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*The Salafiyya Movement in Northwest China:
Islamic Fundamentalism among the Muslim Chinese?*

Dru C. Gladney

Moving slowly down one of the main alleyways of the concentrated Bafang ("eight districts") Muslim quarter of Hezhou, known as the "Little Mecca" among China's Muslims for its large collection of influential mosques, tomb complexes, and madrassahs, a young Hui Muslim stopped to peruse one of the many Islamic periodicals and commentaries laid out on a ground cloth by a peripatetic Muslim book salesman. Hezhou, now known as Linxia, is the most likely place in China proper where one might find Persian poetry and short stories for sale on the street. As China's Hui Muslims speak the mainly Chinese dialects in the areas where they live across the length and breadth of China, very few of them get beyond the memorization of the standard Quranic *suras* in Arabic, even fewer begin to actually read Quranic Arabic or go on to the Persian commentaries. It is indicative of Hezhou's place as the heart of Islam in China, therefore, to find Muslims fluent enough in Persian to make it profitable to reprint and sell short stories and poetry from Iran. Located at a traditional cross-roads in southwestern Gansu, on the lower escarpments of the Tibetan-Qinghai plateau, it grew up as a redistributive center linking the wool, tea, and opium trades between the Northwestern Silk Route and the Southwestern Burma Road. From Hezhou many Muslims travelled to and from the Muslim Middle East on missions of trade and pilgrimage. Upon their return, they

helped establish Hezhou as the "Chinese Mecca," a pilgrimage center that drew many local and foreign Muslim travelers, which is still the heart of Islam in China today. Like most other Islamic reform movements in China, Hezhou is where the Salafiyya gained their first foothold on the China mainland.

Deciding not to spend the exorbitant 8.30 yuan for the Chinese introduction to Islamic Orders in China by the renowned Hui scholar Ma Tong, a book that lists for 1.50 yuan in the State-run bookstores (had it not been bought out long ago by Islamic booksellers), the Hui youth turned to go back to his noodle stand in the central square. It was not until he reached the great Southern Gate Mosque, an Yihewani Mosque that boasts over 10,000 members, that he noticed another Hui walking ahead of him, similarly dressed as himself, but with his hair cut slightly longer, just touching the back of the collar of his faded-blue Mao jacket.

Calling out in his thick Hezhou dialect, he said: "Hey you *Munafele* (Arabic for 'nominal Muslim'), who do you think you are, walking through our district with your hair cut like that!"

The Hui in front of him stopped, and cursed: "You *Zhuhuda* (Persian for 'Jew'), I can go wherever I want, *Anla* ('Allah') is here to protect me. You should be the one that's worried: where is *Zhenzhu* (Chinese for 'true Lord,' or Allah) when you need him -- too distant to do you any good."

"*Makeluhai*" (Arabic, 'troublesome ghost')! Stop coming here or I'll send you to *Duozehe* (Persian, 'hades, hell') and *Shefaerti* (Arabic, the advocacy of Muhammad on the day of judgement) will refuse to recognize you with that long hair!"

Knives were drawn, but just before the fight got nasty, several bystanders jumped in to break them up.

"Those 'Three Prostrationers' (Chinese, *santai jiao*), they are always fighting over something," one of the men standing next to me explained.

"These 'new new teachings' (*xinxin jiao*) are worse than the Sufis ever were."

The Hezhou Hui beside me, a member of the traditional Gedimu Islamic order, went on to explain that the two young men were rival members of two recent divisions within the Salafiyya, which he knew only as the "teaching of the three salutations" (*Santai jiao*) in China, for their unusual practice of raising their hands three times instead of the usual one during *namaz*, or prayer. While they themselves reject this label as demeaning, they are well known throughout the Northwest as the "*Santaijiao*" and few non-members I spoke with knew them by their order, the Salafiyya (Chinese, *Sailaifeiye*). It seemed that a recent debate had sprung up dividing the Salafiyya, who arose in China in 1930s from among the Yihewani. The current debate was sparked by a 1984 Chinese translation of the Quran, the first translation since the last issue in 1941, before the founding of the People's Republic. One particular *sura* (7:54) had been translated in the earlier version as stating that "Allah is exalted above the throne of the affairs of the world" (*shengshan baozuo shi shijie zhi wai de*). This *sura* was retranslated in the newer version as: "Allah is seated upon the throne of the affairs of the world." One group of Salafiyya, interpreting the passage metaphorically, maintained that the earlier translation was more true to the original Arabic, arguing that Allah was transcendent, above the affairs of man. Allah, they maintained, was exalted *above* the affairs of men; it was not possible for him to be positioned upon a throne. By contrast, the other faction maintained that Allah was indeed pervasive, ever-present and immanent in society, overseeing the affairs of humankind from upon his throne. Thus, the debate initiated a dispute not unlike the medieval Christian immanentist controversies. In China, the "transcendentalists" among the Salafiyya cut their hair short, indicating their interpretation of the earlier text. The "immanentists," on the other hand, let their hair grow longer, reaching the top of their collars, signifying Allah's presence in

the world. This dispute led to the altercation on the street which I witnessed and the closing of mosques once the State was brought in to adjudicate. The State eventually ruled in favor of the "transcendentalists," who followed the earlier translation of the Quran, and did not allow the "immanentists" to practice their teaching publicly or open mosques, in the name of preserving "ethnic solidarity" (*minzu tuanjie*), a State-sponsored slogan promoted in minority areas whereby minorities are urged to unite together with the Han as members of one new "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*, see Gladney 1991).

While I was not able to learn much more about this current dispute within the Salafiyya, the rise of the Salafiyya itself in the last sixty years in Northwest China provides an excellent illustration of the nature of Islamic reform movements in China. In this paper I argue that the Salafiyya in China represent one of the more recent "tides" of Islamic reform movements in China, which follows the contours of many of these earlier movements. While it may be tempting to label all of these reform movements as "fundamentalist," in that each has sought to renew Islam in China by calling Muslims back to the basic ideals of their faith as embodied in the Quran as well as the practices of the earliest Islamic communities, it is also misleading in that "fundamentalism" has often been associated with radical, highly politicized movements. It also may be unhelpful to seek to understand a religious reform movement in China's Muslim hinterland by other movements labelled "fundamentalist" in the Islamic heartlands, or by notions of fundamentalism developed through the study of Protestant Christianity. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a recent Islamic movement in China that could well be termed "fundamentalist," in that it calls Muslims back to the early ancestral teaching of their faith, but is as yet unpolitical in its stance *vis-a-vis* the State. A corollary argument in this paper will be to outline the extraordinary historical and

contemporary diversity among Islamic movements and their followers in China, and how Islam has become uniquely situated in the Chinese cultural and political context.

Hence, the term "fundamentalism" is misleading when applied to this Islamic movement in China, which is as yet reformist, quietest, and non-political. This movement is in keeping with the beginning of many if not most of the Islamic reform movements which have influenced the wide diversity of Islamic identities and associations across China today. These movements, then, have been at once *orthodoxic* and *orthopraxic*: they called for both strict adherence to the original texts *and* moral practices, which they argued, had become too acculturated to specifically *Chinese* traditions. Theirs was not a reaction to the West -- as other fundamentalist movements which perhaps gained their greatest impetus in resistance to colonial and cultural assaults on Islam -- but to the East. They objected to the accretion of indigenized Chinese practices and beliefs over 1200 years of Islam's tenure in China. As Muslim reformers, both foreign and Chinese, travelled between China and the Islamic heartlands, they took what they found in the pilgrimage cities as the standard for their critique of Islam in China, arguing that Islam in China had strayed too far from the "center" -- not realizing, of course, that in the interim, the so-called "center," if it ever really existed at all, had also moved. While the orthodoxy and centrality of the so-called Islamic Middle Eastern "core" may be doubted by recent scholars, and the validity of the center-periphery model questioned (Abu-Lughod 1989:268-70), Muslims in China certainly continue to regard it, and anyone coming from the Muslim heartlands, as somehow more closely attuned to the core of Islam than themselves. This underscores the salience of continued interaction and travel with the Middle East.

This illustrates a point frequently made by the late Joseph Fletcher: far from being isolated from Islamic movements in the Middle East, China was often on the cusp of religious change through its not infrequent contacts with the Islamic

heartlands, particularly when those movements arose during certain "open door" periods when access to the Middle East was more practicable. While the founder of the Salafiyya, Muhammad ^CAbduh (d. 1905), was known to have had a profound influence on the Young Tunisians, Ben Badis in Algeria, and ^CAllal al-Fasi in Morocco, few, except perhaps Joseph Fletcher, would have suspected that ^CAbduh's influence would have led to considerable upheavals in China as well. But this influence was never only one sided. China's Muslims were confronted by both the Muslim and Chinese worlds. Interestingly, the very critique of Islamic movements in China often took on a decidedly Chinese tone, in that in order to survive the orders had to legitimate themselves *vis-à-vis* the Chinese Empire or State, which was generally brought in to judge between the disputants, and "orthodoxy" frequently was decided according to entirely non-Islamic criteria.

While many have considered the Sufi reform movements of the 17-18th century as the most fundamentalistic and divisive throughout the history of Islamic reform in China, leading, it is generally thought, to several large-scale Muslim rebellions in the 18th and 19th centuries, I have chosen the Salafiyya as a means of contesting that received wisdom. It was not Sufism *per se* that was disruptive in China, but it was the problematic of any reform movement which posed a challenge to local authority: by seeking to reform Islam according to an authoritative tradition that was higher than and outside of the Chinese court, each of these movements posed a tacit threat to the Chinese State, that was at times difficult to ignore.

The Salafiyya, then, became but the most recent of several Islamic reform movements in China, illustrating many of the issues these movements encountered as they sought to reconcile Islamic ideals with local Muslim practice in the context of the Chinese State. I must note that this paper at this stage must remain only a basic introduction to the rise of the Salafiyya in the context of these prior movements, as I have yet to follow-up on many of the leads that I encountered among the Salafiyya

while doing my field research in Northwest China between 1983-86. Since then, though I have returned to China several times and found that the Salafiyya are still one of the fastest growing Islamic movements in China, I have not spent enough time in Northwest China to fully examine the movement.¹ During my original fieldwork in China, I lived in a Sufi Naqshbandi community in the Northwestern region of Ningxia, concentrating more on the range of Islamic diversity between that village and more urban and secular communities I also studied (see Gladney 1991). I became only interested in the Salafiyya as I encountered their vibrant activities (and conflagrations) on the streets of China's Muslim towns and villages. This paper, therefore, is a background piece that is intended to situate the Salafiyya in the context of the rise of other reform movements in China which, though quite different in terms of ideology and Islamic practice, struggled with some of the similar issues of reconciling the ideal with the real, the high standards of their recent Islamic interpretations with the actual social practices of Muslims. In order to understand the rise of the Salafiyya and the dynamic character of their movement, then, we must first consider the background of previous reform movements in China, outlining the tremendous diversity of Islamic practice that the Salafiyya continue to encounter and, in some cases, contest throughout China today.

Three Modes of Islamic Reform among Hui Muslims in China

The Hui are the most numerous of 10 Muslim nationalities recognized by the State in China. Numbering more than half of China's nearly 20 million Muslims, the Hui are classified by the State as the one Muslim minority that does not have a specific language shared by all of its members. The others include eight Turkish-Altai Muslim language groups in China (Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tatar, Salar, Bonan, Dongxiang) and one Indo-European Tadjik nationality. Unlike these other groups who are concentrated primarily in China's Northwest near the Sino-

Soviet frontier, the Hui have communities in 97% of China's counties, with concentrations in the Northwest (Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region), the Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou), and the North China plain (Hebei, Henan, Shandong). They are the largest urban ethnic minority in most of China's cities (200,000 in Beijing, 150,000 in Tianjin, and 50,000 in Shanghai), and they traditionally dominated certain trades throughout China (noodle, beef, and lamb restaurants, leather-making, jewelry-making, and wool-trading).

While the Hui have been labelled as the "Chinese-speaking Muslims" or "Chinese Muslims," this is misleading since many Hui speak only the non-Chinese dialects where they live, such as the Tibetan, Mongolian, Thai, and Hainan Muslims, who are also classified by the State as Hui. Yet most Hui are closer to the Han Chinese than the other Muslim nationalities in terms of demographic proximity and cultural accommodation, adapting many of their Islamic practices to Han ways of life, which often became the source for many of the criticisms of the Muslim reformers. In the past, this was not as great a problem for the Turkish and Indo-European Muslim groups, as they were traditionally more isolated from the Han and their identities not as threatened, though this has begun to change in the last 40 years. Cultural proximity of the Hui and Han may account for some of the dynamics and urgency of Islamic reforms among Hui Muslim communities. As they have no single language of their own, and are so widely dispersed, the Hui did not originally conceive of themselves as one nationality. As a result of the State-sponsored nationality identification campaigns over the course of the last 30 years they have begun to think of themselves as a national ethnic group, something more than just "Muslims," which is what the term "Hui" originally meant. "Islam" in China was known as the "religion of the Hui" (*Hui jiao*) until the nationalist campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s classified the Hui as one among several nationalities who believed in Islam. The Hui became the residual Muslim group that contained anyone who did not fit the

more stringent linguistic categories, many of which had been previously established in the Soviet Union (Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar, Uighur, etc.) The Hui are also unique among the 55 identified nationalities in China in that they are the only nationality for whom religion is the only unifying category of identity. Through a process of State-influenced ethnogenesis and transnational association, the Hui, like other nationalities such as the Uighur (see Gladney 1990), began to think of themselves as one nationality category officially recognized by the State, and eventually as one ethnic group. Now, one can travel throughout China and meet people who identify themselves solely as Hui -- only later does one find that within the Hui there are tremendous linguistic, cultural, and religious differences.

Resulting from a succession of Islamic reform movements that swept across China over the last 600 years, one finds among the Hui today a wide spectrum of Islamic belief. The variety of religious orders within Hui Islam represent a history of reforms and Islamic movements that derived from both interaction with and isolation from the Islamic world. The late Joseph Fletcher (1988) was the first to suggest that the nature of China's present-day Islamic communities and orders can be traced to successive "tides" of influence and individuals who entered China during critical periods of exchange with the outside world. Like a swelling and ebbing tide, Fletcher argued that the influence of these movements grew or diminished with the interaction of China's Muslims and the Islamic world. This influence was not based on population movements so much as the gradual and profound exchanges of ideas between the two regions. Fletcher's argument profoundly influenced mine thinking on the history of Islam in China, but reflection on the Salafiyya has led me to reject his metaphor of "tides" of Islam, for it suggests not only uni-directional movement (from the Middle East to China), but also the notion that there was one moment, individual, or movement that touched all of China's Muslims and transformed them in one wave of religious reformation. In reality, what we find on the ground among

China's Muslim is enormous complexity, discontinuity, and continued co-existence of a wide variety of religious orders. Each new "tide" or religious movement did not replace the former movements; rather, they debated each other, sometimes violently, and have generally established uneasy coexistences. They were also not only one-way. As we shall see in the following discussion, China's Muslims, and Chinese culture, exerted as much if not more influence on the movements that came into China from the Middle East, as the other way around. Moreover, each "tide" is not easily isolated to one narrow period of time, but hundreds of Islamic movements spread throughout China over the course of a millennia, and many of them are just as vibrant today as they were from the beginning.

I will argue instead that these tides are better understood as "modes" of Islamic reform that were in conjunction with other Islamic movements that spread throughout the Islamic world, reaching China when it became more open politically, economically, or even, philosophically to the outside world. Newer movements did not replace earlier modes of belief in China. It helped to define them. So, for example, the association known as the "Gedimu" in China today are not one "tide" (Fletcher's first) of Islam in China, but represent within themselves a wide variety of Islamic practices and organizational orientations that are similar only in their rejection of later Sufi and Wahhabi inspired reform movements. Followers of traditional Islam in China only began to define themselves as "Gedimu" or "old teachings" when newer "new teachings" and reform movements rose in their midst and criticized them. Though these newer modes of Islamic practice and belief drew their converts from the earlier Muslim communities, they did not replace them entirely, and provided only new alternatives for Muslims in China to choose from. In my earlier work (Gladney 1991:) I noted that these represented a "wide spectrum" of religious alternatives for Muslims in China to choose from; what I did not emphasize was the different modalities that each kind of movement represented, and why some

were more appealing than others. Observing the rising appeal of the Salafiyya during my research in China, and the different kind of "mode" of Islamic practice and orientation it represented, convinced me that this was yet another important stage for Islam in China, one that would contend with and contest, but never completely replace other Islamic modes of practice among Muslims in China. Following Bourdieu (1977), this approach favors examining the "habitus" or style of actual habituated practice that this new mode of Islamic reform represents for certain Muslims in China, rather than examining its entire theology or history. Unlike Bourdieu, however, I will argue that it is much more than the practicalities of class and the socio-economic milieu which gives the Salafiyya its appeal among certain Muslims in China today, but it is also the nature of Islam's relation with the Chinese State and the modern condition that provides its rationale and distinguishes it from other modes of Islamic practice.² For it is often ritual practice which distinguishes Islamic affiliation in China and elsewhere (indeed, the term given for the Salafiyya by outsiders in China is "the three prostrations teaching" *santaijiao*), but this practice is only an icon indicating the appeal of one movement over another for Muslim believers in the Northwest enmeshed in the Chinese State and society.

While this study does not begin to address Islam's complex history in China, an introduction to the context of Islamic reforms is necessary for an understanding of the rise of Islamic reform movements in China. Each of these "modes" can be characterized by certain kinds of related and successive reform movements seeking to reform Islam in China by reference to discursive and moral standards encountered in the Middle East by Muslims from China on the Hajj, or preached by peripatetic Middle Eastern representatives of these movements in China. The somewhat quixotic quest of these Muslims at the distant edge of Islamic expansion for the fundamentals of their faith, and the dialectic interaction between periphery and center, society

and State, engendered the rise of a series of reformist tides that washed across the China Islamic hinterland.

The First Mode: "Gedimu" Traditional Chinese Islam

The earliest Muslim communities were descended from the Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim merchants, militia, and officials who settled along China's Southeast Coast and in the Northwest in large and small numbers from the 7th to the 14th centuries. Generally residing in independent small communities clustered around a central mosque, they only became later known as the Gedimu (from the Arabic qadīm, "old") when later Islamic movements criticized them as "old" and antiquated. The mode for these communities was characterized by what Jonathan Lipman (1984) terms a "patchwork" of relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and urban enclaves, who related with each other via trading networks and recognition of belonging to the wider Islamic "Umma." For these communities, it was Sunni, Hanafi Islam that became so standard that few Hui with whom I spoke in the Northwest had even heard of Shi'ism, even though the Iran/Iraq war was at its height during my fieldwork and in the daily news.³

These earliest Islamic communities established an consistent pattern of zealously preserving and protecting their identity as enclaves ensconced in the dominant Han society. Each village was centered upon a single mosque headed by an Ahong (from the Persian, akhun[d]) who was invited to teach on a more or less temporary basis. These Ahong generally moved on an average of every three years from one mosque to another. A council of senior local elders and Ahong were responsible for the affairs of each village and the inviting of the itinerant Imam. Late 19th century and early 20th century travelers noted the maintenance of these isolated communities. "I know of no strictly farming village where there is an equal mixture of the two groups [Han and Hui];" Ekvall (1939:19) observed, "in every case

the village is predominantly one or the other. In some instances, the population is composed almost entirely of one group, with only a few hangers-on of the other." He goes on to suggest that due to different cultural, ritual, and dietary preferences that sometimes led to open conflict, the communities preferred physical separation.

This isolation was mitigated somewhat during the collectivization campaigns in the 1950s, when Han and Hui villages were often administered as clusters by a single commune. They have also been brought closer together through national telecommunications and transportation networks established by the State, including such umbrella organizations as the China Islamic Association, established in 1955, which seeks to coordinate religious affairs among all Muslim groups. With the recent dismantling of the commune in many areas, however, these homogeneous Hui communities are once again becoming more segregated. While these disparate communities among the Gedimu were generally linked only by trade and a sense of a common religious heritage, an attachment to the basic Islamic beliefs as handed down to them by their ancestors, it was the entré of the Sufi brotherhoods into China that eventually began to link many of these isolated communities together through extensive socioreligious networks.

A Second Mode: Sufi Communities and National Networks

Sufism did not begin to make a substantial impact in China until the late 17th century, during the second mode of Islam's entrance into China.⁴ Like Sufi centers that proliferated after the 13th century in other countries (Trimingham 1971:10), many of these Sufi movements in China developed socioeconomic and religiopolitical institutions built around the schools established by descendants of early Sufi saintly leaders. The institutions became known in Chinese as the menhuan, the "leading" or "saintly" descent groups.⁵

The important contribution that Sufism made to religious organization in China was that the leaders of mosques throughout their order owed their allegiance to their shaykh, the founder of the order who appointed them. These designated followers were loyal to the leader of their order and remained in their prayer communities for long periods of time, unlike the Gedimu Among who were generally itinerant, not well connected to the community, and less imbued with appointed authority. Gedimu mosque elders were loyal to their congregation first, and connected only by trade to other communities.

Many Sufi reforms spread throughout Northwest China during the early decades of the Qing dynasty (mid-17th to the early 18th centuries). Increased travel and communication between Muslims, both east and west, during what Fletcher terms the "general orthodox revival" of the 18th century and A.H. Johns (1991:174) refers to as the "second expansion", had great influence on Muslims from West Africa to Indonesia, and not least of all, on China's Hui Muslims (see Voll 1982:33-86; Rahman 1968:237-60). Exposure to these new ideas led to a reformulation of traditional Islamic concepts that rendered them more salient, posing a challenge to traditional clerical and State authorities alike.

While a mystical interpretation and social organization were perhaps Sufism's most lasting contributions to Islam in China, the public conflict between Sufi's and non-Sufi's was over the contested turf of Islamic practice. Sufis criticized traditional Hui Muslims for being *too Chinese*: materialistic, bound to their mosques, incense, and Chinese texts, and refusing to fully experience the presence of Allah in their worship. They condemned the non-Sufis for their use of Chinese in worship, adorning their mosques with Chinese Quranic quotations and hadith. They condemned the Muslims for wearing traditional Chinese white funeral dress and sullyng Islam with many other Chinese cultural practices, calling for a purified return to the aescetic ideals of the Prophet and his early followers. They also offered

a more immediate experience of Islam through the rituals of remembrance and meditation, and the efficacy of the Saint, instead of the daunting memorization and recitation of Quranic texts. While theirs was a reformist movement, it was less textual than experiential, revealing the power of Allah and his Saints to transform lives through miracles, healings, and other transformative acts.

Sufi orders were gradually institutionalized into sociopolitical organizations known in China as the menhuan.⁶ Only four orders maintain significant influence among the Hui today, what Claude Pickens (1942) as a Protestant missionary in Northwest China first discovered as the four menhuan of China: the Qadiriyya, Khufiyya, Jahriyya, and Kubrawiyya (see Ma Tong 1983; Mian 1981:45-117; Yang, In Press). While these are the four main menhuan, they are subdivided into a myriad of smaller branch solidarities, divided along ideological, political, geographical and historical lines. As William Roff (1985) notes in his seminal article on Southeast Asian Islam, these divisions and alliances reveal the disparities encountered between the indigenous practice of Islam in China and new Islamic ideals as represented by returned Hajji or itinerant foreign preachers who maintained, in their eyes, more "orthodox" interpretations of Islam.

It is unfortunate but perhaps quite natural that Western scholarship has prolonged the confusion of early Chinese writers over the rise of Sufism and later Islamic orders in China. As each Islamic reformer established a new following in China, often in conflict with other older Islamic orders, these "new" arrivals challenged or converted the "old" traditional Islamic communities. Chinese officials and even less knowledgeable Muslims from the beginning naturally referred to these communities with their new teachings as "xin jiao" (lit., "new religion" or "teaching," not "new sect" as it has been erroneously translated). As each new arrival replaced the older, they became known as the "new," or even "new new" teachings ("xin xin jiao"), as in the case of the arrival of the Ikhwan in China.

Traditional Islam among the Hui generally was referred to as "lao jiao," the old teaching(s)," and even some orders that were new at one time, when others arrived were gradually classed as old teaching, lao jiao. This was the case with the Khufiyya, an early Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, which itself is now classified as an "old teaching" (see below), even though when it first flowered in China as a Sufi reform movement it was known as a "new" teaching.

It was often the case that those who regarded themselves as maintaining the established traditional beliefs of Islam in China represented the reformers, who were their critics, as "new," and thus, suspect, while they portrayed themselves as "old," or more true to their traditions. The reformers, on the other hand, generally thought of themselves as the more orthodox, based on a more informed, sometimes esoteric, interpretation of Islam due to more recent contact with movements in the Muslim heartlands. They thus resented the title of "new teachings," or the even more derisive "new new teachings," calling themselves by the more exact names of their orders, Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Wahhabi, Yihewani, etc. The stigmata, "new teachings" or "new sects," stuck as they were applied not only by their critics, but often by the State as well. Even the name, *Gedimu*, for the "older" Islamic communities in China, is a not-so-subtle jibe at the other Islamic orders as being *newer*, and removed from the traditional fundamentals of Islam in China. Hence in China we find a continued contestation over orthodox discourse, the goal of each Islamic movement seeking to portray itself as loyal to the original ideals, the spirit as well as the texts, of Islam. As each movement sought to exert taxonomic control over the labelling of itself and its rivals, the State was often called in to adjudicate, leading to further debates over legitimacy according to the categories of the State. No longer Islamic, these criteria were often Confucian or legalistic in content, seeking to judge a movement's compatibility with the Chinese order.

The designations of the movements thus became important politically as well as theologically. For example, during the mid-nineteenth century Northwest rebellions, some of which were led by Sufi leaders, the Chinese State proscribed all of those movements that became known as "new teachings" in order to root out what they saw as the more rebellious Hui communities. The State became convinced by opponents to the largely Sufi-led uprisings that they were all similarly "new," and thus, suspect. This is precisely the rationale whereby a wide variety of Buddhist sectarian movements were proscribed under the general rubric of the "White Lotus" rebellion in China, whereas recent scholarship has revealed only a few Buddhist movements fell under the shadow of that stem (Naquin 1976). Unfortunately, Chinese and Western scholars perpetuated these designations of "new" and "old" teachings and until recently there were no accurate representations of the Hui's own history of their Islamic orders in China (see Israeli 1978:155-80). The post-1979 opening of China to the West has allowed the appearance of Chinese publications on these groups as well as Western fieldwork for the first time, giving us a better, albeit still quite limited, glimpse into their origins and socioreligious complexity. As we consider the Salafiyya, we shall see that these depictions by outsiders continue to plague Muslim reform movements and their quest for legitimacy.

The Qadiriyya

While there is some dispute among the Sufis themselves as to which order was the earliest to enter China proper, as there had been regular contacts on an individual basis with the Sufi orders of Central Asia that had already begun to proliferate in Xinjiang in the early part of the 15th century, it is generally agreed that one of the earliest to be established firmly on Chinese soil was the Qadiri *tariqa* ("path," or Islamic "order"). The founder of the Qadiriyya menhuan in China is Qi Jingyi, Hilal al-Din (1656-1719). Known among the Hui as Qi Daozu (Grand Master Qi), he was buried in Linxia's "great tomb" (da gongbei) shrine complex, which became

the center of Qadiriyya Sufism in China (Gladney 1987:507-8). One of the reasons that Grand Master Qi continues to be greatly revered among all Sufis in China is that the tradition suggests he received his early training under two of the most famous Central Asian Sufi teachers, Khoja Afaq and Khoja Abd Alla. Qi Jingyi supposedly met with the revered Naqshbandi leader Khoja Afaq in Xining in 1672, where according to Qadiriyya records, the master sent the 16 year old acolyte home, saying "I am not your teacher, my ancient teaching is not to be passed on to you, your teacher has already crossed the Eastern Sea and arrived in the Eastern land. You must therefore return home quickly, and you will become a famous teacher in the land" (in Ma Tong 1983:330). Qadiriyya followers today feel that their saint received the blessing of the great Naqshbandi Khoja Afaq, while their order was formally founded by his second teacher, Khoja Abd Alla, a 29th generation descendant of Muhammad. Chinese Sufi records state that he entered China in 1674 and preached in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Linxia, Gansu, before his eventual death in Guizhou in 1689 (Yang, In Press). While Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani is the reputed founder of the Qadiri tariqa, it is not surprising to find that Abd Alla perhaps studied in Medina under the renowned Kurdish mystic, Ibrahim b. Hasan al-Kurani (1616-1690), who was initiated into both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri tariqas, as well as several other Sufi orders.

The appeal of Qadiriyya Sufism as a renewal movement among the Hui is related to its combining ascetic mysticism with a non-institutionalized form of worship, which centers around the tomb complex of deceased saints rather than the mosque.⁷ The early Qadiriyya advocated long-term isolated meditation, poverty, and vows of celibacy. The head of the order did not marry and eschewed family life, a radical departure from other Islamic traditions in China. Qadiriyya Sufi continue to attend the Gedimu mosques in the local communities in which they live, gathering at the tombs for holidays and individual worship. Qi Jingyi was known for his emphasis upon ascetic withdrawal from society, poverty and self-cultivation. Formalized

Islamic ritual as represented by the "five pillars" (fasting, pilgrimage, prayer, almsgiving, and recitation of the shahadah) was de-emphasized by Qi Jingyi in favor of private meditation. Qadiriyya maintain: "Those who know themselves clearly will know Allah" and "The Saints help us to know ourselves first before knowing Allah." Union with the divine is accomplished through meditation and self-cultivation, rather than formalized public ritual. "The moment of thinking about Allah," they maintain, "is superior to worshipping him for a thousand years" (see Yang, In Press). Although the Qadiriyya menhuan has always been less influential than other Sufi orders in China due to its rejection of "worldly" political involvement, it set the stage for many Sufi orders to follow. By stressing the intimate experience of Allah through the power of his appointed Shaykh, Sufism in China became a force for renewal and transformation. A return to the pure ascetic ideals of Islam, as well as initiating a new sociopolitical Islamic order. At once fundamentalistic and transformative, it initiated a new tide of reform that swept across China.

The Naqshbandiyya

The Naqshbandi tariqa became most rooted in Chinese soil through the establishment of two menhuan, the Khufiyya and Jahriyya, that were to exercise tremendous influence on the history of Islam in China and the Northwest. As Joseph Fletcher argued, the reform movement emphasized "...a shar'ist orthopraxy, political activism, propagation of the religion, and a strong Sunni orientation [which] came to mark the Naqshbandiyya in a way that proved definitive in the mystical path's subsequent history.... Two other general characteristics of popular mysticism, namely the veneration of saints (misleadingly called 'saint worship' by non-Muslim writers) and the seeking of inspiration by visiting and meditating at the saints' tombs (misleadingly referred to as 'tomb worship'), were also prominent features of the Altishahr Naqshbandiyya" [Fletcher n.d.].

Founded by Baha' ad-Din Naqshband (d. 1389), who lived in Mawarannahr (a Central Asian region west of the Pamirs), the Naqshbandiyya order gradually spread East across the trade routes, and by the middle of the 15th century gained ascendance over other Central Asian Sufi orders in the oasis cities of Altishahr, surrounding the Tarim river basin in what is now southern Xinjiang. The Naqshbandi order that gained the most prominence in the Tarim basin and played an important role in later 18th and 19th century politics in Xinjiang, was the Makhdumzada, established by Makhdum-i A'zam (also known as Ahmad Kasani, 1461-1542). It was his great grandson, Khoja Afaq (d. 1694), known in the Chinese sources as Hidayat Allah, who was the saint most responsible for establishing the Naqshbandiyya among the Hui in Northwest China (see Trippner 1961:142-171). Khoja Afaq (Khwaja-yi Afaq, "the Master of the Horizons"), founded the Afaqiyya in Xinjiang, and from 1671-72 visited Gansu, where his father, Muhammad Yusuf, had previously preached, reportedly converting a few Hui and a substantial number of the Salars to Naqshbandi Sufism. During this influential tour, Khoja Afaq visited the northwest cities of Xining, Lintao and Hezhou (now Linxia, China's "little Mecca"), preaching to Hui, Salar, and Northeastern Tibetan Muslims. Two of these early Hui Gansu Muslims became his disciples and went to Central Asia and the pilgrimage cities to become further trained in the order. When they returned to China, they established the two most important Naqshbandi brotherhoods among the Hui in the Northwest, the Khufiyya and the Jahriyya.

Throughout its history, the Naqshbandiyya has stressed an active participation in worldly affairs (Schimmel 1975:367). Their shaykhs worked wonders, chanted the powerful Mathanawi texts of the Turkish mystic Rumi al-Balkhi, Maulana Jalluddin (d. 1273), and advocated scriptural reforms. They emphasized both self-cultivation and formal ritual, withdrawal from and involvement in society. Unlike the Qadiriyya, their leaders enjoyed families and the material wealth accrued from the

donations of their followers. They also became committed to political involvement and social change based on the principles of Islam. Some of the Naqshbandiyya orders in China advocated, I argue, more of a "transformationist" perspective, in which they sought to change the social order in accord with their own visions of propriety and morality. This inevitably led to conflicts with Chinese rule and local governments, causing some orders of the Naqshbandiyya, especially the Jahriyya, to be singled out for suppression and persecution. "Due to the arduous way it has traversed," the Hui scholar Yang Huaizhong (In Press) writes, himself raised in a Jahriyya home, "the branch [Jahriyya] has always advocated the militant spirit of the Muslims, organizing uprisings to resist the oppression of the Qing and KMT [Nationalist, or Kuomintang] governments against the ethnic Hui minority and their religious belief." By contrast, the Khufiyya tended to seek more conformist solutions to local conflicts, stressing personal internal reform over political change. The different stance that the Naqshbandiyya orders took in China with regard to the State and Chinese culture reflects their dialectical interaction with local interpretations of identity and changing sociopolitical realities in the Northwest. A brief introduction to these two movements is necessary for our understanding of the later challenges to the movements by the Yihewani and the Salafiyya.

The Naqshbandi Khufiyya

During his 1672 visit to Hezhou, Khoja Afaq played an important role in the life of a certain Ma Laichi (1673-1753), a Hezhou Hui of extraordinary talent who went on to found one of the earliest and most influential Naqshbandiyya orders in China, the Khufiyya Menhuan. According to Sufi tradition, Ma Laichi was born to a childless couple after receiving Khoja Afaq's blessing, and was later raised and trained by one of his disciples, Ma Tai Baba ("Great Father"), who later gave him his daughter in marriage and passed on to him the leadership of the mystical path that he had received from Khoja Afaq (Ma Tong 1983:223-47). From 1728-81, Ma Laichi

went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, Yemen and Bukhara where he studied several Sufi orders, and became particularly influenced by Mawlana Makhdum, a man of uncertain origin, who Fletcher (n.d.) hypothesizes may have been Indian. When he returned from his pilgrimage, Ma Laichi established the most powerful of the Khufiyya menhuan, the Huasi ("flowery mosque") branch, propagating the order for 32 years among the Hui and Salar in Gansu and Qinghai, before his death in 1766 at the age of 86 (Yang, In Press; Fletcher [n.d.] dates his death in 1753). The menhuan is still quite active and centered in Linxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, at the tomb of Ma Laichi, which was restored in 1986.

Originating in an earlier Central Asian and Yemeni Naqshbandi Sufism, the Khufiyya order was permeated with an emphasis on a more passive participation in society, the veneration of saints, the seeking of inspiration at tombs and the silent dhikr ("remembrance," properly "Khafiyya," the "silent" ones, Fletcher 1978:38; Schimmel 1975:172,366). There are now over 20 sub-branch menhuan throughout China, with mosques in Yunnan, Xinjiang, and Beijing. Most Khufiyya orders are concentrated in Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang with several of the original Khufiyya practices in some outlying areas such as northern Ningxia beginning to lose their distinctiveness over time.

The Naqshbandi Jahriyya

The second Naqshbandi tariqa, the Jahriyya order, was founded in China under the dynamic leadership of Ma Mingxin (1719-1781) (see Ford 1974:153-55; Fletcher 1975). One of the most fascinating detective stories in historical discovery is the tracing of Ma Mingxin's spiritual lineage to Mizjaja, a village on the outskirts of Zabid in Northern Yemen, by Joseph Fletcher. While Chinese Sufis have known for generations that their saint Ma Mingxin studied in the Middle East, it was never clear whom he received his "New Teaching" from or where he studied. Middle Eastern Sufi accounts recorded the presence of Chinese Muslims studying in certain Sufi areas,

but only Joseph Fletcher was able to put the two together. This was an important discovery as Ma Mingxin's Sufi practice was thought to be novel, even heterodox, and the subject of many conflicts in Northwest China. This controversy is mainly over Ma Mingxin's use of the jahr in remembrance ("vocal dhikr," from whence comes the name "Jahriyya," the "vocal" ones), which he openly advocated in opposition to the Khufiyya's silent remembrance, the more standard Naqshbandi practice. After an extensive search through arcane Sufi documents in Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Chinese, and a final personal trip to Yemen, Fletcher discovered that the name of the Sufi saint whom Chinese Muslim records indicated Ma Mingxin studied under, but whose identity was unknown, was a Naqshbandi Sufi, az-Zayn b. Muhammad 'Abd al-Baqi al-Mizjaji (1643/4-1725), whose family home was in Mizjaja, the Zabid. Chinese Sufi records only indicate that Ma Mingxin studied in Yemen in a Sufi order known as the Shazilinye, whose shaykh was Muhammad Bulu Seni, but did not know the full ancestry and origins of the order. Most Jahriyya only say: "The root of our order is Arabia, the branches and leaves are in China" (Ma Tong 1983:365).

It is known that az-Zayn had studied in Medina under the famous Kurdish mystic, Ibrahim b. Hasan al-Kurani (1616-1690), who also advocated the use of vocal formulae in the remembrance of Allah (*al-jahr bi-'dh-dhikr*). Al-Kurani's students were at the forefront of Islamic reform and fundamentalistic movements throughout the Islamic world. Under al-Kurani's student's direction, it is not surprising that Ma Mingxin returned after 16 years of study in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula in 1744 with more activist and radical reforms on his mind. While advocating the use of the vocal dhikr, he generally opposed the heavy emphasis upon the veneration of Islamic saints which had become popular in China. These disputes led to bloody conflicts well into the early 20th century. As the disputes grew worse and conflicts erupted, Qing troops, fresh from the conquest of Xinjiang in 1759, did not wish to have any more trouble among Muslims in Gansu. They arrested Ma Mingxin in 1781

and executed him as his followers attempted to free him. Three years later they crushed another uprising led by a Jahriyya Sufi, Tian Wu. From this point on, the Qing sought to limit the spread of the movements, outlawing many of the so-called "New Teachings," primarily the Jahriyya.

The great Northwest Hui rebellion (1862-1876) was led by Ma Hualong, another Jahriyya Sufi murshid and fifth generation descendant of Ma Mingxin. His rebellion was responsible for cutting the Qing State off from the Northwest, making way for the great 1864-1877 Uigur-led rebellion in Xinjiang under Yakub Beg (see Kim 1986). In 1871 Ma Hualong was captured and executed, supposedly with his entire family. His body is entombed in Dongta Township, Jinji, just east of the Yellow River in Ningxia, while his head is reported to have been buried in Xuanhuagang, a Jahriyya center, north of Zhangjiachuan in south Gansu. There is also evidence that suggests Du Wenxiu, the Panthay Hui Muslim rebellion in Yunnan (1855-73) was also influenced by Jahriyya ideas (Gladney, Forthcoming, a). Following the failure of these uprisings, the Jahriyya became much more secretive and dispersed, leading to the establishment of five main Jahriyya branch orders, all named after their ritual and historical centers: Shagou, Beishan, Xindianzi, Banqiao, and Nanchuan.

Sufi Modalities and Islamic Resurgence

The importance and extensiveness of these Sufi orders for uniting disparate Hui communities across China must not be underestimated. Unlike the isolated "patchwork" Gedimu communities that had been the norm until that time, Sufi orders provided the leadership and organization that could help Hui survive politically and economically. During the fragmented Republican period (1911-1949), extensive Sufi networks proved helpful to some Hui warlords in the Northwest, and disruptive to others.

Even today, membership in various Islamic orders and their concomitant Islamic practices often significantly influences social interaction, especially among

the Sufi orders who often distinguish themselves by dress. Unlike the rounded white hat worn by most Hui men, Sufi followers often wear a six cornered hat, sometimes black.⁸ Many Jahriyya Hui shave the sides of their beards to commemorate their founder, Ma Mingxin, whose beard is said to have been shorn by Qing soldiers before his execution in 1781. While these markers are almost universally unnoticed by the Han majority -- for whom a Hui is a Hui -- Northwest Hui can easily identify in the marketplace members of the various orders that divide them internally. The exclusivity of Sufi orders in China illustrates the cruciality of identity and authority for Sufi Hui. Hui can enter these orders through ritual vow or by birth, but seldom maintain allegiance to two menhuan at once. This is unlike Sufi orders in other parts of the world that tend to be less exclusive and allow simultaneous membership in several orders (Trimingham 1971:11). In China, membership in these orders is exclusive; changing to a new order is tantamount to an "internal" conversion experience for Muslims in China, perhaps the only one they will ever have, since most Muslims in China entered Islam by birth or marriage.

Despite the tremendous variety found among Sufi's today in China, from the traditionalist and fairly apolitical Khufiyya, to the politically active Jahriyya, and to the mystically esoteric Qadiriyya, Sufism may still be generally characterized as a modality that has influenced much of Islam in China. It is distinguished from other Islamic modalities in its hierarchical organization, veneration of saints and tombs, and emphasis upon meditation and self-transformation. Given its often tightly organized networks, and capability to form secretive oppositional movements, it is not surprising that it is one modality that the State in China has most often sought to either eradicate or co-opt. To the extent that various Sufi orders and their shaykhs have been able to maintain their legitimacy through either secret resistance to the State or public compliance, they have maintained their appeal among Muslims not

only in the Northwest where Sufism is most popular, but in the eastern urban centers and northern plains as well.

The Third Mode: Scripturalist Concerns and Modernist Reforms

A third mode identifiable in Chinese Islam began at the end of the Qing dynasty, a period of increased interaction between China and the outside world, when many Muslims began traveling to and returning from the Middle East. In the early decades of the 20th century, China was exposed to many new foreign ideas and in the face of Japanese and Western imperialist encroachment sought a Chinese approach to governance. Intellectual and organizational activity by Chinese Muslims during this period was intense. Increased contact with the Middle East led Chinese Muslims to reevaluate their traditional notions of Islam. Pickens (1942:231-5) records that from 1923 to 1934 there were 834 known Hui Muslims who made the Hajj, or pilgrimage, to Mecca. In 1937, according to one observer, over 170 Hui pilgrims boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound for Mecca (Anonymous 1944:127). By 1939, at least 33 Hui Muslims had studied at Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar University. While these numbers are not significant when compared with pilgrims on the Hajj from other Asian Muslim areas, the influence and prestige attached to these returning Hui Hajji was profound, particularly in isolated communities. "In this respect," Fletcher (n.d.) observed, "the more secluded and remote a Muslim community was from the main centers of Islamic cultural life in the Middle East, the more susceptible it was to those centers' most recent trends."

As a result of political events and the influence of foreign Muslim ideas, numerous new Hui organizations emerged. In 1912, one year after Sun Yat-sen was inaugurated provisional president of the Chinese Republic in Nanjing, the Chinese Muslim Federation was also formed in that city. This was followed by the establishment of other Hui Muslim associations: the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association (Beijing, 1912), the Chinese Muslim Educational Association (Shanghai,

1925), the Chinese Muslim Association (1925), the Chinese Muslim Young Students Association (Nanjing, 1931), the Society for the Promotion of Education Among Muslims (Nanjing, 1931), and the Chinese Muslim General Association (Jinan, 1934).

The Muslim periodical press flourished as never before. Although Löwenthal (1940:211-50) reported that circulation was low, there were over one hundred known Muslim periodicals produced before the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Thirty journals were published between 1911 and 1937 in Beijing alone, prompting one author to suggest that while Chinese Islam's traditional religious center was still Linxia (Hezhou), its cultural center had shifted to Beijing (Anonymous 1944:27). This took place when many Hui intellectuals travelled to Japan, the Middle East and the West. Caught up in the nationalist fervor of the first half of this century, they published magazines and founded organizations, questioning their identity as never before in a process that one Hui historian, Ma Shouqian (1989), has recently termed "The New Awakening of the Hui at the end of 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries." As many of these Hui Hajji returned from their pilgrimages to the Middle East, they initiated several reforms, engaging themselves once again in the contested space between Islamic ideals and Chinese culture.

The Rise of the Yihewani

Influenced by Wahhabi ideals in the Arabian peninsula, returning Hui reformers introduced the Yihewani (Chinese for the Ikhwan al-Muslimin) to China - a religio-political movement that often supported in some cases, China's nationalist concerns, and in others, with warlord politics. While the Ikhwan Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the Islamic world has been depicted as anti-modernist and recidivist, this is not true of the movement in China. "There a fundamentalist, revivalist impulse among returned pilgrims influenced by Wahhabi notions" Lipman (1986:21) suggests, "was transformed into a nationalist, modernist, anti-Sufi solidarity group which advocated not only Muslim unity but Chinese national strength and

consciousness."⁹ In fact, as I shall argue below, the Yihewani in China eventually diverged so far from its Ikhwan Muslim Brotherhood beginnings, that it is misleading to even refer to the Yihewani in China as "Ikhwan" or as a single movement or order. It has now become merely another "mode" of Islamic practice, an alternative to "Gedimu" traditional Islam and Sufism in China.

The beginnings of the Yihewani movement in China can be traced to Ma Wanfu (1849-1934), who returned from the Hajj in 1892 to teach in the Hezhou area. Eventually known in China as the Yihewani, the initial reformers were primarily concerned with religious scripturalist orthodoxy -- so much so that they are still known as the "venerate the scriptures faction" (zunjing pai).¹⁰ Though the reformers were concerned with larger goals than merely "correcting" what they regarded as unorthodox practice, like previous reforms in China, it is at the practical and ritual level that they initiated their critique. Seeking perhaps to replace "Islamic theater" with scripture (Eaton 1984:334-35), they proscribed the veneration of saints, their tombs and shrines, and sought to stem the growing influence of well-known individual Ahong and Sufi menhuan leaders. Stressing orthodox practice through advocating a purified, "non-Chinese" Islam, they criticized such cultural accretions as the wearing of white mourning dress (dai xiao) and the decoration of Mosques with Chinese or Arabic texts. At one point, Ma Wanfu even proposed the exclusive use of Arabic and Persian in all education instead of Chinese. Following strict Wahhabi practice, Yihewani mosques are distinguished by their almost complete lack of adornment on the inside, with white walls and no inscriptions, as well as a preference for Arabian-style mosque architecture. This contrasts sharply with other more Chinese-style mosques in China, typical of the "old" Gedimu, whose architecture resemble Confucian temples in their sweeping roofs and symmetrical courtyards (with the Xi'an Huajue Great Mosque as the best example). The Yihewani also proscribed the adornment of their mosques with Arabic, especially Chinese,

Quranic texts and banners, whereas this is the most striking iconographic marker of Sufi mosques and worship centers in the Northwest, whose walls and tombs are often layered with Arabic and Chinese texts on silk and cloth banners in the distinctive Hui-style art that fluidly combines Arabic and Chinese calligraphy.

The Yihewani flourished in Northwest China under the patronage of several Muslim warlords during the Nationalist period, most notably Ma Bufang. In a modernist discourse, arguing that the Yihewani supported education, a rationalized, less mystical religious expression, and a strong Chinese nation, Ma Bufang supported the expansion of the Yihewani throughout Northwest China. He must have been also aware that wherever the Yihewani went, the hierarchical authority of the Sufi *shaykhs* and the solidarity of their *menhuan* was contested, thus protecting Ma from other organized religious organizations that might orchestrate an effective resistance to his expansion. This could not have been lost on the early Communists, either, who travelled through Ma Bufang's territory and the Northwest on their Long March, which ended in Yanan, near Ningxia, a heavily populated Muslim area dominated at that time by Ma Hongkui, a cousin of Ma Bufang's, who also supported the Yihewani. After the founding of the People's Republic, the State quickly suppressed all Sufi *menhuan* as feudalistic and gave tacit support to the Yihewani. Though Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui both fled with the Nationalists to Taiwan, their policy of opposing Sufi organizations was left behind with the Communists. The China Islamic Association, established in 1955, was heavily dominated by the Yihewani, and was supportive of the 1957-58 public criticisms and show-trials of the Naqshbandi Shaykh Ma Zhenwu specifically and Sufism generally as feudalistic and exploitative of the masses. After the purges of the Cultural Revolution, in which eventually all Islamic orders were affected, the Yihewani was the first to receive renewed State patronage. Most of the large mosques that were rebuilt with State funds throughout China, as compensation for damages and destruction caused by the

Red Guards during the now-repudiated Cultural Revolution, happened to be Yihewani mosques, though all orders were equally criticized during the radical period.

While no Chinese official will admit that the Yihewani receives special treatment, this is cause for some resentment among Muslims. The great South Gate Mosque in Yinchuan city, the capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, was one of the first mosques rebuilt in Ningxia with State funds -- it just happened to be staffed by Yihewani Imams, though the State said it was a "non-sectarian" mosque. After the State spent over 50,000 Yuan to rebuild the mosque in 1982, the local Muslims, most of whom were Gedimu and Khufiyya, refused to attend. The building sat almost empty for the first few years and the State attempted to recoup its losses over the large Arab-styled architectural structure by turning it into a tourist attraction and selling tickets at the entrance. This, of course, only confirmed its lack of religious legitimacy among many local Hui Muslims, especially the Gedimu and Sufis. In 1985, a visiting Kuwaiti delegation to the mosque became aware of the situation and instead of donating money to the South Gate Mosque as originally planned, they gave a \$10,000 (about 30,000 Yuan) check for refurbishing the much smaller traditional Central Mosque instead, which was a Gedimu mosque popular among the locals.

The Yihewani continue to be a powerful Islamic group throughout China. Like the Gedimu, the Yihewani emphasize leadership through training and education rather than inheritance and succession. The Yihewani differ from the Gedimu primarily in ritual matters and their stress upon reform through Chinese education and modernism. Unlike the Gedimu, they do not chant the scriptures collectively, do not visit tombs, do not celebrate the death days of their ancestors, and do not gather for Islamic festivals in remembrance of Saints. Because of their emphasis on nationalist concerns, education, modernization, and decentralized leadership, the movement has attracted more urban intellectual Muslims. This is why the Yihewani in China

cannot be regarded as a tightly founded "order" as the Muslim Brotherhood may be often portrayed in the Middle East, but it is rather a mode of Islamic reform and orientation in China, which the educated and often urban Muslims find more attractive than the traditional Gedimu or the Sufis. The Yihewani's nationalistic ideals, and their cooptation by the earlier Republic Nationalists and the CCP led many of the more religious Yihewani to become disillusioned with the order. It was seen by many to be no longer a fundamentalist agent of reform, but an institutionalized organ of the State for systematizing and monitoring Islamic practice. Though still influential politically, it has lost its dynamic appeal to many of the most conservative Muslims in China. For the vast majority of urban Hui Muslims, and even many rural Muslims in the small towns of the northern plains, however, it is merely the mosque that they belong to by virtue of birth or marriage, and few could tell me the difference between Yihewani and Gedimu, let alone between the myriad orders of Sufis. One Hui worker in Hangzhou once told me that the basic difference between the Gedimu (he used the term *laojiao*, "old teachings") and in this case the Yihewani (*xinjiao*, "new teachings"), was that the Yihewani did not eat crab and the Gedimu did; the Yihewani did not because "crabs walked sideways".

While the total population of the various Islamic associations in China has not been published, Yang Huaizhong (In Press) writes that of the 2,132 mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 560 belong to the Yihewani, 560 to the Khufiyya, 464 to the Jahriyya, 415 to the traditional Gedimu, and 133 belong to Qadiriyya religious worship sites (some of which include mosques). The most comprehensive estimate given so far for Hui membership in Islamic orders throughout China is by Ma Tong (1983:477-82). Out of an estimated total at that time of 6,781,500 Hui Muslims, Ma Tong recorded that there were 58.2% Gedimu, 21% Yihewani, 10.9% Jahriyya, 7.2% Khufiyya, 1.4% Qadiriyya, and .7% Kubrawiyya.

The Rise of the Salafiyya: A Fourth Mode?

The extent of the recent rise in popularity of the Salafiyya in Northwest China is difficult to assess as there are no published figures as to its membership or number of mosques, and few discussions of the movement in the voluminous literature on Islam in China. However, as one who lived in China for three years, I was frequently impressed by the many Muslims I encountered who were formerly associated with the Yihewani or Gedimu and said they had either recently joined the Salafiyya or were considering taking up with the movement. Perhaps discontent with the official patronage of the Yihewani by the political warlords and official organs of power in China, the Salafiyya originally arose out of the Yihewani in the mid-1930s and quickly spread throughout the Northwest. Since the early 1980s reforms, when religious expression was again officially allowed in China, the Salafiyya have flourished perhaps more than any other Islamic movement among the Hui. One Chinese scholar calls them "the faction that is most faithful to the original teaching of Islam" (Da Yingyu 1988:157). They take the Quran as the very words of Allah, and in the terms of American fundamentalism, the verbally inspired word of God. As Dale Eickelman found among the Salafiyya in Morocco:

Like their counterparts who emerged in the eastern Arab world in the late nineteenth century, Salafi Muslims argued that the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet were the only true bases of Islam, thus sharply distinguishing what they considered "true" Islam from the popular Sufism of urban religious brotherhoods and of maraboutism [Eickelman 1976: 227].

Unlike the Yihewani leadership in China, the Salafiyya stressed a non-politicized fundamentalistic return to Wahhabi scripturalist ideals. Arguing that the Yihewani had been corrupted by Chinese cultural accretions, such as the loss of its original founder's ideal to pursue pure Islamic education in Arabic and Persian, as

well as being coopted by the State, the Salafiyya represent one of the most recent versions of reform movements in China. While their scripturalist debates with the Yihewani did not lead to a "battle for the Quran" in China, the struggle for legitimacy of both Yihewani and Salafiyya took place in a discourse of Quranic textualism.

Like former Islamic reform movements, the Salafiyya was transmitted (and translated) to China through the agency of a returned Hajji from the Islamic heartlands, who began spreading his "new teaching" in China's own Muslim heartland: Hezhou. In 1934, a small group of Hui members of the Yihewani left Hezhou on the Hajj, led by Ma Debao, from the heavily Muslim-populated Guanghe County's Bai ("White") village, along with Ma Yinu, Ma Zhenliu, and Ma Ling, the four "Ma's".¹¹ While on the pilgrimage, Ma Debao came under the influence of a certain Salafiyya named in the Chinese sources as Huzhandi, who is reported to be from the Soviet Union. It is not known if this Huzhandi was a direct disciple of Muhammad ^CAbdu, the founder of the Salafiyya and disciple of al-Afghani, but many Hui Salafiyya believe this to be the case. Many of China's Muslims were educated at the al-Azhar in Egypt, where Muhammad ^CAbdu was himself schooled, so it is not unlikely that there would have been some connections. In addition to bringing back to China his new interpretations of the Quran and the original teachings of the Prophet, he brought two Salafi manuals, listed in Chinese sources as the Buerhenu Satuier (the "Glorious Explanation") and the Xianyoushe Islamu (the "Army of Islam").

Upon his return to China, he was also further trained under a visiting foreign Salafiyya teacher, Jialei Buhali, reportedly an Arab from Bukhara (Da 1988:158-9). Under their teaching, Ma Debao began to suspect that Islam in China had been too influenced by Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist ideas. He wished to return to a more purified, Arabian Islam, free from Chinese cultural and ideological syncretic adaptations. Ma Debao was confronted with a similar challenge as the founder of his

order, only from a different direction. As Ira Lapidus notes, "...for ^CAbdu the central problem was not political but religious: how, when Muslims were adopting Western ways and Western values, could they maintain the vitality of Islam in the modern world?" (Lapidus 1988:621) For Hui Muslims in 1930s China, caught between the fall of the last Chinese dynasty, the imperial aggrandizements of the Western colonial powers, and the civil war between Nationalist and Communist, their concerns were certainly political *and* religious. However, for Ma Debao and his followers, it was thought that only through a fundamentalist return to the precepts of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet that the Muslims would be able to survive this stormy period and help renew their nation, as opposed to the Yihewani whom he saw as seeking the patronage of one political faction over another. Similar to ^CAbd al-Hamid b. Badis, the leader of the *Islah* reform among the Young Tunisians, who also took his inspiration from the Salafiyya, it was the Quran and the hadith that were to serve as the only rallying point of the Salafiyya in China.

Since Ma Debao and his followers were critical of the Yihewani for moving away from their earlier Wahhabi ideals, they held several open debates with famous Yihewani scholars, particularly disputing the authority of the four schools of jurisprudence. In 1937 the Salafiyya in China formally split from the Yihewani. Since the Yihewani was under the patronage at that time of the Nationalist warlord, Ma Bufang, the Salafiyya were severely restricted in their movements, persecuted as "heterodox" (xie jiao) and followers of "foreign teachings" (wai dao), unable to propagate their order except in secret. It was only after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 that they began to again come out into the open. By 1950, of the 12 Yihewani mosques in Hezhou's Bafang Muslim district, there were two mosques, the New Fifth Mosque and the Qi Mosque, which belonged to the Salafiyya, along with 7 Imams. This period of open propagation was short-lived, however, as in 1958 the State initiated a series of radical "Religious Reform Campaigns," which regarded

almost all religious practices as feudal, forcing the Salafiyya once again to go underground. Public approval did not come until 20 years later under the economic and social reforms of Deng Xiaoping, who in 1978 once again allowed free religious expression. It was not until 1982, however, that most Muslims in the Northwest began to rebuild their mosques and practice Islam openly. The central mosque for the Salafiyya in Hezhou has now become the Qianhezhe Mosque, in the Bafang district (Linxia 1986:77). The Salafiyya also claim to have mosques and followers throughout the Northwest, including Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, particularly in such market and urban centers as Linxia, Lanzhou, Weixian, Wuwei, Tianshui, Zhangjiachuan, Pingliang, Yinchuan, and Xian.

Due to its suppressed and rather secretive beginnings, the Salafiyya became known by various names. Since Ma Debao was from Bai ("White") Village, outside of Hezhou, and the movement gained quick acceptance there, it became known as the Bai, or White, Teaching. Since the Salafiyya emphasize that "Salaf" in Arabic means "ancestral" or "the previous generations," they say that their order reveres the first three generations of Islam. They signify their adherence to these first three generations by raising their hands three times, with palms extended upward, during *namaz*. Among outsiders, therefore, they have been derided as the "teaching of the three salutations" (*Santaijiao*), as most Muslims in China raise their hands only once during prayer. Instead, they prefer to be known as either the Salafiyya, or in Chinese, the "*Shengxun pai*" ("Faction of the Prophet's Teaching").

Following the Yihewani, the Salafiyya promote a scripturalist Islam that is rationalist and anti-experiential. Like the late Rashid Rida (1865-1935), their fellow Salafi leader in Syria, they emphasize opposition to Sufism and cultural syncretism, rather than modernism (Lapidus 1988:666-7). Perhaps as a result of the drift of the Yihewani toward secularism and nationalism, the Salafiyya in China put more stress on scripturalism and orthodox practice. Again publicly repudiating other Islamic

expression in China at the level of practice, they emphasizing divine unity and criticize the Sufi's and Gedimu alike for their patronage of tombs, saints, and the miraculous. They also will not receive alms during readings, but offer to use the money to buy scriptures instead. They regard the burning of incense during worship, still practiced by the Gedimu and Yihewani, as the syncretistic influence of Buddhism and Daoism. They also reject the commemoration ceremonies on the 4th, 7th, 40th, one year and three year memorial death days as frequently practiced by Gedimu, Sufis, and some Yihewani. They also oppose the collection of fees for performing engagement and marriage ceremonies, as is common among the Yihewani. Like the Yihewani, the inside of their mosques are unadorned with Islamic insignia or scripture, while the outside may have one Arabic verse, in contrast to the Chinese frequently seen on the outside of Gedimu and even some Yihewani mosques, and the ornate Arabic and Chinese banners throughout the Sufi mosques and tombs.

Like their founder Muhammad ^CAbdu, the Salafiyya see renewal as a result of educational, legal, and spiritual reform. But for them, these reforms are all based on the Quran, whereas the Yihewani allowed for secular and even Marxist educational training. Just as the discrediting of the Sufis and urban Muslim intellectuals by the French in Morocco help to promote the cause of the Salafiyya (Eickelman 1976:227-8; Lapidus 1988:707), so the domination of the intellectual elite among the Yihewani and other Islamic orders by the Communist Party in China might have contributed to the Salafiyya movement's call for a purified, non-accommodationist, and largely non-political Islam. The further discreditation and decentralization of the Communist Party in most of the world, if not eventually China, may also give credence to the Salafiyya's cause. The Salafiyya are one of the few Islamic movements in China that can claim a resistance to both Chinese cultural assimilation *and* refusal to collaborate with the State. This may have accounted for their dramatic rise in popularity since

1980, and may augur for its place at the forefront of a new tide of Islamic reform in China. It is one of the few Islamic movements to coalesce after and flourish after the founding of the People's Republic, when China's diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern Muslim relations took several critical twists and unexpected turns. The Sino-Saudi missile deal of Summer 1991 is but the only most recent in a long history of China's rather clumsy early attempts at playing its "Islamic card". The successful conclusion of the deal and subsequent recognition of China by the Royal House of Saud indicates that the Chinese government has become much more deft at this game. Unfortunately for the PRC regime, its Muslim subjects have not always been willing to play along.

Sino-Middle Eastern Relations and the Rise of a Fourth Mode

As China's most important transnational minority (with the exception of the Tibetans who continue to be a particularly painful public-relations thorn -- but little else -- in the soft underbelly of China's human rights record), the Muslims are an important player in the geopolitics and international economics of China's trade with Soviet Central Asia, the Middle East, and Muslim ASEAN nations. Not only are the numbers of pilgrims on the Hajj growing at a phenomenal rate, the flow of Middle Eastern visitors to China has also increased dramatically. Pilgrimage to Mecca has increased from the first state-sponsored group since 1964 of 19 in 1979, to over 6,000 last year, most of them privately financed (yet there is no way to know just how many pilgrims exited China via Pakistan or the Xinjiang-Saudi Arabia-Turkey air route; see also Shichor 1989:7; Gladney 1991a:400ff). There has been such an increase in private and state-sponsored foreign Muslim tourists and businessmen to Beijing that the city just opened a special 4-star "Muslim Hotel" on Wangfujing Avenue, its main shopping arcade, as well as declaring the Oxen Street Muslim neighborhood a "Muslim United Nationality Civilized District" in order to attract Muslim tourists.

Several Chinese state-sponsored construction companies that provide low-level and inexpensive development projects to Third World Muslim Nations, which built such well-known projects as the Sports Stadium outside Cairo, the Cornich roadway along the Nile, the Kenya-Tanzanian highway, and numerous other road, bridge, and dam projects, include Muslims from China as translators and "cultural consultants." These Muslims know how to deal with their fellow Muslims abroad, and they can often speak to them in fluent Arabic. Recently, several joint state and private-collective "Muslim Construction Corporations" have been established in China with Hui Muslims at the head of their organizations in order to foster increased development contracts. In the last few years, direct foreign Muslim investment in China has led to the building of the Xiamen International Airport and the Minjiang Hydroelectric power plant in Fujian province, as well as several major development projects throughout the Northwest. Most unexpectedly, by courting foreign Muslims to invest in China, several large donations have gone to building mosques and madrassahs in Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia -- the Chinese want to build factories, while the foreign Muslims want to build edifices to Allah.

While exact trade figures are hard to come by, and rarely include military transfers, the IMF recorded that between 1982 and 1988 China exported a total of \$2,089 million and imported only \$577 million with 14 Arab states and Iran (IMF Yearbook 1990). Shichor (1989:14) estimates that before the Gulf War there were nearly 70 special Chinese construction corporations working in the Middle East, many of them led by Muslims, with an average of 50,000 Chinese workers every year in the Middle East, and a total turnover of US \$8 billion. There were supposedly over 4,000 Chinese workers stuck in Iraq after the war began, whom the Iraqis initially refused permission to leave (Harris 1991:7), and up to 10,000 Chinese workers in Egypt at the height of their trade in 1985-87. Egypt, surprisingly enough, is the proud owner of Chinese-made submarines.

Many of these projects are coordinated through the China Islamic Association, the state-sponsored administrative agency founded in 1957 to oversee all Muslim affairs, coordinate Islamic publications, train future Islamic scholars and imams, as well as liaison with local mosque communities. The explosion of exchanges with foreign Muslims in recent years has meant both the increased influence of this agency in China's international affairs, as well as its decentralized authority at the local level. Throughout China, Muslims are now building mosques and madrassahs on their own initiative, and sending increasing numbers of Muslims on the Hajj with private community-based funding.

Only in the last few years has China once again attempted to play its "Islamic card" -- a strategy begun in the 1950s of promoting its Muslims, and positive policies toward its Muslim minorities, in order to gain favor with mainly Muslim Middle Eastern countries. I regard this as a case of the "Islamicization" of a geopolitical issue and the minorities involved, (see Gladney 1992, forthcoming), in that in this case Islam is used by the state as a means of promoting international relations, rather than as a religious ideology to be followed. On the surface the state exploits its favorable policies towards Muslims, but in reality as a communist state it actively discourages Islamic practice.

James Piscatori (1987:247) in his essay on the nature of international relations among Asian Muslim countries, writes: "China, without the burden of Afghanistan, is more effective [than the Soviet Union] in the use of Islam in its relations with the Arab states.... [T]he regime in Beijing believes that the use of Islam can help to legitimate it in the eyes of the Arab regimes, and the record shows that it has had some success at it." It was not always successful, however. The first delegation of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca in 1953 were denied visas in Pakistan, and the impasse was not resolved until Zhou Enlai himself during the Bandung conference in April 1955 approached Prince Faysal ibn Sa'ud about the problem, signalling the importance the

Chinese government places on resolving this issue (Shichor 1989:3). As a result of Zhou Enlai's Islamic diplomacy, the pilgrimages were allowed to begin with a maximum of 20 Muslims from China every year, led by two Hui, Da Pusheng and Ma Yuhuai, in July 1955.

At the New Delhi conference of Asian Countries in April 1955, the Uighur political leader and recent Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, Saifudin, was sent to introduce China's new Middle East policy, which was long on criticism of Western imperialism, and noticeably short on the Marxist critique of Islam. In February 1956, Burhan Shahidi, a Uighur from Xinjiang and the Chairman of the China Islamic Society (see Burhan 1984), led the second delegation of hajji in which he followed the usual China-encouraged practice of combining pilgrimage with politics: While in the Middle East he met with King Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, King Husayn of Jordan, and Nasser of Egypt, as well as the premiers of Lebanon, Syria, and possibly North Yemen (Shichor 1979:40-5). As a direct result of his meeting with Nasser, Egypt became the first Middle Eastern Muslim country to diplomatically recognize the PRC on 16 May 1956, severing its ties with Taiwan. It was followed by Syria (1956), N. Yemen (1956), S. Yemen (1968), and only much later, Kuwait (1971), the U.A.E. (1984), and most recently, Saudi Arabia (1990). The recognition by Egypt in 1956 was extremely important to China in that it was the first country to recognize the PRC in 6 years, causing the first crack in the diplomatic blockade, and regarded as quite a coup for the Muslim delegation. Burhan supervised the pilgrimages every year until their termination at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1964. From the very beginning, the recognition of China by Egypt was linked to the arms trade: By recognizing China which was not at that time a member of the United Nations, Nasser had managed to obtain a back channel for Soviet arms (which was barred from arms exports to Egypt due to the UN blockade). Later, it was arms sales that once again led to the final

recognition of China by Saudi Arabia, despite its superior volume of trade with Taiwan.

The Islamic card was essentially discarded during the "20 lost years" (instead of the usual 10 years of the Cultural Revolution) from the beginning of the Anti-Rightist and Religious System Reform Campaigns in 1957-8 to 1978 when, according to China's Muslims, China adopted an antagonistic stance to Muslims who were regarded as feudalistic due to their belief in religion and their local nationalism. Since the 1979 reforms, this card has been pulled from Deng Xiaoping's sleeve. Muslims have benefitted from both increased exchange with the Middle East and favorable government policies. In order to promote its positive policies toward Muslims, the state has been engaged in an Islamic facelift of government buildings in Urumqi and Yinchuan, and recently, the building of a "Muslim Hotel and Shopping Complex" in downtown Beijing, which was funded by the State-sponsored Beijing City Tourism Association, the Beijing City Nationality Affairs Commission, and a privately organized, Beijing Muslim Development Corporation. In addition, it has sought to promote Muslim areas such as Oxen Street in Beijing and Islamic monuments in Quanzhou, Fujian as Muslim tourist sites. This policy has led to considerable increased exchange between China and the Middle East, with such projects as the Xiamen International airport and the Fujian Hydroelectric Minjiang Dam project funded by the Kuwaitis as a direct result of this policy.

The selling of Chinese Silkworm missiles to Saudi Arabia is particularly well-documented in Shichor's (1989) monograph, and need not be further discussed here. It is important to note that the sale went through before the recognition of China by Saudi Arabia, a move that was not taken until the summer of 1990, despite an even larger trade volume with Taiwan. It is only one example, however, of China's growing arms trade with the Middle East. Iraq, with whom China immediately established relations 2 days after the Baathist revolution in 1958 in order to show its

solidarity with what they regarded as the first "real revolution" in the Middle East (Shichor 1979:87), and long thought to be a close friend of China's until the invasion of Kuwait, fired two Silkworm missiles at U.S. ships during the war, and exchanged countless more with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, as part of over \$12 billion dollars' worth of arms deals with China (Shichor 1988:320-1). Egypt, surprisingly enough, is the proud owner of Chinese-made submarines. While exact trade figures are hard to come by, and rarely include military transfers, the IMF recorded that between 1982 and 1988 China exported a total of \$2,089 million and imported only \$577 million with 14 Arab states and Iran (IMF Yearbook 1990). Shichor (1989:14) estimates that before the Gulf War there were nearly 70 special Chinese construction corporations working in the Middle East, many of them led by Muslims, with an average of 50,000 Chinese workers every year in the Middle East, and a total turnover of US \$8 billion. There were supposedly over 4,000 Chinese workers stuck in Iraq after the war began, whom the Iraqis initially refused permission to leave (Harris 1991:7), and up to 10,000 Chinese workers in Egypt at the height of their trade in 1985-87.

One Uighur interpreter for the Liaoning Branch of the Chinese Construction Corporation in Egypt, the most successful Chinese construction team (nearly every province except Xinjiang, and some cities, including Tianjin, have branch offices in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries), explained to me in Cairo why it is that the Egyptians would be interested in Chinese labor in a country that has abundant resources of its own in that category. While the Egyptians have their own cheap labor, Chinese companies are able to underbid Egyptian and other foreign companies for lucrative construction contracts. Chinese workers are also known to be skilled, efficient, and diligent -- a reputation that few other Third World construction companies can match. A Chinese worker can average from US \$80-150 per month in hard currency, which is paltry by world standards, but a fortune compared to the

average RMB \$50-150 (= US \$10-30) earned by workers in China in local currency, which is not exchangeable. Companies such as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Muslim Construction Corporation, established by the former Ningxia Chairman, Hei Boli, and Vice-Chairman, Ma Tengai, both Hui Muslims, are attractive to foreign Muslim governments and Muslim Chinese workers as well.

Now that China has experienced declining investment opportunities in the West, due to a slow return of Western businesses after Tiananmen, and the restriction of Chinese student visas to English-speaking Western countries, the importance of its Middle East trading partners has increased as a source for hard currency. It is not surprising, therefore, that Arabic is increasing in importance as a means for studying abroad. Once thought to have mainly religious-occupation value, enabling students to become Imam in the mosque, Arabic has grown as an important second language for business purposes. Hajji Muhammad Zhang Zhihua, currently an Arabic teacher at the Arab and African Studies Institute at Beijing's Number Two Foreign Languages College (which mainly trains foreign interpreters and tour guides), served several years in Egypt and the Middle East as an interpreter for state-sponsored construction projects. He was one of the first Hui Muslim students trained by the state in Arabic and Quranic studies at the China Islamic Association in Beijing, and his first teachers were both from Egypt, so he speaks fluent Egyptian Arabic. Hajji Muhammad Zhang's Arabic classes were so popular that two-thirds of his 100 students were privately paying their own tuition, unlike the officially matriculated state-supported students at the university who virtually attend free, in order to become interpreters in the Middle East, or increase their chances of receiving scholarships to attend Middle Eastern universities, since it is so difficult to get into Chinese universities or go to English-speaking countries.

China's Party Chairman, Yang Shangkun, in his visit to six Middle Eastern countries after the Tiananmen massacre, underscored the new importance that China

placed on its Middle Eastern relations by affirming its continued commitment to trade with the Middle East, political stability, and fair treatment of Muslims. In a surprising move that underscored the importance China places upon its relationship with Egypt, he unexpectedly announced that China would donate the multi-million dollar International Conference Center in the Heliopolis suburb of Cairo, which Chinese construction firms had been engaged in building for the last three years. Along with the large Cairo Stadium, which was also built by the Chinese, as well as the Cornish highway along the Nile, the International Conference Center stands as yet another monument to improving Sino-Egyptian relations.

As one of 5 members of the United Nation's Security Council, and despite a long-term friendship with Iraq, China went along with most of the UN resolutions in the war against Iraq. Although it abstained from Resolution 678, making it unlikely that Chinese workers will be welcomed back into Kuwait (Harris 1991:7), it enjoys a relatively untarnished reputation in the Middle East as a valuable source for low-grade weaponry and cheap labor.¹²

But what does this have to do with the Salafiyya? The enormous exchange of workers, pilgrims, and students to the Middle East has allowed the Muslims in China many more opportunities to travel abroad, reestablish connections with relatives, and become exposed to the Muslim world outside of China. This confirms Joseph Fletcher's argument that China was very much in tune with socioreligious movements in the Middle East, and that each "tide" of Islamic influence in China resulted from the opening of China to the movement of Muslims, mostly on the Hajj, between China and the pilgrimage cities (Fletcher 1988). In the late 19th and early 20th century, most of the Muslims who were to exert substantial influence on Islam in China studied at the Al Azhar University, the oldest University in the world and the foremost Sunni Islamic training institution.¹³

I already noted that 28 of 34 students from China at the prestigious Al Azhar University in Cairo are Uighur, most of whom are financed by loans from relatives and scholarships from the Mecca-based Muslim World League. Muslims from China complain that while the Egyptian government provides for 10 scholarships per year to the Al Azhar Islamic University, the Chinese government has not taken advantage of them since the first group of 10 students (including 2 visiting scholars) was sent in 1981. The Chinese government claims that the terms of the scholarships, which include room and board, free tuition, and LE \$50 per month (= US \$16), are not adequate for the students to live on, though it is the same given to the majority of other Third World students. By contrast, the Chinese government does allow 10 students per year to take advantage of scholarships at Cairo University, and supports Egyptian students studying Chinese at Ain Shams University. This led one Hui student at Al Azhar to complain to me that "The Chinese government only wants its students to come to Egypt to study science, not religion, even though it claims to support open study abroad."

This same Hui indicated that though the Salafiyya were popular in China and most of the devout Yihewani Muslims in the Northwest were joining the Salafiyya, it was not a real "movement" or order in Egypt. He argued that "Salafiyya" was just another way of saying "Wahabiyya" and indicated that any devout Muslim in Saudi Arabia would use the terms interchangeably to indicate orthodoxy and conservatism. Though this may not be true throughout the Middle East, it is important to note that in China, the Salafiyya have become a full-fledged Islamic movement, or as I have suggested, perhaps a new modality.

In Pursuit of the Salafiyya

In order to understand fully the rise of this movement in the last few years, further questions need to be addressed. It is important to determine from whom they

have been recruiting their followers: the Yihewani? the urban areas? the youth? the middle class? or even the Han Chinese? Examination is also required of their national organization and the connections between their local leadership. While the Gedimu are dispersed in their individual communities, the Sufi's are still closely connected through their appointed saintly lineages and national networks. The Yihewani in China has tended to dominate the State-sponsored China Islamic Association, an organization that has assisted their national organization. National linkages between the disparate Salafiyya communities, now fairly isolated in their individual mosques, will probably be necessary if the Salafiyya are going to grow as a movement across China beyond Hezhou and the Northwest. It is also not known whether ties to Salafiyya members in North Africa and the Middle East are actively being pursued and maintained.

It is also possible that the Salafiyya will lose influence through continued internal debate and dissolution. If scriptural squabbling such as the "immanentist" debate mentioned at the beginning of this paper continues, then it is doubtful that they will gain wider appeal. These incidents of infighting and intra-Muslim conflict might raise the suspicions of the State authorities and lead to restrictions placed on the movement. Chinese authorities schooled in Northwest history know all too well that most major Muslim rebellions in Northwest China originally began as a small-scale intra-Muslim conflict over several of areas of dispute outlined above. When the State stepped in to quell the conflict, Muslims tended to unify and turn against what they perceived as unfair outside Han Chinese intervention, transforming a religious dispute into a large-scale ethnic conflict. After the uprising ran its course, it was also not unusual for the Muslims to split again along local political and sectarian lines -- divisions that the State was all too eager to exploit.

It is precisely because of this historical background that the Chinese State continues to monitor Islamic movements closely, and be wary of any new challenges

to local authorities and traditions. It is also interesting to note that the recent "transcendentalist" dispute within the Salafiyya parallels earlier Islamic sectarian conflicts in their adoption of certain signifying dress and hair styles. Sufi's continue to distinguish themselves by the six-cornered hat, and the Jahriyya often trim their sideburns and beards in memory of their Shaykh Ma Mingxin whose beard was cut off just before his head by the Chinese Qing troops. By cutting their hair short, the "transcendentalist" Salafiyya draw clearly the lines of their movement. Hats and haircuts are one of the many means of signification among Muslim reformists in China, where membership is rarely tolerated in more than one faction.

The Salafiyya represent the extreme religious expression of modern Islamic reforms in China, but they are not the only contemporary compelling social movement among China's Muslims. In 1989, a "Salman Rushdie-like" protest ignited across China over a Chinese book, Sexual Customs (*Xing Fengsu*), that Muslims found offensive. The protest was not organized by any one Islamic order or faction, but the State quickly moved to meet all the demands of the protestors in an attempt to quell the nation-wide protest and placate national and international Muslim opinion (see Gladney, forthcoming). While the Hui are not allowed to organize politically, a host of new periodicals and papers have appeared, outside the State press, and permitted since they are produced by a minority nationality. As a minority in China, the Hui can press for many privileges and make demands that the Han majority are denied (see Gladney 1990a). However, whether the Islamic orders such as the Salafiyya, will move to the forefront in pushing these reforms is yet to be seen. Since the Salafiyya until now have distinguished themselves from the Yihewani in their non-political stance, and refusal to collaborate with the State, it remains to be seen whether young people seeking to alter the constellations of power in Chinese society may be drawn to the movement. At this point, the movement offers more of an orthodox withdrawal from the issues of modern China, rather than a commitment to transform it.

The State in China can ill afford to inveigh too heavily against its Muslim minorities. Particularly since June 1989, China's sources of foreign trade and exchange are coming to increasingly rely on the Muslim world. As indicated above, not only does China supply military hardware to many Muslim nations, but it also exports cheap skilled labor. The leader of several official Muslim friendship delegations to the Middle East is presently the Vice Chairman of the Ningxia Hui Regional Government, and himself the current *shaykh* of one of the largest Naqshbandi factions in Northwest China. These relations are too important for China ignore when it turns to deal with its domestic Muslim problems. At the very time when it was preparing to massacre the student democracy protesters in June 1989, the State immediately met all of the demands of the Muslim students over the Salman Rushdie protest: the State banned the book Sexual Customs, arrested the authors, closed the publishing house, and required public apologies. It is clear that the Salafiyya may be able to take advantage of this new climate of State-sponsored favoritism toward Muslim minorities to expand their movement. Whether they will establish tighter contacts with Salafiyya abroad, engage in national reforms, or become mired in scriptural disputes remains to be seen.

While the Salafiyya are perhaps in the best position to rise as a new modality of Islam in China, fairly unscathed by the past 40 years of Communist rule, they have yet to grow into a recognized national movement, or seen as anything more than still another "new teaching" among a Muslim minority which has been peripheralized not only by the outside Islamic world but the Han Chinese world as well. As they live between these two worlds, Far and Middle East, the Salafiyya are yet another Hui Muslim reform movement which may be well-positioned to transform the space where they overlap.

¹ I would like to thank the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and UNESCO for funding a 1991 return trip to China which helped me to follow up on several issues raised in this study. The AAAS also supported research in Egypt on the Salafiyya, and my earlier research in China upon which this study draws was generously supported by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, the Fulbright Commission, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

² It is precisely the absence of the State in Bentley's (1987) otherwise valiant attempt to introduce Bourdieu's practice theory to the study of Muslim ethnicity in the Philippines that makes the study ultimately dissatisfactory. Lack of attention to the state and state policy toward Muslims is surprising given that the study took place during the declining years of the Marcos regime (see Horvatich 1992).

³ Aside from perhaps a few remaining cultural influences deriving from the large communities of Persian Muslims in the earliest period of Islam in China, there is no institutionalized Shi'ism among the Hui, which contradicts Israeli's (1989) thesis (see Lipman, Forthcoming; Xue 1987). There is at least one Shi'i community among the Uighur in Khotan, and the majority of the Persian speaking Tadjik are Shi'ite. Nevertheless, cultural and political contacts are strong between China and Iran.

⁴ Earlier Sufi communities and other Islamic orders existed in China and may have been involved in several minor disturbances within the foreign Muslim communities. See Chen Dasheng's (1983a:53-64) interesting inquiry into Islamic factional disputes that led to the ten year Isbah disturbance in Quanzhou at the end of the Yuan dynasty (14th century).

⁵ "Menhuan" is the Chinese technical term describing the socioeconomic and religious organization of Sufi brotherhoods linked to the "leading descent line" of the original Sufi founder, extending through his

appointees or descendants to the leader himself and from him to Muhammad. Similar to Sufi organizations found throughout the Islamic world, in China the *menhuan* often amassed large *waqf* and landholdings, and in some cases were patronized or persecuted by local Muslim warlords. For a more detailed discussion, see Jin 1985:187-203; Lipman 1989; Ma and Wang 1985; Nakada 1971.

⁶ Early 20th Century Western travelers in Northwest China were struck by the non-religious political nature of some of these menhuan which were instrumental in organizing many of the large and small Hui rebellions. Lattimore (1940:185) observed: "Different religio-political families -- in the name, characteristically, of different sects of Islam -- began to struggle against each other both for hegemony as between Moslems and for control of external relations as between Moslems and Chinese." The sociopolitical role of these menhuan has been the main focus of Chinese historians, especially during the 1950s land reform campaign when large menhuan landholdings were expropriated as allegedly belonging to feudal landlords. The most controversial victim of this critique was Ma Zhenwu, the Naqshbandiyya Jahriyya Shagou branch leader in Ningxia, whose vast holdings were confiscated in 1958. After dying in prison in 1960, he was posthumously rehabilitated in August 1983, which led to more open study of these groups (see the October 1958 document, "Chinese Moslems Expose the Crimes of Ma Chen-wu" in MacInnis 1972:167-75).

⁷ Forbes (1976:75) regards the popularity of tombs among the Hui as "probably due to isolation from the Islamic mainstream." On the other hand, Trippner (1961) argues that these "grave-worshipping cults" give evidence of the pervasive influence of Shi'ism among the Hui. Alternatively, I suggest (1987:501-17) that the tombs reveal a wide variety of Hui religious meaning, serving as important charters that link different Hui communities to their foreign Muslim heritage.

⁸ Various reasons are given for the significance of these six pointed caps, including its symbolism of God's creating the earth in six days and resting on the seventh. Interestingly, the source for this tradition is not found in the Quran (Th. Emil Homerin, personal communication).

⁹ While the Ikhwan became popular among China's Muslims, few accepted the Hanbali school of jurisprudence as is found among the Wahhabi, so that the Ikhwan in China is distinguished by primarily adhering to the Hanafi school (see Ma Tong 1985:198ff.).

¹⁰ For a history of the Yihewani (Ikhwan) in China see especially, Lipman 1986:14-21, as well as Chinese works by Ma Kexun 1982; Ma Tong 1983:127-154, 1985:168-200; Mian Weiling 1981:118-31; Ye Zhengang 1981.

¹¹ "Ma" (马) is the most common surname among Hui Muslims in China, tracing its origins to the Ming dynasty when many Muslims were required to take on Chinese surnames and "Ma" most closely resembled the first syllable for "Muhammad." It is also the Chinese character for "horse" and since many Hui were engaged as caravaneers, it was a natural choice for a surname.

¹² For an analysis of the Muslim Chinese response to Saddam Hussein, see Gladney, forthcoming, and Harris, forthcoming.

¹³ For an interesting Chinese summary of this earlier period, see Pang Shiqian 1951. For a recent discussion of the role of the Al Azhar in educating China's Muslims, see Ma and Yang 1988.