of 1949.³¹

Appendix**Table 1.** Estimated number of Germans expelled before July 1946.

County	Number of Germans expelled	Number of villages/towns
Bács-Bodrog	9,227	5
Baranya	3,312	5
Békés	455	1
Csanád-Arad	6,140	9
Fejér	11,346	10
Győr-Moson	13,099	14
Esztergom-Komárom	1,777	3
Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun	41,303	29
Sopron	14,733	7
Tolna	11,920	8
Vas	2,520	12
Veszprém	1,113	5
Total	116,945	108

Source: István Fehér, *A magyarországi németek kitelepítése 1945-1950*, (Budapest, 1988) p. 11.

Table 2. Estimated number of Germans expelled in 1946.

Month	Schechtman	Tóth
January	9,166	3,866
February	6,649	7,237
March	15,613	11,334
April	29,696	20,939
May	54,408	49,011
June	34,931	18,479
July	170	-
August	10,365 (3,305 from Austria – those fled before the advancing Red Army)	-
September	5,843 (Hungary and Austria)	-
October	-	-
November	3,924 (Hungary and Austria)	6,090
December	2,239 (Hungary and Austria)	
Total	173,004	116, 956

Source: Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-1955*. (Philadelphia, 1962)

Ágnes Tóth, *Telepítések Magyarországon 1945-1948 között. A németek kitelepítése, a belső népmozgások és a szlovák-magyar lakosságcsere összefüggései*, (Kecskemét, 1993)

¹ Cited in Stephen Kertesz, 'The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy', *Review of Politics*, Volume 15, Number 2, April 1953, p. 179.

² Ibid., pp. 179-180. See also István Fehér, *A magyarországi németek kitelepítése 1945-1950*, (Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1988), p. 15. On the Czechoslovak and Polish cases see Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe*, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press), 2001, pp. 108-138.

³ Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-1955*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1962), p. 36.

⁴ On the diplomatic background of the expulsions in general see Kertesz.

⁵ Ibid., p. 181.

⁶ Ágnes Tóth, *Telepítések Magyarországon 1945-1948 között. A németek kitelepítése, a belső népmozgások és a szlovák-magyar lakosságcsere összefüggései*, (Bács-Kiskun Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára, Kecskemét, 1993), p. 153.

⁷ C. G. Paikert, *The Danube Swabians. Germans Populations in Hungary and Yugoslavia and Hitler's impact on their Patterns*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967), p. 206.

⁸ Schechtman, op.cit., p. 1. See also Béla Bellér, *A magyarországi németek rövid története*, (Magvető, Budapest, 1981), pp. 72-73.

⁹ On the waves of migrations see, for example, Schechtman, op.cit., pp. 7-29.

¹⁰ Tóth, p. 22, Paikert's earlier estimate was 30-35,000, Paikert, op.cit., p. 195.

¹¹ Fehér, op.cit., p. 53.

¹² Ibid., p. 19, Tóth, op.cit., p. 25.

¹³ Paikert, op.cit., p. 198.

¹⁴ Fehér, op.cit., p. 37.

¹⁵ Tóth, op.cit., p. 31, p. 66, pp. 87-88.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 40-41, Fehér, op.cit., p. 60.

¹⁷ Kertesz, op.cit., p. 186.

¹⁸ Tóth, op.cit., p. 37, Fehér, op.cit., p. 58.

¹⁹ Tóth, op.cit., pp. 71-2, Fehér, op.cit., p. 66.

²⁰ Fehér, op.cit., pp. 67-68.

²¹ Ibid., op.cit., pp. 78-79.

²² Tóth, op.cit., pp. 112-115.

²³ Fehér, pp. 91-92.

²⁴ For more on the controversial attitude of the USA towards the expulsions see Kertesz.

²⁵ On the survival strategies of the Germans see Fehér, op.cit., p. 92, pp. 128-131.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 115-120., Tóth, op.cit., p. 141.

²⁸ Tóth, op.cit., p. 177.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 181.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 185-187.

³¹ Fehér, op.cit., p. 162.

The “Expulsion” of the German Speaking Minority from Yugoslavia

Steffen Prauser and Stanislav Sretenovic

The German minority in Yugoslavia, 1918- 1941

At the end of the First World War, following the demise of Austria-Hungary and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, the German speaking population of the ancient Kingdom of Saint Stephen found itself reassigned to the new successor states of the Habsburg Empire: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (Yugoslavia), Romania, and Hungary. In Yugoslavia, according to the 1921 census, the German speaking population numbered around 500.000, about 4,2 per cent of the total population, and as such represented the largest national minority, ahead of the Hungarians and Albanians. The German minority formed enclaves in the Banat, the Backa, the Srem (in today’s Vojvodina, in Northern Serbia); in the Baranja and the Slavonia (in today’s Croatia); in the Stajerska (in today’s Slovenia) and around Banja Luka (in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina). Although geographically dispersed the German minority became politically, economically and culturally increasingly well organized during the inter-war period. Consequently they had an important influence on the internal and external life of the Yugoslav state. The hub of activity, where the largest single group of Germans was concentrated, was the Banat, the region of the Danubian plain which extended from the Serbian towns of Zrenjanin (Veliki Beckerek, *Grossbetschkerek*) and Vrsac (*Werschetz*) into Romania as far as Timisoara (Temisvar, *Temeschburg*) and north into Hungary.

The history of Germans in Yugoslavia in the inter-war period was interpreted by official Yugoslav historiography after the Second World War in order to “settle the score” with both Nazi Germany and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the latter being considered “bourgeois”, “Greater Serb”, retrograde and imperialistic. “Hidden” questions and, until recently, the taboo of this subject, make it especially interesting to historians today.¹

It is recognised that the demise of Austria-Hungary contributed to the creation of national consciousness among Yugoslav Germans. After the fall of the Habsburgs, the idea of a dynastic reference for the German speaking population was gradually replaced by a still indistinct idea of belonging to a German nation. After the Armistice in November 1918, German national councils were widespread in Vojvodina. In the disorder after the collapse of

the Austro-Hungarian administration, these councils represented the wishes and interests of the German population.

The drawing of the border of the new Yugoslav state at the Paris Peace Conference, and the stabilisation of the general situation in Yugoslavia in 1919/20, contributed to the creation of a specific German movement for strengthening and developing some kind of German national identity in the Kingdom of the South Slavs. On June 20th 1920 in Novi Sad (*Neusatz*) the German minority founded a German Cultural Union - *Kulturbund*.² Under the slogan *Staatstreu und Volkstreu* (Loyalty to the State and to the People), the *Kulturbund* aimed at the development and preservation of German identity in Yugoslavia. It organised lectures, set up "German" libraries and undertook the education of "German" teachers.

If this cultural organization of the German minority in Yugoslavia in the period immediately after the war took place without major obstacles, political organization was more difficult because of Paris treaties. Under the terms of the *Saint-Germain treaty*, the participation of national minorities in the political life of the new States was forbidden for two years, between 1920 and 1922.³ Once that time limit had passed, Yugoslav Germans founded their own political party: the "German Party in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians" was created in Zombolj (Hatzfeld) in Romania.⁴ Its program included two points which the Yugoslav ruling parties deemed excessive: military service should be done at the place of residence of the recruits, and the German language should be used in administrative and legal affairs. At 1920's parliamentary elections, the German Party was independently represented and secured between 5 and 8 Members of Parliament, considering this success.

From the moment of its foundation the German party had complex and changing relations with the Yugoslav State, varying with the internal and external political situation. In a political climate characterized by the disagreement between Serbs and Croats concerning the organization of the State, the German Party conducted an opportunistic policy. Exploiting internal strife it collaborated sometimes with the parties in power (as in 1923 and 1927), and sometimes with the opposition (as in 1925).

In the course of the 1920s the State's relations with the *Kulturbund* underwent a number of dramatic shifts. Already in 1919 the German minority considered itself disadvantaged by agrarian reforms which aimed at the dismantling of the large former Austrian - Hungarian estates⁵. From 1920 the State gave support to the establishment of German cultural organizations. The Yugoslav government wanted to guard against Hungarian irredentism by creating obstacles between the two national minorities. The *Kulturbund's* activity grew strongly; the number of local organizations increased from 99 in 1921, to 128 in

1924, and membership from 30 000 to 55 000. However, the relationship between the State and the *Kulturbund* deteriorated in April 1924, when in the atmosphere of strong Serb-Croat tension in the Parliament, the German party supported the Croat Peasant Party. This prompted the government to ban the *Kulturbund* and seize its property because of "pan- German propaganda and its behaviour against the State".⁶ In 1924, under external pressure from Stresemann's Germany and particularly from the League of Nations, the prohibition was partially lifted.⁷ Nonetheless, the number of local organizations and members decreased radically. With the German-Yugoslav "rapprochement" in 1927, under the leadership of King Alexander Karadjordjevic, the ban was completely lifted. The new head of *Kulturbund* orientated its activity away from politics, towards the development of a closer network of German cultural and sport associations such as a German Academic Union, German Sports and Gymnastics Society Union, and a Society of German Singers.

Following the establishment of King Alexander's dictatorship on January 6th 1929, the German party, as all parties with national referents, was forbidden. Nevertheless, once political life was partially re-established, the German minority politicians ran for the election within the radical as well as the democratic party. Furthermore, the German minority found other ways to organize and articulate and defend its interests, especially in cultural and economic associations. From the early 1920s onwards one of the most important characteristics of German economic life in Yugoslavia was associative organizations. With the exception of village traders from Maribor (Marburg, today in Slovenia), most members of the German minority were small farmers. An important number of German economic associations was established in Yugoslavia: in 1922 the Central Agrarian Association "Agraria", becoming in 1927 the Centre for the Trade of Goods; in 1927 a Central Agricultural Office; in 1931 a German Union of Cattle Breeders.⁸ This type of organization developed rapidly, particularly during the Great World Depression and at the end of the 1930s. In 1941, about 95,5 per cent of German families belonged to one or another of these associations. The reasons for this expansion during the Great World Depression were solidarity, need for organization and the German minority's desire to create an economic infrastructure to ease the impact of the crisis. In the second half of the 1930s, this infrastructure allowed the amelioration of the general economic situation in Yugoslavia, and the remarkable economic development of the German minority, who enjoyed furthermore the support of Germany, which sent money and trained personnel.

The dictatorship under King Alexander initially not only banned the German party, but also the *Kulturbund*. However, trying to improve its external image, the regime increased

tolerance towards national minorities and this prohibition was soon lifted. In 1934, the German minority had 258 schools, more than 400 cultural and agricultural associations, one printing house and edited about thirty periodicals and one daily newspaper.⁹

From 1934, a new factor began to effect the life of the *Kulturbund*. Young German “intellectuals” came back after having graduated in Germany and introduced national-socialist ideas into the German community of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ As a result, an intense struggle developed for predominance within the *Kulturbund* between the “reformers or modernizers” (*Erneuerer*), i.e. the national-socialists, and their adversaries, the “conservatives”.¹¹ In the end the “reformers”, with Sepp Janko as leader, gained control of the *Kulturbund* in 1939.

The period 1939-41 was characterized by the re-organization of the *Kulturbund* in the spirit of national-socialism. Ties with Hitler’s Germany were strengthened, the network of subordinate organizations was developed and centralized, and the number of members increased to about 300.000, or almost 60 per cent of the Yugoslav German population.

The Yugoslav State, distracted by growing disharmony between Serbs and Croats, and increasingly under the influence of the Third Reich on its Western border after the “Anschluss” in 1938, maintained a good relationship with the *Kulturbund* up to the moment when Hitler attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941.

The German occupation

Initially, it was not Hitler’s intention to incorporate Yugoslavia within the Third Reich. Rather, “peace” in the Balkans was important for his projects of expansion towards the east. In order to be sure of Yugoslavia as an ally in the imminent war against Greece, thus keeping under the control the right flank of his planned attack on the USSR, Hitler tried to persuade Belgrade to join the Tripartite Pact. Yugoslavia was already surrounded by subscriber-states and encouraged to obtain Thessaloniki in a common war against Greece. It therefore joined the pact on 25th March 1941.

Two days later, pro-western officers under General Simović’s leadership overthrew the Yugoslav government. Although Simović tried to convince Germany of his loyalty to the Pact, Hitler decided to take over Yugoslavia as part of his campaign against Greece. Within 17 days a German, Hungarian, Italian and Bulgarian alliance overran, and subsequently divided, the former Yugoslavia as follows: Dalmazia, the southern part of Slovenia, Kosovo, western Macedonia and Montenegro were annexed and occupied by the Italians. Bulgaria was satisfied with eastern Macedonia and parts of Serbia and Kosovo. The Baranja, the Batschka

(Bačka) and the Medjmurje were assigned to Hungary. Germany, in turn, annexed northern Slovenia and occupied the Banat and the rest of Serbia.

In the centre of the country, the Germans and the Italians founded an "independent" Croatia: *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* (NDH – Independent State of Croatia). Its Ustacha (*Ustaša*) government soon started to persecute Jews, anti-fascist Croats, and especially Serbs. It did this with such cruelty that even the hard-baked German SS expressed disapproval. In addition to various massacres, the Ustacha established its own concentration camps. According to the most recent source-based study, in the most notorious of these camps, Jasenovac, at least 85,000 people perished.¹² Furthermore, the Croat Ustacha immediately expelled about 100,000 Serbs from Croatian territory. This was only one feature of a general ethnic cleansing committed by all the occupants in their respective territories, making the respective ethnic distinctions. One could also mention here the expulsion of Serbs from the other occupied territories, as well as the Hungarian massacre of Serbs at Novi Sad in January 1942, and the Italian concentration camps for Slovenian civilians.

More important in our context is anti-partisan warfare, in the largest sense, conducted by the German army and the SS against a very strong and violent partisan movement from 1941 to 1944. In this conflict, which increasingly developed the characteristics of an ethnic conflict, the German minority also played a role. Yugoslavian troops had just capitulated when, on 20th April, a Serbian rebel shot a German soldier, wounding another seriously. As a reprisal, 36 so-called "suspicious" male Serbs were killed; 18 were hung, with the eager assistance of some of the local ethnic German minority in Pančevo. Following the attack on the Soviet Union in June, German troops in ex-Yugoslavia were few in number and lacked experience, while fast growing partisan movements soon controlled large rural areas even in the German occupied regions. Being unable to defeat the partisans decisively, the Germans opted for an extended policy of terror against the civilian population. This included also the killing of so-called suspects – Jews, gypsies and communists. In October 1941, the General responsible for German occupied Serbia, Franz Böhme, ordered the killing of 100 Serbs for every German soldier or ethnic German killed in a partisan attack, and 50 Serbs for every wounded German. In this way, a temporary peak in reprisals was reached that month, when units of the 717th Infantry Division shot at least 1,755 civilians in Kraljevo, and 2,300 in Kragujevac. By the beginning of December already more than 11,000 so-called hostages had been killed.¹³ In the framework of this type of "anti-partisan-warfare", the German authorities in Yugoslavia implemented the "final solution", which in large part was completed in Serbia without need of intervention from Berlin. Furthermore, thousands of Yugoslavs, mainly

Serbs, were sent as slave labour to the Reich, and ethnic cleansing was carried out in the parts of Slovenia annexed by Germany.

Although most of the ethnic German population in Yugoslavia were not involved in these atrocities, one must bear in mind that the greater portion of these crimes were committed under a "German" banner and therefore reflected badly on the German minorities as soon as the partisans were in the position to take control.

Even before the German invasion, the number of volunteers for the German army among the German speaking minority in Yugoslavia had been relatively high. The Yugoslavian State considered volunteering to be desertion because men from the German minority were subject to Yugoslavian conscription. During the invasion, German troops were generally welcomed in German-speaking villages. German speakers serving in the Yugoslav Army often surrendered at first contact with the German armed forces, as did many Croatian units. When the Yugoslav authorities took ethnic Germans hostage, the latter organised themselves in so-called "self-protection units". These then actively fought on the German side. In Novi Sad members of the German minority went so far, behind the Yugoslavian troop line, as to occupy the post office, the railway and power stations. Similar events are reported in the Gottschee area, Marburg (Maribor), Vukuvar, Esseg (Osijek) and Belgrade. It is understandable that among Serbs the impression spread of the existence of a German fifth column.

After the defeat and division of Yugoslavia, the German minority found itself in very different situations according to which occupying power was responsible for the area in which they lived. In the newly created state of Croatia they enjoyed equal rights, large autonomy for schools, and in areas with more than 20 per cent German speakers German became the second official language. While the German minority in the northern "pure" Croatian part of the NHD-state lived in relatively safe conditions, others found themselves under a serious threat from the partisan movement in Bosnia. In the German-speaking villages "self-protection units" consisting of ethnic Germans were built up to meet this threat. These groups were often called in to participate in reprisals, which certainly did not increase the popularity of the German minority.

In the Banat, ethnic Germans were under the direct administration of the "German military command Serbia". The Serbian pseudo-government under Nedić (by the grace of the German commander) had to agree large tax autonomy and self-government for ethnic Germans. The *Volksgruppenleitung* (Representatives of the *Donauschwaben* = ethnic Germans in Baranja, Batschka, Banat), led by Sepp Janko, became a de facto arm of the

German military administration. Furthermore, the agrarian reform of 1919 was revoked in favour of ethnic Germans. German schools obtained the status of private institutions, although the teachers kept their status as civil servants and continued to be paid by the Serbian "state". The only concession to this puppet state was compulsory lessons in Serbo-Croat. In the Batschka, meanwhile, the ethnic Germans reacted, generally speaking, in a relatively positive manner to the Hungarian occupation. The older generation, in particular, seemed to have been nostalgic about the past era of Hungarian rule. However, a continuing argument between the German Reich and Hungary revolved around the question of whether ethnic Germans should be liable for military service in the Hungarian army or in the "Wehrmacht". In neither of these last two areas were the partisans a real threat, but the killing of Serb hostages by the Hungarian as well as the German occupying forces became a tactic of control in the Batschka and the Banat – intimidating partisans, who took little action against the occupiers there.

In southern Slovenia the German minority was transferred, on the basis of an August 1941 agreement between the Reich and Italy, to Carinthia (Austria). With the relocation of the so-called Gotschee-Germans – mainly to farms belonging to expelled Slovenians – more than 600 hundred years of German-speaking settlement in southern Slovenia ended within a four month period (November 1941–February 1942).

As mentioned above, ethnic German "self-protection units" were established to fight local partisans. In the Banat area, from these an SS-Division was established in March 1942, and later filled by additional ethnic Germans from Romania and Croatia. In the early months of the Division's history, it struggled to fill its ranks from volunteers alone but soon turned to conscription, ultimately comprising some 21,500 members. This 7th SS-Division, named after Prince Eugen (Austria's principal war hero of the Turkish wars around 1700), was intended for anti-partisan warfare in the whole Balkan region.

The "Prinz Eugen" has been wrongly accused of the crimes at Kragujevac and Kraljevo, rather its first deployment was in autumn 1942. Under Romanian ethnic-German SS-Gruppenführer Arthur Phleps, the Division nevertheless committed many other crimes. During its first deployment even the Commanding General in Belgrade noticed the Prinz Eugen's striking propensity for violence. On the merest pretext, they resorted to disproportionate reprisals. After a few weeks the General had to request that they "avoid in future unnecessary brutality towards the unarmed civilian population, such as the shooting of women and children and the burning of villages."¹⁴ At the end of March 1944, the atrocities committed by the Prinz Eugen Division caused a diplomatic crisis between Croatia and Germany, following the massacre of inhabitants of several villages close to Split (Dalmatia).

It was not the high number of victims (at least 500, probably 834)¹⁵ that caused the complaint, but the fact that they this time all were Croats. The leading expert on the topic, Thomas Casagrande, claims that the Prinz Eugen's violence was a kind of ethnic cleansing against an enemy considered by ethnic Germans as a potential medium-term threat to their "Homeland". This fear was deliberately exploited by the SS-leadership.¹⁶

When the battlefield started to move closer, the German authorities began to evacuate, the German speakers from central Yugoslavia: Around 3,000 ethnic Germans were sent to Lublin/Poland. 18,300 ethnic Germans were transferred from Bosnia (NHD-Croatia) to the "Generalgouvernement" (Poland) because of the threat of partisan attacks in the area largely controlled by Tito. These resettlements turned more and more into a flight: In March 1944 20,000 Germans from Slavonia were moved to Smyernia (Western Srem, around Esseg) because of Partisans attacks. From the Smyernia area, they then escaped northwards in October 1944 while the Red Army occupied the eastern part of former Yugoslavia up to the Apatin-Tscherwenka (Crvenka) line. The Russian advance caused also chaotic flight from the strongly German populated areas of Batschka and Banat. Because the German authorities there tried to prevent general flight, even inflicting punishment on refugees, only 50 per cent of the population from the Batschka and only 10 percent from the Banat were able to escape. Another reason for the failure to flee was the fact that due to male conscription only women, children and the older generation remained. Especially the latter wished to stay, trusting to the experience of the First World War, when the civilian population was little affected by occupation by the Serbian army.

The Second World War, however, witnessed far greater violence directed at civilians, but was exacerbated by ideological and ethnic divisions, whereby the distinction between combatants and non-combatants became blurred. The extreme violence accompanying traditionally ethnic conflicts was now turned principally against the ethnic Germans of Yugoslavia (without forgetting atrocities against Italians from Istria) who had been the only ethnic minority that had unanimously – or with very few exceptions – supported the occupant.

The Germans from Slovenia who failed to escape in time, were, generally speaking, just expelled. Ethnic Germans from the Batschka and the Banat were less fortunate. Persecution of the German minority commenced with the "occupation" of their settlements by the Red Army. One can subdivide this persecution into five different phases¹⁷: The first began with the "occupation" by the Red Army at the beginning of October 1944. Women from the German minority were the victims of indiscriminate rape by the occupying forces and some

local Serbs used the occasion to exact private revenge. On the other hand, some Germans were still called by the local partisans to take part in liberation committees.

A second period lasted from mid-October 1944 to mid-April 1945. Partisans from the bitterly disputed areas of Bosnia took power in the Vojvodina during the second half of October and installed a military administration. German-speaking men and women who had been involved in one way or another with the German administration or German army were placed in provisional concentration camps in the main rural towns. Many of the men were tortured, and at least 5,800 were shot.¹⁸ Additionally some men were shot in their home villages despite not having collaborated in the German occupation. Camp survivors and other as yet un-arrested men and women were compelled to do forced labour. Village women suffered "rape-tours" organised by the partisans together with members of the Red Army. The larger towns, such as Pančevo, Vršac and Veliki Bečkerek immediately expelled the German-speaking population to rural areas. After Christmas 1944 27,000-30,000 younger ethnic Germans were abducted to the USSR. Because most of the able-bodied men were either fighting for the German army or had been executed, it was mainly women aged 18 to 40 who were affected by this measure (just 10 per cent of those abducted were male). The Yugoslav partisans organised their transport to the train stations, where the victims had to undergo a medical examination by Soviet commissioners. The pregnant and disabled were held back while others were transported in goods trains to work camps, mainly in the Donez basin/Ukraine. There they were employed in reconstruction works. Illness, exhaustion and accidents killed around 16 per cent.

On an administrative level the "Antifascist-council of Yugoslavia" (AVNOJ), approved the expropriation of all German-speakers' property in November 1944, excepting those who had joined the ranks of the partisan movement. In the larger framework of the agricultural reform of August 1945, partisan families took over former German farms. The *Volksdeutsche* in Banat and Batschka received no information on these purely formal measures. As the German minority already had to deal with more existential problems they might not even have been greatly interested.

By the end of March 1945, a third phase had begun in which German-speakers who had survived the second period were concentrated and ghettoised in so-called "village-camps". The partisan administration divided people between those who were able and unable to work. The unable, consisting mostly of children and older people, found themselves in special camps. Today the survivors still use the term "extermination camps" to express the horror of these camps. This labelling, although historically misleading, is understandable due

to the extremely high death rate up to 50 per cent. Within these camps children under 14, whose mothers had been abducted to Russia and their fathers shot (or in the German army), had their own “children’s district”. From the summer of 1946 onwards these children were transferred to state homes, which mostly saved their lives. The Yugoslavian State, which apparently treated these children relatively well, nevertheless tried to impose some kind of indoctrination. The children were not allowed to speak German and many of them were handed over to Yugoslav families. In the 1950s German parents had great difficulties to reclaim their children – and not all were successful.

In 1947 the situation improved. Through the use of DDT the epidemics were stemmed. Soldiers from the new regular army replaced guards from the ranks of the partisans, and torture was now officially forbidden. Organizations from outside Yugoslavia, such as the Red Cross, the American aid-committee of P. Wagner, and the Vatican, provided help. The French government especially engaged in helping inhabitants of French origin German-speaking villages, such as St. Hubert, Soltur and Charleville. *CARE* parcels reached the camps and were distributed among the prisoners.

A changed attitude among the camp authorities, showing more tolerance towards flight attempts, was of great importance. While previously prisoners who had been caught attempting flight were usually tortured or shot, now they only had to fear being brought back to the camp. If the prisoners were able to organise money, or if they still had some hidden jewellery, they also had the possibility to corrupt the guards and be “freed”.

In a final phase, from the end of 1947 onwards, the authorities once more tried to halt general flight from the camps. In March 1948, they closed down the camp system and employed those Germans able to work in state industry and those liable for military service were conscripted for the Yugoslav army. Throughout the period of fierce persecution ethnic Germans were still officially considered Yugoslav citizens. Most tried to renounce their citizenship, which was possible after the payment of sums equivalent to around 3 months salary. Only then were they allowed to leave the country. Thus slowly, by the end of the 1950s, nearly all ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia had “emigrated” to western countries. After expulsion, flight and “emigration” 150,000 found new homes in Germany, another 150,000 in Austria, 10,000 in the United States and 3,000 in France.

Regarding the casualties among civilian German speakers in Yugoslavia, we have available the most accurate statistics of any for expulsions in the period linked to the Second World War. Although, in 1961, Hans-Ulrich Wehler already had provided us with a trustworthy statistics on these casualties (using historical and statistical methods), the

survivors of the expulsion did not trust his conclusions. They argued that a left-wing historian, such as Wehler declared himself, could not write objectively about crimes committed by a left-wing regime. Therefore, former ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia financed and organised an enormous research in order to establish their casualties. Nearly 200 people have collaborated in counting the victims of every single village with a German community, listing each name as well as the cause and date of death. The result confirmed more or less Wehler's estimations of the '60s (!), requiring only very slight corrections. Apart from 7,199 (Wehler: 7,000) shot by the partisans, 48,447 *Volksdeutsche* died in the concentration camps in Yugoslavia (Wehler: 48,027) and 1,994 were abducted to Soviet labour camps (Wehler gives no exact number). According to this latest research at least 16,8 per cent of the *Volksdeutsche* died during the war in Yugoslavia.¹⁹

¹ For different points of view see: Petar Kacavenda, *Nemci u Jugoslaviji 1918- 1945* (Germans in Yugoslavia 1918- 1945), (Belgrade 1991); Vladimir Geiger, Ivan Jurkovic *Sto se dogodilo s Folksdojcerima?* (What happened with Folksdojcers?), (Zagreb, 1993); Slobodan Maricic, *Susedi, dzelati i zrtve: Folksdojceri u Jugoslaviji* (Neighbours, executioners and victims: Folksdojcers in Yugoslavia), (Belgrade, 1995); Nenad Stefanovic, *Jedan svet na Dunavu* (A world on Danube), (Belgrade, 1997); Vladimir Geiger, *Nestanak Folksdojcera* (The disappearance of Folksdojcers), (Zagreb, 1997).

² N. Stefanovic, op.cit., p.178.

³ Pablo de Azcarate y Flores, *The League of Nations and national Minorities*, (New York, 1972); Umberto Corsini, Davide Zaffi (a cura di), *Le Minoranze tra le due guerre* (Minorities between two World Wars), (Bologna, 1994).

⁴ N. Stefanovic, op.cit., p.188.

⁵ Nikola Gacesa, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu 1919- 1941* (The Agrarian reform and the colonisation in Banat 1919- 1941), Novi Sad, 1972.

⁶ N. Stefanovic, op. cit., p. 181.

⁷ AMAE, Z-Europe 1918- 1940, Yugoslavia 51, Pierre de Margerie (French Ambassador in Germany) to Briand, Berlin, March 7th, 1925.

⁸ N. Stefanovic, op.cit., p. 196.

⁹ Yves Chataigneau, Yougoslavie in V. Blache and L. Gallois (sous la direction de), *Géographie Universelle*, tome VII, (Paris, 1934).

¹⁰ P. Kacavenda, op.cit., pp. 17- 25.

¹¹ SHAT, 7N3196, General Merson (French Military Attaché in Yugoslavia) to Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, October 18th 1939, secret.

¹² Others claim even the improbable number of 1,100,000 victims at Jasenovac alone. In the 1960s, an official "census" of Yugoslav casualties during the Second World War established the number of 600,000–700,000 for the whole war, correcting the 1,7 million claimed immediately after the conflict. These numbers included partisans and civilian casualties, thus the number 1,100,000 for Jasenovac should be considered far too high. See discussion: Holm Sundhausen, Jasenovac 1941-1945, in: Gerd R. Ueberschär, *Orte des Grauens*.

Verbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, (Darmstadt, 2003), p. 54 ed seq. For different points of view see: Viktor Novak, *Magnum Crimen*, (Zagreb, 1948). Vladimir Dedijer, *Vatikan i Jasenovac* (Vatican and Jasenovac), (Beograd, 1987).

¹³ See General Franz Boehme's order as well as the German documents on Pancevo, Kraljevo and Kraguejavac in: *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimension des Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944*, Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (Ed.), (Hamburg, 2002), p. 516, 536-57. Boehme's order was indirectly "covered" by the general order by Okw-Chef (Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces), Fieldmarshall Wilhelm Keitel, from September the 16th 1941, in which the same "Repressalquoten" (reprisal proportions) were fixed for eastern Europe.

¹⁴ Klaus Schmider, 'auf Umwegen zum Vernichtungskrieg' in: Rolf-Dieter Mueller/Hans-Erich Volkmann (editors), *Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität*, (Munich, 1999), p. 911.

¹⁵ The German estimation spoke of 486 victims. A number which was challenged immediately as "far to low" even by the German ambassador in Maribor. See Klaus Schmider, *Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941-1944*, (Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, 2002) p. 373. In the Nuremberg trial the number of 834 victims was reported. Trials of war criminals, Vol. XX, p. 768, Nürnberg 1948. - Klaus Schmider, op.cit.,.

¹⁶ Thomas Casagrande, *Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division "Prinz Eugen". Die Banater Schwaben und die Nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen*, (Frankfurt on Main, 2003).

¹⁷ Still of major importance on this subject: *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (editors.), Volume V, (Düsseldorf, 1961).

¹⁸ Wehler has counted 5,777 shot in this period. Including the later shooting of Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia he reaches a number of 7,000. (see Volume V of *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa* by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, (Düsseldorf, 1961), p. 131E.) A more accurate recent research establishes 8,049 victims shot in the Volksdeutsche for the whole (!) period from 1944 to 1948. (Josef Beer and Georg Wildmann (Hrsg.), *Der Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung, Band I, Ortsberichte über die Verbrechen an den Deutschen durch das Tito-Regime in der Zeit von 1944-1948, (Munich, 1994.)

¹⁹ Beer and Wildmann (editors), *Der Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, p. 1019.

The Germans in Romania – the Ambiguous Fate of a Minority

Markus Wien

If we apply the framework of this edition very strictly, there is actually no room for a presentation about the “expulsion of German speakers from Romania”, simply because such an expulsion never happened. After the end of the Second World War, a considerable German speaking minority continued to exist in communist ruled Romania, and it still exists today – at least officially, albeit only a fraction of the size of the pre-war community. In contrast to other East Central European territories, where the most radical decline of this number happened during the first years after the end of the war, in Romania the number of Germans most seriously diminished during the war and from the second half of the 1950s onwards. Today, the German minority basically consists of members of the older generation, who have not managed to leave the country for various reasons.¹

The decrease of the German minority happened within a context, which was quite different to that in countries like Czechoslovakia or Poland. There, according to the Potsdam agreement, the German population was expelled right after the war from its homelands and sent to the neighboring German territories. This was done in order to facilitate the integration and stabilization of those former German settled regions within respectively the Czech and the Polish state. It was part of the truncation and resettlement program envisaged by the Allied powers during the war. Romania, i.e. its German minority, was not included in such plans, since it had no border with post-war Germany.²

Before the war, its German speaking population was settled in different regions, which had practically no geographic connection. The census of 1930, the last one before 1939, provided the following results: Due to their relatively large number of German inhabitants, the most important regions were Siebenbürgen with 237,416 and Banat with 275,369 people of German “Volkszugehörigkeit” (nationality). Other territories with considerable German settlement were Besarabia (81,089), Bukovina (75,533), Sathmar (31,067) and Dobrudzha (12,581). Except of that, 32,366 Germans lived wide-spread in the Romanian Pre-World-War-One-territories Moldova and Vlachia. Altogether, they formed a minority of 745,421 people among a total population of about 18 million, i.e. 4.1 percent. By 1939 this figure grew to 782,246.³

Looking at the history of the Germans in Romania, one could say, that they were, in a way, an acquired minority. Except the 30,000, who had previously been living in the country,

they had all become Romanian citizens after 1918, when their settlement regions were incorporated into the Romanian state by the provisions of the peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.⁴ Siebenbürgen, Banat, Sathmar and Bukovina had been taken over from Austria-Hungary and Besarabia from Russia. Dobrudzha had already been annexed in 1913 from Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War.⁵ The oldest community was the one of Siebenbürgen, whose history can be traced back to the 12th century, when the first German settlers were invited by King Geisa II of Hungary.

The beginning of the emergence of a collective national consciousness of these German communities can be dated to the appearance of German troops in the Balkans during the First World War. It became politically relevant after the war, when the German populated territories were handed over from Hungary respectively Russia to Romania. Now it appeared to be necessary for the Germans to deal with the Romanian state and to defend their own interests as a unified and organized minority. However, they generally were not dissatisfied with joining "Greater Romania" because this way they were offered the opportunity to escape situations they had considered to be more critical than what they expected from their new statehood.

Within the Romanian state, it was the clergy which played a central role in keeping German national and cultural life intact. After their separation from Hungary a new diocese had been established in Temeschburg/Temeswar. In general, the churches, Catholic as well as Protestant, provided the foundation of German educational life in Romania. Although, according to the agreement about the protection of minority rights, signed by the Romanian government in 1919, the state was obliged to institutionalize and support the education of the minorities in their own languages, in practice the Germans were fully dependent on church-schools. There was a number of state-run German schools, but under the national-liberal minister of culture Constantin Angelescu (1922-26, 1933-37) the number of German speaking teachers employed was far too small to meet the needs of the schools.

Politically, the relation between the Germans and the Romanian state was ambivalent. On the one hand, the government did not fulfill several obligations, which had been mentioned in the Karlsburg agreement of 1918, a resolution by the "National assembly" of the Romanians of Hungary, which were about to join their motherland. This Karlsburg agreement guaranteed equal rights to all ethnic groups within Romanian borders. Anyway, the government had never acknowledged this agreement officially.⁶ On the other hand, the state tried to win the loyalty of the German minority in order to stabilize the newly annexed territories against revanchist ambitions of Hungary, which relied on its co-nationals in Siebenbürgen,

and of the Soviet Union, that tried to get Besarabia back. Therefore notwithstanding some hardship, the German minority had a relatively good position within the Romanian state. It was surely better than the one of the Hungarian minority. The Germans had a permanent representation in the national parliament: Their party, the “Deutsche Partei” always held between 4 and 10 seats and played a considerable role by helping the governing parties to achieve necessary majorities. Basically, there was a pragmatic consensus between the Romanian and the German political representatives about each one’s own interests as well as about those of the state as a whole, and, thus, an atmosphere of problem-oriented cooperation emerged.⁷

This atmosphere was seriously disturbed by the emergence of authoritarian movements and regimes in Germany as well as in Romania in correspondence the deep crisis of the parliamentary system in both countries. Parallel to the rise of the “Iron Guards” in Romania, German National Socialism met a great response among its co-nationals in Romania. Nazi-like organizations – for example in 1934 the “Nationalsozialistische Erneuerungsbewegung der Deutschen in Rumänien” (National Socialist Renewal Movement of the Germans in Romania) - were established and further on it won majorities in several local elections during the 1930s.⁸ This increasing orientation towards the German state caused an ambivalent reaction amongst the Romanian public. On the one hand, it was met with the suspicion that it would weaken the minority’s loyalty towards Romania; on the other hand, the course of the Romanian foreign policy gradually guided the country towards an alliance with Germany.⁹ Therefore, nothing could be done against the growing influence of the Nazis among the German minority. Almost simultaneously with Romania’s joining the Tripartite Pact in November 1940, which already happened under the rule of Antonescu, the “Deutsche Volksgruppe in Rumänien” (German National Group in Romania) was acknowledged as the only body with the right to officially represent the Germans. They all automatically became its members, there was no choice whether to join it or not. At the same time, the newly established “NSDAP of the German Volksgruppe in Romania” was declared to be the only political agent of German national interests in the country. Several other Nazi organizations, on the German model, were established in Romania during the war.¹⁰ Simultaneously, the general relation between the minority and the state was changed. In contrast to the interwar period, when the Germans followed their interests strictly as loyal citizens of Romania, now, in 1940, the “Deutsche Volksgruppe” was officially declared to be part of the greater German community, which received its impulses and instructions directly from Berlin. Its press speaker Walter May said: “(...) The relation between the Germans in Romania and the Romanian state is identical to the one between Germany and Romania.”¹¹ In other words, the German minority

was no longer subject to the sovereignty of the state, whose citizens they were. From now on, they were subject to the leadership of Nazi-Germany. According to Wolf Oschlies, after 1939 they committed themselves to the Nazi-ideology in a way, which is probably unique in the history of German minorities in Eastern Europe.¹²

Initially, from 1940 onwards, the exodus of Germans from Romania was not the product of "ethnic cleansing". It was the expression and execution of the Nazi policy. In October 1939 Hitler declared in the Reichstag that the divided and isolated German minorities of Eastern Europe had to be resettled in order to unite them in a compact East Central European settlement area, which would have a direct geographic connection to the German pre-war territory, i.e. in conquered Poland. In general, clear-cut ethnic borders would have to be created to overcome the ethnic diversity of present East Central European states.¹³ One could say that this way, ethnic cleansing was propagated in the sense, that isolated and "weak" German settlement in Eastern Europe was to be given up in order to be re-consolidated within the core-community in Germany. The policy was applied not only to the German communities in Romania, but also to those in the Baltic states (see chapter by Tegler).

According to these principles, after the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and the Vienna agreement of 1940, in which the return of northern Siebenbürgen and Sathmar to Hungary, of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR and of southern Dobrudzha to Bulgaria had been fixed, resettlement plans for the Germans of these regions were elaborated by the Reichsregierung (German Imperial Government). However, they were executed only as far as Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobrudzha were concerned. The German government fixed agreements with the Soviet-Union, Bulgaria and also with Romania about evacuating the German speaking population and transferring it to German territory.¹⁴ Although Nazism was popular among Romania's Germans, it could not be taken for granted, that those who had to leave first according to the resettlement plans would give up their homeland easily. Anyway, it was rather easy for the German resettlement commands that had started their job in the relevant territories in the summer of 1940 in cooperation with the local authorities, to convince the Germans of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to leave their villages. They preferred to move to conquered Poland or inner Germany, since the alternative would have been to live under Stalinist rule. In southern Bukovina, which remained part of Romania, and where the Germans had been rather prosperous, the resettlement was not so easy. Here as well as in Dobrudzha it was either direct political or at least peer pressure, which made the German speaking population leave.¹⁵

After these German “elements” had been saved from the “danger” of assimilation – in this sense it was ethnic cleansing in order to save an ethnic group rather than to destroy it -, this policy of ethnic (or racial) cleansing also was applied amongst themselves. Having arrived in Germany or occupied Poland, they had to spend a certain time in selection camps. There, they were divided into three categories, which determined the region, where they were to be resettled. People belonging to the “O”-category went to the conquered eastern territories (Ostgebiete), where they were expected to build up the German “Volkstum” (ethnic group) since they were considered to be racially most “precious”. Less precious “Volksdeutsche” (ethnic Germans) from Southeastern Europe were put into category “A” and, thus, sent to inner Germany (Altreich, i.e. pre-war Germany). The rest made up the “S”-category (Sonderfälle, special cases) and were either sent to Polish populated areas or back to where they had come from.¹⁶

As a result from this resettlement policy and the re-shaping of the borders in East Central and Southeastern Europe, the German minority in Romania lost about one third of its population by the end of 1940. Out of approximately 800,000, about 550,000 remained within the Romanian borders. Those, who had been resettled or lost to Hungary, since they lived in northern Siebenbürgen or Sathmar, made up to about a quarter of a million.¹⁷

As already mentioned, the German minority in Romania was, before and after this reduction, highly influenced by Nazi ideology and its German leadership. It was this commitment, which was crucial for their fate during and after the war. Since they were regarded as part of the greater German community in Europe, from spring 1940 onwards, the German armed forces, i.e. Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, started recruitment campaigns among the male German population in Romania. Those young men who were impressed by the German military success during the first years of the war (and disgusted by the corrupt and undisciplined Romanian army) usually preferred to do their service in German units.¹⁸ After the recruitment campaign had been interrupted in 1941/42 in order not to spoil the relations to Antonescu, there were still a considerable number of Romania-Germans who voluntarily joined the German forces. When the Romanian army had been practically annihilated in Stalingrad, the recruitment of Germans in Romania re-started. Now, even an agreement was signed, which allowed those, who served in Wehrmacht, SS or “Organisation Todt”¹⁹ to keep their Romanian citizenship. However, in April 1943 Hitler signed a decree, which provided the German citizenship for all ethnic Germans with foreign passports, who were serving in German forces.²⁰ At the end of the war, this decision turned out to be another factor that had a diminishing effect on the German minority as a whole. Since they had received German passports, the Ro-

manian government, which came to power after the surrender to the USSR in August 1944, had the legal possibility to deprive them of their Romanian citizenship and, thus, reject their return to the country. Approximately 75,000 Romania-Germans had been serving in the SS or Wehrmacht. That was more than 10 per cent of the whole German population within the Romanian borders of 1940.²¹

In general, the German minority in Romania enjoyed the highest possible degree of independence from the state authorities during the war, since it actually came under the direct control of Berlin. However, as soon as this control disappeared, the Romanian state regained full sovereignty over them. Under the conditions of war, this would change their situation dramatically – and even more so, if Romania, under Soviet military threat, would join the Anti-Hitler-Coalition. This is exactly, what happened on August 23rd 1944. After the Romanian government had secretly been negotiating with the Allies since spring 1943 about ending the war, now, on this day, Marshal Ion Antonescu was arrested in a coup d'état led by General Sănatescu, who then took power. On the same day, King Michael proclaimed the end of all hostilities against the Allies. One day later, on August 24th the German air-attack on Bucharest gave him the pretext to declare war on Germany. Thus, the German minority, which officially stood under Hitler's command, was now regarded as hostile.²²

The first measures, which were taken against them, were the suspension of the organization "Volksgruppe" and the arrest of its leaders, as far as they had not yet escaped to Hungary. Although even innocent people were arrested in order to fulfill the previously envisaged rate of prisoners, the Romanian population did not generally behave in an unfriendly manner to the Germans. Therefore their situation seemed to be acceptable, and there was no considerable number of people who tried to escape to the west, except a rather small number who followed the withdrawing German troops.²³

As long as Sănatescu's government was the supreme authority in the country, the policy towards the Germans was quite moderate. Prominent people were imprisoned, the minority as a whole stood under special observation of the police. This situation changed fundamentally when the Red Army conquered Romania. Now, i.e. from the beginning of September 1944 onwards, the evacuation of the German population from Romania including the pre-1940 regions of northern Siebenbürgen had to be started in order to escape the Soviet troops. Some attacks of newly formed German and Hungarian SS- and Wehrmacht-forces stopped the Soviet advance temporarily, so that a number of Germans managed to be evacuated mainly from the western parts of Banat, Sathmar and northern Siebenbürgen. The evacuation was organized by the leaders of the former "Volksgruppe" and SS units. In some cases, the Ger-

mans were driven out of their villages by force. Anyway, the evacuation was not completed. Between the end of August and the end of October, approximately 100,000 Germans left the places (within today's Romanian borders) where they had been living before and reached German territory. The majority of the Saxons and Suebes stayed where they were.²⁴

In contrast to the resettlement campaign of 1940, which can be regarded as a kind of self-applied ethnic cleansing, the evacuation of 1944, which actually was also organized by German authorities, can be viewed as, in a way, subjective ethnic cleansing. Anticipating their expected expulsion or deportation by the Soviets, the Germans left their homelands in advance. They were motivated to do so, because the Romanian state had put them under a regime of discrimination even before the arrival of the Soviets, although they were Romanian citizens. Since their country, Romania, was now on the side of the Allies, viewing its German minority as hostile, they had to expect the worst.²⁵

And indeed, after the war, under communist rule, the Germans experienced further discrimination and even deportation. However, this was still moderate compared to what happened to German communities in other countries, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia or the newly annexed Polish or Soviet territories. First of all, it is important to state, that ethnic cleansing in the sense of a complete expulsion of all ethnic Germans from Romania was never intended – neither by the Romanian nor by the Soviet government.²⁶ Nevertheless, ethnicity was the basic principle of the measures, which were taken against the Germans during the first years after the war. They affected all Germans regardless of their political orientation – even active communists. The most serious ones of the measures that the Romanian government took under Soviet pressure was the deportation of approximately 100,000 Germans to Soviet labor camps in January 1945. It affected men between 17 and 45 years and women between 18 and 30. Officially it was declared to be a contribution for the reconstruction of the Soviet Union after the war.²⁷ Although this deportation was only temporary and not meant to be a measure of ethnic cleansing, it resulted again in a decrease of the German population in Romania. In 1948/49 most of the deported people were released from the camps, but instead of being sent back to Romania they were sent to Germany. Only about the half of them returned to their homelands, the rest stayed either in Germany or in Austria. Approximately 10,000 died on the trains or in the camps. So, altogether the deportation had resulted in a loss for the German minority in Romania of about 50,000 people.²⁸

In the long run, however, the deprivation of German land property, which was consequently conducted from 1945 onwards, had a deeper impact on the existential foundations of the Germans as a national minority than the deportation, since most of them were peasants.

Although the civil rights of the national minorities in Romania had been approved by the communist government under Prime Minister Groza, until 1949 there was an openly hostile policy against the Germans. Officially, restrictions, such as the deprivation of land property, were applied only to those Germans who had been members of Nazi organizations. However, since in 1940 every "Volksdeutscher" in Romania had been forced to join the "Volksgruppe", practically the German minority as a whole was object of the anti-Nazi policy of the Romanian government.²⁹ In this way they were not only deprived of the traditional basis of their social existence, but also of their existence as a national minority. Now, they had to hand their farms and houses over to Romanians, which meant that the regions of compact German settlement got more and more disintegrated.

Anyway, at the end of the 1940s, the situation of the German minority consolidated, because from now on, i.e. after the implementation of the new socialist constitution in April 1948, the Romanian government started a policy, which was more constructive in the sense of building up, integrating and organizing a socialist society. This program also included the national minorities. The first results concerning the Germans were the organization of state-supported institutional life within the framework of the "German Antifascist Committee for Romania" and the re-opening of German speaking state schools. In general, the institutional and economic as well as the cultural life of the German minority seemed to normalize gradually from the beginning of the 1950s onwards, though under communist auspices. Even political rights, regardless their questionable relevance in a socialist system, were restored for all Germans except for those, who were considered to be of high bourgeois origin.³⁰

Nevertheless, another event occurred, which again affected the foundations of the existence of the German minority: the resettlement campaign of 1951/52. However, this was not an anti-German measure, since people from all nationalities were concerned. It was part of the general collectivization of the national economy. Claiming, that they should support the economic development of poorer regions, members of the "bourgeoisie" from the cities and, additionally, about 40,000 Suebes were sent from the Banat to the Bărăgan Desert in the north-east of Romania. There, the deported people lived a more or less miserable life, first in holes they had to dig themselves, later on in wooden huts. Anyway, by 1955 this resettlement campaign was stopped and they were allowed to return back home. Although it was not an explicit anti-minority measure, the resettlement campaign had serious consequences for German cultural and national life in Romania, since it had destroyed part of its social foundations by deporting people from their traditional land of settlement.³¹

From the middle of the 1950s onwards, however, the Germans in Romania lived under a relative institutional, cultural and economic stability. But it was exactly this time, when their exodus to Germany, i.e. to West-Germany, began on a large scale. Initially, there were only 8,500 applications for exit-visa by Germans, who were able to prove that they had relatives in Germany. But, after all the flights, evacuations, deportations and resettlements, practically every Romania-German had relatives in the west. Since, now, their way of life was totally different from the traditional one they knew from before the Second World War and since they knew about the growing prosperity in West-Germany, more and more of them decided to leave Romania. From 1958 onwards, almost every year several thousands emigrated, and from 1980 onwards, this figure was constantly higher than 10,000. It reached its peak in 1990, after Ceaușescu's end, when more than 111,000 left. All in all, about 300,000 Germans left Romania between 1950 and 1990. Today, some 10,000 still live there.³² The political background of this emigration was the agreement on "Familienzusammenführung" (family reunion) from 1957, which finally turned out to be another, now most likely the last resettlement program for the Romania-Germans.

In contrast to countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, the exodus of the German speaking population from Romania finally turned out to be a long procedure that took decades and is not yet finished. Additionally, it was and is based on bilateral agreements between the two involved states – Romania and Germany. These political foundations are the crucial reason, why today there are practically no controversial discussions in the German public sphere about the fate of Romania's Germans after the Second World War. However, the Romanian Germans, after the serious hardships and discrimination suffered in the immediate post-war years, from the mid 1950s onwards had a relatively good life. In 1971 the Ceaușescu regime even found the courage to apologize for their earlier mistreatment.³³ This and the fact, that Romania has no borders to Germany and that the regions of German settlement have never been German state territory, limit the influence of expulsion debates on the German-Romanian relations. Today, the "Landsmannschaften"³⁴ of the Saxons and Suebes do not have any significant weight within the public discourse.³⁵

¹ W. Oschlies, *Rumäniendeutsches Schicksal. Wo Deutsch zur Sprache der Grabsteine wird...*, (Cologne, Vienna, 1988), pp. 186-98.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 74-82.

³ M. Barcan and A. Millitz, *Die deutsche Nationalität in Rumänien*, (Bucharest 1977), pp. 45-9. See also M. Annabring, *Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Rumänien*, (Neuhausen 1956), pp. 3-9.

⁴ Bundesministerium für Vertriebenenfragen (BMV, ed.): *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Rumänien*, (Berlin 1957), pp. 3E-13E. See also Barcan, op.cit., pp. 7-45 and H. Chmelewski, *Die Situation der deutschen und jüdischen Minderheit in Rumänien zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (1919-1939)*, (Munich, 1978), pp. 1-8.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ BMV: pp. 27E-40E. See also Chmelewski, op.cit., pp. 18-24, 158-75.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ J. Böhm, *Die Deutschen in Rumänien und das Dritte Reich*, (Frankfurt on Main, 1999), pp. 147-60.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Oschlies, p. 69.

¹³ BMV: p. 41E.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 42E-47E. See also Annabring, op.cit., pp. 55-62.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ BMV: pp. 47E-49E.

¹⁷ BMV: p. 51E.

¹⁸ BMV: pp. 51E-58E.

¹⁹ "Organisation Todt" was responsible for infrastructure construct with military relevance, such as e.g. the highways ("Autobahnen") or defence fortifications (e.g. the "Westwall"). It was headed by Fritz Todt, minister of armament. After his death in 1942, Albert Speer became its head.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² BMV: pp. 59E-64E. See also Annabring, op.cit., p. 61f and Oschlies, op.cit., pp. 69-82.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ BMV: pp. 64E-75E.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Oschlies, op.cit., p. 74.

²⁷ BMV: pp. 75E-80E.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 85E-91E.

³⁰ Ibid., pp 100E-106E. See also Oshlies, op.cit., pp. 121-5.

³¹ Oshlies: pp. 88-95. See also BMV: pp. 110E-114E.

³² Oshlies: pp. 156-73.

³³ Ibid., p.160.

³⁴ Sub-organizations within the Association of Expelled Germans according to the regions of origin, e.g. Siebenbürgen, Banath, Silesia, East Prussia.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

The Expulsion of the German Speakers from the Baltic Countries

Tillmann Tegeler

At the beginning of the 13th century Germans started to settle in the Baltic area: merchants went there in search of new markets, while priests and monks went to convert the pagan Baltic tribes to Christianity. The final victory over the Lithuanians saw the rise of a new power in this region: the Teutonic Order. From those times onwards Germans held a dominant position in Baltic society, as knights and aristocrats, merchants and clergymen. In addition Germans played a prominent role in the life of the University of Dorpat (today's Tartu), the scientific centre of the Baltic region. After the third Polish partition in 1795, when the Baltic states became part of the Russian Empire, the Germans lost their power and influence. This was further compounded by the growing policy of Russification in the second half of the 19th century.

Nevertheless, the German Balts were proverbial for their loyalty to the Russian tsar. This came to an end with the First World War when the Germans were suspected of supporting the Kaiser's army. Amongst the Germans there a widespread hope that the German army would occupy the Baltic provinces and unite the whole area into one Baltic state. But in the former Russian territories of the Baltic littoral amongst the native inhabitants there was a growing will for independence, sometimes even sympathy with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The hopes of the Baltic German foundered with the defeat of the German army. It was the beginning of the Wilsonian inter-war Europe: the rebirth of the small nations' states.

Estonia and Latvia gained their independence in 1918, but they still had to fight for their freedom from the Bolshevik danger in the East. After their victory in Russia the Bolsheviks sought to restore the territory of the Russian Empire by expanding to the Baltic Sea. But, with the support of the German dominated *Baltische Landeswehr* (Baltic national defence), Estonia and Latvia repelled the Soviet Russian aggression, so that an armistice was signed and bourgeois governments were formed.

In order to avert the danger of peasant revolution the young states passed sweeping land reform measures. The biggest landowners, principally the German knights, were the main victims. By 1934 they had lost more than 97 per cent of the land which they had owned in

Latvia, and more than 98 per cent in Estonia. This was in part a direct result of the legislation enacted, but also a result of the voluntary departure of a large number of Germans from the Baltic states, prompted by the legislation. So the German presence in the economic life of these countries was sharply diminished.

While at the beginning of the twentieth century the community of Germans in Estonia and Latvia numbered about 180,000 persons, this never amounted to more than 10 per cent of the inhabitants. About 75,000 Germans remained in Estonia and Latvia in the 1930s, which meant 1.5 per cent of the Estonian and 3.5 per cent of the Latvian population.¹ Those who remained were concentrated mainly in the urban centres, especially in the big cities of Tallinn, Tartu and Riga.

In Latvia the Germans were represented in the national parliaments in accordance with weighting within the population, and in 1928/29 a German even became Minister of Justice. In Estonia, where there were fewer Germans, they had their own MPs. But they didn't have real influence in politics. This was one reason why young Germans in particular left their Baltic homes. The remaining tried to create for themselves a degree of a cultural autonomy by building up organizations like the *Kulturverwaltung* in Estonia and the *Volksgemeinschaft* in Latvia.² While the *Kulturverwaltung* was the result of a law which gave power to the minorities, the Germans on their own initiative created the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The situation of the Germans in Lithuania differed in important respects to those in Estonia and Latvia. During the inter-war period there were only about 30,000 Germans living in Lithuania, and the authorities tried to minimize the number of Germans in the census.³ They never played such a significant role, like their compatriots in the other Baltic states, because they were artisans and peasants. In the cities there was a small class of German merchants, but the majority of the Germans lived in the countryside.

Following the incorporation of the Memelland in 1923, where many Germans and Germanized Lithuanians lived, the pressure to assimilate increased. There was no educational institute for German teachers, so that 60 to 70 per cent of German children couldn't go to school. As a result illiteracy among the Germans increased. Even the *Kulturverband*, which became the most important German minority's organization as the German political party

failed in the elections, couldn't prevent a deterioration in the standard of the Germans' education.⁴

In the 1930s, like in most European countries, authoritarian regimes were established in the Baltic states. This wrecked the efforts of the Baltic Germans to participate in the political life of their home. Nationalists came to dominate the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia. Finally the presidents of Estonia and Latvia decided on a coup d'état as did their colleague in Lithuania. In Latvia nationalists fought bitterly against the Germans and sometimes also against the Jewish minority. Churches were Latvianized, the use of the German language was forbidden in some scientific areas and attempts were made to hinder Germans in business and administration.

After Hitler became *Reichskanzler* in 1933, national-socialist ideology gained more and more adherents among the Baltic Germans. National-socialist organizations were founded and the relations between Baltic Germans and the NSDP party in Germany grew. In 1936 the NSDP in the German *Reich* founded the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (VoMi)⁵ to co-ordinate "all activities related to the *Volksdeutsche*"⁶ (ethnic Germans not living in Germany). The *VoMi* tried to influence the German Balts. So national-socialist influence on the development of the Baltic German policy increased. The attempts to place national-socialists at the head of the minorities' organizations succeeded. This served to fuel Estonian and Latvian mistrust of the German Balts.

The territorial claims of Hitler's government, especially his claim of the Memelland for the Third Reich, posed a direct danger to Lithuania's borders. As in the other Baltic states the new ideology from Germany became popular – especially among the young. In March 1939 the *Kulturverband* declared its support for national-socialism; the same month the Memelland became part of Germany again. Now the threat for the Baltic states became obvious.

In Moscow the German foreign minister Ribbentrop and Soviet foreign minister Molotov signed the so-called Nazi-Soviet pact on the 23rd August 1939, whose secret supplementary protocols included the division of the Baltic states into a Soviet and a German sphere of interest. Expecting an invasion of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union Erhard Kroeger, a German Baltic leader of the Nazis, who dominated the *Volksgemeinschaft* in Latvia, advanced a proposal for the evacuation of the German population. So on the 28th September – the

Second World War had already started – the Soviet Union and Germany added a so-called “confidential record” about the resettlement of the Germans from the Baltic states.⁷ On the 5th October the German legates to Tallinn and Riga told the Estonian and Latvian governments that the Germans who were settled in their states were now under the protection of the Third Reich. One day later Hitler announced in the *Reichstag* the “rearrangement of the ethnographic conditions in Eastern Europe” and declared his will to resettle the Germans from the Baltic states. The organisation of this undertaking was assigned to *VoMi* in Posen, headed by the Baltic German Kroeger, which was given responsibility for the resettlement of the Germans from abroad and was

Initially the reaction to Hitler’s announcement was one of shock. But for fear of the Red Army in the end the Baltic Germans followed the appeal of the *Führer*. The onset of the Russo-Finnish War in November 1939 heightened anxieties. They regarded the resettlement as an order either of Hitler, when they were national-socialist, or of the people, when they felt national, or of God, when they were religious. The younger Germans Balts more willingly embraced the idea of going to Germany. Amongst the youth national-socialist ideas were especially popular. The German government signed a treaty of resettlement with Estonia and Latvia, which authorised the emigration of the Germans, on the 15th and 30th of October. These treaties brought to an end 700 years of German history in the Baltic states. This was not only the loss of their homes for the Germans, but also the loss of economic power for the Baltic states. While in the 1930s the Germans of Estonia and Latvia only made about up 2 to 3 per cent of the states’ population, they accounted for 20 per cent of the states’ economic output and capital. To save as much German property as possible a so-called resettlement trust company (*Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft/UTAG*) in Riga and a so-called German trust administration (*Deutsche Treuhand-Verwaltung/DT*) in Tallinn were founded.⁸ On the other hand the cultural heritage of the German Balts was destroyed by the Second World War.

Already on the 6th October 1939, the day of Hitler’s announcement, ships of the German merchant fleet sailed into Tallinn to resettle the Germans from Estonia. Twelve days later the first ship with the first resettlers left the harbour. Their future, as the German government had decided, was to live in the newly created, formerly Polish, provinces now called Warthegau and Danzig-West Prussia. In 1940 66,866 people were resettled in their new homes, of whom 52,498 (78,5 per cent) came from Latvia, and 14,368 from Estonia.⁹ They were compensated

with the property of dispossessed Poles and Jews. This was the second shock for the older people, but blinded by the national-socialist reconstruction of the German economy they didn't fight against the Nazi policy. However, many were surprised that they got more land than they had left behind in the Baltic states. This was the result of Himmler's plan. As the *Reichskommissar für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums* (Reich commissioner for the consolidation of the German tradition) from the 7th October he was responsible for the integration of the resettlers and he made all efforts to create a model country out of the Warthegau. In this region many settlers from all Eastern Europe were to form a new tribe of the German people. Therefore their new villages comprised Germans from different Eastern European countries. As a result the individual countrymen couldn't keep their traditions.

But most of the German Balts because of their high education settled in the cities. Many scientists got jobs at the newly established *Reichsuniversität* in Posen (Poznań). Among the intelligentsia there were also opponents of the Nazi dictatorship. Their reasons for resistance were the anti-religious and anti-humanistic Nazi ideology. Representatives of these were the novelist Werner Bergengruen and the philosopher Hermann Graf Keyserling. Those who have already emigrated from the Baltic states after the First World War tended to be opponents to the new regime. Ironically the main ideologist of the Nazi party was also a German Balt who had emigrated to Germany in 1918: Alfred Rosenberg, who later became *Reichsminister* for the occupied Eastern territories.

When this resettlement was finished with the departure of the last ship from Riga on the 16th of December 1939, there remained some Germans in the Baltic states. Some of them were firm opponents to the Nazis like Paul Schiemann, a journalist and the leader of the German faction in the Latvian parliament *saiema*, who died in Riga in 1944. Plans for the resettlement of the remaining Germans were prepared Thus in spring 1940 another 506 ethnic Germans left Latvia; and about six months later a new big resettlement was organised. At the turn of the year 1940/41 nearly all the remaining Germans were resettled to Germany. This time the negotiations with the authorities on the other side were more difficult. In the summer of 1940 the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic states. And the Soviet regime wasn't interested in losing any of its population.

After a further emigration of 17,000 more Germans from the Estonian and Latvian Soviet Republics, the last chapter of the resettlement of Germans from the Baltic states was opened:

the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania. The Lithuanian Germans were mainly peasants and artisans. They had not fought against the Soviets. They shared much with their Lithuanian, Jewish and Polish neighbours. So there was no reason to flee from the Soviet occupiers. On the 10th January 1941 the Soviet Union and Germany signed a treaty concerning an exchange of populations. About 20,000 Lithuanians, Russians and Belorussians from the Memelland and the German occupied, formerly Polish Suwałki territory were resettled to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic.¹⁰ The resettlement of Germans was organised by a special command that set up its headquarters in Kaunas on the 22nd January. A day later the *Kulturverband*, the German minority's organization in Lithuania, was dissolved. Then the registration of the resettlers began. First it looked very easy to determine who was German and who was not: the Soviets treated all Protestants as Germans. But then more and more Lithuanians tried to get registered as Germans. In many cases these people were successful, because the Germans decided on the resettlement of each applicant, for the reason that the Soviets often couldn't read the German documents.

In contrast to the resettlement in Estonia and Latvia there was no need to convince the Germans in Lithuania to move to Germany, because this time Sovietisation was fully underway. Although the organization *Umsiedlung*, which made the registration, estimated that there were 40,000 Germans to be resettled, the applicants grew to 45,000. Finally there were about 50,000 resettlers.¹¹ In mid-February the resettlement started and on the 24th of this month the first trek crossed the border. When the last German newspaper was shut down, the flow of information ceased. Only on the 22nd March did the last resettlers leave Lithuania, when 34,000 persons by train, 8,000 by lorry and 6,800 by trek moved to their new homes.¹² These went also to the Warthegau, where nearly half of the German Lithuanians were resettled, in Mecklenburg, Danzig-West Prussia, East Prussia and other German lands.

Just three months later, on the 22nd June 1941 Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. This raised hopes amongst the German Balts of returning to their homes, after the *Wehrmacht* had occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. But only Germans from Lithuania, those who hadn't found a new home or job, got the chance to go back. Between the 8th June and the 1st September 1942 about 20,000 Germans returned to Lithuania. The others, especially Germans from Estonia and Latvia, only returned to their abandoned homes as a part of the German occupation regime in these countries. They served as interpreters or officers of the *Wehrmacht*. Experienced in living with other peoples they regarded the war in the east less as

a racist war, as the Nazis did, but more as a war against Bolshevism. They were looking for allies against the Soviets and supported the anti-Bolshevik Russian army of Andrei A. Vlasov.

Many of the native Balts welcomed the German attack on the USSR. They supported the Nazis in their fight against the Soviets in the hope of restoring the independence of their countries and for reversing the policies of Sovietisation imposed by the occupying Soviet authorities. Thousands voluntarily signed up to serve in the police and German army – the Wehrmacht. Among the Balts there existed also a latent anti-Semitism towards the 260,000 Jews – about 5% of the population. The antagonism towards the Jews was intensified as they were seen as having welcomed Soviet rule in the Baltic states. Civil servants in the Baltic region collaborated with the German occupation authorities and handed over Jews for extermination. In the Baltic SS-units¹³, partially consisting of local policemen, there were supporters of the Nazi policy, and others played an active part in the Holocaust. In Lithuania prior to the German occupation, and immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, local partisans launched a vicious campaign against the Jews.¹⁴ The history of this epoch remains extremely contentious.¹⁵

The return of Germans to the Baltic states lasted, however, only two years, until the advance of the Red Army in 1944. Now the German Balts shared the fate of the other Germans: their expulsion from their homes east of the Oder. There were last efforts of resistance against the Soviets like the *Posener Volkssturm*, but they all were futile. Most of the refugees fled on foot to Germany, but some took ships like the “Wilhelm Gustloff”, which was sunk by a Soviet submarine with the loss of more than 9,000 lives.

While the great majority of the German Balts found new homes in West Germany, 11,000 to 12,000 persons settled down in the Soviet occupied zone.¹⁶ When in 1949 the ban for expellees and refugees to form associations was abolished, organizations were founded in the Western German lands. One year later the federal “*Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft im Bundesgebiet*” (Community of German Balt countrymen in West Germany) was founded. But unlike other expellees’ organizations the German Balts never made any territorial claims.

In conclusion one can not talk about expulsion in the case of the German Balts. Of course they also fled to Western Germany from the east, but they had already lost their homes before the Second World War. This loss wasn’t first and foremost caused by the fear of the Red

Army, but by the ideological fanaticism of the Nazis. They wanted the German Balts to colonize the occupied formerly Polish territories. Therefore they evacuated the Germans out of the Baltic states. A similar policy was applied with the German population in Romania, and with part of the German population in Yugoslavia (see chapters by Wien, Sretenovic and Pauser) So the Nazis were responsible in a more direct way for the loss of the German Balts' home than was the case with the other expellees. The German Balts at the end did not come to Germany as expellees from the Baltic states, but from Polish and formerly German territories.

¹ Jürgen von Hehn, *Die Umsiedlung der baltischen Deutschen – das letzte Kapitel baltisch-deutscher Geschichte*, (Marburg, 1982). (Marburger Ostforschungen; 40), pp. 15-18.

² Ibid., pp., 12-13.

³ Harry Stossun, *Die Umsiedlungen der Deutschen aus Litauen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Untersuchungen zum Schicksal einer deutschen Volksgruppe im Osten*, (Marburg 1993). (Historische und landeskundliche Ostmitteleuropa-Studien; 12), p.11.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-12.

⁵ The VoMi was an authority under the rule of Himmler's SS; see Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German national minorities of Europe, 1939-1945*. (Chapel Hill, 1993).

⁶ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷ Sources for the whole event of the resettlement of the Germans from Estonia and Latvia are reprinted in: Dietrich A. Loeber, *Diktierter Option. Die Umsiedlung der Deutsch-Balten aus Estland und Lettland 1939-1941*. (Neumünster, 1972). (Skandinavien- und Ostseeraumforschung).

⁸ von Hehn, op.cit., p. 139.

⁹ Wilfried Schlau (ed.), *Die Deutschbalten*, (Munich, 2001), p. 91.

¹⁰ Stossun, op.cit., p. 69.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 85.

¹² Ibid., p. 106.

¹³ In Estonia and Latvia SS-Units, so-called legions, were created by the Germans. In the *Lettische Legion* (Latvian Legion) served 80,000 Latvians, while the auxiliary forces consisted of 30,000 policemen. See Rolf Michaelis, *Esten in der Waffen-SS. Die 20. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (estnische Nr. 1)*. (Berlin 2000) and Heinrich Sturm, *Die Lettische Legion – ein Politikum. Zum Inhalt des Diskurses über lettische SS- und Polizeiverbände*, (Berlin 2001). (BIAB-Berichte; 21).

¹⁴ Alex Faitelson, *Heroism and bravery in Lithuania, 1941-1945*. (Jerusalem 1996), pp. 21-23, and Zwi Katz, *Von den Ufern der Memel ins Ungewisse. Eine Jugend im Schatten des Holocaust*. (Zurich 2002), pp. 60-73.

¹⁵ A lecture by the former Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs and EU-commissioner designate, Sandra Kalniete, at the Leipzig Book Fair on 24. March 2004 caused a scandal, when she compared the German and the Soviet dictatorship by saying "that the two totalitarian regimes – Nazism and Communism – were equally criminal." (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* 31. March 2004, p. 13). The vice-president of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, Salomon Korn, criticised the conflation of Soviet mass repression and Nazi genocide.

¹⁶ Exact numbers are difficult to find in the literature. The estimated number of Wilfried Schlau (ed.), *Die Deutschbalten* (p. 121) of 42,000 German Balts living in West and 10,200 in East Germany seems to be

understated and refer to 1962. Harry Stossun, *Die Umsiedlungen der Deutschen aus Litauen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (p. 106) counts 50,000 resettlers from Lithuania, and Jürgen von Hehn, *Die Umsiedlung der baltischen Deutschen* (p. 18) counts about 75,000 Germans living in Estonia and Latvia before resettlement. Thus the number of German Balts in West and East Germany must be bigger than Schlau's estimate of 52,200.

School History Textbooks and Forced Population Displacements in Europe **after the Second World War**

Luigi Cajani

Introduction

The forced transfers of entire populations after the both World Wars, in particular after the Second, are fundamental events in the recent past of the European continent. Changing the demographic face of whole regions and destroying multicultural societies that had existed for centuries, they put into practice the 19th century's invention of the model ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation-state. The following chapter investigates the ways in which the question of forced transfers is treated in the history school textbooks of three European countries: Italy and Germany (both involved in the forced transfers after the Second World War), and France. In the conclusion some American schoolbooks will be examined.

History schoolbooks are of particular interest for understanding the social perception of a historical phenomenon because history teaching provides the principal connection between historical research and mass culture. Not by chance, history schoolbooks often cause cultural policy polemics. This analysis focuses on the following elements: 1. Do schoolbooks discuss the topic or not? 2. Do they concentrate on one aspect only, or do they treat the phenomenon on a European or even global scale? 3. Is the subject raised only in the connection with the Second World War, or is it presented as a problem that already arose during the First World War and eventually linked to war in the Balkans in the 1990s? 4. Do schoolbook accounts mix up the different phenomena of migration, expulsion and deportation, or distinguish them with accuracy, and how much attention is given to statistics?

Italy

The subject of forced transfer is treated in nearly every Italian history schoolbook for the “scuola media” (lower secondary school) level.¹ However, this treatment is not always satisfactory. In *La storia e noi*, for example, one finds a clear connection between the dimensions of the new nation-states after the First World War and the first population displacements. The topic is reinforced in later discussion of events after the Second World War. Referring to the First World War:

New independent states ascended from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the reduction of German and Russian territories: Nevertheless, the existence of different nationalities inside of these countries [...] caused additional tensions across the continent. There were, for example, the cases of Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, the people of Montenegro, Bosnians etc. lived together, or Czechoslovakia, divided between Czechs and Slovaks. Numerous refugees (especially Germans and Hungarians) found themselves forced to leave their places of residence and emigrate to their country of origin.²

The topic is taken up again under the title “un mondo da ricostruire” (a world to reconstruct) regarding the consequences of the Second World War:

The altering of borders produced [...] another serious problem: the displacement of millions of refugees (especially Germans, Italians, Russians and Poles) who had to leave the territories occupied by their “native” country during the war, and were now obliged to settle within the territories established by the peace conferences. The abandoned regions were taken over by populations to whom they were allocated.³

If the aim here is an appreciation of the phenomenon of forced population displacement in a wider European context, this treatment of events after the Second World War is too vague and even misleading. Not only does the quantitative information leave much to be desired, but very different phenomena are placed - and thus confused - on the same level. For example, 12 million German refugees and 350,000 Italians. Furthermore, citizens of the Soviet Union settled in formerly Polish regions, annexed by the USSR, are found in the same category as the expelled. And, above all, the formulation of the sentence invites a wrong assumption that the refugees were merely returning from areas they had occupied only during the war, while actually they had lived there for centuries.

One finds a similar error in *Storia. Il mondo, popoli, culture, relazioni*: In a historical map the movements of the expellees are listed together with those of guest workers from Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Spain moving to the industrialized areas of Europe during the '50s.⁴ This compilation is wholly senseless, as the two phenomena are completely different both in terms of causes and conditions.

The same textbook again takes up the topic in discussing the consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall. With much more precision, it returns to the difficulties of nationalities after the First World War:

The outbreak of ethnic conflicts followed from an unresolved issue left open in the years 1918-1921. It was in fact after the First World War that the multiethnic states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were born from the collapse of the Ottoman and Austrian empires.

While, by force, the Soviet Union imposed the cohabitation of different ethnic groups within some of its republics – especially in central Asia.⁵

The most detailed information concerning the period after the First World War is provided by Londrillo's textbook:

The erection of new national borders also caused vast migrations of populations from one European region to another, especially where these borders included strong minorities within the new states. In this way more than 700,000 Germans left Bohemia, the Rhineland and western Poland, while Hungary had to accommodate 400,000 Hungarians from bordering regions of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. From Russia circa 200,000 Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians moved to the new Baltic republics. To these one must add the one million Russian emigrants to the West who left following the Bolshevik revolution. Between Turkey and Greece, similarly, an exchange of 430,000 Turks and 1,350,000 Greeks took place after the laying down of new borders.⁶

The issue is addressed in the context of the consequences of the Second World War. A historical map shows the displacement of the German, Russian, Polish and Baltic populations, illustrating by arrows the direction of their movements and the numbers of people concerned. The text, further, explains:

These [...] territorial changes provoked the displacement of about 30 million Europeans from one area of the continent to another in the postwar years – in particular Germans, Russians and Poles. Around 10 million Germans who had settled in the eastern regions occupied by Nazi troops were driven out and sent back to Germany. Around 3 million Russians moved into the eastern territories, recently joined to the USSR, and the same number of Poles returned home. To these numbers one must add the 12 million refugees, interned and deported by the army of the Reich, who were slowly returned to their homes by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.⁷

Here too one sees the same striking mistake as in *La storia e noi* concerning German settlement in the East, and the equally incorrect assertion that all the migrant Poles were returning “home” - although they had been expelled from their ancient homeland by the USSR. Generally speaking, the textbook does not make sufficiently clear the enormous significance for the European continent of this radical demographic change.

In comparison, the textbook by Paolucci and Signorini is much better. The authors provide a map and an excellent explanation:

Thus millions of Germans left Eastern Prussia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, sometimes on their own initiative, sometimes by compulsion. Millions of Poles left the regions passed over to the USSR. From the Baltic countries, which had lost their independence, thousands of

people also left. And many Italians departed from Istria, signed over to Yugoslavia, and the lost colonies. Among Jews who had survived the persecution many emigrated to Israel, which was created in 1948. When all these displacements were complete nearly 25 million people had left their homelands.⁸

The textbooks for upper secondary schools are rather disappointing, in comparison to those for the lower secondary school. The textbooks by Gaeta, Villani and Petraccone,⁹ as well as those by Camera and Fabietti,¹⁰ by Vivanti¹¹ and by Sabbatucci¹² completely ignore the phenomena. Villari treats the subject very superficially, omitting even the case of the ethnic Germans.¹³ De Rosa mentions the ethnic Germans, but in such a confusing way that it is not clear whose victims they were, or why:

Unfortunately, after the fall of Hitler's Germany, the sufferings of the Germans continued. Between 1944 and 1949 more than 16 million Germans were swept away by this tragedy: at least 2,500,000 died due to hunger, exhaustion, violence, deportation, and execution. Those who survived, more than 10 million, escaped partially into the Germany of Bonn, and partially to Eastern Germany and Austria.¹⁴

Desideri limits himself to mention the displacement of Germans. He further emphasizes the positive economic effects on the Western German economy, which by this means acquired cheap manpower for its reconstruction.¹⁵

It is striking that the question of enormous population displacement is absent from most upper secondary school textbooks but is discussed by those for the "scuole medie". The more frequent revision of secondary school textbooks may provide an explanation.

Federal Republic of Germany

In all textbooks used in the Federal Republic of Germany the expulsion of ethnic Germans naturally has a central place. Nevertheless, one may remark a difference between some who emphasize the causes of German expulsions, that is to say the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe, and those who principally picture the Germans as victims.

The *Geschichtsbuch*, by the publishing house Cornelsen, treats the topic carefully, but neglects the issue of casualties:

Ahead of the advancing Soviet troops millions of people escaped from the Eastern German territories. Women and children especially now suffered revenge for the cruelty of German occupation policies in Poland and the Soviet Union, trying to preserve their families and their last belongings in endless treks towards the west. With high casualties, the navy evacuated

nearly 2 million men and women from the Eastern Prussian ports to Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark.¹⁶

Among the documents contained in the *Geschichtsbuch* there are two maps illustrating the deportation of the Poles and the Germans. These maps are followed by two exercises asking the reader to reflect on the causes and consequences of deportation, flight and expulsion. In order to encourage this, the reader is presented with an extract from a speech by the former German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, following the German-Polish agreement of 20th November 1970:

He who has lost relatives, who was deprived of his home, will hardly forget. We others must have sympathy and respect for this burden, which is carried by us all. Nevertheless, I must ask at this hour that my expelled compatriots not to persist in bitterness, but to look to the future.¹⁷

Quotation of Brandt's speech indicates the preferred interpretation offered by the textbook regarding the problem of expellees: Recognition of their suffering, but no recrimination. Moreover, as the textbook reminds us, the Soviet crime had been preceded by those committed by German troops in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

A completely different approach is taken by the textbook *Geschichte und Geschehen*, published by Ernst Klett. In addition to conceding the topic ample space, it speaks explicitly about "crimes" committed against Germans. And further, the crimes against Germans are treated as equivalent to those committed by the Germans and punished in the Nuremberg trials:

That many crimes committed against Germans were not similarly judged, offended the sense of right and wrong of many, particularly as millions of Germans suffered acts of violence in turn during the expulsion from the east.¹⁸

The textbook *Fragen an die Geschichte* gives the topic most space, discussing it in the larger European context. This textbook has an unusual structure, consisting almost exclusively of source material. One finds detailed maps of population displacements in Europe between 1939 and 1952, the final text of the Potsdam conference and the Adenauer speech of 20th of August 1949 surveying conditions in Germany.¹⁹ Special attention is paid to the associations formed by the expelled. In particular, mention is necessary of the extensive

excerpt from the Charter of the Expellees (1950), in which displaced ethnic Germans renounced all intention of seeking retribution in memory of the pain caused by Germany to other nations, as well as the reconciliation declaration of 1997. *Fragen an die Geschichte* is a very balanced and didactically useful textbook for the consolidation of knowledge and a source-based discussion.

France

The French textbook *La guerre des mondes: 1939 à nos jours* notably sets out strong theoretical bases, but lacks quantification of both the overall phenomenon and the specific population displacements of central-Eastern Europe:

These territorial changes sought to achieve a balance between the political and the national maps (of Europe), a difference that had caused trouble and conflict for a century. Population displacements were carried out until 1952. Additionally, there were massive deportations and transplantations by the Soviet government within its own territory of “allogène” nationalities (Balts, Germans from the Volga, Cossacks and Tartars), especially in the newly acquired and re-conquered regions. Parallel to this huge forced migration of the people from central Europe was the exodus of Jews to Palestine. The global scale of the question of displaced persons led the UN to create the office of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the forerunner of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (H.C.R.)²⁰

In the general panorama the textbook *Histoire. Le monde de 1939 à nos jours* stands out for the quality of its information as well as for its global approach. However, precise quantitative data again are missing in this case, which is especially incomprehensible given the context.

In Europe the end of war was accompanied by massive migrations. Millions of frightened civilians fled from central Europe to seek refuge in the west from the Red Army. Millions of Germans were driven out of Poland, Prussia, Silesia and the Sudetenland, having to adapt to life in the destroyed Germany of 1945. Altogether, 12 million people poured westwards.

Poles coming from the regions assimilated by the Soviet Union accommodated themselves in territories taken away from Germany. In the Soviet occupied part of Germany rigid measures of de-nazification and the first laws on nationalization caused numerous members of the middle classes to escape to the west. These population displacements caused all kinds of problems: How to ensure the food supply, the accommodation and the employment of these newcomers? Many migrants lived under precarious conditions in

emergency accommodation while waiting for a decision on their destiny. Their presence ensured to western Germany, especially, the availability of cheap and numerous labour force, the base for a fast recovery.

To this picture of Europe's fate, the textbook add a good and unusual information on mass population displacements in Asia: Japanese coming back home, Pakistani and Indians refugees after the independence. And it concludes:

“Never in history humankind experienced such huge migrations in such a short laps of time”²¹

United States of America

The way in which the textbook *The Earth and its Peoples*, edited by the publishing house Houghton Mifflin, approaches the topic is wholly unsatisfactory.

Many parts of the world were flooded with refugees. Some 90 million Chinese fled the Japanese advance. In Europe millions fled from the Nazis or the Red Army or were herded back and forth, on government orders. Many refugees never returned their homes, creating new ethnic mixtures more reminiscent of the New World than of the Old.²²

Also too superficial is Anthony Eslers' *The Human Venture. A World History: from Prehistory to the Present*, which mentions the fate of the German minority indirectly and confusingly:

The territorial rearrangements that followed World War II were less complicated than those after World War I, but the dislocation of populations was much greater. [...] World War II generated as many as 25 million refugees, perhaps half of them expelled from the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe. Resettlement was undertaken by the victorious Allies through displaced-persons camps and through an International Refugee Organization. Frequently, however, the refugees themselves settled things with their feet, spreading outward in a greater postwar diaspora to West Germany and Britain, the United States, the Commonwealth countries, Latin America, and Palestine.²³

More acceptable is treatment of the issue in *Traditions and Encounters*, by Bentley and Ziegler. Despite a certain confusion again regarding the quantitative level the authors underline the importance of the phenomena at a human level:

At the end of the war in Europe, eight million Germans fled across the Elbe River to surrender or to seek refuge in the territories soon occupied by Great Britain and the United States. They wanted to avoid capture and presumed torture by the Red Army and the Soviet occupiers. The behavior of Soviet troops, who pillaged and raped with abandon in Berlin, did little to alleviate the fears of those facing Soviet occupation. Joining the refugees were twelve million German and Soviet Prisoners of war making their way home, along with the survivors of the work and death camps and three million refugees from the Balkan lands. This massive population shift put a human face on the political transformations taking place in Europe and around the world.²⁴

Conclusion

Most of the analyzed textbooks fail to meet the requirements of a basic information concerning an historical fact which deserves a particular attention not only for its importance in the past, but also for its present dimension, on one hand because the memory of the violence in the recent past still has an impact in the public political debate, as we can observe for instance in Italy concerning the postwar refugees from Istria and Dalmatia, and on the other hand because the problem of refugees has dramatic dimension in many parts of the world. It would be advisable that school deal with this problem as a whole, giving a multi-perspective and complete reconstruction of what happened in the past, and not only on the European, but on the World level, and connecting this experience with the present situation, also giving an account of the juridical questions and of the engagement on the international organizations.

¹ It is absent, however, from one of the most recent: Alberto De Benardi, *Il racconto delle grandi trasformazioni. Vol. 3a. Le guerre mondiali e i totalitarismi; Vol. 3b. Il mondo bipolare e il mondo globale*, (Milan, 2001).

² Renato Bordone (editor.), *La storia e noi. Vol. 3. Il Novecento*, (Turin, 1997), p. 147.

³ Ibid, p. 211.

⁴ Marcello Flores, (con la collaborazione di Giampaolo Calchi Novati, Amos Luzzato, Italo Rosato, Bianca Maria Scarcia-Amoretti, Alessandra Aretini), *Storia. Il mondo, popoli, culture relazioni. Vol. 3. La società contemporanea dalla metà dell'Ottocento agli scenari del presente*, (Milan, 1994), p. 261.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Antonio Londrillo, *Viaggio nella Storia, Vol. 5. Il Novecento*, (Milan, 1997), p. 311.

⁷ Ibid, p. 393.

⁸ Rosario Villari, *Storia contemporanea*, (Bari, 1985), p. 575.

⁹ Franco Gaeta, Pasquale Villani, Caudia Petraccone, *Storia contemporanea*, (Milan, 1993).

¹⁰ Augusto Camera, Renato Fabietti, *L'età contemporanea*, (Bologna, 1987); Augusto Camera, Renato Fabietti, *Elementi di storia. XX secolo*, (Bologna, 1999).

¹¹ Corrado Vivanti, *Età contemporanea*, (Casale Monferrato, 1988).

¹² Giovanni Sabatucci, *Manuale di storia. 3. L'età contemporanea*, (Bari, 1988); Giovanni Sabatucci, *Storia, documenti, storiografia. 3. Il mondo contemporaneo*, (Bari, 1994).

¹³ Rosario Villari, *Storia contemporanea*, (Bari, 1985), p. 575.

¹⁴ Gabriele De Rosa, *Il Novecento*, (Milan, 1997), p. 262.

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