

**MEASURING DISSIDENT AND STATE BEHAVIOR:
THE INTRANATIONAL POLITICAL INTERACTIONS (IPI) PROJECT**

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) project was designed to measure political conflict and cooperation within societies through the coding of political event reports from news sources.¹

The events identified in these reports were coded on two ten point scales which reflect the severity of various cooperative and conflictual statements and actions. These scaled events data can be used to calculate the volume and intensity of political conflict and cooperation within the domestic polity.

The data were collected over the years 1979-1992 in 15 'middle power' countries.² In Africa we collected data on Nigeria, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. In Asia we collected data on India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Korea. In Europe we collected data on Belgium and Hungary. Finally, in Latin America we collected data on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We used as news sources Reuters North American Service for 1979-81 and Reuters World Service for 1982-92.³

¹ The IPI project can be found on the WWW at:

<http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~whmoore/ipi/ipi.html>

The codebook and other information are available there. The project was supported with grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9423762), the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (University of California, San Diego), the Center for Social and Behavioral Sciences (University of California, Riverside), the Academic Senate of the University of California, Riverside, and the University Research Committee at Emory University.

² We selected 'middle powers' because the co-PIs (Davis and Moore) are interested in studying the nexus between domestic and international conflict behavior outside of the major powers. The end of the cold war suggests to us that regional conflicts may be more salient than they were during the cold war, and that motivated our interest to look beyond the major powers. We focus on 'middle powers' rather than 'minor powers' because 'minor powers' are less likely to have the capabilities required to foment regional conflicts by 'gambling for resurrection' (Downs and Rocke 1994) or engaging in 'diversionary behavior' (Levy 1989). The research agenda grows out of Davis and Ward (1990) and Moore (1995), and our first analysis is reported in Moore and Davis (1998).

³ As a pilot study Zaire and Zimbabwe were coded for 1975-85 using *The New York Times Index* and *Africa Research Bulletin*. Zaire was also coded for 1986-92 using the same sources.

In addition to providing information regarding general levels of political conflict, the IPI coding scheme allows the examination of the dynamics of interaction among specific groups within the society. While scholars have focused a great deal of attention on the causes of political violence, internal war, and revolutions, their explanations have typically been based on attributes of the parties involved and attributes of the socio-economic-political environment in which these conflicts occur (Snyder 1976, Moore 1995). As a consequence, the literature has failed to address the impact of the behavior of groups and, more importantly, the interactions between groups. Like the Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (VICDP, Moore and Lindström 1996) that preceded it, IPI gives scholars the ability to track interactions among social groups and between the state and social groups.

II. EXISTING EVENTS DATA ON POLITICAL INTERACTIONS

Two data collection efforts begun in the 1960s [COPDAB (Azar, 1982) and WEIS (McClelland, 1972)] have given scholars of international relations a useful bank of information with which to examine issues of the conflictual and cooperative behavior of states in the international system. Referred to as "events data," these data record the behavior of nations interacting with one another. Burgess and Lawton define events data as "words and deed--i.e. verbal and physical actions and reactions--that international actors (such as statesmen, national elites, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental international organizations (NGOs)) direct toward their domestic or external environments" (1972, p. 6). The availability of this data has spawned a large literature examining peace and conflict in the international system.

Unfortunately, similar data have not been available for the study of conflict and cooperation within states. Like VICDP, the IPI project helps fill that void.⁴

The most commonly used dataset which attempts to measure the behavior of domestic actors is the "Daily Political Events Data" from *The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Taylor & Jodice, 1985). *The World Handbook* provides information on several classifications of conflict relevant events, including four types of demonstrations, six types of armed attacks, two types of strikes, seven types of leadership changes, five types of elections, nine types of state action with respect to civil liberties, and finally the number of riots and the number of deaths from domestic political violence. While this is an impressive collection of variables, it is only a typology. No scaling system for the events analogous to those used in the international events data is developed, and, more importantly, only a small number of types of events are coded, thus limiting the utility of the data for the study of political conflict in a society. *The World Handbook* scheme ignores, for example, statements, speeches, and petitions. We contend that these events are relevant to the study of internal interactions (e.g., the opposition makes demands against the state, the state denounces the opposition, etc.). *The World Handbook* also fails to track cooperative interactions between groups embroiled in conflict. If we are interested in modeling conflict processes and testing those models, we need data that account for the full spectrum of relevant events.

In addition to the type of event, the *Handbook* provides information on the actor, the target, and the issue that motivated the event. Taylor and Jodice clearly intended to make their

⁴ There have been a number of events data projects launched in the past several years, among them the PANDA project (<http://cfia-db2.fas.harvard.edu/>), Ron Francisco's data project, and Christian Davenport's Black Panther Party effort.

data useful for testing hypotheses regarding the behavior of actors and their interactions, but their choice of actor and target designations suggests that they were envisioning cross-national studies rather than time-series case studies. For example, there are eight "actor groups" variables: government, political party, political group, military, clergy, intellectuals, workers, students, minorities, revolutionaries, and general population. While these categories are useful for broad comparisons across many cases, they are less likely to be useful for the analysis of the interactions of dissidents and states in specific countries. The actions of all political parties in the society, for instance, are coded under the single political party variable, making it impossible to distinguish among the actions of different parties that may have different goals and means of pursuing their goals. Because data can be aggregated to higher levels of analysis (e.g., one can create data about the behavior of types of dissidents groups from data about specific dissident groups), but cannot be disaggregated (e.g., one cannot create data about the behavior of specific dissidents groups from data about types of dissident groups), we chose to record the actors and targets as they were identified in the news reports.

Following VICDP, the IPI project was designed to overcome some of the limitations of the *World Handbook* scheme. First, IPI data are scaled according to intensity. Second, IPI provides codes for a broader range of political events, both verbal and substantive, both conflictual and cooperative. Third, IPI assigns unique codes for actors and targets which may be aggregated into broad categories for cross-national studies, but also can be used for detailed time series analysis of the interactions among particular groups. Yet, IPI data can still be used to generate many of the variables in the *World Handbook* project, allowing for a longer continuous time series of data on these 15 states.

III. THE IPI CODING SCHEME

The IPI coding scheme is composed of three parts: a generic set of actors and targets; a conflict scale; and a cooperation scale. Each is reproduced in a table below. For the purpose of this project, conflict has two crucial elements. First, conflict involves perceptions of incompatible interests. Groups in conflict believe that the realization of one party's interests inhibits the realization of the other party's interests. Second, conflict is reflected in actual behavior; we are not interested in "latent" or "potential" conflict. One or both parties take purposive action against other parties in an effort either to advance their own interests or inhibit the realization of the interests of others. In other words, conflict is visible in actions or events. As Tilly states, conflict tends

to flow directly out of a population's central political processes, instead of expressing diffuse strains and discontents within the population; . . . the specific claims and counterclaims being made on the existing government by various mobilized groups are more important than the general satisfaction or discontent of those groups, and . . . claims for established places within the structure of power are crucial (Tilly, 1985, p. 1).

Thus, the actions undertaken by groups to advance their own interests at the expense of others or to inhibit the realization of the interests of another group represent the level of political conflict within a society.

Cooperation has historically been thought of as the absence of conflict. Our concept goes beyond this simple definition. We believe that cooperation, like conflict, involves intentional, purposeful action in pursuit of goals. Keohane's distinction between cooperation and harmony is especially useful.

Harmony refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others'

goals. Cooperation, on the other hand, requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations-- which are not in preexistent harmony-- be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation which is often referred to as 'policy coordination' . . . Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination (1984, p. 51).

Following Keohane, we define cooperation as policy coordination and our coding scheme identifies events that involve behavior in pursuit of policy coordination.

Groups pursue their goals through both conflictual and cooperative actions.

Understanding the dynamics of political interactions thus requires measuring both the conflictual and cooperative behavior of domestic actors. We accomplish this through identifying and categorizing political events. We modify Azar's (1975, p. 2) definition of political events, proposing the following:

A political event is an action taken by an actor at a given point in time to advance its political interests. Thus a political event involves (1) an *actor*, (2) a *target*, (3) a *time period*, (4) an *action*, and (5) a *political interaction*.

Thus, events are identified with regard to actors and targets, time, action, and space. Each actor/target group, each day and each location involved in an action represents a distinct event. If two groups protest in three cities for five days, a total of thirty (two times three times five) events are coded. By political, we mean issues that involve the authority to make decisions concerning the extraction and distribution of social resources or values. Azar additionally specifies that events must be "distinct enough from the constant flow of 'transactions' . . . to stand out against this background as 'reportable' or 'newsworthy'" (Azar, 1982, p. 3). Howell interprets this to mean that "Transactions are the *normal activities* between nation-states, while interactions are the

extraordinary events that occur in irregular patterns" (1983, p. 150). We, too, are interested in extraordinary events (interactions), rather than normal activities.

The term actor carries with it a connotation of initiator. We wish to note explicitly that we do not intend that connotation in our use of the term. It is frequently impossible to ascertain *who started* a set of given interactions, and no attempt is made to do so. Rather, we begin by assuming that groups face options to act or not to act at any given point in time. If they act, they are coded as actors. If they are acted upon (i.e., the recipient or target of another party's action), they are coded as targets.

One of the primary goals of the IPI project is to create data which allows analysts to examine the behavior of particular societal groups and their interactions with other social groups and the state. As a result, the IPI coding scheme provides a large number of actor and target codes so that groups can be identified and tracked with a greater degree of precision than has been previously possible. We have created a list of generic actor-target codes to facilitate defining actors and targets. For each country we examine, the generic sheets are modified to reflect the specific circumstances and political context of that case. Thus, individual political parties and dissident groups within each society are assigned unique codes.

{Table 1 about here}

The IPI conflict scale is designed to facilitate the measurement of the volume and intensity of political conflict within a domestic polity. Events are assigned values on a one to ten scale according to their severity. In general, 100 and 200 level events represent verbal conflict and 300-1000 level events are conflictual actions (rather than statements). 100 level verbal conflict implies no threat of action, whereas 200 level verbal conflict involves an explicit or an implicit

threat to the target. 300 level events are always nonviolent, whereas actions starting at the 400 level may involve violence.

{Table 2 about here}

The IPI cooperation scale is designed to be used in conjunction with the conflict scale. Again, 100 and 200 level events are statements, and 300 and higher are actions. 300 level events are unilateral or bilateral actions that represent minor concessions or aid. 400 level events cover negotiations, and 500 through 700 level events represent major unilateral or bilateral concessions. The 800-1000 level events cover conflict termination, settlement, and resolution (following Burton's 1990 usage of those terms).

{Table 3 about here}

IV. CODING CHALLENGES: EXPENSE, RELIABILITY, AND VALIDITY

Three issues presented themselves as challenges during the project: expense, reliability, and validity. These problems are not unique to this project—all data collection projects address these challenges—but recent advances in computerized coding software made alternative choices available and forced us to confront some issues more acutely than we might have otherwise. Gerner et al. (1994) describe the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) software that can be used to code events data.⁵ KEDS has two substantial advantages to recommend it over human coding: dramatically lower expense and better reliability. We maintain that for our project, however, KEDS (and any system like it) has a validity disadvantage. Having completed the project we feel

⁵ To learn more about the KEDS project, please point your WWW browser to:
<http://www.ukans.edu/~keds/>

that the advantages of computer coding outweigh the disadvantage, but our purpose here is to identify the issues so that the reader may draw her/his own conclusion.

With respect to expense, computer-assisted coding is cheap in comparison to human coding. We received over \$115,000 in support for the project and have produced completed data on eight cases.⁶ Had we used the KEDS software, it would have cost substantially less money to generate the same amount of data.

With respect to reliability, computers will be 100% reliable; if we have two computers code the same stories using the KEDS software they will produce identical data sets. Human coders, however, rarely produce identical data sets, even when they have been extensively trained. To enhance reliability, we trained our coders by having them practice code a series of stories that had been coded in advance. We then reviewed their coding and the rules, pointing out errors. In addition, we conducted weekly coding meetings to address questions that had arisen during that week's coding and review procedures. In addition, we occasionally had coders code a series of common articles that had already been coded to check inter-coder reliability. The results from the occasional inter-coder reliability checks ranged from acceptable (correlations around .85) to distressing (correlations around .55). As a consequence, we instituted a reliability check where the lead coder—Ashley Leeds—went back through and checked each entry. This additional step improved the reliability of the coding scheme (several events were recoded in each case), but was rather expensive.⁷ In retrospect, the coding rules are largely to blame—they are very complex, and

⁶ We have collected the data on eight others, but the final reliability check (see discussion below) has not yet been completed on those cases.

⁷ A number of common errors became apparent over the course of the project, and the majority of the changes that were made concerned these common errors.

this complexity drives down reliability. Were we to do it again we would create a simplified coding scheme somewhere between the VICDP scheme and the IPI scheme.

While computer-assisted coding has substantial expense and reliability advantages, we are of the opinion that the KEDS protocol has a validity disadvantage. The problem concerns the fact that the KEDS software codes verbs (i.e., the verb is the unit of analysis). That KEDS codes verbs makes a great deal of sense: it was created to produce WEIS data, and WEIS is a verb-based coding scheme. That is, WEIS uses verbs to code cooperation and conflict between actors. As a comparison, the COPDAB, VICDP and IPI projects use the entire news report as the unit of analysis.

A major distinction between computer-assisted coding and human coding is that computers require terribly specific instructions that make it rather difficult to move beyond the verb when doing the kind of events coding that these projects do. Human beings need not rely on such an explicit rule-based system and can use their judgment to use full descriptions to generate events data. Of course, the more explicit rules produce greater reliability. We contend, however, that this reliability is purchased at a validity cost because the news reporters who initially describe the events probably do not use verbs as precisely as the WEIS scheme requires they would. We think that given a choice between inferring the level of conflict/cooperation between two actors from (1) a single verb or (2) a full news report, most social scientists would argue that the full news report will provide a more accurate (i.e., more valid) picture of the event than the single verb will. This is not to say that relying on a single verb will produce invalid data; the verbs coded by WEIS/KEDS are part of the information that would be coded by COPDAB. Rather, we

contend that human coders making judgments based on entire news reports will produce less reliable, but more valid data.

This discussion may raise a related validity issue in many readers' minds: the validity of the news reports themselves. We have been concerned with the extent to which the coding scheme validly captures the information in the news report, but many people are interested in the extent to which news reports validly capture the relations among actors. This is a validity issue that events data projects cannot solve. We can only code what we have available, and we make no claim that the news reports we code are 100% accurate (or valid). We do contend, however, that news reports are the most valid source available, and we believe they are sufficiently valid to warrant their use.

V. CONCLUSION

This brief paper sketches the motivation behind the IPI project, places it in the context of other events data projects, briefly describes the coding scheme, and reviews some of the challenges we encountered collecting the data. By way of conclusion we would like to consider how the data have been, and might be, used. Moore and Davis (1998) used the IPI data to explore the nexus between domestic and international conflict behavior. Lee et al. (1999) use the VICDP data to test a predator-prey model of dissident–state interactions, and Moore (1998) uses the VICDP data to test several models of dissident responses to state repression. Lee (1998a) replicates Moore (1998) using IPI data, and the predator-prey model could also be explored using these data. Davis and Moore plan to study the duration of ‘peace’ (i.e., the length of time between

conflictual events) using the IPI data. The common theme to these analyses is that they require events data: data about the behavior of one actor toward another.

Events data are also useful for the analysis of other theories. For example, Tarrow's (1994) cycles of protest theory could be subjected to empirical analysis using the events data coded by IPI. Similarly, Davenport's (1995) multidimensional threat theory of state coercion can be examined using IPI (see Lee 1998b). Again, the common denominator is that these theories produce hypotheses about the behavior of actors as they behave in time.

The IPI project was motivated primarily by our desire to understand the process of political interaction within societies. Most large n empirical studies of conflict within states focus on correlating attributes with outcomes. We believe that a full understanding of the causes and effects of domestic political conflict requires much more attention to the process of interaction among groups. The data provided by the IPI project makes it possible for us and others to evaluate process and specific theories based on processes of interaction empirically. The empirical evidence accumulated as a result of the IPI project should advance scientific knowledge regarding political dissent and help us to develop and evaluate policy prescriptions for conflict management and resolution.

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Table 1: IPI ACTOR/TARGET SCALE

I. ETHNIC POPULATIONS:

01-08 GEDS identified subactors for each country. (#.1 for elites, #.2 for masses).

09 General population

II. STATE:

10 National Executive

11 High Level Officials

12 Elected Representatives

13 Judicial Branch

14 Regional/State government

15 City/Village government

16 Military/Armed forces

06.1 Military elites (officers)

06.2 Military masses (enlisted men)

17 Paramilitary forces

18 Police

19 Deposed leaders and officials

20-24 Other government actors

III. DISSIDENT ORGANIZATIONS:

25-44 Groups. #.1 for elites, #.2 for masses.

45 Unspecified guerrillas

IV. SOCIAL ACTORS:

46 Domestic Media

47 Foreign Media

48 Educators

49 Students

50 Peasants

51 Business Group Confederation (very general, widespread)

52 Sector or Region specific business group

53 Government workers

54 Labor Confederation

54.1 Labor Confederation elites

54.2 Labor Confederation masses

55 Labor Union

55.1 Labor Union elites

55.2 Labor Union masses

56 Laborers

56.1 Laborer elites

56.2 Laborer masses

57 Roman Catholic Church Groups(local, not Vatican)

57.1 Catholic elites

57.2 Catholic masses

58 Christian Religious Groups

58.1 Christian elites

58.2 Christian masses

59 Buddhist Religious Groups

59.1 Buddhist elites

59.2 Buddhist masses

60 Muslim Religious Groups

60.1 Muslim elites

60.2 Muslim masses

61 Prisoners

62 Human Rights Groups

63 Public Interest Groups

64-74 Others

75 Unspecified opposition

V. POLITICAL PARTIES:

76-85 Others

86 Communists

87 Unspecified Leftists

88 Unspecified Rightists

89 Unspecified Opposition

VI. ORGANIZED CRIME:

90 Drug Traffickers

91-94 Others

VII. UNASSIGNED:

95-98 Unassigned

VIII. MISSING:

99 Missing/Need More Information

Table 2: IPI CONFLICT SCALE

1. Mildly negative statements (verbal or printed) about other parties, their representatives, proposals, or activities. No action threatened or implied.

- 101. Negative statements, verbal or printed, directed at specific actors or specific policies/activities.
- 102. Calls for reform activities; appeals for support or liberalization; calls for a ceasing of opposition activities with no threat of violence.
- 103. Appeals to foreign actors to criticize domestic actors.
- 104. Failure to meet, canceling planned meeting with explicit political justification.
- 105. Denying a request.
- 109. Other negative statements.

2. Strongly negative statements representing implicit or explicit threats.

- 201. Threats directed at particular actors/policies. (*e.g., rumors/threats of a coup; death threats; calls for a vote of no-confidence in parliament; calls for strikes, economic boycotts, or for supporters to stockpile/take up arms; rumors of threatening action; failed plots; formal investigations.*)
- 202. Rejection of proposals for reform/change. (*e.g., government rejects opposition proposals for reform, democratization; opposition rejects government compromise; reaching deadlock in negotiations.*)
- 203. Appeals for foreign action/interventions.
- 209. Other 200 level events.

3. Non-violent protests, demonstrations, or strikes with political intent. Minor restrictions on political and economic participation. Legal actions protesting leadership or policies.

- 301. Non-violent protests and other non-violent conflictual political actions. (*e.g., sit ins; hunger strikes; self-imposed political exiles; legislators' political refusal to take seats; executive veto; political elite's resignation for political reasons.*)
- 302. Non-violent political strikes. (*e.g., student strikes; labor strikes for political reasons; general strikes; boycotting local elections.*)
- 303. Individual restrictions on free speech/free press/individual action. (*e.g., closing a newspaper; confiscation of anti-regime propaganda; fines or other restrictions on papers.*)
- 304. Legal actions to increase power/mobilize resources. (*e.g., additional police; military call-ups; placing of forces; abolishing social welfare programs; imposing draft/conscription; mobilizing significant political figures to join a group; formation of a united front; creating new groups or organizations; filing a lawsuit for political reasons; bringing opponents to trial; firing striking workers.*)
- 305. Vote of confidence won by incumbent.
- 306. Executive adjustment (*Replacement of Cabinet Officials.*)
- 307. Judicial Decision (conflict for loser).
- 309. Other 300 level events.

4. Minor political violence and more significant restrictions on political and economic participation. Legal actions by elites undermining governance.

- 401. Riots, violent demonstrations: property damage, but no deaths.
- 402. Police violence in response to protest or riots, no deaths.
- 403. Suicide protests.
- 404. Major national strikes; boycotting national elections.
- 405. Acts of intimidation that are not life threatening and brief in duration. (*e.g., physical coercion to intimidate member(s) of other groups; abductions which last less than 24 hours.*)

406. Minor restrictions on political/economic participation. (*e.g., enacting new laws restricting freedom of speech and association; closing universities, schools, or public facilities for political reasons; short term restrictions on travel and internal movement; or widespread media censorship.*)

407. Failure to form a ruling coalition in legislature.

408. Interbranch conflict. (*e.g., judiciary overrules executive, legislature overturns veto, executive refuses to implement legislation.*)

409. Other 400 level protests and restrictions on political participation.

5. General restrictions on political and economic participation, and political violence. Legal actions ending tenure of ruling group. Illegal attempts at restricting rival power.

501. General restrictions on political participation. (*e.g., declaring curfews; complete censorship.*)

502. Illegal actions to increase coercive power/mobilize coercive resources. (*e.g., creating private militia, military wings for opposition groups/parties; robbing banks or kidnapping for ransom; secret trials.*)

503. Actions to limit opposition activities or restrictions on political groups/individuals. (*e.g., arrests of rival elites or mass arrests/detentions; deporting individual dissidents; police raids of rival headquarters; reshuffling of the military; outlawing political parties; dissolving labor unions; forbidding public gatherings.*)

504. Riot with 10 or fewer deaths; police violence in response to protest or riot involving deadly force and/or ten or fewer deaths.

505. Violent political acts. (*e.g., bombings of nonhuman targets; sabotage; hijacking of planes or buses with political demands; political kidnappings; shootings with no deaths; seizing territory temporarily with limited violence (no deaths).*)

506. Legal actions ending tenure of ruling group. (*e.g., vote of confidence lost by incumbent; coalition collapse; impeachment.*)

507. Violating a cease fire.

509. Other 500 level political violence or restrictions.

6. Illegal attempts at ending tenure of ruling group or extra legal violent activities.

601. Temporary restrictions or bans on fundamental freedoms. (*e.g., imposing regional states of emergency or total curfews with the constitution retained.*)

602. Riot or police violence in response to protest or riot involving 11-99 deaths.

603. Breaking a truce.

604. Armed attacks with 15 or fewer deaths; bombings of human targets.

605. Unsuccessful assassination attempt.

606. Political convictions.

607. Capturing adversary's troops.

608. Extra legal activities threatening elites or preventing opponent's activities. (*e.g., barracks uprisings, minor coup attempts (less than 10 dead), reports of disappearances.*)

609. Other 600 level political violence or restrictions.

7. Extensive political violence.

701. Major rioting or government violence in response to protest or riot involving hundreds of deaths.

702. Political assassinations/executions of significant figures. (*includes extra legal armed attacks by state against political leaders or death squad activity.*)

703. Declaration of a nation-wide state of emergency that is temporary and most of constitution remains in effect.

704. Military clash, raid, or ambush, with both sides armed.

- 705. Violent unsuccessful coup attempt (*greater than 9 dead*).
- 706. Nonviolent coup that only rotates rulers (*i.e., does not alter structure of government*).
- 707. Breaking a peace treaty, renewing hostilities.
- 708. Armed attack on unarmed group involving 16-30 deaths.
- 709. Other 700 level political violence or restrictions.

8. Changing the structure of government or very high levels of political violence.

- 801. Ending normal governmental policy/decision making process. (*e.g., executive suspension of legislature; legislature's suspension of executive power; abolition of civil courts; voiding the results of an election.*)
- 802. Nonviolent coup that alters the structure of government (*less than 10 dead*).
- 803. Violent coup that only rotates rulers (*i.e., does not alter structure of government*).
- 804. Forced relocation of population into protective villages under the control of the government.
- 805. Massacre of civilians (*more than 30 dead*).
- 806. Rebel occupation of territory that lasts longer than 24 hrs.
- 809. Other 800 level political violence or restrictions.

9. Societal upheaval.

- 901. Rebels setting up rival government.
- 902. Declaration of martial law.
- 903. Forced expulsion of portions of the population (*i.e., they leave the country as refugees*).
- 904. Violent coup that alters the structure of government.
- 909. Other 900 level political violence or restrictions.

10. Civil war.

- 1001. Genocidal/Politocidal action (*i.e., executions of hundreds of members of an ethnic/ political group*).
- 1002. Major battle (*defending territory with conventional military tactics and weaponry with many deaths*).
- 1003. Violent coup followed by purge (*government structure altered and many former government leaders executed*).
- 1009. Other 1000 level political violence or restrictions.

Table 3: IPI COOPERATION SCALE

1. Mildly positive statements, verbal or printed, about other parties, their proposals, or activities. No action promised.

101. Statements of support.

102. Appeals to foreign actors for support of other domestic actors.

103. Proposals for action. (*e.g., requesting support; presenting conditions for negotiation or peace.*)

109. Other 100 level events.

2. Strongly positive statements about other parties, their representatives, proposals, or activities. Implied or literal promises of action.

201. Promises directed at particular actors.

202. Promises designed to end dispute.

203. Talks/meetings between groups that have not consistently cooperated in the past (groups that have not been engaged in a protracted conflict).

209. Other 200 level events.

3. Minor cooperative actions.

301. Relaxing individual restrictions on free speech/free press/individual action.

302. Agreeing to minor reform. (*e.g., ousting corrupt officials; agreeing to investigate war crimes/human rights violations; social welfare program concessions.*)

303. Actions carrying out promises to end minor disputes.

304. Agreements between groups that have not consistently cooperated in the past (groups that have not been engaged in a protracted conflict).

305. Judicial decision (cooperation for winner).

306. Helping another group to mobilize resources/gain political advantage. (*e.g., government rewriting electoral law to advantage one party; raising money/support for a group; regime support demonstrations.*)

309. Other 300 level events.

4. Agreements to attempt to settle protracted conflict or relaxing minor restrictions.

401. Relaxing minor restrictions on political/economic freedom. (*e.g., relaxing travel & movement restrictions; reopening universities; relaxing widespread censorship; ending local curfew.*)

402. Agreements to talk, planning a meeting, or reports of talks between parties to a protracted social conflict. (*e.g., secret negotiations, dialogue through a third party, meetings of minor officials, exchange of position papers/ideas.*)

409. Other 400 level events.

5. Relaxing government sanctions or actions designed to mitigate protracted conflict.

501. Relaxing government sanctions. (*e.g., releasing arrested or detained individuals; relaxing complete censorship.*)

502. Cease fire (*single event, day, or battle*).

503. Releasing hostages.

504. Agreements/proposals designed to overcome protracted conflict. (*e.g., party in power introducing legislation to open political system; suffrage/land reform; agreeing to allow elections to be held; agreeing to consider granting relative autonomy.*)

505. Talks or negotiations between parties to a protracted social conflict.

506. Small scale/individual surrender of rebels.

509. Other 500 level events.

6. Reforms; relaxing major restrictions; truces.

601. Relaxation of major repressive activities. (*e.g., ending ban or restrictions on fundamental freedoms; ending regional state of emergency; ending total curfew; releasing political prisoners; granting amnesty to political leaders; allowing exiled leaders to return; legalizing banned political groups; returning expropriated property; establishing the rights of minorities/individuals.*)

602. Truce. (*e.g., agreement to halt hostilities indefinitely or for a period of negotiation; renouncing the armed struggle.*)

603. Implementing policy reform. (*e.g., making taxes more equitable; adjusting social welfare programs; instituting land reform; setting a date for national elections; holding minor elections; allowing opposition parties to take power following election; staging a trial of previous leaders or human rights violators.*)

609. Other 600 level events.

7. Substantial agreements.

701. Ending nationwide state of emergency.

702. Convening a commission to write new constitution (multiple parties/groups involved).

703. Peace treaties.

704. Holding major national elections without full participation.

709. Other 700 level events.

8. Conflict Termination: The parties agree to terminate the internal war but do not create new institutions for managing the underlying conflict.

801. Holding elections under old constitution in which all parties to the conflict participate.

802. Reestablishing civil society - constitution, parliament, courts, judicial process.

803. Ending martial law.

804. Ratifying/passing new constitution.

805. Territorial withdrawal (rebels relinquishing territory after a peace treaty).

809. Other 800 level events.

9. Conflict Settlement: The internal war is terminated and the underlying conflict settled as a consequence of the construction of institutions that will manage future conflict.

901. Implementing new constitution that guarantees political and civil rights to all participants in the conflict or one that grants autonomy to specific groups.

902. Election contested under new constitution with full participation.

909. Other 900 level events.

10. Conflict Resolution.

1001. The internal war is terminated because the underlying conflict is resolved such that each party's needs are guaranteed.

1009. Other 1000 level events.