

**BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING
IN THE ROMANIAN DECISIONS CONCERNING
THE INITIATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT**

Director Editor for *Strategic Issues Review*:

Professor Mihail IONESCU, PhD.

BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING IN THE ROMANIAN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE INITIATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT

By

Andrei MIROIU

Translated from Romanian by Alexandru MACOVEI

© National School of Political Studies and Public Administration,
NATO Studies Center, Bucharest, 2003.

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naționale a României

MIROIU, ANDREI

**Balancing versus bandwagoning in the romanian decisions concerning the
initiation of military conflict** / Andrei Miroiu. - București : Politeia - SNSPA, 2003.

Bibliogr.

ISBN 973-86287-7-6

94(498)

POLITEIA-SNSPA Publishing House
Bucharest, 6-8 Povernei str., Romania
Tel./Fax: 40-1-314 90 11

Andrei MIROIU

**Balancing versus Bandwagoning
in the Romanian Decisions Concerning
the Initiation of Military Conflict**

NATO STUDIES CENTER

2004

Andrei MIROIU

Andrei Miroiu holds a BA in Political Science from the Faculty of Political Science, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest. He is currently an ABD in Political Science of the Department of International Relations and European Integration of the NSPSPA. His research interests are in the fields of the history of international relations and strategic and security studies.

Table of content

INTRODUCTION /7

Balancing versus bandwagoning in the political theory of international relations /9

The balancing decisions /15

The bandwagoning decisions /19

August 1916: The framework of the problem /24

The nature of the conflict and the balance of power /24

The state of the international system in August 1916 /25

The pattern of the decision /26

a) The actors /26

b) The actors' objectives /28

c) the capabilities /30

Conclusions: the type of the decision /32

NOTES /33

BIBLIOGRAPHY /40

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Often, the historical interpretations summed up in academic papers or in schoolbooks differ significantly. An exclusivistic focus on the use of first-hand documents and the lack of a broad and coherent pattern of analysis alters the understanding as well as the explanation of the historical phenomena. The Romanian decision in 1916 of entering the world conflict on the side of the Entante constitutes such a case. The western theorists argue, rashly in my opinion, the fact that this decision was a bandwagoning one to the stronger side of the moment (taking into account the situation at that particular time of the war). Such misunderstandings, based both on a lack of information, as well as on serious theoretical interpretative deficiencies, distort not only the level of information of those interested in the study of international relations, but also their theoretical capabilities and their comprehension. If “history is the study of singular events and political science represents the effort of their generalization”¹, it will be necessary for us to bring together theory and historical event in order to understand the phenomenon and to present a valid pattern of interpretation at least for a series of similar events – the Romanian decisions concerning the initiation of military conflict would be one (for instance). The following will be an attempt to analyze this type of decisions from the international relations’ theoretical perspective on the relation between balancing and bandwagoning, between a willing endeavour to alter a state of equilibrium or disequilibrium of power and one to form an alliance with the presumptive winner of a power struggle. My essay seems to me significant, the more so as an authentic trend is developing itself in the international scientific environment, especially the theoretically extremely influential American one, by which the Romanian deci-

sion would have been a bandwagoning one, which is a mistake in my opinion. Methodologically, the present essay will be supported both by an analysis of the relations between balancing and bandwagoning, as well as by an investigation of Romanian sources (political and military documents, memoirs, interpretative works) in order to study the way in which the Romanian decisions concerning the initiation of military conflict are to be found on the balancing, or on the bandwagoning grid. One of the most intimate goals of this research will approach the way in and the moment at which the minor powers are capable of balancing, relying on motives that do not concern only their survival, but also the satisfaction of their interests in the international status-quo at the decision time. Special attention will be also granted to the type of the conflict in which that decision occurs, and to the state of the international subsystem in which the minor power at hand (Romania) is situated at that particular moment – a hegemony or a balance of power situation.

Balancing versus bandwagoning in the political theory of international relations

The problem of the way in which minor powers understand to relate themselves to the initiation of military conflict did not occupy a significant section of the studies in international politics. The minor powers have been seen either as following a major power in its ambition to alter the state of affairs in their own benefit, the minor powers' action contributing to their own survival as well as to a possible participation at the partition of the spoils of war, or as fighting for their own survival. This behaviour was determined firstly by their capacity to follow and defend only limited interests². For a minor power the wager on the use of military force in its relations with other states can only mean its disappearance as an international player, or the dramatical alteration of its own power-status, since usually, the loss of a major battle means, for a lesser power also the loss of the war³. The war decisions of all states are directly linked to their perception of the phenomena present on the international scene of events. An estimate based on false information, on misconceptions, on the ignorance of the other international players' intentions may have, for a less important player, the decisive consequences that such a miscalculation would provoke in a conflict between two nuclear superpowers: total annihilation⁴.

In one of the classical works on the study of conflicts initiated by minor powers against more powerful adversaries, T. V. Paul identifies four conditions in which a weaker state regards the initiation of the conflict as beneficial: a) when there is a serious conflict of interests between the parties involved, b) when the smaller power attaches more meaning to the problem at hand than the larger power, c) when the minor power is not sat-

ified with the status-quo, and finally, d) the situation in which a weaker party is afraid of a deterioration, or of a perpetuation of the status-quo in the future⁵. The political actor's calculus will be influenced by some specific variables such as, political and military strategies in existence, the possession of offensive weapons systems, the defensive support of a great power and the international structure of the political power. If the decision makers believe in the "fait accompli" strategy, based on a limited goals' strategy that could stop the growth of a conflict, the probability of asymmetric war initiation by a minor power increases. A "limited goals" strategy is to be wished for in the case of a minor power because it could avoid a massive military mobilization with all its inherent costs, as well as a large scale response from the adversary⁶.

But the conditions in which a minor power accepts or refuses the initiation of military conflict do not actually take into account only its own reasons and its own interests. The structural constraints of the system, the way in which the forces are allocated at a certain moment in the international system, have a great influence in the positioning towards the conflict. If we admit that security and the maximization of power are the main motives of the state's actions, the minor powers must grant special attention to the grounds linked to the international system in their decision regarding the conflict⁷. Especially determining is the relative power position that a minor power holds, as compared to the positions held by one or more of the major powers. If the weaker state is under the rule of a hegemonic power, by which we understand that the majority of its international relations are intermediated by another power, its revisionism or its status-quo stance is directly determined by the interests and intentions of the hegemonic system⁸. By the contrary, if its own subsystem of relations is one dominated by a balance of power between the major players, the action spectrum of the minor powers is left to be determined only by the strength of the motives for which the great powers would defend the balance, or act for its change. In the following I will discuss a few matters in connection to the balancing and bandwagoning theory, in order to recreate the complete picture of the debate on the initiation of military conflict in relation to minor powers.

The debate on the relations between balancing and bandwagoning steps in the international relations at the time of the introduction of the second term – bandwagoning – in the theoretical debate by K. N. Waltz, in his fundamental treatise *Theory of international politics*⁹. In Waltz's view, who centers his entire theoretical approach on an extended defense of the old theoretical framework of the balance of power, in an anarchical system each state is interested in its own survival more than in anything else. The main purpose of every state is thus, the insurance of its own safety, the maximization of power being just a means to an end. The rise of a to powerful state inclined either towards a subsystem hegemony¹⁰, or towards an universal empire, is a direct threat to the other states. Thus, the states will have a natural tendency, induced by the anarchical structure of the system, to ally against the respective hegemonic power, to equilibrate the balance of power preserving their former statute through a balancing alliance. Bandwagoning is interpreted by Waltz as the opposite of the balancing attempt. Using an analogy with the American intra-party elections in the caucus system, bandwagoning means siding with the strongest force of the moment in order not to be excluded from the distribution of the benefits of a victory in the power struggle. The weaker states, the minor powers, as far as they are forced to choose, will however side with the weaker party in a conflict, because the stronger state is the one that is threatening their existence¹¹. In the vision of the father of structural neo-realism, the natural tendency is balancing, bandwagoning being rather an unnatural behaviour, which gives account of the measure in which the state that embraces such a policy is integrated in a hierarchical system of international relations. The strength of the balance as a way of explaining the international behaviour also comes from the fact that it poses the problem at the level of the international system, while bandwagoning is rather a form of “foreign policy“, in other words, a behavior that is comprehensible only through the second image of the international relations' study, a reductionist perspective in Waltz's opinion.

The main modification of Waltz's perspective comes from Stephen M. Walt. In his view, the analysis of the states' behaviour must also start from the security premise as the purpose of the main international actors' exis-

tence. What shapes their behaviour isn't any longer the consideration of maintaining in one form or another the balance of power, but the close analysis of their own positions defined through a framework of the "balance of threats". In this way, there could be situations in which a balancing attempt could be fairly dangerous, because of the direct threats of a potent adversary, so that the security maximization strategy would rather call for a bandwagoning policy. Although Waltz's case studies, especially those on the Middle East and South Eastern Asia, prove the predominance of balancing as a political strategy, his works justify bandwagoning as a viable politics induced by the system almost as naturally as balancing¹².

A broader analysis of the relation between balancing and bandwagoning is provided by Randall L. Schweller¹³. If Waltz and Walt had approached the problem only through the defensive strategies of security preservation, Schweller views the relation through the prism of the states' general strategies in the international system. What dominates the states' decisions is the result of a calculus based on a "balance of interests" confronted with an international issue. The fashion in which this balance tilts predicts the behaviour of a certain state. In view of its main interests one state can be a status-quo or a revisionist power. Its strategy can either be a balancing, or a bandwagoning one, depending on the way in which the respective strategy moulds itself on the equilibrium of the state's balance of interests. Revisionist states can have unlimited goals linked to the reestablishment of the world balance of power in their benefit, or limited ones measuring up to their small power. A revisionist minor power is more inclined towards a bandwagoning attempt with an unlimited revisionist in order to get the left-overs from the winners' table, while a status-quo minor power is rather free to choose which of the two strategies is more profitable¹⁴.

In the following, I will try to discuss, based on the abovementioned theoretical aspects, the Romanian decisions related to the initiation of military conflict. The central issue that I wish to analyze is connected to a tendency of the Western theorists to consider the Romanian resolution to war in 1916 a bandwagoning one. Both Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller subscribe to such a point of view¹⁵. Summing up, the two

authors argue that Romania, a revisionist power interested in the acquisition of new territories on behalf of the dualist monarchy, was submitted to immense diplomatic pressure from the Entente's powers in order to join the war. Convinced by the apparent success of the Brusilov offensive in Galicia, by the presence of Sarrail's army in Tesalonic, by the chain of events on the French front, that the fate of the war is favourable to the Entente, Romania understood to bandwagon to the latter in order to satisfy its revisionist ambitions. I will attempt to show that such a point of view is unsustainable; the August 1916 decision was a part of the balancing policy initiated by Romania at the beginning of its participation at the First World War. I will also try, in the process, to give a realistic account of the Romanian decisions regarding the initiation, the acceptance or the refusal of military conflict in order to empower empirically the discussions on balancing and bandwagoning. I do not set myself on the way of minutely analyzing each and every decision related to the starting of the conflict, but on that of focusing those decisions that arose the most significant controversies from the balancing and bandwagoning theoretical perspective. I will neither analyze in detail those decisions in which Romania was under German hegemony, because they are fairly well covered from a political science perspective in a fundamental work of Larry L. Watts¹⁶.

A few methodological specifications are necessary at this point. I considered Romania as being a full rights international player only after the recognition of its state independence in the years 1878-1879, as a consequence the decision regarding the War of Independence will not be taken into account. I also regarded decisions that have not been followed by military conflict to be of the same type (July 1914, June and August 1940), because the phenomenon upon which the Romanian political elites had to convene was of the same nature: initiation or acceptance of military conflict for the defense, or offensive affirmation of national interests¹⁷. The dates of the international crisis are in the old style up to the 1920's¹⁸. I chose to consider the date of the main case study as being the 4th of August 1916, because after the ratification of the treatise with the Entente's powers the war initiation decision is practically taken. I

consider the summer period of the year 1940 to be another one of balance of power from the Romanian perspective because the political, economic and military dependency connections through which the Romanian international relations are to be submitted to a hegemonic power are not yet in act (Germany becomes a hegemonic power only after the Hitler-Antonescu agreement of November 1940¹⁹).

Thus, the question at hand could be schematized as follows:

Date	Crisis	Crisis initiator	State of the subsystem	Result of decision	Type of decision
June 27 1913	Second Balkans War	Bulgaria	Balance of power	Conflict initiation	Balancing
July 21 1914	First World War	Austro-Hungary	Balance of power	Conflict refusal	Balancing
August 4 1916	The intervention in the First World War	Romania	Balance of power	Conflict initiation	Balancing
July 20 1919	The attack of the Hungarian Council's Republic	Hungary	Balance of power	Conflict acceptance	Balancing
June 27-28 1940	U.S.S.R.'s ultimatum	U.S.S.R.	Balance of power	Conflict refusal	Bandwagoning
August 30 1940	Hungarian claims in Transilvania	Hungary	Balance of power	Conflict refusal	Bandwagoning
June 22 1941	The German-Soviet war	Germany	Hegemony	Conflict initiation	Bandwagoning
August 23 1944	The Romanian-German-Hungarian war	Romania	Hegemony	Conflict initiation	Bandwagoning

We will promptly note from this table that Romania, as a minor power, constitutes a very good study subject through its multitude of conflict related decision types taken in the most diverse international situations. Romania initiates and accepts the conflict about four times and also four

is the number of its refusal. The conflict decisions are rather of a balancing nature, but the bandwagoning ones are not missing at all from the scene. Finally, the conflict initiations are made under the sign of the balance of power system as well as under that of a hegemonic one. The one behaviour that cannot be found amidst the actions analyzed is that of balancing under a hegemonic regime, and for its analysis in the case of the minor powers there would be necessary some other case studies. In the following I will have a brief look upon those balancing or bandwagoning decisions that do not constitute the main object of this study.

The balancing decisions

Some preliminary observations on the balancing decisions are required. We will note that they are specific to a balance of power regime, none of them appearing in a hegemonic system. One specification is crucial at this point: all the decisions regarding the initiation of a military conflict discussed here are taken under the conditions of a preexisting military conflict. In all of the eight cases under analysis, the Romanian decision makers act under the pressures of undergoing conflicts, either in the framework of their own international relations' subsystem, or in the world state system. We do not know how a conflict initiation decision would look like in a hegemonic peace condition that would be similar to a balancing action. The possible decision of an armed opposition to a Soviet aggression in August 1968 could have been such a decision, but it has been a deterrence tactics rather than a decision regarding military conflict²⁰. Often, in the case of Romania, a balancing decision is followed by the initiation or acceptance of the military conflict, a singular decision of this type is not followed by war. This is a natural conjecture according to the realist theory, for which the balancing behaviour is often a reaction to the alteration of the balance (or to an imminent alteration of the balance) in the case of lack of military reaction²¹.

The decision to intervene in the second Balkans war is considered to be the typical balancing action: the disappearance of a great power in the Balkans (Turkey) is followed by a power struggle in which Romania, the

most significant state before 1912, was left aside, and thus, disadvantaged. Moreover, after the surprise Bulgarian attack on Serbia and Greece at the beginning of June 1913, the Romanian decision makers felt that the equilibrium of power South to the river Danube could rapidly be deteriorated by the rise of a significant power that would assume the role of dominant power of the region²². We need to underline the following fact: the Balkan conflict, as a minor powers' war, had a easier spectrum of decision than those in which warmongers would have been major powers. In the absence of any clear great power politics in the region, the Balkan leaders (and implicitly the Romanian ones) have been able to act a lot easier in relation to the perception of their national interests²³. By attacking Bulgaria, the Romanian decision makers hoped, if not a return to the status-quo (seen as a power relation) before 1912, than at least an enforcement of a power equilibrium in which the Balkans would not be dominated by a single power. Romania sees itself beginning with the end of the XIXth century, as a status-quo power in the Balkans, opposed to any territorial revisionism and implicitly to any power-shifts²⁴. The Romanian decision makers were formed, as a matter of fact at an international politics school of thought that recognized the principle of the balance of power both as the natural objective of a foreign policy, and as the warrant of international security. Romania as a state formed on the basis of agreements directly connected with the balance of power²⁵, could but follow its precepts in order to survive on the grand scene of sovereign entities. The Romanian prime minister, the "Junimea" descendant conservative – Titu Maiorescu, in perfect agreement with the other parties involved in the external affairs decision-making (king Charles I, the minister of the interior and the chief of the party in coalition with the conservatives – Take Ionescu, and last but not least, the leader of the opposition – I.I.C. Bratianu), adopted rationally, in an estimate based on the balance of the Romanian interests, the decision to balance the power to the South of the Danube by a military intervention²⁶.

Things are a little more complicated in regard to the Crown Council of July 21st 1914. The decision is taken under the pressure of time and of the events that were succeeding extremely fast in the last few days (the

Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia followed by the mobilization and the declarations of war between the great powers of the Western, Central and Eastern Europe). It is a well known fact that the conflict decision taken under the pressure of the time factor tend to be somewhat alienated from the intentions and strategies of the other international players²⁷. The World War had started by surprise and none of the great powers had defined for themselves neither a general conflict strategy, nor the objectives that had to be fulfilled. The general war of the great powers had started rather as a degeneration of an armed conflict between a major and a minor power (Austria-Hungary against Serbia) and as the honoring of previous external affairs agreements (that of Germany towards the Hapsburgs, of Russia towards Serbia, and of France towards Russia). If the Entente's forces have built up the conflict bringing it to the level of a major war, Germany continued the action, provoking by its attack on Belgium the intervention of Great Britain and the reach of a systemic war level²⁸. The Romanian decision makers have acted somewhat hastily in choosing a particular course of political action. No aggression was threatening in a direct manner Romania and no immediate national interest was yet affected. Moreover, the alliance agreements with the Central Powers did not include the compulsoriness to act on their side unless a third party would have initiated an action against Austria-Hungary²⁹. The decision could have been postponed, but the general opinion that the problem at hand needed an immediate solution prevailed. The elements that contributed to a rapid decision were both the relentlessly warlike attitude of the Germanophile minority within the Council (king Charles I and the ex conservative prime minister P.P. Carp) and the Italian neutrality decision. The weighing of national momentary interests have compelled the neutralist side to an immediate decision of noninvolvement and of guarding a distance until the objectives and the capacities of the great powers would be clearer³⁰. Romania opts for a policy that allows itself to pose as the holder of the balance, ready to take part at the conflict, either on the weaker side, in order to keep her independence in the case of an external threat, or on the strong one, to book herself a place for the spoils of war. Somebody might suggest that this was actually a buck-passing decision. I

think that this is not actually the case, as Romania could not actually get someone else to fight in its place. Although a revisionist state North of the Carpathian Mountains and East of the river Prut, Romania adopts a neutrality policy that suits her all the better, as no political or military preparations would have guaranteed, at the time of the Crown Council, a military success. Moreover, no agreements whatsoever with any great power involved in the world conflict did not assure the recognition on the latter's behalf of any of the Romanian territorial demands³¹.

The intervention against the republic under the rule of Bela Kun started in the spring of 1919 as a purely defensive act. The Romanian armed forces in Transilvania had responded to the April attack of the Bolshevik troops, occupying at the political decision makers' order, the rest of the territory that had been established in the August 1916 conventions to be taken from Austria-Hungary and incorporated to Romania, as well as an extended defensive perimeter on the river Tisa. The July 1919 decision of armed intervention in order to abolish the Soviet Republic of Hungary had a few obvious balancing elements. Firstly, irrespective of the nature of its regime, Hungary had to be reduced to the role of a minor power imposed by the power redistribution that followed the First World War. Even at that time the outlines of the Romanian external affairs policy in the interwar period could be clearly seen: the opposition to any vengeful tendency of the powers defeated in 1918³². In other words, after the fulfillment of its territorial objectives, Romania had become a status-quo state in all directions. The second argument for me sustaining that the decision to defeat communist Hungary was a balancing one is related to the political regime in power in Budapest. The spread of the Bolshevik revolution throughout Europe, a possible land connection between Hungary and Soviet Russia were perceived as serious security threats on the states resulted, or nationally united by the destruction of the German, Hapsburgic and Russian Empire. A successful proletarian revolution in the center of Europe would have meant the destruction of the power equilibrium newly formed after November 1918. A third argument is related to the nature of the Romanian action and the defeat of the Bolshevik regime. Obeying the strongest precepts advocated by the supporters of the balance of power, the Romanian

leaders reinstated the Hungarian state as an international player³³ with full rights, not imposing on it but those compliances that were required for the realization of the Romanian national unity.

The bandwagoning decisions

The framework in which minor powers make bandwagoning decisions can be much more easily argued in the theoretical literature. As a matter of fact, the majority of the international relations theorists that have been interested in those issues predict, significantly detaching themselves from the realist or non-realist logic, the prevalence of bandwagoning behavior over the balancing one in the minor powers' external affairs policy. The minor powers are by definition, in Robert Rothstein's acception, states that acknowledge that they can not obtain their security by their own means and have to rely heavily in order to get it, on the aid of other states, institutions, and international processes³⁴. Their ability to extract resources belonging to other states (more powerful protectors) changes in relation with the international system's conditions, among the very often encountered results being their obvious capacity, for as long as they live under the hegemony of a major power, to place the most significant part of their expenditures on the account of the major power that they depend on³⁵. If the test that a major player passes to enter in the elites circle, or to keep itself there, is the winning of a military conflict with another major power, for a minor power this test is constituted by the capacity to resist or not to the demands and desires of the other states³⁶. In the case in which a politics based on the balance of power isn't any longer able to ensure this resistance capacity in front of those states interested in the reshaping of the existing order of the international system, a minor power could choose to submit its external affairs to other states, thus entering a subordination relation towards a subsystemic hegemonic power³⁷. As part of the same type of relations, as we have mentioned above, the most probable type of reaction in the case of a military conflict is that of bandwagoning to the hegemonic power's position.

We will note that out of the four cases in which we have considered that Romania has undertaken bandwagoning actions, two represent this kind of behaviours under a balance of power regime. But this is a completely different regime in the way it distributes the power resources between the actors of the international system. The previously analyzed decisions took place in an environment in which the polarization of the system was extreme, while in the summer of the year 1940 we are dealing with a bipolar situation³⁸. In this structure, the two main competitors for Eastern Europe's resources still had a formal agreement on the retracing of the borderlines, a revisionist one, for which they were ready to use every available military resource. Romania, who had been left without any important allies since 1939³⁹, had to be satisfied theoretically, immediately after the total military collapse of France in May-June 1940, only with the British guarantees. The status-quo policy led by Romania for the entire period between 1919 and 1939, was collapsing without any Occidental endorsers of world order. Without a major power interested and capable in maintaining the balance of power on the Eastern part of the continent, Romania had to reorient itself, as have other status-quo states in Eastern and Southern Europe, either towards an extremely risky policy of confrontation with the revisionist powers (as would Yugoslavia and Greece see after a year, and as Poland had already seen), or towards a bandwagoning to the politics of the major powers in the region (Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia)⁴⁰. The Romanian foreign policy had been based, throughout the period that preceded World War II, on a set of alliances and institutions that had proven their lack of adaptability. The League of Nations stopped being a relevant organism after the inefficiency of its actions in the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia, the Little Entente had proven its meaninglessness facing the major powers' decisions at Munich, the mutual assistance agreement with France was futile after the astonishing German victory and the allies from the Balkans Entente counseled in a very serious manner a submission to the USSR's demands. Once more we can argue the fact that an alliance with minor partners has meaning only in the context of an existing, strong, but strongly polarized balance of power. If the system changes, the number of great

powers decreasing, possibly because of a general war of the major powers, the only chance of the minor powers is the hasty approach to a major power, the integration in a hegemonic subsystem with its direct consequences – external affairs restraints that will favor mostly bandwagoning actions⁴¹. Those are the exact coordinates of evolution for the Romanian decision system in June and August 1940. Bandwagoning actions were inevitable not only because of the external affairs incapacity to offer a broad mobility framework through the alliance with major powers. Decades of disastrous arming policies and the lack of military skills within the ranks for an “all horizons” war without any allies were reflected in the discourses of the Chief of the General Staff, General Florea Tenescu, in the Crown Council sessions of June the 27th 1940, regarding the incapacity of the Romanian army to face a possible conflict⁴². As a matter of fact, the political leaders knew, through first hand military works, the huge distance that separated them, from the military capacities perspective, but also, generally, from the war potential perspective, of the major European powers⁴³.

In August 1940, a yielding policy, a bandwagoning to the major players’ will policy was led to its conclusion. The situation was worse than that of June, because, to the same diplomatic isolation is now added the lack of a territorial and recruitment base (Basarabia and Northern Bucovina) and the loser’s psychology, a lot similar to the sensation experienced by a large part of the French people before May 1940. A demoralized elite, missing more and more of its national representative attributions, is taking decisions motivated rather by the will to survive in the Romanian political, social and economic system. A politics of acceptance of the conflict would have turned the Ardeal in a “Triangle of Death”^{*} not only for the Romanian army, but also for the political elite. The only viable political decision was that of bandwagoning the Romanian position to the demands of the fascist forces from Central Europe⁴⁴.

* The “Triangle of Death” was a strategy suggested during the last stages of Romanian resistance against Austro-German armies in World War I by which the Romanian would make a brave, but suicidal last stand in Moldova rather than accepting defeat.

The last Romanian decisions regarding the initiation of military conflict have been taken under a hegemonic regime. Beginning with November-December 1940, the Romanian economic and military policies are carried through a German decision network, while the only diplomatic section that will not depend on joining the Axis will be the underground one. The political power is concentrated in the hands of a military dictator who becomes the only one responsible for the Romanian political actions. The decision of June the 22nd 1941 to join Germany in the war against the Soviet Union rests entirely on the shoulders of general Antonescu, who was content with dealing, in the first meeting of the Council of Ministers after the beginning of the war, led by him through the intermediary Mihai Antonescu, only with internal affairs issues, his own collaborators not deserving explanations for the “high level politics” of the future marshal⁴⁵. But bandwagoning has been more than a “one man show”. Siding with the strongest force has been, on one hand, the consequence of a powerful hegemonic system, on the other, the wish to participate at the winner’s feast by taking over the territories occupied by the Soviets a year earlier. National interest demanded in the June 1941 moment a bandwagoning to the anti-Soviet war policy, in order to reintegrate part of the national territory and to get the German favor for some possible corrections to the Vienna Dictate⁴⁶. The subsequent policy of marshal Antonescu, of sending the bulk of the Romanian armed forces in territories that had no connection to the Romanian interests, proved itself to be both useless and wasteful⁴⁷, but the bandwagoning decision of June 1941 was taken, both according to the demands of the international sub-system of relations and with the Romanian national interests.

The decision to join the Soviet Union of the 23rd of August 1944 is, in many respects, a controversial one. It would be very hard to argue that it hasn’t been a bandwagoning action. The Romanian decision makers, united in the group that starts and leads the insurrection, admit that after the Soviet offensive on the Iasi-Chisinau line any hopes of a negotiated truce are gone, that a policy of war continuation would probably mean the end of the Romanian state and that only joining the anti-German war could ensure, through the goodwill of the great powers, the regaining of the ter-

ritories lost through the Vienna Dictate⁴⁸. Countless contemporary testimonies and many ulterior studies concur in defining the objectives of the coup as being related to the insurance of national survival and the possible gain through battle of the territories lost to Hortnyst Hungary in September 1940⁴⁹.

In this way, the Romanian bandwagoning decisions that also presume the initiation of a military conflict and that are taken under a hegemony of power regime, are determined both by the state's desire to survive and by the will to alter a certain territorial status-quo. In the following I will try to explore the most controversial Romanian war initiation decision, that of August 1916.

August 1916: The framework of the problem

The nature of the conflict and the balance of power

The First World War was undoubtedly a gigantic power struggle resulted from the wishes of some revisionist powers (Willhelme Germany and Austria-Hungary which was dominated by the pro-war views of the Imperial general staff) to fundamentally alter the balance of power in their benefit through a territorial redistribution in the Southern and Eastern Europe, on the banks of the river Rhine and in Belgium, and through a new colonial regime for Africa and Asia⁵⁰. The war also meant the total destruction of the international system based on the power struggle of a few European powers, signaling the transition to a system in which the main powers are situated outside Europe⁵¹. The great powers have tried during the war to reposition the powers left outside the conflict-major or minor ones – on one of the sides. This was an intentional attempt coming from both sides of the struggle to decide the fate of the war by a repositioning of the force ratio between one or the other of the system's players⁵².

The balance of power, either as a theoretical construction that influences the decisions of the main political actors, or as a perennial, immutable feature of an international anarchical system⁵³, has certain characteristics that sometimes the neo-realist logic passes over in silence. The balancing action does not constitute at all only the intervention in favor of a weaker party of a conflict with the purpose to reestablish the status-quo in existence at the beginning of the conflict. It can as well mean an action with the object of overthrowing a momentary existing balance in a conflict, through the inclination of one of its scales to one of the sides, either at the moment in which that side is weaker, or because the inter-

ventionist power believes that the general power relations can only be maintained through its action on behalf of a certain side. A balancing action can simply mean to position oneself on the side of one of the parties in conflict with the firm conviction either that the respective decision will equilibrate the two parties, or that strength brought in will decide the fate of the conflict. Balancing is not just a preserving action, but also an active politics of influencing the way in which, concretely, the power relations are standing at a certain time⁵⁴. Finally, I will try to analyze the Romanian decision through the aforementioned conceptual framework.

The state of the international system in August 1916

It is very hard to say that in August 1916 one of the sides in the world conflict had obviously the upper hand. Although numerically, and somewhat from the economic and military capacities perspective, the Central Powers seemed dominated even without the USA in the Entente⁵⁵, on the war front this aspect was far from being clear. On the Galician front, far from decisively defeating Austria, general Brusilov's offensive had stopped about the end of July, because of the huge losses in human power and also because of the Hapsburg entrenchment being reinforced with German reserve troops. Besides a slight adjustment of the front, the Russian attacks of June and July 1916 had no other influence but the strategic subordination of the Austrian armies to the decisions coming from Berlin⁵⁶. The battle on the river Somme did not seem to bring more than a few tactical successes (200 square km gained at the price of several hundred thousand casualties) the army in Salonika was wasting time. Moreover, when this army started to act, after Romania had joined the war, it didn't succeed more than a few tactical victories⁵⁷. After the battle of the coast of Jutland, the naval blockade of Germany continued, though the British decision makers knew that only a decisive continental involvement could change the course of the war, which could not have been concluded at sea⁵⁸. The Central Powers were, in their turn, forced to restrain themselves to defensive operations on all fronts, after their offensives at Verdun and on the Italian front had been repelled. Much more serious

problems between the main allies were made by the inexistence of a coordinated war effort through unique command centers, the more so for Germany and Austria-Hungary since their resources were far more limited than those of the Entente⁵⁹. It seems extremely hard to claim under those conditions that one of the sides in the conflict was a clear winner. This is also proven by the fact that the Russian Imperial General Staff was aware at the end of July 1916 that resuming the offensive would be extremely difficult and that an eventual Romanian participation at the war (that, in fact, the Russian diplomacy was eagerly supporting) would do nothing but to lengthen the line of operations and to bring forth a new adversary (Bulgaria). Thus, the strategic situation would have become yet more complicated, and the Russian army did not have the human and logistical resources to assume the defense of the Romanian front in the case of a failure of the Transilvanian offensive⁶⁰. As it follows, one of the main points in sustaining that the Romanian action of August 1916 was a bandwagoning one does not seem to be well founded.

The pattern of the decision

a) The actors

The importance of knowing the structure of the decision group is fundamental in any pattern of a decision. In the international relations this fact need to be strongly stressed since usually, the decision makers of a military conflict are few, even in the conditions of an existing democratic mechanism of limited control over the foreign policy and security issues. Thus, we will not only find out who makes the decision, but we will also be able to analyze the motives that made the respective conflict policy to be adopted⁶¹. The Romanian pre-war governing system was observing the rules of the democratic game, in what concerned its foreign policy, only on the surface. We know very well today that the most important Romanian foreign affairs alliance agreement of the period between the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and the beginning of the Balkans conflict, the alliance treatise with the Central Powers from 1883 had not been known but by a handful of politicians (not even by all the prime-ministers or the

ministers of foreign affairs). The delicate issues of foreign policy (the problem of the Danube Committee, the military alliances, the Balkans conflicts, the peace negotiations with the great powers) have been talked-over only internally between the king and the leaders of the main political parties, liberal and conservative (after 1908, also with Take Ionescu's Democratic-Conservative party)⁶². Of course, the negotiations were known to a small circle of the foreign powers' representatives in Bucharest. It's a well known fact that the ministers of the Central Powers, Czernin and von Bussche, were often taken by the conservative leaders Al. Marghiloman and Titu Maiorescu as counselors, and that France's ambassador, Saint-Aulaire, was entertaining personal relations with the liberal leaders⁶³. The decision to engage in a military conflict was supposed to be even more centralized in the case of August 1916, although the negotiations with the allied powers were held at different levels, including that of the Romanian ambassadors abroad and of the governmental staff in the country, and have lasted for more than a year⁶⁴. Their efforts to engage the Romanian military forces in the conflict on one side or the other were meeting the thoughts of the leaders in Bucharest, who, at the beginning of the summer of 1916 arrived at the conclusion that an option for one of the sides in the conflict was imminent and inevitable⁶⁵. Undoubtedly, the decision was finally taken on the 4th/17th of August 1916, the date of the signing of the secret alliance treaty and of the military convention between Romania (represented by its prime minister, I.I.C. Bratianu) and the Entente's powers (represented by their accredited ambassadors in Bucharest). The Crown Council's session of the 14th/27th of August, unlike that of 1914, constituted only a report made to the leaders of the parliamentary opposition. The decision circle was extremely limited: the Romanian prime-minister, the second in command (but in fact the real leader) of the Romanian Chief of General Staff, General Dumitru Iliescu, king Ferdinand and in a far lesser measure Vintila Bratianu, Constantin Diamandy (Romanian ambassador in Petersburg) and I.G. Duca (Minister for public instruction in the Bratianu government)⁶⁶. The negotiations were held directly especially by the Romanian prime minister and the Russian representative Poklevsky and by general Iliescu and

general Alexeev, the Russian chief of staff. And the responsibility for the decision rests entirely on the shoulders of the signer of the two documents of August 4/17, Ion I.C. Bratianu. The exclusion of the main neutralist or philo-German leaders from the decision regarding the conflict, though not respecting the democratic course of decision, gave rationality and coherence to the measures related to the negotiations and, last but not least, to the war decision itself⁶⁷. It would be extremely interesting to observe in the case of the neutralists and of the philo-Germans (except P.P. Carp) that they sustained in the Crown Council a bandwagoning policy: neutrality up to the point where one of the sides seemed obviously defeated and then, intervention in the conflict on the side of a presumptive winner⁶⁸.

b) The actors' objectives

It is obvious, from my point of view, that Romania could be considered, from the perspective of Randall Schweler's typology a revisionist state North and West of the Carpathian line and a state fundamentally interested in its status-quo to the South of the Danube. The results of the Balkans war meant for Romania, the acquiring of a mediator statute in the Southern Danube region, at which it wasn't interested in renouncing, as well as it wasn't interested in any change of the territorial equilibrium resulted from the peace at Bucharest, alteration possible either through the return of Turkey in Europe, or through an enlargement of the Bulgarian territory. Handling with kid gloves the Bulgarian sensitiveness was one of the major priorities of the government in Bucharest, not at all wanting to carry a two front war. Even under those conditions, the only direct presence of the Russian troops on Romanian territory was that required for the defense of the Southern frontier, where it was hoped that the old Slavic affinities would counteract the Bulgarian revisionism, already inflamed for well over three years now, by an active Austro-Hungarian foreign policy⁶⁹. If to the South of the Danube the Romanian decision makers would limit themselves to demand the preserving of the power and territorial equilibrium in existence, for Central Europe the Romanian politics would be a revisionist one. Long past the time when the relation with the Central Powers was so tight that the Romanian revisionism in Basarabia was

comprised in military planning formulas like “the march to Kiev” in a presumptive war with Russia. The transition to a foreign policy directed towards the West, towards the accomplishment of the national unity through the incorporation in the Romanian state of the preponderantly Romanian inhabited provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the hole of Bukovina, Transylvania and Banat, was neither short, nor very easy. It had implied the revival of the amiable relations with Russia, which had been seen for more than three decades after the annexation of the Bugeac (1878) as the main adversary; it had meant the renunciation at a security matrix that had offered to Romania many years of peace and safety under the protective military umbrella of the alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It had also meant the activation of the ideological fight through the activity of the “League for the cultural unity of all Romanians”, and through the initiation of military and political contacts with the Western powers. Last but not least, it meant the temporary renunciation to the claims on Bessarabia, generously and repeatedly offered by the Central Powers during the negotiations held during the neutrality years⁷⁰. Moreover, the Romanian political decision makers knew the obvious fears of the German and Austrian decision makers concerning a Romanian intervention in the war. Both the General Staff of the Central Powers and the German and Austro-Hungarian political elites, perceived the possible entry of Romanian forces in the conflict as a disaster on the Eastern front, with clear implications on all other theaters of operations and – possibly – on the outcome of the entire war⁷¹. The Romanian revisionist objectives thus become clear in the realist theoretical pattern: maintaining of the security status towards the Balkans and power maximization through the acquisition of new territories beyond the Carpathian line. We will note that the forming of the objectives is indicating the priority that the power maximization policy has over the security maintenance one. The risk of a war with Bulgaria was a taken one, but the risk of not participating at the partition of the Austro-Hungarian territory in the case of its defeat, was not an acceptable one⁷². In the balance of interests, the revisionist ones had proven themselves to be overwhelming⁷³.

c) the capabilities

The fundamental obstacles between the actor and the accomplishment of its objectives are the capabilities by which he has to put his decision into operation. In August 1916 the Romanian decision to join the war was made on the basis of an analysis of the international situation, on the correspondence between the latter and Romania's revisionist and status-quo objectives and on the way in which those objectives could be attained through its existing military and political capabilities. According to the Romanian military planning, a military intervention North of the Carpathians would make a considerable difference on the Eastern front. The application of the "Z Hypothesis" of the war against the Central Powers and Bulgaria presumed reaching the line Hateg-Fagaras-Miercurea Ciuc on the 17th day of the mobilization, the reach of the Mures line on the 25th day, the overflowing to the West of the Occidental Carpathians in the Oradea-Debretin zone on the 39th day, thus breaching into the Hungarian Plain and turning over the right flank of the Austrian and German armies in Galicia. All those were in perfect agreement with the maintaining of the Danube and South Dobrogea front by a secondary group of Romanian forces reunited in the 3rd Army and supported by three Russian divisions⁷⁴. The forces which Romania understood to dedicate to the two scenes of operations were considered to be perfectly suited to make a major difference on the left flank of the allied Russian-Romanian front. At the mobilization and in the next few days, Romania could count on four field armies, 6 army corps made out of 23 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry ones, one border guard brigade, 5 mountain brigades, 2 heavy artillery brigades. This meant a concentration of 365 infantry battalions, 104 cavalry squadrons and 374 artillery batteries mounting up to 833 601 men. More than three quarters of the effectives were dedicated to the strategic offensive in Transilvania⁷⁵. This forces had passed through an accelerated process of restructuring in the years that followed the Balkans wars and in the neutrality ones. Military subventions had risen spectacularly and the budget of the War Office had got from 74 428 036 lei in 1912, to 115 000 000 lei in 1916⁷⁶. However, there was only a small number of modern weapons, each infantry regiment having just a squad of

three machine-guns (the mountain corps having 2 machine-guns). The problem of weapons and ammunition supply by the allies was crucial, since, at the beginning of the war the ammunitions amounted only to 720 cartridges per rifle and 48 000 cartridges per machine-gun, only enough for a few days of combat⁷⁷. Taking into account the fact that the enemy forces in Ardeal comprised solely the 1st Austrian Army, with only 3 infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades and 1 cavalry division, and also the presumed impossibility of the German allies to rapidly deploy forces to support the Hapsburgs' army because of the powerful French offensive on the river Somme, the plan seemed to be accomplishable⁷⁸. In the general strategic context, the allies were pledged to support the Romanian offensive with an offensive of the Salonic army, to supply ammunitions and war material weighing at least 300 tons a day, to ensure logistical and technological support⁷⁹. In spite of the dissatisfaction related to the frequent changes in the position and in the orders coming from the General Staff, the Romanian military commanders were not unconfident in the success of a military action in Transylvania⁸⁰. This was also due to the fact that the terrain on which the operation was to be held on made them as confident in the success of the offensive, as were two years before, their counterparts of the armies already in the conflict⁸¹. The result of the thinking process of the Romanian decision makers, based on the above mentioned considerations could only have been a single one: the firm conviction that a Romanian military intervention in the war against the Central Powers would be a successful one.

Conclusions: the type of the decision

Romania had in view, in August 1916, the realization of specific objectives: the maximization of its own power by the union with the Romanian inhabited territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The international context in existence at the moment of the decision did not allow the clear denomination of a winner to which Romania could rally in order to accomplish its revisionist goals. The diplomatic and military discussions with Entente's powers, and also the thoughtful consideration both of the international strategic situation, and of its own military capacity and of the support promised by the Quadruple Agreement, have led the Romanian decision makers to a certain perspective of the situation. Their policy in August 1916 was a step taken to change the military force ratio on the Eastern front, a deliberate attempt to add its own weight to the scale of the balance in which rested Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. This endeavor to recalibrate the balance does not constitute a balancing action in the classical sense of the word, that is, an alliance to the weaker side against an offender of the power relations in existence. It rather represents the classical attitude of the holder of the balance who tries to tilt to one of the sides and thus, to insure the latter's victory. Romania was, in August 1916, a revisionist state for which the balance of momentary interests tilted towards a decisive action on behalf of the old status-quo powers. And its decision was a balancing one, not a rallying to a victor that wasn't yet standing out.

NOTES

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. – “Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention “, in *Journal of Interdisciplinary Histor* (1988), no. 18, p. 581.

2. Martin Wight – *Politica de putere* (Chişinău, Ed. Arc P.H., 1988), p. 73.

3. David Vital – *The Inequality of States. A Study of Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 60.

4. For the study of the problems induced by misperceptions at the strategic nuclear-war level, see Robert Jervis – “War and Misperception” in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 675–700.

5. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 15–16. Paul calls asymmetric conflicts, somewhat against the mainstream in international relations, those conflicts that oppose two states with differentiated economic or military power resources (the power discrepancy rate is higher than 50%).

6. *Ibidem*, p. 20–27.

7. See Patrick James – “Structural Realism and the Causes of War “ in *Mershon International Studies Review* (1995), no. 39, p. 181–208. James identifies four structural elements the conflict evolution should consider: the number of great powers (system’s polarization), the capabilities of the system, the strength of the alliances and the degree of polarization of the conflict blocs, p. 183.

8. See, for this perspective, among others, Robert Bocock – *Hegemony* (London, Tavistock, 1986).

9. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 126. Waltz attributes the term to Stephen van Evera, though new research made by Randall L. Schweller have proven that it was used since 1942 in Quincy Wright’s work “A study of war”.

10. See for the analysis of subsystem hegemony the work of Robert Gilpin – *Război și schimbare în politica mondială* (Craiova, Ed. Scrisul Românesc, 2000).

11. Waltz, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

12. Stephen M. Walt – *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 17–33. A similar Romanian position regarding the preponderance of balancing over bandwagoning behaviour, could be found at Mihail E. Ionescu – *După hegemonie. Patru scenarii de securitate pentru Europa de Est în anii ‘90* (Bucureşti, Ed. Scripta, 1993), p. 28.

13. The articles I refer to are “Tripolarity and the second World War” in *International studies Quarterly* (1993), no. 37, p. 73–103, “Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist State back In” in *International security* (1994), no. 19, p. 72–107 and “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition” in *American Political Science Review* (1997), no. 91, p. 927–930.

14. Schweller does not exclude the possibility that minor powers could balance, in the measure in which the connection between the balance of interests and the degree of liberty permits them to. Author’s private correspondence with professor Schweller, March 5th, 2003.

15. Stephen M. Walt – “Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power” in *International Security* (1985), no. 9, p. 7–8, Randall L. Schweller – “Bandwagoning for Profit”, p. 95. The second author based his approach on an interpretation given by the historian Paul W. Schroeder in “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory” in *International Security* (1994), no. 19, p. 122. Schroeder only makes a vast enumeration, but does not discuss the Romanian case in particular.

16. *Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance Behaviour in Wartime* (Umea University, 1998).

17. It is interesting to observe the fact that the classical study regarding the conflict decision concerns a crisis that never went “hot”. See Graham T. Allison – *The essence of decision* (Boston, Little Brown, 1971).

18. The dates are taken from Ion Calafeteanu, Cristian Popisteanu (coord.) – *Politica externă a României: Dicționar cronologic* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986).

19. This is obvious in the document from November the 26th 1940 “Declarația generalului Ion Antonescu, conducătorul statului român în ședința Consiliului de Miniștri în legătură cu vizita sa la Berlin, cu aderarea României la Pactul Tripartit și cu politica României în cadrul Axei Berlin–Roma–Tokyo” in *Antonescu–Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940–1944)* (București, Ed. Cozia, 1991), vol. I, p. 53–62.

20. I have already discussed the general context of the Romanian attempts to elude the Soviet hegemony in the years 1960–70 and their inherent limitations in “Controverse privind rolul României în Pactul de la Varșovia. Perspective militare și diplomatice” in *Revistă de istorie militară* (2002), no. 19, p. 48–55.

21. See for this kind of perspectives applied to the European concert system Paul W. Schroeder – “The 19th Century International System. Changes in the Structure” in *World Politics* (1986), no. 39, p. 1–26, Richard B. Elrod – “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System” in *World Politics* (1976), no. 28, p. 159–174.

22. The politological literature of the time emphasized the balancing resorts of Romanian politics, see Stephen P. Duggan – “The Balkan Adjustment” in *Political Science Quarterly* (1913), no. 28, p. 627–645.

23. See for the uncertainty of the great powers in following firm politics for the Balkans during the Balkans Wars, Serban-Radulescu Zoner – “Bernhard von Bulow” in *Diplomați iluștri* (București, Ed. Politică, 1973), vol. III.

24. Costica Prodan – “Romania and the Balkan states at the brink between the 19th and the 20th century” in *Geopolitics and History at the crossroad between Millennia* (Bucharest, Military P.H., 1999).

25. T.W. Riker – “The Pact of Osborne: A Controversial Episode in the Making Of Rumania” in *The American Historical Review* (1929), no. 34, p. 237–249.

26. A classical portrait of the prime minister’s diplomatic activity during the Second Balkans War can be found in Eugen Lovinescu – *Titu Maiorescu* (București, Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă – Regele Carol II), vol. II (1876–1917), p. 347–363. For the balancing decision also see Mihai Macuc – “Caracterul intervenției României la Sud de Dunăre la sfârșitul celui de-al doilea război balcanic (1913)” in Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istoric Militară, *Anuar 1998* (București, Ed. Militara, 1998), p. 197–205.

27. T.V. Paul – *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, p. 20.

28. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. – “The Origins of World War I” in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 795–818.

29. This was the official pretext for not entering the war, see Gheorghe Nicolae Cazan, Serban Radulescu-Zoner – *România și Tripla Alianță* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979), p. 416–418.

30. Miron Constantinescu et. al. – *Istoria României. Compendiu* (București, Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1969), p. 410.

31. Go to Nicolae Ciachir, Gheorghe Bercan – *Diplomația europeană în epoca modernă* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984), p. 465–466.

32. Gheorghe Zaharia – “Considerații asupra politicii externe a României (1919–1929)” in Viorica Moisuc (coord.) – *Probleme de politică externă a României 1919–1939* (București, Ed. Militară, 1971), p. 22.

33 Typical balancing behaviour, see Morton A. Kaplan – “Balance of Power, Bipolarity and other Models of International Systems” in *The American Political Science Review* (1957), no. 51, p. 684–695.

34. *Alliances and Small Powers* (NY, Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.

35. Michael Handel – *Weak States in the International System*, (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 171. The classical paper on the smaller contribution of minor partners to the common security expenditures is Mancur Olson, Richard Zeckhauser – “An Economic Theory of Alliances” in *The Review Of Economics And Statistics* (1966), no. 48, p. 266–279.

36. Anette Baker Fox – *The Power of Small States. Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 3.

37. Raimo Vayrynen – “Small States in Different Theoretical Traditions of International Research” in Otmar Holl – *Small States in Europe and Dependence* (Vienna, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1983), p. 87–88.

38. See, for the issue of the system's bipolarization following the negotiations in Moscow and the first phase of the World War II, M. Maiski – *Cine l-a ajutat pe Hitler... Din amintirile unui ambasador sovietic* (București, Ed. Științifică, 1963), p. 182–188, Lord Strang – “The Moscow Negotiations 1939” in David Dilks (ed.) – *Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century* vol. I, 1906–1939 (London, Macmillan, 1981) p. 170–186, Leonida Loghin – *Mari conferințe internaționale (1939–1945)* (București, Ed. Politică, 1989), p. 101–119, Henri Michel – *La seconde guerre mondiale* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 2 vols.

39. Livia Dandara – *România în vâltoarea anului 1939* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985).

40. These bandwagoning tendencies were obvious since the last few years of the politics based on the League of Nations and on The Little Entente, see Genevieve Tabouis – *Douăzeci de ani de tensiune diplomatică* (București, Ed. Politică, 1965), p. 325.

41. Jack S. Levy – “Theories of General War” in *World Politics* (1985), no. 37, p. 344–374.

42. Teofil Oroian, Gheorghe Nicolescu (coord.) – *Șefii Statului Major General Român (1859–2000)* (București, Ed. Europa Nova, 2002), p. 211.

43. A good example is Ioan Vitzu – *Potențialul de războiu al marilor puteri* (București, 1940).

44. Constantin I. Kiritescu – *Romania in al doilea razboi mondial*, (Bucuresti: Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, 1995), vol. I, p. 143-152.

45. *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri. Guvernarea Ion Antonescu* vol. III, (aprilie-iunie 1940) (București, 1999), p. 601–617.

46. A vast literature is covering this issue. I will mention only the first edition of col. Magherescu's memoirs in Iosif Constantin Dragan (coord.) – *Antonescu. Mareșalul României și războaiele de reîntregire* (Fundăția Europeană Drăgan, 1991), vol. I.

47. See for this subject Mihai Vasile-Ozunu, Petre Otu – *Înfrânti și uitați. Români în bătălia de la Stalingrad* (București, Ed. Ion Cristoiu, 1999).

48. See for this, among others, *România în anii celui de-al doilea război mondial*, vol. II, *Revoluția de eliberare socială și națională, antifascistă și antiimperialistă din august 1944* (București, Ed. Militară, 1989), especially the chapter “Revoluția de eliberare socială și națională, antifascistă și antiimperialistă – act istoric de legitimă și deplină suveranitate națională”. A very good guide to the effectual development of the coup are also general Constantin Sanatescu's memoirs, *Jurnal* (București, Ed. Humanitas, 1993).

49. Among the memoirs and documents stand out those of the prime minister of the period, Constantin Visoianu – *Misiunile mele* (București, Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997), and of those concerning the military issues, *România în războiul antihitlerist. 23 august 1944–1949 mai 1945* (București, Ed. Militară, 1966) and Ion Cupșa –

Armata română pe frontul antihitlerist. Studiu operativ-tactic (București, Ed. Militară, 1973).

50. The theoretical literature covering those issues is extremely vast. Such a point of view is mainly to be found in Henri Hauser (ed.) – *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe 1871–1914*, tome 2 (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1929), Jacques Droz – *Les causes de la Première Guerre Mondiale. Essai d'historiographie* (Paris, du Seuil, 1988), Paul M. Kennedy – “The First World War and the International System” in *International Security* (1984), no. 9, p. 7–40, Dominique Lejeune – *Les causes de la Première Guerre Mondiale* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1992), Henry Kissinger – *Diplomația* (București, Ed. All, 1998).

51. Hajo Holborn – “The Collapse of the European Political System, 1914–1945” in *World Politics* (1949), no. 1, p. 443.

52. Charles S. Maier – “Wargames 1914–1919” in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 819–849.

53. For the constructivist perspective see Alexander Wendt – “Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” in *International Organization* (1992), no. 46, p. 391–425, for the realist one see Hans J. Morgenthau – *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (NY, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 198–217, Martin Wight – *Politica de Putere*, p. 176–193.

54. There is an immense number of works on this problem. I would remind here only the works of A.F. Pollard – “The Balance of Power” in *Journal of The British Institute of International Affairs* (1923), no. 2, p. 51–64, Alfred Vagts – “The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea” in *World Politics* (1948), no. 1, Ernst B. Haas – “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda” in *World Politics* (1953), no. 5, p. 442–477, Morton A. Kaplan – “Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems”, David Ziegler – *War, Peace and International Politics* (Boston, Little Brown, 1990).

55. Paul M. Kennedy – *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London, Fontana Press, 1990), p. 330–354.

56. John Schindler – “Steamrollered in Galicia: The Austro-Hungarian army and The Brusilov Offensive, 1916” in *War in History* (2003), no. 10, p. 27–59.

57. H. Corda – *La Guerre Mondiale (1914–1918). Les grandes opérations sur terre et sur mer* (Paris, Chapelon, 1922), p. 174–182 and p. 188–190.

58. Keith Wilson – “British Power in The European Balance” in David Dilks (ed.) – *Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, vol. I, 1906–1939 (London, Macmillan, 1981), p. 21–41.

59. On the defects of the Central Powers' Coalition, see R.L. di Nardo, Daniel J. Hughes – “Germany and Coalition Warfare in the World Wars: A Comparative Study” in *War in History* (2002), no. 8, p. 166–190.

60. V.P. Potemkin (ed.) – *Istoria diplomației*, vol. III (București, Ed. Cartea rusă, 1948), p. 334.

61. For this point of view see John Stoessinger – *Why Nations go to War* (NY, Bedford/St.Martin's, 2001), Antonio de Jesus Bispo – “The decision Making Process for Military Intervention From a Historical Perspective” in *The Total War The Total Defense, 1789–2000* (Stockholm, Swedish Commission on Military History, 2001), p. 363–371.

62. C. Gane – *P.P. Carp și rolul său în istoria politică a țării*, 2 vols. (București, Ed. Ziarul Universul, 1936–1937), Anastasie Iordache – *Reorientarea politică a României și neutralitatea armată: 1914–1916* (București, Ed. Paideia, 1998), Keith Hitchins – *România 1866–1947* (București, Humanitas, 1998).

63. Of special interest for the study of the period are count Saint-Aulaire's – *Confesiunile unui bătrân diplomat* (București, Humanitas, 2002).

64. Eliza Campus – *Din politica externă a României 1913–1947* (București, Ed. Politică, 1980), p. 96–123.

65. Glenn E. Torrey – “Rumania and the Belligerents 1914–1916” in *Journal of Contemporary History* (1966), no. 1, p. 171–191.

66. See I.G. Duca – *Memorii*, vol. II, *Neutralitatea 1915–1916* (Timișoara, Ed. Helicon, 1993), p. 131–146. Of course, because of the usual indiscretion, some of the pro-Entente leaders of the opposition had found out about the decision but had nothing to comment, see Constantin Argetoianu – *Pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. II, section IV, 1913–1916 (București, Humanitas, 1991), p. 261–264.

67. Although it could be asserted that also the decision to remain neutral would have been an equally coherent, and probably wiser, one in August 1916, see Titu Maiorescu – *România și războiul mondial* (București, Ed. Machiavelli, 1999), p. 150–153.

68. Alexandru Marghiloman – *Note politice*, vol. II (București, Ed. Machiavelli, 1994), p. 11–13. The same author asserts that Bratianu presented the decision as an attempt to rally to the winning Entente camp. Such a position could be sustained by the reading of several memoirs of the participants at the Crown Council, see Ion Mamina – *Consilii de Coroană* (București, Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997), p. 53–87.

69. See for the issue of the Bulgaria diplomacy in the preceding years of the conflict Ernst Christian Helmreich – *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913* (London, Harvard University Press, 1938).

70. There is a huge literature covering Romania's “war objectives” in August 1916. Some works of synthesis are Constantin Kiritescu – *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României 1916–1919*, vol. I (București, Arta Grafică, 1922), p. 71–106, Victor Atanasiu, Atanasie Iordache, Mircea Iosa, Ion M. Oprea, Paul Oprea – *România în Primul Război Mondial* (București, Ed. Militară, 1979), especially chap. I, “România în anii neutralității”, Charles and Barbara Jelavich – *Formarea statelor naționale balcanice* (Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Dacia, 1999), p. 337–340.

71. This state of mind also persisted during the first days of the war with Romania, see Glenn E. Torrey – “The Rumanian Campaign of 1916: Its Impact on the Belligerents” in *Slavic Review* (1980), no. 39, p. 27–43.

72. I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, p. 138–140.

73. In Schweller’s typology Romania is a “Jackal” state, a moderated revisionist who bandwagons to the Entente, at least in theory a status-quo alliance, “Bandwagoning for profit”, p. 100.

74. “Proiectul de operațiune în vederea unui război contra Puterilor Centrale și a Bulgariei. România aliată cu Quadrupla Înțelegere. Aplicarea Ipotezei Z”, document belonging to the 3rd Section of Operations of the Romanian General Staff, in *Istoria Statului Major General Român. Documente 1859–1947* (București, Ed. Militară, 1994), p. 147–157.

75. *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. V (București, Ed. Militară, 1988), p. 371–379.

76. Victor Atanasiu – *România în anii 1914–1916. Atitudinea și rolul militar* (București, Ed. Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1997), p. 89.

77. Gheorghe Romanescu, Gheorghe Tudor, Mihai Cucu, Ioan Popescu – *Istoria infanteriei române* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985), vol. II, p. 62.

78. Victor Atanasiu et. al. – *România în primul război mondial*, p. 153.

79. “Convenția militară încheiată între România și puterile Antantei, 4 august 1916” in *Primul război mondial 1914–1918. Texte și documente* (București, Universitatea București, 1981), p. 341–342.

80. Marshal Alexandru Averescu – *Notițe zilnice din război*, vol. I, 1914–1916 *Neutralitatea* (București, Ed. Militară, 1992).

81. On the relation between the offensive thinking of the military commanders at the beginning of First World War and its connection to the conflict initiation, see Stephen Van Evera view in “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War” in *International Security* (1984), no. 9, p. 58–107.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Graham T. Allison – *The Essence of Decision* (Boston, Little Brown, 1971).
- Constantin Argetoianu – *Pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. II, partea a IV-a, 1913–1916 (București, Humanitas, 1991).
- Victor Atanasiu, Anastasie Iordache, Mircea Iosa, Ion M. Oprea, Paul Oprescu – *România în primul război mondial* (București, Ed. Militară, 1979).
- Victor Atanasiu – *România în anii 1914–1916. Atitudinea și rolul militar* (București, Ed. Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1997).
- Mareșal Alexandru Averescu – *Notițe zilnice din război*, vol. 1, 1914–1916 (*NEUTRALITATEA*) (București, Ed. Militară, 1992).
- Anette Baker Fox – *The Power of Small States. Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1959).
- Robert Bocoock – *Hegemony* (London, Tavistock, 1986).
- Ion Calafeteanu, Cristian Popișteanu (coord.) – *Politica externă a României. Dicționar cronologic* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986).
- Eliza Campus – *Din politica externă a României 1913–1947* (București, Ed. Politică, 1980).
- Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner – *România și Tripla Alianță* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979).
- Nicolae Ciachir, Gheorghe Bercan – *Diplomația europeană în epoca modernă* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984).
- Miron Constantinescu *et. al.* – *Istoria României. Compendiu* (București, Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1969).
- H. Corda – *La Guerre Mondiale (1914–1918). Les grandes operations sur terre et sur mer* (Paris, Chapelot, 1922).

- Ion Cupșa – *Armata română pe frontul antihitlerist. Studiu operativ-tactic* (București, Ed. Militară, 1973).
- Livia Dandara – *România în vâltoarea anului 1939* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985).
- R.L. Di Nardo, Daniel J. Hughes – “Germany and Coalition Warfare în the World Wars: A Comparative Study” în *War in History* (2002), no. 8.
- Iosif Constantin Drăgan (coord.) – *Antonescu. Mareșalul României și războaiele de reîntregire* (Fundăția Europeană Drăgan, 1991), vol. I.
- Jacques Droz – *Les causes de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale. Essai d'historiographie* (Paris, du Seuil, 1988 (1973)).
- I.G. Duca – *Memorii*, vol. II, *Neutralitatea 1915–1916* (Timișoara, Ed. Helicon, 1993).
- Stephen P. Duggan – “The Balkan Adjustment” în *Political Science Quarterly* (1913), no. 28, p. 627–645.
- Richard B. Elrod – “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System” în *World Politics* (1976), no. 28, p. 159–174.
- C. Gane – *P.P. Carp și rolul său în istoria politică a țării*, 2 vol. (București, Ed. Ziarului “Universul”, 1936-1937).
- Robert Gilpin – *Război și schimbare în politica mondială* (Craiova, Scri-sul Românesc, 2000).
- Ernst B. Haas – “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda” în *World Politics* (1953) no. 5.
- Michael Handel – *Weak States in the International System* (London, Frank Cass, 1981).
- Henri Hauser (ed.) – *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe (1871–1914)*, tome 2 (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1929).
- Ernst Christian Helmreich – *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913* (London, Harvard University Press, 1938).
- Keith Hitchins – *România 1866–1947* (București, Humanitas, 1998).
- Hajo Holborn – “The Collapse of the European Political System, 1914–45” în *World Politics* (1949) no. 1.
- Mihail E. Ionescu – *După hegemonie. Patru scenarii de securitate pentru Europa de Est în anii '90* (București, Ed. Scripta, 1993).

- Anastasiu Iordache – *Reorientarea politică a României și neutralitatea armată: 1914–1916* (București, Ed. Paideia, 1998).
- Patrick James – “Structural Realism and the Causes of War” în *Mershon International Studies Review* (1995), no. 39, p. 181–208.
- Charles și Barbara Jelavich – *Formarea statelor naționale balcanice* (Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Dacia, 1999).
- Antonio de Jesus Bispo – “The Decision Making Process for Military Intervention From a Historical Perspective” în *The Total War The Total Defence, 1789–2000* (Stockholm, Swedish Commission on Military History, 2001).
- Robert Jervis – “War and Misperception” în *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 675–700.
- Morton A. Kaplan – “Balance of Power, Bipolarity and other Models of International Systems” în *The American Political Science Review* (1957), no. 51.
- Paul M. Kennedy – “The First World War and the International System” în *International Security* (1984), no. 9.
- Paul M. Kennedy – *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London, Fontana Press, 1990).
- Constantin Kirițescu – *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României 1916–1919*, vol. I (București, Arta Grafică, 1922).
- Constantin I. Kirițescu – *România în al doilea război mondial* (București, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, 1995), vol. I.
- Henry Kissinger – *Diplomația* (București, Ed. All, 1998).
- Dominique Lejeune – *Les causes de la Première Guerre mondiale* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1992).
- Jack S. Levy – “Theories of General War” în *World Politics* (1985), no. 37, p. 344–374.
- Leonida Loghin – *Mari conferințe internaționale (1939–1945)* (București, Ed. Politică, 1989).
- Eugen Lovinescu – *T. Maiorescu* (București, Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă – Regele Carol II), vol. II, (1876–1917).

- Mihai Macuc – “Caracterul intervenției României la sud de Dunăre la sfârșitul celui de-al doilea război balcanic (1913)” în Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militară, *Anuar 1998* (București, Ed. Militară, 1998).
- Charles S. Maier – “Wargames: 1914–1919” în *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 819–849.
- Titu Maiorescu – *România și războiul mondial* (București, Ed. Machiavelli, 1999).
- I.M. Maiski – *Cine l-a ajutat pe Hitler... Din amintirile unui ambasador sovietic* (București, Ed. Științifică, 1963).
- Ion Mamina – *Consilii de coroană* (București, Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997).
- Alexandru Marghiloman – *Note politice*, vol. II (București, Ed. Machiavelli, 1994).
- Henri Michel – *La seconde guerre mondiale* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 2 vol.
- Andrei Miroiu – “Controverse privind rolul României în Pactul de la Varșovia. Perspective militare și diplomatice” în *Revista de istorie militară* (2002), no. 19, p. 48–55.
- Hans J. Morgenthau – *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).
- Joseph S. Nye, Jr. – “Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention” în *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 581–590.
- Mancur Olson, Richard Zeckhauser – “An Economic Theory of Alliances” în *The Review of Economics and Statistics* (1966), no. 48, p. 266–279.
- Teofil Oroian, Gheorghe Nicolescu (coord.) – *Șefii Statului Major General român (1859–2000)* (București, Ed. Europa Nova, 2002).
- T.V. Paul – *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Costică Prodan – “Romania and the Balkan States at the Brink Between the 19th and the 20th Century” în *Geopolitics and History at the Crossroad Between Millenia* (Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1999).
- Șerban-Rădulescu Zoner – “Bernhard von Bulow” în *Diplomați iluștri* (București, Ed. Politică, 1973), vol. III.

- A.F. Pollard – “The Balance of Power” în *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* (1923), no. 2.
- V.P. Potemkin (ed.) – *Istoria diplomației*, vol. III (București, Ed. Cartea Rusă, 1948).
- T.W. Riker – “The Pact of Osborne: A Controversial Episode in the Making of Rumania” în *The American Historical Review* (1929), no. 34, p. 237–249.
- Gheorghe Romanescu, Gheorghe Tudor, Mihai Cucu, Iacon Popescu – *Istoria infanteriei române* (București, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985), vol. II.
- Robert L. Rothstein – *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968).
- Saint-Aulaire – *Confesiunile unui bătrân diplomat* (București, Ed. Humanitas, 2002).
- Constantin Sănătescu – *Jurnal* (București, Ed. Humanitas, 1993).
- John Schindler – “Steamrollered in Galicia: The Austro-Hungarian Army and the Brusilov Offensive, 1916” în *War in History* (2003), no. 10, p. 27–59.
- Paul W. Schroeder – “The 19th Century International System. Changes in the Structure” în *World Politics* (1986), no. 39, p. 1–26.
- Paul W. Schroeder – “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory” în *International Security* (1994), no. 19.
- Randall L. Schweller – “Tripolarity and the Second World War” în *International Studies Quarterly* (1993), no. 37, p. 73–103.
- Randall L. Schweller – “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In” în *International Security* (1994), no. 19, p. 72–107.
- Randall L. Schweller – “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition” în *American Political Science Review* (1997), no. 91, p. 927–930.
- John Stoessinger – *Why Nations Go To War*, (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001).

- Lord Strang – “The Moscow Negotiations, 1939” în David Dilks (ed.) *Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, vol. I, 1906-1939 (London, Macmillan, 1981).
- Genevieve Tabouis – *Douăzeci de ani de tensiune diplomatică* (București, Ed. Politică, 1965).
- Glenn E. Torrey – “Rumania and the Belligerents 1914-1916” în *Journal of Contemporary History* (1966), no. 1, p. 171–191.
- Glenn E. Torrey – “The Rumanian Campaign of 1916: Its Impact on the Belligerents” în *Slavic Review* (1980), no. 39, p. 27–43.
- Stephen Van Evera – “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War” în *International Security* (1984), no. 9, p. 58–107.
- Mihai Vasile-Ozunu, Petre Otu – *Înfrânți și uitați. Românii în bătălia de la Stalingrad* (București, Ed. Ion Cristoiu, 1999).
- Alfred Vagts – “The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea” în *World Politics* (1948), p. 1.
- Raimo Vayrynen – “Small States in Different Theoretical Traditions of International Relations Research” în Otmar Holl *Small States in Europe and Dependence*, (Viena: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1983).
- Constantin Vișoianu – *Misiunile mele* (București, Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997).
- David Vital – *The Inequality of States. A Study of Small Power in International Relations* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967).
- Ioan Vitzu – *Potențialul de războiu al marilor puteri* (București, 1940).
- Stephen M. Walt – “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” in *International Security* (1985), p. 9.
- Stephen M. Walt – *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987).
- Kenneth N. Waltz – *Theory of International Politics* (New York, McGraw Hill, 1979).
- Larry L. Watts – *Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance Behavior în Wartime* (Umea University, 1998).
- Alexander Wendt – “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization* (1992) p. 46.
- Martin Wight – *Politica de putere* (Chișinău, Ed. Arc, 1998).

- Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. – “The Origins of World War I” in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1988), no. 18, p. 795–818.
- Keith Wilson – “British Power in the European Balance” în David Dilks (ed.) *Retreat from Power. Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century*, vol. I, 1906-1939 (London, Macmillan, 1981).
- Gheorghe Zaharia – “Considerații asupra politicii externe a României (1919-1929)” în Viorica Moisuc (coord.) *Probleme de politică externă a României 1919-1939* (București, Ed. Militară, 1971).
- David Ziegler – *War, Peace and International Politics* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1990).
- * * * – *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940–1944)*, (București, Ed. Cozia, 1991).
- * * * – *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. V (București, Ed. Militară, 1988).
- * * * – *Istoria Statului Major General Român. Documente 1859–1947* (București, Ed. Militară, 1994).
- * * * – *Primul război mondial 1914-1918. Texte și documente* (București, Universitatea din București, 1981).
- * * * – *România în războiul antihitlerist. 23 august 1944 – 9 mai 1945* (București, Ed. Militară, 1966).
- * * * – *România în anii celui de-al doilea război mondial*, vol. II, *Revoluția de eliberare socială și națională, antifascistă și antiimperialistă din august 1944* (București, Ed. Militară, 1989).
- * * * – *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri. Guvernarea Ion Antonescu*, vol. III (aprilie-iunie 1940) (București, 1999).

In *Strategic Issues Review* was/also appeared:

Nr. 1 - June

Vladimir PASTI, Vasile SECARES - *MANAGING THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY - The Romanian Experience and its Relevance for a Democratic Transition in Iraq*, translated from the Romanian by Ileana COSACEANU, BURSA Newspaper.

Nr. 2 - July

Daniel BIRO - *TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: HOW USEFUL IS THE MARS-VENUS METAPHOR?*

Nr. 3 - August

Viorica Zorita POP - *HUMAN SECURITY IN TRANSITION SOCIETIES*

Nr. 4 - September

Nicu POPESCU - *EUROPEAN UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE TOWARDS MOLDOVA*