Region, Contingency, and Democratization

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Recently, Robert Dahl noted that the challenges facing the world's roughly 200 countries vary, from the *transition* to democracy in non-democracies, to the *strengthening* or *consolidation* of democracy in the newly democratized countries, to the *deepening* of democracy in the older democracies (1998:2). As we grapple toward an understanding of transitions to democracy and of its consolidation and deepening we frequently try to discover general laws of cause and effect, ones that operate in the same way over time and space. And, with a few exceptions, we have ignored the role of contingency in encouraging or impeding democratization. Yet mounting evidence points toward spatial unevenness in democratization and in the consolidation of democracy. And their spatial unevenness can be the result of contingent choices and chance events.

The dictionary definition of contingency is something that is likely but not certain to happen, happening by chance, or dependent on something else. In this paper I define a contingent cause or outcome as one that would have appeared, *ex ante*, unlikely to occur. Contingent causes or outcomes appear unlikely because they rely on choices or chance events that could easily have gone in another direction. After discussing contingency in general and offering some examples of political phenomena that are subject to contingent causation, I focus on contingencies related to spatial location. I examine the role of *region* in democratization. In so doing I hope to clarify what we mean by regional effects in politics, and to specify whether, and which kinds of, regional effects represent a form of contingency.

What is Contingency?

Political outcomes may be contingent in at least three senses. A potential cause may have its effect only in the presence of some background condition or additional

cause, and the fact that an interaction is required makes the event unlikely (interactions); or an outcome may appear *ex ante* unlikely because it depended on two or more factors that had to occur in a particular temporal sequence (sequence); or it may rely on a choice by an actor who might have made another choice (choice). All of these senses of contingency have been discussed at length (see, e.g., Pierson 2004, Giddens 1979, Elster 1983), so I touch on them only briefly.

Interactions

In interactions, *A* and *B* cause *C*; with only *A* or only *B*, *C* does not occur. Unless either *A* or *B* is certain to occur, then, by probability theory, the fact that they both have to occur makes the outcome less likely than it would be had only *A* or only *B* been required. Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963) contains an example. They find that, in advanced democracies, people who trust government also participate more in politics. But in developing countries trust does not cause participation. If trust is *A* and development – the necessary background condition – is *B*, and if participation is *C*, then *A* and *B* together cause *C*, but *A* alone or *B* alone do not.

Kalyvas (1994) offers an example in which the chance simultaneity of two causally unrelated events has an effect that would have been absent had the two events not coincided. In England and France in the early 1970s and early 1980s, respectively, leftist governments came to power and instituted policies of nationalization. In both countries major economic crises followed these nationalizations, crises that were caused by events that had little to do with the nationalizations. The chance near-simultaneity led, in the minds of the mass publics of both countries, to "the association of nationalization with economic crisis and the subsequent rejection of nationalization by public opinion"

(:335). If nationalization is *A* and economic crisis *B*, then had either *A* or *B* not occurred,

then the discrediting of nationalization (*C*) – and, indeed, according to Kalyvas, a broader

collapse of a Keynesian economic hegemony – would also not have occurred. Indeed,

had these events not unfolded in the particular order that they did – for instance, had

economic crisis preceded nationalizations – then C would not have followed. Kalyvas's

example leads us nicely, then, into a consideration of *sequence* and contingency.

Sequence

 A must happen before *B* in order for *C* to occur; if *B* happens before *A*, *C* does not

occur. In addition to Kalyvas's example, here are two more. First, where the habit of

political contestation among opposing elites preceded mass electoral participation, Dahl

(1971) explains, the emergence of democracy was smooth; where the two emerged

simultaneously, it was turbulent. Second, if, in Western European countries,

constituencies favoring bureaucratic autonomy came into existence before the franchise

was extended, then parties were induced to mobilize voters by using programmatic

appeals and by providing public goods. If mass enfranchisement took place before a

constituency emerged that favored state autonomy, then the outcome was patronage

politics (Shefter 1977; see the discussion in Pierson 2004).

 Note that "sequences" can be nearly simultaneous, and do not necessarily entail

processes that unfold over long periods of time. Kalyvas's example, where economic

crisis followed quickly after nationalizations, is a sequence that unfolded quickly. The

sequences that Kalyvas describes happen to be temporally compact. Sequences will also

tend to be temporally compact in cases of policy innovation. But to the extent that policy

innovators are aware of the importance of proper sequencing, this sequencing is *ex ante* probable and hence the sense of contingency is reduced.

Consider economic liberalization, which the governments of many developing countries have undertaken in the past two decades. It is now the conventional wisdom among practitioners and scholars that trade liberalization (*A*) only has the desired effect of increasing consumer welfare (*C*) when it follows domestic relative-price adjustment (*B*). If internal price structures are out of whack, a flood of cheap goods from abroad will destroy many efficient domestic firms along with inefficient ones. A similar sort of sequencing should take place in financial-sector liberalization. If reform is to produce an efficient financial system, the privatizing of banks must succeed a process by which lenders learn how to price risk. The opposite sequence occurred in Mexico in the mid-1990s, and it resulted in a catastrophic string of bank failures and a generalized economic crisis.

Choice and Chance

Often in the social sciences what we mean by an outcome being contingent is that, for it to happen, some actor has to make a choice, or take a particular action, and it is not unimaginable that he or she would not have made that choice or taken that action. Had *A* not taken action *B*, *C* would not have happened. The lower the probability, *ex ante*, that *A* would do *B*, the more contingent the outcome. Fearon (1991:184-185) cites the example of the Brazilian coup d'etat of 1964, as analyzed by Stepan (1978). Had Joao Goulart not responded to an earlier uprising of junior officers with leniency, Stepan contends, there was a high probability that the coup would not have taken place. His leniency caused discontent among military leaders, and produced a "winning coalition"

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for a coup, a coalition that had been elusive just weeks earlier (Stepan 1978:129). And

Goulart might not have taken the action that he did: the evidence is that he debated in his

own mind between leniency and a tougher response, one that would have mollified the

senior officers. Goulart's (*A*'s) action (*B*), which was not obviously more likely than a

different action (not-*B*), produced *C*, a highly contingent outcome.

Transitions to democracy, like transitions to dictatorship, have been attributed to

chance events. Having found no link between economic development and transitions to

democracy, Przeworski and his associates (1997, 2000) posit that chance events – the

death of a dictator, a later leader's absorption of Christian-democratic ideology – can

cause democratization. "Some dictatorships have fallen in the aftermath of the death of

the founding dictator, such as a Franco, uniquely capable of maintaining the authoritarian

order. Some have collapsed because of economic crises, some because of foreign

pressures, *and perhaps some for purely idiosyncratic reasons*" (2000:89, emphasis

added).

In sum, in common social-science usage, outcomes are contingent if an

interaction of factors or a specified sequence of factors is required to bring them about, or

if a particular choice or action is required. The smaller the probability, *ex ante*, that the

interaction, sequence, choice or action would occur, the greater the sense of contingency.

What is a Regional Effect?

I define a region as a contiguous and compact space constituted by a set of

countries in the world or by an area within a country. Whether a contiguous and compact

space constitutes a region is largely a matter of convention and public perception, as is

the definition of a given region's borders. Natural features frequently define the borders

of conventional regions, such as when the oceans around the African continent define the boundaries of the region we call "Africa." Natural features shared by countries can create a region: the location within their borders of segments of the Andes mountains define the "Andean region" just as the shared location of segments of the Appalachian mountains define the "Appalachian region." A given geographic territory can simultaneously belong to different regions. Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski (1999) offer two coding schemes for the world's regions, one more coarse-grained, the other more fine-grained. Hence in one scheme, Tunisia (for example) is located in a region called "Africa," in the other it is located in a region called "Middle East/North Africa."

Scholars are likely to identify regional effects of four sorts. (1) *A* is a factor operative in a region and *A* causes *B*. But it is not regional location but *A* that causes *B* (*spurious regional effect*). (2) A vector of causes *A* is operative in a given region. The same vector would have the same effect in any region, but the probability of its appearing elsewhere is small, and this small probability creates a particular link between the region and the outcome (*regional vector*). (3) Structural factor *A* is present in a region. *A* causes *B*, but its effect on *B* is a negative function of the spatial distance from *A* (*proximity-dependent regional effects*). Finally (4) some quality of a region as a whole, or the dynamics within it – diffusion, persuasion, learning – change the behavior of units within that region, in comparison with the behavior they would exhibit were they located in a different (*regional dynamics proper*).

Spurious Regional Effects

Many ostensibly regional effects are really not regional at all; the effect of region is spurious. Indeed, when we think about why regions differ politically from one another, our first instinct may be to offer explanations in which region itself plays little part. That is, we treat the effect of region as a spurious stand-in for some other factor.

Consider, for example, the effect of region on the type of political regime of countries located in it. A randomly chosen country in Western Europe in the period 1950-1990 had a 95% chance of being a democracy, whereas a randomly chosen African country had only a seven percent chance (calculated from Alvarez et al., 1999). Pressed to explain this cross-regional difference, we might say that Africa is highly economically unequal and that inequality discouraged democratization (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2004).[1] But if this is true then it is inequality, not Africa, that impedes democracy. Call this the *spurious* explanation of regional effects.

Spurious causes may be either contemporary or historical. Following the African example, we might note that African countries were subjected to European colonial rule. Colonial administrations invented tribal distinctions and sometimes stoked tribal antagonisms, and these distinctions and antagonisms militated against democracy. Here not Africa but a particular legacy of colonialism impeded democracy. But there is a reasonable sense in which region really is a cause in this case, more so than in the example just discussed. Although any region that had undergone the same kind of colonial rule would be equally prone to dictatorship, if no other region did experience the

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[1] Countries in the African region have the second highest average Gini index in the world (44), second only to Latin America's (50). Calculated from the ACLP database.

same form of colonialism, with the same relevant features that would later discourage democracy, it is not unreasonable to call this a regional effect.

Regional Vector of Causes

Historically driven regional effects of this sort are like the interactions discussed earlier. A combination of factors is required if a given outcome is to occur, and these factors are uniquely present in a certain region. Strictly speaking, were this same combination of factors in place elsewhere, the same outcome would occur. But their co-occurrence is unlikely: it reflects the region's particular history and defines it as a region. Arend Lijphart's (1990) discussion of the factors that need to be in place for "ethnofederal" institutional arrangements to succeed is a case in point. Ethnofederalism means the sharing of executive powers among representatives of distinct ethnic or linguistic groups, as well as quotas for their bureaucratic representation. Such schemes will work, Lijphart contends, in places where an array of factors is in place – indeed, he lists nine such factors. Cumulatively, the list sounds like a description of Belgium.[2] Although Lijphart identifies other countries (Canada, Malaysia) where ethnofederalism works, one suspects that a "Belgian" context is really required.

Another example is the American South, a region that is politically distinct from the rest of the country. Perhaps we want to explain why a white southerner in the early 21st century is more likely to vote for the Republican Party than is a similar person in the Northeast. The list of factors that we would need to mention would read like the history of the South. It would be quite true that, were the factors to appear together in some other region, we would expect the same results – it is not Southern soil, in a literal sense, that must be present for the outcome to occur, but the various factors and forces that

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[2] Of his nine conditions, seven are present in Belgium.

define the South's story. Because we are unlikely to find such a combination of factors

elsewhere, we would be overly fastidious if we objected to the notion of Southern

regional effects.

Regional Dynamics

If these regional effects are not, strictly speaking, regional, what form might a

truly regional effect take? Pure geographic location is a factor that one encounters rarely

in the social world. We would be skeptical of the claim that being located, as Africa is,

between 35 degrees north and 40 degrees south longitude and 60 degrees east and 20

degrees west latitude discouraged democracy. If Norway were to become dislodged from

Scandinavia and float southward until it reached the West African coast, but remained in

all other ways the same, we would not expect it to fall prey to coups and dictatorship.

Geographic features, by contrast, do sometimes influence social phenomena.

Mountainous terrain, for instance, is claimed to help insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin

2003). Yet this is not a regional effect for the same reason that inequality is not: if an

imaginary country in the heart of Western Europe had big volcanoes, all else equal it

would presumably be just as prone to insurgencies (and hence just as inhospitable to

stable democracy) as were countries with big volcanoes elsewhere in the world.

In considering spatial unevenness in relations of cause and effect, we need to

distinguish three phenomena: (1) causes that dissipate over space, (2) causes that operate

over a politically defined jurisdiction, and (3) causes that operate over a conventionally

defined region. I consider each in turn.

Causes that dissipate over space. Many causal factors in politics rely for their

effect on spatial proximity. We know, for instance, that a person's friends, family, and

acquaintances influence his or her political opinions and voting behavior, and one's friends, family, and acquaintances tend to live nearby (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Hence the power of persuasive communications is an inverse function of distance. All else equal, a person's family and friends will exert less influence over her if she moves to a distant place; her views will shift to some degree in the direction of those of people in her new milieu.

If a large proportion of proximate countries have chosen a particular political regime, the preponderance of this regime type may exert pressure on other countries to choose this same regime. The advantages of doing so may lie in *network externalities*, which explain why computer buyers select brands that many other users have chosen (e.g., they anticipate that service will be better for a popular than for a seldom-used brand; see Katz and Shapiro 1985, Elkins 2004). By the same logic, to the extent that democracies prefer to trade with other democracies, a rash of democratizations in neighboring countries will make democratization more attractive for holdout dictators. Such network externalities are more often cited as explaining clusters in time than in space. In the case of computer purchases this is particularly so: computer networks are less dependent on spatial proximity than are other sorts of interactions. But trade is less costly and hence (*ceteris paribus*) more intensive the closer two partners are to one another. Hence a wave of democratizations in nearby trading partners exerts a more powerful effect than such a wave on distant shores. Network externalities related to trading patterns among like political regimes will therefore produce spatial-proximity effects on regime choice.

Elster (1983) suggests that spatial contiguity is always required in causal relations. *Local causality* means that "action at a distance is impossible. If a cause is said to have an effect distant from it in time or space, we assume that there must be a continuous chain from cause to effect, with no unbridgeable gaps in it (:28)." For example, educational investment encourages economic growth. But without the constraint of local causality we would expect educational investment in Alaska to stimulate development in Papua-New Guinea.

What Elster's formulation misses is that causal factors rely *to varying degrees* on spatial proximity. Even in the area of political influence and persuasion, one effect may rely on face-to-face interactions whereas another can race across large spaces with dizzying speed. The age of computers and electronic communications challenges a literal interpretation of local causality. Educational investment in Alaska really might stimulate development in Papua-New Guinea if the training materials were available on the state's website.

Political jurisdictions. When compact and contiguous spaces are not merely conventional regions but also political jurisdictions, spatial location can have powerful effects. I mentioned earlier the example of countries that share the Andes mountains and hence are known conventionally as the "Andean region." Countries of the Andean region joined in 1969 into the Andean Pact, a multilateral organization with an attendant bureaucracy. Agreements governing trade within the Andean Pact have force within its borders but not outside them, creating spatial unevenness over a series of social and economic phenomena. An even starker example is the convention of "North America," which brought to mind the United States and Canada more readily than it did Mexico:

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school children in all three countries had to be taught that, in some coding systems, Mexico was part of North America as well as being, more obviously, part of Latin America. The signing in the 1990s of the North American Free Trade Agreement transformed a loose convention into a legal and bureaucratic reality, creating enormous spatial effects.

From the vantage point of someone residing close to the border between jurisdictions, they can appear to create big contingencies. Imaginary lines separate places where economic opportunities, political regimes, legal structures, and opportunities of many sorts are vastly different. One of the effects of political jurisdiction, in addition to creating boundaries for the operation of laws, is that they define the sphere of action of political actors such as parties and candidates. Later in the paper I illustrate the impact that this separation of physical space into spheres of political action can have, even in a sense by accident, on the beliefs and worldviews of the people living there.

Regional location as cause. If the likelihood that A will do B if he is located in region C is significantly different than the likelihood that this same A will do B if he is located outside of region C, C wields a regional effect. Such regional effects are usually the result of communication or persuasion within regions. To return to the (admittedly preposterous) Norwegian example, if it were the case that African regional effects discouraged democracy, then a relocated Norway, even if identical to the Scandinavian Norway in other respects, would experience a heightened probability of democratic breakdown. For a more realistic example, Weakliem and Biggert (1999) document substantial differences in political opinion among people living in different regions of the U.S., and explain that these differences come in part from regional identities. They

contend that regional identities can function like other identities – religious, ethnic – and structure the interactions that a person experiences and hence the influences that he or she absorbs. A white Protestant southern man, for example, can be expected to oppose abortion or favor the death penalty with a higher probability than would a sociologically identical person from New England, and the difference reflects communication and mutual persuasion among people living in each region.

In voting behavior, another classic example is offered by Butler and Stokes (1971). They show that, in Britain of the 1960s, working-class voters who lived in predominantly middle-class resort communities, where the Conservative Party was dominant, voted for Conservatives at much higher rates than did working-class voters who lived in mining towns, where Labour was dominant. Ninety-one percent of working-class voters who lived in mining seats voted for Labour, against only 48% who lived in resorts. The reverse was also true: middle-class voters in resorts voted for Conservatives at higher rates (93%) than did their counterparts who lived in mining seats (64%). Butler and Stokes cite as plausible explanations voters' perception and conformity to local political norms, and "the persuasive influence of informal contacts on the shop floor, in the public house, and other face to face groups of the elector's world" (:184).[3]

In the context of an argument that, in American politics, these sorts of location or regional effects are small, Gary King offers a hypothetical example that is helpful in illustrating what regional effects on Americans' voting behavior would look like:

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[3] Butler and Stokes implicitly assume that workers who live in resorts are not systematically different than workers who live in mining seats in ways that would influence their voting behavior. They implicitly make the same assumption about middle-class Britons who live in mining seats. Recent U.S. elections make one wonder whether the suppression of turnout and partisan vote counting, quite apart from differences in party choice among similar voters in different regions, might have contributed to local partisan hegemony.

[C]onsider two voters. Both are conservative, poor, white men who identify with the Republican Party, prefer more defense spending and insist that the federal government balance the budget immediately. They are each afraid that someone will take their guns away, hope to end welfare as anyone knows it, and think Rush Limbaugh should be president. The only difference is that, after being raised as twins in Utah, they were separated. One moved to Lancaster Country, Pennsylvania amidst many other voters like himself. The other settled in Brookline, Massachusetts, with Michel Dukakis and many other Liberal Democrats. Now suppose Bill Clinton runs for re-election against Phil Gramm in 1996. Both voters would obviously vote for Graham" (1996:160).

Were this were not the case – were the Massachusetts twin likely to vote for Clinton – we would conclude that a regional effect was at work. (King's refutation of such an effect is not entirely persuasive: one would want to know the effect of residence in Brookline on the likelihood of the twin giving up his Republican identity, his guns, and his admiration for Limbaugh.)

Should we expect regional effects on the probability of transitions to democracy? For a hypothetical example of such an effect, assume that Region 1 encompasses the set of countries *A*, *B*, and *C*. Region 2 is made up of countries *D*, *E*, and *F*. Assume, furthermore, that the countries in the regions and the regions themselves are identical in all respects except their regional location: *A*, *B*, and *C* are located in conventionally recognized Region 1, *D*, *E*, and *F* in conventionally recognized Region 2. Suppose that all six countries were dictatorships at the outset and that, for exogenous reasons, *A*, *B*, and *D* democratized. International donors who wanted to encourage democratization

observed these events. They inferred that the democratization of *D* was a fluke but the democratization of *A* and *B* was a trend. They therefore showered resources on *A* and *B*. *C*, observing the shower, also democratized. But the donors ignored *D* and neither *E* nor *F* democratized. In this example, the shared regional identity of *C* with *A* and *B* is the only factor distinguishing *C* from *E* and *F*; the cause of democratization of *C* was its regional location.

One could object that the example is contrived because it involves international donors who assume some sort of regional contagion of democracy, an assumption that then creates just such a regional contagion. (Still, as Weakliem and Biggert showed in the context of regional effects on political views in the U.S., regional identity can in itself constitute a powerful political force.) Why might such intra-regional influence occur, even without the self-realizing assumption of regional contagion? It might be a result of learning, with information disseminating more readily to spatially proximate places or within a region and less fully to distant ones and to other regions. Let's say that *A* democratizes and, rather than sending the former dictator to jail, *A*'s new elected leaders send him to a comfortable exile abroad. The news travels quickly to *B* and the fate of *A*'s dictator is highly salient to the ruler of *B*, who, anticipating a comfortable retirement, also steps down and makes way for elections. But the news of events in *A* arrives slowly to *D* and is less salient to *D*'s dictator, who remains in office. If the greater geographic distance between *A* and *D* explains the lesser salience in *D* of events in *A*, then this is an example of a proximity-dependent effect. If the fact that the two are located in different regions explains the lesser salience, then we have an example of regional location as cause of democratization.

Of course one could state the effect in non-regional terms: the anticipation of a luxurious retirement for dictators increases the probability of democratization.[4] But if a dictator will tend to anticipate such a retirement when a neighboring dictator (and not a distant one) or a dictator in his own region (and not one in another region) has been treated this way, then the effect will be, respectively, proximity-dependent and region-dependent.

Regional effects also appear under circumstances of network externalities, at least when these externalities distribute themselves in a spatially uneven manner. Elkins notes the political benefits of being a member of a crowd, rather than an outlier. "In terms of norms, the predominant benefit is reputational. Joining a growing majority of other actors confers a degree of legitimacy or, in the case of a negatively valenced practice, *cover* from criticism" (2004:9, emphasis in the original). And the comparison set, the units that either offer cover or turn the unit in question into an outlier, will tend to be either countries that are spatially proximate or countries that are in the same region.

The cover that large numbers of fellow dictatorships provide, and the added pressure to democratize once that cover is lifted, helps explain the apparent contagion in the most recent round of Latin-American democratizations. When the first military government fell in the region – Ecuador's in 1979 – this event probably put little pressure on dictators in other countries in the region. But a decade later Chile was the only holdout: the cover was gone. All else equal, it was more costly for the Chilean regime to

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[4] Yet the example of former dictators being provided with a comfortable retirement may also encourage would-be dictators to instigate coups against elected leaders. That the treatment of former dictators creates opposing incentives, one for them to step down once they are in power, the other for them to grab power when they are out of it, makes this treatment a perennial topic of debate among democratizers (a debate that has parallels in other areas of action of new democratic regimes, for example whether and what sorts of prosecutions former dictators should be exposed to, whether and what sorts of truth commissions ought to be held, and so forth). Ideally one would want to quantify, or at least loosely weigh, the countervailing effects and compare their magnitude.

remain in power in a region where nearly everyone else was a democracy than it had been while the Chilean military's Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan colleagues were also still in power.[5] The prediction follows that, if regional contagion of this sort is at work, democratization should accelerate: we should observe ever-shorter gaps in time between each subsequent fall of a dictatorship.

I have distinguished among spurious regional effects – causes or outcomes that are prominent in a region but that are explained by non-regional or non-spatial factors; regional vectors of causes – causes that are uniquely jointly present in a given region – and regional dynamics proper. Among regional dynamics proper I have distinguished among causes and outcomes that dissipate over space, ones that extend within politically defined jurisdictions, and ones that rely for their force on location in a particular region (as defined by not by law but by convention). As the next section shows, we have growing evidence of the regional unevenness of democratization and of the consolidation of democracy across regions in countries. Some apparently regional effects on national democratization are spurious, but others are suggestive of regional dynamics of persuasion and influence. And intra-national regional effects on democratic consolidation illustrate the power of contingent choices of actors to speed or obstruct this consolidation.

Regional Effects on Transitions to Democracy

What region of the world a country is to be located in has a big effect on the probability that it will democratize. Perhaps because our grasp on the mechanisms that

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[5] Paraguay had still not democratized when, in 1988, Pinochet lost the plebiscite that would have allowed him to remain as president until 1997. But Paraguay is a country whose events are not closely watched around the region, or the world. Its long-time dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, undoubtedly felt pressure from regional democratization, but the fact that he was still in power in 1988 would not have been terribly salient in Chile and hence of little comfort to Pinochet.

produce spatial unevenness is weak, we have only begun to study these apparent regional effects. Przeworski and his colleagues (2000) find that, among countries at the same income level as Latin America's, "[b]eing in Latin America makes democracy 12 percent more likely...than elsewhere" (2000:87). But they offer no explanation for this apparent regional dynamic.

Acemoglu, Yared, and Robinson (2004) also study democratization cross-nationally. To control for countries' economic institutions – institutions which, they contend, can either promote or inhibit democratization – they organize cross-national pooled time-series data as a panel. This procedure is equivalent to including a dummy variable for each country in the sample. In effect they are positing that each country's economic institutions, the influence of which extends only to its borders, affect the probability of a transition to democracy. The authors indeed find that, say, being Portugal rather than being any other country influences the probability that Portugal will democratize. We cannot know whether the country-specific effects that they model really reflect economic institutions, or whether they reflect some other differences among the countries. That is, what they have discovered may be regional effects in the sense that I am using the term: countries are jurisdictional regions, and this jurisdictional-spatial discreteness may be what influences their probability that they will undergo a transition to democracy.

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2004) go more deeply into regional effects on the probability of a transition to democracy and on the quality of democracy. They define regions as I have defined them, as conventionally recognized compact and contiguous spaces. Regions are "geographically bounded parts of the world that are commonly

viewed as occupying the same large part of the world. In this understanding, Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia are regions of the world (:4)." They find that Latin American and Middle Eastern regions powerfully shape their component countries' quality of democracy and the probabilities that thee countries will undergo transitions to democracy. Regarding Latin America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán find that per-capita GDP has no effect on the level of democracy (as measured in the Polity VI dataset) whereas it does for the set of all countries and for the set of all non-Latin American countries with incomes in the Latin-American range. This implies that, for development to influence the quality of democracy, it must interact with a country's being located outside of Latin America. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán also show that the shape of the function relating income to the level of democracy is very different in Latin America than in the rest of the world. They show that the shape of the function relating income to the probability of a *transition* to democracy is very different than in the rest of the world. Finally, they find that the only factor significantly influencing the probability of transitions among dictatorship, democracy, and semi-democracy in Latin American countries is the number of other countries in the Latin American region that were democracies at the time. This final result is suggestive of the contagion examples I offered earlier.

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's explanations include both true regional effects, as I defined them earlier, and some spurious ones. In fact, the role of the Catholic Church was both spurious and truly regional. After Vatican II, "change in the Catholic Church affected prospects for democracy in other regions, but Latin America is the only overwhelmingly Catholic region of the world, hence change in the Church affected Latin

America more than other regions" (2004:34). In this instance, not location in the Latin-American region, but the presence of the Catholic Church, encouraged democratization. One would expect the post-Vatican-II Church to have favored democratization in the Philippines, say, just as strongly as it did in Latin America.

But Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán also point toward true regional dynamics, as I have defined them. They point toward interactions among factors, interactions that were unlikely to be repeated in other regions. They write, "although the Catholic Church is global in scope, it has regional specificities that stem from a combination of responding to some regionally specific opportunities and challenges, a regional leadership organization (the Latin American Bishops' Conference), and regional communication among theologians, priests, religious [leaders], and bishops" (:34). Not just Catholicism in general but Catholicism as it interacted with other conditions specific to Latin America encouraged democracy. The more such factors that needed to interact, or to be jointly present, to produce the effects that we observe in a region – Catholicism and inequality and non-European populations and proximity to the U.S. – the more contingent – the smaller the *ex ante* probability – of the effect on democratization. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán also hint at regional dynamics of communication and persuasion. They explain that the "dissemination of norms and ideas frames the way political actors within countries perceive political regimes and their own interests and political preferences" (2004:31).

I have discussed both spurious and true region effects on democratization where regions are contiguous groups of countries. Although one might describe these effects as contingent in the sense that they depend on regional location and influences, this is not

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contingency in a strong sense. After all, the location of a country in one region of the world or another is hardly a low-probability fact or one that could easily have turned out differently. And the kinds of chance events Przeworski and his coauthors point to certainly are contingent but they are not unevenly distributed across regions. Although I have offered several examples of regional effects on democratization, both real and hypothetical, the only one that has the air of contingency about it is the shift in the role of the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council – an event which, under a different ecumenical leadership, might never have occurred.

In the next section I illustrate another kind of regional effect, this one related not to democratization but to the consolidation of democracy. My research in Argentina demonstrates true regional dynamics, where strategic choices made by key actors in some regions helped consolidate democracy, whereas other choices by other actors in other regions hampered it. These are regional dynamics: they depend on intra-regional processes of persuasion and influence. And they are contingent regional dynamics in the sense of contingency explained earlier: if actors (in this case, leaders of political parties) had made choices other than the ones they did make, the outcome would have been different, and the choices they did make were, *ex ante*, not the only ones imaginable.

Within-Country Regional Effects on the Consolidation of Democracy

In many countries the consolidation of democracy varies across regions. The Italian south was dominated through the 1960s by clientelism and inefficiency, whereas in the north local governments were relatively clean and efficient (Chubb 1981, Putnam 1992). In India, communal violence is endemic in some localities but absent in others (Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2004). In the 19th-century United States, New York,

Cincinnati, and Philadelphia were notorious machine towns, whereas Detroit and San Francisco were relatively free of patronage and graft (Gimpel 1993). And such regional differences persist: one would be less surprised by a major municipal corruption scandal today in New Orleans than in Minneapolis. In Latin American countries, parties effectively compete for office and act accountably in some regions, whereas competition is muted and governments escape accountability in others (Cleary and Stokes 2004).

Some of this cross-regional variation can be attributed to structural differences from one region to the next in economic development, income equality, or levels of education. But, as in cross-national variation in democratization, structural factors leave much of the variation in the degree of consolidation unexplained. In this section I illustrate this cross-regional unevenness with data from one new Latin American democracy, Argentina. I demonstrate that many of the structural differences one might expect to cause regional differences do cause them, and yet even when one takes structural factors into account, regional differences persist. In part this persistent regional variation is the product of contingent political choice.

Regional Unevenness in the Consolidation of Democracy in Argentina

In 1983, in the wake of a disastrous war against the United Kingdom, the military leaders who had ruled Argentina since a coup d'etat 10 years earlier were driven from power. The jubilation that many Argentines felt in the first years of democracy inevitably faded as national governments failed to solve basic problems or even to keep the country from chaos. Argentina is a federal system, and politics in the provinces had dynamics of their own. Some provinces were the feudal domains of ruling families, and national leaders attempting to carry out reforms had to co-opt or entice recalcitrant

governors (Remmer and Wibbels 2000, Gibson and Calvo 2000). In other provinces electoral competition prompted violent clashes. In contrast, in some provinces and locales, a creative political leadership found innovative ways to improve public policy and enhance citizen participation.

Cleary and Stokes (2004) studied a subset of Argentine regions where local political practices and local political cultures varied. Our regions were jurisdictional: they were provinces or districts governed by local and provincial governments. We studied the district (*partida*) of General Pueyrredón, in the province of Buenos Aires, where the seat of government was Mar del Plata, a city of half a million inhabitants; the rest of the province of Buenos Aires, heavily dominated demographically and economically by the federal capital and the Greater Buenos Aires urban area; the province of Córdoba, which encompasses more than 600 cities, towns, and *comunas*, including the city of Córdoba, Argentina's second largest; and finally Misiones, a small, poor, and rural province in the northeast, bordering Brazil and Paraguay. Drawing on a secondary literature and our own research, we found Mar del Plata and Misiones to occupy extremes in a ranking of the four regions by levels of democratic consolidation. Buenos Aires and Córdoba fell in between.

Although they live at most a few hundred miles apart, people in these distinct Argentine regions engage in strikingly different political behaviors.[6] The Peronist party is Argentina's most clientelistic party, the one most similar to U.S. political machines (Auyero 2000, Levitsky 2003). Our surveys revealed that more than three times as many people in Misiones as in Mar del Plata supported the Peronists (see Table 1). Almost

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[6]The analysis in this section draws on sample surveys we conducted in early 2002 in the four regions. We used multistage cluster sampling procedures, based on census tracks. The margin of error was 4.5%.

twice as many voters in Misiones as in Mar del Plata reported that they never split their

ticket, a practice that Almond and Verba (1963) associate with less-developed

democracies and less-reflective electorates. About half as many people in Misiones as in

Mar del Plata got their news from newspapers. And nearly three times as many in

Misiones refused to tell our interviewers how they had voted – a sign, again according to

Almond and Verba, of a closed and fearful political culture. Among the measures

reported in Table 1, only in their subjective sense of being informed about politics did we

find no difference between residents of the two polar regions. Figure 1 illustrates these

trends.

* * * Table 1 and Figure 1 about here * * *

The regions that we studied are located in the same country. The people in these

regions lived through the same national political history, sustained the same set of

political parties, and had basically similar political institutions. Yet people living only a

few hundred miles apart participated in sharply different regional political subcultures

and hence had very different ways of thinking about politics.

They displayed striking differences in their implicit theories of responsive

government. In a series of questions, we posited that governments are sometimes

responsive and asked people to choose among explanations for this responsiveness. In

each case, we asked them to choose between a personalistic response – governments are

responsive when they are staffed by good people – and an institutional or interest

response – governments are responsive because their leaders want to be reelected or

because they want to avoid being sanctioned by the courts or the press. Table 2 shows

responses to two of these questions by region, with the regions listed in declining order of

consolidation. The table shows a monotonic decline in the numbers of respondents, from

the most- to the least-consolidated region, who said that governments provide good

services when they are under the watch of the courts, the congress, or the press. It shows

a near-monotonic increase in the numbers who said that governments provide good

services when they are staffed by good people.

<center>* * * Table 2 about here * * *</center>

But one might well ask whether these are really *regional* differences. The more-

consolidated regions, after all, are also wealthier and have a more equal distribution of

income than the less-consolidated ones; apparent regional effects could be spurious. The

surveys confirm, for instance, that Mar del Plata has the smallest percentage of poor

people and the largest percentage of middle-income people; Misiones, by contrast, has

the largest number of poor people and the fewest middle-class people (see Table 3).

Intuition leads us to expect that wealthier people and those living in more equal regions

would be more likely to hold an institutional theory of government responsiveness, and

be less trusting of unmonitored politicians.

<center>* * * Table 3 about here * * *</center>

Multivariate analysis, reported in Table 4, confirms some of these intuitions.

Some are not confirmed. The *lower* a person's reported income, the greater the

probability that she would attribute good service and responsiveness to politicians'

desires to avoid sanctions and to be reelected. This income effect comes out in the

negative and significant coefficients relating income to *Service* and *Attention* responses in

Table 4. Younger respondents and men were more likely to offer institutional

explanations for responsiveness. But what matters to us here is that the regional effects

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remain, even in the presence of these controls. Respondents from Mar del Plata were

significantly more likely than those from Misiones to offer institutional answers to all

three questions.[7]

* * * Table 4 about here * * *

In fact region shaped people's interpretations of government responsiveness more

powerfully than any other factor. Simulations are useful in illustrating how much more.[8]

Consider the factors that influence the probability of one of our respondent's saying that

governments provide good services when they are "under the watch of the courts, the

congress, or the press" and not when "they are staffed by good, committed people"

(*Service*). Figure 2 reports the simulated predicted probabilities of this answer,

conditional on a whether a person supported the Peronist party or did not, was male or

female, had high or low income, was 91-years-old or 18-years-old (the oldest and

youngest in our samples), and, finally, whether the person lived in Misiones or in Mar del

Plata. Holding all other factors at their sample means, the regional effect predicts a 27%

increase in the probability of the institutional response, a larger effect than any other and

much larger than all others but age. If one wished to predict whether a randomly selected

person held a personalistic or an institutional view of government responsiveness, the

most valuable piece of information is what region he or she lived in.

* * * Figure 2 about here * * *

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[7] The models in Table 4 include dummy variables for three of our four regions: *Buenos Aires*, *Córdoba*, and *Mar del Plata*. The excluded or base region is Misiones. Therefore the coefficients on the regional dummies in the table show the effect of a respondent living in that region in comparison to Misiones.

[8] I generated the simulations using the *Clarify* program (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001, and King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). *Clarify* draws simulations of parameters of statistical models (in this case, logit regressions) from their sampling distribution and then converts these simulated parameters into expected values, such as expected probabilities of an answer to a survey questions, given hypothetical values of explanatory variables. *Clarify* software and documentation are available from Gary King's website at http://Gking.Harvard.edu.

In short, we find strong regional differences in political behaviors and in ways of thinking about politics – differences in what one might call *regional political subcultures*. In a moment I will present statistical evidence that these subcultures are not reducible to structural differences among the regions, but instead are at least partly the product of the contingent choices of political parties and party leaders. The inventive choices of political leaders in one region, Mar del Plata, helped to define good performance by local governments in terms of the provision of public goods, the enactment of sound public policy, and the soliciting of public opinion in matters of common concern. This style of leadership stood in stark contrast to that of leaders elsewhere, who relied on the private payoffs of clientelism to mobilize voter support. Hence in some regions politicians took actions that speeded the consolidation of democracy, whereas in others they slowed this process. Although in some measure politicians' choices were driven by the underlying characteristics of their respective electorates, their actions went beyond mere responsiveness to these characteristics.

To get a feel for some of these choices, consider alternative ways that parties can mobilize electoral support and how these strategies of mobilization varied across regions. Among other strategies, parties can offer private benefits as *quid pro quos* for the votes of individuals, a strategy known as clientelism. Or they can use programmatic appeals, promises to provide public goods, or universalistic programs. We shall see that parties' choices of strategies are in some measure explained by the underlying characteristics of the populations they seek to mobilize. In poor and economically unequal regions, parties have an incentive to use clientelism, in wealthier and more equal regions they have an incentive to adopt universalistic and programmatic appeals.

Yet even when we control for these underlying characteristics of regional electorates we find persistent regional differences. Even though Mar del Plata, for instance, has a relatively affluent electorate and less pro-Peronist than voters in other regions, we still find less clientelism there than we would expect. To explain this absence of clientelism and the region's tilt toward programmatic politics we must take into account the nature and actions of the district's political leadership. This leadership was exemplified in the mid-1900s by mayor Elio Aprile, a philosophy professor on leave from the local branch of the National University. Aprile dreamt up a scheme at the outset of his first term that would allow his administration to undertake an ambitious program of community infrastructural development – everything from tree-plantings to road paving to streetlight installation. To pay for the program, which he called *Mar del Plata 2000*, he held a referendum in which voters would decide whether to impose on themselves a special tax over a period of eight years. Everything about Aprile's effort was innovative. No city had used the device of a referendum to raise its own taxes; in fact the Mar del Plata administration had to deploy a team of lawyers to navigate around Buenos Aires-provincial law, which barred binding referendums. The debate about the proposed special tax, and about using a popular referendum to make this decision, was lively, and attracted national attention. Most remarkable, the referendum was approved, and people in a poor country who suspected politicians of graft agreed to turn substantial amounts of money over to their political leadership for the purpose of securing public goods.

Statistical analysis is consistent with the interpretation that contingent political innovation and not merely structural factors explain differential degrees of democratic consolidation in Argentina. Had parties and leaders chosen different strategies, ones that

one could have imagined them choosing, the cross-regional unevenness in the consolidation of democracy might have been muted.

The impact of contingent choice on the consolidation of democracy comes out when we analyze the relations between voters and political parties. Across regions, people's linkages to political parties differed sharply. And their perceptions of other people's linkages to parties also differed. We asked which party was most popular in the respondent's neighborhood and then asked why people supported this party, whether because it "gave out favors" or because it was "concerned about everyone." In effect, the question asked people to assess the prevalence of clientelism versus a more universalistic politics in their neighborhoods. Less than half the number of respondents in Mar del Plata than in any other region attributed party strength to clientelism (see Table 5). Party strategies – the strategies, that is, of particular parties – vary from region to region.

* * * Table 5 about here * * *

In themselves these regional differences in party strategy are not particularly surprising. Cross-regional differences in the characteristics of electorates would lead us to expect that parties would vary their messages and tactics from place to place in a country. For example, consider a party that was active in a country where people in region *A* were wealthy and people in region *B* poor. Given the diminishing marginal utility of income and given the greater ease of monitoring votes in low-income places, we might expect the party to attempt to garner support in region *A* with programmatic appeals and in region *B* with personal handouts (see Dixit and Londregan 1996, Stokes 2004). In a relatively middle-class community like Mar del Plata, we would expect parties to try to attract support with innovative programs and public goods, such as

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Mayor Aprile's *Mar del Plata 2000*. The relationship between *B*'s poverty, the party's

strategy there, and the consequent regional concentration of clientelism might be as in

Figure 3. The party's strategic choice becomes an intervening factor between the

region's poverty and the prominence of political clientelism there. In statistical terms,

apparent regional differences in clientelism should disappear in the presence of controls

for income: at a given income level, we expect the same strategy and the same

probability of clientelism. Or, to the extent that not the poverty of individuals but the

proportion of poor people living in their community promotes clientelism, then

controlling for characteristics of communities should suppress any apparent effect of

region on clientelism.

<center>* * * Figure 3 about here * * *</center>

But cross-regional differences do not disappear in the presence of controls for

individual and regional poverty, and Figure 3 is therefore not an accurate portrayal of the

causal relations involved. The irreducibility of region comes out in the regressions in

Table 6. All five are logit models of the probability that a respondent would say that

clientelism explains the popularity of the most popular party in his or her neighborhood.

Model 1 shows that perceptions of clientelism are less likely in Mar del Plata (and in

Buenos Aires and Córdoba) than in Misiones (the omitted region). This is true despite

controls for the income, education, gender, age, and party preference of the individual

respondent, and despite a control for the size of the municipality in which the respondent

lives. The next four models in Table 6 control for other features of the communities in

which respondents lived, other features that might explain parties' strategic choices.

Models two and three control for the proportion of poor people in the municipality with

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two measures (measures which are highly collinear): the proportion of people in the

respondent's municipality who live in poor-quality housing, and the proportion whose

income falls below a poverty line and hence leaves them with "unsatisfied basic needs."

A measure of municipal public expenditures per capita in 1998 (models four and five)

allows me to control for level of economic development of the municipality.

* * * Table 6 about here * * *

All of these municipal-level factors have the expected effect: poverty and

inequality encourage clientelism, and municipal economic development discourages it.

But they fail to eliminate the effect of region. Hence the continuing statistical

significance of the coefficient on Mar del Plata dummy variable, despite all of the

individual and municipal controls.

Figure 4 simulates the joint effects of region and poverty on expectations of

clientelism. When we assume a resident of a Misiones municipality with that province's

highest rate of poverty (76%), as measured by the extent of poor-quality housing, the

expected probability of a clientelist response is 59%. When we assume a resident of a

Misiones municipality with the province's *lowest* poverty rate (29%), the probability of a

clientelist response drops to 43%. When we assume a Misiones municipality with Mar

del Plata's poverty rate (8%), the probability of a clientelist response drops to 36%. And

when we assume a resident of Mar del Plata (and a poverty rate of 8%), the probability of

a clientelist response drops to 15%.[9]

* * * Figure 4 about here * * *

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[9] Simulated expected probabilities produced by *Clarify*. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are 49-70% when the proportion of low-quality houses is set at 76%, 39-51% when the proportion of low-quality housing is set at 29%, 25-47% for the Misiones resident and 11-20% for the Mar del Plata resident. We assume a male Peronist sympathizer who in all other respects is average for the sample.

My inability to make regional effects go away, even in the presence of controls for factors that differ by region and that influence party strategy, suggests that they are not spurious stand-ins for characteristics of individuals that also vary by region, nor are they spurious stand-ins for structural features of communities. They represent *choices* that political leaders have made, choices that are not, in turn, explained – or at least not entirely explained – by the distinctive characteristic of regional electorates and hence the distinctive regional incentives that regional parties face. These are choices that might have gone differently. Mar del Plata, for instance, might not have elected a mayor who turned out (somewhat to the electorate's surprise) to be the activist and innovator that he was. In this sense, the outcomes – political mobilization via particularistic rewards and vote buying in one region, via programmatic appeals and past performance in another – are contingent.

Conclusion

Outcomes are contingent when they are the product of interacting factors, or a sequence of events, or the choices of actors, and when these interactions, sequences, and choices are far from inevitable. Regions can have contingent effects on political outcomes, and regional differences can themselves be contingent outcomes.

I have distinguished between contingencies and non-contingencies, and between regional effects and effects that are not regional. Table 7 reviews examples offered in the paper of democratization and democratic consolidation that fall in the four categories suggested by these two distinctions. The upper-left-hand cell offers the example of the encouraging effect of equality on democratization. The causal force that equality plays on democracy thus approaches more closely than the other examples in Table 7 a

universal effect: it is non-contingent and equally powerful across regions. The equality

effect is empirically well documented and stands on firm theoretical grounds (i.e., the

more equal the distribution of resources, the less upper-income actors fear being

expropriated under democracy; see Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2004). And

empirical evidence of its existence comes from all regions of the world. The lower-left-

hand cell offers the example, drawn from the writings of Przeworski and his coauthors, of

democratization as a non-regional chance event. The death of a dictator (among other

possible contingencies) produces a chance opening for democratization, but there is no

regional unevenness in the mortality rates of dictators. In the upper-right-hand cell,

diffusion and contagion exemplify dynamics that are regional – differentially effective

within and outside of a region – and yet non-contingent. It is *ex ante* highly probable that

holdout regimes will be under more pressure, or perceive themselves to be under more

pressure, to democratize than are early democratizers.

<center>* * * Table 7 about here * * *</center>

The lower-right-hand cell, finally, offers an example of democratization

(democratic consolidation) where both regional effects and contingency are at work. A

party leadership chooses a strategy for mobilizing voters. Its choice diffuses through its

regional constituencies ideas and practices that encourage or impede democratic

consolidation. That other leaders in other regions choose other strategies, and that these

choices cannot be reduced to structural differences among the regions, underscores the

contingency of the regional unevenness in consolidation.

A heightened sensitivity to specific regional dynamics of democratization and

democratic consolidation, and to the contingency sometimes entailed in these dynamics,

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may help counterbalance the determinism and universalism of earlier accounts of democratic transitions. Chance interventions can help consolidate regional democracy, just as chance events can lead countries to democratize. Of course chance interventions and low-probability choices can undermine democracy and encourage dictatorship, as we saw they did in Brazil. And recent U.S. policy in the Middle East cautions us to pay attention to what may be very real structural limitations for democratic transitions. This policy also reminds us that we must understand the role of regional particularities in making democratization more or less likely. Understanding just how far structural determinants take us in explaining democratization, and how much more is due to contingency, chance, and choice can only improve social science and public policy.

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Table 1 Argentina: Cross-Regional Variation in Democratic Participation

	Peronist Supporters	Never splits tickets	Politically uninformed	Reads newspaper	Refused to report voting decision
Mar del Plata	14% (65)	39% (187)	13% (62)	61% (294)	4% (17)
Buenos Aires	27% (127)	49% (232)	16% (74)	47% (225)	4% (19)
Córdoba	30% (139)	62% (296)	24% (116)	34% (163)	8% (39)
Misiones	47% (216)	65% (312)	12% (56)	38% (183)	11% (54)

Figure 1

Political Behaviors by Region

Legend:
- ◆ Peronist Supporters
- ■ Never Splits Ticket
- ▲ Uninformed
- ■ Doesn't Read Papers
- ■ Rufused to Report Vote

X-axis: Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Misiones

Y-axis: percent (0–70)

Table 2 Responses to Questions About Responsive Government, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Services When governments provide good services to the people, is this because					
they are under the watch of the courts, congress, or the press	65% (311)	56% (268)	48% (232)	40% (192)	52% (1003)
because they are good, committed people	30% (142)	40% (192)	40% (194)	53% (256)	41% (784)
no answer	6% (27)	4% (20)	11% (54)	7% (32)	7% (133)
Attention When politicians really pay attention to people like you, is this because					
they want to be reelected	85% (410)	80% (386)	78% (365)	78% (365)	81% (1546)
they really care	12% (55)	17% (83)	16% (76)	18% (87)	16% (301)
no answer	3% (15)	2% (11)	6% (29)	4% (18)	4% (73)

Table 3 Argentine Income Levels by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones
Low Income	27%	33%	34%	57%
Middle Income	59%	51%	53%	39%
High Income	14%	16%	12%	5%
TOTAL	101%	100%	99%	101%

Low: up to 300 pesos per month.
Middle: 301 to 1,000 pesos per month.
High: More than 1,001 pesos per month.

Table 4 Logit Models of Responses to Questions about Government Responsiveness

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	*Service*	*Attention*
Income	**-0.085** (0.035)	**-0.125** (0.044)
Education	0.057 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.040)
Housing	0.013 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.092)
Gender	**-0.277** (0.096)	-0.069 (0.128)
Age	**-0.012** (0.003)	-0.005 (-0.004)
Peronist supporter	**-0.244** (0.115)	**-0.432** (0.150)
Radical supporter	-0.065 (0.149)	0.023 (0.200)
Log Population	-0.021 (0.030)	0.031 (0.038)
Buenos Aires	**0.633** (0.151)	0.065 (0.195)
Córdoba	**0.553** (0.139)	0.234 (0.182)
Mar del Plata	**1.098** (0.169)	**0.526** (0.228)
Constant	**0.867** (0.399)	**2.339** (0.524)
N observations	1920	1920

These and all subsequent regressions draw on five datasets with imputed values for missing data, generated with the *Amelia* program described in King et al. (2001) and implemented in Honaker et al. (2001). **Boldface** indicates coefficients where $p<0.001$; the numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Figure 2

Simulated Expected Probability of Beliefs in Institutional Explanations of Government Responsiveness

Simulation executed with *Clarify* program (see footnote 7). Independent variables held at their sample means.

Table 5 Views of Reasons why Neighbors Support Locally Prominent Party, by Region

	Mar del Plata	Buenos Aires	Córdoba	Misiones	Total
Favor Do people support this part because					
It has done them some favor	16% (77)	45% (215)	37% (175)	35% (166)	29% (564)
It is concerned for everyone	52% (250)	42% (200)	43% (204)	45% (217)	69% (1330)
no answer	32% (153)	14% (65)	21% (101)	20% (97)	22% (416)

Figure 3 Party Strategy of Clientelism as an Intervening Factor between Regional Poverty and the Regional Prominence of Clientelism

Poverty ⟶ Clientelist strategy ⟶ Regional prominence of clientelism

Table 6 Logit Models of the Probability of Respondents Reporting that Campaign Handouts Explain their Neighbors' Support of Locally Popular Party (*Handout*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Income	-0.057	-0.046	-0.045	-0.022	-0.017
	(0.036)	(.036)	(0.036)	(0 .044)	(0 .044)
Education	0.044	0.055	0.053	0.024	0.022
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(.033)	(0 .033)
Housing	-0.030	0 .032	0.036	0 .011	0.009
	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0 .078)	(0.078)
Gender	0.056	0.064	0.068	0.040	0.042
	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0 .111)	(0 .111)
Age	-0.000	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0 .004)
Peronist	**-0.487**	**-0.743**	**-0.747**	**-0.497**	**-0.503**
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0 .129)	(0.129)
Radical	**-0.623**	**-0.826**	**-0.816**	**-0.643**	**-0.666**
	(0.178)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0 .187)	(0.189)
Log population	0.061	0.002	-0.007	-0.059	-0.025
	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.049)
Buenos Aires	**-0.489**	-0.029	-0.196	0.0156	0.256
	(0.169)	(0.224)	(0.185)	(0 .211)	(0.239)
Córdoba	**-0.414**	-0.126	-0.199	-0.038	0.226
	(0.182)	(0.234)	(0.221)	(0.267)	(0.298)
Mar del Plata	**-1.956**	**-1.147**	**-1.283**	**-1.110**	**-0.864**
	(0.234)	(0.259)	(0.225)	(0.284)	(0 .313)
Proportion low-quality housing		**1.422**			1.130
		(0.581)			(0.049)
Proportion unsatisfied basic needs			**0.030**		
			(0.013)		
Muncipal Expenditures per capita				**-0.002**	**-.0013**
				(0.0005)	(.0005)
Constant	-0.389	-0.245	-0.179	1.047	0.1326
	(0.547)	(0.603)	(0.606)	(0.505)	(0 .814)
N observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

Figure 4 Simulated Expected Percentages who say their Neighbors Support Parties because of Clientelist Inducements, in Misiones and Mar del Plata, under Varying Poverty Rates (Housing Quality)

Simulated expected percentages, generated by *Clarify* (see footnote 7). The simulations assume a male Peronist sympathizer who in all other respects is typical of our sample (i.e., other independent variables held at their sample means).

Table 7 Examples of Contingent and Non-Contingent Effects, and Regional and Non-Regional Effects, on Democratization

	Non-Regional Effect	**Regional Effect**
Non-Contingent Effect	Equality on democratization (African example)	Diffusion and contagion (Chile pressured to democratize after other L.A. dictators have fallen)
Contingent Effect	Chance events – e. g., death of dictator	Party leaders choose strategies that either promote or inhibit regional democratic consolidation (Argentina)