PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONSORTIUM
OF DEFENSE ACADEMIES
AND SECURITY STUDIES INSTITUTES
Working Group on Military History

Third International Seminar

Prague, Czech Republic
7-11 April 2003.

Organized by;
Czech Republic Military History Institute

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungamt,
Germany

2003 Conference Comments and Papers

"NATO and Warsaw Pact – The Formative Years 1948-1968,"

The members of The Military History Working Group would like to thank the Partnership for Peace Consortium for Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes for sponsoring the meeting of the Third Annual Military History Working Group Symposium held in Prague, Czech Republic. There, military historians from many nations met to share ideas and to gain an appreciation of differences in national perspectives with respect to them. We are extraordinarily pleased with both the intellectual depth and diversity of the papers presented, and we believe the reader will similarly enjoy the papers from that conference. Mutual understanding is the first step toward friendship.

1. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes' Military History Working Group's (MHWG) third international seminar, "NATO and Warsaw Pact – The Formative Years 1948-1968," in Prague, Czech Republic, 7-11 April. was co-chaired by the Czech Republic Military History Institute and the German Military History Institute .

2. The Partnership for Peace Consortium Program (PfP) provides the umbrella organization under which the Military History Working Group is organized. The Consortium provides a conference framework and some limited funds for Central and Eastern European nations (non-NATO) to attend. In addition, PfPC provides translation in English and Russian and publications support for the group.

3. In April 2000 representatives of the newly formed "Military History Working Group" (MHWG) met at the Marshall Center to draw up a working group charter and establish goals. The first conference was held in April 2001 in Bucharest, Romania with the United States Center of Military History and the Romanian Center of Military History co-hosting this first event in which 12 national official military history offices of the different countries met to present papers on the Cold War. The second conference was held in March 2002 in Sofia, Bulgaria with the French Army and Gendarmerie History Offices and the Bulgarian G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College. Forty-nine attendees from 11 national official military history organizations and one outside agency met in Sofia, Bulgaria: the United States, France, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey.

4. In 2003, forty-nine people from 13 national official military history organizations met in Prague, Czech Republic: the United States, Russia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Nineteen seminar papers were presented. The Czechs and Germans were perfect hosts and had very professionally organized the academic conference; and the Czechs also were generous in providing cultural tours to their National Military Museum, Air Force Museum, Military Technical Museum, and other points of interest. The Chief of Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic Lieutenant General Pavel Štefca hosted the farewell cocktail, and presented the Cross of Merit of the Minster of Defence (third class) to Colonel Hans-Joachim Harder and Brigadier General John S. Brown (not present).

5. The Partnership for Peace Consortium provided interpretation and meal/lodging/travel funding for the Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians, Russians, Slovakians and Slovenians. Finally, the Consortium will publish the conference papers in the presented languages, as they will for last year's conference.

6. The conference thematics focused on the formative years of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, generating a wide variety of papers produced by authors whom, for the most part, had lived through the events being discussed. It was interesting to note that 1951-52 seemed to emerge as the period marking the height of the mutual distrust and fear separating the Eastern Bloc and NATO. The United States was concerned that the Russians would invade Western Europe while they were mired in a protracted conflict in Korea. Conversely, the Soviets were aghast at the defeat of their North Korean allies and determined to rebuild their own conventional capabilities

as a result of American battlefield successes. Both sides seemingly viewed the other as "eight feet tall", exaggerating their opponent's capabilities and minimizing their own strengths. A common thread emerged as historians from the former Eastern Bloc nations told of their government's reticence to comply with unilateral economic and military directives emanating from Moscow. It was evident that these nations had to be very careful balancing nationalist sensitivities against Russian desires, as witnessed by the Soviet intervention in East Germany and Hungary during the 1950's, as well as Czechoslovakia in 1968. Subtle foot dragging by East European nations, however, did prevent adoption of a unified WP military command structure for almost thirty years. The same is true, to am admittedly lesser extent, of Western governments on the periphery of NATO, especially in the early years before sufficient conventional forces were in position to defend all of the member nations. The monolithic image of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact certainly does not hold up under close scrutiny, something which should not come as a surprise to those following recent events at the United Nations.

7. At the end of the academic session of the seminar, a MHWG "Administrative Session" was held. The MHWG agreed that heads of the military history offices of the United States and Hungary would be the co-chairs of the next seminar (2004) and that Canada and Slovakia the tentative co-chairs for 2005. The 2004 seminar will be held in Budapest, Hungary with the tentative theme "The Interwar Years 1919-1939." The date is tentatively set for April 2004.

8. POC for this report is Dr. Robert Rush, MHWG Coordinator (202) 685-2727, robert.rush@hqda.army.mil.

Prague Conference Comments

OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE
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Lieutenant-Colonel Aleš KNÍŽEK (Czech Republic)Introduction of administrators:
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Captain André RAKOTO. The French representative, Gendarmerie CPT Andre Rakoto, informed the MHWG that their delegation had originally consisted of eight members, but this was reduced to two. The French stated that they would not participate in the MHWG in the future if funding were not available for a French translator.

FIRST WORKING SESSION
Chairman: Dr. Robert S. RUSH (USA)
PhDr. Vladimír PILÁT (Czech Republic): Czechoslovak Military Hospital in Korean War 1952-1953.
Colonel Dr. Oleg BELOSLUDTSEV (Russia): Soviet Military in Korean War 1950-1953.
PhDr. Michal ŠTEFANSKÝ (Slovakia): Cold War and its Consequences in 1952-1953.
The first three presentations presented a perspective with which the West is only vaguely familiar. Regarding the first two papers, much has been written on the different aspects of the United Nations support of South Korea-these document the support rendered North Korea by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The last tied very nicely the perceptions gained about the Americans in Korea by Stalinist Soviet Union and its satellite states and the military buildup and militarization of economies in Eastern Europe, with a detailed examination of the Czechoslovak Republic response: political, military and economic. "The Cold War was not planned, but it was inevitable as a result of the failure of the Soviets and U.S. to successfully transition from military wartime coalition to peaceful co-existence".

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Chairman: Brigadier General Mihail IONESCU (Romania)
Prof. Jan HOFFENAAR (Netherlands): Will the Netherlands be defended? The problems with the main defence line in Central Sector of NATO at the beginning of the 1950's.
Prof. Ronald G. HAYCOCK (Canada): Voyage from Innocence: Canada and the Early Cold War 1945-1963.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Winfried HEINEMANN (Germany): NATO and the Trieste Crisis.
This panel examined the workings of two of the smaller countries of NATO and the problem with Trieste. The first dealt with NATOs decision to leave the Netherlands outside the final defense zone and its efforts to convince NATO otherwise by building the River Ijssel line. The next paper explained how NATO commitments created the modern Canadian force from a small peace time army relying on militia in wartime to one increasingly larger and more professional, which at the same time separated the Canadian populace from military consciousness. The last paper focused on the Italy, Yugoslavia and the impasse over Trieste. After the flare up of tension between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste, the West made overtures to Tito's Yugoslavia, trying to split it away from being Stalin's satellite; however Tito did not want to join NATO directly or indirectly.

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Dr. Tamas NAGY (Hungary): Hungarian Military Policy 1948-1956.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. István BALLÓ (Hungary): The Hungarian Army during the Cold War Years (1948-1968).
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The third panel dealt with how the satellite nations of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria operated within the Communist block; with each having a different perspective. Closer to NATO countries and bordering Austria, Hungary was closely watched, had no independent military policy, and followed Moscow's lead. Although Romania under the Peace Treaty of 1947 was obligated to allow Soviet troops right to occupation-it developed its form of socialism not through the physical presence of troops of the Soviet Union, but because it "did not want to make the master angry." Bulgaria functioned within the political military doctrine of Soviet Union, but with some latitude as if was far from the borders of Central European NATO countries. Also covered was the organizational and decision making process' evolution within the WP. It was only in 1958 that the Warsaw Pact developed a new nuclear doctrine in which nuclear weapons would be employed against a full range of targets in enemy sector in event of a future war.

FOURTH WORKING SESSION
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While the first two papers focused on the special situation of the city of Berlin, the third dealt with the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The two presentations on Berlin emphasized its strategic importance at the forefront of the Cold War with what happened in Berlin a precursor of things to come. The first considered Berlin the " early warning station for the West," and the second deemed Berlin "the barometer of the climate of the Cold War." The last offered an overview over fifty years of West German foreign and security policy , which for the first twenty years focused exclusively on integration into the Western alliance. It never looked East even when Stalin offered reunification of Germany for the price of neutrality. With the beginning of the Brand era West Germany embarked on a new course stressing cooperation with the Eastern Bloc and offering subtle persuasion and not so sublet economic incentives in its relations with the other German state.

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nations on the periphery of the Warsaw Pact in trying to assert their own national interests and influence the policies of the Soviet dominated military alliance.

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Plenary Session
Col Harder opened the session by passing the co-chair responsibilities to the United States and Hungary, and then questioned whether there would be a conference the next year, because of rumors that he had heard. Dr Rush addressed his concerns and then the concerns over Berlin with the following:
"I have represented the Military History Working Group at the Consortium Secretariat three times since our last meeting in Sofia and wish to render a short report. In the past year there have been some changes within the Consortium, organizationally and administratively. Some of the groups have disappeared while others have merged or been relegated to projects. Additionally, there has been some difficulties between the Consortium and the Marshall Center, however I will not address those internal problems now. I would like to make clear though that some within the leadership of the Marshall Center do not understand the value of the MHWG.
Berlin
This will be a different conference that that of Paris 2002. There will be no working group meetings, and it will be more along a series of sessions conducted by high-level speakers to high-level dignitaries, with attendance by working groups limited to one representative per country represented in the Military Working Group. The Consortium has asked that the MHWG as well as the other groups prepare some type of display presentation for the two-three hours between sessions on the first day. To accomplish this I propose the following: 1) PPT presentation regarding MHWG accomplishments, organization, and metrics of success, 2) Paper copies of conference proceedings for display purposes and in CD form for distribution, 3) Listing of all papers with authors names for the years 2001-2003-all against a backdrop of a map listing the different participating countries and their representative military history offices. (later thought, ask each country to bring one or two of their representative products.) After debate at which there seemed little direction, Dr Rush volunteered his services and those of the Center of Military History to organize such a display, at which time many of the representatives offered their assistance.

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The conferees addressed the subject of the 2004 Conference. Among the topics were: 1) The Interwar Years 1919-1939 2) The Cold War 1969-1989 and 3) Professionalization of the Military. The second subject was rejected because of the 30-year declassification rule in most countries and the decision between the first and third were left to the co-chairs Hungary and the United States. (Later emails between Dr. Rush and Dr. Vezpremy

confirmed the "Professionalization of the military during the 20th Century," which could be looked at in several veins such as from conscription to a long service force; officer education and training; the changes in dynamics between the military and civilian institutions, or doctrine development.
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«Холодная война» и ее последствия для Чехословакии в 1951-1953 гг.

Михал Штефански

«Холодная война» не была запланированной, она была неизбежной. К такому мнению пришли многие историки, анализирующие развитие отношений между США и СССР после второй мировой войны. Незапланированная, но неизбежная «холодная война» вытекала из того, что ни американская ни советская сторона не справилась с переходом от военного периода к мирной жизни. Начиная берлинским кризисом 1948 - 1949 гг в «холодной войне» начали преобладать военные аспекты. Военной силе на обеих сторонах (США и СССР) приписывалась важная роль орудия политики. Милитаризация «холодной войны» еще раз усилилась во время Корейской войны в 1950 - 1953 гг. Армии США и СССР достигли наибольшего количественного уровня от конца второй мировой войны.

Важным фактом милитаризации «холодной войны» было совещение представителей коммунистических партий и министров обороны государств советского блока при участии Й. Сталина и советских генералов, которое проходило 8 января 1951 года в Москве. Темой строго секретного совещания было сообщение Сталина о военно-политических целях советского руководства, новой европейской политике и мерах, касающихся совместного продвижения. На совещаниии были определены точные обязательства, которые взяли на себя государства советского блока в 1951 – 1953 гг. в области строителства армии, оборонной промышленности и в социально-экономической сфере.

За чехословацкую сторону на совещании принимал участие Генеральный секретарь ЦК КПЧ Рудольф Сланский и Министр национальной обороны Алексей Чепичка. О содержании совещания возможно узнать только пользуясь воспоминаниями трех его участников[1], так как аутентичную запись совещания пока не удалось найти. Все участники совещаня говорили о принятых обязательствах – протоколах, которые были подписаны на второй день его работы. Протоколы содержали конкретные данные о количественном возрастании армий, кадровом профиле, вооружении и обучении, а также росте расходов на вооружение. По оценке совещаня его участники расходятся в мнении особенно относительно анализа обстановки этого периода и планах советского руководства, с которыми выступил Й. Сталин и Начальник Генерального Штаба Советской Армии маршал Штеменко. По мнению М. Ракоши Штеменко сообщил, что к концу 1953 года государства НАТО полностью завершат свою военную подготовку. До этого времени должны были сравняться с уровнем НАТО и армии союзников Москвы путем быстрейшей перестройки всего народного хозяйства. Дискуссия развязалась в связи с тем, что некоторые представители государств советского блока считали трехлетний период слишком коротким для того, чтобы достичь уровня подготовленности армий и государств согласно советским представлениям, содержащимися в протоколах. Такое мнение на совещании выссказал польский Министр обороны маршал Рокоссовский. На его выступление реагировал Сталин своим замечанием, что если маршал Рокоссовский может гарантировать, что до 1956 года не будет войны, то возможно будет принять польский план строительства армии. Но правильнее будет принять предложения, с которыми выступил Штеменко.

По словам А. Чепички на совещании Й. Сталин давал оценку ходу Корейской войны, во время которой проявилась военная слабость (не преимущество США), и наоборот, сила социалистических армий. Несмотря на большое количество военной техники, США не достигли решающего успеха. Социалистический лагерь в Европе удерживает за собой преимущество, которое США и его союзники не могут достичь за короткое время. Исходя из данных, касающихся мощи американской армии в Европе, о которых говорил Сталин, было сделано заключение, что военное преимущество советского блока – временное и будет существовать максимально 4 – 5 лет. За это время армии НАТО вооружатся и атомным орудием. Период 4 – 5 лет по словам Сталина возможно будет использовать как благоприятные условия для социалистический перемены Западной Европы. Это мнение Сталина часто упоминается в литературе в подтверждение экспансионистской политики СССР. Сегодня нет возможности подтвердить, что предполагаемая экспансия опиралась на существующие оперативные планы и директивы по ее осуществлению. Я присоединяюсь к мнению, что все это осталось в мире воображений.

Советский генеральный штаб приписывал Чехословакии важное военно-стратегическое значение. Но давая политическую оценку, указывал на то, что Чехословакия является самым слабым звеном социалистического лагеря. Особенно критически он отзывался о кадровой обстановке в чехословацкой армии и о положении в партийном и государственном аппарате. На критику относительно кадровой обстановки в армии позже реагировал К. Готвальд. В письме Сталину в январе 1952 года он давал оценку результатам подготовки военных кадров в офицерских школах и военных училищах наряду с проходящим увольнением старых генералов и офицеров на всех уровнях командования армии.

Важное место в подготовке новых кадров заняло созданное Главное политическое управление.

Заключения секретного московского совещания нашли свое отражение в различных политических решениях Политического секретариата ЦК КПЧ, принимавшего постановления по вопросам вооруженных сил. Самые важные решения, касающиеся армии принимал Министр обороны А. Чепичка без решения правительства, а в некоторых случаях и Политического секретариата ЦК КПЧ, но только после консультаций с Президентом К. Готвальдом. Контроль над армией фактически не осуществлял комитет по вопросам обороны и безопасности чехословацкого парламента. Повышенные требования армии и остальных составных частей вооруженных сил отразились в изменениях пятилетнего плана в 1951 году. «Ускоренная перестройка народного хозяйства», как в словаре того времени обозначалось повышение производства тяжелой промышленности и в его рамках оборонного производства, пользовалось первоочередностью в планировании, производстве, материальных и человеческих ресурсах. Недостаточное количество рабочей силы должно было пополниться за счет ускоренной коллективизации сельского хозяйства. Об этих вопросах говорилось на февральском заседании ЦК КПЧ в 1951 году. Февральское заседание ЦК КПЧ в 1951 году ориентировало народное хозяйство на его милитаризацию с подготовкой к военной экономике.

Составной частью такой ориентации были и новые способы планирования оборонной промышленности, контроля выполнения задач производства и финансового обеспечения. В сентябре 1951 года при Государственном плановом управлении в Праге был создан военно-экономический отдел. Его задачей было разработать кратковременные и перспективные планы оборонной промышленности с правом контроля производства и инвестиций.

Военно-экономический отдел составлял планы согласно требованиям армии и министерств национальной обороны и внутренних дел. Отчеты этого управления согласно особому режиму органов ЦК КПЧ предоставлялись лишь правительству и президенту.[2] Право контроля оборонной промышленности принадлежало совестким военным советникам, число которых в 1951 – 1953 гг. быстро возрастало. Чехословацкие партийные и государственные органы обращались с просьбой направить советских советников по вопросам планирования и оборонных заводов.

Отчеты военно-экономического отдела являются важным источником информаций о расходах на вооружение. Но и они не предоставляют нам точного и исчерпывающего представления о реальных расходах, так как они частичны и подлежали изменениям. На основании одного такого отчета возможно создать представление о расходах на вооружение в 1952 – 1953 гг.[3]

В отчете военно-экономического отдела Государственного планового управления от сентября 1952 года, адресованного Министру обороны А. Чепичке было отмечено, что за 1952 год прямые расходы на вооруженные силы представляли собой 18,8% из общего бюджета государства. В номинальном выражении прямые расходы представляли сумму 68,5 миллиардов Кчс. Вместе с непрямыми расходами Министерства общего машиностроения, химической промышленности, транспорта и связи величина расходов представляла сумму 87,2 миллиарда Кчс. Расходы на оборонную промышленность и материальное обеспечение представляло 39,9 миллиардов и 16,1 миллиарда инвестиций.

В 1953 году запланированные прямые инвестиции должны были достичь размера 104,2 миллиарда Кчс, т.е. на 52 процента больше, чем в 1952 году и с непрямыми расходами в размере 25,7 миллиардов общая сумма на вооруженные силы представляла 129,9 миллиардов Кчс, т.е. 19,1 процента от планированного национального дохода 1953 года. Из бюджетных денег, выделенных на вооруженные силы, расходы на армию представляли 90% от общей суммы, а для Министерства национальной безопасности и Министерства внутренних дел -– гражданскую оборону – 10%[4].

Чехословакия в 1952 – 1953 гг. имела многочисленную армию с запланированным количеством 267 500 военнослужащих. Армия наряду с составными частями государственной безопасности, Управлением Яхимова, Милицией и Гражданской обороной в 1952 году насчитывала около 300 – 370 000 человек., т.е. в общих чертах 10% от всего населения Чехословакии.

Выдвижение на передний план тяжелой промышленности с большими инвестиционными затратами на геологическую разведку, добычу и обогащение низкокачественной железной руды и цветных металлов в Чехословакии было причиной больших проблем в народном хозяйстве. Недостаточное количество сырья, которого недоставало в Чехословакии ограничивало и возможности металлургической и машиностроительной промышленности. Спад чехословацкой оборонной промышленности после второй мировой войны стал причиной недостаточного количества квалифицированных работников. Поэтому боролась с трудностями и оборонная промышленность. Потери появились вследствие производства некачественной и часто ломающейся техники, например, производство и монтаж танков по советской

лицензии. План повысить производство оборонных предприятий на 100 и больше процент втечение короткого периода реально был невозможен. Невыполнение планов и некачественное производство исключительно приписывалось вредительской деятельности противника. Частые репрессии, направленные против руководящих работников в министерствах и на заводах вызывали атмосферу страха в обществе. В саботаже и вредительской деятельности, направленной против строительства тяжелой промышленности и на нарушения экономических связей с СССР, в 1952 году были осуждены и приговорены к высшей мере наказания – смертной казни или долголетнему тюремному заключению авторы первого пятилетнего плана (Л. Фрейка, Р. Марголиус, Й. Франк, Е. Лебл), а в 1954 году следующая группа экономистов, которые в 1950 году готовили чехословацко-советский торговый договор.

По мнению чехословацкого руководства главной причиной невыполнения плана была застарелая организация промышленности и методы управления. Выходом из этой ситуации руководство считало подражание советской модели управления. В июле 1951 года Й. Доланский выступил с предложением по реорганизации чехословацкого народного хозяйства. Согласно проекту было аннулировано Министерство тяжелой промышленности и созданы пять новых министерств. Оборонная промышленность перешла к Министерству общего машиностроения. В рамках каждого министерства образовались отделения безопасности. Надзор структурных подразделений безопасности за работниками министерств, заводов и предприятий стал неотделимой составной частью жизни и был признаком миллитаризации общества.

Ориентация чехословацкого народного хозяйства на быструю перестройку с выведением на передний план тяжелого машиностроения привело в народном хозяйстве к большим потерям вследствие неподготовленности к высоким темпам развития, которые диктовалисть потребностями обороны. Импульс к высокому росту расходов на вооруженные силы был дан совещанием представителей коммунистических партий советского блока со Сталином и советским генеральным штабом. Милитаризация «холодной войны» в 1951 – 1953 гг. проявилась в отрицательных последствиях, влияющих на народное хозяйство и все общество. Многие меры, принятые в 1951 – 1953 гг. свидетельствовали о подготовке к военной экономике. Наследие этого периода не смогли полностью устранить руководящие круги до 1989 года. Особенно это касалось структур чехословацкой промышленности, инвестиций и способов управления народным хозяйством.

Примечания:

1 Оценку совещания дает К. Каплан, исходя из разговоров с А. Чепичкой в 1956 году. Смотри: Каплан К.: Сильные и бессильные, Торонто, 1989 г., стр. 201 – 205; Ракоши М.: Людям свойственно ошибаться. Смотри: Исторический архив, 1997, № 5 – 6, стр. 7 – 8; Bondareçe, E.: Forgein Affairs, 1999, May - June, № 3.

2 Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA) f. 025, zv. 8, a. j. 62.

3 SÚA, f. 100/24, zv. 59, a. j. 917.

4 Там же.

The Problems with the Main Defence Line in the NATO Central Sector at the beginning of the 1950s*

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In August 1952, a shock wave reverberated through the Netherlands. The newspaper headlines were dominated by alarming reports stating that, in the event of a Soviet attack, the Netherlands would be left undefended. Many people were wondering what purpose NATO membership served, if not defence in a potential attack. Questions were asked in parliament and the Dutch government was urged to clarify the situation. The cause of the excitement was an article by Drew Middleton, the widely respected *New York Times* correspondent in Bonn, Germany. He described the growing opposition against the strategic views of a number of unspecified French generals who, Middleton felt, would dominate the future debate on the Allied defence strategy. The French were "interested mainly in the defence of Metropolitan France and the territories in Northern Africa". They were not interested in "holding the Low Countries and northwest Germany".

We have landed in the heart of a major strategic debate in the early 1950s. At the time, the military threat posed by the Soviet Union was perceived to be very real in the West, while the build-up of the NATO forces was nowhere near the stage where the West would be able to withstand a Soviet offensive. The chasm between NATO's actual and desired and indeed, required military capacity was formidable. True, at the beginning of 1952, the Emergency Defence Plan by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) had come into force, but the major Allied countries were nurturing their own concepts and plans regardless.

This paper, I hope, will make clear how and why the Netherlands became caught in the force field of official Allied objectives and plans on the one hand, and the actual, de facto views and opinions that were clearly informed by national interests on the other hand. In the last analysis, it all boiled down to the one question: would the Netherlands be defended and held in the event of a Soviet attack?

* A longer, more detailled and annotated version of this paper will be published shortly.

At first glance, the Dutch security situation at the end of the Second World War looked fairly bright. From the first, the Netherlands had been involved in Western political and military alliances. In 1948, it had ratified the Brussels Treaty, bidding farewell to a long-standing policy of neutrality, which it had maintained for over a century. One year later, the Netherlands became one of the first signatories to the Washington Treaty, which saw the establishment of NATO. In so doing, the main objective of Dutch security policy had been achieved, namely the assurance that the United States had a definite stake in European security. An attack on a single member state would be considered an attack on NATO. This principle instilled a sense of security.

The official NATO defence plans – which, by the way, were mainly discussed behind closed doors – likewise gave rise to optimism. In the medium term, with effect from 1954, a forward defence was to be formed. In the short term, the main defence would be concentrated along the rivers Rhine and IJssel. The Netherlands had strongly urged for the latter part of the defence line to be included in NATO defence plans. The Dutch position was that this defence line was paramount to safeguarding at least the political and economic heart of the country. The British, who for centuries had set great store by holding the Low Countries for the purposes of their own defence, supported the idea of a defence line along the river IJssel. This was shown, among others, by a discussion between Field Marshal Montgomery and the French general De Lattre de Tassigny at the end of 1948 on the "alignment of our defences in Holland". Montgomery stated that "… it was essential to do everything possible to prevent the Russians overrunning Western Holland. (…) To achieve this objective it would be necessary to fight on the IJssel line." De Lattre also recognised that "the IJssel was the most reasonable line of defence", but he had reservations about the viability of this defence line. Montgomery's rejoinder was: "In all circumstances, however, [I] would continue to work on the principle that we should never desert the Dutch."

The Dutch subsequently left no stone unturned in their attempts to make the IJssel line fully acceptable to all Allies. Within two years, true to the best Dutch engineering tradition, they completed a full-scale water defence line. They were capable of inundating large landmasses on either side of the river in a matter of days. To this end, large weirs were to be moved into the rivers Rhine and IJssel. This engineering feat convinced the remaining sceptics among the Allies. The Dutch population, meanwhile, was completely ignorant of the debate on the IJssel line. People who read the papers closely were aware of the existence of the defence line,

while residents of the area who stopped to take a closer look probably guessed that something was being done there that was defence related. Only very few people, however, had detailed information on the exact operation of the water defence line. The construction of the defence line was a highly secret project. The reasons for this secrecy were both military and social. Had it become known that, in the event of a Soviet attack, over 400,000 residents on both sides of the river would have to be evacuated, this would have led to great unrest among the Dutch population.

In those first years, the official operation plans were not overly realistic. Internal, confidential estimates of the Western defensive capability tended to be far more pessimistic. This pessimism was mainly based on the fact that the build-up of the Allied forces, not least among which the Dutch forces, had fallen way behind schedule. The Emergency Defence Plan by General Eisenhower, the then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, became effective on 15 February 1952. This plan stated that the Rhine-IJssel line was of vital importance to the Central Sector and was to be held. The British Chiefs of Staff termed the plan "unrealistic because with the forces available (…) we do not consider that the Rhine Line can be held". The US Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, approved in September 1952, provided for the withdrawal of American troops from the river Rhine to the Pyrenees. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated this plan with General Eisenhower personally. His NATO staff was not informed, only the British were. Both the Americans and the British recognised that General Eisenhower, for political reasons, was forced to take the Continental Strategy as his sole and exclusive starting point in respect of NATO planning. This meant the defence of the Rhine and IJssel line. Any hint of a further withdrawal of troops or any suggestion of a "Peripheral Strategy" in itself would be non-negotiable for the continental European member states. It would shatter Western cohesion and ultimately play into Stalin's hands.

In other words, the situation with respect to Allied planning was anything but straightforward. Although the continental European member states were not aware of the details of the situation, they realised that implementation of the official operation plans depended on the required divisions being raised. The military leadership, in particular, realised that there was a chasm between the official position on how to operate and the wherewithal to do so.

This conclusion takes us back to the heart of the matter and to the article by Drew Middleton that so excited the public mind in the Netherlands in the summer of 1952: how would the

Allied forces respond in the event of an attack in the short-term by the Red Army on western Europe? The question was all the more pertinent, as the chasm I described before could be bridged in different fashions. There was room for different interpretations and solutions, which would open the door to national interests. Self-interest would take over and dominate Allied operations. This, precisely, was Holland's worst nightmare. As early as 1951, the Dutch Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had observed a serious lack of interest among the Allies in the defence of the Netherlands. The Dutch Defence leadership suspected that the Allied commanders were swayed by the French strategy, which focused on a defence line behind the river Rhine. This suspicion was based on statements by the chief of the Dutch liaison mission at SHAPE, who warned that Allied headquarters were taking serious account of a defence line south of the main rivers.

The scepticism of the Dutch Defence leadership was taking on major proportions in the autumn of 1951, with the appointment of the French Field Marshal Juin as commander of the Allied Land Forces Central Europe. Their suspicions appeared to be confirmed by various military developments. Thus, Field Marshal Juin's original plan had designated both the Ardennes and Holland as firm bases that were to be defended at great cost. In his final plan, however, Holland did not feature anymore. The only words in the plan devoted to the Netherlands were that the enemy's advance in the Netherlands would be obstructed through inundation and destruction of infrastructure. Secondly, there was reason to believe that Rotterdam was no longer considered a major supply port and that the scheduled oil pipeline network in the context of the NATO infrastructure programme would stop below the main rivers. The anxiety of the Dutch Defence leadership was fed further by reports by the commander of the Northern Army Group, Sir John Harding, who wanted to move the line between the Dutch and the British army corps from the river Waal southward to the Rees-Gogh-Afferden-Boxmeer-Uden-Vught line. He maintained that one Dutch division was to be deployed south of the main rivers. The Chief of the Dutch General Staff, General Hasselman, the later chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, considered this southward move premature. He felt that priority should be given first to raising sufficient troops for the defence of the IJssel sector.

Indeed, the Dutch Defence leadership was on a different wavelength altogether. Dutch priorities lay with establishing a robust defence line behind the IJssel river. In the event that hostile forces broke through this defence, Allied forces were to be withdrawn to a 'firm base

Holland', which was to be held at all costs. These views were more or less in line with the views held by the German military leadership and the approach advocated by General Eisenhower as the most desired from a military point of view. The starting points were that Denmark and parts of northern Germany were to be held in order to be able to launch a flanking attack on advancing Russian units. Southern Germany and the Alps were to be held for the same reasons, namely to attack the enemy's other flank. The Dutch military leadership, however, had no real intentions of linking the Dutch and the German defence lines. A proposal made by an influential Dutch general, possibly in consultation with the Allies and with German help, to extend the IJssel line to the river Eems and the Dortmund-Ems channel, was utterly disregarded by his Dutch colleagues.

Indications that appeared to corroborate the suspected Allied neglect of the defence of the Netherlands north of the main rivers, coincided with the unfavourable assessments by the Allies of the progress of the build-up of the Dutch defence. The Dutch army and its officers in particular got it in the neck, witnessed by the withering judgement passed by Montgomery after his visit to the Netherlands at the end of November 1951: "The Dutch Army [is] useless to NATO".

Only a small circle of politicians, diplomats and officers had inside knowledge of the ins and outs of the Dutch defence issues of the early nineteen fifties. This was all the more reason why the chance 'discovery' of Drew Middleton's article in the middle of the summer of 1952 had the impact of a meteorite. It made the headlines in virtually all the newspapers in the Netherlands. The Dutch population had suddenly come face to face with the dangers hanging over its head. Not only would the northern and eastern parts of the Netherlands be given up in a Russian attack – something that few people in the country were aware of in the first place – chances were that the densely populated western part of the Netherlands would undergo the same fate. As I said before, there was even a distinct possibility that the south of the Netherlands would not be defended either. Only very few people were aware of this, however.

Middleton's article prompted the most influential and respected parliamentarian of the time, the leader of the Roman Catholic party, Romme, to ask the government to disclose the information they had. This greatly embarrassed the government. Four weeks went by before they came up with an answer. Although this was understandable, given the fact that a new government was being formed, it did not inspire confidence. The government was in a

predicament that can be likened to trying to square the circle. It did not have detailed and definite information on the Allied defence plans, but it did know that there was a world of difference between ambition and reality. At the same time, the government felt the moral obligation to reassure the population and guarantee the astronomical defence budget needed to be able to bridge the gulf within a few years' time.

That summer, the Dutch government had sought to obtain a definite undertaking from the most senior NATO officials on holding the IJssel line as part of the main defence line and on holding the western part of the Netherlands as a firm base. The new Supreme Allied Commander, General Ridgway, recognised that there was "cause for misunderstanding regarding intentions" concerning the Emergency Defence Plan. He gave the assurance, however that: "I am firmly determined (and so is Marechal Juin), under the Emergency Defence Plan to defend the Rhine-IJssel line to the last. I do not countenance any thought of failure in this strategy and, therefore, no planning for withdrawal into national redoubts is possible." General Hasselman subsequently informed General Ridgway that the Dutch military authorities saw fit "to prepare a retreat to a firm base." These assurances, however, did not set any minds at ease. It all boiled down to a matter of confidence and that was in short supply in the summer of 1952.

What was the government to tell parliament in order to square the circle? The Minister of War went to NATO headquarters in Paris to get first-hand information on the real merits of the situation. This did not get him very far though. The only solution was time and patience, but this was hardly the message that people were waiting to hear at a time of acute threat. For this reason, the government resorted to more general formulations, hoping that this would be sufficient to contain the unrest. The first drafts still contained passages such as "the existing plans provide for the defence of the territory of the Netherlands". This was subsequently rephrased as "the existing concepts provide for an *adequate* protection of Dutch interests." This was rephrased once more as: "The existing plans, given the limited means, are taking Dutch interests into account." The government's ultimate answer to parliament was worded as follows: "The government does not think that it is in the public interest to disclose the existing military-strategic plans". It went on by saying that: "The Dutch government holds that the enormous Dutch defence efforts in the context of Allied defence plans *ought to be* accompanied by the absolute assurance that, in the event of an attack, the territory of the Netherlands will be defended. In light of the information the government has on current

Allied military-strategic concepts, this standpoint leads to the undiminished continuation of the Dutch defence effort." Outsiders had no other option than to take the government's word for it.

Concerns continued unabated, even in the 'inner circle' of Dutch politicians, diplomats and the military elite. The latter briefly considered raising the military-strategic issues in the Military Committee, but this never materialised. At the same time, parliamentary questions continued to be asked. Doubts were even expressed as to Atlantic solidarity. A member of the Senate of the States-General asked the government whether they had any assurances that none of the Allies would make a separate peace, in the event of the Netherlands being occupied after an unsuccessful Allied defence, before the whole of the Netherlands was liberated. The government answered that it felt this was sufficiently covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Doubts remained, however.

Despite all this, it looks like the hot issue of the defence of the Netherlands was becoming less of an issue from 1953 onwards. Various factors contributed to this process. At the end of 1952, the IJssel defence line was completed and various Allied commanders had expressed their satisfaction about this fact. They were moreover a great deal more positive about the progress of the Dutch defence build-up than before. Naturally, both the Dutch political and military leadership jumped at the opportunity of relaying these positive comments to the Dutch population. An even more important factor in this context was the prospect of a sizeable German contribution to the Western defence effort in the context of the soon to be established European Defence Community. This would enable a veritable forward defence. Added to this was the death of the Soviet leader Stalin in 1953. There was time for a breathing space.

Concerns had not been taken away completely. The fact that the eastern part of the Netherlands would be given up without further ado in the event of an enemy advance was hard to swallow. Also, at the most senior political level, much more sombre scenarios continued to circulate for a number of years after that. At the beginning of 1954, the two Dutch ministers involved with foreign affairs, including the future NATO secretary-general, Joseph Luns, in a memorandum to the Minister of War and the Navy stated the following. In the absence of the planned twelve German divisions, "NATO forces will not be able to do

more than hold up the advance of Soviet forces. At best, this delaying operation will result in a bridgehead being held in southwestern France".

It was only from 1958 onwards that the Netherlands was reaching smooth waters. 1958, not 1954, as had been intended, witnessed the first concrete steps being taken towards a forward defence. The main defence line shifted from the Rhine-IJssel line to the Weser-Fulda line. This had become possible thanks to the participation of the German forces in the Allied defence and the positioning of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1963, the line was moved further east, to the river Elbe, along the inner German border, the *inner-deutsche Grenze*. That was the end of deeply worrying articles in the papers like Drew Middleton's. The Netherlands would be defended, although no-one had the luxury of feeling safe. That was the paradox. The entire human race had a nuclear war hanging over its head like the Sword of Damocles.

"The Road from Innocence: Canada and the Cold War, 1945-1963"

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Less than a month after the explosions of the Atomic bomb had brought a brutally shocking but abrupt end the Second World War, Canadians were horrified to learn that their wartime ally, the Soviet Union had a well developed spy ring aimed at Washington and London operating out of Canada's capital city. These surprises came in early September when Igor Gouzencho, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa walked into the offices of the Ministry of Justice with all of the evidence. What it revealed in the next 9 days stunned usually complacent Canadians.[1] It was a loss of innocence, and it pushed the country onto a completely different road than it had ever traveled before.

For decades before, Canadians were " an unmilitary people" sheltered by their colonial past and their particular historical and geographical circumstances. After the post US Civil War settlements had ended the antagonisms with the Americans in the 1870's, there was very little real threat to Canada. All it needed for its protection was a rag-tag part-time militia. When Canada did go to war, it raised volunteer citizen soldiers and only after the crisis had started. So it was in 1914. However, by war's end Canada had sent three-quarters of a million overseas in the Great War. But after 1918, that caustic experience with its 100,000 casualties on the European killing fields confirmed much about getting too heavily involved in a dangerous world, and the country and its politicians took on an uneasy isolation all through the twenties and thirties. Moreover, Canada had always been a very junior partner in a large alliance system. Seldom was it ever asked or expected to take part in the great strategic questions. As one Canadian former Prime

[1] Canada. Department of External Relations, **Documents on Canada's External Relations**, vol. 11, 1944-1945, pt. II (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990), doc.1228, "Translation of a Note from the Embassy of the Soviet Union", Ottawa, 7 September, 1945**; ibid**; doc. no. 1233, Ambassador in Soviet Union to Sec. of State for External affairs, dispatch 368, 25 September, 1945.secret. For the entire run of

Minister put it in 1919, it was made safe from "the vortex of European Militarism" by time and distance.[2] In most citizens' minds, questions of domestic development were far more important than military or strategic ones at home or abroad. For its part, the senior "partner" usually only wanted the young Dominion's human or natural treasures. And so the Canadian peacetime worldview did not develop much beyond a very basic tactical and technical level. In 1939, when Canada went to war its professional soldiery numbered about 5,000, and its navy and airforce were even more miniscule.

The Second War had many characteristics of the first albeit with fewer deaths. For 6 years there had been a huge and successful military effort. Canadians also did well in industrial terms and it all seemed to prove that the mostly volunteer citizen soldier could hold their own. There is no doubt that it was a new industrialized country with a proud fighting record that emerged in 1945. And so there were many who simply wanted to get back into a tranquil peacetime civilian life to enjoy the new prosperity, and- to use the words of a popular song of the day -"let the rest of the world go by." But in 1945, the Gouzencho affair abruptly ended that.[3]

For the next 18 years, it was the Cold War that would rivet Canada's attention whether it liked it or not. The issues that sprang from this were varied and not always immediately clear. A select group of Canadians mostly in federal political circles or associated with the Department of External Affairs, like future Prime Minister, Lester B. Mike Pearson, had known for some time, even before the Gouzencho affair that there was no going back to the halcyon days. The Second World War had given them experience in the international community and they knew that only a proactive stance aimed at keeping the world as peaceful as possible would maintain the hard-won Canadian prosperity and keep the nation safe from the future ravages of war. During the war, politicians had developed what the Prime Minister called "the functional principle" as a sort of Canadian way of thinking about the country's ability to interact with those

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documents on the atomic secrets spying issue and the deteriorating relations of the West and the USSR in 1945, see **ibid.,** docs. 1229 to 1245. Hereafter cited DEA, **Documents** .

[2] C.P.Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1921**(Toronto: Macmillan,1977).vol.1, p.311

[3] For a general survey through a series of articles, see those in Greg Donaghy ed. **Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945**, Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1995.

alliance partners of much greater power. Put briefly, the principle held two things: first, since Canada had made great contributions to winning the conflict, she should be accorded a post-war role commensurate with her contribution. Second , if she had an expertise in a given area, then she ought to be allowed to contribute that quality to the alliance for the common good. Implicit in the concept was that Canada would have something to contribute that the alliance wanted. This meant that a balance between 'ends and means' and 'commitment and capability' were a key to the functional principle's usefulness.[4] It would remain to see if the balance could be kept. But be that as it may, even as the last shots of the conflict were being fired, the reluctant Canadian Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, fortunately bolstered with enough of his "new men" of the internationalist bent, were at San Francisco determined to use the new United Nations as a means to establish the peace. While this agency would remain for many years a prime focus of Canadian internationalism, it was not quite enough as other forces came to bear.

In the post war world as it had been for centuries before, Europe had a special place for most Canadians. It was part of their historical posture and political space.[5] Now it had to be rebuilt and defended especially Western Europe. War should not be allowed to break out there, and if it did, it had to be won. The British Commonwealth remained and even took on new leadership possibilities for Canada as Britain withdrew on its Imperial retreat. But the United States had replaced Britain as Canada's prime concern in trade and national security issues both at home and in whatever came out of the ashes of Europe. It was a siren call harder and harder to resist.

Yet the past had taught Canadians of the paradox that being too close to the new "senior partner" could be as risky as not being close enough. Sovereignty had to be preserved. So did winning recognition of Canada's new status the result of her tremendous wartime effort on behalf of the alliance. Complicating all of this was the fact that Canada was in North America, and, albeit often slowly, the Dominion had always

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[4] For an analysis of the 'functional principle', see the late A. J. Miller's article, "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations,"in the **International Journal,** vol.35, no. 2 (Spring,1980), and Alex Morrison, "Canada and Peacekeeping : A Time for Re-Analysis," in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, eds., **Canada's International Security Policy**, pp.202-203.

[5] Paul Buteaux, "NATO and the Evolution of Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy" in David B. Dewit and David Leyton-Brown ,**Canada's International Security Policy**(Toronto:PrenticeHall Inc.,1995),pp.155-156

subscribed to its security and defence. The American Monroe Doctrine made it hard to escape such a conclusion. In 1938, FDR had made it clear that the USA would "not stand idly by" if Canada was attacked. No doubt it was then assuring to Canadians, but it also contained the subtle message that if they did not protect their turf then the Americans would do it for them.

And so in the immediate post war world Canadian policy makers had to balance two competing imperatives: European peace and stability in an rapidly widening east-west estrangement, and the security of North America. The former would demand collective defence likely within multilateral arrangements[6]; the latter meant bilateral connexions with the great power to the south. The Canadian questions were what were the proportions of either and how much was enough. The answers were not easy or simple. As it soon turned out, the Cold War created several events that tested Canada's ability to handle these issues, not the least the creation of NATO in 1949, followed rapidly over 12 short years by the Korean War in 1950, then the permanent commitment of Canadian forces to Europe, the Suez affair the formation of NORAD and the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. Canada moved along this "road from innocence" with remarkable agility and coherence but certainly not without problems and introspection.

The post war Canadian Liberal government of Mackenzie King had hoped that the once the big citizen armies were demobilized in 1945, the defence budgets could return to the low levels of the interwar years. Professional forces, it was hoped could easily return to their usual small size and not cost the taxpayer much. The Reserve Forces (the citizen militia) would remain the first lines of Canadian defence. But by 1946 with Communist aggrandizement extending itself in many spheres, the "Iron Curtain", as Churchill described it in Fulton Missouri, had descended on Europe. This meant that Canada as it had always done in the past, would be looking for allies to guarantee the security, which it felt it could not pay for. Consequently, getting involved with the Americans and keeping them involved in Europe became a long-term goal in Ottawa. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan were clear indications that Washington was already convinced that Stalin's policy would not stop at the simply building a buffer zone around the USSR.

After 1947, events such as the Soviet endorsed Maoist victory in China, the communist take-over in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet pressures against Greece, Turkey and Finland coupled with the Berlin blockade marked the true onset of the Cold War.[7] For Canada, the same events only pushed the equally disturbed Canadian government- by now headed by the much more internationalist Liberal administration of Louis St Laurent-to get into the shelter of an alliance that had a military mutual support component to it. To the Ottawa men such as Lester Pearson, St Laurent's new External Affairs minister, there was no question of withdrawing from international participation for several reasons. First, ultimately it would mean that Canada would be not only isolated in North America, but in a de facto bilateral relationship whether she wanted it or not with the neighboring behemoth that was itself involved in Europe. If this was so, there would be no independent Canadian representation in Europe to act in her national interests: economic, military or otherwise; nor would there be for Ottawa any balancing influences of other countries to mitigate the lop-sided nature of American power in North America or Europe. Besides, to pick another version of the former path –an independent foreign and defence policy- would involve unimaginable defence spending. It was therefore more practical if not easier –in Denis Smiths words-to accept the traditional prerequisite foreign and defence policy umbrella of having "the approval and protection of the United Kingdom and the United States."[8]

In early 1948,when Clement Attlee, the British Labour Prime Minister urgently cabled Ottawa that there was an immediate danger of a Soviet attack possibly on Norway, and that a regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance was the best way to countre it, alarms went off. Admittedly, the Canadian authorities took these urgent warnings on their face value without much consideration to determine if the threat was real.[9] Canada then worked hard at helping to establish that first child of the Cold War, the North Atlantic

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[6] H.v.Riekhoff in Dewitt and Brown, pp.227-250 discusses the collective security arguments for Canada from the League of Nations until the Gulf War.
[7] For a scholarly interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, see Thomas Paterson and Robert McMahon, eds., **The Origins of the Cold War** Lexington, Mass: Heath and Co., 1991,3rd ed. This is a broad compendium of articles on various aspects of the Cold War.
[8] Denis Smith, "Canada and Nato: Adjusting the Balance", in Keith Neilson and Ronald Haycock, eds., **The Cold War and Defence** (New York: Praeger, 1990), p.174.
[9] Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, London, 10 March 1948, Top secret, personal and most immediate, in DEA, **Documents,** vol. 14 ,1948, no. 296.

Treaty in 1949. And so NATO was born and Canada had been a prime player. The cost of playing was not yet known, but that would soon change.

But for the moment Canada was fulfilling a role she had often played before –she was an interpreter in the North Atlantic Triangle; this time she was explaining not only the United Kingdom and the United states to each other but now to the western Europeans as well.[10] Moreover, if any one then saw it, she seemed poised to exert an influence far larger and more important than her long- term resources might sustain. Certainly, this new Atlantic Alliance would give the smaller powers a greater say in the direction of policies, and possibly in military strategy, than had been afforded them by the Allied Combined Boards in the Second World War. What was also true was that in the realm of strategic thinking Canada had deferred to the ideas of her two great allies rather than developing her own, and her fate seemed more dependent on maintaining her interests in the NATO alliance than elsewhere. Perhaps that was just hard power reality tempered by the conviction that she could work to soften whatever harshness the big partners tried to impose on the alliance. Such a position could have also given the comfortable illusion that Canada was participating in high policy decisions. Whatever the case, Canada's High Commissioner in the UK, Norman Robertson thought that the North Atlantic Treaty was a "providential solution for so many of our problems."[11]

One of the problems was the escalating cost of defence in light of the new Cold War. Canada had hoped that a formal alliance would allow a reduction or a stabilization of her defence budget. Compared the ruined state of most European countries in 1949, Canadian military capability and material resources were good. Yet the real attraction for Canada like the war –ravaged Europeans was that mutual defence pooling

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Also see in ***ibid.*** Prime Minister Canada to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 11 March 1948, top secret. No 298. King promised Attlee that he would send immediately "one of our officials to Washington just as soon as he is required, to join officials of the United Kingdom and the United States government in the exploratory talks suggested."

[10] On this traditional role , see B.J.C.Mckercher and Lawrence Aronsen eds., **The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) ,especially the chapters by Aronsen and Martin Kitchen covering the period 1945 to 1956

meant that each one hoped to spend less?[12] Additionally, in Canada, however obsolete, there was lots of munitions and equipment left over from the war. Emptying the Dominion's warehouses into Europe was not only magnanimous alliance diplomacy, but happily for the senior officers of the much reduced Canadian Forces it also put pressure on the Canadian Government to buy them modern replacements. And the Europeans were willing to take the surplus kit because they simply had very little of their own. What Canada could give the alliance was munitions, raw material and training, the latter of which much as she had done before in the old British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) during the war.[13] It would certainly help the Canadian economy and give further life to the marvelous munitions manufacturing capability Canada had created in the war. This was especially important since the American congress had imposed a " Buy American" policy that kept the Canadians from benefiting from the revival in the US arms market as a result of the Soviet threat, In the end, during the early 1950s, Canada outfitted with old British pattern equipment several divisions for the Dutch, the Belgians and the Italians. Ottawa also initiated a smaller Mutual Aid programme for others in Europe. This eventually included newly manufacture munitions.[14] And there were many NATO military personnel trained in Canada.[15]

Other Canadian contributions came not in equipment and training but in defining the NATO organization and planning procedures that helped make it a better relationship for the lesser powers therein. For instance, Ottawa saw the treaty as more than one of just mutual defence; if ultimately to be in vain, Canada originally hoped to develop the economic and social aspects of a true Atlantic Community. The treaty's article 2 referred to this and became known as the 'Canadian article'.[16] But, it was only reluctantly accepted in a much watered-down form by the rest of the signatories. Perhaps its real intent for Canada was

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[11] Canadian High Commissioner to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 April, 1948, DEA files 264(s) cited in Smith, "Canada and NATO: Adjusting the Balance", in Neilson and Haycock, p.174, fn 8.
[12] Desmond Morton, **Canada and War: a Military and Political History**(Toronto: Butterworth's, 1981),p.159
[13] DEA **Documents**, "extracts from Report of the Minister of National Defence" no. 418, "Notes on defence Meetings November26 to December 14, 1949 in Europe, the United Kingdom and Ireland", top secret.
[14] Jon B. McLin, **Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963:The Problems of a Middle Power in an Alliance** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p.18.
[15] Demond Morton, **A Military History of Canada**(Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), pp. 232-3
[16] John Hilliker and Donald Barry, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, vol.2, **Coming of Age, 1946-1968**(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), pp.76-78. Over the next 40

to exercise her role as a middle power being able to influence alliance policy by other means than military activities alone. Fortunately, there were other less idealistic but more productive Canadian initiatives in these early alliance years.

In Canada's view, initial alliance defence planning and subsequent demands for member contributions laid down by NATO's Defence Committee was found to be unrealistic and dominated too much by British and America ideas and resource scales. And so Canada proposed that the defence contributions be based on what the other members could afford. [17] Canada also was one of the firsts to suggest a full-time Secretariat. It was the Canadian General and chairman of the Combined Chief of Staffs Committee, Charles Foulkes who was an early promoter of the creation of a Supreme Commander for NATO. And he wanted Eisenhower.[18] On the planning front, Ottawa drew on its wartime experience of joint planning inside a regional alliance (the Canadian –American Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) which had operated since the 2 nations signed the Ogdensburg Agreement on bi-lateral co-operative defence in 1940) to get a similar process in NATO. Moreover, our diplomats gained recognition that there was a difference between what members agreed was the common Defence plan and the right of any of them to implement its share. These assumptions then, along with the new Secretariat, helped guide the first Medium Term Defence Plan circulated by the NATO Defence Committee shortly after the outbreak of the next Cold War crisis: the Korean War.[19]

In late June 1950, when the Canadian Cabinet heard that Communist North Korea had invaded and literally overrun the American and UN sponsored South, they were surprised to say the least. No one had really expected a confrontation in this part of the world so far away from Canadian interests. An even harder reality was the fact that when asked by the USA to help form a UN Force to protect South Korea, the Canadian Armed Forces were unprepared in numbers and equipment. The question was 'what was the

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years, Canada had very little success in turning this hope into a reality in NATO. Indeed the creation of the European Union has developed that aspect. It remains to see how separate NATO remains from the EU.

[17] DEA, **Documents**, vol.16, no. 479, "Extract from Minutes of the Cabinet Defence Committee", Ottawa, 25 April 1950, minute V11, "NATO: Progress of Defence Planning", top secret.

[18] James Eayrs, **In Defence of Canada,** vol.4, **Growing Up Allied** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 132-5 and 172-6.

crisis"—a 'red herring' to mask a general Soviet attack on the west's defences in Europe, or a simple North Korean territorial excursion? Immediately obvious, however, was the obligation of Canada to the United Nation's collective security. And that is where Canada started its at first very small and reluctant combat role on the Korean Peninsula.[20]

The Canadian cabinet was at first, only slowly responsive to the call from the United States for help through the UN. Its initial statement in the early summer 1950 committed 3 RCN destroyers, then some air services. The Americans were chagrined at the small Canadian contribution and were quite vocal about it. One US spokesman labeled the destroyers as a "token force" only. The indignant Canadian reply was that one could hardly call 3 destroyers a "token force' ---to which the American commented "Ok –lets call it 3 tokens".[21] The criticism stung as much as the situation in Korea deteriorated. Finally, by August the Cabinet announced land forces, but not that units of the regular army, rather a Canadian Army Special Force of about 10,000 recruited from civilian volunteers. In fact, because of an economic slump and the recent proximity to the Second World War, the force was full of battle experienced but very rough citizen soldiers. The plain fact was the regulars were too few,[22]and given the sudden failure to re-enlist that summer of a significant numbers of permanent force NCOs, some were obviously very reluctant to go to war again. Finally when the Special Force was raised, it trained on American soil and used s significant amount of US equipment.[23]

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[19] Douglas Bland, **The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy**(NewYork: Praeger,1990), pp.113-160

[20] Herbert Fairlie Wood, **Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea**(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp 4-7

[21] J.L Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, **For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s**(Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), p. 179

[22] DEA, **Documents,** vol.16, doc. no.45, " Memorandum from the Under-Secretary of State to the Secretary of State for External Affairs: Korea: the UN Secretary-General's Letter of July 14", Ottawa, 18 July 1950, top secret Heeney told Pearson that "Korea is but a side show" and that Western Europe is "still the main theatre". He also said that given the need to defend Canada and the NATO agreement, there were no Canadian troops available for Korea. At the time the total regular force was about 47,000.

[23] C.G.Rennie, "Mobilization for War: Canadian Army Recruiting and the Korean Conflict", in the **Canadian Defence Quarterly**, vol. 15, no.1 1985 comments on the lack of NCOs' enthusiasm to join. The official history, LCol. H.F.Wood, **Strange Battleground,** in 1966, and more recently David Bercuson, **Blood on the Hills** cover the conflict's details.

As the conflict see-sawed back and forth over the next 3 years and took on the very dangerous possibility of a general or even nuclear war with China, Canadians contributed over 20,000 troops and suffered 1,557 wounded and dead. Ostensibly they fought on behalf of the United Nations and collective security-as indeed they were. But the ominous reality was that the Korean action had the Americans in charge. One could even argue that this United Nations experience for Canada was more a response to temper her southern neighbour's overly aggressive military policy, than it was motivated by altruistic allegiance to UN collective security.[24] Such a reaction was likely spawned by the revelations in General Douglas MacArthur's adventurism toward the Chinese border in the fall of 1950 and President Truman's comment in late November that the United States was not discounting the use of the "bomb. " [25]

And there was something more: the Canada's External Affairs diplomats seemed more convinced than the military that the Korean action was in fact a diversionary one to mask a general Soviet threat to Europe; in short it was simply an extension of the Cold War in Europe. As for the Ottawa soldiers, in July 1950, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had originally held that a war precipitated by the Soviet Union out of the Korean situation "was slight". But they quickly warmed to the idea of a diversion as their small forces and their role expanded with the crisis. This suggests that even at this early date the most important aspect of evolving Canadian defence and security policy was the North Atlantic posture, and that Canada was reacting because of the weight and the subsequent acceptance of the policy of the great powers in that alliance. [26]

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[24] Dennis Stairs**, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States**, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974 analyses the role of tempering the elephant and why.

[25] DEA, **Documents**, vol.16, doc. no. 174, Sec. of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador in Washington. secret. 4 Dec 1950 containing the memo "Korea and the Atomic Bomb"(Ibid**.** doc 175); also see **Ibid.** doc. no.164, "Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions", Ottawa, 29 November 1950, top secret . This cabinet minute extract notes that on several occasions Canada had expressed concern over the American "reckless action in Korea".

[26] All through the 213 diplomatic documents on the Korean conflict published in the DEA for 1950 alone the continuous themes are a central focus on what the Americans have as policy, a worry that they will over-react, an attempt to mitigate and guide it where possible to avoid war. There are also constant references, especially by the diplomats, to the North Atlantic threat. And so they promoted the need to bolster Western Europe's defences as well as her own. See DEA, **Documents** vol. 16, 1950, doc. 48, "Minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee", 19 July 1950; **ibid.,** doc.171, Pearson's "Memorandum on Korea", 2 December, 1950 for samples of both the diplomats' conviction and the

Whatever the case, simultaneously with, and because of the thesis that the Korean War was simply a diversion in the Cold War, the Canadian Government began a rapid expansion if its defence capabilities at home and in Europe. By the time in mid 1953 that the Korean conflict had been negotiated to a belligerent stop in a status quo ante bellum, Canadians were well on their way along this route. They promised the NATO alliance both an infantry brigade group of 10,000 and 12 squadrons of the RCAF to form an air division permanently situated in Europe. Components of these were to remain there in ever-decreasing numbers for the next 40 years. At home, the defence budgets almost tripled from their 1949 levels of 2.2% of the GNP. In money value, this went from about $360 million to 1.9 billion in 3 years.[27] The actual numbers in the regular armed force saw a corresponding rise from 47000 to 104,000 in the same period. All three services started on massive modern re-equipage. The government even re-established its old wartime munitions ministry with full cabinet status and even the same man, C.D. Howe in charge. But this time they called the new portfolio the Department of Defence Production. Its job was to co-ordinate the tremendous Cold War defence procurement production process. Significantly, this was the first time that Canada had ever created a munitions ministry in peacetime. The country actually came another step closer to the American policy by reaffirming its defence sharing relations with the USA through the Joint US-Canadian Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee (JIMPC) established in 1949. In the next 3 years, Canada got nearly 400 million dollars worth of American munitions orders, but also managed to spend over twice as much in the States.[28]

The international events between 1949 and the end of the Korean War were defining moments for Canada. First, there was the permanent connexion to the defence of Europe. Essentially this was the acceptance of the Cold War policies of her two great partners with the Americans being clearly the first among the equals. Yet this deference also meant that Canada was far more active on the world stage than she had ever been before. The Cold War had forced her to do that. Second, and very importantly, was the effect on the Canadian military: here the modern professional Canadian Armed Forces were born. For the

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soldiers initial hesitation about the larger threat. For the entire group of "Korean documents", see doc. nos. 10 to 223. The rest relating to the Korean conflict are found in DEA, **Documents**, vols. 17 to 19.

[27] Granatstein and Hillmer, p.181

first time in Canada's history the old volunteer citizen militia was no longer considered the first line of Canadian defence. The new larger number of regular units demanded a continuing and expensive military commitment in peacetime. These formations demanded ,as well, all of the infrastructure including professional schools, large permanent training bases and professional and social services. For example, once there was the commitment to Europe, the defence minister allowed families to accompany Canadian troops to European postings. And so the Canadian military communities in Europe were created. They remained there 40 years, the last one, CFB Lahr in southern Germany, was only closed in the mid 1990s when the Canadians finally left Europe. Foreign commitments also meant foreign exchanges so that military personnel spent lots of time practicing, learning and even teaching the profession of arms in alliance forces. There was no doubt that this incremental direction was steadily toward the "professionalism" of the United States Forces and of inter-operability with them.

As the '50s decade wore on and the Canadian military establishment crept steadily toward 120,000, a few doubts started to grow about the Cold War posture. For example, one could argue, as later Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau did, that Canadian foreign policy was being determined more by her military alliance commitments in Europe than by the formulation of any independent thought about Canada's national interests. Furthermore, a few in government, especially in External Affaires wondered if NATO was obsolete. Such voices questioned whether it was the European alliance or her troops stationed there that protected Canada or was it simply the American nuclear deterrent.[29] There was also the sky rocketing dollar value of the new armament, itself made more costly by the technology of nuclear weaponry. These costs were in competition with the other great domestic development projects in Canada in the 1950s, namely, the Trans-Canada pipeline to bring Canadian natural gas energy to eastern (and American) markets, and the huge engineering feat of the construction of the St Lawrence Seaway. And

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[28] Morton, **Military History of Canada**, pp.236-9, and Granatstein and Hillmer, pp.180-1. On the RCAF Air Division see, Major B.C. Frandsen, " A Blunted Sword or Rapier: 1 Canadian Air Division in NATO", a MA paper in War Studies, RMC, Kingston, 28 August 2000.

[29] For a good survey of Canada after WWI , see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, **Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, revised edit. 1989), pp.421-23

there were lots of others contending demands for the limited financial resources such as the health care, pension plans, baby bonuses and the expansion of post secondary education. [30]

These Cold War commitments even raised some old cultural and social issues. Manpower problem was one. Filling the spaces for the Korean force had been difficult. Maintaining ones for the new European units proved also no easy task. There were those who advocated that anathema of Canadian military politics: conscription. Canadians never believed in it; even in the two world wars they only accepted compulsion at the last desperate moments of war. It was political suicide to attempt it in peacetime. The result was that recruiting in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) remained a difficult task as the new prosperity of the decade after 1945 siphoned manpower into the better paying jobs of a thriving civil economy. Some units started to reflect parts of Canada where there was chronic unemployment and other social or ethnic difficulties. The Royal Canadian Regiment, for instance, had a very high proportion of North American Indians and unemployed Newfoundlanders in its battalions. Over a third of the population was French Canadian but they did not share proportionately to their numbers within the culturally stifling and heavy historic Anglophilia of our navy or the airforce; in the army they were nearly all clustered in the one French Canadian unit, Royal 22eRegiment du Canada.[31]

Another problem raised by the Cold War was that the new professional demands coupled the high costs and immediacy of the nuclear threat, had shoved the Canadian Reserve Forces further and further into the shadows. Nuclear conflict meant there was only enough time to go to war with what one had "in being". No longer, it was believed, could there be the usual time to mobilize the traditional Canadian citizen soldier. The consequence was that the relations between the militia and regular became at best strained with one often accusing the other of either uselessness or of arrogance. By the end of the decade, the combat role of the militia had all but ended. Its new job was aid to the civil power and emergency measures. Disillusioned, the enthusiastic part time members quit; they wanted to be soldiers not sand bag fillers. Unfortunately, the militia's social imprint which traditionally had made the connexion between civil and

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[30] Bothwell, et al. is a good survey of Canadian politics after 1945.
[31] J.L.Granatstein and J.M.Hitsman, **Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada**(Toronto: Oxford University press, 1977), pp.245-60

military society also faded The Canadian people were becoming separated from their military consciousness; they were indeed becoming more and more an "unmilitary people". The military's constituent political clout waned as the militia shrank. Henceforth it would be easier for politicians to do with the armed forces 'what they will'.[32] Nevertheless, as the Cold War of the 1950s ground on the regular Canadian Armed Forces developed a solid reputation for being good, even exceptional soldiers. As it was with Canada's diplomats, they got used to thinking about "punching above their weight".

In the Cold War of that decade, there were two other very important events exposing Canada's voyage from innocence: the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 and the creation of a North American Air Defence Command. Here again the 'Road from Innocence' took a new turn. On the surface, the Suez Crisis seemed to have little to do with the Cold War and perhaps at its beginning hardly anything to do with Canada. As we know the immediate crisis started with the apparent reneging by the United States and other Western European powers on a promise to finance Egypt's Aswan Dam. The new and supposed despot of that country, Col. Ab'dul Nasser had been tweaking Britain's imperial nose since King Farouq had been deposed to get the 70,000 British troops out of the canal area, then he promptly nationalized the mostly British privately owned Suez Canal Company.[33]

With all of this going on, the Soviet Union, was quick to exploit the Cold War situation. It not only provided bargain-priced arms for the Egyptians but also offered to fund the Aswan Dam without any attached strings .The strategic locus of western hegemony in the Middle East appeared to be shifting toward the 'communists'. With the rebuilding of Europe's and their own economies still going on, Great Britain and France needed the access to Suez to maintain their vital international trade and the sustained flow of oil. The short of it was an Anglo-French and Israeli scheme to invade the Canal area. This, in a bungled way, they did in the late fall of 1956.[34] The United States was horrid angry at the British. In Washington,

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[32] J.C.Willett, **A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution,** Boulder Colo. Westview Press, 1987 covers the fate of the Militia in the 1950s and 60s. Also see Douglas Bland, **The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada: 1947 to 1987**(Kingston: Frye, 1987), p.23.

[33] For a good survey of the various aspects of Suez, see W.R.Louis and Roger Owen, eds., **Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequence** ,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

[34] P.J.Vatikiotis, **The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak** (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 4th edition, 1991), pp. 392-406

John Foster Dulles had secretly hoped that the Soviets would foolishly finance the Egyptian dam scheme and when it proved unviable would be saddled with huge and continuing costs. But the pre-emptive invasion threatened the US strategy on the Aswan project. It seemed that the North Atlantic alliance was coming apart, and here was Canada's opportunity to play the traditional role of constraining, explaining and healing.

Canada was also repelled by the precipitous Anglo-French invasion. To Ottawa, it was handing the Soviets just the opportunity they wanted. This time, unlike Korea 6 years earlier, it was the other 'partner', the UK that had to be constrained for the sake of the alliance. The Prime Minister fired off a blunt condemnation to his counterpart in London claiming that the Anglo-American alliance was being destroyed by unacceptable British action. NATO was unraveling. This seemingly last sputter of Victorian colonialism, as Louis St Laurent told Anthony Eden, had alienated most in the United Nations and certainly fractured the British Commonwealth.[35]

For his part, the Minister of External Affairs, Lester Pearson like many others also saw a direct and harmful link to the revolutionary events simultaneously unfolding in Hungary as that country tried to throw off the Soviet yoke. The USSR's military units, he told a hushed Canadian cabinet in early November, were now crushing the freedom fighters in Budapest and that the "deplorable" British-French action in Egypt was all the more reprehensible because it prevented the free world from taking a united stand…against this naked [Soviet] aggression".[36] Britain had to be brought to her senses, but finding a not-too-humbling a way out for her was necessary. Borrowing an idea from a conversation with some American contacts, Pearson formulated the simple plan of offering through the United Nations a UN Emergency Force under Canadian command. He had the whole-hearted support of Washington because it kept the Soviets out and them in without much cost. And so the first truly Canadian Peacekeeping force materialized not only because of good diplomacy but also largely because Canada had the military

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[35] Martin Kitchen, " From the Korean War to Suez: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations,1950-1956" in Mckercher and Aronsen ,eds., **The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World"** ,pp.249-252

[36] DEA, **Documents**, vol. 22, pt.1,"International Situation; Middle East; Hungary; Policy at the United Nations" from "Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions", Ottawa, 3 Nov 1956, doc.no.126. St Laurent made the

effectives to give substance to her diplomacy. The Cold War had already greatly increased and professionalized her military effectives and she had the strategic lift to get them there. Hence the Suez situation was diffused, and Pearson got the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts the following year.[37]

The Suez Crisis of 1956 again pointed clearly to the fact that Canadian policy glass was sighted on collective security with a European Cold War focus. Paradoxically its binocular lens also increasingly looked at bi-lateral North American defence with the USA. Initially, the two different foci could co-exist because the Americans' primary security commitment was toward Europe. But in the 10 short years of the fifties, nuclear weapons technology and advanced delivery systems shifted this strategic balance toward bi-lateral defence in North America. The continental 'partner' was so powerful and determined on all levels that Canada was in danger of being subsumed in the arrangement .The Soviets had exploded their first atomic device in 1949; their long-range bombers could reach North American shores the following year, and permeate well into its interior shortly thereafter. Then there was appearance of Soviet ICBMs by the end of the decade. [38] Obviously any confrontation between the Soviets and the Americans would take place high in the skies over Canadian territory. The Dulles nuclear weapons policy of "massive retaliation" announced in 1954 made it all the more chilling for Canadians. And for those worried about such things, the Americans had developed this brutal idea without consulting anyone. The multi-lateral alliance in Europe was being challenged by the reality of defence at home through a bi-lateral agreement with its southern neighbour whether Canada liked it or not. As Joseph Jockey has written: there was "no boundaries upstairs"[39] in the military minds of either country. But to some Canadians that was not true in politics.

In 1957, the newly elected and very inexperienced Conservative Government of John Diefenbaker agreed with Washington to create the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). There has been hardly any single issue of Canadian–American relations as controversial as was this Cold War agreement.

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same point to Eden 2 days later in another firm condemnation but this time offering a Canadian Force for Egypt. See **ibid.,** "Prime minister to Prime minister of united kingdom", 5 Nov, 1956 doc. no. 136

[37] Kitchen, in Mckercher and Aronsen, p.252.

[38] Canada. Department of Defence **Canada's Defence Programme, 1954-1955** (Ottawa: Queens printer 1955), pp.23 &55 and Eayrs, **Growing Up Allied,** pp.275-318 covers the sky-rocketing defence budgets of the mid decade. This included large amounts of Mutual Aid to Western Europe.

For many Canadians, it raised the thorny issues of civil-military relations, the acceptability of having nuclear arms, of Americans failure to consult, of threats to sovereignty and even of the relationship to NATO. As we know, military co-operation between Canada and the United States had its genesis in WW II with the PJBD. Then Ottawa had sniffled that sometimes her great ally took the Dominion for granted. Moreover, there were many American servicemen stationed on Canadian soil and in the building of such projects as the Alaska Highway--sometimes so many that one could have thought they were an "army of occupation."[40] With the onset of the Cold War, the PJBD again picked up and became more comprehensive in its bi-lateral function.[41]

By the time the Soviet bomber threat ended the historic protection of geography, both Canadian and US airforces were easily co-operating in each other's services and over each other's airspace. But there were two separate commands. And, given that warning time was getting ever so short, there was not always quick enough communication to co-ordinate speedy continental defence. With the hugely increased emphasis on air power by the both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, especially in the form of their Strategic Air Command, the RCAF had responded in growth to the point where in mid '50s it was larger than the Canadian Army and got a nearly 50% of Canada's defence dollars. This fact alone encouraged inter-service antagonisms and expensive procurement competition. Canada had also embarked on designing building her own supersonic jet fighter, the much applauded but very costly CF 105 "Arrow". Furthermore, operational continental air-defence co-operation was intense. By 1954 there were three radar lines stretching across Canada. The USA had supplied significant portions of the funding and technology. With so much American presence on our territory, Ottawa was concerned about the independence its of command and control as well as its sovereignty. [42]

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[39] Joseph T. Jockel, **No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, he United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958**(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987), and pp.91-117.
[40] R.D.Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, **Ties that Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War** (Toronto: Hakkert, 1977), 2nd ed. revised, pp.93-112.
[41] Joel Sokolsky, "A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances ", in **Armed Forces and Society**, vol. 16, no.1, (fall, 1989), pp.11-35.
[42] J.T Jockel, "Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD", in **American Review of Canadian Studies**, vol.12, no.3 (fall, 1982), pp.1-16.

Indeed, the continental defence issues generated a momentum in Canada of trying "keeping- up with the Jones" to the south and the chief advocates were in the military in both countries. Making their minds up purely on the basis of operational necessity rather than the larger national security implications, the airmen decided that an integrated and unified North American Air defence command was what was needed. Both countries officers pushed very hard on their governments to approve. They also organized themselves well along this path at the operational level first in 1951with Canadian liaison officers attached to the USAAF, Air defence Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado; three years they formed an even closer coalescence of a joint planning group there. And there was "no boundaries upstairs" for what these airmen of both countries were concerned about. [43] The Eisenhower administration was the first to approve of a formal bi-lateral air defence agency. Then, in 1957 just after the Canadians had changed their government, the Canadian top soldier General Foulkes privately convinced the new Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker to sign the NORAD deal. There was no discussion in the Cabinet Defence Committee; nor was there any debate in Parliament prior to the decision. And it seems that the events were certainly orchestrated by the RCAF senior officers toward this end. Foulkes had not briefed his PM on the sovereignty or the command and control implications for Canada, which was surely his duty. As for Diefenbaker, he was a novitiate; he did not ask the correct or relevant questions which indicated that he had very little idea of what he had too easily, almost nonchalantly, agreed to.[44] The short of it was that the enthusiasm that some senior Canadian officers had for co-operative operational efficiency determined Canada's strategic and her national security policy.

When the NORAD agreement became public in 1958, it raised many more issues. One was that the Prime Minister, then under substantial public pressure in Parliament and elsewhere to explain what he had done, again naively claimed that NORAD as simply an extension of Canada in NATO. Since the Canadian electorate approved of the latter, surely, he likely thought, they would also accept the former. Added to this were the implications of that there would as in NATO multi-lateral consultation and

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[43] Jockel, **No Boundaries Upstairs**, p.93.
[44] The classic analysis of the time is James M. Minifie's **Peacemaker or Powder Monkey**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960. Jockel's, **No boundaries Upstairs** is definitive. Also see David Bercuson, " Continental Defence and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-1950: Solving the Dilemma," in Haycock and Neilson,

collective security. That certainly was not the Washington view. North American Defence was completely separate from and none of Europe's business. There was also the omni-present concern of having an American general commit Canadian forces to combat without the approval of the Canadian government as a result of a policy not necessarily of Canadian making or interest. In due course these aggravations were in part solved by "double nuclear keys", having a Canadian as second in NORAD Command and "red telephones" in Ottawa and Washington. [45]

Perhaps the most contentious issue coming out of NORAD's creation in 1958 centered on Canadian use of nuclear armament. The recommended stationing of US troops in charge these weapons on our soil was also as troubling as it was complicated. Both implied far more than just what sort of weapons were present. Earlier, when our government had accepted its NATO air role attached to the American command in Europe where nuclear munitions were part of their force arsenal, it meant that Canada too would be a handler of such the devices. The Canadian Air's Division's task for instance was stated to be nuclear strike/ reconnaissance. In northern Europe, our land battle group got the 'tactical' nuclear weapons in the form of the Honest John Rocket. Even in the Royal Canadian Navy our there were operating on the assumption they would have nuclear depth charges as part of the anti-submarine capability. In NORAD, it was the same. Such weapons were the cores of Washington's massive retaliation strategy delivered by Strategic Air Command. The air defence devices such as the Bomarc missile were also intended to use nuclear warheads against whatever was in-coming. Canada was part of that. The "Arrow" would be built to fire nuclear missiles. Moreover, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee had recognized their use in early 1957.[46]

However, the public debate over these weapons only became very contentious in the late 1950s. Some Canadians baulked at the cost, believing that we just simply could not keep it up; others increasingly

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pp.153-170, and Ron Purver, "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy," in Dewitt and Leyton Brown, pp. 81-110

[45] George Lindsey, "Canada-U.S. Defence Relations in the Cold War", in Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel, eds., **Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defence Co-operation: The Road from Ogdensburg** (Lewiston: Mellon Press, 1992),pp. 66-68

felt the utter futility of nuclear war and that something had to be done to stop the mad race to oblivion. Still others were so worried that the sky-rocketing nuclear weapons costs would side-track some of the expected social and civilian national development programmes intended to raise the Canadian quality of life and keep the country internationally competitive. There were such massive schemes going on as plans for a national health plan or the huge construction projects like the grossly over budget Trans-Canada natural gas pipe line and the St Lawrence Seaway all of which were vying for a fixed purse of money. Something was going to have to give way. In early 1959, when the RCAF's Avro "Arrow" project was suddenly cancelled by the Diefenbaker government, it seemed to be the articulation that Canada was coming new place on her 'road from innocence' in the Cold War. [47] The story about this Canadian military icon is interesting.

The AVRO Arrow had been conceived in the early '50s as the RCAF's response to the Soviet long-range bomber threat. Canadian Airmen were both confident that our domestic scientific and industrial talents were good enough and that the resulting superior airframe would make an excellent contribution to the defence of North America as well as Canada. When it finally appeared in prototype in late 1957,this state of the art Canadian fighter may have been the best airplane of its type in the world; but right from the start it costs was enormous. The RCAF knew this, as did the Liberals in power until their unexpected defeat in 1957. But they had not let the politically embarrassing knowledge get too far out in public. Some of the airmen and those in the Department of Defence Production had hoped to offset the huge costs by selling it to the allies. But none of them were interested; especially the Americans afflicted as they often are with a mixture of the usual nationalism and a touch of xenophobia. If the USA was to have any new fighter airplane, Congress was not in the mood to have anything but a home- produced weapon. Besides, the size of U.S. industry, their armed force demands and the state of their own air weapons research and development was hot on the tail with aircraft of a similar high performance quality as the AVRO Arrow. And no doubt they also wanted to sell to the allies just like Canada did. Senior partners always seem to prevail in strategic procurement. In the end, however marvelous, the Arrow was an expensive attempt to keep-up to the new high technology demands of the Cold War, a pace forced by the USA and the USSR.

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[46] DEA, **Documents**, vol. 22, part 1, no.641, Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council to Sec. State for External Affairs, 6 Mar. 1957, and **ibid.**no.642, "Extracts from the Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee", 19 Mar 1957.

The same day Diefenbaker shut down the Arrow, the Canadian Company laid of 14,000 of its employees many of who subsequently had to leave Canada for places such as NASA to practice their talents. Perhaps the lesson was that if there is any validity in the "functional principle" it is to assess realistically what one can do. [48]

But when Prime Minister Diefenbaker cancelled the Arrow project in early 1959, he was less than forthright with the public about the reasons why. There is no doubt that he feared that his party would be held responsible and that he had been 'set-up' by the previous Liberal administration which generated and then carried out the expensive fighter scheme. Instead of giving a reasoned explanation for the cancellation, all the Prime minister said was that in light of the new Cold War intercontinental missile capabilities, manned fighter interdiction was obsolete. Instead, he declared those counter missiles like the Bomarc B a US. developed weapon meant to carry a nuclear warhead was the answer.

But the problem by now was in the cabinet. It was split on the issue if nuclear weapons, with Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs the most vocal of the anti-nuclear advocates. And there was a growing sympathy among the electorate reacting against the possibility of a nuclear Armageddon as a result of the arms race in the Cold War. Consequently the ever-nimble Prime Minister now bought into the American Bomarc scheme which his airmen had already accepted if he knew it.[49] When reminded that the missiles were intended to carry a nuclear load, he refused to accept the warhead that made them potent .In one breath, he told Canadians that there were conventional warheads available for the Bomarc instead when that simply was not true; in another breath, he claimed that the US Strategic Airforce was "our only hope of survival".[50] The result was that Canada's Bomarcs sometimes got bags of sand put up front. This bouhaha also exposed the inconsistencies with Canada's position on nuclear weapons in our NATO role in Europe. Evident too was that the Prime Minister did not know much about his own nation's strategic interests. Furthermore, his faulty ideas were not corrected or even challenged by his military personnel who did not tell him soon enough or with sufficient accuracy what he had a right to know. Diefenbaker of

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[47] Morton, **Canada at War,** pp.173-181
[48] Granatstein and Hillmer, **For Better or For Worse**, pp.198-199
[49] DEA, **Documents**, vol. 22, pt 1,doc. 462, "Extracts from the minutes of the Chief of Staff Committee" 19 Mar 1957, secret.

course did not ask the correct questions either, and he was animated by his own dislike of Americans and his inherent distrust of his soldiers whom he often felt were conspiring against his government. Until Diefenbaker's Conservatives lost the election in 1963, the nuclear question remained increasingly contentious and unresolved. [51]

By the fall of 1960 Canada was in the middle of a substantial downturn in the economy. This only highlighted some of the Cold War problems such as escalating cost. Originally the Canadian NATO theory was when the Europeans reestablished their economies and were able to defend themselves, Canada would begin a withdrawal. That did not happen. In part because many Canadians were very worried about the increasing dependence on and integration with the American economic juggernaut, corporate assets, investment and culture were steadily being inundated by the United States. Diefenbaker for one blamed all of this 'creeping republicanism' on the previous 22 years of having Liberal "continentalists" in office; he wanted to redirect at least 15% of Canada's trade away from the Republic, toward England preferably but Europe too. He did not get much of either, and the drift toward the United States continued. And then there was the old Canadian animator that belonging in a multi-lateral alliance could still offset a unilateral one. As a result instead of looking at the hard costs of keeping so many forces in Europe. Diefenbaker reaffirmed the Cold War European strategy by deciding to keep them there in return, he hoped, for having a for the seat at the table, for the potential reciprocal access to their markets and for political reasons. [52] And so Canada entered the 1960s with both a huge European commitment and a clear North American defence obligation: the two would come together with a vengeance in 1962.

The last event of this portion Canada's sojourn on the 'road from innocence' culminated in one of the most frightening of Cold War confrontations: the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The actual details of that event are well known. It looked like the world had come to the brink of nuclear holocaust in the Kennedy- Krushchev showdown over attempts to put Russian ICBM installations in communist Cuba. Put succinctly the Cold War was physically in the New World. In Canada, the Diefenbaker government

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[50] J.M Beck, **The Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections** (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1968), p.356.

[51] On the Diefenbaker administration, see Peter C. Newman, **Renegade in Power,** Toronto: Mclelland and Stewart, 1963, and John G Diefenbaker, **One Canada: the Years of Achievement, 1957 to 1962**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1976.

was on its last legs. The problem of the use of nuclear weapons, of not being consulted about North American defence, of the effect of the now long standing military co-operation and integration, and the sense of horror and helplessness of possible nuclear conflagration.---these were again all present. And again when Washington asked Ottawa to support its tough stand against the Soviets, the cabinet was split and the Prime Minister prevaricated. The defence minister's pleadings for supportive action went nowhere. He wanted to go to the same high alert as had Washington; he also wanted to activate the existing bi-lateral arrangements between US and Canadian NORAD forces. But Diefenbaker refused to mobilize Canada's portion or to arm the Bomarcs or even allow the Americans to fly over Canadian Airspace to get their nuclear weapons in position in Alaska. Finally, after one critical cabinet meeting in which the Prime Minister remained obdurate, the frustrated defence minister secretly ordered his service chiefs to have the operators go to the appropriate state of alert. But in the case of the Maritime Command Atlantic, the Chief of the Naval Staff would not let his commander there initiate plans. There was no waiting given the fast and dangerous count down of events. As a result, on his own authority, Rear Admiral K.L.Dyer mobilized some of Canada' Atlantic ships to replace American naval units on ASW duty thereby freeing them for any war zone. Clearly the Admiral, with the mind-set of years of practicing his profession integrated with the US navy, was more concerned about the immediate operational crisis and than he was with the niceties of responsible government.[53] In the end, the Soviet Union backed down, But Canada's defence policies- to quote one of the few strategist Canada had at the time, were "in disarray its reputation a little tarnished, but its nuclear virginity intact". [54]

What did the Cuban Missile Crisis reveal? First, to the Americans at least, it showed that while the senior members of the Canadian NORAD Forces were willing and capable professionals anxious to co-operate, Canadian politicians were not. They appeared irresolute and did not want to fulfill their continental defence obligations. Diefenbaker had publicly criticized President Kennedy for his lack of consultation even though the President had put in personal calls to the PM to get him to show alliance solidarity in the coercive strategy. While Canada's defence minister may have broken the principle of collective cabinet

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[52] Bothwell, et al., **Canada Since 1945**, chapters 20 and 21 ,

[53] Peter Haydon, **The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered** (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Canadian Studies, Canadian Printco Ltd., 1993), pp.121-147. This is the most definitive treatment of the crisis to date.

responsibility, as the minister in charge he could legally raise such military alerts under his mandate. There also was a default in civilian control of the military. This was not only due to the personality of the Prime Minister who did not communicate with his military personnel, but who also showed like many others in the cabinet that he had very little understanding of the working of the their own military or of the NORAD agreement and its subsequent obligations.[55]

There certainly was a problem caused by the absence of a central command structure at defence headquarters in Ottawa. After the Second World War, the then defence minister had set up a HQ organization at the top of which was a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee who in turn set on the Cabinet Defence Committee. He was not a 'central commander' who synthesized all of the ideas, needs and wants of the service chiefs into coherent and enforceable defence policy recommendations for the cabinet; nor was there a flow in the other direction in which the chairman of the COS Committee necessarily carried the will of the Cabinet to the three service commanders. If there had been a central commander and staff with the authority to carry out the cabinet directives, it would have established a clear civilian control. But this weak arrangement had been put in place at the beginning of the Cold War and NATO because it had simply and naively been assumed that there was no need for a central control since the individual Canadian services would be put under NATO command after the politicians had had their input.[56] Given all of these considerations, fault for the Canadian problems of the Cuban Missile Crisis lay heavier with the politicians than with their senior service personnel.

However, this does not absolve military leaders either. For their part the military were once again driven by the narrow concerns of operation more than anything else This is one manifestation of what a later commentator claimed was a historical failure of Canada's military to think at the highest strategic and command levels.[57] Moreover, as individual services they were too competitive and did not consult easily.

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[54] Robert Spencer quoted in the **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1962**, p.136 as cited in Bothwell, Drummond and English, **Canada Since 1945**, p.233.
[55] Haydon, **The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis**, pp.216-221
[56] Haydon, pp. 206-211.
[57] Adrian Preston, "The Profession of Arms in Canada, 1945-1970: Political Authority as a Military problem," in **World Politics**, vol.23, no.2, Jan.1971. For a look at a similar problem in officer education in

The concept of 'jointness' currently so highly valued in Canada's senior staff and Command College was not there. There is little doubt that some military personnel took advantages of the lack of expertise and interest among the politicians to pursue their own service agenda. But wherever fault lay, some politicians remained suspicious of the military, and some others began to think that they should be brought under closer civilian control. In all, the Cuban Missile Crisis was but a sign post –albeit a major one, along the road begun at the onset of the Cold War.

The fall out of the missile crisis was immediately political. Diefenbaker's crippled regime staggered into 1963 under the onslaught of the nuclear arms debate: would Canada have nuclear weapons or not. Defence debates are a rarity in Canadian electoral politics. That they were a major concern in this one showed that Canadians were indeed at the parting of the ways in their Cold War experience. As we know Diefenbaker had denied that the NORAD or the NATO agreements required that Canada have nuclear weapons. And then in early January 1963, the retiring NATO supreme commander in Europe, the American General Lauris Norstad stopped off in Ottawa where he told newspaper reporters that Canada had definitely accepted the nuclear role in Europe. He implied that the governments past statements were a lie. There was also his non-too-subtle message that Canada was really not pulling its weight if it did less than fulfill its nuclear obligations. That an American general said such things on Canadian soil stung to say the least. Within a week the Liberal Party leader who had also opposed the nuclear devices in 1959, made what became known as the "Pearson flip-flop". Having experienced an obvious epiphany, Pearson now accepted the warheads because there was a "commitment that we must honour."[58] Shortly thereafter, Washington waded into the fray by issuing a blunt statement confirming that Norstad's allegations concerning what Diefenbaker had either tried to conceal or had denied were in fact true: Canada had nuclear obligations both in NORAD and NATO. Three members of Diefenbaker's cabinet promptly resigned, including the Minister and associate Minister of National Defence. Then in February the government failed in a vote of confidence. Six weeks later it lost the federal election. Lester Pearson, now the nuclear advocate (labeled at the time the "Pearson flip-flop"), had hammered the issue all through the

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Canada, see R.G. Haycock, "Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions of Military Education in Canada," in the **Canadian Military Journal,** vol.2, no.2, summer 2001, pp.5-18.

[58] Beck, **Pendulum of Power**, pp.351-371covers the 1963 Canadian election campaign in detail.

election campaign and he had won. And so the Cuban missile crisis was the denouement of the most volatile period in Canadian national security history that started with the election of the Diefenbaker government in 1957. The Cold War and defence controversies of 1962-1963 were the first time that the country had finally assessed the utility of being on a road that it had been on for the past 18 years.

But the fall-out did not stop at mere self-examination of policy. The next 5 years saw some fundamental changes in defence and foreign policy. One of the most immediate and important was the unification and integration of the Canada's three services into a single force. Perhaps trying to get a better control of its 'soldiers', the government also induced a civilianization of the Department of National Defence. When Pierre Trudeau succeeded Pearson as Prime Minister at the end of the decade, he was very concerned that the Ottawa's European defence commitment was driving Canadian all foreign policy. And he vowed to get out of the obligation in the early 1970's. But he found that Europe might ignore Canada in a variety of scenarios; especially economically. It was important to have a seat at the table and the price seemed to be to stay in NATO even though with a much reduced and repositioned force. It took another 2 decades before the Canadians left Europe.

While the country would remain in Europe for the next generation of the Cold War, the 'sixties also initiated a move toward another form of functionalism: peacekeeping, ostensibly because it was cheaper, humanitarian and non-nuclear. And it was a role one could do with smaller forces and it earned lots of international kudos for the country. Consequently, Canadians served all over the world in this capacity. But it seemed contradictory in as much as the country's leaders had not really given up the old pledge to Europe while accepting a new task. Some historians have even argued that the peacekeeping role was really just the "Cold War by other means"—a continuance of Canada's North Atlantic posture to defend western interests.[59] Within the new force the duality sparked another sometimes equally divisive debate of whether being peacekeepers meant that the armed service was really truly a professional military body or just international policemen. It also heightened competition for decreasing funds among the "all green" services. Outside of the military, many voices also openly questioned whether our past NATO

[59] Sean M. Maloney, **Canada and UN Peacekeeping. Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970**, St Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2002.

defence posture was continuing to dominate foreign policy[60]; others in the academic community felt that the the early Cold War period, Canada was too weak or disinterested in developing its own strategic policies , and had blindly accepted those of the major players , namely the United States. At the time, Colin Gray even called the phenomenon "strategic theoretical parasitism." Fortunately, later studies have demonstrated that this was not so. [61]

However, in 1963, the effects of this part of the Cold War story were not yet known. What was known was that the "road from innocence" for Canada had been neither smooth nor straight.

[60] For a good synopsis of the unification effects, see Rod B. Byers, "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty," in Henry Wiseman, ed., **Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals** (New York, Pergamon Press, 1983), pp.130-160, and W. Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military," in Armed Forces and Society, vol.16, no.1 (fall, 1989), pp.117-136.

[61] Colin Gray, " The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought", in **Canadian Defence Quarterly** , vol., no.1, 1971, pp. 6-12. Also see his **Canadian Defence Priorities: a Question of Relevance** Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972. Earlier, Adrian Preston had levelled much the same charges in part aiming them at the limited professional development of Canadian officer corps. See Preston," The Higher Study of Defence in Canada: A Critical Review", in the **Journal of Canadian Studies** vol.3, no.3 1968, pp.17-28. Recently, Andrew Richter has seriously challenged this 'school of thought' showing clearly by using heretofore classified documents that Canadians were developing their own form of strategic thought based on Canadian national interests. See Andrew Richter, **Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-63** Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.

THE WEST AND YUGOSLAVIA IN THE 1950S

by Winfried Heinemann

1. Yugoslavia's Defection

"From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an iron curtain has come down" is how Churchill worded the new political geography in 1946. Stettin - that referred to Poland; oddly enough, the Soviet zone of Germany was not conceived as being behind the iron curtain. Trieste - that denoted Yugoslavia, a staunch ally of the Soviet Union, and as Stalinist as any other country in its internal structure. Yugoslavia was busy supporting Greek communist units in their civil war, with Britain and later the U.S. giving aid to the democratic government[1]. Five years later, World War II American military equipment was being delivered to Yugoslavia. What had happened?

Yugoslavia was the only country within the Soviet orbit that could claim it had liberated itself. It had certainly not been liberated by the Red Army, but when Tito called for a measure of independence, he soon found himself ostracised by Stalin. In June 1948 Stalin cut his ties with the Tito government. Of course he expected to see its overthrow within a matter of weeks, and its replacement by a more servile administration.

Much to everybody's surprise, Tito stayed. Still, for a long while to come, he was bound to feel insecure, threatened by military aggression from outside, and uprisings of malcontent Stalinists from within. That meant Tito had to maintain a large army, and at the same time maintain an acceptable standard of living to keep his population happy. It was the classical balance between military and social security, and Tito was standing alone. Would he turn to the West, and would the West support him[2]?

For the West, there was a good rationale to do so. After all, if suitably encouraged by Tito's example, other Eastern states might well want to follow suit, making this the first of a series of splits within the Eastern bloc. Was this the beginning of "roll-back"?

The North Atlantic Treaty had been a reaction to a threat perceived as being political at least as much as military. When the Alliance was founded in 1949, no military structures were envisaged, and the North Atlantic Treaty provided for political rather much more than military cooperation. If the defection of Yugoslavia was to provide an opportunity to drive a political wedge into the emerging Soviet bloc, then maybe additional military efforts might turn out to be superfluous. For the West, too, this was a political challenge as well as a military opportunity, and it would remain to be seen how political and military elements in Western policy would interact in formulating a response to this challenge.

However, any such political initiative would have to be based on a mutual understanding of NATO partners not to take the problem to the United Nations. Any involvement of the UN would encourage the Soviets to try and attempt to play NATO member states one against the other.

2. The Strategic Importance of Yugoslavia

On top of any political reasoning, Yugoslavia could be a valuable military asset. Not only did Tito command the largest army of any Balkan state, Yugoslavia was also in an important geostrategic position. In case of war in Europe, the Soviets were expected to resume the traditional Russian drive toward the Mediterranean. The Western front would have two major weak spots where this was most likely: One was across the Yugoslav-Italian border, and the other along the Greek-Turkish border.

In the North, a push through what was known as the Ljubljana gap would evoke memories of 1916-8. Once the Soviets reached the North Italian plains, there would be no stopping them. Italy was economically weak, and its Christian Democrat government did not dare to stretch the economy any further by additional armament drives as that might lead to just the situation which might bring the Communists to power. Italy's only hope lay in early defensive action, and that would have to begin in the mountains, along the river Isonzo, i.e. the lines of World War I fighting. That river, however, was already in Yugoslav territory, which meant that a successful denial of this attack route could only be attempted in a well-prepared, concerted Italo-Yugoslav defense effort.

In the south, things were slightly different. Both Turkey and Greece had originally planned to leave Thrace to the Soviets in case of attack. Both considered the narrow coastal strip indefensible. Both Greeks and Turks were therefore quite surprised when, upon joining NATO in 1952, they were visited by Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Deputy SACEUR, who urged them to hold on to Thrace by all means and even seemed to promise additional NATO troops for that. Little did they realize that this was Monty's own, on-the-spot idea, by no means an agreed SHAPE policy. On the contrary, the British ambassador in Ankara had warned London never to let the Turks know just how little NATO planned to do in their defense should war ever come[3]. However, if Yugoslavia could be made to join in the defense of the area, the whole thing might become feasible. Any thrust south from Bulgaria along the Vardar valley would then have sizable Yugoslav forces in its deep right flank.

3. Military Aid for Yugoslavia?

However, much as military cooperation might seem advisable, it was not easy to achieve. The major obstacle was Trieste and the are around it, known as the Venezia Giulia. While the city's population was mostly Italian-speaking, the countryside was mostly inhabited by Croats and Slovenes. At the end of the war, Trieste had been conquered by Tito's partisans, but under the pressure of British troops, they had had to vacate the town after a few days. Under the Italian Peace Treaty, the port and its hinterland had become a "Free Territory", nominally under UN control. Since the Soviets had sabotaged the nomination of a UN High Commissioner, however, Trieste was divided into two Zones: Zone A, held by British and American troops of about 10,000 men each, and including the port and town, and Zone B, controlled by the Yugoslavs[4]. All this had been Italian territory before the war, and in order to boost the Christian Democrats' election prospects against Communist aspirations, the U.S., Britain, and France had declared in March 1948 that they would support the Italian claim to the entire territory.

Trieste was also an important strategic asset for Western defense in general. Its port was the major supply point for US and British forces in Austria. Its sizeable US-British garrison continued the uninterrupted frontline formed by Western troops in Germany and Austria down to the Mediterranean. Not only could these units help to stop or delay a Soviet drive towards the Mediterranean, but before Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform, they also served to prevent Tito from supporting possible Communist guerrilla in Northern Italy the way he was doing it in Northern Greece.

In the U.S., there was slight pressure to invite Yugoslavia to join NATO – usually from the same corners that asked for Franco's

Spain to be incorporated into the Western alliance, although these circles were often enough conservative Roman Catholics who did not approve at all of Tito jailing a veritable Cardinal. The suggestion went to the heart of NATO's self-perception: Was NATO to be a community of shared values such as individual freedom, democracy etc., or was it just an anti-Soviet bloc?

The Italian government called for any US-Yugoslav contacts to be discussed in the North Atlantic Council, as they would obviously affect Italian security. The pro-Western Italian prime minister, Alcide de Gasperi, needed Western support, possibly even a substantial success over Trieste, to retain power in the elections scheduled for June 1953. Many Italian immigrants in the U.S. supported their native country's policy, and wrote in to their local Congressmen voicing their concerns. In the National Archives, I found one such letter being forwarded to President Truman by a junior Catholic Representative from Massachusetts, by the name of John Kennedy.

So, Italo-Yugoslav relations were tense. When Tito did ask for military aid in 1952, it was obvious that such help could not be coordinated by NATO. A delegation of British, French, and American officers was put together, but since the British and French contributions to the envisaged aid program would be no more than nominal, the bulk of the delegation, too, was American. It was headed by General Thomas T. Handy, Deputy CinCEUR, selected because he was the highest-ranking U.S. officer who did not wear a second, NATO "hat".

The Handy mission in November 1952 ended in failure. The U.S. demanded to know about Yugoslav defense planning, notably whether Tito meant to defend the Ljubljana Gap, or whether he would withdraw into the mountains again – as he had done during World War II. Not without reason did Handy argue that if the

U.S. were supposed to provide military equipment, at least they should know what sort of warfare it was going to be used for. Would the Yugoslavs want tanks or rifles, regular artillery or rather mortars? The Yugoslavs, however, would not reveal anything unless the West was prepared to reciprocate. Western defense planning for the region, however, was at the same time Italian planning against a Yugoslav attack. No way would the Italians consent to handing it over to the Yugoslavs.

This failure prompted Tito to look elsewhere for extra security, and that meant a look south. Early in 1953, Tito initiated talks with Ankara and Athens about a joint defense of the Balkans.

4. The Trieste Crisis

Before those talks led to a proper pact, the Trieste situation flared up. De Gasperi lost the June elections and had to resign. After a lengthy process of negotiations, Christian Democrat Giuseppe Pella succeeded him as prime minister. Pella, however, was not as staunchly pro-Western as de Gasperi, and he had to rely on a coalition which included a number of right-wing parties. In other words: The Italian attitude would probably harden.

In September 1953, Yugopress published a report that Belgrade would have “to seriously reconsider Yugoslavia’s attitude toward this problem”, i.e. Trieste. Following a series of misunderstandings, this led Italian politicians to believe Tito was going to formally annex "his" Zone B. Pelly gave a fiery speech in the Italian parliament and obtained a vote of confidence. Despite American and British calls for moderation, he immediately began moving Alpini formations and warships into the area. Yugoslavia soon responded in kind.

This was where NATO came into play. Tito at once charged that the units being deployed were "NATO troops". Was the Alliance conniving in Italy's threatening posture? The British explained to their wartime ally that, in peacetime, there was no such thing as "NATO troops" and that, technically, the Italians were free to move their troops as they wanted. However, this sounded hollow, and privately, the U.S. told the Italian government quite bluntly what they thought of this provocative act.

US-Italian relations were not without their complications, either. President Eisenhower had not forgotten the Pope had denied him an audience when he was still SACEUR, and resented all Italians almost as much as he resented the Germans. Italians, on the other hand, were shocked that Eisenhower had sent a woman ambassador to Rome, and that moreover, Claire Booth Luce obviously owed her position to her husband's support for the Eisenhower election campaign. Both sides were inclined to tread carefully.

After a prolonged illness, Eden resumed office. In early October 1953 things began to move swiftly. Clare Boothe Luce, US ambassador in Rome, now showed her mettle. Using all her husband's contacts, and all her considerably dramatic abilities, she pointed out that something had to be done to beef up the Italian Christian Democrats. Or else, she argued, Italy would fall to Communism, and with that the whole of Europe, and eventually the whole world. It all depended on Zone A of Trieste going to the Italians – if one was to believe Mrs Luce.

Of course, everybody expected the three Western signatories of the Italian Peace Treaty, the U.S., Britain, and France, to act together as they had always done. But this was not to be. The U.S. and Britain decided that the French were too supportive of the Italian position, and went ahead alone. On October 7, the Ameri-

can and British ambassadors in Paris informed French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault that their governments were withdrawing their troops from Trieste, and that control of Zone A was to be handed to the Italians. Bidault was “hurt, upset and displeased”, as the U.S. Ambassador recalls, at this cavalier abandonment of what had been a tripartite policy.

Even less had NATO been made part of this decision. The U.S. Permanent Representative was told that, surely, none of his colleagues on the North Atlantic Council could challenge this step, and should they still question the wisdom of it all, he was to give them copies of the joint U.S.-British communiqué. Would he care to pick up a few copies at the Embassy? This was certainly not the kind of political consultation the smaller partners had expected.

The matter was soon to become a NATO problem. Yugoslavia announced that it could not accept a solution which one-sidedly favored Italy. Should Italian troops enter Zone A, they would be attacked. Soon, smaller NATO countries were wondering if Italy would then be entitled to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty. No way, was the joint U.S. and British knee-jerk reaction. After all, Trieste was not and would not become Italian territory.

But when they consulted their respective legal departments, the result was quite surprising. Article 6 had been amended by the Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey. It now stated that “an armed attack [...] is deemed to include an attack [...] on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over [...] any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the forces were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force [...]”. This had of course been meant to protect Germany and Austria, but technically, it would apply even if the forces attacked (Italian) were not identical with those stationed in

the territory in question (Trieste) in April 1949 (i.e. American and British). A Yugoslav attack against Italian troops in Zone A would indeed constitute an aggression as defined by Articles 5 and 6 of the NAT[5], and would entitle Italy to call for Allied support. U.S. and British action had brought NATO to the brink of war with a prospective security partner, without consulting anybody beforehand. All those Allies who had always stressed the political dimension of NATO, above all Canada, were severely critical.

It took the U.S., Britain, Yugoslavia and Italy a year of tortuous negotiations, and millions in U.S. aid to Belgrade and Rome, to bring the Trieste crisis to a successful end. In October 1954, a Trieste agreement was signed in London which gave Zone A, minus a few barren rocks, to Italy, and Zone B to Yugoslavia.

5. Founding the Balkan Pact

It was the solution of the Trieste crisis which opened the way to US military aid to Yugoslavia. Still this was not without its problems, either. Delivering equipment was one thing, but without appropriate training, Yugoslav personnel would find it hard to operate US military technology. So, a number of Yugoslav officers were sent to the U.S. to be trained, but relations soured when a number of them asked for, and were granted, political asylum in the States.

Solving the Trieste crisis also made possible a true Balkan Pact[6]. Throughout 1954, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey had been negotiating. Again, there was close scrutiny from NATO partners of what was going on. Italy's claim that under the North Atlantic Treaty[7], Greece and Turkey were obliged to obtain NATO agreement before the could engage in security arrangements with a third party, was soon dismissed by the other Allies. After all, such

an interpretation of the NAT would have given every NATO partner the right to veto, say, future U.S. security arrangements. However, there was concern in NATO over what would happen should Greece and Turkey have to go to war in support of Yugoslavia. Would NATO have to follow suit, thus giving Yugoslavia an indirect security guarantee without reciprocal Yugoslav undertakings? For one thing was certain: Tito did not want to join NATO, either directly or indirectly[8].

By 1954, NATO had developed techniques of multilateral diplomatic cooperation which had not existed before. One useful tool of cooperation were regular “private meetings” of the North Atlantic Council. “Private Meetings” are not even deemed to exist. When I was working in the NATO Registry, I was warned that, since such meetings did not exist, no notes were taken. Should I nevertheless find such notes among documents, I would not be allowed to copy them, as notes which did not exist obviously could not be copied. Ladies and Gentlemen: That is NATO logic. (If you do want to know what such a Private Meeting, you consult the relevant diplomatic archives in NATO member states, as obviously the Permanent Representatives would report back what had been said at the meeting.)

Coming back to the 1950s, when the Balkan Pact was signed at Bled, Yugoslavia, on August 9, 1954, the NAC had previously taken note of it in such a private meeting. Once again, this very useful invention proved its worth: As no official notes were taken, that Italian acquiescence did not go on the record, which would otherwise have implied express Italian approval. Rather, both NATO's role had been reasserted, and Italian face saved[9].

Still, at the insistence of the U.S., and other NATO partners, the actual assistance clause in the Balkan Pact had been toned down to parallel the rather non-committal text of Article 5 of the NAT,

which left the kind, and measure, of assistance to be rendered in case of an attack, and more specifically the use of military force, to the discretion of every contracting party. For Yugoslavia, this was disappointing. Even though this measure of Balkan cooperation had opened the way for limited U.S. military aid in November 1952, expanded after another round of negotiations in 1953, Yugoslavia could not rely decisively upon any nation to come to its aid should it be attacked.

For the Turks, the objective of the entire enterprise had always been to tie Yugoslavia closer to the West, maybe even to make it the next member of NATO[10]. Not for the Turks any lofty objections based on the concept of NATO as a community of democratic nations. Ankara, like Lissabon, had never believed in that sort of thinking anyway[11].

For the Greeks, the principal aim of the Balkan Pact was to reinforce their military defenses, no more. Greece always accepted that Yugoslavia did not want to join NATO, and that most NATO members would object should Tito ever change his mind. The Greeks, however, were also hoping that relations between the West and Yugoslavia might be conducted principally through the Balkan Pact nations, thus enhancing their own position[12].

The treaty eventually arrived at did not meet any of the expectations. In a way, it bore the seeds of failure even when it was signed.

And fail it did. In the spring of 1955, Tito's new allies were as surprised as everybody else when Chrushchev's forthcoming visit to Belgrade was announced. The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, had been in Belgrade while the visit had been planned, and nobody had informed him[13]. Chrushchev's visit itself seemed to indicate a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and post-

Stalinist Russia, even if Tito did nothing to make things easy for his guest. Mercilessly, he kept asking about comrades from his Moscow days, and an embarrassed Chrushchev had to admit that every one of them had been shot[14].

Still, the Soviet threat had receded, and Tito was hoping to become one of the leading figures in the nascent movement of Non-Aligned States, initiated by the Bandung Conference. Tito saw himself as closer to Nehru and Nasser than to Eisenhower and Dulles[15]. And John Foster Dulles, the arch Cold Warrior, deemed neutrality in a fight between good and evil, between the free world and world Communism, positively immoral.

Almost at the same time, conflict erupted between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. After the anti-Greek riots in Izmir and Istanbul in September 1955, Yugoslavia openly sided with Greece, bringing Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation to a virtual halt[16]. In fact, NATO became the forum of attempts at Greek-Turkish reconciliation, and the Balkan Pact[17][18][19], the making of which had exercised diplomats for two years, lapsed into insignificance in just over twelve months[20].

Simultaneously, Tito decisively stabilized his internal position. The arrest of Archbishop Cardinal Stepinac, a Croatian nationalist and therefore a potentially divisive factor in Tito's multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, indicated a clampdown on disintegrating forces[21]. (However successful the ruthless repression of such forces may have been during Tito's lifetime, events soon after his death were to show that the demon had been dormant, not dead.) Jailing western-minded Milovan Djilas signaled a continuing adherence to Marxist principles[22].

Tito's dependence on aid waned, and he let the West feel it. The hoped-for military cooperation on the Yugoslav-Italian border

never prospered, and the U.S. phased out military aid in 1956[23]. The withdrawal of U.S. and British troops from Trieste in 1954, and from Austria in 1955, together with the end of all plans for a coordinated defense along the Isonzo, created a potentially dangerous situation in Northern Italy. The U.S. responded by deploying the first tactical nuclear weapons they sent to Europe in Verona, Italy[24].

6. Military vs. political Aspects of the North Atlantic Alliance

It has been argued that the West should have reacted earlier to Yugoslavia's defection from the Stalinist camp, should have given more, and that by not doing so, it wasted an opportunity to tie Yugoslavia continuously to the Western camp[25]. This seems doubtful. In view of Italy's position, and the need for the Allies to support a democratic government on the brink of electoral defeat, there was no way the West could have been more forthcoming to Yugoslavia. When all was said and done, Tito's state was a repressive Marxist dictatorship. If NATO really was to be anything more than an old-fashioned military alliance, there was no room for Yugoslavia, or for Franco at that. Tito never wanted to commit himself more than he actually did, and it would have been hard to imagine him pledging himself to uphold the principles of "democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law", as laid down in the Preamble of the NAT. There never was a real opportunity which the West might have missed.

Still, there were lessons to be learned. Lack of timely political consultation had gravely offended NATO partners, and overlooking the NATO dimension of their ill-conceived snapshot solution to the Trieste crisis had landed both the State Department and the Foreign Office in a nasty pickle. The major powers in NATO

were only beginning to learn that the Alliance was in fact putting more restrictions on their policies than they had imagined back in 1949.

Continuous calls for political consultation had come from Canada's Minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and from Italy. In the end, it had been the appointment of a relatively unknown schoolteacher, Gaetano Martino, as Foreign Minister in Rome which had broken the deadlock over Trieste – Martino went on to serve the longest term in office for any Italian foreign minister in the 50s. Maybe it is no coincidence then that in 1956, Pearson and Martino, together with their Norwegian colleague, Halvard Lange, were appointed the "Three Wise Men" of NATO, and codified the basic rules of political consultation within the Alliance which still apply today – rules which had been developed by NATO through the successful management of complex problems such as the Alliance's relations with Tito's Yugoslavia in the 1950s[26].

Looking back at the Trieste crisis in this context, it is another small, but important step in the development of NATO political cooperation. Founded as a mainly political structure, in response to a threat perceived as mainly political, NATO had only been militarized following the Korea shock. Still, this “militarization” had been accompanied by the creation of sound political structures to ensure political control of the military even within an alliance framework. These structures were something really new on the diplomatic stage. Never before had democratic nations subordinated their military forces to an allied command in peacetime. Never before had they exchanged sensitive political, military, intelligence and economic information within the framework of a multilateral organization. The requisite toolkits for this sort of cooperation had to be developed on a trial and error basis. Trieste

showed both the trials and the errors. One is left wondering if the Suez Crisis of 1956, which really strained the internal structure of NATO, might have wrecked the Western Alliance, had these repair kits not been ready for use. But that is another story.

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2 Heuser, Western "Containment", p. 128ff., 150, 160; Brands, Redefining the Cold War, p. 44, 47; Djilas, Jahre der Macht, p. 292f., 299; PRO, FO 371, 86750. Summary of Indications Regarding Soviet Foreign Policy No. 47 vom 26.01.1950; Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951. National Intelligence Estimate 29 vom 20.03.1951, quoted in Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, p. 117-127. - Hebert, Luk i Voda, p. 52, sees Tito in an stable internal position.

3 Di Casola, Grecia, Turchia e patto atlantico; PRO, FO 371, 95283. Brief Foreign Office an War Office vom 11.01.1951; ebd., 95284. Telegramm Foreign Office an Botschaft Washington 781 vom 16.02.1951.

4 For the Trieste problem, see two books which, although not very recent, are still essential: Duroselle, Le Conflit de Trieste, and Novak, Trieste.

5 Article 6 had been amended by the Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey. It now stated that "an armed attack [...] is deemed to include an attack [...] on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over [...] any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the forces were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force [...]. This had of course been meant to protect Germany and Austria, but technically, it would apply even if the forces attacked (Italian) were not identical with those stationed in the territory in question (Trieste) in April 1949 (i.e. American and British).

6 Incidentally, the solution of the Trieste crisis also cleared the path for a U.S.-Italian base agreement which opened Naples to the Sixth Fleet.

7 Article 8: "Each party [...] undertakes not to enter into any international agreement in conflict with this Treaty."

8 Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, p. 851, 1007; Hebert, Luk i Voda, p. 53; National Archives, Washington (NA), RG 59, DF 1950-54, 760.5/11-1054. Telegram Dillon to State Department 2002 dated 10.11.1954.

9 National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (NAC), RG 25, Acc. 1990-91/008, vol. 45, 50030-P-40, pt. 1. Despatch PermRep NATO to Secretary of State for External Affairs No. 2286 dated 29.07.1954; ibid., Telegram PermRep NATO to Secretary of State for External Affairs No. 567 dated 29.07.1954; FRUS 1952-54, viii, p. 671ff., no. 355, 760.5/7-2954. Telegram Hughes to State Department Polto 171 dated 29.07.1954.

10 NA, RG 59, DF 1950-54, 740.5/7-2454. Telegram Dulles to Embassy Paris TOPOL 113 dated 24.07.1954; ibid., 760.5/7-2654. Telegram Hughes to State Department POLTO 148 dated 26.07.1954; ibid., 760.5/9-2854. Letter Maffitt to Wolf dated 28.09.1954.

11 Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart 1953, 3845A; Heuser, Western "Containment", p. 182; FRUS 1952-54, viii, p. 616-619, No. 322, 668.811/2-653. Telegram McGhee to State Department 969 dated 06.02.1953; NAC, RG 25, Acc. 1990-91/008, vol. 50, 50030-V-2-40. Despatch Embassy Ankara to Department of External Affairs 160 dated

04.03.1953; ibid., vol. 267, 50115-40, pt. 1. Despatch PermRep NATO to Department of External Affairs 134 dated 30.03.1953.

12 NA, RG 59, DF 1955-59, 760.5/3-1755. Telegram Cannon to State Department 1946 dated 17.03.1955. For the aims of Menderes' foreign policy see Bagci, Die türkische Außenpolitik, p. 92f.

13 Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, 5161A, 5175E; for the Turkish reaction NAC, RG 25, Acc. 1991-92/109, vol. 144, 50323-40, pt. 1. Despatch Embassy Athens to Department of External Affairs 211. Summary dated 18.05.1955.

14 NAC, RG 25, Acc. 1986-87/360, vol. 80, 9623-40, pt. 3. Telegram PermRep NATO to Department of External Affairs 725 dated 08.06.1955.

15 Brands, Redefining the Cold War, p. 48; English, The Worldly Years, p. 92ff.

16 Photographs in Kadritzke/Wagner, Im Fadenkreuz der NATO, p. 28. For descriptions see Andries, Turkey and Greece, p. 135; Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, p. 29. The best account in archival sources is: PRO, FO 371, 117710. Telegram Consul-General Istanbul to Foreign Office 175 dated 09.09.1955.

17 NATO IS Registry, Brussels, Belgium, NISCA, Cyprus 1, SG/55/293. Note Ismay to Vredenburgh dated 28.09.1955; ibid., DSG/82. Note Vredenburgh to Ismay dated 28.09.1955.

18 PRO, FO 371, 117712. Telegram Bowker to Foreign Office 759 dated 24.10.1955; Archives du Ministère des Affaires trangères, Paris, EU44-60, Grèce 142, f. 21. Telegram Embassy London to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 4697/98 dated 24.10.1955; Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, Germany, Ref. 301-83 Band 32. Telegram PermRep NATO to Auswärtiges Amt Nr. 109 dated 02.11.1955; NATO Brussels, C-R(55)49. Council Meeting. Record dated 02.11.1955.

19 NAC, RG 25, Acc. 1990-91/008, vol. 217, 50102-N-40 pt. 1. Memorandum to the Minister. Cyprus and NATO dated 24.04.1956; PRO, FO 371, 123879. Minute Ward to Permanent Under-Secretary dated 17.03.1956.

20 NA, RG 59, DF 1955-59, 681.82/9-1155. Telegram Thurston to State Department 624 NIACT dated 11.09.1955.

21 NAC, RG 25, Acc. 1985-86/019, vol. 324, 9623-40, pt. 1. Despatch Embassy Belgrad to Department of External Affairs 268 dated 31.03.1952.

22 The US did not share this evaluation: FRUS 1952-54, viii, p. 640ff., no. 337, 760.5/2-1354. Telegram State Department to Embassy Athens 2460 NOFORN dated 16.02.1954. For the effect this measure had on the Soviet Union see Kind, Krieg auf dem Balkan, p. 96.

23 Heuser, Western "Containment", p. 171f.

24 SHAPE Registry, Mons, Belgium, Project 1A, Reel 10, Location 23. Memorandum AFSOUTH for SACEUR: Delaying Action Forward of the Italian Frontier. AFSOUTH/58/56 dated 20.04.1956; Nuti, Italy and the Nuclear Choices, p. 224; ibid., U.S. Forces in Italy, 263ff; Greiner, Militärstrategische Konzeptionen, Part 6.

25 Heuser, Western "Containment", p. 200f.

26 NATO IS Registry, Brussels, Belgium, NISCA 4/5/8 C-M(56)126. Letter of transmittal of the Report of the Committee of Three dated 17.11.1956. Report published in NATO, Facts and Figures.

Hungarian military policy 1948-1956

Tamás Nagy

Introduction

The battles of the Second World War were still going on, when on January 11th, 1944 in Moscow deputy foreign affairs commissar Maiskiy prepared his concept on "the desired main principles of the future world". In a memorandum prepared for his boss V. Molotov, the foreign affairs commissar of the Soviet Union, outlined the Soviet foreign policy priorities for the post-war period in the different regions of the world. According to this Hungary after the Second World War as the other states of Central Europe was supposed to become the part of the Soviet sphere of influence and should have been treated as a country defeated in the war.

The course, which was set by Soviet great power interests for Hungary determined the Hungarian foreign and military policy for the next almost half a century.

As the Red Army took control of Central Europe it became clear, that there is no differentiation between the defeated country and the ally in the war. The irony of the fate is that Hungary received the same Soviet system for punishment, as the small victorious countries for reward. The adoption of the Soviet model, which actually meant the seizure of power by the communist and workers' parties faithful to the Soviet Union in these countries, made possible for Stalin and its comrades gradually integrate the region into their political, economic and - not the least important - military sphere of interest. After the Second World War as a result of the clash of interests between the Soviet Union and the Anglos-Saxon allies in the just started Cold war, Europe became the major scene for the standoff.

As the result of the described compulsory course the occupational force of the Red Army, the Allied Control Commission, the Hungarian Communist Party and other forces sympathising with Moscow together in 1948 incorporated Hungary into the Soviet sphere of influence. As the result of this process among other things:

- The Hungarian multiparty political system was liquidated,
- The administration was transformed into a Soviet style one
- The Hungarian economy was cut from its traditional foreign markets and was converted to serve the Soviet interests,
- The Hungarian Army was deprived from its best-educated and trained officers.

The representatives of the victorious powers and Hungarian delegates signed in Paris on February 10th, 1947 the peace treaty that closed down the Second World War and it allowed for Hungary to keep a land force of 65 000 and air force of 5 000 soldiers. With the developments in the Cold War Hungary according to the Soviet interests a few years after already significantly overstepped this limit and created mass army, whose maintenance significantly surpassed the capabilities of the Hungarian economy.

The creation of Soviet style mass army 1948-49

Year 1947 signified a change in Hungarian internal affairs. After the signing of the Paris peace treaty it became obvious for all the Hungarian political forces, that the Soviet occupational forces will not leave Hungary. The reasoning was referring to the need to keep connection between the Soviet occupational zone in Austria and the Soviet hinterland and beyond this the Soviet military presence presented a wonderful political backing for the Hungarian Communist Party lead by Mátyás Rákosi in order to seize the power and to eliminate all the political enemies. The Communist party won the parliamentary elections organised on August 31st of that year, but this success of the party was overshadowed by the abuse of election ballots by their activists. The minimal victory of the Communist at the elections allowed for the Communist Party together with its allies – the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party and National Peasant Party - to start the sovietization of Hungary.

According to the Stalinist Soviet practice the system of party rule was introduced not only into civil life but in the army as well. In accordance with this concept on February 18, 1948 in Moscow the Hungarian-Soviet friendship and co-operation treaty was signed and as a result of it very soon Soviet military advisors started to arrive to Hungary and the education of Hungarian military officers started in the Soviet Union. The primary task of the Soviet advisors was the reorganisation of the Hungarian Army to a Soviet style mass army ruled by the party. The speciality of the Soviet advisory system was that it had a separate, hierarchically organised own leadership structure, which duplicating the Hungarian military leadership was even capable to command the Hungarian army. This system of advisors received its tasks and commands directly from Moscow.

With the formation of the Information Office of the Communist and Workers' parties (Kominform) on September 22, 1947 a political leadership presiding over the military was also created. Kominform practically transmitted the expectations and concrete demands of the Soviet Stalinist leadership towards the "fraternal" communist and workers' parties. Deviation from the guidance of Moscow could result in serious sanctions, as the Tito led

Yugoslavia experienced it after May 1948. After the condemnation of Yugoslavia and its declaration as the enemy, the Hungarian military leadership started to look at its Southern neighbour, the socialist Yugoslavia as its primary enemy.

The development strategy of the Hungarian army after 1948 was clearly shaped according to the Soviet strategic interests. The signing of the agreement in June 1948 about equipping the Hungarian army with Soviet weapons already indicated, that the process of the integration of the Hungarian army into the Soviet military system has started. Another sign of the introduction of Soviet guiding principles was the formation the Political Directorate of the Hungarian People's Army in November 1948, the primary task of which was the realization of party ruling in the Hungarian Army. Meanwhile on June 27, 1948 with the unification of the Hungarian Communist Party and Hungarian Social-Democratic Party a Soviet style mass party - the Hungarian Workers' Party (MDP) was formed. The creation of MDP finished the political battle that started in 1944 and made clear that in Hungary a political structure was formed in which one party had the control over all the power branches. The creation of one party system in the army meant the creation of the party control system. As the first step in this direction as of October 7, 1948 the activity of MDP party cells were allowed in the Hungarian Army and with the introduction on February 19 of the Soviet style institution of political officers, the creation of the party control system was finished.

Referring to Soviet experiences on the proposal of the Hungarian military leadership the Central Committee of MDP decided on July 21, 1948 to start the elimination from the army of the non-commissioned officer staff. As a result of this decision a deformed command structure was created in the Hungarian Army, and the negative effects of this decision still cause problems in the functioning of the present Hungarian Army. According to this decision the officers had to perform tasks, which previously were done by the non-commissioned officers, and the authority of these officers became so non-transparent that the majority of them after some time were unable to take their own decisions and assume responsibilities.

The culmination of these changes in the Hungarian military policy was the nomination of Mihály Farkas, the closest colleague and friend of the party general secretary Mátyás Rákosi as the minister of defence. The personality of Farkas was a guarantee for the party leadership for the control of the army, but also meant a never seen possibility for the army to promote its interests. The new defence minister did not have any military education, but this did not stop him from taking the highest military rank (army general). The arrival of the new

minister also meant that the older, well-educated military leaders were pushed into background and many of them were executed.

Preparing for the third world war 1950-53

The sovietization of the Hungarian army was finished by the mid 1950's. The political leadership got rid of those military leaders in the army who could have their own opinions. In the Hungarian army of new type the number one expectation from the military leaders was political reliability, which meant an unquestionable loyalty to the party leadership. In this period the professional qualities were not the most important requirements in Hungary and this was not only true for the army but for the civil life as well. That is why it is no surprise that statistics of those times give an appalling picture about the general and military education of the top military leaders. The freshly created military education system could not meet the criteria of the qualitative education for officers because the army as a result of its reorganisation and enlargement was constantly demanding new officers in greater and greater numbers. People could witness never before seen careers, but this was often overshadowed by the lack of general knowledge of these people.

By the May of 1951 the Hungarian Army as a result of quantitative development reached the size of 65000. But the extensive development of the army accelerated only after the breakout of the Korean War in June of that year. The Stalinist Soviet leadership assessing the result of the first half-year of the Korean War came to the conclusion that the third world war was imminent. That is why between January 7 and 17, 1951 in Moscow the communist parties of the socialist countries conducted consultations about the situation. On this meeting the Soviet leadership called its allies to raise their spending on the military and to develop their armies more quickly as the third world war was approaching.

In case of Hungary it meant the growth of the production of the military industry, which was planned to be executed in the first 5-year plan. The state of the military industry was regularly checked by the leaders of MDP and the party helped by direct means the development of the Hungarian defence sector. As Hungary was far from Korea and no NATO country was a neighbour to Hungary for the Hungarian leaders Yugoslavia was considered as the main enemy after 1948. Because of this war hysteria on June 2, 1951 the MDP's leadership made a decision to build a fortification system the along the Southern state borders with Yugoslavia. These works were going on under the biggest secrecy and

under direct party guidance and control. This top secrecy made possible great waste of resources and equipment which became known to public only a few years after, in 1956. Besides that, when the fortification system was ready, it became useless as the result of turns in world politics - as often before - modified the Hungarian military policy too.

Melting and reduction 1953-54

The one-man command system introduced on January 20, 1953 already indicated that in the Hungarian People's Army there were sufficient numbers of reliable officers acceptable for the political leadership. As the result of extensive development by the end of 1952 the size of Hungarian People's Army reached 210 000 people, its highest number in peace. These developments seemingly were successful as such a Hungarian force was created that was meeting the quantitative Soviet and Hungarian expectations. However with US President Eisenhower taking office on January 1953 and with death of Stalin on March 5 of that year some major changes started that drastically altered world politics.

The collective Soviet leadership after Stalin called to Moscow on June 13-14, 1953 the Hungarian party and state leaders in order to determine the main tasks for the next period. Among the members of the delegation led by Mátyás Rákosi was Imre Nagy the future Prime Minister of Hungary. Khrushchev and Berea made clear for Rákosi that a radical change was needed in the Hungarian economic and military policy and this was questioning the basics of the Hungarian practice of the previous period. This consultation between the Hungarian and Soviet leaders made again absolutely clear that Hungary did not have even the minimum of independence from the Soviet Union. As the result of the inner power fights within the Soviet party leadership some surprising changes happened in the Hungarian domestic affairs, which had substantial effects on the Hungarian military policy too.

The changes happening in the relations of the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union clearly indicated that a melting process started which also meant the reduction of military potentials on both sides. As the part of this process on decision of MDP in the Hungarian Ministry of Defence on July 17, 1953 the plans for the reduction of military forces were prepared. As the result of this reduction the morality of the Hungarian People's Army dangerously worsened as in this period a massive number of officers, who began their careers in the quantitative development phase of the army, found themselves on the streets. The analysis of the documents from that period also shows that general István Bata, who

was the defence minister in the government of Imre Nagy used every mean in his possession to minimise the reductions in size of the army. However it should be mentioned that Bata was not belonging to the inner circles of the party leaders and his personality did not predestined him for this job.

In the summer of 1954 the Hungarian military leadership several times attempted to force the leadership of MDP to accept the development strategy of the Hungarian People's Army until 1960, but the political leadership every time dismissed the ideas of the military. Many timed drastic ways were used to let the military leaders know that the rise of military expenditures was not among the priorities of the state. No wonder that the Hungarian officers lived through this period quite frustrated because of existential fears (job, salary) and they became a stable base in the MDP for the conservative change in 1955.

Integration into Warsaw Pact (Treaty) 1954-55

The so called treaties of Paris signed by nine Western European countries on October 23, 1954 recognised the military equality of the German Federal Republic and with this step the possibility of NATO membership opened for Germany. The Soviet leadership realising the change in the German question and sensing the coming results of negotiations on the neutrality of Austria decided to create a new type of political and military alliance system. In the Soviet sphere of influence the Soviet leaders were not allowing any internal party fights, so Hungarian party leader Mátyás Rákosi, who as a result of the change in 1953 lost only his position as the Prime minister but kept the post of party boss, launched an open attack against the Imre Nagy, the prime minister at that time. Rákosi received encouragement for this step from Moscow, where on June 12, 1955 the Soviet and Hungarian party leaders held their meetings. The Khrushchev led Soviet party leadership found the figure of Imre Nagy inconvenient by that time. For Khrushchev and his comrades it was not bothering anymore that only two years before it was exactly them who chose Imre Nagy for the post of the Prime Minister. The leadership in Moscow in January 1955 concentrated completely on the creation of the future military alliance and this process demanded persons who would accept the superiority of the Soviet interests without questions.

Mátyás Rákosi after returning from Moscow using the momentary situation started the process of comeback to power. Rákosi systematically pushed out Imre Nagy from the political life and put him into an unbearable situation so that Imre Nagy had to resign

voluntarily. After the Imre Nagy's resignation István Hegedűs became the new Prime Minister of Hungary, who fully executed the integration of Hungary into the organisation of the Warsaw Pact formed on May 14, 1955. The creation of Warsaw Pact at the same time legalised the status of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary because with the establishment of the neutral Austria the Soviet troops had to leave Austria's territory. Moreover the Warsaw Pact made possible to put the Soviet forces from Austria on the Hungarian territory. The creation of Warsaw Pact, the influx of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary and the return to power of Mátyás Rákosi generated growing antipathy within the Hungarian society. This negative mood only further strengthened the decisiveness of Rákosi to hold to power and to make his ties closer with the Soviets.

According to the decision of the Hungarian government of September 7, 1955 the personnel of the Hungarian People's Army was cut by further 20 000 people. As the result of these cuts the sense of pessimism gained strength among the ranks of the professional military. It must be mentioned that parallel to the reductions from 1953 continuously and after the foundation of the Warsaw Pact especially, significant developments were made in the air defence. It was necessary because of the American concept of "total retaliation" adopted in 1954, when the US leadership declared that if its or its allies' interests were in danger it would massively use weapons of mass destruction. The US intended to use its strategic air force in order to deliver its atomic and hydrogen bombs. The Soviet led Warsaw Pact could defend itself from this danger only with an effective air defence system. So the development of the Hungarian air defence system after 1955 was accelerated in contrast with the Hungarian ground forces where further reduction were still on the agenda.

Crisis and revolution

In February 1956 on the XX. Congress of the Soviet Communist Party it became apparent that Khrushchev strengthened its positions in the power fight following Stalin's death, so he could start to criticise the Stalinist period. The world learned in no time about Khrushchev's speech delivered behind closed doors at the Congress and it started a decay process in the Soviet sphere of influence, which was completely unprecedented.

It became clear for the Hungarian party leaders that in Moscow such a change happened again that will deeply rearrange the Hungarian domestic affairs. Among the Hungarian population many people demanded that the MDP leadership should return as

soon as possible to the political line of 1953 that was connected with the figure of Imre Nagy. The changes in the Soviet Union had a major effect within the army too, based on the experiences of the previous years the existential fears among the professionals were growing again. The uncertainty and bad atmosphere only further deepened when on August 1, 1956 the size of the Hungarian People's Army was further reduced by 15 000.

In this period the Hungarian officers' staff completely lost its confidence. The existential fears, the facts of misuse which came to public knowledge and the rehabilitation of the innocently executed military leaders shook the mood of soldiers in the Hungarian People's Army. The drastic changes in the political life like the final removal of Mátyás Rákosi from power and the country did not contribute to a more positive and hopeful atmosphere in the army. No wonder that the newest plans for further reduction planned for the fall shook the foundations of the trust in the political leadership among the soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army.

In the people's revolt and later revolution started on October 23, 1956 the Hungarian army remained without guidance and leadership. The army personnel was awaiting its future with worries and it became totally uncertain with the start of armed fights on the streets. The leadership of MDP on October 31, 1956 dissolved the party and at the same time formed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which after the Soviet intervention of November 4 assumed with some modifications the military policy of its predecessor, accepting the Soviet power interests. It took a long time for the new Hungarian party to make itself accepted by the domestic and international public.

Господин Председатель, Дамы и Господа, Уважаемая Научная Конференция!

Венгерская армия в период холодной войны (1948-1968 гг)

После второй мировой войны в международной политике образовались два полюса (две мировые системы). Под руководством Соединённых Штатов Америки НАТО объединил капиталистические страны, а Советский Союз – объединил страны, считающих себя социалистическим.

Основное направление соотношения сил было определено политическим, экономическим и военным соперничеством этих группировок. Взаимное недоверие и беспокойство, направленное в сторону противника с целью удержания достигнутых позиций, привело к обострению в международных отношениях, к холодной войне, а в итоге – к усиливающейся гонке вооружения.

На основании договора держав-победителей, после 1945-го [*тысяча девятьсот сорок пятого*] года Восточно-европейские страны попали под сферу влияния Советского Союза. На территории нескольких государств данного пространства базировались советские войска. Бывшие социалистические страны не имели право самостоятельно решать свою судьбу.

«Парижский мирный договор»[1] (10 февраля 1947 года) [*десятого февраля тысяча девятьсот сорок седьмого года*] разрешил реорганизацию венгерской армии и постановку её в количестве 70.000 [*семьдесят тысяч*] солдат. Сухопутные войска ограничивались в количестве 65.000 [*шестьдесят пять тысяч*]-, а зенитные войска (90 [*девяносто*] самолётов) – в количестве 5.000 [*пять тысяч*] солдат.

В 1948-ом [*тысяча девятьсот сорок восьмом*] году был разработан план развития армии, в котором рассчитывали достигнуть допустимое количество военнослужащих в течении 4-5 [*четырёх-пяти*] лет.

Венгрия надеялась, что советских войск выведут с территории страны, и государство станет независимым, демократическим. Случилось не так! Статья 22 [*двадцать вторая*] главы 4 [*четвёртой*][2] Парижского мирного договора гласит, что в течении 90 [*девяносто*] дней с момента вступления его в силу, вооружённых союзных войск необходимо вывести с территории государства. Однако, Советская Армия и в дальнейшем сохранила за собой право базировать в Венгрии такие силы, которые могли обеспечить сохранность путей сообщения с австрийской территорией, ранее оккупированной советскими войсками. При этом державы-победители не установили максимально допустимую величину этих войск.

Для обеспечения дорожных и железнодорожных путей сообщения в Венгрии, Советский Союз с середины 1950-ых [*тысяча девятьсот пятидесятых*] годов содержал две стрелковое дивизии и по одной бомбардировочной и истребительной авиационной дивизии[3]. Содержание таких сил вероятно было обусловлено не с целью обеспечения путей сообщения, а с более высокими стратегическими целями.

Власть в Венгрии от середины 1948-ого [*тысяча девятьсот сорок восьмого*] года попала в руки узкого круга руководства Венгерской партии трудящихся[4] (Матяш Ракоши, Эрне Гере, Михаль Фаркаш, Йожеф Реваи). Развитие государства проходило в условиях диктатуры, в однопартийной системе. Образовалось однопартийное государство сталинского образца, в результате чего коммунистическое руководство продала страну советским интересам.

Самостоятельной военной политикой Венгрия не владела. Венгерская партия трудящихся разработала военную концепцию государства по запросам московского руководства. В её исполнении значительную роль играли и советские военные советники.

В 1948-ом [*тысяча девятьсот сорок восьмом*] году венгерская армия состояла примерно из 30.000 [*тридцать тысяч*] солдат. Наиболее весомую военную силу представляли две пехотные дивизии[5]. В период с 1948-ого [*тысяча девятьсот сорок восьмого*] - по 1953-й

[*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третий*] год министром обороны был тот Михаль Фаркаш (с 1949 [*тысяча девятьсот сорок девятого*] года – генерал-полковник), который одновременно занимал должность заместителя генерального секретаря Венгерской партии трудящихся.

Умеренное развитие армии продолжалось не долго. Когда Москва и Информационное бюро коммунистических партий (КОМИНФОРМ) сделало определение об ухудшении и «обострении» в международных отношениях, и когда после 1949-ого [*тысяча девятьсот сорок девятого*] года – с момента образования НАТО – обвинили некоторых капиталистических стран в усиленной подготовке к войне, радикально изменилась и военная политика Венгрии.

Помимо того, что КОМИНФОРМ Югославию осуждал и многократно нападал на неё, характеризовал страну, как враждебное (империалистическое) государство. С точки зрения военной политики, страна, совместно с советскими частями, должна была идти против Югославии. Подготовку воинских частей и штабов проводили в основном в знак ожидаемого столкновения с югославами.

С 1949-ого [*тысяча девятьсот сорок девятого*] года в результате советского запроса началось нереальное по масштабам и темпам развитие армии.

Война в Корее[6] (25 июня 1950 – 27 июля 1953 год) [*от двадцать пятого июня тысяча девятьсот пятидесятого года – по двадцать седьмое июля тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третий год*] подвергла Соединённых Штатов и Советского Союза значительному испытанию. Климат в мировой политике ещё более обострился. По некоторым прогнозам в последующие 1-2 [*один-два*] года считали возможным начало новой мировой войны.

Ранее выдвинутый план развития армии был полностью отброшен из-за изменившейся ситуации в международной политике. В период с 1949-ого – по 1953-ий [*тысяча девятьсот сорок девятого по тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третий*] годы в среднем два раза в год

менялась структура (организация) войск. Одним из важных задач 1950-ых [*тысяча девятьсот пятидесятых*] годов был переход к советскому принципу руководства и военного учения.

Количество армии к 1953-му [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третьему*] году превысило 200.000 [*двести тысяч*]. Основную группировку сухопутных войск составляли: три стрелковые и одна мотострелковый корпус, одна пробойная артиллерийская дивизия и пять артиллерийских бригад. Основная сила зенитных и воздушные силы состояли из двух истребительных авиационных дивизий, одной бомбардировочной и одной штурмовой дивизии.

Содержание армии ежегодно требовало всё больше средств. Так, например в 1952-ом [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят втором*] году для защиты государства выделили 8,6 [*восемь миллиардов шестьсот миллионов*] форинта. Эта сумма составляла 20% [*двадцать процентов*] государственного бюджета.

Армия по количеству была значительной, однако состояла из слабо подготовленных войск, снабжённых устаревшей техникой.

Среди кадровых офицеров первостепенное значение имели не деловые качества, а политическая надёжность. В 1953-ем [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третьем*] году количество офицеров превысило 32.000 [*тридцать два тысяча*] человек[7].

После смерти Сталина (5 марта 1953 г.) [*пятое марта тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третьего года*] и окончания войны в Корее (27 июля 1953 год) [*двадцать седьмое июля тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третий год*] политика нового советского руководства (Маленков, Хрущев, Молотов, Микоян...) благоприятно изменилась. Место резко-замкнутой политики в отношении западных государств заняла политика, провозглашающая мирное сосуществование на основании конструктивного сотрудничества.

Такие перемены повлияли и на Венгрию. В июне 1953-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третьего*] года премьер-министром стал тот Имре Надь, который многое сделал за снос сталинских рамок[8]. В изменённой ситуации Венгрия уже не нуждалась в содержании 200.000-ой [*двухсот тысячной*] армии. Сокращение в 1953-ем [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят третьем*] году составило 50.000 [*пятьдесят тысяч*], в 1955-ом [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят пятом*] году – 20.000 [*двадцать тысяч*], а в начале 1956-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестого*] года последующих 15.000 [*пятнадцать тысяч*] солдат.

14-ого мая 1955-го [*четырнадцатого мая тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят пятого*] года Венгрия стала членом Варшавского Договора[9]. Со стороны Венгрии документ подписал премьер-министр Андраш Хегедюш.

Усиленная индустриализация, подготовка к войне, большие расходы на оборону и на содержание огромной армии, а также совершённые ошибки и грехи, беззаконные поступки, судебные процессы концепционного характера и другие подобные явления, к лету и осени 1956-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестого*] года привели к тяжелому кризису.

Октябрь 1956-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестого*] года застал армию неожиданно, в ходе реорганизации. Венгерская армия в это время состояла из 127.000 [*сто двадцать семь тысяч*] военнослужащих.

Осенью 1956-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестого*] года разные группировки сформулировали свои требования по пунктам. Они ставили своей целью проведение выборов в многопартийной системе, назначение на пост министра Имре Надь (его в 1955-ом [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят пятом*] году освободили от должности), вывод советских войск, пересмотр системы обязательных поставок, ликвидацию Управления

государственной безопасности, восстановления герба Кошута, снос памятника Сталину и так далее.[10]

Все стремления, направленные на улучшение системы, 23-го [*двадцать третьего*] октября перешли в крупномасштабную демонстрацию, а позже, когда появилась угроза потери достижений, демонстрация перешла в народную революцию.

Советский Союз с помощью 17 [*семнадцати*] танковых и моторизованных дивизий подавил революцию (войну за независимость).[11]

Опасаясь от кровавой бойни, Народная армия Венгрии в 1956-ом [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестом*] году не выступила на стороне революции и освободительной войны. Вместе с тем, многие военнослужащие помогали вооружённым группировкам. Среди героев офицеров в первую очередь необходимо назвать: Пал Малетер, Бела Кираль, Андраш Мартон, Иштван Мариан, Иштван Ковач и Йожеф Вароди.

С другой стороны армию и офицеров нельзя было применять для подавления революции и войны за независимость. Причиной этого с одной стороны было то, что большая часть солдат отожествлялся с целями революции, а с другой стороны военная присяга была несопоставима с выступлением против населения (солдаты обязались служить родине и трудовому народу оружием, не щадя свою жизнь).

Советская Армия в 1956-ом [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят шестом*] году разоружила венгерских частей без сопротивления.

Развитие государства вновь проходила в однопартийной системе, определяющая роль принадлежала Венгерской социалистической рабочей партии. Правительство возглавлял Янош Кадар. Вернутся к сталинским методам 1950-ых [*тысяча девятьсот пятидесятых*] годов, было уже невозможно, но страна многое должна была отдать от своей независимости. Руководство страны ставило своей первостепенной задачей многостороннее сотрудничество с Советским Союзом, в ходе которого во множестве случаев страдали венгерские национальные интересы.

С 1957-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят седьмого*] года началась реорганизация армии.

С 1960-ых [*тысяча девятьсот шестидесятых*] годов венгерская армия состояла из двух типов вооружённых сил. Одновременно проходило развитие сухопутных и отечественных зенитных войск.

В конце 1960-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестидесятого*] года основную мощь сухопутных войск составляла одна танковая дивизия, пять стрелковых дивизий и одна ракетная бригада[12], а основную силу авиационных войск – три истребительных авиационных полка и один сквозной авиацианный дивизион[13].

В соответствии с разработанной военной доктриной, Варшавский Договор большое значение уделял подготовке и обучению войск с целью атаки. В планах всегда фигурировало предположенное нападение со стороны НАТО.

Венгерские войска совместно с советскими силами должны были захватить разные территории и уничтожить объекты НАТО.

Народную армию Венгрии подготавливали для выполнения военных операции в два направления:

1. Придунайская военная операция: Вена – Линз – Сальзбург – Мюнхен.
2. Северо-итальянская военная операция: Грац – Клагенфурт – Удине – Милан – Генуя[14].

Свою подготовку о свою силу члены-участники Варшавского Договора демонстрировали на разных международных учениях. Наиболее значительные среди них: в 1962-ом [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят втором*] году: «Дунай-1962» (Венгрия), в 1963-ем [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят третьем*] году «Квартет» (Германская Демократическая Республика), в 1966-ом [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят шестом*] году «Влтава» (Чехословакия) и в 1967-ом [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят седьмом*] году «Родопе» (Болгария).

В период с 1957-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят седьмого*] - по 1960-ый [*тысяча девятьсот шестидесятый*]

год министром обороны был генерал-лейтенант Гейза Ревес (с 1958-го [*тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят восьмого*] года -генерал-полковник), с 1960-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестидесятого*] - по 1984-ый [*тысяча девятьсот восемьдесят четвёртый*] год генерал-лейтенант Лайош Цинеге (с 1962-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят второго*] года – генерал-полковник, а с 1978-го [*тысяча девятьсот семьдесят восьмого*] года – генерал армии).

К концу 1960-ых [*тысяча девятьсот шестидесятых*] годов среди стран-участников Совета Экономической Взаимопомощи темпы экономического роста замедлились. С первого января 1968-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят восьмого*] года в Венгрии ввели экономическую реформу, которая взамен неповоротливого центрального планового регулирования предоставила предприятиям более широкую самостоятельность в области экономики. Советское руководство к «новому экономическому механизму» с самого начала относилось с подозрением, так как в нём появились элементы, характерные рыночной экономике.

В Чехословакии в начале 1968-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят восьмого*] года вырисовывалось движение, ставившее целью создание более демократического строя («Пражская весна»). Во главе реформ стоял Александер Дубчек и Ольдрих Черник. Однако, свои планы они не могли осуществить, так как воспрепятствовало им совместное военное выступление пятерых социалистических государств (Советский Союз, Болгария, Польша, Венгрия и ГДР). Ситуацию в Чехословакии Л.И. Брежнев охарактеризовал как контрреволюцию[15].

Так как Основной закон Варшавского Договора запрещал оккупацию территории любого участника-союзника, советское государство эти военные действия представлял во всём мире как учение.

Относительно советских войск, другие государства, принимающие участие в оккупации не представляли значительные военные силы. Вместе с тем, их было достаточно для того, чтобы руководство во главе с Брежневым могло перед всем

миром представлять оккупацию как единое, общее решение государств-участников.

В акции, под лозунгом интернациональной взаимопомощи, Венгрия приняла участия с помощью одной дивизии (8-ая [*восьмая*] мотострелковая дивизия из города Залаэгерсег). Усилили это соединение одним стрелковым полком и одним батальоном, подготовленным для выполнения задач, связанных с поддержанием и обеспечением порядка.

С 28-го [*двадцать восьмого*] июля 1968-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят восьмого*] года эта дивизия попала под командование генерала-полковника Проволова, командира Южной группой войск Советской Армии. С этого момента венгерское военное руководство права командования не имело, приказов и распоряжений давать не могло.

Количество военнослужащих в венгерской дивизии достигло 12.500 [*двенадцать тысяч пятьсот*] человек. В соединении имелось 155 [*сто пятьдесят пять*] танков, 200 [*двести*] штук разных типов и разных калибров зенитно-полевых и стрелковых орудий, а также 2.000 [*две тысячи*] штук автомобильной и броневой техники[16].

Венгерские части находились в Чехословакии, начиная с 24.00 [*двадцать четвёртого*] часа, 20-го [*двадцатого*] августа 1968-го [*тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят восьмого*] года, а последний венгерский солдат покинул страну 31-го [*тридцать первого*] октября.

Венгерская дивизия в Чехословакии должна была держать под контролем 10.000 км² [*десять тысяч квадратных километров*], при этом в юго-западной части Словакии необходимо было оккупировать 10 [*десять*] гарнизонов (Нитра, Тополчани, Шеред, Нове-Замки, Левице, Нове Место над Вахом, Пештани, Хлохорец, Велки Кртис, Врабле)[17].

Венгерские солдаты старались иметь хорошие отношения с местным населением. Среди венгерских и чехословацких (военных и гражданских) лиц вооружённого столкновения не было, поэтому от венгерских орудий чехословацкие лица не страдали. В результате ввода венгерских войск на территорию

Чехословакии, по имеющимся данным, потеряли свою жизнь 4 [*четверо*] венгерских солдат (из-за несчастного случая, из-за болезни и самоубийства) и 2 [*двое*] граждане Чехословакии (из-за автокатастрофы)[18].

С военной точки зрения 8-ая [*восьмая*] дивизия безупречно выполнила свои задачи. Вместе с тем, оценка воинских частей негативная и бесславная, поскольку они принимали участие в разгроме демократического процесса. Однако из-за предоставления акции под предлогом «интернациональной помощи», ответственность принадлежала не солдатам, а неправильной, ошибочной политике Брежнева.

Благодарю Вас за внимание!

Будапешт, 04 марта 2003 года

Д-р, подполковник Иштван Балло
Министерство обороны
Венгерской Республики
Военно-исторический институт и музей

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ВЫВОД СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК ИЗ РУМЫНИИ – ПОБЕДА БУХАРЕСТА ИЛИ РЕШЕНИЕ МОСКВЫ

Командор (запаса) ГЕОРГЕ ВАРТИК

27 мая 1958 года общественное мнение Румынии было осведомлено о работах состоявшегося 27 мая того же года в Москве Совещания Политического Консультативного Комитета стран-членов Варшавского Договора. Доклад Верховного Главнокомандующего объединенных вооруженных сил маршала Советского Союза И.С.Конева касался «*нового сокращения вооруженных сил стран-участниц Варшавского Договора*» и «*вывода советских войск с территории Румынской Народной Республики*»[1].

Центральный орган печати Румынской Рабочей Партии отмечал: «*Политический Консультативный Комитет утвердил* ***предложение Правительства Советского Союза*** (подчеркнуто нами – Г.В.), *согласованное с Правительством Румынской Народной Республики о выводе в ближайшем будущем с территории Румынской Народной Республики советских войск, которые находились там согласно Варшавскому Договору*»[2].

Это предложение содержит хотя бы одну неправду , советские войска остались в Румынии после завершения войны, что было «узаконено» статьей 21 Мирного Договора, заключенного между Румынией и Союзными и Присоединившимися Державами, подписанного в Париже 10 февраля 1947 года[3.] Москва оставляет за собой право оставаться на оккупированной территории , не делая никаких уточнений в связи с численным составом сохранявшихся в Румынии войск, путей сообщения, которые должны были быть предоставлены в их распоряжение для прохождения в Австрию, числом, когда они будут выведены.

Что касается мотивации решения о выводе советских войск, так как это объяснялось исключительно «*предложением Правительства Советского Союза*» , то необходимо отметить ряд оттенков, так как случай

Румынии был единственным, как впоследствии признал Хрущев:»*Румыны* – вспоминает он – *предложили нам вывести наши войска с ее территории»,* в отличие от Венгрии или Польши, когда «*мы предложили им сократить или полностью вывести войска с их территории»*[4].

После смерти И.В.Сталина 5 марта 1953 года, «новый курс» политики Москвы, проводимый «тройкой» Маленков-Молотов-Хрущев, представлял надежду как для советского народа, так и для национальностей стран-сателитов, о «народной демократии». Надежда для тех, кто был руководим, но озабоченность для коммунистических руководителей, бывших постсталинистов, которые видели в этом угрозу для своих позиций. Боязнь , что они могли быть заменены со своих постов, заставила Георге-Георгиу-Дежа быстро устранить Лукрециу Пэтрэшкану - его возможного заменителя (апрель 1955 года[5]). Присутствие войск Советской Армии на территории страны еще во время Сталина было очень неудобным для румынских политических руководителей, но было очень опасным узнать мысли Хрущева в этом отношении. Существовала надежда, что заключение Мирного Договора с Австрией создаст условия , которые позволили хотя бы поставить этот вопрос на обсуждение. Для западной дипломатии считалось естественным, чтобы с юридической точки зрения советские войска покинули Румынию после урегулирования международного политического статуса Австрии. Уже в 1949 году, один дипломатический французский документ, датированный 30 июня, касался доклада, разработанного военным атташе Франции в Бухаресте майором Парисот, о перспективах, создававшихся возможным выводом советских войск из Румынии после заключения Мирного Договора с Австрией[6].

1955 год был годом надежд для руководителей в Бухаресте, так как Румыния стала учредительным членом Варшавского Договора, в то время как Союзные и Объединенные Державы признавали, что в результате подписания 15 мая Договора «*Австрия восстанавливается как суверенное, независимое и демократическое государство»*[7]. В новом политическом контексте можно было прощупать почву в Кремле о необходимости дальнейшего пребывания его войск на территории Румынии. Но кто из руководителей в Бухаресте имел смелость сделать это?

Новая возможность появилась на фоне ослабления международной напряженности, отмеченной состоявшейся 18-23 июля 1955 года в Женеве Конференции глав четырех держав – СССР, США, Великобритании и Франции.

Недавние свидетельства участников политической арены того времени отмечают, что жарким летом 1955 года ряд румынских коммунистических руководителей пытались обратиться к Н.С.Хрущеву с просьбой высказать свою точку зрения.

Так, Георге Апостол вспоминает, что Георгиу-Деж якобы организовал на своей вилле у моря встречу членов Политбюро РРП и будто бы сообщил им:»А*встрия подписала с Объединенными Нациями Договор о нейтралитете. Согласно Договору советские войска остаются только до подписания им Договора с Австрией. Необходимо ,чтобы мы подняли вопрос о выводе советских войск из Румынии на основании того,что Австрия подписала Договор о нейтралитете с Объединенными Нациями и что положения Договора в связи с нахождением советских войск ясны. Советские войска должны отступить!»*[8].

Ион Георге Маурер рассказывает, что он подружился с Хрущевым во время частых охот в Румынии. При одном обстоятельстве Маурер якобы ему сказал:»*Какой тебе смысл держать русские войска в Румынии? Это можно объяснить тем, что если ты их держишь в Германии, или в Польше, или в Болгарии, то эти страны – соседи с государствами, которые не входят в состав союза социалистических стран. Но Румыния расположена в середине! Как ты сможешь объяснить им, чтобы они поверили, что ты держишь здесь войска не для того, чтобы оккупировать Румынию, а для того, чтобы защитить ее от нашествия капиталистических стран?*[9]» Возможно, что этот случай произошел 4 или 6 июня 1955 года, когда Хрущев находился в Бухаресте , после окончания своего путешествия в Белград и Софию[10].

Если поверить этим признаниям, связанным с архивными документами, вытекает, что Деж желал вывода советских войск, но не осмеливался официально завить об этом руководителю в Кремле. С другой стороны, возможно, что после конференции в Женеве, сам Хрущев думал о своевременности вывода части или полного вывода своих войск из Румынии, присутствие которых не оправдывало себя после заключения Договора с Австрией. Но по мнению московского руководителя такое решение должно было быть результатом великодушного жеста Кремля,

примером для международного сообщества и ни в коем случае реакцией на требование Бухареста. Хитрый Деж отдавал себе отчет в том, что он мог бы завоевать доверие хозяина, избегая выразить официально свое желание освободиться от советских войск. Так, что по настоянию вице-президкента Агентства Юнайтед Пресс А.Л.Брэдфорда, комментировать известие о том, что советские войска якобы будут выведены из Румынии до 1 октября 1955 года, румынский коммунистический руководитель умолчал о своих намерениях. Он притворился, что понимает необходимость дальнейшего пребывания советских войск в Румынии и после заключения Договора с Австрией, диктуемую значительными изменениями положения на континенте. «*Если иностранные войска западных стран* – заявлял Георге Георгиу-Деж 12 августа 1955 года – *были бы выведены из стран Западной Европы в их национальныу границы, а созданные на Западе военные группировки были бы ликвидированы, положение в Европе изменилось бы и была бы устранена необходимость Варшавского Договора, а также и других мер обеспечения безопасности, предусмотренных этим Договором». В таком случае* – продолжал румынский руководитель – *ясно, что была бы устранена необходимость нахождения сочетских войск в Румынии»*[11]. Это был ответ, который косвенным образом удовлетворил бы Хрущева, который в тот же день обратился с письмом к Георге Апостолу , запросив его рассмотреть вопрос о сокращении общей численности румынских войск с 250 000 до 210 000 человек[12].

Будучи в Бухаресте, Н.С.Хрущев выступил с большой речью. В этой речи советский руководитель, казалось бы, давал надежду:»*Предложения Советского Союза в связи с вопросами о разоружении, решение советского правительства до 15 декабря 1955 года сократить численность советских войск на 640 000 человек было тепло встречено мировой общественностью и оценивалось как новый важный вклад Советкого Союза в дело мира и безопасности народов»*[13]. Может быть – думали некоторые –, что сокращение численности войс влекло за собо

и перемешение около 33 000 военных из Румынии в рамки советских границ. Согласно данным американской разведки, в октябре 1955 года в Румынии находились две пехотных дивизии, численностью в 35 000 военнослужащих, еще 2 000 человек представляли войска безопасности, к которым добавлялись 111 реактивных и 10

транспортных самолетов. В Венгрии находилось 24 000 военнослужащих и 15 000 войск бехопасности, в Польше – 35 000 и еще 2 000, а в ГДР – 400 000 и еще 15 000[14].

Согласно свидетельствованиям Георге Апостола, после завершения упомянутого совещания, Хрущев встретился с назначенным румынскими руководителями министром Вооруженных сил Эмилем Боднэрашем, кажется даже самим Георге Георгиу-Деж, поставить вопрос о выводе советских волйск, имея в виду тот факт, что генерал был членом советских специальных отделов (?).Хитрость Дежа была явной, как позднее рассказывал Боднэраш Паулу Никулеску-Мизилу:»если все получалось хорошо, то было хорошо для обеих сторон», для Дежа и для Боднэраша, если все выходило плохо, то тогда Политбюро заявило бы, что это была личная инициатива министра вооруженных сил[15].

Касаясь этого момента, Хрущев вспоминает, что «он разозлился», когда Боднэраш «вдруг поставил вопрос о войсках». Румынский коммунист аргументировал, что Румыния имеет границы только с социалистическими странами, но Хрущев возразил, что СССР должен сохранять войска в Румынии для предотвращения нападения турок с Черного моря. Вследствие реакции советского руководителя, который обвинил своих партнеров по диалогу в национализме и антисоветизме («*до настоязщего времени вы хорошо себя чувствовали под крылом Советского Союза, а теперь вы его отталкиаете*»), румыны отказались от своего предложения, согласившись, что «*развитие социализма в нашей стране не определяется давлением Советского Союза».*

Непреклонное отношение «хозяина» в такой мере испугало Дежа, что – если верить Георге Апостолу – для празднования в Москве 7 ноября 1955 года, он назначаил руководителем делегации Эмиля Боднэраша, который якобы получил от Хрущева и Булганина заверение в том, что Советский Союз «*решил вывести свои войска с территории Румынии. Это, не вследствие того, что вы подняли этот вопрос, а потому что мы пришли к выводу о том, что мы должны отступить»*[17]. Трудно верить , что это намерение не было сообщено Бухаресту по дипломатическим каналам[18] и нужно было, чтобы прошло три года, пока было принято это категорические решение.

Последующий период был отмечен перестановкой руководителей в Бухаресте, которые отдавали себе отчет в том, что решение о выводе советских войск из Румынии должно идти только из Москвы, по собственной инициативе советских руководителей, без того, чтобы оно находилось под влиянием румынских коммунистов.

Представленный Хрущевым 25 февраля 1956 года на XX Съезде КПСС секретный доклад, в котором осуждался «культ личности» и раскрывались совершенные Сталиным преступления, так ужаснули руководителей в Бухаресте , что они уже видели себя смещенными с власти. Ясно, что хозяина нельзя было сердить, а наоборот, необходимо было продемонстрировать безоговорочное повиновение.Начавшиеся в Польше события – волнения в г.Познань и возвращение к власти Владислава Гомулки - затем в Венгрии – кризис на верхушке партии и замена Матиаса Ракоши – «*привели к тому, что волнения в румынском Политбюро прекратились перед опасностью, возникающей в «социалистическом лагере»*[19].

После грубого подавления Революции в Венгрии, руководимая новым председателем Совета Министров (с 3 октября 1955 года) Киву Стойкой длегация подписала в Москве 3 декабря, вместе с председателем Верховного Совета СССР Булганиным, опубликованное на второй день Заявление о том, что *«принимая во внимание (...) существующее международное положение, обе стороны считают, согласно Варшавскому Договору, показательным,* ***временное нахождение*** (подчеркнуто нами – Г.В.) *советских военных частей на территории Румынской Народной Республики»*[20].

Ясно, что подписание Киву Стойкой документа от 3 декабря 1956 года, означало отступление от первичного , сделанного год тому назад требования руководства в Бухаресте. Более того, Соглашение , парафированное 15 апреля 1957 года, румынским (Григоре Преотяса, Леонтин Сэлэжан) и советским правительствами (А.А.Громыко, Г.К.Жуковым) регламентировало, спустя более десяти лет, юридический статус **временного (**подчеркнуто нами – Г.В.) пребывания в Румынии советских войск[21]. За Соглашением последовало несколько специальных договоренностей об: оказании взаимной помощи по вопросам преследования и осуждения преступлений и по решению гражданских судебных процессов, возникших в связи с пребыванием советских войск; способ и условия использования казарм, помещений для услуг, складов, аэродромов, учебных полей,электроэнергии, коммунальных услуг; ремонт используемых советскими войсками помещений; использование железнодорожного транспорта и телекоммуникаций; снабжение материалами; численность советских войск и мест их дислокации[22].

Регламентирование юридического статуса находившихся в Румынии советских войск положило конец каким-либо попыткам Бухареста возобновить обсуждение

вопроса об их пребывании постольку, поскольку было получено заверение о том, что они никоим образом не затрагивают суверенность румынского государства и обязаны «*соблюдать и подчиняться румынским законам*»[23].

Теперь любое решение в этом отношении могло исходить только из Москвы, но при согласии всех стран-участниц Варшавского Договора. В ожидании этого решения прошел год, когда 17 апреля 1958 года Георгиу-Дежу было сообщено подписанным Н.С.Хрущевым письмом о том, что на основе международной разрядки, имея в виду, что Румыния «*располагает надежными вооруженными силами, способными дать отпор империалистическим провокациям»,* Советский Союз считает, что *«теперь нет необходимости»* в пребывании советских войск в Румынии[24]. Разумеется, ответ Дежа был положительным[25].

На этой основе, 24 мая 1958 года в Москве было подписано Соглашение между Министерством Вооруженных Сил Румынской Народной Республики и Министерством Обороны Советского Союза о способе вывода советскуих войск из Румынии в Советский Союз. В статье 1 было указано, что советскиу войска будут выведены в период 15 июня –15 августа 1958 года[26].Спустя три дня, страны-члены Варшавского Договора гарантировали соглашение сообщением Совещания Политического Консультативного Комитета, в котором отмечалось и дополнительное сокращение на 419 000 человек вооруженных сил стран военного коммунистического блока (Румыния должна была сократить численность состава армии на 55 000 военнослужащих)[27].

Политические руководители в Бухаресте поняли, что они должны скрыть свое удовлетворение в связи с решением о выводе советских войск, дав понять,что идет речь исключительно об инициативе Москвы. Они разработали программу мер, которая должна была выразить «признательность» Советской Армии и СССР, организуя митинги в честь румыно-советской дружбы, многие советские офицеры были награждены румынскими орденами, а весь состав сочетских частей был награжден медалью за «Освобождение от фашистского ига». Тогда Георге Георгиу-Деж выступил с одной из наиболее льстивых и угодливых выступлений, высказанных когда-либо, будто для того, чтобы заставить советских еще больше верить его верности[28].

Бесспорно, что советские войска покинули территорию Румынии в 1958 году, наша страна была первой, из которой были полностью выведены русские войска. В остальных государствах-членах Варшавского Договора, Красная Армия продолжала находиться еще 30 лет. Это была победа румынской дипломатии или решением Москвы ?

Считаем, что мы имеем дело с решением Москвы, на которое не могли оказать влияния румынские коммунистические руководители. Перед категорическим отказом Кремля, Бухарест сделал отход, оставаясь в терпеливом ожидании лучших времен. По нашему мнению, решение советского руководства было вызвано:

- низкой стратегической ценностью Румынии, в условиях, когда наша страна не граничила ни с одной из капиталистических стран;
- желанием Советского Союза изменить сой облик в международном плане в результате грубой интервенции против революции в Венгрии и доказать, что в странах Востока социализм не строится при поддержке советских штыков;
- необходимостью сокращения своих военных расходов для содержания войск, находившихся в странах-сателитах, для увеличения финансирования программы выпуска баллистических межконтинентальных ракет (первый спутник был пущен в 1957 году).

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NATO AND WARSAW PACT - THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1948-1968

PfP Consortium Military History Study Group

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The evolution of the Warsaw Pact Organizational Structure and Decision Making Process. 1955 – 1969.

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While revealing the East-European postwar military and political alliance' history some questions, "strange" at first glance, could appear: When was actually created that alliance?; Why was the Warsaw Treaty signed exactly in May 1955 and not at any other time?; Are we in a position to speak of a "normally functioning" military coalition before 1969?; Was there any generally accepted doctrine of the Pact in the early years of its existence?; Wasn't the highest level decision making process regulated frequently beyond the official sessions and the official bodies of the organization?

Few of these problems were treated in synthesized form in the most recent publications of Dr. Vojtech Mastny[1], based on newly declassified multinational archival sources obtained by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The author of this paper also has examined, in a number of his previous publications in the last decade, the issues regarding the Warsaw Pact structural build-up and decision making process[2]. Unfortunately, some of the most controversial matters are still avoided or sidestepped in research discussions and memoirs of the participants in the events discussed[3].

When we are trying to determine the different stages and periods within the Warsaw Pact history, we have to select which kind of approaches and methodology to apply – political, doctrinal, operative, technological ones, or to follow simply the more global developments of postwar international politics. One can argue that there are established various stages depending mainly of Kremlin's personal rule – "Stalin era", "Khrushchev era", "Brezhnev era", or "Gorbachev era". Another argument is the evolution of the

military strategic views – post WWII art of war in the 50s, "nuclear-missiles global war" thinking in the 60s, a new assumption for a "conventional warfare" at the "initial war period" in the 70s, and a "joint defensive doctrine" in the late 80s. Third reason could be the process of Armed Forces' modernization with new weaponry and equipment, thus the boundary between two different stages can be determined approximately on the late 50s and early 60s.

Today we are more confident in answering the question concerning the pre-history of the Pact establishment. The imposing of the Soviet political model and the Soviet type of Armed and Security Forces with a very strong subordination to Moscow brings to a more or less clear conclusion that the creation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 actually marks not the beginning, but the end of an initial process of Soviet bloc political, economic and military integration.

The initial stage of multilateral military cooperation is marked by a secret summit held on Stalin's initiative on 9th –12th January 1951 in Moscow. All East-European political and military leaders support indisputably the idea of establishing a "Coordination Committee for build-up the Armed forces in the countries of people's democracy". A working group, chaired by the Soviet War Minister Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevski, offers concrete figures for increase in the wartime and peacetime combat strength of the East-European armies. A plan for their rearmament in the period 1951 – 1954 is adopted too[4].

The archival sources show that in the course of some years after that meeting, a lot of mechanized, tank, air-force and naval divisions and naval coastal batteries are intensively built up following the Soviet pattern. Some new field manuals and other directive documents have been introduced as well. Many officers of different branches and services are trained in Soviet Military schools and academies. From 1951 on regular military exercises are carried out under the "consultative" participation of the Soviet advisers and in the presence of military delegations from other East-European countries.

The original idea to build up an East European collective defense system has been declared in a most general way at the Moscow Conference of the Soviet Bloc government

leaders (29th November – 2nd December 1954).[5] A prelude to the Moscow Conference had been the famous "Molotov plan" of March 1954 for an European security system and a provocative propaganda proposal for inclusion of the USSR into NATO, rejected by the Western governments in May same year[6]. The documents available offer the possibility to assume that till the middle of March 1955 the Soviets' East-European partners had neither precise information of the nature of the alliance proposed nor even an idea of the approximate date of its constitution. Only on 1st April 1955, at a Soviet leadership meeting, the Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov is charged with the task to prepare a draft of the joint military structure of the future alliance. Thus, the opening of the Warsaw Conference has been postponed from April 25nd to Mid-May 1955. And just on 2nd May the East-European leaders are informed that the constitutive meeting in process of preparation will take place from 11th to 14th May 1955 in Warsaw[7].

Just before the opening of the meeting at preliminary consultations the defense and foreign ministers agree on the final contents of the draft-documents. The Bulgarian Defense Minister, Gen. Panchevski, accompanied by the Head of the General Staff Operational Department, Col. Atanas Semerdjiev, leaves for Warsaw as early as 6th of May and stays there another three days after the end of the meeting.[8] In his memoirs Semerdjiev* states: "In the course of the next few days because of the full lack of information regarding my duties I felt extremely uneasy… Especially, since the instructions given to me in Sofia were rather scanty" [9]

The leaders of all invited delegations adopt unanimously the draft-treaty introduced at the fourth session, held on 13th of May and chaired by the Soviet Prime Minister, Nicolai A. Bulganin. The session lasts precisely twenty-five minutes. According to the provisions of the Treaty, the supreme leading body of the WTO is the Political Consultative Committee /PCC/. At a separate confidential session Soviet General Alexei I. Antonov, delivers a formal report regarding the proposed creation of Joint Armed Forces /JAF/ at the newly inaugurated Warsaw Pact.

* Col.-Gen. Atanas Semerdjiev has been the longest ever Chief of General Staff of a Warsaw Pact Army – between March 1962 and December 1989, and Zhivkov's dismissal served as a Vice-President of Bulgaria (1990-1992).

At this initial stage no special representatives of the Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces are appointed at each individual member-army but the chief Soviet military advisers to the defense ministers act in this capacity to a considerable extent. Similarly to the previous years the head of the military advisers' group fulfills the most important connecting and coordinating functions with the Soviet Defense Minisrty. The military attaches at the Soviet Embassies in East-European capitals have more limited, representative functions.

The correspondence of the Bulgarian Defense Minister, Gen. Petar Panchevski and those of the Chief of the General Staff, Lt.-Gen. Ivan Buchvarov for the period 1955 - 1956 make clear that the contacts with Moscow more often than not are established through the mediation of the chief Soviet military adviser. Only in a number of particularly important cases the contact is made directly with the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov or the Supreme Commander of the JAF, Marshal Ivan S. Konev. The part assigned to the military attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Sofia is strictly technical and relates to supply of information. The summarized reports of the Bulgarian military attaché in Moscow make evident that his contacts with the Unified Command and the Staff of the JAF are limited to officially formal and technical tasks. According to some memoirs, till 1969 the everyday activity of the Unified Command and the Staff of the JAF are carried out by the especially created for the purpose 10th Main Department of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1955 does not cause any significant changes in the position of dependence of the smaller East-European Kremlin allies set up during Stalin's rule. At the very moment of its creation the organization assigns specific observation and analysis tasks to each of its member states in regard of the fighting capacity and military power of their neighboring member states of the adversary NATO bloc. Thus Bulgaria and Romania share the charge to study the NATO intentions and actions in South Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East area. The key issues for the East-European political and military leaders are the NATO policy and strategy, the dislocation of its nuclear and missile weapons and the stationing of the US troops in Europe, the interdependence and contradictions among the members

of the North-Atlantic Alliance. With no fail a place of importance is always given to the condition of all armed forces branches and their participation in NATO joint maneuvers and exercises.

On 7th September 1955 Nikita Khrushchev sends his East-European colleagues the draft of the "Statute of the Unified Command of the JAF". In it the functions and the rights of the Supreme Commander of the JAF and his deputies, the Staff of the JAF and the relations between the Staff and the General Staffs of the Pact member states are described in a most general way. Though some of the allies rush to answer in affirmative to the proposed draft within the very same month[10], the final adoption of this document is adjourned to the forthcoming first regular session of the superior political body of the Warsaw Pact.

The first regular session of the Political Consultative Committee takes place on 27th – 28th January 1956 in Prague. Just as at the constitutive Warsaw Conference, at the PCC session in Prague the documents to be discussed are previously agreed and the speeches of the Heads of the individual delegations are just informative. On the first item of the agenda the Supreme Commander of the JAF, Marshal Konev introduces the draft of "The Statute of the Unified Command".

The official public WTO documentation does not state even a single fact of disagreement among the delegations. The classified minutes of the conferences of the permanent bodies of the organization, however, often contain enough evidence of difference and sometimes even controversy in attitudes, views and evaluations regarding some important issues. And while the public is aware mainly of the different reactions to the internal crises in Hungary –1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Soviet - Chinese split, the confidential reports show to the participants in these events the varying points of view of other government leaders of the Pact: of the Polish leadership (1956-1959), the Albanian leadership (after 1960), the Romanian leadership (after 1963). There are cases of disagreement also between two different groups within the Pact. For example, in the mid 1960s the GDR and Poland are strongly opposed the intentions of the "Southern Tier" countries (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) to maintain more intensive contacts with

West Germany, availing of the change in the Soviet position after the Berlin Crisis regulation[11].

In 1957 at the highest state and party levels several bilateral and multilateral meetings take place. Among other issues the problems of the "consolidation of the defense power of the Socialist Camp" are discussed.[12] In the period 1957-1961 in result of the qualitative changes in the armaments and the new expert evaluations, stating a change in the co-relation of the forces of the two military blocs, the most essential elements of the new Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine are formed. It is later adopted by the smaller Pact member states.

On 24th May 1958 in Moscow a new PCC session has been held. The previous day a conference under the CMEA is concluded. At it there are animated debates on item 2 of the agenda: "In regard of the coordination of the plans of production and mutual deliveries of armament and equipment". The decisions adopted on this item predetermine in many aspects the further specialization and development of the defense industries of the individual WTO member-countries. In regard to the matter of the specialization in the "special production" field nearly all of the participants accept the Soviet suggestion that conventional weapons shall be produced in all East-European countries but "modern more-complicated technical devices, air-missiles, rocketry, etc. shall be produced only in the USSR." The Polish representatives attempt to promote the idea that some models of air-missiles and combat jets might be produced in their country but left in isolation; they are compelled to give way and accept the Soviet proposal.[13] Following a proposal of Nikita Khrushchev made on 27th February 1959, at the joint conference in May 1959 the WTO Defense Industry Commission is finally formed. That Commission functions, however, within the CMEA frames[14].

The next PCC session, held on 4th February 1960 is called mainly in response of the aggravation of the "German issue". In his speech the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev gives place also to the modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces by equipping them with the newest most technically advanced weaponry, particularly underlining the importance of the missiles' use in a contemporary warfare. Khrushchev mentions that the military

superiority of the USSR allows the consideration for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland and Hungary in the near future. However, this issue never finds any further development in the years to come.

In 1958 - 1960 a new military doctrine has been formulated in the USSR. Although previous regulation and normative documents since early 50's also include as a primary task the preparedness of the Armed Forces to fight in terms of a nuclear strike, the new military doctrine determine the unavoidability of a general "rocket-nuclear war". The Soviet leaders' views are well manifested at a top secret Warsaw Pact Unified Military Command meeting in October 1960 in Moscow. The Chief of Staff, Gen. Antonov underlines in his basic report the perspectives for battle actions using the nuclear and missile weapons. The Supreme Commander of Warsaw Pact Armed Forces Marshall Andrei Grechko is arguing in his own report that future wars would begin by using missile-nuclear weapon within the full enemy's territory and not only against selected tactical targets. Of great importance is also the statement of the Soviet Defense Minister Marshall Rodion Malinovski: “Speaking that we can't strike first, it doesn't means that we shall wait to be stroked first. This means exactly to maintain our work in such a way that to receive an immediate information about enemy’s intentions to blow up against us and to get ahead of them in this moment, and our rocket-nuclear strikes immediately to found the enemy's targets." Further on Marshall Malinovski assures its East European partners: "In case of emergency you will receive the necessary missile-nuclear weapons and you will use them as you wish. Hence, you have to be trained to use such missile-nuclear weapons".[15] These words show quite well a realistic danger of a global catastrophe at the time of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises due to the confrontation Cold War thinking of the military elites.

From 1960 on conferences of the commanders or of the senior personnel representatives of the Warsaw Pact armies of this kind are held once a year and as a matter of fact they play the part of the future Military Council. From the next year, 1961, on regular conferences of the defense ministers are also held. They actually have the functions of a specialized Committee of the Defense Ministers. Another form of mutual consultations

and exchange of experience are the organized from the 1960s on command assemblies at which usually all ministers of defense and chiefs of General Staffs present.

At the PCC regular session in Moscow, taking place from 28th to 29th March 1961 new steps for "further consolidation of the defense capability" of the WTO are discussed. On 29th March with a special decision the Statute of the Supreme Commander's Special Representatives Institution at the allied armies is approved.

On 8th – 9th September 1961 in Warsaw for the fist time a separate meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers is held. The Supreme Commander of the JAF, Marshal Andrei Grechko delivers a report, and "practical matters related to the improvement of the combat readiness of the troops comprising the Joint Armed Forces" are discussed. Soon after the first conference of the defense ministers a second one is called in Prague on 30th January – 1st February 1962. The "matters of consolidation of the JAF" are further discussed there. At the next meeting of the defense ministers, held in Warsaw in February 1963 subject of discussion is the securing the defense of the allied countries from an anti-nuclear attack. From 1964 on conferences of the General Staffs chiefs are also held independently.

The main principles of the new Soviet military doctrine are made public by some publications and speeches of the Soviet military commanders and form the ground for the first Soviet "Military Strategy", edited by Marshal Vasilii S. Sokolovski in 1962. Later on the new Soviet doctrinal concepts are adopted as leading defense principles for all Warsaw Pact member-countries, and new "Field Manuals" and "Instructions" destined for the different branches are predefined and introduced in mid-60s.

When there are international conflicts or inner political crises in the Pact countries some extraordinary meetings of the senior Party and state leaders are called up as well. For instance, in relation to the Berlin crisis on 7th August 1961 an emergency meeting is held in East Berlin, on 9th June 1967 an urgent meeting is called in connection with the Middle East war, and in the next year, 1968 the "Prague Spring" induces several discussions (in which Romania does not take part) - in Bratislava, in Warsaw, and in Moscow. From as

early as Khrushchev's time the informal multilateral meetings play an important part, too. Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, tries to turn these meetings into an annual event (the so-called Crimean meetings of the 1970s).

At the PCC Warsaw meeting in January 1965 following the tradition and in the spirit of the previous years the main speech is delivered by the new Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, who had replaced Nikita Khrushchev three months earlier. He puts the accent on the necessity of adequate counter-action to the program of NATO nuclear armament and informs the other delegations what the USSR undertakes "for the improvement of the newest types of weapons". Together with that in view of the US and NATO concept about "local wars", Brezhnev draws the attention to the "improvement of the conventional weapons as well". This first indication of change in the Moscow views regarding the possibility of "local wars" during the nuclear era is caused to a considerable extent by the development of the Vietnam war and it evoloves further on, influnced by the develompment of the Middle East conflict.

The East-European leaders in their speeches accentuate the topics of their own interest – Walter Ulbricht speaks about the militarization of the West Germany, Wladyslaw Gomulka – of the futher development of the Polish initiative for creating a collective security system in Europe, Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej appeals for a policy leading to "gradual dissolution of military blocs", and Todor Zhivkov insists on improving the economic cooperation among the socialist countries.

The PCC Warsaw Session in January 1965 puts a special accent on the "improvement in the structure of the WTO General Headquarters' commanding bodies". In the course of the discussions held on this matter convincing arguments based on the much better commanding structure and methods of the NATO Headquarters and its regional military staffs are put forward to prove that in consequence the organizational structure of the commanding bodies at the PCC and the WP' Headquarters have to be improved. Owing to the opposition of the Romanian representatives, the matter regarding the structural changes in the commanding bodies of the Warsaw Pact is postponed till an agreement on it is reached in a special working group[16].

The essential improvement of the Warsaw Pact command military bodies turns into an issue of growing weight at the bi-lateral meetings consequently held during the next few months. In February 1966 a special discussion of the WP deputy foreign ministers is held in Berlin. At the same time another meeting of the chiefs of staff of the allied armed forces is organized in Moscow. On it a packet of proposals for changes in the structure of the military commanding bodies is delivered. The acceptance of these proposals is blocked by the Romanian delegation's irrevocably adverse attitude on practically all points.

In May 1966 at a conference of the defense ministers of the WP member-states a new Soviet proposal regarding "The statute of the Unified Armed Forces and WP Military Bodies Structure" is accepted. Since the new proposals have been nearly unanimously approved, the Romanian Minister of Defense also signs the documents, with reserve only in regard of the functions, subordination and name of the Military Council[17].

Similar discussions spring up at the preparatory consultations of the foreign ministers on 7th –15th June 1966. At the discussions on the draft of the decision "for the improvement of the Warsaw Pact activities" entered by the GDR delegation the main objections are voiced again by the Romanian representatives. The Romanian foreign minister, Mania Manescu declares: "It is not feasible to regulate the activity of the PCC …To limit the consultations within the frames of set rules would mean to rob the cooperation among the countries of its flexibility and efficiency…" The Soviet foreign minister, Gromiko fends off: "We are placed in a most awkward position … A whole lot of the PCC activities is not regulated … It is to the PCC's own interest to be able to take decisions. If it is limited to consultations only, the Warsaw Treaty Organization will not function efficiently. We must reach agreement. Look at the West – at the NATO bloc – everything undertaken organizationally functions with perfect precision. Their organizational system acts nearly automatically … Indeed, the Western countries would not do something that would harm them, and if this is not in their best interests they would not have followed this method…" Because of the Romanian position no joint stand-point is reached on this item

of the agenda. The Bulgarian foreign minister even decides not to deliver for discussion at the conference a Bulgarian draft of "The Statute of the PCC".[18]

Regardless of all the preparatory work carried out, the PCC summit held on July 4th-6th 1966 in Bucharest is marked with serious discord on many points. On the eve of the meeting the Romanian Defense Minister suddenly declares that he cancels his signing the agreement regarding structure changes in the alliance military bodies reached in May, last. Consequently, the PCC faces a situation when it is impossible to reach unanimous decision and this point of the Agenda is never entered for discussion at a plenary session.

The issue concerning the structural changes is on the Agenda of the next regular PCC session held on March 6 - 7 1968 in Sofia. The formal motion for calling up the summit comes from Nicolae Ceausescu who comes forward with a Romanian initiative for a declaration regarding "the issue of nuclear weapons restriction". After preliminary consultations with Moscow the Bulgarian leadership accepts in its capacity of host to the next PCC conference the proposal to fix its date for the beginning of March.

The main bone of contention at the Sofia summit continues to be the problem for the necessary organizational changes in the WTO structure. In February 1968 in Prague a preliminary meeting of the chiefs of the allied General Staffs takes place. On it draft documents are discussed and adopted in regard of the status of a future Military Council with consultative functions, creating expanded Unified Command and a Technical Committee to be comprised of generals and officers of the allied armies proportionally represented.

With the very first item of the agenda, which is the Romanian proposal referred to the declaration for "nuclear weapons restriction", a lively discussion begins. According to Alexander Dubcek, Wladyslaw Gomulka, Willy Stoff and Alexei Kosigin entering such proposals would delay and sabotage the final adoption of the draft treaty, while Janos Kadar characterizes them as "unrealizable". The most important debate, however, is on item three of the agenda. In his report the Supreme Commander of the JAF, Marshal Ivan I.Yakubovski states that the organizational and structural changes are exigent, owing

mainly to the revolutionary changes in the military science, NATO achievements with the improvement of its military bodies as well as the quick, full capacity rearmament of the WTO armies with new modern weapons and military equipment. It is concluded that "the existing military command structures proved to have neither the legal base nor the composition adequate to decide in full the matters related to securing the defense capability of the countries of the socialist alliance. Particularly alarming is the lag in creating new bodies for coalition command in wartime… It is well known that the lack of allied command was one of the main reason for the defeat of the Arab countries in the war of June 1967".

Principle agreement has been reached on the documents on the statute of the Military Council, Unified Command, and Technical Committee but Nicolae Ceausescu objects to the adoption of these documents before the final "Statute of the WTO functions" is entered. Following the Romanian motion, the PCC decides for a second time to postpone the acceptance of the documents about the structure changes, charging the defense ministers to enter the finally agreed proposals within a term of 6 months.[19]

Indeed, in the course of the next few months for the purpose of reaching a favorable decision on the long postponed problem of structural reforms in the JAF bodies of the WP active consultations, both - bi-laterally and multilaterally, are carried out at different levels. Thus, for instance, on April 23rd 1968 during his talks with Alexander Dubcek in Prague Todor Zhivkov, does not miss the chance to point out among other things: "Ripe is the necessity to give a more prominent role of the Unified Command of the WP Joint Forces. Obviously, we cannot calmly accept the fact that NATO has created a well regulated organization of its Allied Forces while we keep on arguing on certain points for years and are not in a position to reach a decision on them."[20]

At a meeting of the defense ministers on October 29 -30 1968 in Moscow the documents under the following titles are approved: "Statute of the Joint Armed Forces", "Statute of the Defense Ministers' Committee", "Statute of the JAF' Unified Command", "Statute of the Military Council", "Statute of the Technical Committee" as well as "Statute of the Allied System of Air-defense". This time the Romanian representatives sign the draft

documents with one reserve only in regard of a point in the draft-proposal about the JAF[21].

The very PCC session at which the structural changes in the joint commanding bodies of the WP' JAF, postponed for several years, are at last approved takes place on March 17-th 1969 in Budapest. Just before the opening of the conference a half an hour meeting of the Party and state leaders of the Pact member-countries takes place. On it the agenda is finally agreed. According to the proposed Statutes of the Committee of the Defense Ministers, it is stipulated that the same will be a military body of the JAF, the main functions of which are "working out agreed recommendations and proposals for consolidation of the defense capability" and "improvement of the combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces" of the alliance. In the new "Statutes of the JAF and the Unified Command" the "targets and the organizational principles of the Armed Forces, the Unified Command's structure and control bodies" are specified. A separate proposal is made for establishing a Military Council as an operative JAF body with consultative functions. The proposed document in regard of the Military Council functions explicitly specifies that it shall consider "the matters concerning the state and development of the JAF", i.e. – having in mind the previous Romanian attitude it is obvious that after discussing the different standing points a certain compromise has been reached. Normative documents providing the establishment of Joint AAD system and a Technical Committee are also presented.

There are no objections in principle to the presented documents in the speeches following Marshal Yakubovski's report. The following arguments are expressed in the speech of the leader of the Bulgarian delegation: "The consolidation of the military command of the Warsaw Pact is made imperative also by the fact that our probable opponents – the NATO countries - despite their differences succeeded to create an integral system of military control …"

This time Nicolae Ceausescu also accepts the texts of the presented statutory documents and makes only one formal alteration - instead of "Resolution of the PCC" he requires the statement that the documents are accepted with a "Resolution of the delegations or the

government of the countries-members of the Warsaw Pact." [22] This insignificant formal requirement is accepted and included in the final official statement of the conference[23].

Thus the process of elaboration of the coalition control of the Joint Armed Forces which took 14 years finds its successful conclusion. At the Budapest PCC summit the statute of one of the two main auxiliary bodies at the PCC – The Committee of the Defense Ministers is finally validated too[24]. In the course of the next few years the complete WTO structure is finally built up through the normative regulation of the "legal rights, privileges and immunity" of the members of the command, control & coordination bodies (1974); the composition of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Unified Secretariat (1976), and the Statute of the Unified Command in war time period (1980). The representation of the members in the military command bodies of the JAF is determined mainly by the respective relative share of the individual national army in the joint defense force of the alliance. According to General Wojciech Jaruzelski memoir, however, after the JAF's Staff has been formed, of the 523 people comprising it only 173 are representatives of the East-European countries (43 of them from the Polish Army) while the remaining 350 are military personnel of the Soviet Army[25].

The evolution process of the Warsaw Pact organizational structure demonstrates several main features and specifics in the character of this East-European military and political alliance. They can be made even more discernible if outlined against the background of the parallel process of re-structuring of the commanding bodies of NATO. While during the initial period of the NATO history particular accent is put on the military character of the alliance, and by 1955 the harmonious structure of the coalition command bodies and specialized committees is completed[26], the civil-and-political and information-and-technological structures are developed and elaborated in the second half the 1950s and the 1960s.

Contrary to NATO, the original orientation in the activities of the WTO Political Consultative Committee is toward the development of coordinative-consultative and political functions at senior representatives of the executive authority level. The East-European communist leaders who as a matter of fact are the real bearers of undisputable

personal authority have formal and effective participation in the PCC work only from the early 1960s on. That is the time, at which the voids and shortcomings of the functioning mechanisms of the organization from the point of view of its coalition nature are perceived.

For many years the Warsaw Pact structure remains generally outlined and rudimentary which is caused mainly by the absolute subordination to the Soviet military command in Moscow from as early as Stalin's times. Till the early 1960s all most important directives, decisions and recommendation of military nature are taken by the Soviet Ministry of Armed Forces and the Soviet High Command and most often than not are transferred "down" to the lesser partners through the Soviet military representatives in the East-European capitals. The objective qualitative changes in the military science and art make imperative the reconsideration of this practice and stimulate the interest for improvement of the coalition command bodies of the JAF. The main purpose of that is to secure a legal base and reliable enough military commanding structures for effective interaction and coordination among the allied armies both - in times of peace and war. This purpose is not achieved to the last day of the Pact's functioning regardless of the new regulating documents adopted in March 1980 and the rather quite delayed attempts for more radical reforms in the organization at the end of the 1980s.

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[1] For instance: Vojtech Mastny, *Learning from the Enemy. NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact* (Zurich 2001); "The New History of Cold War Alliances", *Journal of Cold War History,* No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 55-84

[2] Jordan Baev, "Bulgaria and the creation of the Warsaw Pact" - *Military History Journal*, (Sofia, 1995), No. 4, p. 39-61; "Building of the Warsaw Pact' Military Structures.1955-1969" - *Military History Journal*, (Sofia, 1997), No. 5, p. 56-77; "The Soviet Union and the Building of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. 1956-1964." In: *Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere of interests*, (Sofia, 1998), p. 104-117; "Bulgaria and the political crises in Czechoslovakia - 1968 and Poland - 1980/1981" – *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, (Washington, 1998), Issue 11, p. 96-101; "Die Politischen Krisen in Osteuropa in der Mitte der funfziger Jahre und die bulgarische Staatsfuhrung" In: *Das Internationale Krisenjahr 1956*, (Munchen, 1999), p. 297-313; *Bulgaria in the Warsaw Pact*. A CD ROM Documentary Volume, (Sofia, 2000); "The Irresistible Collapse of the Warsaw Pact: Documents from Bulgarian Archives, 1985-1991". *PHP on NATO and the Warsaw Pact* website, (Zurich, 2000), etc.

[3] For instance: Vladimir Zolotarev, "The Mechanism of Command and Control of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member-states" In: *Peacekeeping 1815 to Today,* (Quebec, 1995), p. 251; Anatoly Gribkov, *Sudba Varshavskogo dogovora*, (Moscow 1998); Atanas Semerdjiev, *There is no appeal for the survived years*, (Sofia, 1999); *The Building of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. History and Policy*, (Sofia 2002), etc.

[4] *Central State Archive [CDA],* Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 64, File. 124; C. Cristescu, "Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide Inarmarea Romanei", *Magazin Istorie*, Bucharest, No. 10, 1995, pp. 15-23.
[5] *CDA*, Fond 1-B, Record 5, File 159, pp. 4-8.
[6] *New Time*, Moscow, 1954, No. 4, p. 1-4; *Collective Security*, Miscellaneous No. 13, (HMSO, London, May 7, 1954), Cmd. 9146; *Le Monde*, Paris, 10 mai 1954.
[7] Vojtech Mastny, "We Are in a Bind. Polish and Czechoslovak Attemts at reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969", *CWIHP Bulletin,* (Washington 1998), Issue 11, p. 230.
[8] *Central Military Archive, Veliko Tarnovo, [CVA],* Fond 1, Record 3, File 17, p. 154.
[9] Atanas Semerdjiev, Op. Cit., p. 171.
[10] *CDA*, Fond 1-B, Record 64, File 218.
[11] Douglas Selvage, "The Warsaw Pact is Dissolving: Poland, the GDR and Bonn's Ostpolitik, 1966-1967" – *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Détente, 1965-1972*, (Dobbiaco, Italy, 27 September 2002).
[12] *CDA,* Fond 1 B, Record 5, File 270, p. 240.
[13] *Ibid.,* File 339, p. 86-96.
[14] *Ibid.,* Record 64, File 257, 258.
[15] *CVA*, Fond 1, Record 2, File 75, p. 155, 171, 176-177.
[16] *CDA*, Fond 1-B, Record 34, File 1.
[17] *Diplomatic Archive [DA]***,** Record 20p, File 804, p. 163-171.
[18] *DA*, Record 32-P, File 12, 17, 20.
[19] *CDA*, Fond 1 Б, Record 35, File 109, p. 1-2; Record 58, File 2, p. 63-101; *DA*, Record 32-P, File 30, 31.
[20] *CDA*, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 7, p. 19.
[21] *DA*, Record 20p, File 804, p. 163-171.
[22] *Ibid*., p. 127-162.
[23] *Warsaw Treaty Organization*. Documents. 1955-1985. Sofia, 1985, p. 114.
[24] The Staff and the Technical Committee start their work in late November 1969. The first session of the Military Council (composed by 11 high rank allied officers, 5 of them Soviet generals) has been held on 9-10 December, and the first session of the Committee of Defense Ministers – on 22-23 December 1969 in Moscow.
[25] "Oral History Interviews with Polish Generals, September 2002 – *http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php*
[26] Gregory Pedlow /Ed./, *NATO Strategy Documents. 1949 – 1969*, (Brussels, 1999).

THE GENDARMERIE DETACHMENT IN BERLIN DURING THE COLD WAR, 1948-1968

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The French Gendarmerie military policemen arrived in Berlin in the summer of 1945. Immediately, they had to face the reality of the East-West bipolarization which tended to crystallize in a city with such a particular status. The political context, which kept moving according to the status of the relations between the US and the USSR, would become a key element in the evolution and organization of the missions of the Detachment of Gendarmerie in Berlin (DGB). Our aim is to study the exact role played by the Gendarmes in this context between 1948 and 1968.

I/ SITUATION OF DGB IN EARLY 1948

Under the command of lieutenant-colonel Hurtrel, DGB included members from the two main subdivisions of the Gendarmerie, namely the departmental Gendarmerie (investigation and administrative police) and the republican guard (guard and riot control). The departmental platoon was divided in three squads, or brigades in the Gendarmerie terminology, which were situated in Frohnau, Reinickendorf and Wedding, plus a reserve squad and an intelligence service. In addition, the Republican Guard 9th Squadron provided the force with the 9th mobile squadron (riot control), and two security squadrons (guards) -of which one was disbanded in 1949. These were based in the Napoleon Barracks, the former luxurious military compound built by Goering for his elite Luftwaffe. DGB also had a headquarters and a naval unit in Tegel. It obtained its own administrative autonomy after July the 1st, 1946.

The installation of DGB in the old capital of the Nazi Reich Nazi, in ruins, caused a certain number of difficulties inherent to the French logistic weakness and to the fact that local authorities were unaware of the Gendarmerie's status and purpose. In 1948, whereas these questions were mainly settled, the international context came as a probelm to the organization of the detachment. The outbreak of the war in Indo-China saw the deployment of a significant number of DGB personnel. These departures for stays of

various lengths disturbed the DGB's mission by disorganizing the units and by depriving them of their specialists (drivers, radio operators...).

In spite of these obstacles, the basic missions of the DGB were carried out according to a framework established relatively early. DGB had to do more than simple military police duty. It was to keep peace, order and security in the French sector, which included the districts of Wedding and Reinickendorf. As was said ealier, Departmental Gendarmerie was in charge of regular police tasks, which involved the enforcement of the new laws enacted by the French authority regarding German civilians. Any incident invloving a French and an ally soldier or a German person also came under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Gendarmes played a significant role in terms of intelligence gathering.

The squadrons of Republican Guard were more especially in charge of maintening order and military security. Certain tasks were permanent, like the protection of the French facilities and of the General Headquarters or interallied Kommandantura. Moreover, the guards controlled all access to the French sector by road way (check points of Babelsberg and Helmstedt) or by railway. In parallel, the squadrons of security carried out semi-permanent tasks. From June 1947, three months a year, they provided personnel to guard the prison of Spandau where eight Nazi war criminals were locked up. Each ally provided troops for this task and every changing of the guards gave place to a ceremonial. Certain activities were more occasional, like those related to the arrival of important persons (motorcyclist escort or honor guard). Except these structural missions, the role of the DGB, at that time, was before all that of a force of occupation. The Gendarmes took part in the denazification of Berlin by arresting war criminals as well as members of secret associations like the "Edelweiss". The French were very sensitive to these questions as they had had, a few years before, the bitter experiment of the defeat. In these first years of occupation, criminality was the other concern of the Gendarmes. With the end of the war, significant movement of population had taken placewhich had brought all sorts of trafficks. Extreme shortage due to massive war destructions made black market inevitable. The French districts where everything was badly needed made no exception. On top of this, the first winters following the end of the war were particularly rigorous. The most flourishing centers of this parallel markets were generally near the stations, especially the one next to the zoo and on Wittenbergplatz, a very famous place for clothing. The Soviets contributed by selling basic products such as corn, butter and cereals. It is notorious that the French imported in Berlin lighter flints, easy to smuggle and highly demanded by the population. In return they brought back thermometers. As for the British, they were considered to be less involved in such activities, even if everywhere cigarettes remained the most common money of exchange.

II/ THE BLOCKADE OF BERLIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

During the year 1948, the political climate degraded suddenly in Berlin because of harsh competition between the Americans and the Soviets. In June, the Russians withdrew themselves from the interallied Kommandatura and imposed the blockade of the city. The Gendarmes found themselves isolated from the "free World". Only the airlift

set up by the Americans made it possible to supply the Berliners. In the French zone, the airport of Tegel became a strategic place. Three senior NCOs and 15 Gendarmes were detached there as a security unit while other Gendarmes were sent to Tempelhof and to Mainz-Wiesbaden.

The moral of the Gendarmes appeared to be rather low. "The tension with the Russian troops of occupation in Berlin creates uneasiness, worried lieutenant-colonel Hurtrel in September 1948. (...) The French think that the means of evacuation by plane would be very limited if not non-existent and they don't expect much from the allies who, of course, will evacuate their personnel first. It is all the more important to take into account the moral burden due to the presence in Berlin of our the families of our soldiers. In the context of violence or aggression, this would seriously diminish their freedom of action and therefore the quality of their duty." Another harmful consequence of the blockade was the departure for France of the personnel designated to be replacements in the Far East.

In December 1948, measures were taken to organize elections in West Berlin: all the personnel of the detachment was on constant duty from December 1st on to answer any call day or night. Many patrols controlled the external limits of the French sector and the surrounding working class areas the most exposed to disorder in the first days of the election. The Gendarmes watched the voting stations and set up check points.

The continuation of the blockade in 1949 still had a negative influence on the moral of DGB. Nearly 82 senior NCOs and Gendarmes asked to return to France in January 1949. In May 1949, the Soviets eventually agreed to restore traffic. The Gendarmerie manpower was then at its lowest but the task to come was to be heavier than ever with the resuming of road and railroad traffic.

In the early 1950s, Berlin became the barometer of the East-West relations. The city lived in the midst of provocations orchestrated by the two blocks. In this threatening climate, the role played by the Gendarmerie moved from occupying to protectingSome of the missions which were established at that time lasted until 1989. The security of the French sector became one of the principal concerns of the command. The common limits with the Soviet sector were more particularly supervised by the Gendarmes. They were of course involved in guarding access points in West Berlin such as the check-point of the Wannsee motorway or railroad station of the French sector.

As a matter of fact, DGB was a key element of the French defense in Berlin. The units of Gendarmerie were integrated in the successive plans of defense. In February 1953, for example, a plan was established in which the Gendarmes were given the responsibility to protect the gatherings of allied citizens stationed in Napoleon barracks and to slow the progression of enemy forces if an attack occured. Constant military training was combined with everyday duty. A particular stress was put upon the speed with which forces were mobilized. A note of November 1957 recommended that two Gendarmerie security squadrons could be mobilized in a two-hour notice. To improve the effectiveness of these units, exercises were regularly organized with the French Army or the Allies. Under names such as "Black Forest" or "Mercury II", these exercises aimed at coordinating the forces of West Berlin.

In addition, the Gendarmerie proved to be an invaluable asset in terms of intelligence. While on patrol, or while investigating, the Gendarmes would take notice of of any interesting information in relation to the security of the French sector of Berlin. They gave accounts of all incidents involving French nationals, Allies, German civilians or members of the Bundeswehr. The Gendamres were sensitive to any piece of information concerning East Berlin such the news of strikes in June 1953, the Russian training exercises carried out in the limits of the sector or the surge of refugees from the East. The state of mind of the local population was another subject of concern. The Gendarmes felt the hostility of the Germans during the wars of decolonization in Indo-China and Algeria. The explosion of the 1st French atomic bomb in the Sahara in 1960 also caused agitation. On February 13th, students of the free university of West Berlin expressed their dissatisfaction in front of the "House of France".

The Gendarmerie reports were a testimony of the degree of tension which existed in Berlin during this period. The smallest incident could have taken dramatic proportions. To avoid any skid in such an explosive context, the Gendarmes received precise instructions, like this one: "at any time and in any circumstance, fire will not be opened as long as the Allied Forces have not been shot at by the Soviets".

III/ THE CRISIS OF THE BERLIN WALL

During the summer of 1961, the Gendarmes of DGB noticed an abrupt increase of tension in the city. In the night of the 12th to the 13th of August, the authorities of East Berlin barred with a network of barbed wires all access to the Soviet sector. On August 15, the Eastern authorities replaced the barbed wires by walls and they definitively prohibited passage by the gate of Brandebourg. The lines of barbed wires between the French sector and the Soviet zone were also reinforced. The trees were cut down in an area ranging from fifteen to twenty meters.

In such a threatening situation, DGB took a series of emergency measures. On August 14, the soldiers of the detachment are ordered to remain in their homes or barracks. After August 16, the squadrons of security are put in a permanent state of alert at Napoleon barracks. They deployed a headquarters and two 37 men platoons. with a reduced PC and two groups of 37 men. On August16 and 17, incursions of Russian vehicles are noted by Gendarmerie patrols. Other intrusions are noted thereafter.

Day afetr day, the Gendarmes informed the French military command about the evolution of the work undertaken by the East-German authorities and about the many incidents which occur in the limits of the sector. On August 23, after a phase of expectancy, the allied command decided to reinforce the security measures at the outskirts of the Western zone to show their determination. Consequently, the Gendarmerie is asked to control the zone between Nordhafen in the South and the Wilhelmsruh station in the North. Gendarmerie platoons used particular intinaries with temporary check points designed to show Allied presence. The instructions, very precise, prohibited any crossing of the sector limits and recommended only to open fire "in the event of self-defense". Any incident had to be reported immediately by radio. Several

times, the patrols of Gendarmerie remarked attempts to bring the wall building over the hundred-meter zone which separated the Western and Eastern zones. The determination displayed by the Western Allies and negotiations on the spot were generally enough to obtain that the orginal limits were respected.

The Gendarmerie reports were true testimonies of the climate of the atmosphere which reigned during several weeks. On August 26, for example, nearly 500 demonstrators came to Chausseestrasse, at the limit of the French sector. In front of them was a car with a loudspeaker which launched harsh speeches against GDR. After a difficult face-to-face situation, the West German police officers managed to move the crowd. Two patrols of Gendarmeries were present. On July 1st, 1961, a vopo and a civilian from the East who had escaped to the West were evacuated by the Gendarmerie. On September 1st, shots were fired by several VOPOs at a refugee who had sheltered in the Western zone. The VOPOs penetrated a few meters in the French sector before turning back at the sight of Western police officers. Immediately, three Eastern high-speed boats positioned themselves in the canal separating the Hohmzollernhanal from the Havel. Three Gendarmerie jeep crews faced them on the French bank of the Havel an a little less than two hours later, the high-speed boats eventually withdrew. In October 1961, violent incidents are recorded. Shots are even heard between police officers of the East and the West.

In spite of constant protests from the West, the Berlin wall would stay for more than a quarter of a century, constantly strenghtened by the East-Germans. Because of the "wall of shame", the Gendarmes had to remain in operational alert at all time. As a consequence of the situation they also got involved in guarding Check-Point Charlie.

Whereas DGB adapted to this new situation, a significant reorganization occured in 1968. September 30 marked the dissolution of DGB as a complete organization. It became a simple level of command. The 2nd squadron of security was sent back to France as reinforcement after the May 1968 social events in France. The decrease in manpower also included the deparmental Gendarmes. To compensate for these losses, a company of Gendarmerie NCO candidates was installed at Napoleon Barracks. The school gave the same instruction that was given to cadets in France but it was integrated to the French military in Berlin as an operational unit. The NCO candidates also guarded the Kommandantura and the Spandau prison.

* * *

The period between 1948 to 1968 was marked by a constant evolution of the role of the Gendarmes of DGB due to the effects of the Cold War. While they had arrived as occupants, the French Gendarmes of Berlin had soon found a new kind of legitimacy. Truly, they had become the protectors of the German inhabitants of the French sector of the city.

Hans-Joachim Harder

Freedom or Unity
The Dilemma of German Foreign and Security Policy between 1949 and 1990

1. *Dichotomy between Freedom and Unity*

It was only with Germany's reunification on 3 October 1990 that Germany became a state like any other. It is true that the name of the state was not changed – it is still called the Federal Republic of Germany, but a shift in emphasis has taken place. While in the previous forty years the term "Federal Republic" had mainly been used, this designation of the form of government is now generally omitted and simply replaced by "Germany". Whereas the political aspects had previously outweighed the national aspects, normality was now restored - even though some people feared that nationalism, which they recollected with horror, might gain the upper hand after 1990. Due to this shift in emphasis, the fundamental conflict of West German foreign and security policy became apparent, i.e. the dichotomy between freedom and unity. Only with absolute commitment to the West could a free state continue to exist under the conditions of the Cold War. Given the practical political situation under Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe, it would only have been possible to establish a unified German state at the expense of the free and democratic - constitutional order. The political parameters of its creation had a lasting effect on the West German state and set tight limits on its foreign and security policy. This identifies the conditions prevailing when its political system was constituted[1], without which it is impossible to fully explain the self-image and pattern of action of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the uncertain democratic tradition, the unsolved national question and the emergence of the two German states under the conditions of the Cold War.

Much has been written about Germany's "special course", about Germany as a belated nation. It was not until 1871, later than the classical nation states in Europe –

[1] See Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung. Zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1982*, Baden-Baden, 1983, p. 19.

especially much later than France – that a German nation state was founded. Based on an authoritarian constitution, this state suffered from elementary democratic shortcomings up to its fall in World War I. The Weimar Republic, burdened with the mark of Cain of the Versailles Treaty, failed after only fourteen years as a result of its internal conflicts and some structural deficiencies and was supplanted by a brutal National Socialist dictatorship. Hitler's regime of terror spread war all over Europe and the world, and Germany – so it seemed – went to rack and ruin.

The unconditional surrender of the German Wehrmacht on 8 May 1945 put an end to the German Reich as a state. Germany was no longer a subject of international law, but instead an object controlled by the four victorious powers. In the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945 the military commanders-in-chief of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR assumed "supreme authority" "in consideration of Germany's defeat" and by virtue of the rights of the victor.[2] Germany was divided into four zones and Berlin, the capital of the Reich, which was located in the Soviet zone was divided into four sectors. The Allied Control Council was established as the highest authority in Berlin.

2. *The Anti-Hitler Coalition Breaks Up*

Outwardly, the Potsdam Conference held from 17 July to 2 August 1945 still conveyed the impression of an intact wartime coalition of the Big Three. But it soon became obvious that already prior to the Potsdam Conference considerable differences of opinion had surfaced between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other over fundamental issues pertaining to the state order and the self-determination of the Eastern European states and the future world peace order; it was hard to reach a compromise to settle these differences of opinion. The world powers reached a degree of consensus that was just sufficient to implement the plans to eliminate the defeated Axis powers, yet it was not enough to establish joint control of Germany. It was obvious that the anti-Hitler coalition had not been based on common ideals, but had only been guided by temporary common interests. It had only been formed because the USSR had been attacked by the German Reich in violation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

In spite of diverging positions in the Middle and Far East, the real reason for the increased East-West tensions was the fundamental difference of opinions between the allies over Germany and Europe. The negotiations of the Foreign Minister's - Conferences between the autumn of 1945 and the summer of 1949 made it quite evident that the Soviet Union sought to extend its sphere of interest to include West Germany as well. It demanded a share in control of the Ruhr district and 10 billion dollars in reparations to be drawn out of the current production process. Moreover, the Soviet Union was anxious to reunite Germany along the lines of its socio-political system. Otherwise it was determined to retain Germany's division into four separate zones and thus to permanently weaken and divide it.

Yet as early as 1946 the USA had recognized that Europe would not be able to recover as long as Germany remained the seat of an infectious disease. This is why on 5 June 1947 the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, offered Europe extensive economic aid on condition that the European states reach agreement on the economic measures and the distribution of funds. The Soviet Union initially accepted the invitation for cooperation, but, after brief deliberations, on 2 July 1947 abruptly refused to participate and forced Poland and Czechoslovakia to reject the Marshall Plan as well. This event marked the onset of the Cold War. The coalition of World War II had broken up.

The formation of the Eastern political bloc triggered a counter-reaction in the West. In January 1948 the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, took the initiative by requesting the neighboring Western European states, i.e. France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, to move closer together and to create a solid core for the consolidation of Western Europe. This resulted in the creation of the Western Union by the signing of the Brussels Pact on 17 March 1948. One week after the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, had fallen to his death from a window - an event that initiated the process of Bolshevization throughout the country, the five states decided to cooperate on economic, social and cultural issues and to embark on collective self-defense. While negotiations on the Brussels Pact and the European Economic Council were still in progress, initial consultations on a

[2] Quoted in Ernst Deuerlein, *Die Einheit Deutschlands. Ihre Erörterung auf den Kriegs- und*

permanent political and economic merger of the three Western zones of Germany took place. Just as the merging of the two Anglo-Saxon occupation zones had met with the utmost disapproval of the USSR, the plan to unify all three Western zones not only economically, but also politically caused the Soviet Union to protest vehemently. A few days after the conclusion of the Brussels Pact on 20 March 1948, the Russian Military Governor ostentatiously walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin which was never convened again. The currency reform carried out in Germany's Western zones on 20 June 1948 was answered with a blockade of all overland and inland waterways to and from Berlin. The airlift organized by General Lucius D. Clay provided not only the garrisons of the Western powers, but also the population of the Western sectors with supplies over a period of nine months, thus thwarting the Soviet intention to force the Allies to refrain from linking West Germany with Western Europe.

After the Brussels Pact had come into force, it very soon became apparent that the defense of Western Europe would be insufficient without the participation of the United States of America. As early as 11 June 1948 the US Senate adopted a motion submitted by Senator Vandenburg to provide US support for regional alliances such as the Western Union. The talks which were initially held between the USA, Great Britain and Canada and were then extended to include the five powers of the Western Union were soon crowned with success. The Soviet blockade of Berlin considerably advanced the progress of negotiations. The treaty to establish a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was signed by twelve European and North American states on 4 April 1949 became the backbone of the defense of the Free World.

3. *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany*

The changed international balance of power called for the relations between the Three Powers and occupied Germany to be put on a new contractual basis. Visible tokens of this change are the authorization granted by the Western victorious powers

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Nachkriegskonferenzen 1941–1949. Darstellung und Dokumentation, Frankfurt/Main, 1957, p. 218 ff.

to commence preparations for establishing a West German partial state, the - discussions of the Parliamentary Council in Bonn and finally the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany resulting in the promulgation of the Basic Law (provisional constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany on 23 May 1949. The Allied Control Council had already been paralyzed since 1948 when the fourth victorious power had left under protest; it was to be replaced by an Allied High Commission composed of representatives of the USA, the United Kingdom and France. The powers of the military governments in the Western zones thus terminated on 21 September 1949. Under the supervision of the High Commissioners who took up official residence on the Petersberg, the Federal Government instituted by a freely elected Bundestag (lower house of parliament) could now take office.[3]

Initially, the Occupation Statute as the new contractual basis was an issue of great controversy between the Three Powers. Generally speaking, France, and to a lesser degree Great Britain as well, sought to give the Federal Republic as little leeway as possible and to subject it to as much control as possible whereas the USA was anxious to raise Bonn's status to that of a partner of equal standing as quickly as possible.[4] The conference of the three foreign ministers held on the occasion of the signing of the Washington Agreement eventually agreed on the text of an Occupation Statute encompassing twelve clauses. It settled legal issues such as the demilitarization and control of the Ruhr District, foreign affairs, protection and security of the allied forces and foreign trade. But most important was the revision clause which stipulated a review of its terms after 18 months in force and promised further reduction of the rights of the occupying powers.[5] The details of the Statute were the subject of controversial discussions during the Petersberg Talks and during the sessions of an Intergovernmental Study Group throughout the year 1950.

When the three High Commissioners handed over the Occupation Statute to Federal Chancellor Adenauer on the Petersberg on 21 September 1949, Adenauer committed a breach of protocol which is indicative of the new quality of the relations. Waiting

[3] For details on the High Commission refer to Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Der besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955*, Opladen, 1991, in particular p. 12–33. See also Walter Schwengler, *Der doppelte Anspruch: Souveränität und Sicherheit,* published in AWS, vol. 4, p. 187–566.
[4] See Rupieper, p. 41–67.
[5] See *Documents on Germany 1944–1945*, published by the US Department of State, Washington, publishing year not mentioned, p. 212–214.

for the German head of government, John J. McCloy, André François-Poncet and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick were lined up on a carpet in the hall of the villa. Adenauer was supposed to have stopped short of the carpet to be presented with the Statute by the representatives of the victorious powers. Adenauer thwarted this intention by walking on, without any hesitation, until he stood on the carpet on an equal footing with the High Commissioners. The scene was captured by photographers and is proof of the increased self-confidence of the Germans who no longer just waited for what the victorious powers were willing to grant them, but who henceforth also made demands.

4. *The Western Powers as Guarantors of Security*

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 was a painful reminder of how unstable the security situation of the newly founded West German state was. On that day, the troops of Communist North Korea had, without any advance warning, invaded South Korea which had been under US protection. The similarity with the situation in Germany could not be denied and shocked the German population. The hoarding of food was a sure sign of the panic felt by the people. The widely asked question was: Germany in 1950 – a second Korea?[6]

The first command and staff exercises of the Western occupying powers conducted under the code names HALFMOON (1948) and OFFTACKLE (1949)[7] which dealt with a possible war with the USSR on the borderline of the blocs which ran right through Germany produced results that were not at all encouraging. It was all too obvious that the demands made on the remaining US troops were hopelessly out of proportion. Even the defense of the Rhine line in cooperation with the French and British occupation forces could have only been a delaying action in the face of the overwhelming military superiority of the Soviet Army. Therefore, plans provided for a withdrawal of the US forces to the British Isles, beyond the Pyrenees and to North

[6] This is the headline of an article by Norbert Wiggershaus, *Deutschland 1950 – ein zweites Korea? Bedrohungsvorstellungen Bundeskanzler Adenauers nach Ausbruch des Korea-Krieges*, in MGM 25, 1979, p. 79–122.

[7] See the following still authoritative contribution by Christian Greiner, *Die alliierten militärstrategischen Planungen zur Verteidigung Westeuropas 1947–1950* in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, I, p. 119–324.

Africa which would have practically been the reverse order of the 1944 operations. From these transatlantic bridgeheads, Europe and Germany were then to be "freed" by strategic forces brought up from the United States. Given the impact of modern destructive weapons, this would have meant the certain destruction of the basis of life not only of the German people.

In order to prevent a development similar to the one in Korea, first and foremost, however, in order to dispel the doubts about the US promise to protect Europe, a stronger military commitment of the United States in Europe was required. "It was not possible for Europe to increase its defense contribution considerably due to the continuing weakness of the European economy, and German rearmament which would have filled the gap could not be implemented because of the French opposition to it."[8] The invasion of Korea acted as a catalyst or – as US Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it: "June 25, 1950 transformed abstract plans into physical projects."[9]

Aiming to overcome the dilemma, the Truman Administration pursued a package approach. Stationing additional US troops was combined with the build-up of an integrated NATO Force under US supreme command. The Europeans had to commit troops of their own to the integrated structure. In September 1950 - almost parallel to the New York Foreign Ministers' Conference - US President Harry S. Truman announced two long-awaited decisions which had been subject to fervent discussions in the US Senate: Four additional divisions would be stationed in Germany on a permanent basis and General Dwight D. Eisenhower would become the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). With Resolution 99 of 4 April 1951 the US Senate adopted the President's decision to send four additional divisions to Germany by 69 votes to 21 .[10] The largest US troop reinforcement that had ever taken place in peacetime could commence. Two armored divisions and three infantry divisions were selected for the overseas assignment.

[8] Haftendorn, Helga, *Historische Entwicklung, politische Motive und rechtliche Grundlagen* in *Amerikaner in Deutschland. Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit*, published by Dieter Mahncke, 1991, p. 137–190, p. 145.
[9] Anonymous (Dean Acheson), *The Balance of Military Power*, in Atlantic Monthly, June 1951, p. 22.
[10] See Truitt, *Troops to Europe*, loc. cit., p. 418.

5. *NATO Appears on the Scene*

The second element of the political package offered by the Truman Administration concerned the extension of the North Atlantic Alliance. The founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 4 April 1949 established a valuable framework within which the twelve member states were able to build up common structures. But the decisive impetus was still lacking. This step was taken at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting in Washington on 18/19 December 1950 when US President Truman appointed the universally respected General Eisenhower to be the first SACEUR. Eisenhower left his post as President of Columbia University in New York to become the head of the new Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris.[11]

The newly appointed SACEUR was given operational command over all US Army Forces and US Air Forces in Europe and over the US Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean by the US President on 19 December 1950. On 24 December the CINCEUR, General Thomas T. Handy, sent a cable to Eisenhower stating his willingness to place all EUCOM forces under NATO command immediately .[12] This was the beginning of the dual function of the respective SACEUR who in addition to his "NATO hat" wears the "national hat" of the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe and is thus in command of two headquarters, i.e. SHAPE and EUCOM, later USEUCOM. The relations between EUCOM and SHAPE were very similar to those maintained between ETOUSA, the US headquarters in the European theatre of operations, and SHAEF, the UK-US headquarters.

The system of integrated tactical headquarters was developed even further. Together with the First French Army, the Seventh US Army was placed under the command of a newly created NATO army group, the Central Army Group (CENTAG). This headquarters was co-located with EUCOM in the headquarters building in Heidelberg and was commanded by General Handy. By analogy, the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) was established in Northern Germany comprising British, Belgian and Dutch units to which a Canadian brigade was eventually added. It was headquartered

[11] See Schraut, *Vom Besatzer zum Beschützer*, loc. cit., p. 198–201.
[12] See *Relations of the European Command with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, December 1950–June 1952*, Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, Karlsruhe, 1959, p. 10.

in Bad Oeynhausen and commanded by a British general. The British occupation forces in Germany were increased from two to three and a half divisions.[13]

In order to do justice to the serious situation, Belgium deployed part of its forces to Kassel, right on the demarcation line to the Soviet sphere of influence. Canada had withdrawn its troops from Europe in 1946 and now recommitted a brigade in support of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). On 8 December 1951, the 27th Canadian Brigade was operational in Hanover, also close to the inner-German border.[14]

In 1952 there were two NATO army groups based in West Germany and the Benelux countries in order to withstand the threat and to protect the Federal Republic of Germany. NORTHAG in Bad Oeynhausen – the new headquarters in Rheindahlen was under construction – was largely identical with that of the British Army on the Rhine and consisted of a British corps in Bielefeld, a Belgian corps in Cologne-Weiden and a Dutch corps in Apeldoorn as well as the Canadian brigade in Hanover and Norwegian and Danish contingents in Schleswig-Holstein. CENTAG in Heidelberg under the command of the CINC USAREUR comprised the two US corps, i.e. the V US Corps in Frankfurt and the VII US Corps in Stuttgart-Möhringen and two French corps, i.e. the First French Corps in Freiburg (Breisgau) and the Second French Corps in Koblenz.

6. *"Rearmament" of Germany*

The outbreak of the Korean War acted as the catalyst for a great number of interdependent decisions made by the USA and its allies. A very important issue in this context was the build-up of German armed forces, known as "rearmament" at the time. An assessment of the situation in Washington in 1948 had already shown that a confrontation with the Soviet Union could not have a successful outcome without a substantial German contribution. Out of political consideration for France and other Western European states which only few years ago had been occupied by the Wehrmacht, the USA initially had only thought of exhausting the economic and ar-

[13] See Norbert Wiggershaus, *Von Potsdam zum Pleven-Plan, Deutschland in der internationalen Konfrontation 1945–1950,* in *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, vol. 1: *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven-Plan*, published by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1982, p. 114 ff.
[14] See Truitt, *Troops to Europe*, loc. cit., p. 447.

maments potential of West Germany. Now the situation had deteriorated and the unthinkable was even voiced. Side by side with their former enemies German soldiers were to prevent the Red Army or the Garrisoned People's Police of the Soviet Zone from crossing the demarcation line.

On 11 August 1950 when the Consultative Assembly to the Council of Europe adopted by a large majority the resolution tabled by Churchill for the establishment of a "joint European army" including West German troops, Adenauer took the initiative. He offered a military contribution to the defense of Western Europe. Shortly after this, the decision in favor of a West German military contribution to a NATO force in Europe was taken in Washington.[15] The controversial discussions within the NATO Alliance on the type and scope of the German contribution went on for five years, ranging from the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) to Germany eventually becoming a member of NATO on 5 May 1955.[16]

In the course of these discussions, the military presence of the USA in Germany was assigned a new function, i.e. the so-called "dual containment".[17] It was not only the Soviet military power, but also the emerging German military power that was to be contained. In addition to the direct control elements provided for in the Western European Union (WEU) Treaty, the USA assumed an indirect supervisory function over the restive Germans. The argument was along the lines that, should there be any sign in Germany of a renewed threat to peace in Europe, the US forces would be able to intervene in good time. This argument served to prepare the skeptical public in Western Europe to accept German soldiers within NATO. The common sight of US soldiers in the streets of Berlin and the South German cities – unconsciously – had a reassuring effect in two ways: the Americans guaranteed not only the country's security, but also security against a Germany which nobody wanted to emerge ever again.

This, however, caused a real dilemma for the USA since Germany's military build-up was actually aimed to reduce the US commitment. But in the eyes of the European

[15] See Wiggershaus, *Von Potsdam ...,* loc. cit., p. 117
[16] This is not the right forum to reproduce the discussions. Refer to the standard study prepared by the MGFA, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, vol. 2, *Die EVG-Phase* by Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg and Hans-Erich Volkmann, Munich, 1990.
[17] See Helga Haftendorn, *Historische Entwicklung ...*, loc. cit., p. 148.

partners to the Alliance, the US presence now served to contain the Bundeswehr and to act as a counterbalance. A withdrawal of US troops was therefore out of the question - on the contrary, their military presence was considerably increased. Four US divisions reinforced the defense posture so that the equivalent of six US divisions could keep Germany's future twelve divisions in check as well.[18]

7. *The Federal Republic Becomes a Partner on Equal Terms in the West*

As far as the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was concerned, from the very beginning it was impossible to separate the two issues, i.e. the build-up of a West German contingent to strengthen the allied armed forces – this being the title of the commissioner appointed by the Federal Chancellor for this task – and recovery of German sovereignty. After lengthy negotiations the foreign ministers of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic signed the General Agreement or Bonn Conventions on 26 May 1952.[19] As they were linked with the European Defense Community Agreement concluded two days later, it was not until three years afterwards that they were implemented under completely different circumstances.

Yet the very signatures under the Bonn Conventions implied that the Federal Republic's role had transmuted from a ward of the Three Powers to a partner. The USA was the driving force behind this upgrading of Germany vis-à-vis the other two powers. However, the Conventions on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers (this is the real name of the Bonn Conventions) did not enter into force until Germany was accepted into NATO on 5 May 1955.[20] Due to "the international situation which so far had prevented the reunification of Germany and

[18]See Josef Joffe, *Europapräsenz und Europapolitik der Vereinigten Staaten. Eine Untersuchung über Motivation, Funktion und Evolution der amerikanischen Stationierungspolitik in Europa*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, 1969, p. 79. See also Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Der besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955*, Opladen, 1991, in particular section II.B, *Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland: Die Genesis des westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages*, p. 98–139.

[19] See Klaus A. Maier, ´Die internationalen Auseinandersetzungen um die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und um ihre Bewaffnung im Rahmen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft`, in ´Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik`, loc.cit., p. 1 – 234.

[20] See. Conventions on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers (Bonn Conventions) of 26 May 1952 as amended on 23 October 1954, in Rauschning, ´Rechtsstellung Deutschlands`, loc.cit., p. 45 - 49; see also the Law on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty of 24 March 1955, Federal Gazette, 1954, Part II, p. 256 – 294.

the conclusion of a peace treaty"[21], the Three Powers reserved rights and responsibilities with regard to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, but with the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany. This meant that the occupation statute was revoked, but that sovereignty was only partly restored. Permanent troop stationing in accordance with the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces, which also came into force on 5 May 1955, was the pledge for the allied guarantees.[22]

The manner in which the two conventions entered into force and above all the timing thereof made it very clear that the Western Powers considered their prerogatives regarding the new legal situation did not just take precedence, but even had top priority. Even though the legal documents took effect on the same day, there was a 12-hour interval between the entry into force of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Bonn Conventions. First of all the permanent presence of the armed forces in accordance with the rights derived from the Berlin Declaration of 1945 was laid down and then – after twelve long hours – the Federal Republic of Germany was accepted as a partner in the North Atlantic Alliance.[23] With this subtle diplomatic finesse the sovereign, yet confined status of the Federal Republic of Germany in the concert of the powers was determined for the next 35 years. The dual containment was backed up by these conventions. This implied special status for the Bundeswehr, the only NATO armed forces which were fully incorporated in the integrated structure and did not have a national general staff. The twelve army divisions of the Bundeswehr together made up three army corps which were fitted between the allied troops so that the resulting organization has frequently been compared with a "layer cake". The First German Corps in Münster/Wesphalia was between the British Army on the Rhine, a Dutch corps and a Belgian corps. Then came the Third German Corps in Koblenz to the left of the V US Corps, then the VII US Corps and finally the Second German Corps in Ulm. The First German Corps was assigned to NORTHAG, while the Second and Third German Corps were assigned to CENTAG.

8. *The Federal Government's Claim to Sole Representation of Germany*

[21] See. Bonn Conventions, Art. 2, in Rauschning, ´Rechtsstellung Deutschlands`, loc.sit., p. 45.
[22] See Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany (Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces) of 23 October 1954, in ´Verträge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland`, vol. 7, Bonn, Cologne/Berlin, 1957, p. 609 – 613.
[23] See. Helga Haftendorn, ´Historische Entwicklung`, loc.cit., p. 150 ff.

With the efforts made by the Western Powers after the outbreak of the Korean War to integrate the young Federal Republic of Germany into their alliance system and the progress towards military and political integration of Western Europe, the Soviet Union realized the urgent need for a European security and peace settlement parallel to a solution of the German question. Stalin attempted to ease the confrontation of the two power blocs in Europe by adopting a policy of disengagement based on the principle of neutrality. The Soviet note on Germany of 10 March 1952 addressed to the three Western Powers responsible for Germany was to serve this purpose and even today is still the subject of lively discussions. This note offered free elections for all of Germany, the details of which were not specified but on condition that a reunited Germany become a neutral state. The Western Powers rated this proposal as an attempt to prevent the conclusion of the General Treaty – later called Bonn Conventions – and an agreement on the European Defense Community. This is why they did not accept this offer to negotiate. Chancellor Adenauer, who had come to identical conclusions upon evaluating the situation, sided with the position of the Western Powers.[24]

Stalin's note of 1952 and further political threats on the part of the USSR could not forestall the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western alliance system, finalized when Germany was accepted into NATO on 5 May 1955. By tying Germany to the West, Chancellor Adenauer had found a key to the solution of the German question. Realizing that a second key would be needed in future in order to achieve reunification in freedom as well as the unresolved POW issue, he immediately accepted the invitation of the Soviet leaders to come to Moscow. Shortly before the Geneva Summit in June 1955 the Soviet Government had launched the initiative to take up diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. This took place after the Federal Republic had joined NATO and the WEU in May1955 and had been granted sovereign rights and thus the ability to take action in foreign politics, limited only by the allied reservations concerning Germany and Berlin.

[24] Regarding Stalin´s note refer to Klaus A. Maier, "Die internationale Auseinandersetzung um die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und um ihre Bewaffnung im Rahmen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft", in "Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik", vol. II, Munich, 1990, p. 109 – 119.

The first round of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany took place in Moscow from 9 to 13 September 1955 and was quite dramatic. Thanks to the negotiating skills of Adenauer who was assisted by the then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and later federal chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and his deputy, Carlo Schmid (SPD), visible success was finally achieved on two concrete issues.

The first success was the release of the German POWs and the establishment of a negotiation basis for the return of the German civilian internees. Secondly, Germany succeeded in safeguarding its legal position, i.e. it was able to uphold its claim for national self-determination with the aid of provisos under international law. One of the provisos concerned the non-acknowledgement of all territorial changes in Eastern Europe and of the annexation of the east German provinces which had taken place contrary to the Potsdam Agreement. The other proviso concerned the Federal Republic's claim to have the right to represent the whole of Germany. The Soviet delegation accepted these provisos after long and controversial deliberations, they were recorded in the minutes and set out in writing in a Note to the Soviet Government shortly before the German delegation flew back on 14 September. After Chancellor Adenauer's policy statement on 22 September 1955 the Federal Diet unanimously endorsed the results of the Moscow negotiations.[25]

The Federal Republic was not able to take up direct relations with the USSR until Bonn had, by joining NATO, rid itself of the always "lurking suspicion"[26] that it could pursue a seesaw policy between East and West similar to that practiced at Rapallo . Also in view of the fact that the Four Powers were again taking steps towards reviving their wartime alliance at the summit conferences and discussing European security and the German question, it made sense to join as a full partner. However, precautions had to be taken to ensure that the initial steps toward establishing diplomatic contacts could not be interpreted as the recognition of the status quo – and consequently the existence of the German Democratic Republic. To prevent this from happening the then head of the Political Directorate in the Federal Foreign Office, Wilhelm Grewe, formulated the "Hallstein Doctrine", named after the state secretary

[25]See Boris Meissner, "Westdeutsche Ostpolitik: Die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen", in "Handbuch der deutschen Außenpolitik", ed. by Hans-Peter Schwarz, Munich/Zurich, 1975, p. 286.
[26] Haftendorn, ´Sicherheit und Entspannung`, loc.cit., p. 64.

in the Foreign Office, Walter Hallstein. It made it quite clear that dual German relations with Moscow were a special case and - by threatening to sever diplomatic relations - it aimed at preventing international recognition of the GDR by third states. The Federal Republic of Germany laid claim – as expressed in the preamble of the Basic Law of 1949 – to have acted on behalf of those Germans as well "to whom participation was denied".

In spite of the diplomatic success, the claim to have the sole right to represent Germany became more and more of a burden for Federal foreign politics. Yugoslavia was to become the first test case of the Hallstein Doctrine. After Tito broke with Moscow, the Federal Republic of Germany had opened a consulate general in 1951 which just one year later was upgraded to an embassy. Following the thaw in the relations between Khrushchev and Tito, Yugoslavia recognized the GDR in 1956 and thus supported the Soviet theory of two German states. Due to the Hallstein Doctrine Bonn had no other choice than to sever its relations with Yugoslavia which had taken such an optimistic start. [27] However, the claim to have the sole right to represent Germany not only prevented the building of diplomatic bridges to the Eastern European states which were under Soviet hegemony, but also put a strain on relations with states like Egypt, Syria or India when decolonization started. The Hallstein Doctrine and consequently the refusal to recognize the realities which had evolved after World War II threatened to isolate the Federal Republic in the long term, particularly after its most important allies set about revising their relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. President Charles de Gaulle's visit to Poland made a great impression on Bonn. Attempts to normalize relations were not only made by the United States, but also by Italy and Belgium and were mainly designed to open the Eastern European market for the products of these countries. The establishment of Federal trade missions in Warsaw, Bucharest, Budapest, and Sofia in 1963 and 1964 broke the old taboo that contractual relations are impossible with states which had recognized the GDR. However, these relations were not equivalent to diplomatic relations, because overstepping this threshold without canceling or modifying the Hallstein Doctrine seemed impossible at the time.[28]

[27] See Irina Hendrichs, "Westdeutsche Ostpolitik. Die Beziehungen zu Bulgarien, der CSSR, Polen, Rumänien, Ungarn und Jugoslawien" in "Handbuch der deutschen Außenpolitik", Munich, 1975, p. 292 – 304.
[28] See Haftendorn, "Sicherheit und Entspannung", loc.cit., p. 281 ff.

9. *Renunciation of Force and Eastern Treaties*

The Christian Democratic (CDU) governments under Adenauer and Erhard found no way out of the impasse into which they had maneuvered themselves with their claim to have the sole right to represent Germany. Only with the transition – via the Grand Coalition (1966 – 1969) – to the social liberal coalition and the ensuing turning point in social policy was it possible to adopt of a new political stance. In his policy statement on 28 October 1969, Chancellor Willy Brandt emphasized that his government was determined to continue the policy initiated by the Grand Coalition, but he also pointed out in which aspects it would differ from that of his predecessor. The non-aggression policy of the Brandt/Scheel Government would be based on the realities World War II had created in Europe and would respect the territorial integrity of the respective partners. This principle would also apply to the GDR.[29]

Willy Brandt and his coalition partner and foreign minister, Walter Scheel, wanted to reduce the risky confrontation of the antagonist blocs and gain more room for maneuver for the Federal Republic of Germany, - including vis-à-vis the states of Central and Eastern Europe. They were prepared to accept the statehood of the GDR and the new borders created in the wake of World War II if the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states would honor this move by respecting the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union was greatly interested in launching a conference on the security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For this purpose it needed the Federal Republic as a partner who in turn did not want to have the CSCE process excessively burdened with everlasting controversial debates about the German question.

The efforts of the social-liberal coalition for which the phrase "*Ostpolitik*"(Eastern policy) was coined were directed at safeguarding what Adenauer had attained, i.e. integration in the Western world, and at simultaneously keeping up relations with Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and East Berlin based on mutual agreement. This was impossible without the consent of the United States, Great Britain and France which as the victorious powers were responsible for Germany as a whole and for Berlin. Atlantic Alliance backing was a precondition for the success of the Federal govern-

ment's policy. Consequently the Federal Republic welcomed the fact that at the NATO Council Meeting in December 1969 and at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Rome in May 1970 its political ideas and aims were adopted.[30] The most important coordination body in this context was the Bonn Quadripartite Group established in 1957 on the initiative of the United States to coordinate issues concerning Germany policy between the Three Powers and the Federal Government. Now the representatives of the Federal Government informed the three Western Powers of the negotiations conducted in Moscow and Warsaw and they in turn made sure that the allied provisos were not infringed upon. The Bonn Four States Group thus acted as the main pivot between the Federal Republic and her Western allies. It later became the most important Western coordinating body for issues pertaining to East-West relations.[31]

State Secretary Egon Bahr, a close friend of Chancellor Willy Brandt, played a key role in the *Ostpolitik*. In June 1970 the agreements reached between him and the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, were released. The "Bahr Paper" already contained the core issues of the future treaties.[32] In this paper the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union came out in favor of peaceful relations between the European states on the basis of the situation actually existing in Europe. The renunciation of force was more closely defined in that the Federal Republic entered into an obligation to respect "today and in future" the territorial integrity of all European states and the inviolability of the borders to include the Oder-Neisse Line and the inner-German border. Furthermore, Bonn renounced any territorial claims. In turn the Soviets renounced the assertion of intervention claims in accordance with the Enemy State Clauses of the UN Charter, and the two states agreed to make the renunciation of force pursuant to Art. 2 of the UN Charter the guiding principle of their relations.

The most difficult negotiation issue was the recognition under international law of the GDR by the Federal Republic. Bahr attempted to make clear to Gromyko that such a recognition would compromise the rights of the Four Powers, consequently also

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[29] See policy statement of Chancellor Willy Brandt of 28 October 1969, DBT/VI/5, in "Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik", vol. 4, p. 9 – 40.
[30] See Statement of the NATO Member States Pertaining to European Security Issues of 5 December 1969 in Europa-Archiv 4/1970, p. D 79-82 and "Final Communiqué of the NATO Ministerial Meeting, held in Rome on 26th and 27th May 1970`, loc.cit., p. 327 ff.
[31] See Haftendorn, "Sicherheit und Entspannung", loc.cit., p. 327 ff.

those of the USSR. Hence a compromise had to be made for relations between the two parts of Germany at a level short of recognition under international law.[33] The guiding principle was Willy Brand's formula "of the two states in Germany, neither of which could consider the other to be a foreign country".[34]

In addition, Bahr and Gromyko had agreed on a number of declarations of intent which were to supplement the planned treaty. With these declarations Bonn stated its willingness to conclude pertinent treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR which were to become an integral part of the Moscow Treaty. The Federal Republic promised to settle its relations with the GDR in an agreement binding under international law on the basis of equal rights, non-discrimination and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state. This differed somewhat from Moscow's original request to recognize the GDR under international law, a goal which East Berlin in particular had wanted to achieve and whose undermining it had bitterly opposed. The treaty with Czechoslovakia was to settle issues pertaining to the invalidity of the Munich Agreement of 1938. Finally the Federal Government committed itself to advocating the admission of the two German states to the United Nations in the course of easing of tensions in Europe. This meant that when progress had been made in setting the relations between the two German states on a normal footing, Bonn would renounce its veto against international recognition of the GDR. Finally, the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union stated their basic support of the planned conference on security and cooperation in Europe and their willingness to engage in the all-around development of their mutual relations.[35]

The "*Ostpolitik*" had to offer an acceptable solution for the problems of the citizens of the divided City of Berlin if it was to be a success. What was important was - as stated in the "Bahr Paper" and later in the Moscow Treaty - to take into account "the actual situation in this region". But this also included the Four Power status and the linking of West Berlin to the Federal Republic. Before signing the Moscow Treaty the Federal Government stated that it could only enter into force if the "situation in and

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[32] See publications in the newspaper Bild-Zeitung of 12 June 1970 and the magazine Quick on 8 July 1970.
[33] Interview conducted by Günter Gaus with State Secretary Egon Bahr on 4 June 1972 in the telecast "Zur Person", as quoted by Günther Schmid, "Entscheidung in Bonn", Cologne, 1979, p. 48.
[34] See government policy statement of 28 October 1969, loc.cit. (p. 11 ff).
[35] See. Haftendorn, "Sicherheit und Entspannung", loc.cit., p. 329 ff.

around Berlin were settled satisfactorily".[36] The Four Power Agreement on Berlin was in turn the prerequisite for a settlement of the relations between the two German states, the focal issue of "*Ostpolitik*" of the Brandt/Scheel Government. The Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR resulted in more international prestige for the GDR and the renunciation of the claim of the Federal Republic to have the sole right to represent Germany, but on the other hand the living conditions of the Germans in East and West were improved.

In the end, the course of the Eastern Treaties which were not only politically interlinked and intermeshed but also as far as their subjects and timing were concerned, was as follows:

- Moscow Treaty - 12 August 1970,
- Warsaw Treaty - 7 December 1970,
- Four Power Agreement on Berlin - 3 September 1971,
- Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic – 21 December 1972,
- Admittance of the two German states to the United Nations - 18 September 1973,
- Prague Treaty - 11 December 1973.

1. *German-German Coexistence and Reunification*

When the "*Ostpolitik*" had proved successful and integration into the West had been upheld, the path was clear for a CSCE which the USSR had pressed for more than any other state. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the Chairman of the GDR's Council of State, Erich Honecker, were able to sign the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE jointly in the presence of the European and North American heads of state and government on 1 August 1975. The following 25 years were characterized by peaceful coexistence of the two German states, even though occasional tensions surfaced.

One of the definite lessons the Federal Republic of Germany learned was that during the deliberations about the course of Federal foreign and security policy in the years

[36] "The Cabinet decides to negotiate" in "Der Vertrag vom 12. August 1970", published by the Press and

from 1952 to 1955 and from 1970 to 1972 there were no realistic alternatives to the decision taken.[37] In the fifties the Federal Republic did not have the leeway to actively pursue reunification against the will of the Western powers and based on the Soviet proposals. In the seventies it was only a question of time when the Federal Republic would be forced to accept the status quo under the pressure of her allies and under less favorable conditions . It would probably have strained the alliance relations more than the irritations caused by the "*Ostpolitik*".[38]

A solution to the dilemma of freedom or unity became possible in 1989 due to the policy of Perestroika and Glasnost introduced by Michail Gorbachev, the Soviet Communist Party leader. In this climate of change the courageous and undaunted stand of the citizens of the GDR to defend their rights –especially by organizing the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig – led to success. The slogan "We are the people" soon became "We are one people". When the Wall built in 1961 fell on 9 November 1989 , the dynamism of the social process eventually deprived the GDR leadership of their legitimization. Chancellor Helmut Kohl seized the opportunity and with a political masterstroke was able to secure the creation of the economic (monetary union), domestic and foreign policy parameters. The freely elected People's Chamber decided to take the steps required for reunification by restoring the federal states which had been dissolved in 1952 and for their accession pursuant to Art. 23 of the Basic Law. On 3 October 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany had reached its goal: Unification in freedom with the consent of its neighbors.

In retrospect, the sovereignty which was limited in 1955 by the provisos of the Four Power responsibility for Germany as a whole and Berlin proved – under international law – to have been essential for reunification. Without this title the swift procedures of the Two Plus Four Negotiations could not have been conducted and a lengthy peace conference with all of the 53 wartime opponents of the German Reich would have been inevitable. We can only guess whether there would still have been an opportunity for the restoration of German unity in peace and freedom with the consent of its neighbors or whether the brief timeframe for unification would have

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Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1970, p. 166 ff.

[37] See Walter Stützle, "Frieden, Sicherheit, Abrüstung. Gedanken zur Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik" in Hans-Dietrich Genscher (ed.), "Nach vorn gedacht ... Perspektiven deutscher Aussenpolitik", Bonn, 1987, p. 31.

[38] See Haftendorn, "Sicherheit und Entspannung`", loc.cit., p. 738 ff

elapsed without achieving this goal. I am convinced that the remnants of the Four Power prerogatives - but above all their interpretation under US leadership as Three Power responsibility – were the *conditio sine qua non* of German unity.

As time passed some contemporaries might have considered these relics from the Potsdam Agreement to be an anachronism, but from a political point of view they were important elements needed to support the reunification process, since the Federal *Realpolitik* had resigned itself to the existence of two states. For the citizens, the Four Power claim to speak for Germany as a whole and for Berlin was visible due to the continued presence of their armed forces on German territory.

The American Soldier in Germany 1951-1969

A joint paper by Dr Robert S. Rush and Dr. Bianka J. Adams

"Never before in History, has a country had so many of its sons serving so far away from their own land in a time of danger, not for the purpose of conquest, but for the purpose of freedom." John F. Kennedy, address to 3d Armor Division Troops, Fliegerhorst Kaserne, Hanau, Germany, 25 June 1963.

Introduction

Although never firing a shot in anger, the American soldier in Germany won the Cold War. Many have written about the Cold War Army, however, there has been very little research regarding those soldiers stationed in Germany. Looking at the individual American soldier in Germany in 1951-55, 1959-62 and 1966-70 may lend a better insight to events at the ground level; an area still in need of exploration.

We create a composite character founded upon actual soldiers and events to examine the reality of daily life of a soldier in Germany rather than just the dry details of soldiering. All military organizations exist under the rubric of regulations and doctrine. Every aspect under which soldiers operate, the uniforms they wear and the weapons they carry are all prescribed by regulation. Whilst the focus is on one hypothetical soldier, in fully realistic time scale and experience, the generalities and experiences of the many are also examined and carefully woven into the narrative thread.

This paper follows one soldier ('Frank') through his induction in 1950, training and assignment to the 4th Infantry Division which is deployed to Germany in 1951. He returns to Germany as a sergeant in 1959 as a member of the 8th Infantry Division, and after a tour in Vietnam, a final tour in Germany to the 3d Armored Division from 1967-1970. Through this soldier's eyes comes an examination of the culture and society in

which the ordinary GI existed in Germany. What were the soldiers' educational and mental levels, how were they trained, where were they deployed, and how did they interact with the German population.

There is little primary source material documenting the individual soldier's world. Yearly historical reports, analyses of special topics, newspaper accounts, diaries, reminisces and anecdotal evidence provide the framework for this paper; yet much is left to conjecture.

The Cold War was the struggle of free Western democracies under the leadership of the United States against the global expansionism of the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 60s the Korean War, the Crises in Berlin and Cuba, and the Vietnam War were direct confrontations between the antagonists, each time followed by periods of relative "thaw." In Europe the Soviet Union secured its empire, the so called Eastern Bloc, through repeated interventions against freedom movements in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.[1] What British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill called the "Iron Curtain,"[2] divided East and West Europe for more than forty years.

In 1949 two German states established themselves on the frontline between the free world and the Eastern Bloc. The American, British, and French occupation zones merged and became the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union sponsored the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in its zone. West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), set the new state on a solidly western course from which

[1] Wilfried Loth, "Was war der Kalte Krieg? Annäherung an ein unbewältigtes Erbe," at http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/kalter_krieg/h_loth.htm, 1 of 9
[2] Telegram, Prime Minister to President Truman, 12 May 1945, reprinted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Triumph and Tragedy*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 573

he never deviated. He held steady even when Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in an effort to prevent West Germany's integration into NATO offered to reunify Germany in return for complete neutrality and four power control over the semi-autonomous state. Neither Adenauer nor the western heads of states seriously considered Stalin's offer.[3] Adenauer's ultimate goal was to gain sovereignty and the ability of the young Republic to defend itself within the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with America as its most powerful member and leader. When the Korean War broke out six months after the Federal Republic was founded, the parallels between the situation in the divided Korea and Germany were only too obvious.[4] Still, Germany faced five years of negotiations about rearmament, NATO membership, and sovereignty before it became a full member of the Western Alliance 1955.[5]

The Korean War also had a great effect on the economic situation in Germany. The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan,[6] provided Germany with the seed money for an economic recovery that grew very quickly as a result of the demand for German machines and tools created in the so called "Korea boom." Germany's *Wirtschaftswunder* [Economic Miracle] began to take shape and in December 1950 when unemployment had dropped by 800,000 from its high of two million.[7] On average a German then worked nearly fifty hours in a six day work week

[3] 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1952: Die Stalin Note,5 of 14, at http://koep3og.virtualave.net/; Loth, "Was war der Kalte Krieg? Annäherung an ein unbewältigtes Erbe," p.7 of 9
[4] Deutsches Historisches Musem, "Wir sind wieder wer. Die Fünfziger," Katalog, Die Fifties, Teil 4,2 of 3, at http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/50er/seiten/katalog5.htm
[5] ibid., Teil 5, 1 of 3
[6] Norman Friedman, *The Fifty-Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 8
[7] Die Fifties, Teil 5, 1 of 3

and earned a net income of DM 213,00 per month.[8] In the 1960s German incomes rose by fifty percent, the work week dropped by five hours, and the two day weekend became the norm. Home ownership rose to an all time high of 34.4 percent of the population in 1968, and 13 million Germans could afford their own cars.[9] This unprecedented economic growth continued until 1966 when the German economy encountered its first slow down.[10]

After the deprivations and hard work of the 1950s, Germans became prosperous in the 60s and had time to reflect on developments in their country. Thus, in the mid 1960s publications such "Der Spiegel" and "Die Zeit" became fora for criticism of the republic's seemingly plan less reconstruction of housing, unwillingness to reform the education system, and lack of resolve in dealing with National Socialists. Towards the end of the decade German protesters had joined their American role models in marches against nuclear weapons and the Vietnam War.[11]

Meanwhile the US Army provided the security framework for Germany. US Army forces in Germany comprised 15 percent of the total Army in 1952, 24 percent in 1961 during the Berlin crisis and 12 percent in 1968 while it was fighting in Vietnam.[12] The NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951[13] and the Bonn Conventions of 1952[14]

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[8] Axel Schildt, "Vor der Revolte: Die sechziger Jahre," in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B22-23/2001, 7-13, here 8; Statistisches Bundesamt, In fünfzig Jahren Lohnsteigerungen auf das Dreizehnfache, Mitteilung für die Presse, 25 May 2000.
[9] Schildt, "Vor der Revolte: Die sechziger Jahre," 8
[10] Schildt, "Vor der Revolte: Die sechziger Jahre," 11
[11] Schildt, "Vor der Revolte: Die sechziger Jahre," 9 and 12
[12] Troop Program and Manpower Program (U) Military Personnel Strength, (Washington, D.C.: Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, June, 1952, June 1961, June 1968)
[13] Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, London, 19 June 1951, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b510619a.htm
[14] Convention on Relations With the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, in United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers.1952-1954.*

with the Federal Republic defined the Army's rights on German soil and the distribution of cost for its continued presence. Under these laws the individual soldiers and their dependents were immune from German criminal jurisdiction, received their driver's licenses from US military authorities, and continued to receive tax exempt gasoline, tobacco, coffee, and liquor rations.[15]

The events of Berlin and Soviet successes in installing popular front governments in Eastern Europe convinced policy makers in Washington that the US forces needed allies for the defense of Europe. As a result, the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada, the Low Countries, as well as Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949.[16]

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 had a profound impact on the US Army in Europe. The build-up of US forces in Western Europe and US Military Defense Aid Programs for NATO states began the same year. Two years later the former European Command Headquarters in Heidelberg became Headquarters, US Army, Europe (USAREUR).[17] With the end of the Korean War in 1953 tensions also began to decrease in Europe. USAREUR divisions began to use the new Pentomic structure in 1957 and their equipment was upgraded with the introduction of the M-48 tank, the M-59 armored personnel carrier, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Volume VII. Germany and Austria (in two parts), (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1986)

[15] D.J. Hichman, *The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963*, (Heidelberg, Germany: Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Operations Division Historical Section, 1964), 20-23

[16] Norman Friedman, *The Fifty-Year War. Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 81-82

[17] Hans Jürgen Schraut, "US Forces in Germany, 1945-1955," in Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger (eds.), *US Military Forces in Europe. The Early Years, 1945-1970*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993): 153-180, here 176-177

The period of "thaw" ended in 1958 with the beginning Berlin Crisis. Since the mid 1950s hundreds of thousands of East Germans voted with their feet and escaped through Berlin to West Germany. In the summer of 1961 the GDR lost 3,000 of its citizens per day. In order to halt the flow of refugees the Soviets took desperate measures and closed all the border crossing points on 13 August 1961 and then began to construct the Berlin Wall. Six days later, USAREUR dispatched the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry (Reinforced) in a convoy across the East German autobahn to Berlin. Additionally, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and other units deployed to Europe to reinforce the forces there. Following this crisis USAREUR units received the M-113 armored personnel carrier, the M-14 rifle, the M-60 machine gun, the OV-1 fixed wing observation aircraft, the UH-1B Huey helicopter, the M-60 tank to improve their abilities with newer equipment and systems.[18]

In the beginning 1960s economic problems due rising costs of forces in Europe and the termination of German occupation and support cost payments led to a gold drain from the United States to Germany. For the first time since the end of World War II, the number of dependents allowed in Europe was ordered decreased in 1961. In addition, the German currency was revalued so that the DM, previously at 4.2 /1.00 was lowered to 4.0 /1.00. In the United States the American commitment to the defense of Europe came into question. Hard negotiations between the Kennedy administration and the German government about financial compensation for the maintenance US forces in Germany resulted in the first of many "Off Set" agreements. Under the provisions, the German government purchased weapons from the United States at a predetermined percentage of

[18] A Brief History of the US Army Europe (USAREUR), at http://www.cmtc.7atc.army.mil/history/usareur_history.htm

dollars spent by the US Armed Forces in Germany. This kept the gold drain from the United States into Germany at a minimum.[19]

In 1968 the first Redeployment of Forces FROM Germany (REFORGER) took place resulting in the removal of about 35,000 spaces from Germany. The units and personnel withdrawn remained committed to NATO, however, and during REFORGER I, renamed RETURN of Forces TO Germany, conducted on January 1969, over 12,000 soldiers returned to Germany for the exercise and used pre-positioned equipment. At this time, demands for personnel for the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia also began to draw trained soldiers from USAREUR. In many cases, experienced NCOs, junior and field grade officers were sent to Vietnam with younger and less experienced troops sent to USAREUR to replace them, if there were any sent at all. In 1970, USAREUR continued to improve its firepower when it received the new M-16A1 rifle, the TOW anti-tank weapon, the OH-58 observation helicopter and the AH-1G Cobra helicopter.[20]

The Infantry Regiment, 1950

The infantry regiment of 1950 was very similar to that of the World War II organization. The regimental and three battalion headquarters provided the organization's command and control, with a colonel as regimental commander, lieutenant colonels as battalion commanders and captains as company commanders. The Service Company and the regimental medical company provided the regiment's combat service support.

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[19] Hubert Zimmermann, Why did they not go home: The GIs and the battle about their presence in the 1960s and 1970s. Paper delivered at the Conference: GIs in Germany: The Social, Military, and Political History of the American Military Presence, 1945-2000, (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany, 2000), 8-9

[20] A Brief History of the US Army Europe (USAREUR)

Instead of the Cannon Company, there was a heavy mortar company of twelve 4.2-inch mortars and in place of the anti-tank company was a tank company consisting of 22 tanks, five more than the armor battalion tank company.[21] The above was the ideal, however, most regiments in 1950 were under strength and not fully equipped. It was not until June 1950 and the beginning of the Korean War that units throughout the army were brought to strength.[22]

One of the most important changes in rifle company organization occurred in the rifle squad. The squad dropped in strength from 12 to 9 with the automatic rifle ammunition bearer and the two scouts eliminated, and the squad now contained a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, a BAR team of two men, and five riflemen armed with the M1, one a sniper version of the M1 rifle Added to the rifle platoon was a weapons squad containing a light machinegun and 2.46-inch bazookas. This left three 60mm mortars and three 57-mm. recoilless rifles in the weapons platoon.[23]

The battalion Heavy Weapons Company contained one heavy machine gun platoon, an 81-mm mortar platoon and an assault platoon consisting of 75-mm recoilless rifles.[24]

The Pentomic Battle Group, 1960

Starting in late 1956 infantry units were reorganized from regiments to battle groups under the Pentomic system. Two of the most significant features of this concept were the pentagonal structure and atomic capabilities. Low-yield tactical nuclear

[21] Infantry Lineage Series, 73.
[22] Infantry Lineage Series, 76.
[23] Infantry Lineage Series, 73.
[24] Infantry Lineage Series, 73.

weapons became a mainstay of the Army, and an organization based on five major subordinate units replaced the traditional three basic elements of the triangular system.[25]

The battle group had a headquarters and headquarters company, a combat support company, and five rifle companies, with its commander a colonel and company commanders, captains. When organized for combat, the infantry battle group often had attached tank, engineer, and artillery units.

Each rifle company contained three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. The rifle platoons each had three rifle squads and a weapons squad. The squad leader commanded two teams, each consisting of a team leader and four soldiers, one carrying an automatic rifle. Weapons squads contained two light machine guns and three 3.5" Bazookas. Each rifle and weapons squad received a portable radio set under the 1960 TOE linking for the first time all subordinate elements of the rifle platoon and making them immediately responsive to the platoon leader's orders. The weapons platoon contained three 81-mm. mortars and three 106-mm. recoilless rifles.

Rifle companies within the battle group were foot mobile, however augmentation from the division transportation battalion's armored personnel companies or the light truck company provided the high degree of mobility required of Pentomic units.

The heavy mortar, assault weapons, reconnaissance and radar platoons were located in the battle group's combat support company. The heavy mortar platoon contained four 4.2-inch mortars, while the assault weapons platoon contained the first operational infantry guided missile, the French-manufactured SS10. The radar section's

[25] Infantry Lineage Series, 88.

two medium-range and five short-range radar sets provided greatly increased ground surveillance capability.[26]

In 1960, the new M14 rifle replaced the venerable M1. The M14 was almost a pound lighter than its predecessor and held a 20-round magazine instead of the Ml's eight round clip. It fired the 7.62-mm. NATO cartridge and a selector for automatic or semi-automatic fire increased the M 14's versatility and enabled it to serve as a replacement not only for the M 1, but also for the carbine, the submachine gun and, when used in automatic mode with a bipod, for the much heavier BAR.[27] The M60 was adopted at about the same time as a replacement for both the heavy water-cooled and the light air-cooled Browning .30-caliber machine guns. Firing the same round as the M14 at a rate of 600 rounds per minute, it weighed only twenty-three pounds, and soldiers could fire it from the tripod, the attached bipod, the shoulder or the hip.[28]

The Infantry Battalion, 1966

The infantry battalion of 1966 was closer in organization to the pre-Pentomic battalion than that of the battle group, although it was more tactically self-sufficient and had a greater degree of independence than its predecessors organic to the infantry regiment. It was organized into a headquarters and Headquarters Company and three rifle companies instead of the five in a battle group. The battalion commander was a lieutenant colonel and the company commanders, captains. Communications between

[26] Infantry Lineage Series, 89-92,
27 Infantry, 94
28 Infantry, 94.

units greatly increased with radios almost tripling from 66 in the battle group to 176 in the infantry battalion.[29]

There was no separate heavy weapons company; and the platoons once in the heavy weapons and combat support companies were included within the Headquarters Company. Combat platoons included the heavy mortar platoon, reconnaissance platoon, anti-tank platoon now with the ENTAC (ENgin-Teleguide Anti-Char) a French-manufactured wire-guided missile with a range of 2,000 meters, an air defense section equipped with the new Redeye shoulder launched heat seeking anti-aircraft missile, and ground defense surveillance radar platoon.[30] The battalion could be augmented with the Davy Crockett tactical nuclear weapons system, designed principally for use against massed enemy forces. Should nuclear release authority be given, the battalion commander had four low-yield nuclear weapons under his direct control and the capability of initiating a nuclear fire mission within minutes.[31] Logistically, the company mess teams were consolidated for the first time into a battalion mess section.[32]

Each rifle company contained three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. The rifle platoon consisted of three rifle squads and a weapons squad; and. the weapons platoon had a mortar and an antitank section.[33]

The rifle squad contained ten men, smaller by one than the eleven-man Pentomic squad. It consisted of a squad leader, an extra rifleman and two 4-man fire teams with each containing a team leader carrying an M14, an automatic rifleman with an automatic

[29] Infantry, 105
[30] Infantry, 103
[31] Infantry, 103, 114.
[32] Infantry, 102
[33] Infantry, 102

M14E2, a rifleman with an M14, and a grenadier armed with the new M79 Grenade Launcher that fired a 40mm high explosive fragmentation projectile approximately 400 meters.[34] The squad leader had the same combat systems as the company commander; where the company had mortars, the squad leaders had the M79; for direct fire the company had the M60 machine gun and the squad the automatic M14; for maneuver the company has platoons, and the squad fire teams. The 90-mm. recoilless rifle replaced the 3.5-inch rocket launcher in the rifle platoon's weapons squad and the new M72 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW), weighing just 4.75 pounds with an effective range of 200 meters and capable of penetrating armor of the heaviest known tank, was designated to replace the 3.5-inch rocket launcher in other organizations.[35]

The weapons platoon contained the three-gun 81mm mortar section and four 106mm recoilless rifles within the anti-tank platoon, which were to be replaced by the TOW (Tube-Launched-Optical Guided Weapon) when it entered service.

The M-16 rifle was standardized for general Army distribution in mid-1967, although the M14 rifle continued to be used by most infantrymen stationed outside of Vietnam. It fired a 5.56-mm. (.223-caliber) round at a muzzle velocity of approximately 3,150 feet per second and an average cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. The rifle's firing weight was only 7.6 pounds including a shoulder sling and a fully loaded 20-round magazine.[36]

[34] Infantry, 102-03
[35] Infantry, 103
[36] Infantry, 118

The Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 1966

The mechanized infantry battalion was organized similar to that of the infantry battalion except that it was 100 percent mobile and had high cross-country mobility. When suitably reinforced the battalion provided a highly mobile force capable of operating both in conventional and nuclear environments. The M577 armored command vehicles in the battalion headquarters, M114 armored reconnaissance vehicles in the recon platoon and M113 armored personnel carriers in various configurations in the rifle and weapons platoons provided light armor protection to the command and control and combat elements. With increased mobility, radio communication was essential and the TO&E called for double the number of radios within the battalion than there was in a dismounted infantry battalion.[37]

As in the dismounted company, each mechanized rifle company contained three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon mounted in M113 vehicles. The mechanized infantry rifle squad had eleven men, allowing the same type squad battle drills as that of the dismounted infantry while the driver remained with the armored personnel carriers.[38]

The Peacetime Draft

Over 10,000,000 men were inducted from 1940 until 1947—when the selective service act expired after extensions by Congress. What followed was a period of fifteen months with the selective service act out of existence. During this time the manpower of the Armed Forces fell dangerously below authorized strength. Since voluntary recruitment had failed to fill the necessary manpower requirements a new Selective

[37] TOE 8-45G, Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 1966; Infantry, 106.
[38] Infantry, 106

Service Act was passed in 1948. It required that all men between 18 and 26 register and made men from 19 to 26 liable for induction for 21 months' service, which would be followed by 5 years of reserve duty. When the Korean War broke out, the 1948 law was replaced by the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951, which extended the length of service to 24 months and reduced the minimum age to 18 1/2 years.[39]

At the time of his registration with a local board of the selective service system, a young man generally prepared and submitted a classification questionnaire containing detailed information about him. Based on these data the board determined his status with selective service and classified him accordingly. Class I-A, available for military service, was considered the highest and Class V-A, registrant over the age of liability for military service, the lowest. Classes II, III, and IV were for men who were exempted for reasons such their rare civilian occupation, number of dependents, or military service in World War II. Those who failed either the Armed Forces mental test or were disqualified for medical reasons were classed ass IV-F. Thus out of 12,000,000 men registered by June 1951 the portion from which inductees would come was rather limited. After subtraction of all exemptions and rejections the pool of those available for service amounted to 1,100,000 of which 617, 667 were inducted.[40]

The next step after registration was a national lottery based on birthdays. It determined the order in which registered men were called up by Selective Service. The first to be called, in a sequence determined by the lottery, were men whose 20th birthday

[39] *Selective Service under the 1948 Act Extended July 9, 1950 - June 19, 1951*, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1953), 3; Selective Service at http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/history/A0844347.html.

[40] *Selective Service under the 1948 Act Extended July 9, 1950 - June 19, 1951*, 39 and 66-67; *Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1951 to the Congress of the United States pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act as Amended*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, January 3, 1952), 17

fell during that year, followed, if needed, by those aged 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 18-year-olds and those turning 19 would probably not be drafted. Registrants with low lottery numbers were ordered to report for a physical, mental, and moral evaluation at a Military Entrance Processing Station to determine whether they were fit for military service. Once he was notified of the results of the evaluation, a registrant had ten days to file a claim for exemption, postponement, or deferment.[41]

Our composite soldier, Frank Connor, was born in June 1930 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He registered shortly after his eighteenth birthday in June 1948.[42]

FRANK'S STORY

Basic Training

Frank graduated from high school in 1948 and was the younger of two children.[43] His father worked for one of the steel mills in Pittsburgh but for recent graduates work was scarce.[44] After a year of earning some money in odd jobs, Frank enrolled in a college in the fall of 1949. He had finished his freshman year when he dropped out for lack of money and spent the summer working at an electrical manufacturing plant.[45] That

[41] Agency History and Records, Background at http://www.sss.gov/backgr.htm
[42] *Selective Service under the 1948 Act Extended July 9, 1950 - June 19, 1951*, 184; In 1950 more than 600,000 young men from Pennsylvania followed Frank's example. Among the fifty states plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, only New York, including New York City, registered more young men.
[43] 1950 County Level Census Data, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania at http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/census/cen.pl
[44] Philip Jenkins, "Chapter 7: The Postindustrial Age: 1950-2000," 1-7, here 1, in Randall M. Miller and William Pencak (eds.), *Pennsylvania: A History of the Commonwealth* at http://www.psupress.org/samplechapters/justataste_miller-pencak.html
[45] ibid.; In Pittsburgh heavy electrical manufacturing firms such as General Electric and Westinghouse but also US Steel's business benefited from defense contracts in 1950.

fall he was called up by Selective Service and together with 3,686 fellow Pennsylvanians inducted into the Army in October 1950.[46]

Like many of the young men he met at the Military Entrance Processing Station, Frank was convinced that he would be sent to Korea. He imagined that the Army needed the new draftees to fill the ranks at the front, just as in his uncle's stories about the draft for World War II. After taking the Armed Forces Qualification Test, Frank lined up with the others waiting for the medical examination to begin. He picked up an old issue of a recruiting magazine, "Life of the Soldier and the Airman," and began reading about the life of a soldier in Europe. He learned about the occupation mission of the Army and the training in the European Command. The second half of the article was devoted to education and recreation programs for soldiers. Frank was particularly impressed by the pictures of soldiers on the slopes of Garmisch-Patenkirchen.[47] Intrigued, Frank continued to read articles in other issues that lay on the table. He identified with a young man his own age whose experiences an article chronicled from recruitment through basic training. It seemed to Frank that the Army paid very close attention to an individual's skills and potential in order to give him an assignment that was best for the Army and for himself. He was also encouraged to learn that the Army wanted its soldiers to attend service schools to develop their skills further or teach them new ones.[48] The last article he finished before he was called up, was a vivid description of "the life of Riley" soldiers in Europe enjoyed with the opportunities for travel, sports and shopping the Army provided

[46] *Selective Service under the 1948 Act Extended July 9, 1950 - June 19, 1951*, 246
[47] Corporal Gerald L. Holtman, "Soldier Life in Europe," in *Life of the Soldier and the Airman*, January 1949, Volume XXXI, Number 1, 11-14, here 14
[48] Sergeant James T. Reynolds, "The Making of a Soldier," in *Life of the Soldier and the Airman*, April 1950, Volume XXXII, Number 4, 2-7 here 2-3

for them.[49] After being poked and prodded, he had his turn talking with the Army psychiatrist, who asked him a series of general questions that seemingly went nowhere. He and a many of the other young men passed the physical and were declared eligible to enter the Service and were ordered to gather in a room for the swearing in ceremony. An officer stood in front of the group, raised his right hand and administered the Oath of Allegiance:

> I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America; that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all enemies whomsoever; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.[50]

They then received their travel orders and were told to settle their affairs and to report to the induction station one week later.[51]

Frank was headed for a fourteen week basic training period at Fort Dix, New Jersey. At the camp reception center, Frank and the other draftees took their bedding and proceeded to their barracks. After buzz haircuts removed the fashionable "flat tops"[52] or longer hair on top of the heads of many of the draftees, they were marched to the Post Exchange to buy toiletries from the ten dollar partial pay they had received.[53] Frank and the others spent the rest of the first week on orientation; with personal interviews for classification purposes; more medical and physical examinations and the ever present shots; issue and fitting of uniforms and equipment; filling out the required paperwork;

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[49] Sergeant First Class Walter W. Dowling, "The Life of Riley," in *Life of the Soldier and the Airman*, September 1950, Volume XXXII, Number 9, 10-12

[50] *The Noncom's Guide. An encyclopedia of information for all noncommissioned officers of the United States Army*, Twelfth Edition, (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, January 1957), 51

[51] Agency History and Records, Background at http://www.sss.gov/backgr.htm

[52] Fashions of the Fifties - The Ducktail at http://www.fiftiesweb.com/fashion/fashion-wh.htm

[53] Reynolds, "The Making of a Soldier," 4

and taking more tests.[54] At the end of the week, Frank was told that he would be an infantryman in a rifle company. When he inquired about his test scores he was told that he did well but not the exact scores.[55]

At the beginning of the second week, Frank and the other new arrivals moved from the reception camp to their training company. Here he met his drill sergeants or non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for the first time. The NCOs lined up the new soldiers yelling at each of them in turn. Finally, they herded the newcomers to their barracks to unpack and make their bunks. This was the beginning of the process that turned a civilian into a soldier subordinated to the organizational good.[56]

Then the training began. A typical day began at 0500 with a blow from a whistle. Frank and his squadmates would quickly make their bunks, clean the immediate area, and report to morning roll call formation. After breakfast, they would march off for the day's activities, which might include the rifle range or running an obstacle course. Training continued after lunch in the field followed by a brisk march back to the barracks for dinner. Before lights out at 2200, everybody had to clean their new M1 rifle and equipment, polish their boots, and do some class work.[57]

Frank recalled one particular incident when he and the others learned how to load the clip fed M1 rifle. The sergeant described and demonstrated the proper procedures,

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[54] Reynolds, "The Making of a Soldier," 4

[55] For average scores of enlisted personnel starting in 1952 cf. Enlisted Demographics based on Army Progress Report, Troop Program and Manpower Program (U) Military Personnel Strength, (Washington, D.C.: Statistical and Accounting Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, June, 1952, June 1961, June 1968, (unpublished, in possession of Robert S. Rush, Stafford, Virginia).

[56] Harry Puncec, "Coming of Age in the Army. The bloodcurdling story of how a young man cursed with all the defects and burdens of teenagehood managed, thanks to the US Army and at the cost of only a few years and couple of damaged body parts, to reach adulthood," (unpublished, undated, in possession of Robert S. Rush, Stafford, Virginia), 5

[57] Puncec, "Coming of Age in the Army," 6

and then watched as Frank and the others practiced loading and unloading their rifles. The rifle was a right handed weapon with a small extension on the bolt that he had to push back to open the chamber. He quickly understood that the trick was to push a clip into the chamber with the thumb of his right hand while the edge of his palm held the bolt open. When the clip was fully inserted the bolt automatically released. The first time Frank tried it he did not hold the spring loaded bolt open firmly so that it snapped shut catching his thumb. His NCO explained that "M1 Thumb" was a common affliction among rookies.[58] Frank did not forget that painful lesson.

About seventy five percent of the basic training time was devoted to combat skills and weapons instruction. The remainder of the time, about sixteen percent, was spent on topics ranging from first aid to intelligence training. Only about nine percent of the time was left for studying academic subjects.[59]

The 22d Infantry Regiment

One week before basic training's end Private Connor and others in his company found out they were being assigned to the 4th Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. In December 1950, after processing through the division replacement company he found himself assigned to Company E, 22d Infantry. As a response to the outbreak of the Korean War the Army decided to deploy four divisions to join the 1st Infantry Division in Germany, and the 4th was one of them. He and the other draftees with him were ecstatic that the division was slated for duty in Germany instead of Korea.

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[58] Robert s. Rush, *US Infantryman in World War II (3) European Theater of Operations 1944-45*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2002), 19 ; Puncec, "Coming of Age in the Army," 6-7

[59] Master Sergeant Frank W. Penniman, "Training pays off!" in *Life of the Soldier and the Airman*, September 1951, Volume XXXIII, Number 9, 10-13 here10

Frank's company officers and NCOs had recently arrived to serve as cadre from the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, stationed in Germany.[60] He noticed right away that his new NCOs treated him and the other soldiers in his company better than he had been treated in basic training. The NCOs made an effort to get to know their soldiers, find out about their families and from where they came. In return they told stories about themselves and about their life in Germany. Everybody in Frank's company and during breaks in training asked many questions about Germany: how the food tasted; what the cities looked like; and if German women were as good looking as American women. For the most part, the NCOs answered good naturedly, however, when it seemed the young soldiers were using their questions to get out of doing something, the Noncoms put their foot down.

For the next five months, Frank and his fellow Company E recruits underwent advanced training. The weather was very rainy but the temperatures mild which was a big change for Frank who was used to the harsh and snowy Pennsylvania winters. His company trained for combat, with proficiency and tactical tests every month that progressed from platoon through battalion level—with the requirement to pass each phase before progressing to the next. Included at platoon level were proficiency tests based on the directives for tactical training in FM 7-10 Rifle Company that evaluated security on the march, the approach march, security during halts, tactical march, security in defense, attack as support, continuation of attack, hasty occupation of defensive positions, defense, defense as support, relief of front line platoons, daylight withdrawal,

[60] Command and Unit Historical Report 16th Infantry Regiment 1950, 18, in 301 INF (16), C/U Historical Reports, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, 1950, Box 2355, RG 407

night attack, night patrol, and attack in woods; all logically sequenced into a scenario.[61] Long road marches broke up the series of exercises. Soldiers went without sleep and men became proficient in weapons manipulation and maneuver. With each stay in the field, Frank and the others learned more about basic survival in the field, as well as the tactics they were practicing.[62]

GERMANY – FRONTLINE OF THE COLD WAR, 1951-1955

Housing and Training

In April of 1951 the 4th Division received orders to move to Europe[63] and departed in the beginning of May from Fort Benning for New York Port of Embarkation, Staten Island, and from there sailed overseas to Germany.[64] Private first class Connor was among a vanguard of more than 1,300 officers and men to disembark at Bremerhaven, Germany, on 27 May. Trains then took them through still leveled towns and cities[65] to their temporary home in Ledward Barracks in Schweinfurt, once named *Panzer Kaserne* (tank caserne).[66]

The active training schedule for the regiment kept Frank and his squadmates moving back and forth between their home stations and Grafenwöhr Training Center and

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[61] Rush, *US Infantryman in World W ar II (3) European Theater of Operations 1944-45*, 22 ; FM 7-10, Department of the Army, October 1949, Chapter 2 Tactical Movements, 24-29 and 32-40; Chapter 7 Rifle Company, Offensive Combat, 182-262; Chapter 8 Rifle Company, Defensive Combat, 263-335. The advanced training Frank and his squadmates underwent in 1950-51 was essentially the same that prepared soldiers for combat in World War II.
[62] Rush, *US Infantryman in World War II (3) European Theater of Operations 1944-45*, 22
[63] "Fourth Infantry Division ordered to Europe," The Los Angeles Evening Herald & Express, April 11, 1951 cited in Robert O. Babcock (ed.), *War Stories. Utah Beach to Pleiku. 4th Infantry Division. WWII, Cold War, Vietnam*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Saint John's Press, 2001), 444
[64] "Source says Order is due in 48 hours," Sun and The Evening Sun, Fort Benning, GA, May 7, 1951 cited in Babcock, *War Stories. Utah Beach to Pleiku*, 444
[65] James A. Jamison, "To be Free is not Cheap," in Babcock, *War Stories. Utah Beach to Pleiku*, 450
[66] *4th Infantry Division. Occupation of Germany*, (European Command, 1952), np.

Wildflecken on an almost monthly basis. In the first half of the year their training concentrated on platoon, company, and battalion field problems on the one hand, and small arms firing on the other. Frank was becoming quite proficient at using his weapon but had to wait until the December for his individual proficiency test because Schweinfurt lacked a firing range.[67]

In late February Frank participated in "Exercise Leapyear"[68] together with his whole regiment. On the third day of the exercise Frank's company had to execute a night withdrawal. Frank's rifle squad was the covering force in his platoon's defense area. He and his squadmates spent the better part of the day scouting the area to look for places from where they could cover the most likely enemy approach to their platoon's area. By early evening the wooded area where the exercise took place was completely dark. The platoon leader gave the withdrawal order at a predetermined time and the units began moving to the rear with Frank's remaining in place. Being from Pennsylvania, Frank was certainly used to the cold and snow but he had never spent a long winter's night in a fox hole in a densely wooded forest before. Tired and exhausted from trying to stay warm he and his squadmates were relieved to receive orders in the dark early morning hours to withdraw.[69]

On the whole Frank's company performed well during the exercise, however, but a few soldiers got frostbite of their feet because they had worn two pairs of ski socks in their boots, making the boots to tight and cutting off circulation.[70] Two days later his

[67] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 7-9
[68] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 7
[69] Retrograde Movement Scenario based on FM 7-10, Chapter 8, Rifle Company, Defensive Combat, 334. Night Withdrawal to 341. Withdrawal of Covering Force At Night, 327-332
[70] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 7

platoon sergeant scheduled an afternoon class in cold weather indoctrination.[71] Frank, who was now a private first class, knew that squad leader, in particular, had to take care of his soldiers and that these cases of frostbite proved that he had not ensured that his men wear their boots properly. As a result the squad leader found himself demoted to private but with a freeze on promotions for qualified enlisted men in effect, no one was promoted in his place. Instead the company commander appointed a private first class as acting sergeant or "acting Jack."[72]

The outstanding event for Frank and the other men during the spring training phase was an exercise in air transportability. He like most of his squadmates had never taken a plane ride before. Though he was not easy with the idea of flying, especially with some of the company's vehicles on board, he was amazed at the speed and efficiency with which his whole company was moved over a distance of three hundred miles.[73]

Frank and the other men from Company E liked their quarters. The barracks had all the amenities of modern life such indoor plumbing and, in the rebuilt part, central heating. The following spring, however, the 22d received orders to move to a new permanent station. Frank and his company were sorry to leave their barracks and wondered what awaited them in Giessen. They soon found out that their permanent kaserne in Kirch-Goens was still under construction and that the three battalions had to

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[71] AG 353 GOT-AGO, Headquarters United States Army, Europe to Distribution, Subject: Cold Weather Indoctrination, Instructor's Guide, 21 October 1952, V Corps Decimal System, NREK 338-60AA860, Box 34, RG 338

[72] *Command Report Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR 1952*, (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, 1952), 68; *Handbook and Manual for the Noncommissioned Officer*, (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1952), 113; Acting NCOs had the same authority and responsibility as other NCOs but were not entitled to the pay and allowances of the acting grade to which they were appointed by the company commander. NCO understrength in combat units in Europe was a very serious problem in 1952. The 4th Infantry Division had the largest shortage of all units in Germany with 27 percent; Acting NCOs had the same authority and responsibility as other NCOs but were not entitled to the pay and allowances of the acting grade to which they were appointed by the company commander.

[73] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 7

move to three different locations; 1st Battalion into a tent city near Gießen; 3rd Battalion to Wildflecken; and 2d Battalion into Schloss Kaserne in Butzbach, a castle built in the 17th century that had been a displaced persons camp until recently.[74]

Company E arrived at their new home on 18 June and felt lucky that they had a real roof over their heads instead of tent canvas. The tent city, officially named Pendleton Camp, turned into a field of mud every time it rained. Whenever Frank met soldiers from the 1st Battalion in town they made no secret out of the way the felt about division commander's decision to delay winterization of the tent city because he expected the barracks near Kirch-Goens to be finished by 1 December. It was only in the end of October that he gave up hope moving the regiment and ordered winterizing the tent city as fast as possible with gravel, lumber, and lighting equipment.[75] In order to finish before temperatures dropped too low and snow set in, every soldier who was not away on training exercises or in the regiment's defensive positions had to work in the tent city. Work was also interrupted when the different companies rotated between garrison and their tactical readiness positions. As it turned out, construction on the new barracks, named Ayers Kaserne and known as the Rock, finished in spring of 1953, when Frank's regiment finally moved in.

Training at Ayers Kaserne followed the same pattern as it did in Schweinfurt. While the regiment's units for their major training activities moved back and forth between the Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken training areas and Ayers, much of the small unit training occurred at home station. A typical training week kept Frank's company

[74] 304-INF (22), Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 1, 4th Infantry Division Command Reports, 1949-1954,United States Army Adjutant General, 3117, 3105, RG 407; Schloss Kaserne – Butzbach at http://www.3ad.net/kasernen/ayers_schloss_kaserne/schloss_history_1.htm
[75] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 11

busy with forty-seven hours of primary training.[76] Their training began at 0730 with elementary map reading, preliminary rifle and carbine instruction, land mines and demolition instruction, or care and maintenance of equipment and that took up most of the morning. Every afternoon except on Saturdays and Sundays, Frank and his squadmates had to practice one half hour of dismounted drill[77] and had one hour of physical training. Generally their day ended at 1700 with a Retreat Ceremony.[78] On Thursdays they were usually in the field and trained at platoon level.

One Thursday, they practiced platoon in the defense, where as part of the front line their mission was to stop the enemy in front of their position. Frank and the others in his squad were familiar with their tasks. They prepared defensive positions in anticipation of an enemy attack with their platoon leader selecting positions for the squads and the squad leaders designating the specific locations for the soldiers fox holes, each about ten yards apart. Frank laid down behind his designated position to make sure that he had good location and fields of fire.[79] Having dug numerous fox holes in varying terrain, Frank ruefully considered himself a soils specialist as did every other infantryman. That night they had supper in the field and then road marched back to their barracks. Since they came in after 2200 and then had to clean weapons and equipment, everyone was allowed to sleep in until 1000 the next morning.[80]

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[76] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, Inclosure I, Unit Training Schedule (Sample) "J" Company, 22d Infantry, Week 6 October – 11 October.
[77] FM 22-5 Leadership Courtesy and Drill, (Washington, D.C.: War Department, Government Printing Office, 1946), paragraphs 68-72, 78-80
[78] FM 22-5, par. 211, 204-205; This formation was practice for ceremonial regimental parades.
[79] FM 7-10, par. 77-82, 85-91
[80] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, Inclosure I, Unit Training Schedule (Sample) "J" Company, 22d Infantry, Week 6 October – 11 October.

Alerts also became routine for Frank and his companions. A minimum of once a month, the sirens sounded and soldiers spilled out of their bunks and in from a *Gasthaus* located across the street from the kaserne. With a two hour time limit to clear the kaserne, everyone hurriedly donned their uniforms, battle dress, drew their weapons and platoon equipment. They then stood in formation until the trucks arrived and then drove out to their local deployment area.[81]

For Frank his first full year in Germany was one of those pivotal years when he made decisions that determined the direction for the rest of his life. The move in June from beautiful Ledward Barracks to draughty Schloss Kaserne was only a small episode in a year filled with training, field exercises, weapons qualification tests, deciding to extend for a year, and meeting his future wife.

By mid 1952 US troops in Germany consisted of sixty percent non-Regular Army personnel and the 21-month draftees began leaving Germany[82] which resulted in increased turnover of personnel and spiraling training costs. In response the V Corps Headquarters ordered all units to make "an all out effort" to reenlist soldiers.[83] In an effort to retain trained personnel, commanders offered that Enlisted Reserve Corps and National Guard enlisted personnel who had reserve obligations might discharge of these if they completed twenty-one months of active service plus one more consecutive year of voluntary service, or a total of thirty-three months.[84] Frank took advantage of this

[81] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 6 and 12
[82] *Command Report Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR 1952*, 65
[83] AG 340 ASEAG-RA, Leon J. Gund, Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General to Commanding General, V Corps, Subject: Recruiting Eligibles for Campaign 1 January-30 June 1952, 28 January 1952, in V Corps Decimal System, NREK 338-60AA860, Box 34, RG 338
[84] Command Report Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR , 65 and77

opportunity and extended for one year and with two years service was promoted to corporal.[85]

The uniforms and equipment Corporal Connor wore had not changed since World War II. His dress uniform was the M-1943 cold weather clothing ensemble. That was the technical name for the olive-drab World War II combat uniform featuring the so called "Eisenhower" or "Ike" jacket that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower first wore when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. The Army adopted the hip-length jacket modeled on the British battle dress jackets to give the combat uniform a semidress appearance for garrison wear.[86] Required to wear a uniform in off-duty hours, Frank and many of the other men regarded the "Ike" jacket as their dress uniform coat and asked the tailor cut it to fit snugly.[87] He and his squadmates liked their uniform jackets better this way and their German tailors happily cut them tightly saving the left over cloth for themselves. Frank paid the tailor out of his clothing allowance which was about five dollars a month when he heard a rumor that the commanding general of V Corps had ordered unit commanders to enforce regulations and make sure that soldiers bought a new uniform if theirs was too tight fitting. A short while later his squad leader inspected Frank's and the others' uniforms and almost everybody had to go back to the tailor to order new jackets; this time cut loose fitting.[88] Beginning in July 1953 the Army

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[85] *The Noncom's Guide*, 112; Company of comparable unit commanders can promote to grades E-3 and E-4.

[86] Stephen J. Kennedy and Alice F. Park, "Technical Report 68-41 CM. The Army Green Uniform", Series: C&OM-43, Natick, Massachusetts 01760, Clothing and Organic Materials Laboratory, US Army Natick Laboratories, March 1968, 4

[87] Kennedy and Park, "Technical Report 68-41 CM. The Army Green Uniform", 4; The soldiers' habit of having the jacket fitted snugly ran counter to Army Regulation 600-35 stipulating that it had to fit over chest and shoulders with sufficient fullness because it was supposed to be worn as an insulating layer over several underlayers.

[88] Commanders Conference, V Corps, 9 April 1952, 5, V Corps Decimals 1952, Box 33, RG 338

added blue accessories to the infantryman's uniform in recognition of soldiers' completed advanced individual and group training. Every soldier in Frank's unit received a set of blue plastic discs to go behind his collar insignia, a blue cord to go under his right shoulder, and a blue scarf.[89] While putting them on, one of the men jokingly said that they now looked good enough to work as bell hops in a hotel.

In 1952 black soldiers from the 3-22 joined Frank's company after the all black 3rd Battalion had been broken up.[90] One of the new men was an NCO. With the new men Frank's company now had 133 white and five black soldiers.[91] While working together during duty hours was at first awkward but mainly without incident, Frank and his squadmates avoided contact with the black soldiers during off-duty hours. The black soldiers also seemed to prefer the company of other blacks. Thus while units were integrated within the confines of the caserne or on exercises, segregation continued off base. Frank and his buddies knew which of the local pubs were considered "black" and only went to the ones that were "white."[92]

"Getting Hitched "

One Saturday in the fall Frank and his buddy were listening to the announcement of a dance in Butzbach on the Armed Forces Network (AFN).[93] Since they had weekend

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[89] "Something Blue's Been Added," in *Life of the Soldier and the Airman*, July 1953, Volume XXXV, Number 7, 17

[90] Command Report 22d Infantry, 1 January 1952 to 31 December 1952, 1 and 4

[91] *4th Infantry Division. Occupation of Germany*, (European Command, 1952), np.; Picture of Company E taken in 1952 shows 133 white and five black soldiers.

[92] Maria Höhn, Jim Crow in the Heimat: German and American Racism in 1950s West Germany. Paper delivered at the Conference: GIs in Germany: The Social, Military, and Political History of the American Military Presence, 1945-2000, (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany, 2000), 7

[93] Armed Forces Network, Europe, Us Army, Europe, AFN History (1945-1983), 7 of 18, at http://www.usarmygermany.com/Units/AFNEurope/USAREUR_AFNEurope.htm.

passes and his buddy owned a car[94] they decided to drive through the town before going to the dance. On their drive they saw three German women walking in the same direction. They stopped the car and invited the women to go to the dance with them. One of the women was Gisela Kruse who became Frank's wife the following year.[95]

Gisela was born in Butzbach in 1926 as the older of two daughters.[96] Her father worked as a brick layer[97] in a local construction business. Gisela attended eight years of school[98] from 1932 until 1940. She grew up like so many of her contemporaries participating in Nazi youth activities and joining Nazi youth organizations. At age ten she joined *Jungmädelbund* [a Nazi organization for young girls ages ten through thirteen] that prepared girls for the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM) /League of German Girls].[99] She enjoyed traveling, hiking, and learning how to take care of children and a household. She had many friends in her *Mädelschaft* [girl's group] that had 15 girls from

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[94] In 1952 a single private first class with two years of service stationed overseas had an average income of $ 108,37 dollars per month. At an exchange rate of DM 4.2 to the dollar he earned 455,15 DM and was well able to afford a car. Based on Monthly Basic Pay and Allowances at http://www.dfas.mil/money/milpay/priorpay/.

[95] Typical meeting of American soldiers and German females as described by Bill Seyboth, North Troy, NY, Company L, 4th Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, "A 'Warm' Cold War Story," in Babcock, *War Stories. Utah Beach to Pleiku*, 449

[96] Berger, Universität Rostock, Materialien zur Vorlesung "Sozialstruktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Bevölkerung nach Haushaltsgröße 1900 bis 1982; In 1950 32.3 percent of all household had four or more members.

[97] Johann Handl, "Hat sich die berufliche Wertigkeit der Bildungsabschlüsse in der achtziger Jahren verrringert?" in Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Jahrgang 48, Heft 2, 256; About 34 percent of males born between 1920 to 1922 worked as skilled laborers in Germany. The number skilled workers among males born around 1900 might have been slightly lower but would still represent the largest number in the distribution of trades;.

[98] Schüler in allgemeinbildenden Schulen 1911 bis 1985, in Prof. Dr. Peter A. Berger, Universität Rostock, Materialien zur Vorlesung "Sozialstruktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," at http://www.soziologie.uni-rostock.de/berger/sozialstruktur_vorl/sozialstruktur_vorl.htm; Between 1931/32 and 1951 nearly eighty eight percent of all German students went to *Hauptschulen* [main schools] for eight years. Only twelve percent attended either ten years in *Mittelschule* [middle school], a technically oriented school that graduated future white collar employees, or thirteen years of *Gymnasium* [high school], where students received *Abitur* [university entrance eam]. Schüler in allgemeinbildenden Schulen 1911 bis 1985

[99] Der Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM), 1 of 4, at http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/nazi/innenpolitik/bdm/index.html; Starting in December 1936

her neighborhood as members. When the war moved closer to Germany her BDM group worked for a while in the German armament factory.[100]

In the years since the end of the war Gisela worked at first a few hours every day and then full time in a bakery in order to contribute to her family's income. She, like many women her age had not learned a trade because she expected to marry and have a husband who would be the breadwinner.[101] German women of Gisela's age, however, had a difficult time finding a man of suitable age because women outnumbered German men by twenty five percent.[102]

When Frank and Gisela[103] became engaged in spring 1953, they were one of the first couples to benefit from USAREUR's morale boosting policy change that allowed soldiers with at least eight months of service in Europe to marry German nationals. Almost as important was USAREUR's directive authorizing off-duty personnel to wear civilian clothing.[104] Now the newly engaged couple felt free to enjoy their short trips into neighboring Bad Nauheim or the Hochtaunus on Frank's new Vespa motor scooter just like any other couple.

But even though rules were somewhat relaxed, Frank and Gisela still had to obtain a marriage permit from the USAREUR commander.[105] The first step on that lengthy road to permission was for him to notify his squad leader that he intended to marry a German

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[100] Dr. Bernd Kleinhans, "BDM – Bund Deutscher Mädel," p.3 of 4, at http://www.shoa.de/bdm.html.
[101] Handl, "Hat sich die berufliche Wertigkeit der Bildungsabschlüsse in der achtziger Jahren verrringert?" p.256; About half of all German Women born between the years 1920 (44.7 percent) and 1932 (48.8 percent) earned their income as unskilled workers.
[102] Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressestelle, B5 Bevölkerung am 31.12.1959 nach Alters- und Geburtsjahren.
[103] Berger, Universität Rostock, Materialien zur Vorlesung "Sozialstruktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Durchschnittliches Heiratsalter; In 1950the average for first marriages for women in West Germany was 26 years.
[104] Hichman, *The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963*, 103; Prior regulations prohibited marriages to aliens earlier than four months before rotating out of the theater.
[105] AR 600-240-5, Marriage in Overseas Commands, Washington, D.C., 11 February 1949, 3

woman.[106] His squad leader than informed the platoon sergeant and up the chain it went to the company commander. Each of Frank's NCO's asked nearly the same questions wanting to make sure that he understood what he was about to undertake. They specifically asked him about Gisela's parents, whether or not she had a job, and if she could speak English. Frank told his platoon sergeant where Gisela worked, that she came from a good family and that she spoke enough English for them to have conversations. He did not tell the sergeant where she had learned her English. Like many of her girlfriends, Gisela had dated and performed services such laundering clothing for American soldiers since the beginning of the occupation.[107] On occasion she had still had to put up with her embittered neighbors and their war veteran son calling her *Amiliebchen* [Yank's Sweetheart]. One of their more stinging comments to her was that the German soldier fought for six years; the German woman only five minutes.[108]

Then both he and Gisela went for a formal after-duty course that included a discussion and an interview with the battalion's chaplain. In order to meet the financial requirements, Frank decided to reenlist for three years. This way he could prove that he was able to sustain his wife and stay in Germany. A month later, Frank's company commander promoted him to sergeant to fill one of the vacant NCO positions. [109] After a lengthy interview about her past as a BDM girl, a talk with an Army psychologist, and a

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[106] AR 600-240-5, p. 4; AR 600-240-5 was still in effect in 1953.
[107] Joseph R. Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46 (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1946), 152-153; The German population early on perceived Black soldiers as more generous than White soldiers with their gifts and payments in return for services such as clothes laundering.
[108] Elizabeth Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's "Crisis Years" and West German National Identity," in *The American Historical Review*, Volume 101, Issue 2, April 1996, 354-395, here pp.379-380; Petra Goedde, "From Villains to Victims: Fraternization and the Feminization of Germany, 1945-1947," in *Diplomatic History*, Volume 23, Number 1, Winter 1999, 1-20, here12
[109] AR 600-240-5, 2; *The Noncom's Guide*, 112.

medical exam, Gisela and Sergeant Connor received their marriage permission, signed by an officer in the Adjutant General's Office, US Army, Europe.

They set a wedding date for 6 September 1953. On the morning of their wedding day they went to city hall in Butzbach to the office of the *Standesbeamte* [registrar's office]. Frank's buddy and Gisela's best friend were witnesses and also signed their marriage license, as required by German law.[110] In the afternoon, they were married in the new chapel at Ayers Kaserne by the chaplain.[111]

Since Ayers Kaserne had no government quarters for military spouses and dependents, Frank and Gisela found a small apartment in Butzbach on Römer Straße. Frank's rank of sergeant and a basic allowance for quarters provided them with a comfortable lifestyle that included even some luxuries such as a refrigerator. The following year their first daughter was born and a year later their second.[112] When Frank and his family left Germany in 1955 the Army paid for the transfer of his family back to the United States.

Back in the United States he was assigned to the 5th Infantry Regiment stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington. During his four years there he served as assistant squad leader and also as squad leader and trained at Yakima range and in different countries around the Pacific area. In 1959 he reenlisted to go back to Germany.

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[110] Die Form der Eheschliessung, 4 at http://www.uni-rostock.de/fakult/jurfak/Winkler/ws2002_famr_02.doc

[111] AR 600-240-5, 3; Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman," p.381; Frank's and Gisela's marriage was one of approximately 7,000 performed annually by the mid-1950s. The earliest German statistics are from 1959 when 6,940 German women married American soldiers. Eheschliessungen Streitkräfte, email to Bianka J. Adams form Bernd Racky, Statistisches Bundesamt (Pressestelle) [presse@destatis.de], 21 November 2002

[112] Berger, Universität Rostock, Materialien zur Vorlesung "Sozialstruktur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Geburten je 100 Frauen (BRD/DDR, 1950-1989); The average woman had 2.1 children in the mid-1950s.

GERMANY 1959-1963

Sergeant Connor re-enlisted for Germany in 1959. His wife missed her homeland and he felt that he had not only better opportunities of advancement there, but also a better standard of living. On post family housing in the United States was nothing compared to the new housing communities in Germany and the dollar remained at a favorable exchange rate to the Deutsche Mark.[113] He also believed that training was better in Germany.

There had also been many changes within the Army in the nine years that he had served. Gone were the brown boots and shoes, replaced by black, and the wool olive drab "Eisenhower" winter jacket and trousers were being replaced by the green semi dress uniform which was designed "independent of the field uniform in style, design and color." The overseas cap with its infantry blue braid was replaced by a green garrison cap with a dark green braid for all enlisted members. Infantrymen still wore the infantry cord, insignia backgrounds and scarf, all in infantry blue[114]—however it did not seem right to Frank that the infantry should lose such a hallowed symbol as the blue braid on the garrison cap.

There were also two additional enlisted pay grades. In 1957, Congress added the pay grades of E8 and E9. The two ranks presented more opportunities for

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[113] D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963 (Heidelberg: Historical Section Operations Division, United States-Army, Europe), 209-210. The Deutsche Mark (DM) rate for 1958 and 1959 was 4.2 to the dollar. A sergeant E5 with over eight years of service made $220 plus a ration allowance of $36; which equated to 12,902 DM per year, a nice salary when compared against the average German household of 5325 DM (extrapolated) in 1958.

[114] Stephen J. Kennedy and Alice Park, "The Army Green Uniform" Technical Report 68-41-CM (Natick, MA: Clothing and Organic Materials Laboratory, 1968); AR 670-5 Wear and Appearance of Uniforms (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), 19-20. This feeling may be similar to that felt by members of the 75th Ranger Regiment when the Army adopted the black beret as standard wear for all members of the Army, although the rangers went to a Tan beret.

noncommissioned officers who had remained as E7, some with that grade for as many as 15 to 20 years. In the Army, the rank of staff sergeant was reintroduced at pay grade E6, with sergeant first class becoming E7. The rank of sergeant major E9, which had been abolished during the 1920s, was also added and instead of a master sergeant holding the title of sergeant major at battalion and higher levels, now the sergeant major held the position. Although the first sergeant and master sergeant grade of E7 was now E8, noncommissioned officers holding those positions at E7 kept their chevrons of rank instead of replacing them with those of a sergeant first class E7. Until these noncommissioned officers retired, there were master and first sergeants E7 and E8.[115]

Changes had also occurred in Army organization. Gone was the infantry regiment with which everyone was so familiar. In their place were battle groups designed to fight under atomic war conditions. Frank's battle group in the United States had witnessed an atomic blast during exercise Desert Rock at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site in 1957,[116] and although just a team leader, after having seen an atomic weapons destructiveness up close he couldn't see fighting on a battlefield filled with mushroom clouds.

Before he left his unit at Fort Lewis, Frank had direct assignment orders for the 1st Battle Group 18th Infantry in Mannheim Germany as well as information on the unit he was being assigned to. Since he was a noncommissioned officer with over four years service, his family was command sponsored, however because of limitations on housing

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[115] AR 670-5 Wear and Appearance of Uniforms. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 57; and 1959, 19-20.

[116] P.S. Harris, C. Lowery, A.G. Nelson, S. Obermiller, W.J. Ozeroff, E. Weary SHOT SMOKY, A TEST OF THE PLUMBBOB SERIES, 31 AUGUST 1957 Technical Report 31 May 1981,16, 26, 27. http://www.dtra.mil/td/ntpr/pubs%5CT8583.PDF.

and dependents in Germany at the time, Gisela and his children would follow him when there was available housing. For a short period those families not command sponsored had no commissary or Post Exchange privileges and had a hard time making ends meet.[117] Frank just hoped that their separation would be short.

Frank traveled by train from Fort Lewis to Fort Dix where he was manifested on an aircraft bound for Germany. The plane landed at Rhein Main Airbase and he and the others enroute to units in the V Corps in processed through the 21st Replacement Battalion, after which he took another train to Mannheim and his unit at Coleman Barracks.[118]

Frank immediately noticed that the Germans looked much healthier than he remembered them, and everyone seemed to have a job. There were now few men wearing bits of ragged *Wehrmacht* uniform and the widows in black had disappeared from the streets. He was amazed at the differences between the early 50s when every city center was a blacked ruin of jagged and destroyed buildings to 1959, when much of the earlier destruction was rebuilt either as it once was or into the large modern concrete boxes so popular during the 50s. If nothing else tall fences hid the damaged buildings. He also noticed that goods once scarce but inexpensive, at least to a GI, were now plentiful and available to German and American alike if they could afford it. Military Personnel Currency, formerly used to buy items in the American commissary, post exchanges and different on-post clubs to cut down on black market activity was now

[117] D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963 (Heidelberg: Historical Section Operations Division, United States-Army, Europe), 100-01.
[118] D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963 (Heidelberg: Historical Section Operations Division, United States-Army, Europe), 78-80.

replaced by the dollar.[119] Ration cards, in the early 50s necessary to buy most goods imported from the United States and sold at discount and without tax to soldiers, now were necessary only to purchase liquor, tobacco, coffee and tea.[120]

Coleman Barracks had earlier been the home of the 8th Division's 28th Infantry Regiment until it had reorganized into battle groups. When he arrived at Coleman Barracks he found the unit to which he was assigned had exchanged with the 1st Battle Group 18th Infantry under Operation Gyroscope, where like type units rotated every three years between the United States and overseas. Frank now found himself assigned to the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, which had a distinguished lineage with the 1st Infantry Division, to include serving with the 1st in Germany as occupation forces between 1945 and 1955. Most of the officers and NCOs were long service members with the 18th however many of the NCOS and all of the privates had arrived as fillers in August 1958.[121] So there was a gap in experience with very few of the authorized corporals, specialists and privates first class available. It was cadre and privates. Some of the soldiers from the 1st Battle Group 28th Infantry did not rotate since they like Frank, had just arrived in Germany.

When he reported in to headquarters, Sergeant Connor was escorted into the battle group sergeant major's office, a gruff combat veteran of the European Theater, fifteen years previous. The sergeant major looked at Frank's personnel file, asked questions

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[119] D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963 (Heidelberg: Historical Section Operations Division, United States-Army, Europe), 239.

[120] Period photographs. USAREUR report 1953-63. Ration Cards and commissary.

[121] John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 396-99; 514-517; Continental Army Command, Letter "Rotation of the Infantry Battle Groups, 1st Infantry Division" 16 April 1958 (Unit Organization Files, 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

about his family and what his goals were while in the battle group, and then seemingly satisfied, assigned Frank to a vacant staff sergeant squad leader billet in Company A with the provision that if he soldiered well he'd be promoted to staff sergeant. If he did not, then the sergeant major promised to put the first arriving NCO with more time in grade in the job and move him down to team leader. By the time he left the sergeant majors office, Frank understood the policies and expectations for the NCOs within the unit. It looked to be a good outfit, with high standards in garrison and in the field.

He was now one of nine rifle squad leaders in Company A. His eleven-man squad consisted of himself as squad leader, two fire teams each with a sergeant team leader, two specialists fourth class, one an automatic rifleman and the other a senior rifleman, and two privates first class riflemen. He remembered there were no teams in the old regimental rifle squad, and now the squad leader only had to control the team leaders, with either team providing a base of fire while the other maneuvered.[122]

Frank had been a noncommissioned officer for seven of his nine years—and had learned his trade by watching NCOs; emulating the good and learning what not to do from the bad. When he went to the Seventh Army NCO Academy at Bad Tölz, Frank memorized the traits and dimensions of a leader but as an old NCO once told him "The head learns from schooling, the heart from practice."[123] He realized that a good NCO needed a combination of both. Now he had the opportunity to grow two NCOs of his own, besides the soldiers within his squad. When his company commander interviewed

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[122] Virgil Ney, Organization and Equipment of the Infantry Rifle Squad: From Valley Forge to ROAD (Fort Belvoir, US Army Combat Developments Command. Combat Operations Research Group, 1965), 61-62; 104. Although Ney mentions the E4s are corporals, they were actually specialists as of 1955 with the enactment of the Specialist program.

[123] Larry H. Ingraham, "Fear and Loathing in the Barracks—And the Heart of Leadership, *Parameters, December 1988, 77.*

him, Frank learned that he as a squad leader had more influence than any superior above him in making efficient, well-disciplined and well-trained soldiers.[124]

As squad leader, Frank was responsible for everything that his squad did or failed to do, as well as being accountable for the health and welfare of every soldier in his squad. He understood that he had to maintain discipline and train his soldiers in squad tactics, the individual infantryman's skills as well as on how to operate and maintain their weapons and equipment.

He remembered his recruit barracks and understood that soldiers in operational units could not keep their areas inspection ready at all times, and taught his young NCOs the difference between messy and dirty. He knew from his own experience how hard it was to keep a foot locker and a narrow wall locker, his only storage areas, ready for inspection twenty-four hours a day. He could inspect his soldier's lockers everyday, however if his soldiers spent their time keeping their lockers organized then they would have to disregard something else. He believed that being ready for Saturday inspections was enough. Filth was another matter, he had no tolerance for that, and some of his soldiers spent many an off duty hour learning to clean to his standards. When inspecting his men, he checked for their attention to detail. Frank looked for specks of rust on their rifles, holes in their uniforms or other similar signs of neglect.

Every morning before the duty day began, Frank had his men make their bunks, fold their bedding, and clean the common areas. At first formation he checked to see if men had shaved, that their uniforms were clean, well-pressed and properly fitted, their footgear and brass highly polished; and that they did not need hair cuts. On Friday s, he

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[124] Noncom's Guide, 48

ensured that his soldiers exchanged their bed linen, and whenever he had a soldier go absent without leave, he inventoried his equipment and turned it into the supply sergeant for safekeeping.[125]

With the encouragement and candid advice of other NCOs, he learned to care for his soldiers without coddling them, and knew instinctively when to admonish and when to comfort them. Frank's first sergeant had given him a little green memo book to use when making notes on his squad members: their birthdays; families and their addresses as well as training and disciplinary data. He did not bring every infraction to his platoon sergeants attention. Frank knew that his superiors expected him to take care of the minor disciplinary problems. He cared for his men as if they were his brothers—because they were—and they were his responsibility. And his soldiers gave in return. When he pulled guard for a soldier after a foul up on the duty roster so the soldier could go on pass, he realized that there was no limit to what he could ask of his soldiers. Some nights, thankfully infrequently, he was called from home to go with his platoon sergeant to pick up soldiers who had gotten in trouble with the MPs so they did not spend the night in jail.[126]

Early in his career, Frank's noncommissioned leaders had demonstrated that NCOs ran the unit's day-to-day operations in garrison. NCOs prided themselves in making their part of the Army work.[127] The first sergeant passed to the platoon sergeants any details that needed to be done, and the platoon sergeants passed the details on to the

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[125] Noncom's Guide, 48

[126] Larry H. Ingraham, "Fear and Loathing in the Barracks—And the Heart of Leadership, *Parameters, December 1988, 77.*

[127] Larry H. Ingraham, "Fear and Loathing in the Barracks—And the Heart of Leadership, *Parameters, December 1988, 78.*

squad leaders for action. The platoon leaders that he had had were present at morning formation, but then usually left to perform their additional duties such as supply officer or mess officer. He saw more of his platoon leader when they were doing tactical training than he did when they were in barracks.

Over time, Sergeant Connor found that the majority of his company was regular army (RA) with more than half of the RAs with a high school or higher education. Forty two percent of the RAs and 45percent of the draftees met the mental requirements to be an officer. A bit more than 30 percent of the regulars had fewer than two years of service while practically all of the draftees were in for less than two years. Those like him who had 10-15 years of service comprised about 18 percent of the company. Half of the RAs in the company were married and 30 percent of the draftees, although most of the draftees and lower enlisted regulars were without their families.[128]

He noticed that unlike the 22d Infantry during the early 50s, there were now a few black officers. More noticeable was that although blacks made up 19 percent of the battle group in 1959, 24 percent of the NCOs were black; with some companies having as many as 35 percent black NCOs. Many were staff sergeants and sergeants first class although none were first sergeants.[129]

While only one in ten officers wore the coveted Combat Infantryman's Badge, one in four of all noncommissioned officers had it; earned either during World War II or in Korea. Surprisingly, only one of the seven company commanders and three of the

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[128] Army Personnel, June 1959, 65-68;70. The demographics portrayed are for the Army as a whole.

[129] Data taken from company photographs in First Battlegroup Sixteenth Infantry 1861-1961 (no publisher information, nd). The 16th was a sister battle group of the 18th and both assigned to the 8th Infantry Division, and should be demographically close to that of the 18th for the time period in question.

seven first sergeants had the badge.[130] Frank considered himself fortunate that his platoon sergeant had a CIB with star above, denoting combat service in both World War II and Korea, and only one Purple Heart earned he said, because he zigged when he should have zagged.

In preparation for Grafenwöhr, Frank drilled his soldiers hard in individual movement techniques, movement as buddy teams, movement as fire teams and finally as a squad. He began in an open field where everyone could see one another and then practiced over progressively more difficult terrain. He was teaching his soldiers how to move forward under direct fire while presenting the smallest target possible, and then the groups to move as a single entity operating off their leaders direction. Frank supervised and controlled each exercise, walking close behind each group and observing each soldier's actions. He talked to each man after every iteration, explaining what he did correctly and what he did wrong. If necessary, he directed the group through the exercise again. When exercising as a squad, Frank led his teams using arm and hand signals and a whistle. If nothing his soldiers would be well trained when they went through the squad live fire course at Grafenwöhr during the summer rotation.[131]

Once finished with squad battle drills, they progressed to platoon training. Similar to the squad, the platoon leader began the training in an open field and proceeded to more difficult terrain. Like the squad there were only three basic maneuvers when making enemy contact, maneuver right, maneuver left and frontal attack. Frank changed

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[130] Data taken from company photographs in First Battle group Sixteenth Infantry 1861-1961 (no publisher information, nd). The 16th was a sister battle group of the 18th and both assigned to the 8th Infantry Division, and should be demographically close to that of the 18th for the time period in question.

[131] FM 7-10 Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Battle Groups (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 281-85.

his squad movement either by signaling a change of direction or commanding "Follow Me."[132]

When his unit traveled to Grafenwöhr during the summer for range firing and tactical training, its soldiers still carried the M1 rifle and Browning Automatic Rifle, both remainders from World War II. There they maneuvered dismounted over the "battlefield," reacted to the nuclear simulators exploding in the distance, fought the "aggressor" during platoon and company tactical tests and practiced moving from one location to another by helicopter and army aircraft as well as the M59 armored personnel carriers from the division's armored personnel carrier companies.[133]

The trip to Grafenwöhr was a learning experience for Frank. They had practiced maneuvering as buddy teams up through platoon movement in the local training area near Coleman Barracks. Now they practiced with live ammunition. When his squad went through the live fire lanes they were briefed by the safety officer and then each team closely followed throughout the course by safety officers and NCOs; some hanging on to the soldier's webbing to slow them down and preventing the soldiers from maneuvering as they had been trained to do. Although himself frustrated by the overzealous safeties, he savored listening to his soldiers complain about the restrictions.

Besides the training there were the ever present details of range patrol, courtesy patrol in the town of Grafenwöhr[134] and ensuring that his team kept their living areas inside and out policed. He hoped to be promoted after Grafenwöhr and so took Army

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[132] FM 7-10 Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Battle Groups (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 296-98.

[133] 1-16th yearbook, FM7-10 Rifle Company, Infantry and Airborne Battle Group, 1962.

[134] Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 218

correspondence courses at night. There were also those who did nothing and counted on their time in grade and time in service to see them promoted. Frank did not want to retire at twenty as only a staff sergeant.

Frank's family arrived about two months after his return from Grafenwöhr when they were far enough up the housing list that an apartment would be waiting when they arrived. While they had been separated, Frank had been providing for them through a compulsory Class Q allotment of $156.90, comprised of a mandatory deduction from his paycheck combined with the family allowance authorized for his grade and number of dependents.[135]

When Frank signed for his three bedroom stairwell apartment in Benjamin Franklin Village he also signed for the Quartermaster furniture within it that included everything his family needed: beds, tables, chairs and desks. The furniture was solid and heavy and almost impervious to damage. With the weight limitations in place for families moving overseas, his wife Gisela was only able to bring the family clothing, linens, dishes, mattresses, children's toys and Frank's easy chair. The remainder of their belongings went into government storage in the United States. They had also shipped the family car at government expense. She brought no electronic equipment since she knew that the voltages were different. They had received a dislocation allowance of $96.90 to help defray the incidental costs of the move.[136]

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[135] The Noncom's Guide, 12th Edition (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1957), 206-207.

[136] The Noncom's Guide, 12th Edition (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1957), 207

Benjamin Franklin Village was located just northeast of Mannheim about five kilometers from Coleman barracks that was an easy drive up highway B44.[137] Using funding from the German government, German contractors had recently constructed this American area of masonry apartment buildings, individual houses, grouped together with a theater, schools, a library, chapel, bowling alley, baseball and football fields and a community center.[138]

The area reminded Frank of his last post in the United States. The military shopping area contained a super market styled commissary and a department store sized post exchange where they could buy American products, a snack bar, garage, laundry and dry cleaning, a Class VI alcoholic beverage store and other facilities and was within walking distance in the Mannheim suburb of Käfertal. Movies at the base theater were a quarter. They listened to news and music from the United States through the Armed Forces Network and read their morning *Stars and Stripes* Newspapers. They drank chlorinated water and homogenized milk just like in the United States even though the Germans did not.[139]

To Frank, it seemed that it was easier to meet Germans when he and Gisela had lived on the economy in 1954-55, a period when soldiers and families lived amongst German families than during his second tour and the establishment of self-contained

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[137] http://home.mannheim.army.mil/293BSB/tenant.htm;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/mannheim .htm

[138] Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 209.

[139] Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 211, 210, 112, 208; ;
http://home.mannheim.army.mil/293BSB/tenant.htm;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/mannheim .htm. German authorities had discontinued using chlorinated water except for emergencies.

American communities. Their little community and others like it contained practically everything an American family needed to live comfortably and they could spend an entire tour in Germany without needing to learn the language or the people. [140]

There were some differences though. Any accident between and American and a German was jointly supervised by both military police and the local *Polizei* [police]. These two groups also jointly patrolled the towns and communities near American installations. And as Frank had experienced at Grafenwöhr, officers and noncommissioned officers were detailed as "courtesy" patrols on Saturday nights, payday nights, and other times when there might be trouble.[141]

Most dependent children attended American schools, however Gisela enrolled their children in a German kindergarten and elementary school. She wanted to preserve her children's German heritage as well as make use of the excellent school system.[142] There was an elementary school in their housing area, but like most of the Department of Defense schools during the early 1960s, there was a shortage of teachers exacerbated by the high yearly turnover of teachers to and from the United States.[143]

With the children in school, Gisela applied for one of the many job openings on post that had earlier been filled by Germans paid through Deutsche Mark funding. With those funds drying up, dependents filled many of the positions under the "hire Americans

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[140] Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 215-16; 222.

[141] Hickman, D. J. *The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963* (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 217-218.

[142] Hickman, D. J. *The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (*Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 211.

[143] Hickman, D. J. *The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963* (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 213-214. There were 59,000 service member dependent school children enrolled in Department of Defense schools in USAREUR during 1960.

first" policy that kept United States funds in American hands. Her job as a receptionist at the transportation office did not pay as much as one on the German economy, nevertheless it was close to her children and allowed her to become a US Government employee with transfer rights when they moved back to the United States.[144]

In early 1961, Frank finally received his long anticipated promotion to staff sergeant. He had been a sergeant for eight years and a squad leader for two. Although he had received both accolades and admonishments along the way, his first sergeant after talking with Frank's platoon leader and platoon sergeant recommended to their company commander that he be promoted. When the recommendation reached the battle group headquarters, his sergeant major concurred with the request and recommended the commander approve his selection.

The world changed two years into Staff Sergeant Connor's tour. During the night of 13 August 1961, the East Germans closed all border crossing points to the American, British and French sectors, cutting them off except for certain gates from the Russian sector and East Germany. Frank's battle group was ordered to Berlin just after construction of a wall around that city had begun, and on 18 August, after organizing the 1600 soldiers and 350 into six serials, one for each rifle company and the combat support company, the 1st Battle Group 18th Infantry began the long convoy from Coleman Barracks to Helmstedt, the gateway to the over-land route to Berlin. They camped overnight at the Helmstedt airfield and woke early on 20 August, ate breakfast, and boarded their trucks for the trip through East Germany to Berlin. Frank could feel the

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[144] Hickman, D. J. *The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963* (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 95.

tension in the air, though no one spoke of it. His company serial led the march and began moving just after 0500 and arriving at Marienborn, the first checkpoint in Eastern Germany at 0630. The soldiers had been awake for most of two days and two nights, and almost everyone was asleep slumped among the baggage stacked in the rear of the vehicles. Frank was awake and watched the Russian soldiers going from vehicle to vehicle and then back again counting heads. This went on for about fifteen minutes, and then he heard his platoon sergeant moving down the line of vehicles directing everyone out to form up alongside the trucks. One of Frank's officers walked alongside the Russian officer as he counted each file of men, verifying his number against the list given him. With the number confirmed the soldiers all climbed back into the vehicles.[145]

The move along the East German autobahn went well, with everyone that could peering out the canvas at the scenery; the others sleeping. Being the lead serial Frank's company was the first to enter Berlin. After arriving, they changed into starched fatigues, arranged their battle dress, fixed bayonets and boarded armored personnel carriers for the to McNair Barracks. Instead of taking a direct route, the convoy wound through the streets with thousands of Berliners crowding close to the vehicle parade, yelling and throwing bouquets of wildflowers at the grinning soldiers. Frank had never experienced anything like it. The convoy halted at the parade field bordering McNair Barracks where he saw Vice President Lyndon Johnson standing behind a microphone. Frank remembered him speaking something about "a presence of peace, a pledge of assistance,

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[145] Headquarters, Berlin Brigade "History of Military Movements along the Berlin Helmstedt Autobahn 195-1962" (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.2 CC1, US Army Center of Military History), 28-29; "Chronology-Berlin" ("US troops move on Berlin without hitch" 19 August 1961, 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7

a promise of America's growing concern," but not much else. Then they reboarded the vehicles for the trip to their temporary quarters at Tempelhof Airfield.[146]

Frank inspected his soldiers daily to ensure that they met the image of a Berlin soldier, one of "toughness, spit and polish and pride." Frank's commander told them that no one expected nukes in Berlin, more likely if war came they would be isolated and have to hold out as long as possible while causing as much damage as possible.[147]

Life in Berlin was not at all bad, outside the fact the soldiers were again without their families, and the only way to remain in contact was through expensive long distance calls or through letter writing. Their first weeks there were devoted to training and learning the lay of the city and where their fighting positions were. Frank and the others also spent more time training to control street riots and civil disturbances than practicing the standard infantry tactics.

It was also in Berlin that they turned in their old and venerable M1 rifles and carbines, and Browning Automatic Rifle for the new M14 rifle, which was lighter than an M1, carried a 20 round magazine instead of an 8 round clip, and had a selector switch for automatic fire. The M60 machinegun took the place of the M1919A6 air-cooled machinegun that had been in service with modifications since 1940, and the M113 armored personnel carrier replaced the M59 armored personnel carrier.[148]

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[146] "Chronology-Berlin" ("West Berliners join Johnson in cheering US Troop Arrival" 20 August 1961; 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7; http://www.operator-98/usafsslite/sstale15.htm.

[147] "Chronology-Berlin" ("Berlin GIs specially trained for combat in troubled city" 26 September 1961; 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7

[148] Hickman, D. J. The United States Army in Europe 1953-1963 (Historical Manuscript File 8-3.1 CU3, United States Army Center of Military History), 142.

With the three battle groups now in Berlin, one patrolled the wall while the other two trained and were on high alert. It seemed like there was a call out weekly, usually during the wee hours of the night. At the alarm, soldiers tumbled out of bed, threw on their uniforms and battledress, were issued weapons and ammunition and dashed out the door into formation in a matter of minutes. From there they deployed to their designated defensive positions within the city. At first it was exciting; after the umpteenth iteration, it was not.

On 25 October it was for real. Frank's squad was on the parade field practicing dry firing their new weapons when the company orderly ran up, took two or three deep breaths and said they were on alert, to draw their weapons and ammunition and prepare to move out at once. "This was definitely not an ordinary alert." Frank looked at his watch to note the time, 1010, not knowing what was going to happen. Once armed they moved out in armored personnel carriers to their now well-known defensive positions. Six hours later it was over, and the world knew about the standoff between Russian and US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie.[149] That was the highlight of Frank's tour and five months later he was back at Coleman Kaserne with his family.

In 1963, after extending for one year, Frank and his family returned to the United States, this time to the 1st Battalion 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division stationed at Fort Riley Kansas. In October 1965, he and his unit rotated to Vietnam, where he was promoted to SFC E7 in January 1966 while serving as a platoon sergeant in an infantry

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[149] "Chronology-Berlin" ("One thousand American troops maneuver in Berlin" 11 October 1961; 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7; "Chronology-Berlin" ("a West Texan in Washington" 17 October 1961; 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7; "Chronology-Berlin" ("US Has battle alert of 6 hours in Berlin" 20 August 1961; 228.01 Historical Records Collection HRC Geog. M. Germany 314.7

rifle company. With his one-year tour in Vietnam ending in September 1966, Frank requested an inter-theater transfer to Germany and reenlisted for what he considered his last assignment.

Germany 1967-1970

Sergeant First Class Connor took a 30-day furlough in the United States and then flew with his family to Frankfurt. After processing through the familiar 21st Replacement Battalion in Frankfurt, they took the Army bus up to Ayers Kaserne, where he signed in, found that he was being assigned as a platoon sergeant in C Company 3-36 Infantry and then went on leave to settle his family.[150] They had shipped hold baggage earlier, but had to wait for their car to arrive in Bremerhaven. Since he was an inter-theater transfer, housing was waiting for his family in the Roman Way housing area in Butzbach. Similar to 1959,when he signed for his house, he signed for his furniture.

Frank found the housing area in disrepair and not like the one he remembered in Mannheim. Their apartment had not been painted between tenants, and Gisela clearly let him know her displeasure. When he began talking to other married soldiers, he found that it was the same in other households. The soldiers in his company also complained about not getting maintenance on broken plumbing, heating, chipped and cracked flooring, or when the houses required painting both inside and out. When Frank called the housing office to inquire about getting some of the repairs made, he found that because of funding cuts, much of the maintenance was deferred. Only damages involving safety or health of the tenants were being repaired. When their German friends visited,

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[150] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 101.

they wondered aloud why the *Amis* were not maintaining the housing areas and *Kasernes;* was it because they only expected to be there a short time and did not want to invest in the future.[151] It seemed that every other wife in the housing area was German, some who had been married for 20 years, with newly married and new ones still coming in. [152] Gisela was now a US citizen and had been married for 12 years to a soldier, and took the younger wives under her wing teaching and mentoring them.

Unlike 1960, when Frank and Gisela's children went to a German school, in 1966 with their children now in the sixth and seventh grades respectively, they enrolled them in a DoD school. Their children were now more familiar with English than German and the American school was not tracked like that of the German system with its *Hauptschule*, *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*; each leading to different levels of education and work. Frank was unsure what his children would do when they grew up, but he wanted them to have every available opportunity.[153] There was not as much crowding in the schools and Frank wondered if this was because those soldiers who had families with children of middle school age, such as mid-level officers and noncommissioned officers, were gone replaced by soldiers younger whose children, if they had any, were younger than school age.[154]

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[151] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 271; Colonel Douglas Lindsay, "Heinrich and Joe" *Army*, June 1967, 60. The CINCUSAREUR considered the inadequacy of family housing single most important morale factor affecting married soldiers in Europe

[152] Colonel Douglas Lindsay, "Heinrich and Joe" *Army*, June 1967, 60.

[153] Eugene K. Keefe, et al *Area Handbook for the Federal Republic of Germany*, DA PAM 550-173 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 142-43.

[154] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1966" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 124.

How things had changed since his first tour at Ayers Kaserne during the 1950s. The Third Armored Division's Combat Command A, now 1st Brigade, had replaced the 4th Infantry Division's 22d Infantry in 1956 at Ayers Kaserne, and Schloss Kaserne in Butzbach held the 2d Battalion 3d Field Artillery and the 3rd Armored Division NCO Academy.[155] Ayers Kaserne now carried the nickname of the "Rock," since it was so isolated from any large city. Also new was the "Welcome Inn" a German *Gasthaus* right outside the main gate that soldiers frequented for beer and companionship.

Frank had been in a regular infantry battalion in Vietnam, a war that lay below the horizon of limited warfare, one "marked by intense turbulence but not a character demanding exposure of the more destructive means of military power that would be logical in a general or limited war."[156] Now he was back in the theater of decision, where if war broke out it would be between NATO and Warsaw Pact and everyone assumed would be a total war.

Army divisions in USAREUR had reorganized again in 1963, this time to ROAD (Reorganization of Army Divisions). Battalions now replaced the battle groups, and although not quite as robust as the battle group, they were more powerful than the infantry regiment battalion of the1950s.[157] Frank was surprised by the condition of his battalion. In Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, practically every officer and NCO position was held by a soldier of the appropriate grade. Where once Europe had the best and most

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[155] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1966" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 107; D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953-1963 (Heidelberg: Historical Section Operations Division, United States-Army, Europe), 246.

[156] Charles J.V. Murphy, "The New Multi-Purpose Army" Army, July 1966, 31. Quote from General Harold Johnson.

[157] John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 297; 308; 310.

modern equipment, and units contained seasoned officers and large numbers of long service NCOs, now at Ayers Kaserne, like most units in USAREUR, he found his battalion commanded by a lieutenant colonel with only two lieutenant staff officers. In each company there were only one or two lieutenants , the commander a first lieutenant and a newly arrived second lieutenant. There was a true age and Army experience gap between the battalion commander and his senior noncommissioned officers and the younger officers and NCOs. [158] He could tell this was a "peacetime army" as most of the senior leadership had as their highest award the Army Commendation Ribbon or "Green Hornet," and in 1966 only about one in twenty wore the Combat Infantryman's Badge. However, by November 1968, Frank was one of almost 24,000 soldiers or more than 13 percent of all soldiers in Germany with Vietnam experience, including almost every senior NCO.[159]

Frank found his battalion in 1966 less diversified than his battle group in 1959. There were no black officers and of the 15 black NCOs, seven were in one company. The same company had 40 percent of the black privates and specialists.. [160]

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[158] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1966" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 28. 31; General James K. Polk, A Changing US Army Europe: Building Combat Capability for Tomorrow, Army October 1967, 66; "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 99-100.

[159] Review of pictures of the 1st Brigade officers and senior NCOs in the 1966 3d Armored "Spearhead" Silver Anniversary Yearbook shows six of ten battalion commanders and sergeants major with the Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM) as their highest award. Others held higher combat awards, however, none held a service award higher than the ARCOM; General James H. Polk, "Our Men in Germany: Tough, Young, Ready" *Army* November 1968, 53.

[160] Review of pictures of the 1st Brigade officers and senior NCOs in the 1966 3d Armored "Spearhead" Silver Anniversary Yearbook shows the following .

	HHC	A Co	B Co	C Co
Total	5/131	4/80	3/86	5/60
Officers Cauc/Blk	5/0	4/0	3/0	5/0

Although assigned as a platoon sergeant Frank found himself appointed after about two weeks as acting first sergeant when the old first sergeant rotated back to the United States. The company had a master sergeant E7 assigned; however he worked at brigade headquarters and did not want to be first sergeant.[161] Although Frank had been a platoon sergeant off and on since his promotion to staff sergeant in 1961, and an E7 platoon sergeant for about 8 months in the jungles of Vietnam he felt lost as a first sergeant, especially in a unit where there were only a few seasoned noncommissioned officers. Sometimes he wished that he only had to worry about himself and his family.

He found for the first time just how much a first sergeant did. He was no longer directly involved with training soldiers, although he spot checked training and mentored his noncommissioned officers. At least initially, he found himself tied to his desk most of the day supervising the company clerk, checking the morning report, individual sick slips, preparing duty rosters, reviewing correspondence, organizing the daily details, posting the company orders, and assisting those soldiers brought in by their chain of command.[162]

First Sergeant Connor discovered that the free spending "rich" American soldier of the early 1950s was now struggling to make ends meet during the late 1960s. He remembered that when he was a corporal E4, just recently married, he and Gisela did not live in the lap of luxury, however they were comfortable and able to afford the items they needed. It was not that bad for young soldiers in the late 50s and early 60s either.

NCOs	Cauc/Blk	15/4	11/2	6/7	11/2
Enlisted	Cauc/Blk	102/10	53/14	56/17	36/11

[161] Sergeant Major William J. Sammis, "What Price Prerogative?" *Army*, May 1966, 86.

[162] *The Noncom's Guide,* 12th Edition (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1957), 46.

However, now a young non-command sponsored E4 with a wife living on the economy struggled; with rental prices for American families around the *Kaserne* high and although non-command sponsored families were now allowed commissary access, they had to watch every penny.[163]

Frank's rifle company was supposed to consist of a headquarters, three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon, similar to his company's organization in Vietnam except now he had armored personnel carriers.[164] However, because of personnel shortages, his company was short two rifle squads.

More than two-thirds of the soldiers in Frank's company were draftees, average age 20 with less than two years service; many more than when he had been in Germany in the 50s and early 60s.[165] With large numbers of NCOs either volunteering or being levied for Vietnam duty, he found instead of the more seasoned platoon sergeants and squad leaders of the 1950s and 60s, most of his squads led by privates first class and specialists fourth class "acting jack" (acting but lacking) sergeants, and his platoons by young sergeant or staff sergeants.[166]

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[163] DoD yearly pay tables at http://www.dfas.mil/money/milpay/priorpay; German Average Salary, ; exchange rates from Lothar Kettenacker, Germany since 1945 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 and http://www.triacom.com/archive/exchange.de.html.

[164] Department of the Army, Rifle Company Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized FM 7-11, 1965 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 6.

[165] General James K. Polk, "Our men in Germany: Tough, Young, Ready" *Army* November 1968, 56; "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1967" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 125.

[166] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1966" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 28. 31; General James K. Polk, A Changing US Army Europe: Building Combat Capability for Tomorrow, *Army* October 1967, 66; General James K. Polk, "Our men in Germany: Tough, Young, Ready" *Army* November 1968, 56. Since the beginning of 1965, more than 50,000 soldiers in USAREUR had volunteered for Vietnam service.

Some of the privates first class arriving from the United States had only four months of service, having distinguished themselves during their basic and advanced individual training. It had taken Frank two years to reach E4 and four to make E5. Now with the shortages of NCOs, a soldier could progress from private E1 to specialist E4 in seven months and sergeant E5 in eighteen. Privates frequently went home as sergeants after a 20-month tour. Although they carried the rank, Frank knew they lacked the years of experience to provide the necessary leadership and supervision, and it was his duty to teach them as much as he could as long as they were in his company.[167] There was mentoring but much of it was directive, especially when dealing with soldiers.

Frank taught his NCOs that if they walked past a soldier or deficiency needing correction they had just established a new lower standard. He wanted soldiers to understand that any sergeant he encountered would correct him if he needed it.[168] He believed that a man who looked like a soldier acted like a soldier, and a soldier sloppy in appearance was sloppy in his job performance. Frank taught his squad leaders to inspect their charges and their living areas daily; walking through the barracks himself showing his subordinate noncommissioned officers what to inspect for. From his own experience, he knew that most soldiers welcomed their NCOs ensuring that they lived in clean and

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[167] Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Annual Historical Summary, FY 1966, office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel," 39; General James K. Polk, "Our men in Germany: Tough, Young, Ready" *Army* November 1968, 56; "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1967" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 125.

[168] Sergeant Major of the Army George W. Dunaway, "New Emphasis Aims at Putting More Strength in 'Backbone of the Army'" *Army*, October 1969, 33.

habitable quarters, as any group of men living together without structure was a recipe for dissention and disaster.[169]

When Frank was a squad leader he knew not to push his soldiers too far in areas that did not matter in the big picture. Now as a first sergeant he did the same thing. He gave a bit on hair length, and let them grow theirs almost to the point they needed a mirror to comb it, and let them arrange and decorate their rooms within reason, and as long as they were kept clean. Although he did not announce it, many realized what he was doing and worked within the rules. However, there were always the malcontents who wanted more; and he had a special set of rooms reserved just for them near his office.[170]

As the years passed he received a trickle of soldiers from the United States to replace some of those who had either rotated back to the States, or shipped to Vietnam. He received some NCOs who had had service in Vietnam and a few from the NCO school at Fort Benning. The latter were "Shake and Bakes" who had gone through a twelve week NCO producing school and graduated as sergeant E5s. Many had just over a half year in service. He found they knew the technical and tactical aspects of being a combat squad leader and could lay a claymore or lead a patrol. They knew more than the private first class or specialist "acting jack" NCOs but Frank felt that they also needed to be "Army wise." No one had taught them how to be as effective in garrison as they were in the field. Nobody had shown them how to keep floor buffers operational in garrison or

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[169] Sergeant Major of the Army George W. Dunaway, "New Emphasis Aims at Putting More Strength in 'Backbone of the Army'" *Army*, October 1969, 33; Colonel William R. Hanks, "The New Soldier's Morale," *Army* April 1967, 54-55; personal experience of Command Sergeant Major (Ret) Robert S. Rush.

[170] Colonel Douglas Lindsay, "Heinrich and Joe" *Army*, June 1967, 61.

to counsel and mentor their soldiers. Frank also knew that they received great grief from some of the other sergeants and staff sergeants who had made their rank the hard way, and he worked hard to ensure they received fair treatment.[171]

Frank had never been mechanized and joked that he hardly knew what the term motor pool meant. Now he had seventeen M-113 series armored personnel carriers in the motor pool across the street. Unfortunately, only a few experienced "mech" sergeants remained in the company to assist and train the soldiers and him. On the days designated for motor stables, Frank, instead of holding his work formation in the company area adjacent the mess hall, held it between the rows of his company vehicles. There everybody in the company learned maintenance procedures "by the numbers." Frank read each procedural step from the vehicle's technical manual waited for his soldiers to perform the function and then continued until the maintenance was complete. Motor pool maintenance was not as good as field training, however it got the soldiers out of the barracks and working on something, even if they did not have the parts to fix the deficiencies they identified.[172]

Frank and other Army leaders had to face more than just the normal training and personnel problems leaders had during the 1950s and early 60s. The ongoing social and racial unrest in the United States as well as the war in Vietnam spilled over into Germany. The same category of young people who were in the forefront of various protest movements was also the segment of the population that provided large numbers of draftees arriving in Germany.

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[171] Larry H. Ingraham, "Fear and Loathing in the Barracks—And the Heart of Leadership, *Parameters, December 1988, 75-80;* CSM Othon O. Valent, "A New Breed of NCO" Army, July 1968, 6..

[172] Personal experience of Command Sergeant Major (ret) Robert S. Rush.

Frank learned in meetings with the Army legal advisors that he had to balance the need to maintain military discipline against his soldier's Constitutional rights and guarantees unless there was "a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale, military personnel are entitled to the same free access to publications as are other citizens." This included the soldiers using their own money and equipment to publish underground newspapers during their free time. Additionally, he learned that his soldiers could join "servicemen's unions," although no one in the chain of command was authorized to recognize or bargain with them.[173]

It was not only the Americans. Many Germans were against the war and there seemed to be demonstrations almost daily in different parts of the country. Frank wryly noted that it appeared that the demonstrators preferred to protest near American military housing units, scaring the families living in them while the soldiers were on duty. The commander's and his greatest concern was the possibility of incidents between soldiers and the protestors, which some of the protestors clearly tried to provoke. Whenever they received information on an upcoming protest, commanders issued detailed guidance concerning soldiers' behavior both on and off duty, and Frank ensured through his NCOs that everyone complied.[174]

Another source of worry for commanders and NCOs was escalating racial tension. Frank noticed that members from both races were more than ready to resort to militancy.

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[173] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 160-161.

[174] Colonel Gordon A. Moon "USAREUR's Vast Vistas, or From Kansas to Germany" Army, September 1968, 24; "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1967" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History),155-156.

Previously soldiers who worked together treated one another with some regard, although they socialized separately after duty hours. Now it was different and soldiers seemed to look for conflicts. Although they had been put off-limits, he knew of two bars in Giessen on opposite sides of the street-one catering to blacks and the other to whites-where the street between them was the site of numerous fights, and where individual soldiers of either race dared not walk alone.[175]

After a series of interracial fights at the on post Enlisted Mens' Club, all of the officers and senior NCOs gathered in the post theater to listen to the brigade commander discuss the local problems as well as the specific findings of the Race Relations report submitted to General Westmoreland concerning units in USAREUR. The main thrust was that there was a lack of communication between black enlisted personnel and white company grade officers and NCOs. The colonel directed that battalions hold interracial meetings to find the local problems and seek solutions at the unit level. In response to black soldiers complaints the exchange system began stocking additional items such as cosmetics and ethnic hair products.[176] However, racial tensions within the Army did not ease until the mid 1970s.

Frank also was concerned with the number of drugs that he was finding in his barracks. When he queried battalion, he learned that narcotics usage in USAREUR had

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[175]Recollection of Edith Rush, March 4, 2003, who walked daily down the street between work and home.

[176]"Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 107-09.

tripled between 1967 and 1968.[177] With the above problems, haircuts seemed minor in comparison.

Frank found training between 1966 and 1969 marginal at best and nothing like he remembered in earlier assignments. Gone were river crossing operations and major field exercises. Now they trained at the squad and platoon level because of the shortage of funds and inexperience of junior leaders, officers and NCOs, and with the high turnover they trained the same task again and again rather than progress to more difficult tasks.[178]

Exacerbating the shortage of soldiers was the ever present non mission related details that he had to assign every day, from cutting grass in the housing area to providing manual labor unloading rations at the mess hall. All of which were once accomplished by local nationals.[179]

Besides going to one of the training areas for six weeks and one field training exercises per year that lasted no more than 72 hours, soldiers trained in the training areas around Ayers Kaserne. Most of the training was dismounted because there was little money for fuel and spare parts; all of which Frank knew reduced the realism and quality of training. Every soldier, especially infantrymen, wanted to spend time in the field, as Frank did because it kept his charges busy and out of trouble in garrison. One year his brigade participated in Exercise Frontier Shield to evaluate Army doctrine on the

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[177] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 103.

[178] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1966" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 28. 31; General James K. Polk, A Changing US Army Europe: Building Combat Capability for Tomorrow, Army October 1967, 66.

[179] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 80.

employment of conventional forces on the nuclear battlefield, but that was not enough to keep his soldiers happy.[180] He wished that his company could have participated in the first REFORGER (Redeployment of Forces from Germany) exercise where two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division and a squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment deployed from the United States to Nürnburg, Germany, aboard C141 Aircraft, and then traveled to Grafenwöhr. There they drew tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other organizational equipment and supplies from pre-positioned stocks and then faced off against the "aggressor" trying to invade southern Germany.[181] Now that was training.

Frank received his promotion to pay grade E8 in 1967, just before the Army centralized promotions for master sergeant E8 and sergeant major E9, and later centralizing promotions for sergeant first class E7. He liked the centralized system better because noncommissioned officers now competed on an Army wide basis which eliminated the requirement for a vacant position in the soldier's current unit. Promotion to the pay grades of E5 and E6 remained at the battalion level, where the sergeant major and first sergeants conducted monthly promotion boards to select those most deserving of promotion.[182] He felt promotion to first sergeant the high point of his career, even if he was later promoted to sergeant major. Nothing was more gratifying than being the *Mutter der Kompanie.*

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[180] "Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 January to 31 December 1969" (Heidelberg: Military History Branch, US Army, Europe, Historical Manuscript File, US Army Center of Military History), 80-81; General James K. Polk, "Improvements in Readiness Posture Highlight 1969 Watch in Europe, *Army* October, 50.

[181] General James K. Polk, "Improvements in Readiness Posture Highlight 1969 Watch in Europe, *Army* October 1969, 48-49.

[182] Sergeant Major of the Army George W. Dunaway, "New Emphasis Aims at Putting More Strength in 'Backbone of the Army'" *Army*, October 1969, 34.

Frank had attended the NCO Academy during his last tour in Germany. Now he read that the Army in the future planned to institutionalize the Noncommissioned Officer Educational Development Program into three levels of instruction: basic, advanced, and senior noncommissioned officer courses. The first trained soldiers in the pay grade E4 to perform at grades E5 and E6, the advanced course trained E6s and E7s for E8 and E9 positions and the senior course trained E8s to perform duty as sergeants major of higher Army headquarters or of joint or combined headquarters.[183] It appeared to him that the Army was marrying the long term "Army wise" noncommissioned officer with one who now had a professional education; transitioning the NCO corps from that of a trade to a profession.

CONCLUSION

Although there was no armed conflict in Germany the American soldiers stationed there looked down the muzzle of a cannon that if fired would have plunged the world into a nuclear Armageddon. Throughout the Cold War, the US Army placed great emphasis on the defense of Europe, with never less than 12 percent of the field army assigned there and twice that during the Berlin crisis in 1961. Training ranged the gamut from division level exercises spread over the countryside to squad level training in training areas adjacent to their home *Kasernes*.

Many officers and NCOs, especially those in the combat arms, rotated between stateside and Germany every three or four years, with each assignment in Germany built

[183] Sergeant Major of the Army George W. Dunaway, "New Emphasis Aims at Putting More Strength in 'Backbone of the Army'" *Army*, October 1969, 34, 36.

upon their past experiences. They knew the different training areas better than they did their hometowns, as well as understood their role in keeping Europe free.

Returning noncommissioned officers at the company level established continuity within organizations seldom matched in other countries, and as long as there were experienced officers and NCOs within units in USAREUR, even degradations in funding affected readiness only in the short term. It was only during the latter 60s with the ongoing war in Vietnam that funding constraints combined with a shortage of qualified leaders that units fell into disrepair.

Not only was this paper an examination of the US Army in Germany; it also examined the role of the noncommissioned officer in training and leading soldiers. We observed Frank Connor in three settings, first as a rookie private, then his maturation while a junior noncommissioned officer and finally as a mentor and trainer of junior noncommissioned officers and soldiers. He follows the normal progression of a soldier, the first ten years as a soldier learning; the next ten learning and teaching, and the next years still learning, but now imparting his years of experience and expertise to those coming behind him.

Those stationed in Germany between 1950 and 1970 watched the country evolve from a nation in ruins to Europe's economic powerhouse. It was not just soldiers who served in Germany, soon after the end of World War II, their families did also. Living both on the economy and in military communities, soldiers' families were the unofficial ambassadors of American values, culture, and friendship. These families began arriving in Germany when it was still a heap of rubble and shared the good and the bad with their German neighbors during the years. They experienced first hand the optimism of the

years of the *Wirtschaftswunder* as well as the fear of a new war when the Berlin Wall went up. They stayed even when in the late 1960s their standard of living declined and their German neighbors turned on them because of their country's war in Vietnam. The soldiers and their families symbolized America's steady determination to defend Germany against the ever-present Soviet threat. Many of the soldiers who arrived single departed with a German bride, and if they remained in service, probably returned to Germany on subsequent tours.

Greeting President George Bush on his visit to Berlin on18 June 1996, Chancellor Helmut Kohl recognized the contribution of American soldiers and their families made to German-American Friendship:

> We should realize that these [German-American] good relations are valuable capital, indeed a treasure. The same is true of the seven million GIs who have been stationed in Germany over the past fifty years. Counting their families as well, that means about fifteen million Americans who have lived in our country.

ROMANIA AND THE MILITARY REFORM OF THE WARSAW PACT (1964-1968)

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In a report forwarded to the leadership of the country on the 3rd of June 1968 by the minister of the Romanian Armed Forces, Ion Ionita, a mandate for an official stand to the next meeting of defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact was asked for. In accordance with the mentioned document, the Romanian high official proposed the sustaining of a previous position on a set of issues. This position had been already presented to the Soviets, but the later ignored it. Ion Ionita did not forget to mention that approving and applying the solicited mandate meant de facto that Romania was to abandon the Pact."In the view of this stand, the Socialist Republic of Romania, without declaring that it is getting off the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, it is in fact positioning itself outside of the integrated structures of the Warsaw Treaty".[1] To put this in other words, Romania was excluding itself from the Pact.

What were actually, in the spring of 1968, the military problems inside the alliance on which Romania had expressed several points of view rejected by the Soviets? How can be explained the decision taken by the leadership from Bucharest, to choose such a limited position versus the "big brother"? And when such divergent opinions, capable of shaking the so many times invoked unity within the Pact, actually appeared? Did the leadership from Bucharest really intent to leave the Alliance?

Two moments are essential for understanding the substance of the answer to the above questions.

The first one - not necessarily the most important - occurred in 1966, when the Soviets initiated talks about optimizing the regulation of the Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact (UCWP) within the organization. In fact, this moment represents the "peak" of an already on-going process, that had began during the previous years. On one hand, Moscow tried to give a formal appearance to its hegemonic role inside the alliance, and on the other hand the Soviets wanted to make the Pact more functional, especially in case of a war.

The second moment - which in fact must be considered as being the first one, both chronologically and through its significance - was represented by the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (WPPCC) held from 18 to 20 January 1965. On this occasion Romania publicly affirmed, for the first time, its own viewpoint

[1] *Report forwarded by General Colonel Ion Ionita, minister of the Romanian Armed Forces, to Nicolae Ceausescu, related to the content of the drafts elaborated by the United Command of the Warsaw Staff.* 3 June 1968, Romanian Military Archives (RMA), Fund V2, File 12/35, f.11.

on several sensible issues concerning the relations with Moscow. The importance of this moment is revealed by the characterization that the Romanian communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej made on the previous exclusion of Albania from the Pact following Moscow's initiative (he said this was "an illegal action"), also by the position Romania expressed on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In regard with the later issue, the Romanian leader vigorously rejected the proposal made by Moscow to condemn the setup of NATO's Multilateral Nuclear Forces - a proposal which in fact constituted the real purpose of the meeting. Instead, Romania proposed that the Warsaw Pact should forward an initiative for concluding a treaty for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact we do not have yet enough documents to decipher the intimate reasons of a such very determined position, one may observe that Romania was considering the conclusion of a treaty for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a part of an ample process of nuclear disarmament, concerning the destruction of all A-bombs and, nevertheless, the avoidance of a nuclear monopoly.[2]

In our area of interest, the mentioned meeting had another major significance. At Warsaw, the Romanian delegation also rejected the proposal made by the Soviets to create new structures inside the Warsaw Pact. Among these structures were the Military Committee (MC) and a Staff or Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (SUFWP). So, this was the moment when Romania started to obstruct the Soviets' proposals for the optimization/operationalization of the military alliance dominated by Moscow.[3] In fact, Romania's purpose was not intending to "freeze" the Alliance founded in 1955. What the leadership from Bucharest actually opposed was a presumable increased domination of the Warsaw Pact by the USSR, which had inspired or initiated all proposals aiming at strengthening the role of the Soviets inside the Pact. By acting in such a way, the Romanians tried to put new benchmarks on the path of taking distance from Moscow, a process which had begun openly in April 1964.

Accordingly with the records from the Romanian archives until now available, the issues that attracted the interest of Moscow during the year 1966 were to elaborate and enforce several new statutes (regulations, ordinances):of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (UFWP); of the Military Council of UFWP; of a unique system of antiaircraft defense of the Warsaw Pact (AASWP); and of the organizational frames of leading structures of the Supreme Command of the UFWP and of the Technical Committee of the WP Armed Forces.

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[2] *Shorthand of the Meeting of the First secretaries of the Central Committees of communist parties and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries, held at the residence of the Central Committee of the Polish United Working Party. Bucharest, 20 January 1965.* Central Historical National Archives (C.H.N.A.), Fund CC al RCP, Foreign Relations Section, File 15/1965, f.121-122.

[3] At Warsaw, during the plenum session of the Political Consultative Committee of 20 January 1965, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej said: "We have already expressed our opinion on the proposals for creating new structures apart of those which exist inside the Pact. We do not understand why these new structures are necessary. What would their competence be? Why must we adopt a decision for creating a permanent structures made of deputy foreign ministers, while they cannot take any action outside the guidance lines given by the superior leadership of the party and government of our countries?" *Ibidem*, f.124.

As already shown, during the meetings of the Warsaw Pact member-countries, the representatives of Romania positioned themselves on a stand opposed both to the Soviets and the other partners from inside the alliance. Thus, during the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Pact member-countries (4-9 February 1966) when the project of a statute for the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was discussed, the Romanian delegation observed that the structure had only a consultative role, this being also the case for posting a Supreme Commander. The Romanian representatives did not agree the idea supported by all other participants, to create a Military Committee, to function adjoining the Political Consultative Committee; instead, they proposed that the Military Committee would work beside the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP). The Romanians also asked the deputies of the Supreme Commander for each country to work directly with the later and opposed the proposal made by Soviets to have such a high representative of Moscow in all allied countries, a fact that would have meant a direct control of USSR in the military field The chief of the Romanian delegation, General Ion Gheorghe, understood well what was the real intention of the Soviets: to transform the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP) into a direct supervisor for all other commands of the allied armed forces. On the other hand, in accordance with Moscow's proposal, in wartime the Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was to become the heading organ for CUFWP, the later being thus reduced to a secondary role.[4]

During the meeting of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member-countries held in Berlin from 10 to 12 February 1966, the Romanian representatives criticized the proposals forwarded by Soviets related with the statute of the United Secretariat of the WP and the Permanent Commission for Foreign Policy, by saying these structures were useless and contrary to the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty. They invoked the 6 article of the treaty and also the principles from the Romanian Working Party Declaration of April 1964, which had been transcripted as guiding principles for Romania's foreign policy.[5] The words of the Romanian delegates expressed the concern of the leadership from Bucharest for the steps aiming at an increased integration level of the Warsaw Pact structures. This would have as a consequence the effective diminution of the national sovereignty of minor allies and the control of the Soviets over all armed forces of the Pact member-countries. The base for the Romanian delegation own point of view were the examples of the crises from Berlin and Cuba, when the Soviets had sent to Bucharest direct orders for alarming the Romanian units,

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[4] *Report by General-lieutenant Ion Gheorghe, Deputy Minister of Armed Forces and Chief of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, on the meeting between the Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Pact member-countries held in Moscow from 4 to 9 February 1966. 11 February 1966*, R.M.A., Fund V2, vol. 3, File 7/59, f.1-7.

[5] Lavinia Betea, *Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Manescu in dialog cu Lavinia Betea,(Unfinished Talks. Dialogue between Corneliu Manescu and Lavinia Betea),* Polirom, Iassy, 2001. See especially pp. 117-119, 125-129, 156-159 and p.163.

without consulting or even without previously noticing this fact to the Romanian State leadership.[6]

Romania's position, stating that the military structures of the Warsaw Pact were to deal only with consultative matters, without having effective command and control, eventually ended in a small success. During the meeting of the ministers of defense on 27-29 May 1966, most of the Romanian amendment were accepted and the protocol of the meeting mentioned that on several issues divergent opinions had been expressed.[7] Among the principles proposed by Romanians included in the new draft of the statute of the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP) can be mentioned the following: CUFWP should coordinate, and not effectively command the activity of the UFWP (as the Soviets were asking for); the units of the UFWP were directly subordinated to their national command and leadership; the officers from all Warsaw Pact member-countries should to be proportionally represented in the Staff of the UFWP; the Supreme Commander was to be posted according to a rotating principle, from all marshals and generals of all the Warsaw Pact member-countries. Also, several initial provisions had been eliminated from the statute, as a result of Romanian representatives' demands. Among these, the most significant were: the right of the Supreme Commander to control the UFWP; excluding the nuclear forces from the UFWP; the direct link between the Political Consultative Committee and the Military Consultative Council.

The Romanians also expressed a reserved position related with other issues: the role and functions of the Political Consultative Committee; posting representatives of the Supreme Command beside other allied armed forces; and the proposal for creating a Military Council, to have a consulting role beside the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP).

On such a basis, at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee from July 1966 which took place at Bucharest, the Romanian representatives forwarded to their counterparts a new project for a Statute of the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP). The Romanian draft was to be never discussed. This fact proved that Moscow did not intend to share the leadership of the alliance with its minor partners or - moreover, as the Romanian draft stipulated - to accept a discussion on its hegemonic role. So, what one should expect for the future was that Moscow would react and would affirm its *primus inter pares* status. Such a thing actually happened in a short time.

On the first moment, the Soviets took the path of protracting whatever they could. They put in their drafts the Romanian proposals, but then they tacitly eliminated these adds. Thus, as a Romanian report showed, at the meeting of the defense ministers from

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[6] *Report by Army General Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces forwarded to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, on talks of 3 May 1966 with Army General M. I. Kazakov, Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact.* R.M.A., Fund V2, File 8/61, f. 8-9.

[7] *Report by Army General Leontin Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces forwarded to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, on the Meeting of the defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact member-countries held at Moscow from 27 to 28 May 1966.* R.M.A., Fund V2, vol. 3, File 9/62, f.4.

27-28 May in Moscow, in the draft of the statute "the majority of issues of principles elaborated by our delegation were included" and also "several provisions not corresponding to our viewpoint" were erased. (The report was mentioning the erased provisions as follows: the right of the Supreme Commander to control the UFWP; excluding the Soviet nuclear forces from the frame of UFWP; the direct link between the Political Consultative Committee and the Military Consultative Council, a structure that would have comprised all defense ministers).[8]

A significant pauses occurred after this ministerial summit, until a new meeting was scheduled at Prague between the deputy ministers of defense from 29 February to 1 March 1968. During the passed months the Soviets overlapped the opposition of the Romanians by avoiding to elaborate a new draft and meanwhile they materialized their own intentions through small actions, supported by other minor allies. Thus, at Prague, the Soviets directly opposed the proposal made by Romanians to discuss on the draft forwarded on July 1966 at Bucharest. According to the report handed to Nicolae Ceausescu by the Romanian Chief of Staff "when we (Romanians-our note) made the proposal, all other chiefs of delegation, and insistently Army General Sokolov and Marshal Iakubovsky declared that they hadn't been mandated for such a discussion, that they were unprepared and the conditions for talking on such subjects were inappropriate and embryonic".[9]

Practically, what the Soviets did was to impose a separate discussion on creating the Military Council and the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUFWP). The mentioned report was shortly showing that "by the way the meeting took place and from all discussions one may conclude that the representatives of the other armed forces of the Warsaw Pact intend to solve one by one the different issues related with the Unified Command, such as the issue of the Military Council, of the Staff, of the Technical Committee, by stating they all agree upon these issues. /…/ So, the conclusion to be made is that the creation of different parts of the Unified Command was intended, without taking into account the essential problem, id est to elaborate a new statute of the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact".[10]

Finally, this protractory stratagem adopted by Soviets culminated in May 1968. Although at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Sofia on March 1968 it was decided that the ministers of defense should analyze all the issues and to present a report after six months, only two months passed until on 24 May 1968 the Soviet Marshal I. I. Iakubovsky officially forwarded to the Romanian Ministry of the Armed Forces the drafts of statutes for the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, the Military Council and the unique system of antiaircraft defense of the Warsaw Pact (AASWP). The Romanian authorities were surprised to see that several provisions previously erased from the statutes (specifically, those from May 1966) had been reformulated, thus giving the opportunity for a Soviet inference in the command of the

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[8] *Ibidem*, f.3-4..

[9] *Report by General-Colonel Ion Gheorghe, First-Deputy Minister of Armed Forces and Chief of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, on the Meeting between the Deputies Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Pact member-countries held in Prague from 29 February to 1 March 1968.* R.M.A., Fund V2, vol. 3, File 11/27, f.3.

[10] *Ibidem*, f.4.

Romanian Armed Forces.[11] These reformulated provisions concerned especially the right of the Supreme (Soviet) Commander to command and control all the troops of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, the right of the Political Consultative Committee to appoint the Supreme Commander, to take decisions or to give orders for alarming the mentioned troops, and to plan the strategic development of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. All these meant that several important attributes related with the national sovereignty and the command and control of the armed forces were to be confiscated by an authority outside the national jurisdiction. At Bucharest a written report showed openly that "the provisions of the draft of statute of the Unified Command are contrary to the principles of mutual cooperation and assistance on the basis of respecting the national sovereignty and independence, of non-interference in internal affaires provisioned by the Treaty, thus affecting essential attributes of the governments of the countries member of the Warsaw Treaty (Organization - our add). All these rights positions the Supreme Commander over the national governments and made the Unified Command to become a suprastatal organ of command and control".[12]

The events that occurred in the summer of 1968, respectively the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to which added the fear of similar actions to be performed against Romania, determined a substantial review of the position adopted by the authorities from Bucharest.

These are the circumstances under which new negotiations (talks) between the Soviets and the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu took place at the end of September 1968, occasioned by the visit made by the Supreme Commander of the UAFWP, Marshal I. I. Iakubovsky, and the Chief of Staff of the UAFWP, Army General S. M. Sthemenko.[13] Romania accepted many Soviet proposals, among these the creation of the Military Committee, composed of the ministers of defense, beside the Political Consultative Committee, thus differing from the initial pattern, according to which the MC should be created beside the Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (CUAFWP). But Bucharest also tried to keep several secured gates in order to evade from under a total control of the Soviets. This fact explains why Ceausescu insisted for a phrase concerning the presence of the representative of the Unified Command within the national armed forces. Reformulated, this article said that these representatives "may be accepted within the armed forces of the countries member of the Treaty, whenever this would be asked or agreed by the governments of one of these countries".[14] The leadership from Bucharest also hold a firm voice on the issue which concerned the right of the Supreme Commander to sent troops on the territory of the allied countries, by stating this decision had to be taken only by the government of each country.

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[11]*Report by General-Colonel Ion Ionita, Minister of Armed Forces, forwarded to Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Council of State, on the content of the statutes elaborated by the Unified Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries.1 October 1968.* R.M.A., Funnd V2, vol. 3, File 12/ 35, f.3-4.
[12]*Ibidem*, f.5-6.
[13]*Note on the talks between Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, and I. I. Iakubovsky, the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries, 28 September 1968*. R.M.A., Fund V2, vol. 3, File 13/37, f.1-7.
[14]*Ibidem*, f.6.

The meeting of the defense ministers that took place in Moscow from 29 to 30 October sanctioned these agreements and gave a defined pattern to the previous drafts for the statutes of Defense Ministers Council, United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, the unique system of the antiaircraft defense, the Staff and the Technical Committee of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (UAFWP). The Romanian party reserved for itself in the text of the final communiqué, the right to further reflection upon the forms under which the troops of the UAFWP could be displayed on the territory of an allied country from within the Pact.[15]

The meeting at Moscow in the end of October 1968 put an end to the first stage in the military reform of the Warsaw Pact, that had been started by the middle of '70s. The process was to go on during the next years.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The attitude of the leadership from Bucharest related with the military reform of the Warsaw Pact initiated by the Soviets had been dictated by the genuine "dogma" in the realm of foreign policy represented by the Romanian Working Party Declaration of April 1964. The Romanian communist leaders intended through the adopted position to give credibility for their country's foreign orientation and to convince Moscow about its seriousness. In fact, the "line" adopted in 1964 had its own dynamic and forcibly conducted the main representatives of Bucharest political circles towards positions far beyond their initial intentions. This way must be interpreted the observation made by the Romanian minister of defense in June 1968, related to a de facto abandoning of the Warsaw Pact. Being scared of the posture he himself found suddendly at that time, Ion Ionita immediately added: "Another situation might occur in case the other delegations will not share our point of view and most probably the delegation of the (Romanian - our add) Ministry of Armed Forces would finally agree on the drafts of the documents elaborated by the Unified Command, excepting"[16] the competence and attributes of the Supreme Commander, also other provisions.
2. If this uncontrolled dynamic of the "line" adopted by the Romanian communist leadership subsequently to the Declaration of April 1964 was or was not accurately perceived by these persons, represents a problem that exceeds the framework of our present paper. The communist authorities from Bucharest either took it really seriously, or misinterpreted the consequences and thus eventually became victims of their own "line", as a result of a certain lack of experience in the field of international relations and foreign policy Whatever the truth, we must say that "the battle of statutes" put Bucharest in a very unpleasant and politically costing situation of not being aware of the intervention made by the troops of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, on August 1968. From a technical viewpoint, as they systematically opposed the enforcing of the Soviet-patterned statute of United Forces of the Armed

[15]Dumitru Preda, Mihai Retegan, *Principiul dominoului*, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p.5-6.

[16]*Report forwarded by General Colonel Ion Ionita, minister of the Romanian Armed Forces, to Nicolae Ceausescu, related to the content of the drafts elaborated by the United Command of the Warsaw Staff.* 3 June 1968, R.M.A., Fund V2, File 12/35, f.11

Forces of the Warsaw Pact, the representatives of the Romanian leadership excluded themselves from any common endeavor of the Pact. From a political viewpoint, Bucharest repeatedly voiced that Prague was capable of dealing itself with its own problems. And the invasion, of course, came eventually as a total surprise. So, the inflexibility in applying the "line" of 1964 forcibly brought the political leadership from Bucharest in the position of excluding itself from the "family" to which it actually belonged. The first major consequence was the fact that Bucharest had no knowledge about the Prague episode.

3. In the case of the "statutes battle" the Soviet party managed the opposition of Romania in an unfitted manner. Firstly, because the Soviets played a double-crossing game and instead of looking for a compromise and a satisfactory solution for both parties, they put an end to this attitude of Romanians by avoiding a direct negotiation and finally by isolating Romania. Following such a wrong approach of the "Romanian crisis", Moscow eventually found itself facing a de facto non-allied Romania within the Warsaw Pact. Subsequently to the outcome of the Prague spring, the leadership from Moscow adopted a different management of the crisis and choused the political path for a compromise solution. This way new major crises were avoided and the communist Romania remained faithful to the Warsaw Pact until its final dissolution.
4. In the end, a question remains to be credibly answered by further historical research. Was or was not the "battle of the statutes" an episode in Romania's prolonged attempt for giving a comprehensive shape to its foreign neutral policy within the frame of a global (both possible and feared) confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO? This question still exist, as there are opinions that such a neutral pattern of Romania's foreign policy might have been envisaged by September 1963, through a bilateral arrangement with the US.

Jan ŠTAIGL

Slovakia in the Conception of Building Czechoslovakian Army as the Army of the First Operational Line of the Soviet Bloc in 1948 – 1968.

The first phase of military-political integration of the Soviet bloc ended in 1947--1949 by supplementing of two-sided allied system of states in a sphere of power of the USSR in the Central and South-East Europe with agreements with the former satellites of fascistically Germany. The alliance of countries leaned on the Soviet Union left in this phase direct after-war Slavonic base and by means of commencement of leftish powers it gained uniform ideological platform and extended its orientation. Dogmatic schemes and great power plans of the Soviet policy imprinted class-political character and anti-West orientation to the alliance of the USSR and so-called people's democratic states. After the establishment of NATO and the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany it was spoken in no uncertain terms about the preparation of the USA and Great Britain ruling groups for a new war and their attempt to restore the position of the German militaristic and revanchist powers.

Up to the so-called Berlin crisis in the summer 1948, probable origin of a new world conflict was expected by the Command of the Czechoslovakian army in the term of 10 – 15 years. Concerning this first attempt of the Soviet Union to confront the power with the West world, the Command admitted its commencement even earlier. At the same time it accepted the thesis that the "West capitalistic states" would start the war, that it would be a war of classes led until the complete annihilation of the enemy and the Europe would become its main battlefield. The opinions on the military character of the war were formulated under the influence of principles of the Soviet post war doctrine. About till the half of 1949, with the existence of atomic monopoly of the USA, the opinions were based on intentional downgrading of the nuclear weapons importance. They asserted the war would be a long-lasting matter and the victory would be achieved by the co-action and collaboration of all weapon with the decisive role of land force and the winner would become a party, which manage to mobilize and use its moral and economy potential better. After the successful trials of the atomic bomb in USSR, the Command of the army started to stress a strategic importance of the air forces more, above all in an initial stage of the war.

In 1949 a new concept of military defence of the Czechoslovakian Republic definitively won its way in the Command of the Czechoslovakian army. Its existing form, which issued from pre-war military-strategic situation of Czechoslovakia, was based on military cover of the whole state territory with the accent on the main offensive directions of potential aggressor. It assumed positional retreat fights the allies. After their strike so called strategic counter-attack should follow with the aim to push out aggressor from the occupied areas and to transfer the combat activity onto his territory. A new concept reckoned on an active and dynamical defence mainly of the west parts of the Czechoslovakian Republic and on offensive activity of Czechoslovakian and allied armed forces practically immediately after the military conflict origin. Also the possibility of so-called preventive strikes in a direct threat to Czechoslovakia or allied state was not excluded.

Already at the turn of forties and sixties, in a military-political links of the Soviet bloc, the Czechoslovakian army profiled itself as the army of the first operational line. The place and mission of the Czechoslovakian army were determined by the

geographical location of the Czechoslovakian Republic between northern and southern strategic direction, crosswise main potential axis of each larger military operation of a European importance and by the common boundary with the West Germany. According to the Command of the armed forces the Czechoslovakian territory was not intended as a main battlefield in a future war, but it should be of great importance thus for the enemy as for allied bloc of countries with USSR in the lead. It was supposed that the Czechoslovakian army would create an independent front in the composition of allied armed forces, operations of which would be closely coordinated with the combat activities of other armies, especially with the operational plans of the Soviet general staff. The concept of building strong, well equipped and from the point of view of individual types of forces self-sufficient peace and war army accorded with the assumption. Main military grouping should concentrate in a defensive and muster area of Bohemia, with the prevailing tasks orientation to Germany and Austria.

Military-politic integration of the Soviet bloc and a new concept of the military defence of the Czechoslovakian Republic changed significantly military-strategic situation of Slovakia. With the exception of West Slovakian region near the border with Austria, which in fact the occupation zone of USSR in this country covered, Slovakia practically remained inside of politically united and militarily closely interconnected power sphere of the Soviet Union. In the military plans of the Czechoslovakian Republic it was apprehended above all as a rear area and logistic base of the Czechoslovakian Army.

Slovakia, until the 1950, represent relatively independent territorial-organisational and could be said also operational whole in the peace organization of the armed forces – military area 4 with the Command in Bratislava. Organisational structure and deployment of the troops followed-up before the Munich Pact organisation and deployment of the Czechoslovakian army and also corresponded with immediately after-war military-security interests and principles of the military defence concept of the Czechoslovakian Republic. Up to 1948 about 25% of all units, garrisons and army establishments were deployed in Slovakia, the number of more than 40 000 people was calculated. Progressive reduction of an operational relevance of Slovakia that was particularly related to the development of friendly and allied relations with Hungary resulted (already in 1948—1949) in the redeployment of the part of army to the west boundary of the CSR.

In 1950 fundamental reorganization of the Czechoslovakian army begun -- with the aim to adjust its peace and war organisation to the Soviet army organisation. Unlike previous reorganisations, first of all, the military organisation was created and on the basis of it peace organisation was formed. According to the Soviet general staff requests the Czechoslovakian army should be based on maximum numbers of people, with a strong land forces, it means with the large number of infantry, mechanised, tank, and artillery units and with the strong air forces, fighter units above all. Even still on 1 November 1954 more than 250 thousand of people, including university and military schools students, were planned in the tables of peace numbers of Czechoslovakian army.

Since September 1950 Slovakia become within reorganisation a part of 2nd military circle, in which also southern parts of Moravia were included. This territorial–organisational grouping with the Command in Trenčín was perceived as a home area and the second line of the Czechoslovakian front of the allied armed forces. It fulfilled especially training and mobilisation tasks in peace conditions and constituted the main logistic and school base of the Czechoslovakian army. It provided enhancement

of the protection of South West Slovakia and South Moravia by means of detached units. In the case of mobilisation deployment the change of command of circle to the command of 2nd military army was intended, meant for the deployment in defence but mainly in offensive phase of the activities of the Czechoslovakian front, to the west respectively south west operational direction.

There was about half of military troops of 2nd military circle deployed within the Slovak territory, it means about 15 % of all units and garrisons of the Czechoslovakian army. At the beginning of 1951, considering their military structure, there was no fight unit of air forces deployed in Slovakia, not a single one of the five unions and unsupported units of mechanised troops, there were three from twelve unsupported artillery leagues and units and two from ten infantry divisions. They formed together with the special and support units a peace base of the army corps with the Command in Banská Bystrica or comprised the elements of support forces of the 2nd army command.

In the peace organisation of the army all units and troops were present in reduced numbers or the partially or even completely decreased. For example the planned peace figures for infantry deployed in west and East Slovakia did not exceed 3 000 people. With respect to priority armament modernisation of the units, which were subordinated to the Command of the 1st military circle – it means first lined 1st war army (located mainly in Bohemia and rest of Moravia), the Slovak units had weapons and military equipment of different types of older production (for the most part even of trophy origin from World War II) at their disposal.

The situation partly changed in the spring 1954, when one fighter air division and one battle air regiment transferred from Bohemia to Slovakia. The division belonged to a new system of troops of state air defence with the Command in Prague and it was equipped with modern Soviet aeroplanes Mig-15. The protection of the Slovak air space was provided within the framework of allied protection of Central European air space before West boundaries of USSR. The tasks were fulfilled in collaboration with fighter air forces of Poland, Hungary and Soviet air forces deployed in the territory of these states, in Austria and Ukraine.

In the conditions of intensive preparation for the war conflict with the West, the building of a strong army and modernization of its armament, Slovakia quickly took a turn for a strategically important base of defence industry. In 1951 – 1953 the defence industry experienced really intensive development. The Slovak munitions factories participate above all in the production of tanks, artillery technique, and the parts of small guns, ammunition and explosives. The concrete numbers documents the increase in armament industry in Slovakia at that time: having index 100% in 1950, it reached the index of 453% in 1953, while total amount of investment to the armament enterprises was 3 and half milliards of the Czechoslovak crowns then (valued at crowns after the monetary reform in 1953).

The constitution of the Warsaw pact led to a gradual specification of a place and mission of the Czechoslovakian army in coalition relations and strategic plans of the Soviet general staff. The associated establishment of a new organisational structure and operational arrangement of troops considered also the principles of combat activities conducting in conditions of weapons of mass destruction usage, withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Austria and strengthening of the Hungarian army role within south strategic direction. At the same time it reflected imperfections expressed in the time of popular uprising in Hungary and so-called Suez crisis, especially from the point of view of command operativeness. The building of the army had to take into account more also economic and demographic possibilities of the

Czechoslovakia that was manifested, among others, in decreasing of planned peace numbers to 185 thousand people.

The Soviet general staff demanded the organisational core of the land forces of the Czechoslovakian army to have at least two operational associations (armies), supplemented with the second line association and strong reserves after mobilisation deployment of troops. The peace framework of the second line – it means 3rd war army in 1956 consisted of the units of 2nd military circle concentrated in Moravia and shooting division from West Slovakia. Its command should be formed on the basis of the command of the shooting corps in Brno. Another shooting division at East Slovakia was subordinated directly to the command of 2nd military circle, which was in charge of providing mobilisation deployment of reserve troops, respectively to control and rule personal and material supplement of the fighting troops. Six shooting and mechanised divisions and in the case of the reserve army three of them were reckoned with for the organisational structure of the war armies. Therefore West Slovakian and East Slovakian association as well should deploy two divisions more within mobilisation deployment of these armies.

The basic structure of the main types of armies in Slovakia in that time included two shooting divisions, one fighter air division, two battle air regiments, transport air regiment, one parachute brigade, three artillery brigades, two anti-aircraft artillery brigades and other units, for which approximately 8 000 people were planned in their peace organisation. From the point of view of numbers of main types of combat equipment there were 265 combat airplanes, 116 tanks and self-propelled guns (cannons) and about 400 gun barrels of land and 150 barrels of anti-aircraft artillery.

At the turn of fifties and sixties the opinion, that the future war would be of rocket (missile)-nuclear character and it would start in the form of surprising attack of NATO armies without previous redeployment of armies, started to prevail. The decisive importance of the initial stage of the war, as well as of the preparation of troops deployed in supposed geographical areas of combat activities, was derived from it. The stress was put on active and dynamic defence, transition to the counter-attack and direct fight conduct or carrying out of so-called overruns strike. Increased requirements for firepower, mobility and manoeuvre capabilities of armies were related to it. Also geo-strategic areas of building and operational activity of Warsaw pact armies were re-evaluated. From the point of view of Czechoslovakia especially Czech-Moravian space was considered, which was evaluated as difficult to defend, but as one creating favourable conditions for conducting larger war operations of land and air character. In the Slovak geo-strategic area more extensive combat activity was practically excluded.

The phase of reorganisation and redeployment of the Czechoslovakian army, the aim of which was to adjust its peace and military constitution to new circumstances commenced already in 1958 and continued till the half of sixties According to the specified military plans 1st military circle was abolished and two peace operational associations – 1st and 4th army originated in the territory of Bohemia and southern Moravia and western and central military circle since 1965. At the same time the intention -- to have peace framework of 3rd military army in Moravia and western Slovakia prepared -- was abandoned. The main task of the Command of 2nd military circle (East military circle since 1965), operating within Slovakia and northern Moravia, constituted the mobilization and training duties for the benefit of armies in western and south western part of state and support of deployed reserve forces.

The reorganization changed noticeably the number and structure of the armed forces in Slovakia. In 1958 – 1966 only one from the total number of eight mechanised divisions of the Czechoslovakian army was deployed here. It had only undetailed character and minimally planned number of people and military equipment. In 1964 they represented only 13% of number of people and technique of the first lined mechanised divisions in the West Bohemia. In 1966 the division was reorganized into the tank one with the planned number of 1600 people. The similar situation existed also in other land forces units, the number of combat air units decreased too. On the other hand the number of military schools in Slovakia increased substantially. In the half of sixties ten from eighteen schools of the Czechoslovakian army were situated here. Back then the number of 4 000 people was calculated within the peace tables of all military units and establishments in the Slovak territory.

In connection with the armament modernisation of the Czechoslovakian army and others Warsaw pact armies the deepening of Slovakia's importance as a production base of defence industry continued at the same time. In the half sixties the defence industry become a decisive branch of national gross production in Slovakia and its volume comprised more than 70% of the all Slovak engineering production.

Outlined military statistics of Slovakia changed partially at the end of sixties, in connection with the presence of occupation forces of the Soviet army and deployment of the Czechoslovakian army changes. However, the perception of Slovakia as a rear area and logistic base of the Czechoslovakian army and as the army of the first operational line of Warsaw pact endured until the end of eighties.

ROMANIA'S POLICY OF AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SINO-SOVIETIC CONFLICT: 1960-1968

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At the end of the Second World War, Romania, against her will and as a consequence of the new world geo-political configuration, was included within the Soviet sphere of supremacy. Therefore, the policy of the Romanian communist regime complied with the international political realities having as the main directions the subordination to Moscow and obedience to the Kremlin decisions.

Starting with 1960, Romania, without questioning her allegiance to the socialist camp, has promoted - sometimes with a great deal of risk- a policy of detachment, even of autonomy, from the constraints imposed by Moscow to the satellite states.

The year 1960 had a double significance from internal and external points of view. At the internal level, some achievements had been done - the abolishment of the SOVROMS'[1], the retreat of the Soviet counselors, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. These achievements provided the basic conditions for the beginning of an internal process of detachment from USSR without changing the very nature of the regime itself. At the external level, the Sino- Soviet ideological and power rift deeply affected the communist world as

[1] SOVROMs were mixed Romanian-Soviet companies created in compliance with the Accord for Economic Collaboration between Soviet Union and Romania from May 8th 1945. Their main justification was to provide to Soviet Union the established war compensations.They were based on the principle of half-shares, each of the contracting parties having 50% percent of the shares. In fact, all these companies were entirely under the Soviets control becoming the expression of the Romania's economic exploitation. SOVROMs included almost all Romanian economical branches, including the financial and banking systems. The last SOVROM company- SOVROMCUART- was abolished in 1956.

well as the "monolithic unity" of the system placed under the strict hegemony of Moscow.

The deepening of the friction between the great communist powers provided to Romanian leaders a space of maneuver and allowed them to promote their own political actions based on the defending of the national values and interests.

Taking benefits from the rift between USSR and China, the Romanian leaders tried to mediate this conflict impartially. Doing so, Romania aimed at providing herself a certain protection, a kind of "umbrella", otherwise unrealistic, in case the "big brother" would have intended to punish such a kind of behavior.

Romania's "detachment" attitude from Moscow and her involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict were based on practical and opportunity reasons that were influenced mainly by the rethinking of the soviet leadership policy. Both the destalinization process, initiated by Khruschev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and the Hungarian uprising showed the Romanian communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, his vulnerability meaning that he could be removed by Moscow anytime, as well as the lack of any Soviet support guaranteeing his political survival. These political circumstances and the attempts for preserving his political power are relevant for understanding the new Dej's political thinking towards Kremlin. Therefore, Dej's political strategy was based on the re-assessment of the national values and the development of the national communism. In this regard, Dej followed a double goal: internal and external legitimacy. The first one, having as a pretext the defending of the national interests, aimed to provide him the increasing of the public support. The second one had to provide him a real credibility in order to enhance the relations with the West, especially important from economical point of view and a distinct position within the communist world as well. Following the "small steps policy", Dej paid attention not to challenge Moscow, being aware that an open hostile action against the Soviet Union

could be fatal. The experience gained after the Hungarian revolution of 1956 had been relevant in this regard.

As the Sino - Soviet conflict become acute, Romanian leadership was able to put into practice the new political course as it had been thought before. Without this dispute, without the breach opened inside the communist bloc, the Romanian action could not have been possible.

The "detachment" from Moscow was made simultaneously at economic, internal and external levels.

Within Council of Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon), Romania adopted a relentless stand: she refused to accept any Soviet pressure aimed at the economic integration of the socialist countries and at the setting up of some supra-national economic structures (the EEC had been, in a way, the starting point for building the Comecon) intending the economic subordination of the satellites.[2] Romania adopted the same stand as regarding the implementation of the principle "labor's international division inside of socialist camp" which would have provided to Romania, according to the Soviet plans, a role of supplying agricultural products and raw materials to the more developed socialist countries.[3] Therefore, the Bucharest regime initiated a high-level industrialization process simultaneously with the increasing of economic cooperation with the Western countries, Yugoslavia and China. The measures taken by Dej's régime provoked an open conflict with the Moscow within Comecon.

The same attitude was adopted by Romania regarding the Warsaw Pact as well. Despite of the pressures against her, any kind of political-military integration through setting up of supranational structures within the alliance

[2] The plan for setting up an economic planning supra-national structure has been delivered by Khruschev during the Meeting of Comecon' countries which took place in Moscow on August, 3-5, 1961.

[3] During the Plenum session of the reprezentatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties from socialist countries and of the Political Consultative Committee from the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, the principle of specialization was firmly rejected by the Romanian delegation : "we can not transform ourselves in a supplier of fodder materials for the other countries benefit." *Shorthand of the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party (CC of RWP), of February 8*, 1960, Central Historical National Archives, (C.H.N..A.) Fund CC of the RCP, Chancellery Section, File no. 9/ 1960, p. 18.

was rejected firmly by Romania.[4] A categorical proof of the Romanian communist régime's decision to carry on her own foreign policy within the Warsaw Treaty was its attitude, a courageous one, regarding the Cuban crisis (October, 1962).[5] Since that event, Romania tryed to take all necessary measures in order to avoid a possible involvment in the Soviet risky policy which could have endagered the Romanian state's security interests.

The Soviet pressures for economic and political-military integration have been strengthen due to the worsening of the conflict with communist China: the control over the satellites had to be emphasized in order to avoid a possible rift inside of the political-military bloc under the Soviet domination. Dej proved diplomatic ability in dealing with these two phenomena: the "detachment" from Moscow (including the rejections of the Soviet lines) and the involvement, preserving her neutrality, in the Sino- Soviet dispute have been accomplished simultaneously.

The perception of the motivations that determined Romania to assume the role of mediator has to be correct. The Romanian leaders were far from having the necessary power to play a significant role in settling the Sino-Soviet divergences. Yet, as these divergences got worse, they created the necessary context and the rationale for expressing some ideas and directions of actions, impossible to be accepted by Moscow's leaders in different circumstances.[6]

The visit of the Romanian delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, in China in March 2-11, 1964, apart from the official reasons (to persuade both

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[4] Dej did not accept the setting up of a new standing structure of the deputy foreign ministers within Warsaw Treaty as well as the establishing of the General Staff of the United Armed Forces. *Memoranda of Discussions at the Meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries held at the residence of the Central Committee of the Polish United Working Party*, Bucharest, January 20, 1965, C.H.N.A., Fund CC al RCP, Foreign Relations Section, File no. 15/ 1965, p.124-127.

[5] According with some recent testimonies, on October 4, 1964, it took place a meeting between Corneliu Manescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dean Rusk, American State Secretay. During these talks, Romanian minister informed about Romania's decision to preserve a neutrality status in case of a possible war between United States and Soviet Union. By such a kind of behavior , Romania essentially repudiated its allegiance obligations regarding the Warsow Pact Raymond L. Garthoff, *When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact,* Cold War International Historical Project Bulletin, Bulletin 5 Spring 1995.

[6] Alexandru Osca, *Soviet-Chinese Polemic, Just a Pretext for Romania* in *On Both Sides of the Iron Curtain*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, pp.98- 105.

parts to cease the public polemic and to solve the disagreements by "brotherly" discussions), offered the Romanian leaders the opportunity of showing their own dissatisfactions and frustrations generated by the Soviet attempts to take over the entire control of the satellites. The Romanian leaders were, yet, aware of the fact that they were unable to solve this political crisis or to influence the further evolution of the relations between the two great communist powers. It still has to be proved by documents to what extent Romania aimed at acquiring the support of the Chinese leaders in order to renounce to the Soviet hegemony or to build up a Balkan bloc under Chinese guarantee.

Due to these efforts of solving this conflict, the Romania's stand has been perceived as being unique, neutral and impartial, worried of its possible consequences over the future of the socialist camp. In this way is justified the position of the Romanian delegation within the Warsaw Pact related to disarmament[7] and to Mongolia's membership application[8]. The argument of the Romanians were that, in both issues, adopting a positive solution could be perceived by China as a direct attack against her, thus increasing the division of the communist world.[9]

The Bucharest strategy had in view a double orientation: to play a role of mediator even of negotiator between these two rivals of the communist world and to maintain a position of neutrality avoiding to adopt either a firm pro-Chinese position or a pro-Soviet one.

Being aware of the Soviet reactions and of the fact that a real support from China is less credible, Romania had to find an alternative, respectively the improving of the political and economic relations with the Western countries, whose support was essential for achieving the established goals. In order to

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[7] *Shorthand of the Meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, held at the residence of the Central Committee of the Polish United Working Party*, Bucharest, January 20, 1965, C.H.N.A., Fund CC al RCP, Foreign Relations Section, File no. 15/ 1965, p. 113-119

[8] *Shorthand of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC of RWP of April 3, 1963*, Bucharest, C.H.N.A., Fund CC of RCP, Chancellery Section, File 39/ 1963, p. 123-126

succeed in achieving its plan, the Romanian communist régime had to create for itself the image of a credible independent and sovereign state.

The highest expression of the policy of "independence" adopted by Romania was the "Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning Problems of the Communist World and Working Class Movement" issued on April 22, 1964. The development of the Sino-Soviet polemic and the necessity to restore the communist world's unity have given the background for the discussions. Taking into account the possible Soviet reaction, the issued principles emphasized the need to cease the dispute. In the same time, these principles pointed out the Romanian leaders' concerns regarding a possible military intervention that could have stopped the political course of Bucharest. Being aware of this reality, the Romanian communist leaders sustained that the relations between states should be based on the observance of the independence and national sovereignty, equality of rights, mutual advantage, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, territorial integrity and socialist internationalism.[10] To prepare, choose or change the forms and methods of the socialist organism was an attribute of every Marxist-Leninist party, a sovereign right of every socialist state. The idea that there is not "a farther party" and a "son party" anymore, that no party could have a special place and impose its own views to other parties, was courageously affirmed by Romania.[11] Adopting a neutral position on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the statement of the Romanian Labors' Party asserted that there is no unique strategy regarding the ways of passing from capitalism to socialism, a certain way being "determined in every country by its concrete historical conditions". [12] Underlining this principle, the Romanian leaders

[9] In the last day of the plenum session from January 19-20, 1965 held in Varsaw, Soviet leaders decided to meet togheter, without Romania, in order to discuss a possible strategy which had to be adopted against China. This event proved the Romania's relentless stand regarding the Chinese problem.
[10] *Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning Problems of the Communist World and Working Class Movement issued on April 22, 1964* by the Plenum session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party (April 15-22, 1964), C.H.N.A., Fund CC of RCP, Chancellery Section, File 23/ 1964, p. 12, 19-20, 28.
[11] *Ibidem*, f. 29
[12] *Ibidem*, f. 25

aimed at justifying their own political orientation and at formulating their own arguments for the position adopted related to many of the Soviet proposal, both within Comecon and within the Warsaw Treaty, without being subject to possible consequences.

The new Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceausescu (elected on March, 1965) continued to apply and put into practice the main principles as they were issued in the "April Declaration". This declaration remained, throughout the period of Ceausescu's rule, the fundamental premise upon which Romanian autonomy within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon relayed on. During 1965, Romania required a radical change of the Warsaw Treaty's command structures, underlying the fact the pact "wasn't an organization of equals but a fief of the Soviet Union" being used as an instrument entirely controlled by the Soviets. Also, Romania claimed for an increase of the role of the other member states within the Treaty, as well as each state's right to keep its own military forces outside of the alliance.[13] Regarding the Soviet intentions of reorganizing the Treaty and setting up new integrated structures, the new Romanian leader continued his predecessor's policy.[14] Playing the role of mediator of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Romania adopted, again, at the Meeting of the Consultative Political Committee, held on July 4-6, 1966 in Bucharest, a pro-Chinese position, contrary to the Soviet one, related to Vietnamese war.[15]

The policy of national autonomy and sovereignty has been emphasized through some spectaculars gestures (the refusal to cut off the diplomatic relations with Israel during and after the six-day war, the recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany, the enhancing of the relations with the Western

[13] *Note on the talks between Nicolae Ceausecsu, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and I.I. Iakubovski, the Supreme Commander of the United Armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries*, Romanian Military Archives, Fund V 2, Vol.3 , File no. 13/ 37, p. 64-70

[14] During the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin (February 10-12, 1966), Romania's delegation asserted that the Soviet proposals were not in compliance with the principles upon the relations between the socialists countries relayed on. Due to this, Romania rejected the Soviet proposals in this regard. *Shorthand of the Presidium Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Bucharest, February 16*, 1966, C.H.N.A., Fund CC of RCP, Chancellery Section, File 17/ 1966, f.13

[15] *Shorthand of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party of July, 12, 1966*, C.H.N.A., Fund CC of RCP, Chancellery Section, File 95/ 1966, p.23-24

world), having as the highest point the firm denunciation of the military intervention of the Warsaw Treaty's forces against Czechoslovakia. Ceausescu opposed to any interference in what was called "Prague spring", and Romania did not take part in the invasion of the Warsaw Pact's troops in Czechoslovakia.

Conclusions

The analysis of the policy promoted by Romania between 1960-1968 is closely connected to the internal and international realities. It was favored, on one hand, by the changing of the Moscow's strategy towards West on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" principle, and, on the other hand, by the increasing breach within the communist world due to the breaking out of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership understood very well the real limits of Romania's policy of autonomy and the fact that her defiance would not turn into an open rift from the Soviet block menacing the unity and integrity of the camp under Moscow's control. As a result, Moscow watched indulgently Bucharest's endeavors of autonomy, without taking into account the solution of military intervention. This reality does not reduce the significance of the actions undertaken by Romanian communist leaders, of defiance and insubordination, both at economic and political-military levels.

The involvement as mediator in the Sino-Soviet conflict gave to Romania the opportunity to promote, in order to defend the unity of the communist world, a policy of autonomy within the socialist block, as well as the image of a régime concerned about the defending of its national values and security interests.

Playing the role of mediator, Romania was able to draw up her own points of view on many problems of the communist world during this period.

As a conclusion, one must say that Romanian leaders did not really want that this dispute to be settled. It is hard to say that without it the Romanian

leaders would have been tempted to adopt a position contrary to the one dictated by Moscow, both at international level and within the communist bloc. The role of mediator was only an instrument of dealing tactfully with Moscow's susceptibilities regarding the opposition actions promoted by the Romanian leaders. Without agreeing with the Maoist political vision, Romanian leaders supported, in various circumstances, the Chinese positions against Moscow's ones in order to justify, on one hand, its autonomous policy and, on the other hand, its credibility as impartial mediator of this conflict.