

Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025

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Table of Contents

I.	Reporting Requirement.....	3
II.	Submission of the Report.....	3
III.	Analytic Efforts Supporting Force Structure Requirements.....	3
IV.	Plan Objectives – Priorities, Fiscal Environment, and Force Structure Adjustments	6
V.	PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan FYDP Overview	9
VI.	The Future Navy Fleet to Support Expanded Maneuver	9
VII.	Unmanned Platforms	11
VIII.	Industrial Base	12
IX.	Summary.....	14
	Appendix 1: PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan (FY2025-FY2029).....	16
	Appendix 2: Annual Funding for Ship Construction.....	21
	Appendix 3: Annual Funding for Sustainment	23
	Appendix 4: Planned Ship Decommissioning, Dismantling, and Disposals	25
	Appendix 5: Auxiliary and Sealift Shipbuilding Plan	29
	Appendix 6: Estimated Total Cost of Construction for Each Vessel.....	34
	Contained in the Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025 (Limited Distribution)	

Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025

I. Reporting Requirement

This report is submitted per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code. Appendices 1 - 6 provide supporting details. Appendix 6 is controlled under limited distribution.

II. Submission of the Report

This report is the Department of the Navy's (DoN) 30-year shipbuilding plan for FY2025 through FY2054. The FY2025 President's Budget (PB2025) provides planned funding to procure the ships included in the FY2025-FY2029 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) detailed a specific information requirement to provide the views of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps on the budget and the unaltered assessment of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps of the plan. These assessments are in Section IX. Additionally, the FY2024 NDAA also directed that in developing annual naval vessel construction plans, the Secretary of the Navy shall take into consideration the most recent biennial report on shipbuilder training and the defense industrial base. This information is in Section VIII. Unless otherwise noted, funding levels are constant year (CY) 2024 dollars.

III. Analytic Efforts Supporting Force Structure Requirements

Multiple threat-informed analyses conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD) as well as external entities underscore the need for a larger, more capable Navy to fulfill the service's statutory Title X mission of "the peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States and for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea." The June 2023 Battle Force Ship Assessment and Requirement (BFSAR) report as well as the analytic work supporting it reflects the tenets of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the aligned Defense Planning Scenarios. This shipbuilding plan is informed by the June 2023 BFSAR.

Table 1 presents an updated future battle force structure objective and shows how it compares to other recent force structure assessment efforts. The changes in the battle force structure objective from the initial BFSAR report are primarily due to the changes in future force architecture: single crewing of the small surface combatants and the shifting of additional large surface combatants to Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF).

Table 1: Comparison of June 2023 BFSAR report and Recent Force Structure Assessments

Battle Force Ship Type	2016 FSA ¹	INFSA ²	FNFS BF2045 ³	Initial BFSAR Report (June 2022)	June 2023 BFSAR Report
Aircraft Carriers (CVN)	12	12	8-11	12	12
Large Surface Combatants	104	96	72-80	96	87
Small Surface Combatants	52	56	47-60	56	73
LCS (MIW-capable SSC)	28	24		24	15
FFG / FFG Flt II	24	32		32	58
Amphibious Warfare Ships	38	31	36-53	31	31
LHA / LHD	12	10		10	10
LSD / LPD	26	21		21	21
Attack Submarines	66	66	58-70	66	66
Ballistics Missile Submarines	12	12	12	12	12
Combat Logistics Force	34	47	51-85	46	46
T-AO / T-AOE	20	20		20	20
T-AKE	14	14		13	13
NGLS	n/a	13		13	13
Command and Support	37	70	27-51	54	54
LCC	2	2		2	2
AS	2	2		2	2
T-ESD	2	2		0	0
T-EPF (Expeditionary Fast Transport)	10	20		8	8
T-ESB (Expeditionary Sea Base)	6	6		6	6
LSM ⁵	n/a	20		18	18
ARS / ATF	8	8		8	8
T-AGOS	7	10		10	10
BATTLE FORCE	355	390	337-404	373	381
Unmanned Vehicles⁴		45	143-242	45	134
USVs			119-166		78
XLUUVs			24-76		56
Total Platforms	355	435	480-646	418	515

Notes:

1. Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment
2. DoN's integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment
3. Potential battle force ranges from the OSD-directed Future Naval Force Study
4. Unmanned vehicles are not currently Battle Force assets. The numbers in this report were those used in the campaign modeling of the 2040 Control Case. Additional analysis is required to determine future unmanned vehicle inventory objectives
5. The 2022 Amphibious Force Requirements Study determined an initial capacity goal of 18 LSM, with a total requirements of 35

The Department continually evaluates industrial base health for both new ship construction and maintenance of the in-service Fleet. Navy evaluations measure readiness, capacity, and capability. Timely industrial base delivery of systems and platforms within budgeted estimates is essential to the Navy's ability to deliver decisive combat capability on strategically relevant timelines and at affordable costs. Improvements in today's production will enable greater capability and capacity for developing future platforms, such as the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)) and the next generation attack submarine (SSN(X)). Working with industry partners, the DoN continues to make deliberate strides in reducing execution risk through improved cost estimation, prototyping, and land-based testing. To achieve the goal of simultaneous construction of the Columbia-class SSBN and two Virginia-class SSNs annually, the DoN is investing heavily in the submarine industrial base to reduce production risk, stabilize critical suppliers, and help enable recruitment and retention of the skilled production workforce. Industry must do its part to deliver capability on time and within cost.

Lastly, the DoN recognizes the significant strategic opportunity presented by the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) trilateral security pact. AUKUS will advance peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen deterrence by enhancing all three nations' technical capabilities, expanding allied fleet capacity, and deepening cooperation. AUKUS Pillar One is dedicated to delivering a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability to the Royal Australian Navy. Pillar One has three separate phases, each of which will proceed as all three partners reach agreement that applicable milestones have been met. Phase One entails the establishment of Submarine Rotational Force – West as early as 2027. Phase Two involves the sale of three Virginia class submarines to Australia with an option for up to two more, subject to Congressional approval. Phase Three is the construction of the trilateral SSN AUKUS, with initial delivery to Australia in the early 2040s. The Navy's current planning assumption for Phase Two envisions sales of in-service Virginia class SSNs in FY32 and FY35 and initial delivery of a new construction Virginia class SSN in FY38. Tables A1-2 through A1-5 will be updated in future reports to reflect these transfers.

The DoN is committed to fortifying the submarine production and sustainment industrial base to meet U.S. needs while also enabling the sale of three Virginia class submarines to Australia. From FY2018 appropriation/execution through FY2023, the DoD, DoN, and Congress have worked in partnership with state/local governments and industry to invest over \$2.3B across shipyard, workforce, suppliers, strategic outsourcing and modern manufacturing technology lines of effort. The Navy estimates additional \$17.5 billion in additional funding will be needed from FY 2024 through FY 2029 to achieve sustained production levels of 1 Columbia SSBN + 2.0 Virginia SSNs by 2028, with additional productivity required thereafter to support selling SSNs to Australia. This additional funding was included in the FY2024 budget request, and FY2024 supplemental and is included in the PB2025 budget request. This funding is displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Submarine Industrial Base Funding FY2024 through FY2029 (TY\$B)

PB23 FYDP	\$1.6
PB24 FYDP	\$2.2
FY24 Supplemental ¹	\$3.3
PB25 FYDP ¹	\$10.4
Total with SIOP	\$17.5

Note 1: Includes Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)

IV. Plan Objectives – Priorities, Fiscal Environment, and Force Structure Adjustments

In order to deliver a ready and lethal Navy within available resources, the Navy has utilized a consistent process with well-defined priorities in budget submissions, namely:

- Prioritize recapitalization of the SSBN fleet with the *Columbia* class SSBN.
- Prioritize readiness to deliver a competition and combat-credible forward force in the near-term.
- Invest in increased lethality/modernization with the greatest potential to deliver non-linear combat advantages against China and Russia in mid-to-far-term.
- Grow combat-capable capacity.

The once-in-a-generation recapitalization of the Nation's most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the SSBN force, comes at the same time as the Navy works to modernize for future threats. This places strain across the Navy's budget. The Navy will only grow ready, lethal, combat-capable capacity at a rate that we can sustain, based on fiscal guidance, which requires industry to eliminate excess construction backlogs and produce future ships on time and within budget. Therefore, this plan does not resource capacity beyond what can be reasonably sustained and delivered.

PB2025 includes decisions to decommission 19 ships in FY2025, with ten decommissioning before reaching their expected service lives (ESL). Decommissioning these ships frees up additional resources to construct more capable and lethal platforms relative to current threats. Legacy platforms that are expensive to repair and maintain and unable to provide relevant capability in contested environments must be retired in order to invest in essential capabilities the Navy needs for our national security.

- 2 Guided Missile Cruisers (CG) – The DoN assesses that the best use of resources is investing in combat readiness, capabilities or capacity not achievable in these legacy platforms. The CGs' primary mission for over three decades as the Navy's premier air defense command and control platforms is now transitioning to more up-to-date Flight IIA and Flight III DDGs. While CGs have a large vertical launch capacity, they are in poor material condition due to age; the Navy is conducting hull-by-hull assessments to ascertain which CGs' service lives can be extended. Following assessment of their material condition, the Navy has determined that the two CGs being proposed for decommissioning this year have reached the end of their useful service lives. There are ongoing concerns with functionality, reliability, and obsolescence for sensors, weapon systems, and hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) systems installed more than 30

years ago. The substantial costs to maintain and operate these ships exceeds the combat value of the increasingly outdated capabilities they can contribute over their limited remaining service life. The Navy continues to assess potential future life extensions based on evaluating warfighting relevance and material condition of the CGs which have been through CG modernization.

- 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – PB2025 continues to focus the LCS class on mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare (SUW), eliminating the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission for the class. Dedicating each variant to a specific mission set and fleet concentration area allows us to more effectively align, simplify and streamline manning, training, and sustainment activities. PB2025 resets the LCS program to maintain ten Freedom class LCS dedicated to SUW and reduces the Navy’s requirement to 15 Independence class LCSs dedicated to the MCM mission. LCS 6 and LCS 8 were originally SUW designated ships; LCS 6 and LCS 8 are no longer required to meet the SUW requirement. A total inventory of 17 Independence class LCS leaves the Navy with two ships as excess to need for the revised MCM requirement; consequently, the two oldest remaining Independence class ships are planned for decommissioning in FY2025. Neither of these ships have completed lethality and survivability upgrades, a cost of several million dollars per ship which is beyond our current fiscal guidance. These two ships will be replaced by new Independence class ships delivering in the FYDP with more capability¹.
- 1 Landing Dock Landing Ship (LSD) – LSD 42 is no longer required to maintain a force of 31 Amphibious Warships. This ship is in poor material condition due to her advanced age and high rate of operations; she will require significant resources to continue to repair, maintain, and operate her. The substantial costs to repair and modernize this ship outweighs the potential combat capability she would contribute over her limited remaining service life. Shifting resources to other capabilities better supports the amphibious fleet and provides more operational capability to the Navy and Marine Corps. The DoN assesses that the best course of action is to invest in combat readiness, capabilities, and capacity other than this legacy platform.
- 4 Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF) – The four oldest T-EPFs are being inactivated, reducing the total EPF inventory from 16 to 12. Based on the BFSAR, the Navy requires eight T-EPFs. The Marine Corps requires four T-EPF in direct support of the Stand-in-Force (SiF), as part of the Littoral Maneuver Bridging Solution (LMBS), until LSM is available in appreciable numbers. The Navy is challenged with maintaining crew manning and operator proficiency, and the class operational availability and material availability is below life-cycle projections. Shifting resources to other platforms and capabilities better supports fleet operations and provides more operational capability to the Navy.
- 1 Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) – Navy plans to inactivate one T-ESD. T-ESDs were originally designed and configured for a specific concept of operations that has been obviated by the evolution of the threat environment. Operational limitations (i.e., low sea-state restrictions; lack of organic surface connectors; protracted ballasting and fender

¹ At the time this report was submitted, the FY2024 Appropriations Act was not completed. Navy requested to inactivate LCS 6 and LCS 8 in FY2024. When the Appropriations act is completed, if Navy is not allowed to inactivate these ships in FY2024 the Navy intends to request to inactivate the ships in FY2025.

deployment timeline; and limited suitable communications) limit the utility of this platform as presently configured. Shifting resources to other platforms and capabilities better supports fleet operations and provides more operational capability to the Navy. The T-ESD will be placed into OSIR while the Navy explores possible future applications for the vessel.

The planned decommissionings of ships that meet or exceed their ESLs include six combatant ships and three SSNs.

Appendix 1 summarizes PB2025 FYDP funding for ship construction (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy – SCN) and illustrates the acquisition, delivery, retirement, and inventory over the next 30 years for both the Navy’s FY2025 shipbuilding plan and one potential alternative beyond the FYDP. The first profile is the official PB2025 “shipbuilding plan,”¹ which reflects growing a larger Navy to approach the requirement reflected in the BFSAR. This profile assumes industry eliminates excess construction backlogs and produces future ships on time and within budget. This profile reflects growth matched to planned, but not yet achieved, industrial capacity and a larger force requiring additional resources beyond the FYDP.

The Resource-Constrained Alternative to PB2025 profile (see Appendix 1; hereafter referred to as “the Alternative Profile”) displays a Navy force structure reflecting a budget with no real topline growth above inflation. The Alternative Profile assumes industry eliminates excess construction backlog and produces future ships on time and within budget. The alternative was constrained to 2.1% SCN inflation growth after the FYDP.

Both the PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan and the Alternative Profile maintain a balanced force structure while procuring two SSNs per year through the 2030s in support of the National Defense Strategy and AUKUS, and sustaining 31 amphibious ships. Prioritization of SSBNs, SSNs and amphibious ships under the resource-constrained alternative profile forces procurement gaps and/or inconsistent procurement profiles in other ships classes. Appendix 1 outlines the lower procurement quantities in large and small surface combatants as well as combat logistics ships necessitated by prioritizing SSNs and amphibious ships under a constrained SCN topline.

Evolving operational concepts and rapid technological changes make single-point predictions of fleet levels after approximately 10 years unreliable. Accordingly, the Alternative Profile displays one potential option for procurement and inventory for key battle force platforms beyond 10 years, dependent on resource availability, technology development, threat considerations, and improved shipbuilding industry performance. As the Administration works with Congress to refine future years’ plans, the composition and potential ramp-up of battle force procurement beyond FY2029 will be adjusted accordingly.

The 2024 NDAA requires not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare ships, of which not less than 10 shall be amphibious assault ships. This shipbuilding plan complies with that mandate. The Navy is examining procurement options to maintain the required force in the future while actively examining the suitability and maintenance requirements to execute service life extensions to meet the requirement of 10 amphibious assault and 31 total amphibious warfare ships. Service life extension planning and investment will be addressed in future budget submissions. This shipbuilding plan currently reflects extensions to several LHD class ships

¹ The current first profile will be hereafter referred to as the “shipbuilding plan” as it is the Navy’s profile to grow towards its BFSAR requirement.

beyond their 40-year ESL and an increase in LHA procurements to three-and-a-half-year centers to ensure proper planning for the correct maintenance tracking actions and overall force size in support to the Marine Corps.

Appendix 2 depicts projected costs for the PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan and the Alternative Profile outside the FYDP consistent with Appendix 1. The shipbuilding plan's higher range would require additional ship procurement funding to achieve the force objectives discussed in Section III of this report and would produce a larger, more capable Navy. Under the Alternative Profile, the modest increase in battle force options beyond the FYDP is the result of two new programs: the Light Amphibious Warship program delivering Medium Landing Ship (LSM), and the Next Generation Logistics Ship program delivering Light Replenishment Oiler (T-AOL). The LSM is categorized as an expeditionary vessel and is grouped in the support vessels category; the T-AOL is included in the combat logistics force category. The LSM is a critical enabler of the USMC Stand in Force supporting both the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concepts, but do not bring the same level of global, multi-mission responsiveness as the larger and more capable amphibious warships.

As previously stated, the Navy will focus first on maintaining readiness of the Fleet. Regardless of the future profile, the Navy should not resource capacity beyond what can be reasonably sustained and delivered. Projected sustainment costs for this force are detailed in Appendix 3.

V. PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan FYDP Overview

This report shows the Navy's Shipbuilding Plan to grow the Navy toward the required force levels. PB2025 includes procurement of six manned ships in FY2025 and 57 manned battle force ships within the FYDP. The shipbuilding plan outside the FYDP shows the procurement of battle force ships to grow the Navy toward the BFSAR objective force levels. The increased procurement and delivery rates achieve 330 manned ships in the mid-2030s and maintains a force structure over 350 ships after FY2037. As stated, the above inventory levels are traditional manned battle force ships. In addition, it is estimated that the Navy could achieve 89-143 unmanned platforms by FY2045. Future force levels will be adjusted as the capabilities of unmanned platforms develop and are integrated into the battle force.

Full FYDP details of the FY2025 shipbuilding plan are in Appendix 1.

VI. The Future Navy Fleet to Support Expanded Maneuver

The Joint Warfighting Concept focuses on the central idea of Expanded Maneuver. The concepts of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) / Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) require a balanced and different mix of traditional battle force ships as well as new unmanned, amphibious, and logistics platforms for future operating environments and sea denial strategies. Analysis has repeatedly validated the need for progressive evolution of existing platforms combined with revolutionary introduction of new technologies to achieve a more survivable and more lethal force. The Department is committed to continually analyzing, testing, and experimenting with

novel concepts and capabilities to deliver an optimal mix of capability for tomorrow’s fighting Sailors and Marines.

DMO addresses challenges to sea control and access in contested and “informationized” environments, providing an intellectual framework to evolve our fleet to meet future challenges. The Department continues to experiment and analyze a range of solutions to provide strategically decisive sea control and power projection capability within the framework of DMO.


Areas of studies include, but are not limited to, aircraft carrier force structure, DDG(X), SSN(X), T-AOL, LSM, amphibious ship mix and force structure, and expanded missions for unmanned platforms presently under development. This analysis and experimentation in support of warfighting concepts is informed by operationally relevant metrics highlighting capacity, lethality, survivability, operational reach, and affordability.

The metrics in Figure 1 below highlight the capacity of potential future fleets to generate aircraft sorties, carry Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes in surface or undersea platforms, and employ undersea torpedoes. The area between the capacity lines within each graph represents the potential trade space between the two inventory profiles in Table A1-5 for each of the platform types. This trade space would be resource dependent. Procurement pace and volume of platforms will evolve based on technological maturation, operating concepts, threat projections and industrial base capacity.^{1,2}

¹ The reduction in torpedo capacity is indicative of the “submarine trough” in the mid-2030s.

² The steep reduction in undersea VLS capacity reflects the retirement of the four SSGNs in the latter part of the 2020s.

Figure 1. Key Naval Platform Metrics



VII. Unmanned Platforms

Looking out three FYDP's into the 2030s and beyond, the Navy is laying the foundation of the Hybrid Fleet with investments in enabling technologies, material reliability, resilient networks, and autonomy. Efforts are proceeding incrementally, using robust land and sea-based testing to minimize new technology risk and ensure systems deliver on schedule to meet Fleet requirements. These systems are evaluated in wargames, exercises, fleet battle problems, and limited real-world operations to develop employment plans and concepts of operation. Platform development and subsystem technical maturation is following a Systems Engineering Framework approach across six lines of effort: reliable HM&E systems; automated communications systems; integrated combat system; common control system; sensory perception and autonomy; and platform and payload prototyping. Learning from land-based testing, functional prototypes, and innovative Fleet initiatives will support continued refinement of platform requirements, technical maturation, capabilities development, and procurement program planning.

PB2025 shifts the initial procurement of LUSV from FY2025 to FY2027, ramping up to three LUSV per year by FY2029. This necessary delay reduces risk associated with concurrency

in requirements development, design specifications and machinery reliability testing. By the end of FY24, Navy will operate up to seven self-deploying USV prototypes: four Overlord USVs (OUSV), two Sea Hunter Medium Displacement USVs, and a MUSV prototype. The Orca XLUUV test and evaluation asset (XLE0) was delivered in Q1FY24, and five operational prototype systems are scheduled to be delivered to the fleet by the end of the FYDP.

VIII. Industrial Base

The Navy's industrial base must build the Future Fleet while sustaining today's Fleet. A strong, resilient, and effective shipbuilding industrial base, composed of shipyards, original equipment manufacturers (OEM's), suppliers, ship designers, and associated supply chains, is essential to accomplishing the Navy's mission readiness. Growing and modernizing this vital shipbuilding and repair base is a national security imperative.

As put forward by Secretary Del Toro in his speech to the Harvard Kennedy School on September 26, 2023, the Department of the Navy is a catalyst and key stakeholder in a first-of-its-kind, whole-of-government effort to drive Cabinet-level awareness, advocacy and action to rebuild the comprehensive maritime power of the nation, both commercial and naval. As Alfred Thayer Mahan argued at the end of the 19th century, naval power begets commercial maritime power, and commercial maritime power begets greater naval power. The reverse is also true: history demonstrates a clear pattern that no great naval power has long endured without also being a great commercial maritime power. Our new Maritime Statecraft effort seeks to reverse decades of decline in the commercial and naval shipbuilding industries—the result of several factors including the withdrawal of key longstanding subsidies from the U.S. commercial maritime industry in 1981 and the consolidation of the defense industrial base following the end of the Cold War. These policy choices led to the near-total collapse of the U.S. commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries with the exception of the naval and Jones Act sectors, which have since consolidated to such an extent as to nearly eliminate competition, producing single source suppliers in all but two classes of major warships (the exceptions being DDGs and SSNs, which have dual source suppliers). The resulting emergence of a series of these relationships over the past three decades has resulted in progressively higher costs to the government, greater fragility of the workforce and supplier bases, and reduced incentives for private sector investment in aging infrastructure. With the ultimate objective of reforming current policies to increase demand for U.S. commercial shipping and shipbuilding, the Maritime Statecraft effort will seek to attract new market entrants to restore competition to the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This would increase overall shipping and shipbuilding capacity, incentivize private investment, grow the skilled labor pool, bolster resilience against hostile coercion, and ultimately result in a larger, more robust national shipbuilding base able to deliver more ships, on time, and at lower cost than the current, naval-only industrial base.

As we work to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry over the long term, in the near term, the Navy remains committed to creating a healthy shipbuilding base through stable, executable acquisition profiles that promote both the retention of highly skilled trades workforces and investment in world-class manufacturing and shipbuilding facilities. The DoD provided \$2.6B of industrial base funding in the PB2023 FYDP to increase infrastructure, reduce production risk, stabilize 330 critical suppliers, and enable recruitment, training and retention of


the skilled production workforce at the two private shipyards which build new nuclear warships. The PB2025 request shown in Table 2 includes ~\$10.4B additional funding across the FYDP to grow these efforts and provides funding to address sustainment needs. The non-nuclear shipbuilding industrial base has been bolstered by the FY2023 funding Congress provided for Large Surface Combatant Shipyard infrastructure and *Constellation* class FFG industrial base and workforce development. The Navy is working with these shipbuilders to manage platform transitions, and when shipbuilders have excess capacity, to support nuclear powered shipbuilding programs through strategic outsourcing initiatives.

The Navy is mindful that as fleet composition evolves to meet competition and combat requirements, the Navy must examine alternative opportunities within the industrial base. Alternative opportunities include adjusting procurement profiles ensuring stability in shipyard workload to prevent “boom and bust” periods of shipyard activity, and ensuring ample competitive opportunities for current and future platforms (i.e., AS(X), LSM, T-AOL, T-ARC), and a potential FFG 62 second source for construction once the design and technical data package is mature and risks are reduced and validated. These opportunities allow the current industrial base to adapt while maintaining the capacity to deliver the capability the nation needs.

The Navy recognizes the “boom and bust” acquisition profiles of the last 60-plus years have resulted in challenges for the industrial base that have compounded over time. Some elements may not recover from another “boom/bust” cycle. Through collaboration with industry and government stakeholders, investments in sustainment, expansion of initiatives in key maritime regions and supply-base centers of gravity, the Navy is invested in ensuring a skilled workforce is available, both today and in the future, to support Navy shipbuilding and repair needs. The Navy will continue to maximize use of the American workforce to build and sustain our forces.

The Navy recognizes that industry requires consistency in work orders under contract, or “backlog,” to invest in the facilities, capital equipment, workforce, and processes to deliver affordable ships at rate. During the 1 to 2 years between contract funding and the formal start of the construction milestone, shipbuilders order long lead-time material from suppliers, develop and update construction build plans, and start steel cutting and early component fabrication that enable an optimized and efficient production flow once formal construction starts (reflected in Figure 2).

Figure 2. Notional Contract Award to Delivery Timeline



With the support of Congress and working with local, state and national organizations, the Navy and its shipbuilders are identifying opportunities to generate resiliency and productivity at our shipyards, within the shipbuilding workforce, and in the supply chain for both new construction as well as in-service maintenance providers. Congress has consistently appropriated funding in support of increasing industry capacity and supplier health. The industrial base investment proposed in the PB2025 FYDP for new construction and sustainment furthers the investment made in the PB2023 FYDP and supports a generational increase in new construction demand and required support of in-service submarines. This investment includes supplier development, ship builder/supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advances, and strategic sourcing of material across the submarine industrial base. The Navy will continue to collaborate with Congress and industry on strategies to positively affect shipbuilding and repair industrial base health.

IX. Summary

The PB2025 shipbuilding plan includes procurement of 6 manned ships in FY2025 and 57 manned battle force ships within the FYDP.

In order to deliver a ready and lethal Navy within available resources, the Navy has utilized a consistent process with well-defined priorities in budget submissions, namely:

- Prioritize recapitalization of the SSBN fleet with the *Columbia* class SSBN.
- Prioritize readiness to deliver a competition and combat-credible forward force in the near-term.
- Invest in increased lethality/modernization with the greatest potential to deliver non-linear combat advantages against China and Russia in mid-to-far-term.
- Grow combat-capable capacity.

The once-in-a-generation recapitalization of the Nation's most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the SSBN force, comes at the same time as the Navy works to modernize for future threats. This places strain across the Navy's budget. The Navy will only grow ready, combat-capable capacity at a rate we can sustain in the future, based on fiscal guidance, which requires industry to eliminate excess construction backlogs and produce future ships on time and within budget. This shipbuilding plan outlines the resourcing requirements to build a larger Navy with continuous global access.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) assesses the shipbuilding plan shown in this report to be the battle force necessary to ensure the Navy can support the NDS and the demands of being a globally forward deployed Navy at an acceptable level of risk. The CNO observes that while fiscal pressures are forcing tough decisions, the Navy's funding levels across the PB2025 FYDP are adequate based on what the industrial base can accomplish at this time; she likewise assesses that consistency and increased steady resource levels into the future remain critical to building the larger objective force structure in the BFSAR. As more effort and funding are applied to expand the industrial base, additional funding above these levels would be necessary outside the FYDP to grow force levels to those described in the BFSAR.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) assesses the PB2025 plan shown in the report meets the minimum requirement for amphibious warfare ships and initiates

acquisition of the medium landing ship (LSM) within the FYDP. In the out-years, consistent investments in amphibious warfare ship procurements and critical maintenance and modernization are essential to sustaining a combat credible naval expeditionary force. Amphibious forces play an essential role in persistent naval campaigning and crisis response across the competition continuum. The Marine Corps continues to assess the adequacy of the amphibious warfare ship and medium landing ship inventories which enable the service to meet Title 10 requirements and provide the Fleet and Combatant Commanders globally relevant Stand-in-Forces (SiF) and sea-based Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF).

This era of strategic competition requires a larger, modernized, capable, and lethal multi-domain Navy to face multiple pacing threats. The Navy is moving forward building advanced platforms such as *Ford* class aircraft carriers, DDG 51 Flt III, FFG 62, and SSN 774 with the Virginia Payload Module. Meeting Joint Force operational requirements under current budgetary guidance and against the backdrop of deteriorating industrial base market conditions over the past four decades requires difficult choices. These choices include divesting less capable ships that are expensive to repair and maintain, along with ships that provide less relevant capability against the requirements of our pacing challenge. But these hard choices can also present opportunities, such as investments in promising technologies that can be fielded at operationally relevant timelines and scales over the coming years. Careful prioritization in the near-term, in accordance with the National Security Strategy and the 2022 National Defense Strategy, will result in a Navy battle force that is more ready, sustainable, and capable of securing the nation's interests in peace or war.

Appendix 1

PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan (FY2025-FY2029)

Table A1-1 includes the President's Budget (PB2025) funding for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) portion of the 30-yr shipbuilding plan.

Table A1-1. PB2025 FYDP funding for New Construction Battle Force Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)

Ship Type	FY2025		FY2026		FY2027		FY2028		FY2029		FYDP	
	(\$M)		\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty
CVN 78 ¹			1,908		3,188		4,151		4,643		2,744	16,634
DDG 51		2	6,451	2	5,069	2	5,219	2	6,257	2	5,394	28,390
FFG 62		1	1,170	1	2,153	2	1,173	1	2,295	2	1,146	7,937
SSN 774 ²		1	7,336	1	9,360	2	8,846	2	8,477	2	8,695	42,714
SSBN 826 ³			9,557		10,421	1	10,235	1	10,182	1	9,143	49,538
LPD 17		1	1,562	1	250		1,798	1	275		1,894	5,779
LHA(R) ⁴			61		500		3,710	1				4,271
LSM (Medium Landing Ship) ⁵		1	268	1	200	1	349	2	305	2	311	1,433
T-AO 205					1,657	2	861	1	1,711	2	929	5,158
T-AOL (Next Gen Logistics Ship) ⁵							453	1	453	1	453	1,359
T-AGOS 25					425	1	400	1	436	1	445	1,706
AS(X) ⁶							1,113	1			1,559	2,672
Total New Construction⁷			28,313	6	33,223	11	38,308	14	35,034	13	32,713	167,591

Notes:

1. Funding reflects the two-CVN procurement for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and Advance Procurement (AP) for CVN 82 in FY2027-29 and CVN 83 in FY2028-29 with the first year Full Funding (FF) expected to be in FY2030 for CVN 82 in FY2030 and CVN 83 in FY2034. A decision on CVN 82/83 two-ship buy is needed NLT FY2026.
2. AP for second SSN in FY2031 will be identified from within existing DOD planned resources.
3. FY2025 represents incremental full funding for the second ship. Funding in FY2026 and out begins annual serial production. Other funding included is AP and economic order quantity funding across the class.
4. Reflects incremental procurement AP in FY2025-26 to support LHA 10 construction start in FY2027.
5. These future platforms are under development. As the platform and capabilities are further defined, the procurement costs will be refined.
6. New ships planned for future procurement or for replacement of legacy ships are annotated with (X) until their class has been named, such as AS(X).
7. Funding for sustainment (maintenance, personnel, operations, etc.) is in addition to funding for new construction shipbuilding (SCN) and is phased with delivery of battle force ships within the FYDP.

Notable FYDP procurement activity in the PB2025 budget submission includes:

- Final year of FF for the second *Columbia* class SSBN in FY2025 and serial production of one SSBN per year beginning in FY2026. To further bolster the industrial base, Table 2 displays the PB2025 adds across the FY2025 FYDP to increase capacity in the submarine industrial base, as this production rate will require significantly increased and sustained shipbuilding performance.
- FF requirements for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and AP funding for CVN 82 in FY2027-29

with the first incremental of FF in FY2030. A decision on CVN 82/83 two-ship procurement is needed no later than FY2026 and will be addressed in PB2026.

- Funding 9 *Virginia* class Block VI submarines in the FYDP to support multi-year procurement of nine SSNs from FY2025 to FY2029. The Navy is only procuring one SSN in FY2025 to depressurize submarine construction programs to enable progress back to a “1+2” annual cadence of building one *Columbia* class SSBN, which moves into serial production in FY2026, and two *Virginia* class SSNs per year. In order to maintain a consistent demand signal to the component supply base, long lead time material procurements are maintained to support two *Virginia* class SSNs in FY2025. Trade studies and technology development efforts have started for SSN(X) with planned lead boat construction in the early 2040s. The delay of SSN(X) construction start from the mid-2030s to the early 2040s presents a significant challenge to the submarine design industrial base associated with the extended gap between the *Columbia* class and SSN(X) design programs, which the Navy will manage.
- Program funding for 9 DDG 51 class destroyers across the FYDP. Adjust out-year procurement profiles of large surface combatants to pursue a FY2032 construction start for DDG(X) sustains DDG 51 Flight III production while reducing execution risk through land-based testing of the integrated power system and new hull form.
- Maintains the FFG 62 procurement profile of 1/2/1/2/1 FY2025-2029 to allow the builder to complete construction on the last LCS ships and Multi-Mission Surface Combatant ships for Saudi Arabia. This profile in small surface combatant procurement manage execution risk in the FFG program for the FY2025 FYDP as the shipyard ramps up efforts on the lead ship, while also completing existing orders for other ship classes.
- Adds AP and FF to procure three LPD 17 class ships in FY2025, 2027 and FY2029 in addition to funding an LHA in FY2027.
- Maintains the T-AO 205 ship procurement profile of 0/2/1/2/1 as the industrial base works to improve construction and delivery efforts.
- Removes the T-AGOS 25 ship in FY2025 to account for construction / completeness of first vessel of that class.
- Delays AS(X) procurement from FY2026 into FY2027 and adds funding for an FY2029 AS(X) ship.

Long-Range Naval Vessel Inventory

Balance across readiness, modernization and capacity must be maintained to field credible naval power. Resources for operations, modernization and sustainment in addition to the supporting manpower, training, infrastructure, networks and stable procurement profiles are required to maintain the naval force.

Tables A1-2 thru A1-3 depict the procurement and delivery plans, Table A1-4 shows the retirement plan, which drives battle force inventories shown in Table A1-5. Tables A1-3 and A1-5 assume industry increases manufacturing capacity and produces future ships on time and within budget.

The first profile, the PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan, is based on showing a potential path to a larger Navy based on the BFSAR objective. It is however, constrained beyond the FYDP by the Navy’s assessment of current industrial base capacity and the expectation of funding efforts to

improve production. This plan would require additional resources beyond the FYDP to procure the platforms necessary to reach the objective inventory requirement. The Alternative Profile provides ready and battle-worthy platforms to operational commanders with minimal budget growth.

The inventory tables indicate the projected number of ships in service on the last day of each fiscal year:

- Each provides capacity and a mix of ships supporting capabilities required by Combatant Commanders.
- The Alternative Profile adds risk outside the FYDP to the large and small surface combatants and combat logistics force industrial bases. Under this profile, procurement rates outside the FYDP are less than the desired quantity to load the industrial base due to a higher prioritization of other ship classes.
- Each continues to include future plans for introducing new or evolved platforms such as the next generation attack (SSN(X)) and large payload-based submarines, small and large surface combatants (DDG(X)), logistics, and support ships.
- The Department continues to review opportunities to accelerate new construction platforms and to assess the ability to extend existing platforms that have a satisfactory Lifecycle Health Assessment to achieve the force necessary to support the Combatant Commanders.

Table A1-2. Long-Range Procurement Profiles^{1,2}

PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan in support of the BFSAR objective

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	
Aircraft Carrier						1				1					1				1					1					1		
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	
Small Surface Combatant	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
Attack Submarines	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Ballistic Missile Submarines		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																				
Cruise Missile Submarines														1							1					1				1	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1		2		1		2		1	1				1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		1	1	1		
Combat Logistics Force		2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	2					1		2	2	3	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	2	
Support Vessels	1	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	4	3	2	3	2	3	2							2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	
Total New Construction Plan	6	11	14	13	13	13	17	14	16	18	15	13	12	10	12	9	10	8	9	10	10	12	14	14	11	10	13	12	14	11	

Alternative to the Shipbuilding Plan

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Aircraft Carrier						1					1					1					1									
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
Small Surface Combatant	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	3
Attack Submarines	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2
Ballistic Missile Submarines		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																			
Cruise Missile Submarines														1							1					1				1
Amphibious Warfare Ships	1		2		1	1	1		1		1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		1	1		1	1	1	1
Combat Logistics Force		2	2	3	2	3		3	1	3							1	1	1	2	1	3	2	3	1		3	3	1	3
Support Vessels	1	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		2						3	2	2		3	3	3	4
Total New Construction Plan	6	11	14	13	13	13	9	12	10	12	11	9	10	9	10	7	10	8	8	9	9	10	11	12	10	7	13	13	10	14

¹ The ability of the industrial base to support the Alternative has not been independently assessed.

² The profiles shown in Tables A1-2 through A1-5 do not reflect future adjustments to support the AUKUS trilateral agreement. Future Procurement Profiles, Battle Force Delivery, Retirement and Inventory Plans will be updated in future reports after further analysis refines future SSN workload.

Table A1-3. Battle Force Delivery Plans

PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan in support of the BFSAR objective

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54		
Aircraft Carrier	1				1			1								1			1					1								
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	7	2	1	2	2	3	1	3		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1		
Small Surface Combatant	2			2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
Attack Submarines	3	2	1		3	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Ballistic Missile Submarines				1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1															
Cruise Missile Submarines																					1			1								
Amphibious Warfare Ships		2		1	2		1		1	1	1		1	1	1		1					2	1	1	2	1	1		2	1	1	
Combat Logistics Force	1	2	1	3		2	2	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	4	4						1	2	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	2	
Support Vessels	1	5	4	3	4	6	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	3	2						2	2	2	2	2	2	3	
Total	10	13	9	13	14	14	14	16	14	15	20	16	16	17	16	17	10	11	8	6	10	8	10	12	13	12	13	12	11	13		

Alternative to the Shipbuilding Plan

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54			
Aircraft Carrier	1				1			1								1				1					1								
Large Surface Combatant	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	6	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	3		1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1		
Small Surface Combatant	2			2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	
Attack Submarines	3	2	1		3	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1		
Ballistic Missile Submarines				1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1																
Cruise Missile Submarines																					1			1									
Amphibious Warfare Ships		2		1	2		1		1	1	1		2		1			1	1			2	1		2	1	1	1	2		1		
Combat Logistics Force	1	2	1	3		2	2	3	2	1	4	2	3								2	1	2	1	3	2	3	1				3	
Support Vessels	1	5	4	3	4	6	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		2						3	2	2				3	
Total	10	13	9	13	14	14	14	16	14	12	19	10	16	9	10	9	8	10	8	8	10	7	8	9	12	11	12	10	7	13			

Table A1-4. Battle Force Retirement Plans

PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan in support of the BFSAR objective

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54					
Aircraft Carrier		-1				-1			-1				-1				-1				-1	-1	-1								-1				
Large Surface Combatant	-4	-3	-2	-2	-3	-5	-4	-4	-3	-4	-2	-1				-2	-4	-3	-3	-4	-4	-2	-2	-2	-3	-2	-2	-1							
Small Surface Combatant	-6	-1	-4															-2	-4	-3	-3	-2	-4	-2	-3	-2						-2	-2		
Attack Submarines	-3	-3	-1	-1	-1	-3	-1	-1		-1	-1	-2	-3	-2	-3	-1	-3		-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2					-2			
Cruise Missile Submarines		-2		-2																															
Ballistic Missile Submarines			-1	-1		-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1																	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	-1	-2		-1	-2		-1		-1	-1	-1		-1	-1	-1		-1				-2	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1				-2	-1		-1		
Combat Logistics Force		-2	-3		-2		-1	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1							-1	-2	-2	-3	-3	-3	-3	-1	-1				-2		
Support Vessels	-5	-3	-1		-1	-1	-2	-1	-1		-2	-3	-1	-1	-2	-2					-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-4	-2	-3	-4			-3		
Total Naval Force Retirements	-19	-17	-12	-7	-9	-11	-10	-8	-8	-9	-8	-8	-8	-6	-7	-5	-10	-6	-10	-9	-11	-9	-11	-11	-14	-14	-9	-7	-11	-8					

Alternative to the Shipbuilding Plan

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54					
Aircraft Carrier		-1				-1			-1				-1				-1					-1	-1	-1									-1		
Large Surface Combatant	-4	-3	-2	-2	-3	-5	-4	-4	-3	-4	-2	-1				-2	-4	-3	-3	-4	-4	-2	-2	-2	-3	-2	-2	-1							
Small Surface Combatant	-6	-1	-4															-2	-4	-3	-3	-2	-4	-2	-3	-2							-2	-2	
Attack Submarines	-3	-3	-1	-1	-1	-3	-1	-1		-1	-1	-2	-3	-2	-3	-1	-3		-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2							-2	
Cruise Missile Submarines		-2		-2																															
Ballistic Missile Submarines			-1	-1		-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1																	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	-1	-2		-1	-2		-1		-1	-1	-1		-2		-1						-2	-1		-2	-1	-1	-1	-1						-1	
Combat Logistics Force		-2	-3		-2		-1	-1	-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1							-1	-2	-2	-3	-3	-3	-3	-1	-1						
Support Vessels	-5	-3	-1		-1	-1	-2	-1	-1		-2	-3	-1	-1	-2	-2					-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-4	-2	-3	-4					-2
Total Naval Force Retirements	-19	-17	-12	-7	-9	-11	-10	-8	-8	-9	-8	-8	-9	-5	-7	-5	-9	-7	-11	-9	-11	-9	-10	-11	-14	-14	-10	-7	-10	-5					

Table A1-5. Resultant Battle Force Inventories and Trade Space

PB2025 Shipbuilding plan in support of the BFSAR objective

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Aircraft Carrier	12	11	11	11	12	11	11	12	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	11	10	10	11	11	11	10	9	9	9	9	9	10	9	9
Large Surface Combatant	83	82	83	84	83	81	80	79	79	77	82	83	84	86	88	89	86	86	83	80	78	77	77	76	75	74	74	74	76	77
Small Surface Combatant	30	29	25	27	29	31	33	35	36	38	40	43	46	49	52	55	58	59	58	58	58	59	58	59	59	60	63	66	67	68
Attack Submarines	49	48	48	47	49	47	48	50	52	53	54	54	55	56	55	56	55	57	57	58	59	60	61	62	62	62	62	64	64	66
Cruise Missile Submarines	4	2	2																		1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4
Ballistic Missile Submarines	14	14	13	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Amphibious Warfare Ships	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Combat Logistics Force	32	32	30	33	31	33	34	36	37	38	40	43	45	48	52	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
Support Vessels	32	34	37	40	43	48	49	51	54	58	60	61	63	65	66	67	69	72	73	72	71	70	70	69	69	67	67	66	64	64
Total Naval Force Inventory	287	283	280	286	291	294	298	306	312	318	330	338	346	357	366	378	378	383	381	378	377	376	375	376	375	373	377	382	382	387

Alternative to the Shipbuilding Plan

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Aircraft Carrier	12	11	11	11	12	11	11	12	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	11	10	10	10	11	11	10	9	8	9	9	9	9	8	9
Large Surface Combatant	83	82	83	84	83	81	80	79	79	77	81	81	82	83	84	84	81	80	80	76	73	72	71	70	69	68	67	67	69	70
Small Surface Combatant	30	29	25	27	29	31	33	35	36	38	39	40	42	43	45	46	48	48	46	46	45	45	44	44	44	44	47	49	50	50
Attack Submarines	49	48	48	47	49	47	48	50	52	53	54	54	55	56	55	56	55	57	57	58	59	60	61	62	62	62	61	63	63	64
Cruise Missile Submarines	4	2	2																		1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4
Ballistic Missile Submarines	14	14	13	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Amphibious Warfare Ships	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Combat Logistics Force	32	32	30	33	31	33	34	36	37	36	39	40	42	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	43	43	43	42	42	41	41	41	40	43
Support Vessels	32	34	37	40	43	48	49	51	54	57	59	59	61	63	64	64	66	69	68	69	68	67	67	66	64	63	63	62	58	59
Total Naval Force Inventory	287	283	280	286	291	294	298	306	312	315	326	328	335	339	342	346	345	348	345	344	343	341	339	337	335	332	334	337	334	342

Appendix 2

Annual Funding for Ship Construction


The cost to procure a larger Navy is represented by the PB2025 shipbuilding plan in support of the BFSAR objective in Table A1-5, is shown in the first graphic of Figure A2-1, and assumes industry produces future ships on-time and within budget. The high range represents an average of \$2.7B per year in real growth beyond the FYDP in FY2024 constant dollars. The increased procurement level, informed by industrial base capacity and on-time and on-budget performance, achieves 330 manned battle force ships in the mid-2030s, and ultimately achieves 377 manned battle force ships in FY2045.

In Figure A2-1, the second graphic depicts the estimated funding required to achieve the “resource constrained” Alternative profile of battle force inventories depicted in Appendix 1, Table A1-5, and assumes industry produces future ships on-time and within budget. As discussed in Section IV, these two profiles, although similar, depict potential inventory ranges that can be achieved through level of resources applied and by varying the type of ships being procured.


The cost to sustain a larger Navy is in addition to that required for procurement and is phased within the appropriate accounts (i.e., manpower, support, training, infrastructure) to match ship deliveries. Appendix 3 illustrates the projected cost of owning and operating (operations and sustainment) the fleet for the inventory levels shown in Table A1-5 that represent both the force to meet the BFSAR levels and the no real budget growth alternative. This appendix does not include the funding associated with Appendix 5, which discusses the growing logistics requirement, non-battle force ships, and sealift recapitalization.

Figure A2-1. Annual Funding for Ship Construction (FY2025-2054)

PB2025 shipbuilding plan in support of the BFSAR objective



Alternative to the Shipbuilding Plan



Appendix 3


Annual Funding for Sustainment

NDA FY2019 directed reporting cost considerations of owning and operating a larger force. The priorities stated in the body of this report require the DoN ensure operations and sustainment accounts are funded properly to achieve a ready and capable force.

Scaled operations and sustainment funding to support the size of the fleet is essential to maintain and repair the battle force. Appropriately phased sustainment funding must be consistent with the size of the battle force. To be capable, ready, and lethal, the Navy must remain balanced across the elements of readiness, modernization, and force structure. When the life of a ship is extended, the sustainment requirement grows as the age of the ship increases. Moreover, sustainment resources programmed to shift from a retiring ship to a new ship must now stay in place for the duration of the extension. The sustainment requirement grows until equilibrium is reached at the desired higher force inventory, when deliveries match retirements and all resourcing accounts reach steady-state at a higher, enduring cost. Sustainment funding must also be reallocated from other Navy programs during the year of execution for any proposed ship decommissioning that Congress does not approve.


The sustainment costs in Figures A3-1 and A3-2 represent the funding programmed in the FYDP with FY2029 funding levels inflated forward using Office of the Secretary of Defense indices applied to the inventory alternatives shown in Appendix 1, Table A1-5. Included in this sustainment estimate are personnel, planned maintenance, and baseline operations, which represent those costs tied directly to owning and operating a ship. Funding is shown in then-year dollars (TY\$). Figures A3-1 and A3-2 do not capture all costs. For example, long-range costs such as modernization and ordnance (threat and technology driven), infrastructure and training (services spread across many ships), and aviation detachments are not included. Similar to procurement, estimates become less accurate further into the future.

Figure A3-1. PB2025 Shipbuilding Plan Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2025-2054)¹



¹ Shows funding estimated for personnel, maintenance, and operations programmed in the FYDP for the ships in the battle force. Beyond the FYDP, the funding is inflated from FY2029, scaled by projected ship types and quantities in the battle force.

Figure A3-2. Resource Constrained Alternative Annual Funding for Sustainment (FY2025-2054)¹



Appendix 4

Planned Ship Decommissioning, Dismantling, and Disposals

This addendum report complies with the Senate Armed Services Committee request for additional information regarding decommissioning and disposal of naval vessels. Table A4-1 lists the battle force ships to be inactivated within the FYDP. The table also identifies the planned disposition for each ship and the age of the ship in the year the ship is inactivated. The DoN assesses no potential gaps in combat capability will result from removing the projected ships from service. The Expected Service Lives (ESL) for the ship classes are certified by the Naval Sea Systems Command Senior Technical Authorities. The material condition and combat contribution of each individual ship listed in 2026-2029 in table A4.1 will be assessed for potential extension beyond the ship class ESL before a final inactivation decision is made by the Navy.

Table A4-1. Ships planned to be inactivated¹ during the FYDP

Inactivation Year (FY) – Total Ships	Ship Name/Designation/Hull Number	Disposition ²	Age ³	ESL
2025 - 19 Ships	USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58)	LSA	36	35
	USS NORMANDY (CG 60)	LSA	35	35
	USS SHILOH (CG 67)	LSA	33	35
	USS LAKE ERIE (CG 70)	LSA	32	35
	USS HELENA (SSN 725)	RECYCLE	38	33
	USS PASADENA (SSN 752)	RECYCLE	36	33
	USS TOPEKA (SSN 754)	RECYCLE	36	33
	USS JACKSON (LCS 6)	LSA	10	25
	USS MONTGOMERY (LCS 8)	LSA	9	25
	USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42)	DISMANTLE	39	40
	USS SENTRY (MCM 3)	DISMANTLE	36	30
	USS DEVASTATOR (MCM 6)	DISMANTLE	35	30
	USS GLADIATOR (MCM 11)	DISMANTLE	32	30
	USS DEXTROUS (MCM 13)	DISMANTLE	31	30
	USNS SPEARHEAD (T-EPF 1)	DISMANTLE	12	20
	USNS CHOCTAW COUNTY (T-EPF 2)	LSA	12	20
	USNS MILLINOCKET (T-EPF 3)	LSA	11	20
	USNS FALL RIVER (T-EPF 4)	DISMANTLE	11	20
	USNS JOHN GLENN (T-ESD 2)	OSIR	11	40
2026 - 17 Ships	USS NIMITZ (CVN 68)	RECYCLE	51	50
	USS PRINCETON (CG 59)	OCIR	37	35
	USS ROBERT SMALLS (CG 62)	OCIR	37	35
	USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64)	OCIR	35	35
	USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)	DISMANTLE	14	25
	USS NEWPORT NEWS (SSN 750)	RECYCLE	37	33
	USS SCRANTON (SSN 756)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS ALEXANDRIA (SSN 757)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS OHIO (SSGN 726)	RECYCLE	44	42
	USS FLORIDA (SSGN 728)	RECYCLE	43	42

	USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44)	DISMANTLE	37	40
	USS ASHLAND (LSD 48)	DISMANTLE	34	40
	USNS JOHN ERICSSON (T-AO 194)	LSA	35	35
	USNS PECOS (T-AO 197)	DISMANTLE	36	35
	USNS CATABA (T-ATF 168)	FMS	46	40
	USNS GRASP (T-ARS 51)	DISMANTLE	40	40
	USNS SALVOR (T-ARS 52)	DISMANTLE	40	40
2027 - 12 Ships	USS CHOSIN (CG 65)	OCIR	36	35
	USS CAPE ST GEORGE (CG 71)	OCIR	34	35
	USS ANNAPOLIS (SSN 760)	RECYCLE	35	33
	USS HENRY M JACKSON (SSBN 730)	RECYCLE	43	42
	USNS HENRY J KAISER (T-AO 187)	DISMANTLE	40	35
	USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189)	DISMANTLE	40	35
	USNS LEROY GRUMMAN (T-AO 195)	DISMANTLE	38	35
	USS PATRIOT (MCM 7)	DISMANTLE	36	30
	USS PIONEER (MCM 9)	DISMANTLE	35	30
	USS WARRIOR (MCM 10)	DISMANTLE	34	30
	USS CHIEF (MCM 14)	DISMANTLE	33	30
	USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC 20) ⁴	DISMANTLE	56	68
2028 - 7 Ships	USS BARRY (DDG 52)	OCIR	35	35
	USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG 53)	OCIR	35	35
	USS ASHEVILLE (SSN 758)	RECYCLE	37	33
	USS MICHIGAN (SSGN 727)	RECYCLE	46	42
	USS GEORGIA (SSGN 729)	RECYCLE	44	42
	USS ALABAMA (SSBN 731)	RECYCLE	43	42
	USS TORTUGA (LSD 46)	DISMANTLE	38	40
2029 - 9 Ships	USS CURTIS WILBUR (DDG 54)	OCIR	35	35
	USS STOUT (DDG 55)	OCIR	35	35
	USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56)	OCIR	35	35
	USS ALBANY (SSN 753)	RECYCLE	39	33
	USS COMSTOCK (LSD 45)	OCIR	39	40
	USS WASP (LHD 1)	OCIR	40	40
	USNS JOSHUA HUMPHREYS (T-AO 188)	DISMANTLE	42	35
	USNS TIPPECANOE (T-AO 199)	DISMANTLE	36	35
	USNS VICTORIOUS (T-AGOS 19)	DISMANTLE	38	30

Notes:

1. U.S. Navy vessels are commissioned ships that are decommissioned and removed from active status. USNS vessels are non-commissioned vessels that are placed out of service.
2. Out of Commission in Reserve (OCIR) and Out of Service in Reserve (OSIR) ships will be retained on the Naval Vessel Register (NVR) as reactivation candidates. Logistics Support Assets (LSA) and ships designated for Foreign Military Sale (FMS) are not retained in the NVR.
3. Identifies the age of the vessel at retirement.
4. The Department is reviewing potential options to replacing the aging command ships. Options include but are not limited to new ship procurement, commercial options or modifications to existing ships.

Ships planned for dismantling during the FYDP

Prior to final disposition, ships reaching the end of their service lives are evaluated for additional use through intra-agency or inter-agency transfer, foreign military sales (FMS), fleet

training, or weapons testing. Ships designated for FMS are retained in a hold status for no more than two years in accordance with Navy policy. The Navy intends to dismantle the ships listed in Table A4-2 within the FYDP. Specific dates will be determined when the ships are contracted for scrapping or recycling.

Table A4-2. Ships Planned for Disposal by Dismantling

Ex-SAFEGUARD (ARS 50)	USNS HENRY J KAISER (T-AO 187)
Ex-GRAPPLE (ARS 53)	USNS JOSHUA HUMPHREYS (T-AO 188)
Ex-NAVAJO (ATF 169)	USNS JOHN LENTHALL (T-AO 189)
Ex-MOHAWK (ATF 170)	USNS LEROY GRUMMAN (T-AO 195)
Ex-SIOUX (ATF 171)	USNS PECOS (T-AO 197)
Ex-APACHE (ATF 172)	USNS TIPPECANOE (T-AO 199)
Ex-CARR (FFG 52)	USNS VICTORIOUS (T-AGOS 19)
Ex-ELROD (FFG 55)	USNS GRASP (T-ARS 51)
Ex-KAUFFMAN (FFG 59)	USNS SALVOR (T-ARS 52)
Ex-FREEDOM (LCS 1)	USNS SPEARHEAD (T-EPF 1)
Ex-INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2)	USNS FALL RIVER (T-EPF 4)
Ex-CHARLESTON (LKA 113)	USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC 20)
Ex-MOBILE (LKA 115)	USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)
Ex-EL PASO (LKA 117)	USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42)
Ex-FORT MCHENRY (LSD 43)	USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44)
Ex-ZEPHYR (PC 8)	USS TORTUGA (LSD 46)
Ex-SHAMAL (PC 13)	USS ASHLAND (LSD 48)
Ex-TORNADO (PC-14)	USS SENTRY (MCM 3)
Ex-CANON (PG 90)	USS DEVASTATOR (MCM 6)
Ex-WALTER S DIEHL (T-AO 193)	USS PATRIOT (MCM 7)
	USS PIONEER (MCM 9)
	USS WARRIOR (MCM 10)
	USS GLADIATOR (MCM 11)
	USS DEXTROUS (MCM 13)
	USS CHIEF (MCM 14)

Table A4-3 lists the ships that to be used for fleet training in support of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Valiant Shield, Atlantic Thunder and UNITAS training exercises that will occur during the FYDP. The training will include using selected decommissioned ships as targets for live-fire weapons employment, referred to as a “sinking exercise” (SINKEX). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) guidelines authorize SINKEXs when: (1) the event is required to satisfy Title 10 requirements for ship survivability or weapons lethality evaluation; or (2) the event supports major joint or multi-national exercises or evaluation of significant new multi-unit tactics or tactics and weapons combinations.

Table A4-3. Ships Planned for use in Future Fleet Training Exercises

Ex-KLAKRING (FFG 42)	Ex-DUBUQUE (LPD 8)
Ex-TARAWA (LHA 1)	Ex-JUNEAU (LPD 10)
Ex-SIMPSON (FFG 56)	Ex-DE WERT (FFG 45)
Ex-PELELIU (LHA 5)	Ex-CLEVELAND (LPD 7)

Summary

Per the annual Ship Disposition Review conducted on February 22, 2023, Navy will inactivate 64 ships within the FYDP (Table A4-1): 13 will be designated OCIR / OSIR; 16 will be recycled; 25 will be slated for dismantlement; and 10 are assigned a FMS or LSA disposition. These proposed actions will bring the total number of ships designated for dismantlement to 45 (Table A4-2, 20 previously inactivated ships and 25 ships added during the FYDP). Eight ships are designated for fleet training support (SINKEX) (Table A4-3).

Appendix 5

Auxiliary and Sealift Shipbuilding Plan

Auxiliary and sealift vessels provide support to the joint force, battle force, shore-based facilities, and broader national security missions.

Auxiliary Force Structure

Non-battle force auxiliary ships are operating platforms designed for unique United States military and federal government missions including oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile tracking and data collection, acoustic research, and submarine support. Tables A5-1 and A5-2 depict current and required inventories.

Table A5-1. Auxiliary vessels owned and operated by DoN

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Oceanographic survey ships (AGS)	6	8
Navigation test support ship (AGS)	1	1
Submarine escort ships (AGSE)	4	4
Hospital ships (AH)	2	2
Cable repair ships (ARC)	1	2
High speed transport (HST)	1	0
Total	15	17

Table A5-2. Auxiliary vessels procured by DoN and operated by other services/agencies

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Missile range instrumentation ship (AGM)	2	2
Oceanographic research ships (AGOR)	6	6
Total	8	8

Strategic Sealift Force Structure

Strategic sealift is a key enabler of DMO and joint power projection. Sealift ships transport approximately 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps combat equipment and supplies in support of major combat operations. Organic (U.S. Government-owned) sealift includes afloat prepositioning (PREPO) vessels, forward-deployed in full operating status (FOS) and in the continental United States (CONUS) in reduced operating status (ROS), with prepositioned material onboard; surge sealift vessels, maintained in ROS in CONUS; and special capability vessels providing cargo transfer and support functions. With an average vessel age over 40 years, recapitalization of the fleet is necessary to maintain required sealift capabilities. Table A5-3 lists inventory contributing to organic strategic sealift.

Table A5-3. Organic Strategic Sealift Inventory

Type	Current Inventory	Required Inventory
Prepositioning Roll-On/Roll-Off (AK/AKR)	15	19
Surge Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO)	51	48
Special Capability – Crane ships (ACS)	4	4
Special Capability – Aviation logistics ships (AVB)	2	2
Special Capability – Offshore petroleum distribution (AG)	1	0
Total	73	73

PREPO vessels operate under Military Sealift Command (MSC) supporting joint warfighting requirements. The FY2025 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) sealift fleet consists of five Roll-On/Roll-Off (AK/AKR) vessels positioned forward in FOS, two vessels loaded at Blount Island Command in ROS, and three vessels unloaded in CONUS in ROS. The FY2025 Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) consists of five Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMRS) (AKR) ships positioned forward in FOS. This Appendix excludes four special capability ships (AKE/ESD) included in the battle force command/support ships category.

Navy resources the procurement, operations, and sustainment of ten (AK/AKR) vessels designated to support the Marine Corps MPF. Army resources operations and sustainment for five (AKR) ships meeting service specific APS requirements. DoN initiated a new construction acquisition plan to meet future MPF requirements. The current projection is for lead ship delivery to begin in FY2032, and current AK vessel retirements to begin in early FY2030s.

Surge sealift vessels operate under MSC and the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD), supporting joint requirements. The FY2025 Surge fleet consists of 52 RORO vessels, including seven used vessels procured in FY2021-FY2024, and seven special capability (ACS/AVB/AG) vessels. By the end of FY2025, three AKs will transition in from PREPO ROS to MARAD’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF); two additional used RORO vessels procured in FY2025 will enter the RRF and two vessels will retire for a total of 52 surge sealift RRF vessels.

The requirement for prepositioning is 4.92M square feet of cargo capacity and surge sealift is 10.6M square feet of RORO cargo capacity. Total RORO capacity determines recapitalization requirements, not a specific number of ships. Due to commercial market availability, Navy procured five large used RORO vessels in FY2021-FY2023 to meet the planned capacity required of seven smaller ships. The Navy will purchase up to four additional used vessels in FY2024 to recapitalize capacity and, in FY2025, will continue to purchase vessels within programmed funds to meet capacity requirements. With the purchase of two vessels in FY25, the Buy-Used Program will reach the congressionally authorized limit of nine used vessels.

PB2025 continues Navy’s commitment to recapitalize surge sealift capabilities through procurement and conversion of used commercial RORO ships, replacing cargo capacity lost as old ships retire from service. The required inventory reflects the number of vessels necessary to meet the total required surge sealift capacity, assuming future procurements meet minimum RORO vessel operational requirements. As the fleet is recapitalized, current inventory will vary depending on the cargo capacity of individual vessels in the fleet.

Procurement Activity

To recapitalize the sealift fleet, Navy continues to fund MARAD to acquire used commercial RORO vessels. MARAD has contracted a commercial Vessel Acquisition Manager (VAM) to facilitate vessel procurements. Vessel conversions necessary to meet operational requirements and life-cycle sustainment work will be completed by the U.S. commercial repair industry. An MPF Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) beginning Q2 FY2024 will examine new construction sealift vessel options.

Instead of a one-for-one vessel replacement, the existing offshore petroleum distribution (AG) capability will be recapitalized with a family of systems (not vessels) that will be part of the Joint Petroleum Over-the-Shore distributed network of systems.

A crane ship (ACS) AoA is planned to complete Q2 FY2024 to inform the appropriate recapitalization strategy for T-ACS vessels. Anticipated procurement beginning FY2030 aligns with existing ACS retirements.

Table A5-4 provides sealift buy-used procurement and conversion funding. Used vessels are commercial RORO ships procured with SCN funds and modified to meet military cargo carriage requirements with Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN). Funding is transferred to MARAD by General Provision. Early fiscal year procurements are converted/modified in the same year, while late procurements are converted/modified the following year.

**Table A5-4. PB2025 FYDP funding – SCN, OMN, and RDT&E
Long Range Auxiliary and Sealift Plan**

Ship Type	(\$M)	FY25		FY26		FY27		FY28		FY29		FYDP	
		\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty	\$	Qty
Cable Repair Ship						785	1			595	1	1,380	2
Surge RORO (Used Vessels) SCN Procurement	205	2	206	2	213	2	216	2	221	2	1,061	10	
Surge RORO (Used Vessels) OMN Conversion	43		94		96		76		78		387	0	
PREPO (New Con) RDTEN	2		3		16		2		3		26		

Table A5-5 depicts new construction shipbuilding procurements for auxiliary and sealift ships.

Table A5-5. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Procurement Plan – New Construction Vessels

Ship Type	Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)							1		1	1	1	1	1				1													1	
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)								1																							
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																	2	2													
Hospital ships (AH)								1	1																						
Cable repair ships (ARC)				1		1																									
High speed transport (HST)																															
Crane Ships (ACS)																															
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																															
Positioning RORO (AK/AKR)							1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1									3	5	1	2					
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)							1	1																							
Surge (RORO)																															
Total Procurement - New		0	0	1	0	1	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	5	1	2	0	0	1	0	0

Table A5-6 depicts used vessel procurements for auxiliary and sealift ships. The current profile of 2 used RORO ship procurements per year does not replace cargo capacity at the rate required by planned vessel retirements, which will create add risk to mission execution. Four ships at the minimum operational requirement square footage will meet the requirement.

Table A5-6. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Procurement Plan – Used Vessels

Ship Type	Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)																																
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)																																
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																																
Hospital ships (AH)																																
Cable repair ships (ARC)																																
High speed transport (HST)																																
Crane Ships (ACS)							2		2																							
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)																																
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)																																
Surge (RORO)		2	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1								
Total Procurement - Used		2	2	2	2	2	5	4	6	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Tables A5-7 and A5-8 depict associated delivery plans for shipbuilding and used vessels, respectively; assuming construction and conversion efforts remain on plan.

Table A5-7. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Delivery Plan – New Construction Vessels

Ship Type	Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)			1								1	1	1	1	1	1							1								
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)										1																					
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																						2	2								
Hospital ships (AH)											1	1																			
Cable repair ships (ARC)								1	1																						
High speed transport (HST)																															
Crane Ships (ACS)																															
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																															
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)										1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1										3	5	1	2	
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)										1	1																				
Surge (RORO)																															
Total Delivery - New		0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	5	1	2

Table A5-8. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Delivery Plan – Used Vessels

Ship Type	Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)																																
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)																																
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																																
Hospital ships (AH)																																
Cable repair ships (ARC)																																
High speed transport (HST)																																
Crane Ships (ACS)									2		2																					
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																																
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)																																
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)																																
Surge (RORO)		2	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1							
Total Delivery - Used		2	2	2	2	2	2	3	6	4	5	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Table A5-9 provides the retirement plan that, along with the delivery plan, drives the total auxiliary and sealift force inventory in Table A5-10. Executing this plan, for both new construction and procurement of used vessels, is contingent on availability of funding.

Table A5-9. Auxiliary Vessel and Sealift Retirement Plan

Ship Type	Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)					-1		-1		-1		-1	-1											-1								
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)															-1																
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)																						-2	-2								
Hospital ships (AH)													-1	-1																	
Cable repair ships (ARC)									-1																						
High speed transport (HST)					-1																										
Crane Ships (ACS)						-1	-1	-1				-1																			
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)																				-1											
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)												-1	-2													-2	-3	-3	-1		
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)								-1	-1																						
Surge (RORO)		-2	-5	-2	-4	-2	-7	-3	-2	-1	-3	-4	-1	-1	-1	-2									-2	-2	-1	-1		-1	-1
Total Retirements		-2	-5	-2	-6	-3	-9	-6	-3	-2	-4	-7	-4	-2	-2	-2	0	0	-1	0	-2	-2	-1	-2	-2	-3	-4	-3	-2	-1	0

Table A5-10. Auxiliary and Sealift Vessel Inventory

Fiscal Year	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
Oceanographic Survey Ships (AGS)	6	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	4	5	5	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Navigation Test Support Ship (AGS)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Submarine Escort Ships (AGSE)	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Hospital ships (AH)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Cable repair ships (ARC)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
High speed transport (HST)	1	1	1																											
Crane Ships (ACS)	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	3	3	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Offshore Petroleum Distribution (AG)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1												
Prepositioning RORO (AK/AKR)	15	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	14	15	15	14	15	16	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	15	15	17	17	19
Aviation Support Ships (AVB)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Surge (RORO)	52	55	52	52	50	52	48	49	51	53	52	50	50	50	50	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	54	52	51	50	50	49	48
Total Auxiliary and Sealift Inv	89	90	87	86	83	84	78	81	85	90	91	89	88	89	90	90	91	92	92	95	96	95	96	94	92	89	88	90	89	90