Results for 'welfarism'

51 found
Order:
  1. A Welfarist Version of Harsanyi's Theorem.Claude D'Aspremont & Philippe Mongin - 2008 - In M. Fleurbaey M. Salles and J. Weymark (ed.), Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press. pp. Ch. 11.
    This is a chapter of a collective volume of Rawls's and Harsanyi's theories of distributive justice. It focuses on Harsanyi's important Social Aggregation Theorem and technically reconstructs it as a theorem in welfarist social choice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Whole-Life Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  3. Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Welfarism is a theory of value (or the good) simpliciter. Theories of value are fundamentally concerned with explaining what makes some possible worlds better than others. Welfarism is the view according to which the relative value of possible worlds is fully determined by how individuals are faring—or, in other words, by the facts about well-being that obtain—in these worlds. This entry begins by distinguishing between various forms of welfarism (pure vs. impure welfarism, and then narrow vs. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. (1 other version)Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    This paper outlines a new pluralistic theory of normative reasons for belief, welfarist pluralism, which aims to explain how there can be basic alethic/epistemic reasons for belief and basic pragmatic/non-alethic reasons for belief that can combine to determine what one ought to believe. The paper shows how this non-derivative first-order pluralism arises from a purely welfarist account of the foundations of theoretical normativity, thereby combining foundational pragmatism with non-derivative pluralism about normative reasons for belief. In addition, this paper outlines how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Welfarism, preferencism, judgmentism.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These objections suggest a multi-aspect informational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Measurement scales and welfarist social choice.Michael Morreau & John A. Weymark - 2016 - Journal of Mathematical Psychology 75:127-136.
    The social welfare functional approach to social choice theory fails to distinguish a genuine change in individual well-beings from a merely representational change due to the use of different measurement scales. A generalization of the concept of a social welfare functional is introduced that explicitly takes account of the scales that are used to measure well-beings so as to distinguish between these two kinds of changes. This generalization of the standard theoretical framework results in a more satisfactory formulation of (...), the doctrine that social alternatives are evaluated and socially ranked solely in terms of the well-beings of the relevant individuals. This scale-dependent form of welfarism is axiomatized using this framework. The implications of this approach for characterizing classes of social welfare orderings are also considered. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  7. Wrongness, welfarism and evolution: Crisp on reasons and the good.Guy Fletcher - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):341–347.
    A critical notice of Roger Crisp's Reasons and the Good.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. A Choice-Functional Characterization of Welfarism.Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Journal of Economic Theory 222:105918.
    Welfarism is the view that individual welfare is the only thing that matters. One important contribution of social choice theory has been to provide a precise formulation and axiomatic characterization of welfarism using Amartya Sen's framework of social welfare functionals. This paper is motivated by the observation that the standard formalization of welfarism is too restrictive, since a welfarist social planner need not be committed to maximizing a preference ordering or any other binary relation over alternatives. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Climate Change and Justice: A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework.Alyssa R. Bernstein - 2015 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (2):123-145.
    Obstacles to achieving a global climate treaty include disagreements about questions of justice raised by the UNFCCC's principle that countries should respond to climate change by taking cooperative action "in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions". Aiming to circumvent such disagreements, Climate Change Justice authors Eric Posner and David Weisbach argue against shaping treaty proposals according to requirements of either distributive or corrective justice. The USA's climate envoy, Todd Stern, takes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  10. Why Paternalists and Social Welfarists Should Oppose Criminal Drug Laws.Andrew Jason Cohen & William Glod - 2017 - In Chris W. Surprenant (ed.), Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration. Routledge. pp. 225-241.
    We discuss the crucial, but easily missed, link between paternalism and incarceration. Legal paternalists believe law should be used to help individuals stay healthy or moral or become healthier or morally better. Criminal laws are paternalistic if they make it illegal to perform some action that would be bad for the actor to do, regardless of effects on others. Yet, one result of such laws is the punishment, including incarceration, of the very same actors—also clearly bad for them even if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  46
    Some Potential Loopholes for Welfarist Axiology.Walter Barta - manuscript
    DRAFT In what follows, we will attempt to point out two technical loopholes in the proof of the “Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies” as proposed by Gustaf Arrhenius (Arrhenius, 2000). The two problems arise from different principles, one from an application of the “Addition Principle” and one from an application of the “Dominance Principle” after a counterintuitive combination of the “No Repugnant/Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion” criteria, the former non-fatal and latter fatal. We will show that these problems arise via two methodologies. 1) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Best Expression of Welfarism.Christian Coons - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. PHILOSOPHICAL NARRATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARISM.Kevin Aweting - 2020 - Journal of Rare Ideas 1 (1).
    This work discusses human rights from the perspective of welfarism. The problem of human rights and welfare has been central in the thought system of political philosophy. This is so because the state which objective is to protect human rights and guarantee welfare has rather use her apparatus to trample on human rights thereby depriving citizens of their welfare. For the state to ensure successes of human rights she needs to take as its cardinal objective, human rights grounded on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  66
    A Polynomial Approximation Method for Welfarist Axiology.Walter Barta - manuscript
    DRAFT Several philosophers have suggested that it is impossible to formulate a theory of population ethics that simultaneously satisfies all of the necessary conditions set by our ethical intuitions (Arrhenius, 2000; Blackorby et al., 2004). However, we will attempt to demonstrate that, using the Stone-Weierstrass method, starting from scratch with a completely underspecified polynomial approximation function for commensurable cardinal utility (used here as a synonym for welfare) in a domain of commodities and populations, there are possible sets of functions that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. THE PLACE OF AFRICAN ANIMAL ETHICS WITHIN THE WELFARIST AND RIGHTIST DEBATE: AN INTERROGATION OF AKAN ONTOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL BELIEFS TOWARD ANIMALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT.Stephen Nkansah Morgan - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Kwazulu-Natal
    Scholars in the field of environmental and animal ethics have propounded theories that outline what, in their view, ought to constitute an ethical relationship between humans and the environment and humans and nonhuman animals respectively. In the field of animal ethics, the contributions by Western scholars to theorize a body of animal ethics, either as an ethic in its own right or as a branch of the broader field of environmental ethics is clearly seen. Consequently, there are, notably, two main (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings".Ben Bramble - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
    According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17. Group Prioritarianism: Why AI should not replace humanity.Frank Hong - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    If a future AI system can enjoy far more well-being than a human per resource, what would be the best way to allocate resources between these future AI and our future descendants? It is obvious that on total utilitarianism, one should give everything to the AI. However, it turns out that every Welfarist axiology on the market also gives this same recommendation, at least if we assume consequentialism. Without resorting to non-consequentialist normative theories that suggest that we ought not always (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  19. The medical model, with a human face.Justis Koon - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3747-3770.
    In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Ethics without numbers.Jacob Nebel - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):289-319.
    This paper develops and explores a new framework for theorizing about the measurement and aggregation of well-being. It is a qualitative variation on the framework of social welfare functionals developed by Amartya Sen. In Sen’s framework, a social or overall betterness ordering is assigned to each profile of real-valued utility functions. In the qualitative framework developed here, numerical utilities are replaced by the properties they are supposed to represent. This makes it possible to characterize the measurability and interpersonal comparability of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. The moral footprint of animal products.Krzysztof Saja - 2013 - Agriculture and Human Values 30 (2):193–202.
    Most ethical discussions about diet are focused on the justification of specific kinds of products rather than an individual assessment of the moral footprint of eating products of certain animal species. This way of thinking is represented in the typical division of four dietary attitudes. There are vegans, vegetarians, welfarists and ordinary meat -eaters. However, the common “all or nothing” discussions between meat -eaters, vegans and vegetarians bypass very important factors in assessing dietary habits. I argue that if we want (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Welfare and Autonomy under Risk.Pietro Cibinel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper studies the relationship between promoting people's welfare and respecting their autonomy of choice under risk. I highlight a conflict between these two aims. Given compelling assumptions, welfarists end up disregarding people's unanimous preference, even when everyone involved is entirely rational and only concerned with maximizing their own welfare. Non-welfarist theories of social choice are then considered. They are shown to face difficulties, too: either they fail to respect the value of welfare in at least one important sense, or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. El concepto de 'Liberación animal' en Peter Singer y Gary Francione visto desde un análisis marxista.Sergio Chaparro-Arenas - 2019 - Dissertation, Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora Del Rosario
    En este texto se realiza un análisis marxista del concepto de liberación animal en Peter Singer y Gary Francione, mostrando su convergencia liberal. El estudio comparativo se inscribe en el paradigma marxista dentro de los Critical Animal Studies (CAS) y la filosofía práctica. En un primer momento, se muestran las divergencias y convergencias entre el bienestar utilitario y la abolición deóntica, el neobienestarismo y el abolicionismo, haciendo énfasis en una preferencia común y fundamental por una sociedad liberal democrática post-especista (i.e. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. On justifying an account of moral goodness to each individual: contractualism, utilitarianism, and prioritarianism.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    Many welfarists wish to assign to each possible state of the world a numerical value that measures something like its moral goodness. How are we to determine this quantity? This paper proposes a contractualist approach: a legitimate measure of moral goodness is one that could be justified to each member of the population in question. How do we justify a measure of moral goodness to each individual? Each individual recognises the measure of moral goodness must be a compromise between the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Good-for-nothings.Susan Wolf - 2010 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 85 (2):47-64.
    Many academic works as well as many works of art are such that if they had never been produced, no one would be worse off. Yet it is hard to resist the judgment that some such works are good nonetheless. We are rightly grateful that these works were created; we rightly admire them, appreciate them, and take pains to preserve them. And the authors and artists who produced them have reason to be proud. This should lead us to question the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  26. The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.
    People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  27. Moving Through Capacity Space: Mapping Disability and Enhancement.Nicholas Greig Evans, Joel Michael Reynolds & Kaylee R. Johnson - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):748-755.
    In this paper, we highlight some problems for accounts of disability and enhancement that have not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The reason, we contend, is that contemporary debates that seek to define, characterise or explain the normative valence of disability and enhancement do not pay sufficient attention to a wide range of cases, and the transition between one state and another. In section one, we provide seven cases that might count as disability or enhancement. We explain why each (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Wolff, the Pursuit of Perfection and What We Owe to Each Other: The Case of Veracity and Lying.Stefano Bacin - 2024 - In Sonja Schierbaum, Michael Walschots & John Walsh (eds.), Christian Wolff's German Ethics: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 237-252.
    My chapter deals with an important part of how Wolff pursued the normative ambitions of his ethics in giving practical guidance with regard to specific moral issues. I first consider how Wolff’s ethics tackles the duties to others, which traditionally represent a difficult issue for moral perfectionism. In this regard, I argue that Wolff’s strategy combines two aspects: (a) he includes in perfection non-active aspects and (b) operates with an agent-neutral notion of perfection, in spite of important passages that might (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Extensive Measurement in Social Choice.Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Theoretical Economics 19 (4):1581-1618.
    Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. In Search of Lost Nudges.Guilhem Lecouteux - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):397-408.
    This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time. Time inconsistency (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  31. Existence Value, Preference Satisfaction, and the Ethics of Species Extinction.Espen Dyrnes Stabell - 2019 - Environmental Ethics 41 (2):165-180.
    Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or well-being for them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. The Greenhouse: A Welfare Assessment and Some Morals.Christoph Lumer - 2002 - Lanham, MD; New York; Oxford: University Press of America.
    In this book some options concerning the greenhouse effect are assessed from a welfarist point of view: business as usual, stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions and reduction by 25% and by 60%. Up to today only economic analyses of such options are available, which monetize welfare losses. Because this is found to be wanting from a moral point of view, the present study welfarizes (among others) monetary losses on the basis of a hedonistic utilitarianism and other, justice incorporating, welfare ethics. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  33. Justice after Catastrophe: Responsibility and Security.Makoto Usami - 2015 - Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 26 (4):215-230.
    The issue of justice after catastrophe is an enormous challenge to contemporary theories of distributive justice. In the past three decades, the controversy over distributive justice has centered on the ideal of equality. One of intensely debated issues concerns what is often called the “equality of what,” on which there are three primary views: welfarism, resourcism, and the capabilities approach. Another major point of dispute can be termed the “equality or another,” about which three positions debate: egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Consequentialism and Respect: Two Strategies for Justifying Act Utilitarianism.Ben Eggleston - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):1-18.
    Most arguments in support of act utilitarianism are elaborations of one of two basic strategies. One is the consequentialist strategy. This strategy relies on the consequentialist premise that an act is right if and only if it produces the best possible consequences and the welfarist premise that the value of a state of affairs is entirely determined by its overall amount of well-being. The other strategy is based on the idea of treating individuals respectfully and resolving conflicts among individuals in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Minimalizacja cierpienia zwierząt a wegetarianizm.Krzysztof Saja - 2013 - Analiza I Egzystencja 22:67-83.
    The article is a reductio ad absurdum of assumptions which are shared by a large number of followers of the animal welfare movement and utilitarianism. I argue that even if we accept the main ethical arguments for a negative moral assessment of eating meat we should not promote vegetarianism but rather beefism (eating only meat from beef cattle). I also argue that some forms of vegetarianism, i.e. ichtivegetarianism, can be much more morally worse than normal meat diet. In order to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Identifying Objects of Value at the End of Life.Christopher James Sampson - 2016 - In Jeff Round (ed.), Care at the End of Life: An Economic Perspective. Adis. pp. 103-122.
    End-of-life care has a number of characteristics that make economic evaluation particularly challenging. These include proximity to death, the improbability of survival gain, individuals’ changing priorities, declining cognition and effects on close persons. In view of these particularities of end-of-life care, some researchers have determined that current ‘extra-welfarist’ approaches to defining do not adequately reflect well-being. As a result, suggestions are being made that would see the QALY approach either replaced or subject to significant redefinition. The purported goal of adopting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Utilitarianism on the front lines: COVID-19, public ethics, and the "hidden assumption" problem.Charles Shaw - 2022 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 12 (1-2):60-78.
    How should we think of the preferences of citizens? Whereas self-optimal policy is relatively straightforward to produce, socially optimal policy often requires a more detailed examination. In this paper, we identify an issue that has received far too little attention in welfarist modelling of public policy, which we name the "hidden assumptions" problem. Hidden assumptions can be deceptive because they are not expressed explicitly and the social planner (e.g. a policy maker, a regulator, a legislator) may not give them the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Sen, Amartya.Sanjit Chakraborty - 2022 - Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics.
    Amartya Sen’s remarkable endeavour to realize the normative capability of welfare economics goes beyond the impecunious resultants of the neoclassical welfare economy. The neoclassical welfare economy decoratively bracketed values to speculate about factual observations. This was due to the influence of logical positivists and their convictions about experimental scientific statements (primarily mathematical) and their vicinity to empirical truths and analytic statements. Sen adequately inquires “whether morality can be expressed in the form of choice between preference patterns rather than between actions” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. What is it for a Life to go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comment of Waynes Sumner's Theory of Welfare.Thomas S. Petersen - 2009 - Journal of Happiness Studies 10:449-458.
    In an effort to construct a plausible theory of experience-based welfare, Wayne Sumner imposes two requirements on the relevant kind of experience: the information requirement and the autonomy requirement. I argue that both requirements are problematic.First, I argue (very briefly) that a well-know case like ‘the deceived businessman’ need not support the information requirement as Sumner believes. Second, I introduce a case designed to cast further doubt on the information requirement. Third, I attend to a shortcoming in Sumner’s theory of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Exactly Why Are Slurs Wrong?Thaddeus Metz - 2021 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 84:13-29.
    This article, part of a special issue on 'Expressing Hatred', seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Economic Liberty, Price Control, and Environmental Harm.Rafael Martins - 2018 - Justiça Eleitoral Em Debate 8 (2):83-90.
    One core question in contemporary political economy is whether economic liberties should be constitutionally protected as basic rights. In this article I do not provide a positive argument for the view that economic liberties are basic rights. Rather, I seek to provide a reason for not embracing the opposing view, i.e. that economic liberties should not be constitutionally protected as basic rights. Based on Hayek’s theory of price as signal, I argue that price control, a view usually associated with high (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The pragmatic foundations of non-derivative pluralism about reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    This paper offers a sketch of welfarist pluralism, a view that is intended to resolve a difficulty for non-derivative pluralists about normative reasons for belief. Welfarist pluralism is the view that all reasons for belief are rooted in wellbeing, and that wellbeing has as one of its components being in a positive epistemic state. The paper explores how this view can explain various pluralist intuitions and why it offers a plausible basis for combinatorial pluralists who believe that alethic and pragmatic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Combining Pragmatic and Alethic Reasons for Belief [Ch. 3 of The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason].Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    This chapter sets out a theory of how to weigh alethic and pragmatic (non-alethic) reasons for belief, or more precisely, to say how alethic and non-alethic considerations jointly determine what one ought to believe. It replaces my earlier (2008) weighing account. It is part of _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, which develops a view, welfarist pluralism, which comprises central two theses. One is that there are both irreducibly alethic or epistemic reasons for belief and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  96
    Social Discounting and the Tragedy of the Horizon: from the Stern-Nordhaus debate to target-consistent prices.Ramiro Peres - 2024 - Working Paper Series - Banco Central Do Brasil.
    This paper reviews debates related to the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the challenge of pricing uncertain damages that will occur only in the future. They often revolve around the pure time preference rate, which reflects how much one favors present over future well-being. The SCC measures the marginal cost of the impact on economic growth caused by the emission of a quantity of greenhouse gases equivalent to an additional ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2eq). There is significant variance among (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Middle Earth, Narnia, Hogwarts, and Animals: A Review of the Treatment of Nonhuman Animals and Other Sentient Beings in Christian-Based Fantasy Fiction. [REVIEW]Michael Morris - 2009 - Society and Animals 17 (4):343-356.
    The way that nonhuman animals and other nonhuman sentient beings are portrayed in the Christian-based Harry Potter series, C. S. Lewis's Narnia series, and Tolkien's Middle Earth stories is discussed from a Christian animal liberationist perspective.Middle Earth comes closest to a liberationist ideal, in that vegetarianism is connected with themes of power, healing, and spirituality. Narnia could be described as a more enlightened welfarist society where extremes of animal cruelty are frowned upon, but use of animals for food is acceptable. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters.Susana Monsó, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg & Annika Bremhorst - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):283-310.
    It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  48. A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2779-2787.
    According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. (2 other versions)Better to be than not to be?Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz - 2010 - In Hans Joas (ed.), The benefit of broad horizons: intellectual and institutional preconditions for a global social science: festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Leiden [etc.]: Brill. pp. 65 - 85.
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. (1 other version)Utility theory and ethics.Mongin Philippe & D'Aspremont Claude - 1998 - In Salvador Barbera, Peter Hammond & Christian Seidl (eds.), Handbook of Utility Theory: Volume 1: Principles. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 371-481.
    This chapter of the Handbook of Utility Theory aims at covering the connections between utility theory and social ethics. The chapter first discusses the philosophical interpretations of utility functions, then explains how social choice theory uses them to represent interpersonal comparisons of welfare in either utilitarian or non-utilitarian representations of social preferences. The chapter also contains an extensive account of John Harsanyi's formal reconstruction of utilitarianism and its developments in the later literature, especially when society faces uncertainty rather than probabilistic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 51