EE364a Homework 5 additional problems

1. Schur complements. Consider a matrix $X = X^T \in \mathbf{R}^{n \times n}$ partitioned as

$$X = \left[\begin{array}{cc} A & B \\ B^T & C \end{array} \right],$$

where $A \in \mathbf{R}^{k \times k}$. If $\det A \neq 0$, the matrix $S = C - B^T A^{-1} B$ is called the *Schur complement* of A in X. Schur complements arise in many situations and appear in many important formulas and theorems. For example, we have $\det X = \det A \det S$. (You don't have to prove this.)

- (a) The Schur complement arises when you minimize a quadratic form over some of the variables. Let $f(u,v) = [u^T \ v^T] X [u^T \ v^T]^T$, where $u \in \mathbf{R}^k$. Let g(v) be the minimum value of f over u, i.e., $g(v) = \inf_u f(u,v)$. Of course g(v) can be $-\infty$. Show that if $A \succ 0$, we have $g(v) = v^T S v$.
- (b) The Schur complement arises in several characterizations of positive definiteness or semidefiniteness of a block matrix. As examples we have the following three theorems:
 - $X \succ 0$ if and only if $A \succ 0$ and $S \succ 0$.
 - If $A \succ 0$, then $X \succeq 0$ if and only if $S \succeq 0$.
 - $X \succeq 0$ if and only if $A \succeq 0$, $B^T(I AA^{\dagger}) = 0$ and $C B^TA^{\dagger}B \succeq 0$, where A^{\dagger} is the pseudo-inverse of A. $(C B^TA^{\dagger}B$ serves as a generalization of the Schur complement in the case where A is positive semidefinite but singular.)

Prove one of these theorems. (You can choose which one.)

(c) Recognizing Schur complements often helps to represent nonlinear convex constraints as linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Consider the function

$$f(x) = (Ax + b)^{T}(P_0 + x_1P_1 + \dots + x_nP_n)^{-1}(Ax + b)$$

where $A \in \mathbf{R}^{m \times n}$, $b \in \mathbf{R}^m$, and $P_i = P_i^T \in \mathbf{R}^{m \times m}$, with domain

$$\mathbf{dom}\, f = \{ x \in \mathbf{R}^n \mid P_0 + x_1 P_1 + \dots + x_n P_n \succ 0 \}.$$

This is the composition of the matrix fractional function and an affine mapping, and so is convex. Give an LMI representation of **epi** f. That is, find a symmetric matrix F(x,t), affine in (x,t), for which

$$x \in \operatorname{dom} f$$
, $f(x) \le t \iff F(x,t) \succeq 0$.

2. Formulate the following optimization problems as semidefinite programs. The variable is $x \in \mathbf{R}^n$; F(x) is defined as

$$F(x) = F_0 + x_1 F_1 + x_2 F_2 + \dots + x_n F_n$$

with $F_i \in \mathbf{S}^m$. The domain of f in each subproblem is $\operatorname{\mathbf{dom}} f = \{x \in \mathbf{R}^n \mid F(x) \succ 0\}$.

- (a) Minimize $f(x) = c^T F(x)^{-1} c$ where $c \in \mathbf{R}^m$.
- (b) Minimize $f(x) = \max_{i=1,\dots,K} c_i^T F(x)^{-1} c_i$ where $c_i \in \mathbf{R}^m$, $i = 1,\dots,K$.
- (c) Minimize $f(x) = \sup_{\|c\|_2 \le 1} c^T F(x)^{-1} c$.
- (d) Minimize $f(x) = \mathbf{E}(c^T F(x)^{-1} c)$ where c is a random vector with mean $\mathbf{E} c = \bar{c}$ and covariance $\mathbf{E}(c \bar{c})(c \bar{c})^T = S$.
- 3. Optimality conditions and dual for log-optimal investment problem.
 - (a) Show that the optimality conditions for the log-optimal investment problem described in exercise 4.60 can be expressed as: $\mathbf{1}^T x = 1$, $x \succeq 0$, and for each i,

$$x_i > 0 \implies \sum_{j=1}^m \pi_j \frac{p_{ij}}{p_j^T x} = 1, \quad x_i = 0 \implies \sum_{j=1}^m \pi_j \frac{p_{ij}}{p_j^T x} \le 1.$$

We can interpret this as follows. $p_{ij}/p_j^T x$ is a random variable, which gives the ratio of the investment gain with asset i only, to the investment gain with our mixed portfolio x. The optimality condition is that, for each asset we invest in, the expected value of this ratio is one, and for each asset we do not invest in, the expected value cannot exceed one. Very roughly speaking, this means our portfolio does as well as any of the assets that we choose to invest in, and cannot do worse than any assets that we do not invest in.

Hint. You can start from the simple criterion given in §4.2.3, or the KKT conditions, or additional exercise 1 from homework 4.

(b) In this part we will derive the dual of the log-optimal investment problem. We start by writing the problem as,

minimize
$$-\sum_{j=1}^{m} \pi_j \log y_j$$

subject to $y = P^T x$, $x \succeq 0$, $\mathbf{1}^T x = 1$.

Here, P has columns p_1, \ldots, p_m , and we have the introduced new variables y_1, \ldots, y_m , with the implicit constraint $y \succ 0$. We will associate dual variables ν , λ and ν_0 with the constraints $y = P^T x$, $x \succeq 0$, and $\mathbf{1}^T x = 1$, respectively. Defining $\tilde{\nu}_j = \nu_j/\nu_0$ for $j = 1, \ldots, m$, show that the dual problem can be written as

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & \sum_{j=1}^{m} \pi_{j} \log(\tilde{\nu}_{j}/\pi_{j}) \\ \text{subject to} & P\tilde{\nu} \leq \mathbf{1}, \end{array}$$

with variable $\tilde{\nu}$. The objective here is the (negative) Kullback-Leibler divergence between the given distribution π and the dual variable $\tilde{\nu}$.

4. Log-optimal investment strategy. In this problem you will solve a specific instance of the log-optimal investment problem described in exercise 4.60, with n=5 assets and m=10 possible outcomes in each period. The problem data are defined in $log_opt_invest.m$, with the rows of the matrix P giving the asset return vectors p_j^T . The outcomes are equiprobable, i.e., we have $\pi_j = 1/m$. Each column of the matrix P gives the return of the associated asset in the different posible outcomes. You can examine the columns to get an idea of the types of assets. For example, the last asset gives a fixed and certain return of 1%; the first asset is a very risky one, with occasional large return, and (more often) substantial loss.

Find the log-optimal investment strategy x^* , and its associated long term growth rate R_{lt}^* . Compare this to the long term growth rate obtained with a uniform allocation strategy, *i.e.*, $x = (1/n)\mathbf{1}$, and also with a pure investment in each asset.

For the optimal investment strategy, and also the uniform investment strategy, plot 10 sample trajectories of the accumulated wealth, i.e., $W(T) = W(0) \prod_{t=1}^{T} \lambda(t)$, for $T = 0, \ldots, 200$, with initial wealth W(0) = 1.

To save you the trouble of figuring out how to simulate the wealth trajectories or plot them nicely, we've included the simulation and plotting code in $log_opt_invest.m$; you just have to add the code needed to find x^* .

Hint: The current version of cvx doesn't handle the logarithm, but you can use geomean() to solve the problem.

5. Maximizing house profit in a gamble and imputed probabilities. A set of n participants bet on which one of m outcomes, labeled $1, \ldots, m$, will occur. Participant i offers to purchase up to $q_i > 0$ gambling contracts, at price $p_i > 0$, that the true outcome will be in the set $S_i \subset \{1, \ldots, m\}$. The house then sells her x_i contracts, with $0 \le x_i \le q_i$. If the true outcome j is in S_i , then participant i receives \$1 per contract, i.e., x_i . Otherwise, she loses, and receives nothing. The house collects a total of $x_1p_1+\cdots+x_np_n$, and pays out an amount that depends on the outcome j,

$$\sum_{i \in S_i} x_i.$$

The difference is the house profit.

- (a) Optimal house strategy. How should the house decide on x so that its worst-case profit (over the possible outcomes) is maximized? (The house determines x after examining all the participant offers.)
- (b) Imputed probabilities. Suppose x^* maximizes the worst-case house profit. Show that there exists a probability distribution π on the possible outcomes (i.e., $\pi \in \mathbf{R}_+^m$, $\mathbf{1}^T \pi = 1$) for which x^* also maximizes the expected house profit. Explain how to find π .

Hint. Formulate the problem in part (a) as an LP; you can construct π from optimal dual variables for this LP.

Remark. Given π , the 'fair' price for offer i is $p_i^{\text{fair}} = \sum_{j \in S_i} \pi_j$. All offers with $p_i > p_i^{\text{fair}}$ will be completely filled (i.e., $x_i = q_i$); all offers with $p_i < p_i^{\text{fair}}$ will be rejected (i.e., $x_i = 0$).

Remark. This exercise shows how the probabilities of outcomes (e.g., elections) can be guessed from the offers of a set of gamblers.

(c) Numerical example. Carry out your method on the simple example below with n = 5 participants, m = 5 possible outcomes, and participant offers

Participant i	p_i	q_i	S_i
1	0.50	10	{1,2}
2	0.60	5	$\{4\}$
3	0.60	5	$\{1,4,5\}$
4	0.60	20	$\{2,5\}$
5	0.20	10	{3}

Compare the optimal worst-case house profit with the worst-case house profit, if all offers were accepted (i.e., $x_i = q_i$). Find the imputed probabilities.

6. Heuristic suboptimal solution for Boolean LP. This exercise builds on exercises 4.15 and 5.13, which involve the Boolean LP

minimize
$$c^T x$$

subject to $Ax \leq b$
 $x_i \in \{0, 1\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n,$

with optimal value p^* . Let x^{rlx} be a solution of the LP relaxation

minimize
$$c^T x$$

subject to $Ax \leq b$
 $0 \leq x \leq 1$.

so $L = c^T x^{\text{rlx}}$ is a lower bound on p^* . The relaxed solution x^{rlx} can also be used to guess a Boolean point \hat{x} , by rounding its entries, based on a threshold $t \in [0, 1]$:

$$\hat{x}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & x_i^{\text{rlx}} \ge t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

for i = 1, ..., n. Evidently \hat{x} is Boolean (*i.e.*, has entries in $\{0, 1\}$). If it is feasible for the Boolean LP, *i.e.*, if $A\hat{x} \leq b$, then it can be considered a guess at a good, if not optimal, point for the Boolean LP. Its objective value, $U = c^T \hat{x}$, is an upper bound on p^* . If U and L are close, then \hat{x} is nearly optimal; specifically, \hat{x} cannot be more than (U - L)-suboptimal for the Boolean LP.

This rounding need not work; indeed, it can happen that for all threshold values, \hat{x} is infeasible. But for some problem instances, it can work well.

Of course, there are many variations on this simple scheme for (possibly) constructing a feasible, good point from x^{rlx} .

Finally, we get to the problem. Generate problem data using

```
rand('state',0);
n=100;
m=300;
A=rand(m,n);
b=A*ones(n,1)/2;
c=-rand(n,1);
```

You can think of x_i as a job we either accept or decline, and $-c_i$ as the (positive) revenue we generate if we accept job i. We can think of $Ax \leq b$ as a set of limits on m resources. A_{ij} , which is positive, is the amount of resource i consumed if we accept job j; b_i , which is positive, is the amount of resource i available.

Find a solution of the relaxed LP and examine its entries. Note the associated lower bound L. Carry out threshold rounding for (say) 100 values of t, uniformly spaced over [0,1]. For each value of t, note the objective value $c^T\hat{x}$ and the maximum constraint violation $\max_i(A\hat{x}-b)_i$. Plot the objective value and the maximum violation versus t. Be sure to indicate on the plot the values of t for which \hat{x} is feasible, and those for which it is not.

Find a value of t for which \hat{x} is feasible, and gives minimum objective value, and note the associated upper bound U. Give the gap U - L between the upper bound on p^* and the lower bound on p^* . If you define vectors obj and maxviol, you can find the upper bound as $U=\min(obj(find(maxviol <= 0)))$.