

BEARER OF AN IDEAL

1. SPONTANEOUS ORIGIN

The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) was founded in 1918 as the spontaneous enterprise of a group of young men. Two typical factors of such a spontaneous group enterprise, were present. These were: 1) the personal conditions, experiences and expectations of the group, and 2) the idealistic element - the formulation of a cause or ideal they wished to promote. The personal element was the feeling of alienation in the unsympathetic environment of Johannesburg, a cosmopolitan mining city with the overwhelming power of the mining financiers and the group's need for a space and existence of their own, a place for them as Afrikaners. The ideal was mainly the pursuit of new hope and vision for Afrikaners, who had suffered defeat, were poor, felt powerless and experienced alienation in a hostile political and socio-economical environment.

The founders who had no power of influence could not rely on any existing structures. They only had two means at their disposal, i.e. the emotional appeal of self-help attempts within the Afrikaner community and the inherent motivation and qualities of the people that they wished to call on to participate in the ideal. The self-help ideal had the advantage of coinciding with the foundation of the Helpmekaar movement and the establishment of the then small and insecure Afrikaans enterprises such as Nasionale Pers, SANTAM and SANLAM. The Helpmekaar movement proved what could be achieved through self-help projects within the community.

Against this background, the founder members had to give meaning and stature to the concepts of self-sufficiency and self-help. group relationships, economical upliftment and development were sensitive political issues of the day. the founders had to prevent their aspirations becoming confused with political issues. If this were to happen the enterprise would and could not work. The founders never had a large and dramatic scheme in mind. The plan was based on the contributions of a small group of enthusiastic people and was not aimed at the establishment of an national movement.

After the Anglo Boer War, the British reconstruction in the Transvaal and Free State and the discouraging effects of the First World War, the political struggle of the Afrikaner to obtain a fair share in the country's government and economy, eventually resulted in two possible political options for Afrikaners. In terms of the first, reconciliation with British Imperialism and imperial interests, the Afrikaner would have been relegated to second class South African citizens. The second option was to improve, promote and strengthen Afrikaner interests, to establish Afrikaners as full and equal citizens of their

country. The Afrikaners were divided on these issues. One of the reasons for the division was the different decisions leaders opted for after the Anglo Boer War. Afrikaners had to follow the lead of either Gen Botha and Gen Smuts, or the lead of Gen Hertzog and Dr Malan.

2. STYLE AND CHARACTER

2.1 Organisation for Men

Since its inception the AB had a style and character of its own. In time, these characteristics grew stronger and were embedded in its very nature. It was a male organisation because men played the main roles in economic, political and public affairs at the time. Only men could vote and few, if any, women played significant roles in the Afrikaans business and professional life of the time.

2.2 Small Groups

The AB chose small group activities because it had certain advantages. The emphasis was on the individual and his contribution within his own sphere of influence. Activities within small groups meant that the individualism could be harnessed in a spirit of fellowship (camaraderie) and this strengthened the concept of unity. It also meant an emphasis on local matters. The founders did not want power, they concentrated on individual influencing. Initially they considered a public organisation but dispensed with the idea because they never intended a comprehensive mobilisation effort. It was simply not important at the time.

2.3 Democratic

A third characteristic of the AB was its democratic constitutional element, both in terms of its internal activities and its points of view on public matters. The election of Branch Executives, Regional Councils and the AB Executive Council (EC) was based on true democratic principles. Decisions at the regular meetings of the national representatives of the various Branches, known as the Bondsraad, were taken in accordance with democratic principles. Of course these decisions led to intensive discussion, debates and competition where there were significant differences of opinion. Sensitive matters that led to difficult decisions had to be resolved in the particular style, with the ever-present emphasis on "brotherhood". That often led to patient attempts to ensure unity and consensus before passing difficult and directive resolutions.

2.4 Protestant Christian

The Protestant Christian background was a fourth characteristic. All decisions concerning principles had to comply with this basic background requirement. That is why ministers and theologians played such important roles as leaders in this organisation. In practice this basis meant that members of the organisation

were also, almost exclusively, members of the three Afrikaans churches and, later the Lutheran Church. Non-participation in church matters was the most general cause for membership disqualification. Members of church groups that had for some time not been considered part of the main stream of Afrikaans Christian Churches, did not qualify for membership.

2.5 Anti-Communist

As early as 1924, the organisation took a stand against communism and socialism. By 1943, during the Second World War, the organisation considered the "dangers of communism" a prominent concern. These strong anti-Communist convictions represented a fifth important characteristic and even led to the unsuccessful creation of Antikom in 1965.

2.6 Recruitment

Membership was by proposal and recruitment only. No one could apply for membership, although initially it was possible. This implied that a prospective member had to contact a member or members. If the member or members were convinced of the prospective member's principles and true convictions, they could propose that person for membership. Other members were informed of the proposal for approval or objection. The proposed member needed the trust of other members. This made the organisation a particularly selective association and this became one of the reasons why sometimes, other Afrikaners were envious of the organisation.

2.7 Confidentiality

2.7.1 Compulsory Confidentiality

A sixth characteristic was the AB's decision to function as a confidential organisation. Compulsory confidentiality was included in the organisation's constitution in 1921, although the Bond did arrange public meetings during its early years. There were important reasons for the confidentiality clauses. The first was to ensure that members could not act in their own interest or promote their own interests. The second reason was a desire to create a spirit of candour and frankness to allow and ensure the best possible measure of original, creative thought needed to attain the objectives. A third factor was that the majority of the founders were working in the public sector or in a non-Afrikaans environment and Afrikaners found it a hostile milieu in terms of their ideals. They were afraid of victimisation.

Throughout its history the confidential nature of the AB often led to differences of opinion amongst its members, but fortunately it never led to serious disputes. The differences of opinion existed since 1921, but most members remained in favour of the confidentiality clause. During debates on the matter, it was always

emphasised that confidentiality is not the ultimate characteristic of the Afrikanerbond. It is a means, a working method, not an objective.

Sometimes some members felt that the strict confidentiality simply curtailed the efficiency of the organisation's activities. Others felt differently.

The disadvantage of confidentiality was that it could brand the AB as a colluding organisation - an organisation allowing dark and sinister activities that cannot be made public. This created problems for churches, ministers, political parties and politicians. Most often the AB was accused of pushing members for public office, discrimination against non-members and of manipulation of decisions and power. Some journalists made it their hobby to "disclose" the unholy "scheming and corruption" of the organisation. In this process many sensational reports, containing half-truths or distorted information were published world-wide. This helped to create a negative perception of the AB. The AB seldom attempted to set the record straight - on the one hand, because it would have been difficult for a confidential organisation; and on the other hand, the organisation believed so strongly in its ideals and principles, as well as the integrity of its members, that it avoided any public corrective measures or reaction to these misrepresentations. In the period after 1953 some members who were unhappy with the AB's actions or decisions, approached the public media. The fact that these public campaigns often presented opposing views of the AB, confirms that too often the perceptions were based on biased interpretations - according to some reports the AB was inflexible and rigid and according to others, it had become the victim of liberal views and opinions.

2.7.2 Political Sensitivity

Political parties and groups were rather sensitive to the AB opinions on important public policy matters, or the role it wished to play in handling the matters. The AB often became the target for political condemnation. One such incident occurred in 1934. At the time, Gen Hertzog accused the AB that it was not politically neutral, that it chose to side with the Purified National Party under Dr Malan. After a number of discussions between Gen Hertzog and the AB's Executive Council, they settled the dispute. In 1944, Gen Smuts campaigned against the AB when he told civil servants to resign from the AB or lose their work. The AB recommended resignation rather than risk financial disaster and not being able to support a wife and family. A number of members chose to lose their jobs and not to forsake their ideals.

In 1951 the Prime Minister, Dr D F Malan, offered to institute a judicial inquiry into the alleged sinister role of the AB. The leader of the United Party, Adv J G N Strauss, declined the offer. In 1964, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd requested Judge D H Botha to investigate organisations like the AB and the Free Masons based on their alleged representation of sinister powers. Judge Botha could not find any proof of the allegations.

2.7.3 Churches' Stand on Confidentiality

From time to time the churches criticised the AB's confidentiality. In 1937 the Reformed Church declared that the confidential character of the AB was undesirable. The AB invited the churches to investigate its activities, but they declined the offer. In 1949 the AB invited the "Council of Churches" of the Dutch Reformed Church to investigate its activities and promised its full co-operation. This offer was declined. Although the confidential character was discussed at the NG Church Synod Meetings from time to time, it never condemned it in principle. Individual ministers considered AB membership as an embarrassment for the church and this opinion was set out in the publication, *Stormkompas*. In 1982 the NG Church General Synod requested the AB to reconsider the necessity for confidentiality.

In 1993 the organisation was restructured and during the restructuring process, the AB amended its approach, mission and objectives, and scrapped the confidentiality clause. It means that members may declare their own membership. Fellow members' names may still not be made public without their consent. Since then the AB functions on a business basis. Internal board meetings are still confidential, but public affairs are open and available to the public. It also means that the AB publishes its address, names of members of staff, members of the Executive Council and other office bearers, that it participates in public debate, events and discussion and it regularly makes its viewpoints known by means of press releases. Restructuring also resulted in a name change from the Afrikaner Broederbond to the Afrikanerbond.

2.7.4 Why confidentiality?

In view of the AB's consistent willingness to allow public investigation of its activities, one has to ask why the insistence on confidentiality. A proper study of the AB's history, shows that none of the AB's activities or opinions had ever been a threat to national security, subversive or collusive. The AB never colluded to act illegally, nor can any activity be considered illegal. In reality the only confidential aspects were the points of view and the

names of its members. Confidentiality was the product of the AB's attempts to allow the maximum openness possible for its members. They needed an avenue to express themselves openly about any matter irrespective of it being a preliminary reaction or an experimental suggestion. People in sensitive positions could participate in exploratory discussions and analyses without exposing themselves to unnecessary attacks or criticism. A number of Afrikaners found themselves in rather hostile environments and could not support the Afrikaner ideal openly. Fear of victimisation also played a role.

This means that confidentiality had to promote unity, strengthen discipline and provide an opportunity for frank discussion on matters of principle to get more consensus. The emphasis on brotherhood and common handling of internal differences, did not prevent several cases of confidentiality breaches and leaks to the press. These breaches and leaks served only to fuel the clamour to expose all. It happened with Beyers Naude in 1953, the Herstigte Nasionale Party and *Die Afrikaner's* (HNP mouthpiece) attacks on the AB in the early seventies, the *Sunday Times* reports in 1963 and 1978 and the publication of the AB documents on the transformation in the eighties. In other cases, negligence or malice of some members led to leaks to the press. These press reports caused great embarrassment for members, but did not create any within the organisation.

3. FUNCTIONING

3.1 Academic Intellectual Basis

The functioning of the AB is based on two pillars: think and act. It has to be a source of expertise and deliberation, yet launches certain actions to attain its ideals. Although the organisation was not founded by intellectuals and academics only, it developed a strong academic, intellectual character. The identification and analysing of public matters which are of the utmost importance to Afrikaners and the development of policies and directives based on its principles became the main thrust of the organisation.

This may be why the AB drew so many members having an academic background: teachers, ministers, businessmen, university lecturers and staff, scientists and professional persons. Some of them became civil servants and later became senior officials in the civil service. The membership requirements and selection process resulted in a select group of members. The AB's strong idealistic foundation required members to have a strong idealistic disposition and they had to be willing to render voluntary service

to attain the organisation's goals and ideals.

3.2 Thought and Action

It is noted that the Executive Council often reminded members that intellectual deliberations, analysis and formulating opinions, were not the AB's only functions. The intellectual effort required the support of practical and constructive action. Members often showed impatience because they felt that there was too much talk and too little action. The Executive Council also found it necessary to constantly remind Branches of their duties at local levels. They had to implement their own initiatives.

The tense interaction between discussions and implementation reflects the Afrikaner's own search for balance between theory and practice, between principles and practical policy on very basic levels. The point of departure is that members should thrash out principles and practical policies in a responsible manner before implementing these ideas or principles in their personal capacities, as they would always be accountable for their individual actions. It meant that members often had the advantage of being well prepared and equipped for discussion and application at work or locally. Members are therefore expected to convince others of the correctness, fairness and desirability of their points of view and opinions. More often than not such informed and prepared people become leaders in their communities. Action depended on the channels available to individual members. The AB itself never took group action – it never acted militantly. It never wished to instigate mass movements, and never launched actions to undermine the government, state or to encourage violence. Apart from the fact that such action would be contrary to the very nature and foundation of the organisation, it simply did not have the means to do so.

The AB depended on the means and initiatives of its individual members. If members acted insensitively or enlisted only fellow members for matters of local importance, they acted contrary to the purpose and mission of the AB. The Executive Council often warned members against such behaviour and action.

3.3 Diversity of Opinion

Increased diversity created more problems. There was a marked increase in diversity of opinions in the Afrikaner communities since 1961, the year in which South Africa became a republic. Increasing diversity of opinion on issues of the day led to increasing disputes and tension. This, which was only a natural process, made the promotion of Afrikaner unity by the AB even

more difficult.

3.4 Working Areas

In the search for synergy between brainstorming and action a number of dominant core issues evolved which had a profound effect on the AB's image. The following is a summary of the most important core issues:

- W Language promotion (a matter of continued importance from 1918 to 1948 and again since 1994).
- W Cultural enhancement (a matter of continued importance, culminating in the founding of the FAK (1929). The FAK since its inception increasingly assumed responsibility for cultural matters).
- W Education (creating accessible quality education based on Christian principles using Afrikaans as the language medium for all levels of formal education.)
- W Promoting Christian values and the Christian religion in all spheres of life.
- W Economic independence of the Afrikaner. Since the so-called "Ekonomiese Volkskongres" of 1939 and the establishment of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the latter increasingly became responsible for economic affairs.
- W Upliftment and development of the Afrikaner working class.
- W The Republican ideal.
- W Race relations in general.
- W Promoting good relationships with Coloured communities.
- W Promoting good relationships with Black communities.
- W Political reform and transformation and the survival of the Afrikaner.

These fields will now be discussed in more detail. Please note that the first seven areas have been included under a single heading because they all deal with cultural independence.

4. CULTURAL INDEPENDENCE

4.1 The AB as Cultural Organisation

The AB has always defined itself as a cultural organisation and not a liberation

movement or a people's organisation nor as a political movement. In a multi-cultural country, any cultural manifestation - like the language of education - may easily develop into a political issue. Such a situation does not allow a clear distinction between political and cultural matters. In the fight for supremacy between British imperialist and monarchic interests on the one hand and Afrikaans national and republican interests on the other, matters like language, symbols, cultural rights, education, republicanism etc. all had both a cultural and political content. The survival of a nation or culture is not merely a cultural matter, it also has strong political undertones. The situation became even more complicated not only for Afrikaner culture in general but for the AB in particular when more than one political party, claiming to be the patron of Afrikaner interests, appeared on the political arena. If basically one political party fulfilled this role, the issue would still have retained its political nature, but the party political sting would not have been so problematic. In a cultural jig-saw puzzle like the one presented by the South African situation, a cultural organisation is under constant pressure to watch for the fine distinction between cultural manifestation and political demonstration. The most important test is the extent to which people of various political inclinations can feel at home within such an organisation.

4.2 Relationship: Politics/Culture

Since the institutionalisation of Afrikaans cultural interests in 1875, with the establishment of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, there has been a problem with the relationship between politics and culture. The problems mostly relate to the position of political policy formulation, not party political activities. Organized culture had to express an opinion on policy issues and therefore became involved in political matters. Evidently those political parties with policies that were in line with the opinions expressed by organized culture looked at the cultural issues from a different perspective. The Afrikaans urge for a cultural manifestation had to influence and affect political parties, and the views and attitudes of the various political parties necessarily had to influence the cultural interests. The question was, which type of relationship would develop in this process?

This complicated relationship took shape after 1910, involving two particular political parties in the South African history. The South African Party was established in 1911 and it felt that it needed to promote both Afrikaans and English/British interests. Its inability to find a general supportive balance between the two interest groups, gradually led to more emphasis on the English/British interests of its members. This led to the establishment of the National Party in 1914. This party's priority was to promote Afrikaans interests. The two political parties then competed for Afrikaans support.

Gen Hertzog (who was not an AB member), with his two-stream policy, is renowned as the father of the Afrikaans language efforts. He started these efforts as education minister of the Orange River Colony. In addition, he was a

founder member of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns. His two-stream policy entailed the development of the Afrikaans and English cultures as two parallel and equal worlds. These two separate, yet parallel entities were supposed to be in continuous equilibrium. Botha and Smuts supported a single stream policy with a single South African culture of unspecified character, content and meaning - an integration of the two worlds.

These approaches meant that the language and cultural policies became an integral part of the political scene within the South African context. How should the government formulate a point of view, a stand on the issue and how should they implement this opinion on language rights in theory and in practice? What were the implications for everyday practice of education, the civil service, public administration, the judiciary, etc? What role should the government and state play in the promotion of and care for culture? Which roles would two distinctly different historical heritages – a colonial monarchic and a republican tradition – play in political and constitutional processes?

Inevitably, these sensitive issues led to public political controversy. From time to time, cultural movements, like individuals and political parties, faced very difficult choices. Cultural organisations, just like individuals and political parties, could not side-step these issues, because they touched the very nerve of their cultural interests.

Soon after its founding the AB became involved in this problematic situation. The most significant challenge was to find a guiding balance between absolute neutrality and taking an active stand on policy matters that could mean falling into the slipstream of a political party. The first implied that the organisation could not take a stand on any important and relevant issue. This would be disastrous for any leading organisation. The second implied that it would increasingly allow itself to be absorbed into the power sphere of a political organisation. This would mean losing its autonomous nature and independent ideas.

4.3 Political Programme and Republican Ideal

In May 1934, at a time of increased tension between Gen Hertzog and his decision to amalgamate the South African Party and National Party, and Dr Malan's skepticism about the unnatural combination of the two different political frameworks, the AB committed itself to political neutrality.

However, four months later, the Executive Council accepted Prof Wikus du Plessis' seven point political programme for the AB. It was designed to express the AB's autonomous nature and political independence. Unfortunately it led to serious conflict between AB members of the United Party and the Purified National Party. The basis of the conflict was the republican mission. Some AB members considered the mission a historical cultural ideal and committed themselves to the reinstatement of the republican system. Other AB members believed that reconciliation with the English sentiment required a lesser place

for or even abandonment of the republican ideal. Support for the republican ideal grew stronger within the AB after 1931. In 1941/2 the Executive Council and Reunited National Party reached consensus on the republican ideal, after the AB prepared a republican constitution that got the support of the RNP. After this, the AB concentrated more and more on the establishment of a republican type state. After 1959, the AB worked with Dr Verwoerd's government to implement a referendum on becoming a republic in 1960. It was not considered a party political action, it was seen as the attainment of a traditional Afrikaner ideal.

4.4 Education and Language

Mother-tongue education and language advancement were aspects on which the AB concentrated since its inception. It formulated its basic stand on the right to mother-tongue education as early as 19 July 1921. It regularly had to reiterate its principles on the matter and to resist attempts to tamper with this principle. In the same year the AB expressed itself in favour of Afrikaans as the official language (to replace Dutch) although the government only approved this in 1925. The AB campaigned for Afrikaans tertiary institutions, for equality in the civil service and public life, and Afrikaans on radio and television. The AB never attacked English, and advocated the promotion of indigenous Black languages. However, it issued unequivocal warnings about Anglicisation or any preferential treatment of English. It often warned that English would overwhelm Black communities, causing prejudice against Afrikaans. The AB insisted that all communication with Blacks be in excellent Afrikaans and emphasised the creation of a positive attitude towards Afrikaans. The AB did not accept the argument, without qualification, that the 1976 Soweto Uprising followed resistance to the insistence that Afrikaans remain one of the teaching languages. The AB feels it was cited as the official reason because it served a useful mobilisation purpose.

It will become clear later, that after 1986, the AB again emphasised and demonstrated the primary nature of its cultural duty at a time when it had to reconsider the Afrikaner's role and place in a changing political dispensation. The Afrikaner's right to an own language and full normal public use of this language, as well as the right to promote cultural interests impartially and with government support, became part of the AB's proposals for constitutional reform.

4.5 Establishing the FAK

The most important initiative by the AB in its first decade of existence was the establishment in 1929, of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK). From the AB's point of view, there were two objectives for establishing the FAK. The first was to ensure maximum co-operation between local communities and national organisations involved in cultural efforts. That is why the FAK was established as a federation. It had to initiate and co-ordinate

own initiatives, involving all levels of society and all interest groups. The second objective was that cultural operations could be conducted through a public organisation. Without influencing its independence and autonomy the AB would have a special relationship with the FAK. Regular contact would ensure mutual support in implementing ideas and activities.

4.6 Flourishing Period

The 1930s were marked by an intense revival of interest in the Afrikaans Ideal. The establishment of the FAK, was followed by the establishment of several other organisations like the Voortrekkers, the ATKV, the First Aid League, the Reddingsdaadbond, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, and others based on their own initiatives. It also introduced a period of growth for Afrikaans books, and drama. A strong historical awareness was further created and reinforced through commemoration days and national festivals. Highlights were the Voortrekker Centenary Festival (1938), the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument (1949) and the Van Riebeeck Festival (1952). Ironically, it was also a period marked by a great division between Afrikaners - between supporters of the National Party and supporters of the United Party, the Afrikaner Party, the Grey Shirts, the Ossewabrandwag, the New Order and others. It was also a period during which Gen Hertzog found himself in political exile. Amidst the enthusiasm on the one hand and the upheaval on the other, the AB played a silent role as intermediary thus contributing towards stability and a vision for the future.

4.7 Economic Empowerment

Economic empowerment of the Afrikaner became an important issue on the AB's agenda during the 1930s. The poor White issue received a lot of attention at the time and the AB felt that the principle of self-reliance held the key to the solution of the problem. Although the AB rejected socialism as a system in 1924, the AB felt that some form of Afrikaner solidarity to support Afrikaans enterprises was essential. This combination of national and economic interests was called "national capitalism" (volkskapitalisme): free enterprise that recognises and supports the individual, but serves the interests of the group or nation.

An own bank to mobilise Afrikaans capital, Volkskas, was established in 1934. The Ekonomiese Volkskongres in which AB members played an important role, the Reddingsdaadbond founded in 1940, the Economic Institute of the FAK and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut meant that cultural re-enforcement was supported by an economic infrastructure, all of this within a period of three years and that while World War II raged. Although none of these enterprises were formally established by the AB, AB members in their personal capacities, made substantial contributions. The concept of service to the nation, one of the core issues of the AB, was the driving force in enabling ordinary workers to invest their savings in a variety of Afrikaans enterprises.

In the 1930's and 40's the AB showed particular concern for the fate of the Afrikaans worker. Attempts to organise mineworkers into trade unions and to recruit workers as members of the AB were met with limited success. Organisations like the ATKV attracted railway workers to a cultural organisation and Spoorbond tried to help them invest their savings productively. These organisations achieved a greater degree of success in recruiting members from the workers corps.

The AB cannot claim all credit for the successful development of the cultural independence of the Afrikaner. Other organisations and individuals also played important roles. However, the AB did help in the creation of a framework within which these activities could grow and develop in their own right. This was achieved through the stimulation of the Afrikaans ideal, the active role of its members and strategic positioning.

5. RACIAL AFFAIRS

5.1 Focus: 1918

At the time of its founding in 1918, the positioning and empowerment of the delicate Afrikaans culture and national ideals, were the main concern of the AB. However at the time it was not realised that this was but a forerunner of a much bigger problem.

The awakening of political awareness and growing socio-economic needs of Blacks, Coloureds and Asians were in the initial stages, but the full consequences were not understood during the early decades of the twentieth century. This only enjoyed attention from the point of view of cheap unskilled labour and its consequences for the poor White issue. To address this issue, the Executive Council convened a so-called "Native Commission" in 1929. The work of this commission was found to be overlapping with Gen Hertzog's Pakt Government's civilised labour policy aimed particularly at greater job security for White mine workers who were supporters of its coalition associate, the Labour Party.

5.2 Focus: 1934 - 1938

By 1934, the Executive Council's awareness of the emerging Black aspirations, grew to such an extent that it created a permanent Commission for Native Affairs. In 1939 this commission amalgamated with another group forming the Race Relations Committee. The purpose of this committee was to study race relations on a continuous basis and advise the Executive Council on policy matters.

The 1930s was a period marked by a growing interest in race relations in South Africa. This was the time of Gen Hertzog's so-called Native Laws, the foundation of the Institute for Race Relations (1931) and the Afrikaans Race Relations Bond (1935). The AB was only indirectly involved in the inception of the latter organisation. These organisations were established to gather and

collate information related to race relations. The fact that a number of publications appeared on the subject in the late twenties and early thirties, shows that it finally became a matter of academic investigation and analysis.

Between 1934 and 1938 the AB accepted a number of broad principles on which a policy had to be based:

W First and foremost, good and positive relations between the Afrikaner and other races had to be promoted. (Bondsraad decision of 28 September 1934). With this in mind, the AB supported the Raad der Kerken's (Dutch Reformed Church) proposed decision to discuss matters with Black leaders and requested the Afrikaans newspapers to report sympathetically on Black issues.

W Progress in Black education would be in the Afrikaner's interest, and should be aimed at their progress and development.

W Promote separate working and living areas.

The AB's policy was founded on Prof Wikus du Plessis' political programme developed in 1934, which made provision for the consistent separation of the races, emphasising development with human dignity and an own culture and way of life. There were no guidelines for practical implementation.

Separation, as the AB was looking for, had to form the basis for the development of an own culture, an own way of life, had to support missionary work and had to create good relationships and a spirit of mutual recognition and respect. It is quite evident that the policy of separation was always expressed in positive terms, aimed at real development and upliftment. It was a universal issue with its basis in the white settlement countries established during the previous century. In addition, it was a continuance of the British Colonial Traditions of the Cape Colony and Natal.

It was felt strongly that the policy may never mean negative separation just for the sake of separation. There were indeed Afrikaners who considered it that way, but all decisions, papers and addresses show that the policy was based on the conviction that separation represents a modernising policy allowing own community lives and identities for the various nations.

5.3 Focus: 1948 - 1960

Since 1948 the AB took very little initiative in respect of the implementation of the government policy. The AB followed the government in a supportive role, rather than guiding or providing new ideas. The Executive Council considered the Group Areas Act to be in the spirit of its policy decision of 1934 on separate neighbourhoods. The Bondsraad of 1952, supported the government's measures and the AB reaffirmed its policy view of 1934, that the logical consequence would be individual Black states. The AB considered it its duty to influence people to accept this logical consequence.

Black resistance against this policy of separation, received continued attention of the AB. The AB's ideal that the separation policy should lead to good mutual relationships required that the policy should obtain legitimacy through Black acceptance. For a very long time the opinion within the AB was that they did not accept the policy, because they did not understand the underlying principles or objectives of the policy. It was felt that the resistance was a temporary phenomenon which would disappear as soon as the positive developmental and modernising aspects became clear or as soon as there was a better understanding and appreciation of the issues. Some felt that the resistance was the result of propaganda against the policy. That is why the AB continued to look for ways of improving the policy, to make it more efficient, more development friendly and more people friendly. Committee upon committee, task group upon task group and numerous conferences tried to find ways of ensuring the success of the policy, to make it more acceptable.

That is why SABRA (South African Bureau for Race Relations) was established in 1948, to investigate the matter and provide correct information about the reality of the situation. The inherent tension, later known as the tension between ideal and reality, indeed led to tension between SABRA and the Executive Council. There were two contrasting phases of particular note. In the fifties, Executive Council members accused SABRA of taking too liberal a stand. In the seventies and eighties, Executive Council members accused SABRA of having an unrealistic and idealistic view of reality.

The first clash involved SABRA's insistence that the AB should criticise the government policy because the government did not implement the true ideals of the policy in practice. The government was doing too much about physical separation and too little about the development and modernising aspects of the policy. The liberals in Stellenbosch were replaced and the organisation's head office moved to Pretoria. This brought about an important shift within SABRA's approach and consequently in the AB's points of view.

In 1954 the AB accepted a document as representative of its basic principles. The document "*Grondslag en oogmerke van ons strewes*" emphasised the separation aspects of the policy rather than the developmental aspects. The points of departure were maintaining purity of race, creating own areas, promotion of peace and missionary work and emphasis on the special relationship between Coloureds and Afrikaners.

As the government continued to implement its policy after 1950, two distinct schools of thought emerged within the AB. Both groups had the same basic point of departure i.e. separate development, but the one emphasised separation and the other development. The same applied to schools of thought within SABRA. One group emphasised the necessity and need to criticise the government policy and always asked whether the policy contributed to progress and development, to human dignity and humanity. The other group's first concern was the measure of protection provided by separation and how this

could create security for a White country. The AB debates of the fifties and sixties clearly show the struggle to reconcile these two approaches to the policy. Both had a strong idealistic basis - a conviction that they could adapt the socio-economic reality to suit the ideal.

5.4 Focus: 1960 - 1970

During 1961 the enthusiasm for a Republic to a very large extent, dominated the different approaches within the AB. More over real hope existed that the concept of self-governing Black States and the policy of separate development would draw meaningful Black support and legitimacy for the system. After 1961 the focus shifted to these matters. This is evident from the Executive Council's 1960 decision to convene a special task group on race relations. This task group gave the AB a much better picture about the problems created by the policy. The principle i.e that Afrikaners afford other race groups which they claim for themselves - a principle formulated in 1934 - was emphasised again. The AB felt strongly about its duty to educate the public to always act honourably when dealing with people of other race groups. Legislation is not aimed at arbitrary discrimination or disadvantaging, but to "protect and help".

In the sixties and seventies, the differences on the implementation of the policy increased dramatically. There were intense debates between the pragmatists and the idealists, but serious deliberation was limited mainly to the Executive Council, its committees and task groups. Many reports were sent to members, promoting the concept of a White country alongside independent Black States.

The dilemma was that the number of Blacks within the "White" country would not decrease in line with projections, on the contrary the numbers increased. The independent Transkei, Boputhatswana, Ciskei and Venda never received domestic or international support. Other Black leaders did accept the status of the self-governing states, but did not wish to conclude the policy by accepting full independence.

In 1960 and later, the Black resistance took on a more violent character and the violence presented a threat to the country's safety and security. Sharpeville and Nyanga (1960), Soweto (1976) and a number of other smaller violent incidents supported the information that the Black resistance movement had been orchestrated more effectively and presented significant safety risks. The international condemnation of the South African policy and eventually the pressure for total isolation, increased strongly. The Soweto uprising was a strong indicator to AB members, although it was said that it resulted from the struggle against Afrikaans. After all, AB members wanted to achieve exactly the opposite, the policy was supposed to generate a positive attitude towards Afrikaans.

The AB was not indifferent about the safety situation. The AB informed its members of the scope of the unrest and methods to contribute to an improvement of the safety situation. After 1965 the situation was discussed

with the security forces because of the levels of concern about the safety situation and in 1974 the theme at the Bondsraad was "Safety in the Country."

The AB activities focused on winning support from moderate people of colour, to facilitate a united stand against the spread of revolutionary activities. Creating good mutual relationships over boundaries based on colour, played an important role in this strategy. An anti-revolutionary strategy was launched in 1986. All Branches were requested to promote socio-economic development and to improve quality of life in communities.

Under pressure of practical circumstances, the safety situation, socio-economic and demographic realities, the government started to look for ways and means of moving away from the rigorous separation measures. The Relations Committee under leadership of Prof Carel Boshoff was skeptical about these developments. The Committee worked very hard to present detailed proposals based on an idealistic approach to push the policy of separate development. The Committee proposed the establishment of high speed transport between the PWV area and the homelands to relieve the pressure of the growing number of inhabitants in the urban areas. Luxury facilities such as major sports stadiums had to be erected in the homelands rather than in the urban areas. Blacks in the urban areas were to be denied political powers (so-called Urban Bantu Councils). Prompt consolidation of the homelands was essential and the Committee developed specific, detailed proposals on the issue. Industrial decentralisation had to be accelerated to provide jobs in or near the homelands, in an attempt to reverse migration to the cities. The Committee had access to members of the cabinet to discuss these and other proposals. These activities had little or no effect on ordinary members. It was as if the process became so involved and the pace so fast that members could not be kept informed or be fully involved any longer.

The AB considered it its duty, on the one hand, to work for the elimination of discriminatory measures and on the other, to prevent the increasing skepticism about the realisation of the objectives set for the policy. Against this background, the Executive Council decided to develop a master plan, to identify priorities and develop a method to establish self-determination for each national group within South Africa.

The Relations Committee still worked under the guidance and leadership of Prof Boshoff. The Committee took note of the large amounts of money already spent on job creation in the homelands, rather than in the cities. The development of the border areas amounted to R700 million. The budget for homeland development was increased by 19% in 1976/77, representing 6,8% of the national budget. Despite these measures the influx into the cities continued.

It was realised that the success of homeland development would determine the success of the policy of separate development. The possibility of political control of a White homeland, would be determined by the measure in which

Blacks - those in "White" areas too - were able to exercise political rights in their own states as an alternative to political rights in a White country. If that was not possible, the policy created a moral dilemma, because it would be impossible to continue to refuse political power sharing.

5.5 Focus: 1970 - 1980

Acknowledging a potential moral dilemma meant that the AB had to make an important decision in 1974. In its mission to ensure self-determination for White people in general and the Afrikaner in particular, the AB had to choose between utilising its energy to accelerate the development of homelands in an attempt to attain the set objective, or accepting that the objective cannot be attained and channeling its energy towards finding alternative forms of power sharing. The Boshoff Committee chose the first option.

The Committee chairman, was also the chairman of SABRA and SABRA spent much time developing proposals for accelerated development. The general opinions expressed by SABRA and the AB remained basically the same for some time. The strategy developed by the Committee is important in the light of later developments. The focus shifted from Black homelands to the development of a White homeland. In 1976 the Bondsraad's theme was the development of such a homeland. Extensive proposals were developed to channel Black settlement and political alliance to the homelands to ensure White political control over a White country. These proposals entailed a reversal of the socio-economic processes within the country.

Discussion of these proposals at the 1976 Bondsraad is evidence of how critical AB members were of the idealistic vision of Neo-Verwoerdism. Although members welcomed the Verwoerd vision enthusiastically in the late fifties and early sixties, they were extremely critical of the Neo-Verwoerdism. They expressed great concern about the fact that this vision does not consider a series of undeniable realities. It was impossible to allocate more agricultural land to the homelands because agricultural development was too slow in those areas. South Africa's growth rate deteriorated to such an extent that it was impossible to allocate capital for development. Unemployment amongst Blacks increased sharply. High speed transport would be too costly. Foreign pressure and hostility grew. The need for alternative strategies became a crucial issue. One suggestion was the idea of alternative ways and means of satisfying Black political aspirations by creating local councils and contact mechanisms between Black urban communities and the homelands.

Under the guidance of Prof Gerrit Viljoen, who succeeded Dr AP Treurnicht as AB Chairman in October 1974, this mission to address the realities of the time had a two pronged approach: 1) the AB held meetings with experts with different backgrounds and points of view; and 2) contact and discussions with Black and Coloured leaders.

1977 showed progress towards the formulation of new points of view. The

government was also in the process of implementing a new direction. The new direction eventually led to a new constitution and a three chamber parliamentary system in 1983. This process focused strongly on the position of Coloureds and Asians. The Coloureds were very important to the members of the AB while Asians received less attention.

5.6 Relationship with Coloureds

The natural relationship between Coloured people and Afrikaners, based on a common language and culture, led to a search for a common point of view about the relationship with Coloureds. The AB had to decide which of three convictions were true: 1) Coloureds are Afrikaners and need to remain part of the Afrikaner community; 2) Coloureds are a separate nation with a particular way of life, culture and identity and although the people speak Afrikaans, they do not belong to the Afrikaner nation (ie, Austrians and Swiss people are not part of the German nation); and 3) Coloureds find themselves in a peculiar position because they have strong cultural ties with Afrikaners and therefore form a much closer part of the Afrikaner group than any other, but form a separate social and political community with its own identity.

These three points of view were constantly present amongst AB members. The AB considered the relationship with Coloured people of such importance that three Bondsraad themes were allocated to this group of people (1955, 1971 and 1977). Three special meetings were held (1960, 1977 and 1978) and a number of deliberations were held specifically to obtain clarity and consensus on the relationship issue. The focus was on finding ways and means of creating good relationships and there was some concern about the Coloured people's attitude towards Afrikaans.

Today the AB has Coloured members and this clearly indicates the evolution of the relationship. According to the 1955 Bondsraad minutes, ". . . some issues weighed heavily on the minds of those present . . .". Prof NJJ Olivier concluded that Afrikaners had only two options with regard to their relationship with the Coloured people. Coloured people can either side with the Blacks or with the Whites. The latter is the only possible option that the AB could consider, "whilst maintaining a most significant measure of separation as possible". It is essential to work for the creation of a common bond and friendship "to assist White people in its quest for survival and self-determination". Although Olivier had strong support from prominent members present, the Bondsraad was not prepared to opt for any of Olivier's alternatives.

After 1955 a clear so-called southern point of view, developed within the AB. This presented a more specific and particular policy on Coloureds to attract them to the organisation. In the north they were considered an organic part of the national policy. An uneasy feeling developed about the government's handling of the Coloured people. The question was whether they were being treated with sufficient sensitivity and this led to the first special meeting on the

matter in April 1960, at Sea Point. At this meeting members pointed out that the Afrikaner and government in general had a very simplistic approach to the identity and nature of Coloured people. Variety and variation of cultural mixes were the trademarks of Coloured community and cultural lives. They are not a potential danger to Afrikaners, instead "they may add an accent that may significantly enrich our lives". The AB considered the Coloureds a "potentially strong ally, even partner".

The meeting was critical about the government policy. The meeting chairman summarised the criticism as follows: ". . .[we] have to discuss candidly and confidentially the shape this policy on Coloureds has taken thus far . . . And decide for ourselves whether we are convinced in our own minds, that the implementation of the apartheid policy allowed Coloureds the rights they are entitled to and, at the same time, guarantee the conservation of those aspects for which we have to rely on their trust and co-operation?"

They appointed a continuance committee. The committee recommended a policy between segregation and integration, which later became the concept of parallel development. The focus was on the necessity of a social upliftment programme to develop a national identity. Own group areas, separate public facilities and population registration were considered essential. Work reservation for Coloureds in the Western Cape remained a priority. It is clear that the AB did not offer any new or original ideas.

The idea of a homeland did not disappear. SABRA-members reintroduced the concept in 1969. In 1971, at the Stellenbosch Bondsraad, the AB rejected the idea of a homeland for Afrikaners. However, concepts of growth areas and spatial order as instruments to create the idea of an identity for Coloureds were introduced. The Executive Council's search for a solution is evident from the number of committees and subcommittees established in quick succession in an attempt to find and formulate a policy.

A 1976 survey amongst AB members in the Cape Peninsula showed a new direction. The fact that 74% of respondents (members in the Peninsula) were in favour of direct Coloured representation in parliament, indicated that the Coloured Representative Council (most Coloureds did not accept it in any case) was not regarded as the solution to the political aspirations of the Coloureds.

In its reaction to the Erika Theron report (1976) the AB still emphasised the importance of an own cultural identity and the establishment of an own parliament for Coloureds.

5.7 Spatial Order

The concept of spatial order also contained a duality. Some people considered it the beginning of the development of a homeland. Other considered it as the creation of own townships. The duality showed up clearly in the Executive Council's proposals for a fully fledged three chamber parliament, the purpose

of which was to discuss matters of own and common interest, independently and jointly. This proposal was contained in a circular to members in July 1977. Homeland supporters also thought it had possibilities for evolutionary development. Others thought it should be an evolutionary process to direct representation in Central Parliament.

In this document on the political future of Coloureds, the opinion was that there "[should] be a move away from the situation where the White parliament and cabinet are the material, overriding component of joint management of the state on behalf of all three communities [White, Coloured and Asian]". The principle of joint citizenship and "co-responsibility for each community in terms of managing matters of joint interest" was acknowledged. The concept of own and common matters and spatial order was also contained in this point of view. A series of discriminatory measures that needed attention - eg, the Immoralities Act, the Mixed Marriages Act, group areas and work reservation - were identified. Although the AB searched for new approaches, the Executive Council felt (in 1978) that the Immoralities Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and work reservation had to remain unchanged.

5.8 Separate Ways for the Afrikanerbond and SABRA

The AB's proposals accepted, by implication, that the Republic was the joint area of Whites, Coloureds and Asians. The concept of spatial order still left the possibility that it could be linked to the concept of a homeland. This possibility led to the final rejection of a homeland for Coloureds on 28 August 1981. This announcement marked a clear break between the views of the AB and those of SABRA. SABRA said in its proposals to the President's Council that effective self-determination for Whites, Coloureds and Asians could only be attained on a geographic basis. The SABRA chairman, Prof Carel Boshoff was chairman of the Executive Council at the time. Clearly it was impossible to reconcile such different opinions expressed by the same person acting in different capacities. The Executive Council expressed support for the right to own schools and own townships, and rejected a joint voters' roll. Self-determination for the three groups was still the basis, although some concern about the practical implementation of three parliaments was expressed.

So, the AB had an own opinion, but did basically support the government's proposals. The Executive Council regularly presented proposals to the Commission of Investigation into a new Constitution.

The process of constitutional reform caused serious internal disputes and tensions in both the AB and National Party because the proposals meant that the principles of absolute separation and sovereign White power over a White state had been abandoned. In the NP, Dr AP Treurnicht, Transvaal leader of the party and previous Executive Council chairman, as well as a number of members of the House of Assembly resigned from the party to establish the Conservative Party.

The tension within AB ranks culminated in the resignations of Dr AP Treurnicht, Prof Carel Boshoff and a number of their supporters.

AB members increasingly realised that the Afrikaner could no longer unilaterally determine the country's future. The ideal of a White majority in an own country did not materialise and the Afrikaner had to look for contact, partners, co-operation and allies. The Coloureds, Zulu's and homeland leaders were considered such potential contacts. They had to make some contact with the ANC to determine at first hand their feelings about the Afrikaner. To manage this process, Afrikaners had to reconsider their position. By 1984 they started to raise the question " What are the minimum requirements for the survival of the Afrikaner?"

5.9 Views on Asian Participation

It was always accepted that any policy decision about the Coloureds would apply, *ipso facto*, to the Asians. Other than the case with the Coloureds, the Afrikaners in general and the AB in particular, had very little contact with the Asian population. Initially and in line with government policy at the time, the AB was in favour of the repatriation of the Asians. In the fifties and sixties, they thought in terms of a homeland for Asians in Natal. This point of view was abandoned in the late seventies. Spatial order, own townships, own schools and institutions were accepted as policy. From 1977 onwards, Government involved the Asian population in the development of a new constitutional model.

6. EN ROUTE TO A NEW FRAME OF MIND

6.1 Background

Within a decade of the AB's founding in 1918, the guidelines for debating were prepared and these - under the guise of various names - would run throughout its history. In the thirties, the debate was defined as one between exclusive and inclusive ideals. A well-known language expert of *Die Burger* pleaded for the exclusive formulation of the Afrikaner ideals and vision for the future. It required the maximum homogeneity and unity amongst members. In contrast, the well-known Prof Wikus du Plessis of Potchefstroom pleaded for an inclusive approach. The AB's vision and ideals had to include as many people as possible and had to accommodate diversity of expression, styles and strategies.

By 1937 it was clear that the exclusive approach had become the dominating approach. It was so strong that the Executive Council chairman, Prof HB Thom warned the Bondsraad in 1953 of the Afrikaner's predisposition for isolation. Afrikaners do not need isolation and should fulfil their creative and constructive roles in outward contact with others. Thom and his successor, Dr PJ Meyer, represented two different approaches. With his appointment as chairman in 1960, Meyer declared that he intended to "eradicate liberalism in

the AB". The terminology used to describe the different approaches in the fifties and sixties, were liberalism and conservatism. In this atmosphere, prominent members resigned. Other "liberal members" were called in for "disciplinary discussions". Some Executive Council members said that they were concerned about the fact that differences in the AB were being suppressed. They felt it led to "hard-heartedness and intellectual degeneration in the name of solidarity".

In 1968 new buzz-words were being used in the debate: "verlig/verkramp." The "New Afrikaner", a self-assured outward moving thinker became a popular target for journalists. The Executive Council's careful attempts to suppress the differences in opinion, did not succeed. After the establishment of the HNP in 1968, many supporters of the HNP resigned from the AB. A similar process followed the establishment of the Conservative Party in 1983.

These problems appearing periodically reflected the feelings and opinions of the Afrikaans community as a whole. The differences often led to political disputes especially during periods when new approaches and principles were being thrashed out and developed into important strategic adaptations. These adaptations never affected the AB's duty to promote the survival of the Afrikaner, one thing members always remained in agreement with. The differences and disputes were about the best way to achieve this.

These differences centered mostly around two key issues. The first was the AB's relationship with the NP. How far should they co-operate or to what extent could they criticise the NP? A political party has a primary duty to recruit the maximum support from voters during elections and as such a party needs a pragmatic approach. It implies an element of opportunism. For the AB with its emphasis on consistent basic principles, the situation was quite different. Its constitution clearly states that the AB is not a political organisation and that it therefore does not enter into party political alliances. Depending on whether a political party enhances or harms its principles, the AB retained the right to support or criticise that particular party. This was easier said than done. The AB considered itself the nation's conscience and felt it needed a long-term vision.

6.2 Ideal and Reality

Prof Gerrit Viljoen, Executive Council chairman from 1974 to 1980, had the special ability to bridge this division. His well-known expression, the creative tension line between ideal and reality, emphasised the importance of sustaining proven values, yet emphasising an open approach that allows for the adaptation of the ideal in changing circumstances and inescapable realities. Under his guidance, a new dispensation of outreach, of sustainable enlightened thought and dynamic initiatives developed - a process that lost its momentum after his departure. This period lasted until about 1985.

Although Viljoen felt strongly about the values and ideals fundamental to the

Afrikaans idea, he was extremely critical of the way this once dynamic pursuit collapsed in immovable separatism. That is why the pursuit had to be redefined in a dynamic way, to adapt to the fast changing circumstances. He created a new frame of reference for this pursuit; "compassion" to enable fellow citizens to realise the importance of Afrikaners and their values and to establish the Afrikaner as an indispensable friend of fellow citizens. To promote this, one had to remove all discriminatory measures that might affect human dignity. Opportunities for contact between Afrikaners and other races needed expansion, by "building gates, not erecting fences". Institutional reform and changing existing national structures and practices were necessary to allow a better dispensation for Coloureds, Asians and urbanised Blacks. The wish for Afrikaner self-determination should not be undermined and therefore one should identify the minimum conditions required for its survival. During his term in office, Viljoen's vision developed more depth and maturity amongst the Afrikaners. As a democrat who believed in the validity of his cause and with his ability to convince others of his point of view, Viljoen strived to improve the Afrikaner's situation. It was not his desire to apply power politics or reverting to the trenches but he preferred to achieve this through negotiations and co-operation.

Under his guidance, the AB seriously reconsidered the policy of separate development. The question was how the policy affected people to whom it was applied. Mere theory no longer served its purpose. The practical effects of the policy had to be tested against moral values and demands.

By 1980, Viljoen supported the notion that consolidation of the homelands as viable units allowing the best possible measure of self-determination for Black nations and offering the best possible measure of security for Afrikaner identity, was the solution. Protection of Afrikaner identity required own churches, own schools and, own community life, own cultural life and protection of the nation, with regular contact and co-operation with the other nations and cultures.

In ensuing years his practical political experiences convinced Viljoen that this vision could not be attained. He would ensure Afrikaner identity and survival through negotiation and constitutional accommodation. That is why, while involved in negotiations he emphasised group rights and individual community lives for each nation and culture in South Africa. The shift in Viljoen's vision, also represents the type of shift or change experienced by other Afrikaans leaders and there were strong indications of this shift within the AB in the 1980s. Viljoen explained: "I have never seen separate development as an ideology or dogma, but as a logical method, an instrument to use en route to achieve our objective, to serve the best interests of our nation (nationalism) as it was seen within a certain period and in the circumstances of the time, which may of course change. Apartheid as such is not our basic principle, we just feel very strongly about the survival of our nation and national identity as our basic mission."

6.3 Focus: 1980 - 1990

The period after 1983, when Prof Pieter de Lange succeeded Prof Carel Boshoff as leader, was a particularly difficult and turbulent time for the AB because the two schools of thought were in constant confrontation. Under Prof De Lange's guidance the AB formulated a final framework, a new way of thinking, based on the work initiated by Viljoen. The new framework was based on three issues. In the first place, it was essential to determine the basic requirements for sustaining the nation and national identity of the Afrikaner. Secondly, it was essential to consider alternative models to ensure the success of the ideal. Thirdly, it became essential to establish contact with Black leaders and determine the then current situation for the development of mutual feelings and approaches to create a climate for developing the basis for survival of the Afrikaner through the implementation of new models.

The 1976 Bondsraad accepted the fact that Coloureds and Asians needed political structures within the "White country". This Bondsraad also marked the emergence of the concepts of commonality as opposed to a concept of total separation. Ethnic and cultural differences need recognition, but only if the common situation and joint values are taken into account. By April 1977 and following intensive deliberations at the Bondsraad, the first hint that the Westminster system may not be suitable for the South African situation became evident. The idea was to establish different bodies to handle own affairs, but unlike the previous Representative Councils, a specific interlinking system allowing for joint decisions on common affairs. In July 1977 members received circulars explaining these ideas.

Shortly afterwards the NP published a policy document showing a strong resemblance to these AB initiatives. The next few AB years were marked by intensive debates on these new ideas and various proposals were developed. The debate clearly shows a move away from the sharp differences in opinion between members from the south and members from the north. In the AB there was significant support for the point of view that Whites, Coloureds and Asians belonged to a single undivided country, yet a country allowing for clear own and common structures. It was accepted that the government could not create these structures unilaterally, but through co-operation and persuasion. The focus was still on the survival of White sovereignty. The concept of power sharing was problematic, yet all Branches accepted that they have to contact others and create mutual goodwill in all local communities and at all levels.

The government's constitutional proposals that led to the 1983 constitution, contained many basic ideas developed by AB members. The AB's practical deliberation meetings and the intensive discussion of a number of working papers that were sent to Branches for consideration, definitely played important roles in Afrikaner acceptance of these proposals. The fact that the new dispensation also caused serious clashes and even division in the NP, made the AB's mission to create unity amongst Afrikaners very difficult indeed. The

Executive Council had to pay serious attention to the implications of the divisions and concluded that this problem could not be resolved through compromises.

It had to be accepted that the split was based on one crucial question: was the policy of separate development as it had been implemented in practice, morally justifiable? The establishment of homelands were considered justifiable therefor the focus shifted to intensive involvement of the homeland leaders.

By August 1980, the Executive Council entertained two main ideas. The one was that the principle of sovereignty on the one hand and mutual interdependence and common interests on the other could best be accommodated within a federal structure. The second was that urban Blacks had to be accommodated in the new parliamentary structure by way of a fourth chamber. In reality, an Executive Council committee advocated the idea during a meeting with the then Prime Minister, Adv B J Vorster. He felt that the accommodation of Blacks should be addressed at a later stage. The Executive Council accepted this point of view.

By 1980, it was acknowledged that negotiation was the mechanism to reach consensus with Black leaders. In 1983/1984 AB members pleaded for the accommodation of Black leaders in local authorities within the new regional services councils. Two years later it became government policy.

6.4 Constitutional Balance

A 1985 publication, *Die Staatkundige Weegproes*, emphasised that only a model acceptable to all population groups, has any chance of success. The "parallel model" and the "association model" were developed as alternatives for radical separation. Simultaneously the true consequences of Black urbanisation came under the spotlight. In December 1985 a working document urged Branches to acquaint themselves with the actual living conditions of Blacks in their areas and communities and to pay special attention to the following:

- w elimination of friction by creating more goodwill and a better relationship between Blacks and Whites;
- w learning to speak a Black language to open doors and improve attitudes;
- w assistance with housing, by providing bonds and to supply building materials.
- w It is clear that the AB increasingly concentrated on moral and human relations.

7. THE NEW FRAME OF MIND IN PRACTICE

A State of Emergency was proclaimed in 1985. The Executive Council considered it "essential and inevitable . . . To maintain order" but requested that

it be lifted as soon as possible. The Executive Council instituted a series of penetrating investigations into a number of issues. In addition, the AB was compelled to undertake more and more research on its own. Issues like Black citizenship, urbanisation, education, local authorities, housing, corruption, finance and discriminatory legislation were all researched.

7.1 Departure Points

The active reconsideration of fundamental issues was based on five broad principles:



- 7.1.1 The approach to Black politics should be an approach of reconciliation, accommodation and compromise.
- 7.1.2 The national and independent states should be considered building blocks in finding a constitutional model.
- 7.1.3 A constitutional model had to be found to realise political power sharing with Blacks in such a manner as to prevent domination of one group by another and to avoid future conflict between Black and White.
- 7.1.4 Discussions with Black leaders should be much more structured and enjoy high priority.
- 7.1.5 Replacing legislation that is considered hurtful and discriminatory by Blacks needed serious attention.

7.2 Constitutional Conditions

The reason for the AB's founding and existence rather than unilateral construction and action, lies at the root of the emphasis on the necessity for discussions and negotiations. The continued process of radical new ideas was based on the policy document accepted in 1986, *Basiese staatkundige voorwaardes vir die voortbestaan van die Afrikaner*. After intensive discussion over a substantial period of time the Executive Council approved the document in November 1986. Given the opportunity to respond 89 per cent of the Branches and 86 per cent of individual members indicated their agreement with the general trend of the document.

7.2.1 Basic Rights

The document was prepared within the context of a human rights culture, but was not elevated to a dominating ideology. It served only as a basis for "healthy, balanced realism". The basic rights that had to apply to all population groups were:

-  recognition and protection of language and cultural rights;
-  protection of the right to own private property;

- ❑ recognition of a free conscience; and
- ❑ guaranteed freedom of speech and expression of opinion.

7.2.2 Objectives

These human rights formed the basis for the formulation of a series of broad objectives for the survival of the Afrikaner. These objectives used to test various political models were:

- ❑ guaranteed maintenance of Christian values and civilised norms, and recognition of freedom of religion and religious practice;
- ❑ an independent judiciary and equality before the law;
- ❑ maintaining law and order;
- ❑ promotion of happiness, as well as spiritual and material prosperity for all;
- ❑ respect for and protection of human dignity, life, freedom and property of all; and
- ❑ protection of and respect for the self-determination of all population groups and Nations.

7.2.3 Specific Conditions

Specific constitutional conditions were stipulated:

- ❑ Exclusion of effective Black participation, even at the highest levels, was considered a threat to White survival. A government receiving support from only one part of its constituents, will promote the interests of that part. This is not acceptable to White citizens or the Afrikaner.
- ❑ Certain constitutional models were from the outset excluded from the negotiation process. It included total geographic division or race separation, the *status quo* or any system of group domination, loaded or qualified franchise, entrenched majority domination and a socialistic or military dictatorship.
- ❑ Although separate townships were initially considered desirable for the maintenance of order, it was no longer considered a pre-requisite for Afrikaner survival. Voluntary "open" suburbs would not be a threat to Afrikaner survival.
- ❑ Mother-tongue education in own schools with a Christian

character. The language and cultural rights were not to be interpreted in such broad terms so as to imply exclusive White control over matters affecting to other groups.

W Devolution of power to limit government interference to a minimum.

W An independent judiciary and a just legal process.

W The term 'self-determination' implies that it will not be to the detriment of another group. In addition, it is accepted that 'self-determination' will not embody the existence of a population group in its totality but there should be an attempt at obtaining the biggest possible measure of self-determination in respect of matters concerning a particular population group.

W Abolishing statutory discriminatory measures is a condition for survival. This does not entail "yielding under pressure." It is a condition for just survival.

W All citizens must be afforded effective participation in the legislative and political processes.

W An entrenched white government is no longer acceptable. The status quo cannot be sustained.

W Participation by all, and consequently also power sharing, should be of such a nature that it prevents domination of one group by another. The rights and aspirations of groups need to be satisfied and protected.

7.2.4 Negotiated Settlement

This document committed the AB unambiguously to a negotiated settlement. Members accepted that there could, humanly speaking, be no ". . . guarantees. We have to think in terms of probabilities, calculated risks. The biggest risk we could take was to avoid risks altogether. If Afrikaners could not reach a negotiated settlement, it was inevitable that they would face structures forced on them without having had any say in the matter."

The document, *Basiese staatkundige voorwaardes vir die voortbestaan van die Afrikaner*, was probably one of the most important policy documents accepted by the AB in recent decades. The fact that it was accepted by an overwhelming majority of its members gave the green light to the Executive Council to put the ideas into practice. The publication of the document marked the

AB's final break with the apartheid policy. It was the foundation for a move away from unfair discrimination and a step towards the creation of a democratic dispensation allowing full participation by all South Africans.

7.3 Discussions

While all this was happening more specifically from 1978 onwards, the AB held more and more discussions with Black and Coloured leaders. Discussions with Zulu and other leaders started in 1978 and contact with the ANC was sought in July 1985. This process started with the 1987 New York meeting between the Executive Council chairman Prof Pieter de Lange and Mr Thabo Mbeki. However, the AB was fully aware of the ANC's strategic thinking regarding negotiation as an instrument in its liberation struggle. The AB realised that the ANC simply saw this as another opportunity to establish a Black take-over and knew that any negotiation strategy with the ANC had to take this into account.

The AB was looking for a strategy and negotiable models. After June 1989, the Executive Council circulated certain reports containing various points of view. Power sharing, group rights and partition were the core concepts of the debate. AB members realised that the division amongst Afrikaners on this issue could have a negative effect on the Afrikaner's position in the negotiation process. In 1990 they requested an *Afrikanerberaad* - an attempt to create more unity, before entering into negotiations with the ANC and other parties. The concept of self-determination was the one issue that caused major discord.

Some Afrikaners felt the concept was part and parcel of the sovereign government of a country - resulting in the insistence on an Afrikaner homeland. However, the AB continued to emphasise another form of self-determination. This new concept did not primarily require geographic separation, but emphasised the right and opportunities to develop and promote an own identity, values and the protection of an own cultural heritage and creations. This concept would protect the Afrikaner from ending up in the melting-pot. This type of self-determination could only exist within a democratic dispensation with solid democratic instruments and effective participation in government. That is why the AB said in 1992 that Afrikaners must "convince [others] that our insistence on self-determination is not aimed at a perpetuation of privileges, or an attempt to separate us from our fellow citizens and their problems, or prevent us from helping to build a new South Africa. It means that in our hearts and souls, we do identify, with all the people of our country and that we understand their problems, their missions, their struggle to survive and prosper, their freedom struggle to shed poverty, illiteracy and injustice. We have to negotiate self-determination and use it, not out of selfishness, but to enable us to give ourselves, our talents and expertise unselfishly to the people of this country".

7.4 Practical Implementation After 1992

Principled positioning based on *Basiese staatkundige voorwaardes vir die voortbestaan van die Afrikaner*, was expressed in a number of important ways especially on matters of policy. The AB viewed the Human Rights Charter of 1993 positively and considered it an important aid to protect minority rights. More-over, the AB showed particular understanding for the country's socio-economic inequalities. In April 1993 the organisation emphasised that this situation could not be rectified through constitutional formulas, statutory regulations or other government actions only. It was far more important to develop a good relationship between the government of the day and the various population groups, because individual attitudes and feelings play such important roles in the upliftment process. The AB emphasised that ordinary people shared more common interests and points of contact than is generally realised or recognised.

7.5 The RDP Conferences

In September 1994 the AB reacted constructively to the RDP proposals and encouraged Afrikaners to reflect a positive attitude towards this attempt at development and upliftment. The AB focussed the attention on the many RDP initiatives pursued in South Africa since 1983. A document published in October 1994, contained a number of criteria that had to be complied with if the RDP were to achieve success. It emphasised that the RDP itself could not generate economic growth, it can only be achieved by the private sector. In June 1995 the AB held its first public conference on the RDP to allow participants to analyse the RDP critically. A number of recommendations to effectively attain the goals, were identified.

7.6 The Nation Building Conference

The AB's critical, constructive voice sounded stronger at a conference on nation building held in 1996. The AB committed itself to nation building because it is essential for stability and can contribute to the restoration of a South African patriotism. At the same time there was serious criticism on the government's inability to implement the accepted principles of cultural diversity.

7.7 Education Policy

The AB's positive and constructive approach to the government's education policy was published in policy documents during October 1994 and subsequently. The proposed curriculum was welcomed as an important innovation. At the same time the AB expressed serious concern about a number of disturbing, negative developments in the implementation of the education policy. The concentration of power in the hands of the central government was criticised as being in violation of the constitutional principle of devolution. The growing trend towards the secularisation of education was noted with regret.

The denial of the positive aspects of the previous education system was seen as a threat to goodwill between all. The documents contained sharp criticisms of the pressure on schools to anglicise and expressed strong support for maintaining Model C schools to guarantee quality education for future achievers.

8. PERSPECTIVE ON APARTHEID

Like many other organisations, the AB has been confronted with questions about its views on the apartheid policy. The principles behind the policy of separate development (the AB never used the word apartheid officially) as defined by the AB at the time, represented sincere attempts to establish a policy for the optimal development of all population groups - Afrikaners too - based on the concept of self-determination. One cannot condemn the policy based on principle and at the time it was considered justified. The AB's vision for the policy was to establish a society (like the one in Europe) in which a number of nations would live side by side in national states allowing for complete equality and a balanced co-existence. These states would be completely equal in terms of human dignity, have a rich cultural life without political power over each other and form the basis for a peaceful evolution of relationships. Unfortunately during the course of time, the policy led to a number of alarming results. Instead of creating equal human dignity, a society of race aristocracy arose within a rigid institutional framework, marked by extensive discrimination.

Seen from the current perspective, the AB cannot deny that its points of view or attitudes in the past may have been insensitive and lacked vision. It is difficult to reconcile some of the things said and done within the AB with its own foundation. For as far as our initiatives contributed to injustices of the past, we are sorry. The Afrikanerbond is committed to learn from past mistakes.

9. 1994 AND SUBSEQUENTLY

In reality, the constructive attitude within the AB, under the guidance of chairman Tom de Beer, on the development of a new frame of mind and a new political dispensation showed how far ahead of the ordinary man in the street the AB had been at the time and this was true throughout most of its history, especially for Afrikaners. In March 1996 the Executive Council noted that the new dispensation, established after 1994, had been far more traumatic for most Afrikaners than most people anticipated. This has been particularly true of the past few months. Expectations that the principles embedded in the new constitution, especially in terms of language and cultural rights, were thwarted. The result was that the AB felt it had a far more significant role to play than ever before, in motivating Afrikaners to realise self-determination and self-reliance. Education, economic empowerment, leadership, social care and maintaining values enjoy particular attention. To address these issues successfully, the AB periodically discusses them with the government and develops new initiatives.

The AB's first initiative is an inward approach. The AB feels that the Afrikaner accepted the changes intellectually but not emotionally. The AB warned against the withdrawal syndrome, moving "in a comfort zone" and call upon Afrikaners to accept co-responsibility for the future. There are four ways for the AB to best serve the Afrikaner's own and South Africa's interests as a whole:

- W** reject poor management, misuse of power and deviation from the basic principles that were agreed upon;
- W** participate in governmental processes on all levels to improve decisions and implementation;
- W** formulate points of view to guide, influence opinions, decisions and attitudes;
- W** think and act strategically and creatively, so that fellow South Africans will realise how much they experience the Afrikaner's contribution as constructive and invaluable.

This is how the AB sees its future role.

**MAY THE HOLY TRINITY GRACE
OUR EFFORTS.**

DECEMBER 1997

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BEARER OF AN IDEAL

1. INTRODUCTION

The Afrikanerbond (AB) Executive Council decided to prepare a document, which would present a historical perspective and factual information about the activities, points of view, perspectives and contributions of the AB to the South African society. This perspective and factual information, entitled BEARER OF AN IDEAL, will be made available nationally and internationally, to as many people and organisations as possible so as to meet the growing demand for information and knowledge about the AB's past and present role.

The document represents a summary of the main events of the AB's existence of eighty years. The AB feels that on various occasions in the past the wrong impressions and perceptions were created about the organisation. However, the AB has never deemed it necessary to defend itself against these rumours and allegations. The AB's faith in its own basic principles and the integrity of its members, makes reaction to each misguided or uninformed attack unnecessary.

2. FOUNDATION, MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

The Constitution of the AB states that:

2.1 the organisation is founded on the acceptance of the Bible as the Word of the Holy Trinity and the acknowledgement of the Biblical principles as the basic guidelines for life in its entirety;

2.2 its mission, founded on Biblical principles is to serve and to contribute towards the development of the Afrikaans community to the level of excellence in all spheres of life and thus also serving the interests of all South Africans;

2.3 the objectives of the organisation are:

to promote Christian values in every segment of society;

to be an intellectual think-tank, providing guidance on the realisation of its mission on all levels;

to fulfil its mission by initiating, co-ordinating and stimulating activities utilising its members' abilities, expertise and their willingness to serve;

to contribute towards the maintenance of standards and the development of South Africa by developing expertise and leadership.

2.4 These objectives are attained in a number of ways inter alia:

2.4.1 by creating respect for and promoting fundamental rights; by creating an awareness of the responsibilities of the individual and of communities both independently and interdependently;

2.4.2 serving the Afrikaans speaking communities through;

the cultivation and promotion of unity and co-operation, and the upholding of the Afrikaans language and cultural heritage;

the establishing of new or support for existing organisations and structures at different levels and fields in order to render or co-ordinate essential services;

interaction with individual Afrikaners or associations, organisations or groups within the Afrikaans speaking communities in an attempt to protect their economic, social, educational, cultural, religious, civil and human rights all within the context

of the South African constitution.

2.4.3 purposeful building of a healthy South African nation through the promotion of, inter alia, the following:

- individual integrity, mutual respect and a spirit of goodwill;
- responsible citizenship;
- dedicated labour;
- a shared love for the country;
- respect for the environment;
- a healthy family life;
- a healthy youth; and
- a democratic way of life.

3. VISION

3.1 The AB's vision for the RSA is a "democratic, peaceful, prosperous and just South Africa".

3.2 The AB's vision for the Afrikaans community is a "respected, identifiable Afrikaans community dynamically making an appreciated contribution towards the development of South Africa.

3.3 The AB's vision for itself is that, as an organisation of Afrikaans speaking citizens sharing the same Biblical principles, it will mobilize the spiritual and physical resources of its members in its drive to attain its ideals as set out in its constitution.

4. MEMBERSHIP AND STRUCTURE

4.1 The AB is an organisation made up of voluntary members:

- the 11 500 members are grouped into 800 branches in both urban and rural South Africa;
- the 800 branches are grouped into approximately 120 Regional Councils and 14 Area Councils;
- the Executive Council is elected bi-annually and is supported by a number of national committees and Desks;
- the Bondsraad is convened bi-annually and is attended by representatives of each Branch and Regional Council. It

constitutes the highest authority within the AB.

4.2 The AB has a small staff component at its national head office under the direction of the Executive Director. It is financed through membership fees and voluntary donations by its members. It has never received any funds nationally or internationally from any other source.

4.3 The names of the members of the Executive Council are made public after their election. The office location and address are known and accessible and the organisation participates in a number of public activities.

4.4 The confidential nature of the AB is the one aspect that has caused most of the misconceptions about it. The document clearly shows that confidentiality was a means not the objective. Confidentiality has led to various debates and members often disagreed about the need for confidentiality. Until 1993, most members felt that for two reasons confidentiality was desirable:

4.4.1 Due to agreement on the basic principles members could discuss actual and sensitive matters in an open and thorough manner in an environment of camaraderie and confidentiality. Members could present their opinions without reserve, limitation or prejudice. They could not score public favour for promotion purposes and their opinions could not prejudice them in their personal or professional lives.

4.4.2 Confidentiality provided an opportunity for many members to get involved in the Afrikaans ideal without fear of victimisation at work or in other spheres that might not have been Afrikaans-friendly.

4.5 In 1993 the AB decided to abandon confidentiality as its contribution towards improved transparency. Internal activities remain confidential when and where necessary. However, depending on circumstances membership is made known and activities and opinions expressed in public. It remains the member's prerogative to declare his membership.

5. THE AB AS A CULTURAL ORGANISATION

5.1 The very basis and nature of the AB is that of a caring cultural organisation serving the ideal of independence and self-determination for Afrikaners in all spheres of life. This ideal and mission still forms the basis of its existence today. In its long history, there has been many different opinions about the ways and means to develop and promote this ideal. It involved a dynamic

and active process subject to continued revision and change depending on the circumstances and needs. There have always been intense and constructive deliberations within the organisation and the debates often led to serious differences of opinion, even to the resignation or termination of membership. This confirms the inherent democratic nature of the organisation.

5.2 The AB's commitment to self-development and empowerment of the Afrikaner of necessity implies political participation in terms of taking a stand. Where matters concerning its activities developed into practical political issues, the AB never hesitated to take a stand based on principles affecting Afrikaner interests. The issues varied from time to time and some examples are: language and cultural rights, economic development and upliftment of the poor, education, and relationships between races and nations, to name but a few. Where political parties shared the values and opinions expressed by the AB, the AB was prepared to co-operate with those parties to promote certain issues. However, the AB never hesitated to differ publicly if it did not agree with opinions expressed by political parties.

6. THE AB AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

6.1 Over the years, an informal relationship developed between the AB and the National Party (NP) and the AB leaders often held in depth talks with NP leaders about certain topical issues.

6.2 The document shows clearly that there had always been certain serious differences of opinion between the AB and NP. A number of members had serious concerns about the AB's relationship with political parties and therefore the relationship with the NP remained a sensitive issue. They (the AB and NP) needed to share ideas and intellectual discussion rather than strategy and political activities. The one was never an instrument of the other. Regular discussions between AB leadership and members of government did take place but the government always had to consider its position in terms of a number of variables, most of which did not apply to the AB and its more homogenous interests. The AB was never in a position to prescribe to Prime Ministers, Presidents or Cabinet Ministers – something which they would in any case not tolerate.

6.3 In terms of Section 7 of the AB's constitution, the AB is not bound to any political party. It remains the undeniable right of its members to support the party of their choice. The AB is still involved in formal discussions with representatives of various political parties, including the government of the day.

6.4 The AB supported separate development in principle and tried to promote the conceptualisation and later the implementation of separate development with intensity and perseverance.

6.5 The AB's intentions and actions were honourable and honest at the time when the policy of separate development was being formulated and implemented (the AB avoided the word "apartheid" because of its negative connotation of separation simply for the sake of separation). From the document it is obvious that the ideal was for the policy to contribute towards the optimal development of all population groups. In principle, the AB felt that all nations had the right and freedom to promote their own culture and values. Afrikaners had to afford others that which they claimed for themselves. The vision was that South Africa would follow the same historical pattern as Europe. Nations had to attain self-determination within their own states.

6.6 In the early seventies the AB started to realise and note that due to a number of factors (the most important being socio-economic, demographic and cultural, and historical forces), separate development was doomed to failure. That is why the AB struggled to reconcile concepts like self-determination, sovereignty, human dignity, equality and accommodation of aspirations, reconciliation, settlement and compromise. There were deliberations, meetings and intensive discussion within the ranks of the AB, right down to branch levels, to give practical meaning to a morally justifiable constitution that could accommodate the political aspirations of all South African citizens.

6.7 This struggle first led to the idea of a three chamber parliament in 1977 and the idea of a negotiated democratic settlement since 1984. These ideas were developed and formulated over time as set out in the document. Actually, the AB considered the inclusion of a fourth parliamentary chamber during this time and an EC delegation discussed the matter with the then Prime Minister, Adv B J Vorster, but could not convince him at the time.

6.8 In a document, *"Die Staatkundige Weegproes"*, published in 1985, the AB emphasised that the only successful constitutional model would be one accepted by all population groups. In November 1986 a document, *"Basiese staatkundige voorwaardes vir die voortbestaan van die Afrikaner"* was accepted and this represented an unequivocal negotiated settlement. In 1987 Executive Committee chairman, Prof J P de Lange discussed constitutional models and the accommodation of political aspirations of all South Africans with Mr Thabo Mbeki in New York.

6.9 The AB Executive Committee is convinced that the democratic transitional process in South Africa would have been much more difficult had it not been for the constructive roles played by the AB and its members in their personal capacities. The AB has never been a mass organisation and do not wish to be one. It does neither participate in demonstrations or agitation, nor wish to mobilise the masses. The organisation attempts to exert a positive and honourable influence based on principles, ideas and values by means of discussion, persuasion and personal contact. The AB continually contributes positively and constructively towards the current transformation processes, just as it did for the reconstruction and empowerment of the Afrikaner after the trauma of the Anglo Boer War and the First World War. The last pages of the document describes the AB's 1997 attempts to fulfil its critical and constructive functions not only to the benefit of the Afrikaner, but to that of all the people of this country.

7. MEMBER ACTIVITIES

Members of the AB represent various professions and careers, including farmers, lawyers, businessmen, clergymen, academics, teachers and many, many more. Members are bearers of the cherished ideal and maintain a particular loyalty and balanced passion for Afrikaans, as well as the cultural heritage and values of the Afrikaner.

Debates within the AB and points of views expressed in the AB are the same as those expressed publicly by whites in general and Afrikaners in particular.

The AB is primarily an opinion forming institution aimed at initiating ideas, affording its members an opportunity to present their opinions, hear the opinions of others and develop a new or different understanding before practising the new insights and perspectives in their respective fields, based on their own personal convictions and initiatives. This means that members can influence politics, religious practices and economics from within the culture and environment of the AB.

However, the AB cannot be accused of cynicism, malice or intriguing.

8. RELATIONSHIP WITH INSTITUTIONS

The AB never had any formal ties with any political, religious, social, educational, business or other institutions. The AB never received any financial support or assets from any institution other than its members.

9. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE PAST

It is common knowledge that the AB supported the policy of separate development. In a spirit of honest and active participation, the AB acknowledges that the policy eventually led to a number of disturbing results. Instead of equal human dignity, a race aristocratic society developed within a rigid institutional framework.

Seen from the current perspective, the AB cannot deny that its points of view or attitudes of the past may have been insensitive and lacked vision. It is difficult to reconcile some of the things said and done within the AB with its own foundation. In so far as our initiatives contributed to injustices of the past, we are sorry. The Afrikanerbond is committed to learn from past mistakes.

10. THE ROAD AHEAD

10.1 The AB accepts that Afrikaners form part of the new South Africa and the AB is willing and ready to contribute constructively to realise its vision for South Africa. Based on its principles and value system, the AB will co-operate with anyone in an effort to attain this vision. Based on its basic principles, the AB is geared to contribute to the development of South Africa and all its people.

10.2 The AB accepts that being an Afrikaner and a South African are not contradictory. However we do need room to fully live our lives as Afrikaners. South Africa must succeed and the AB commits itself to the employment and utilisation of its expertise, power, ideas and excellence to reach this goal.

**MAY THE HOLY TRINITY GRACE
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December 1997

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Page was last updated on: 17-05-01