Zihin felsefesinin varlığı felsefenin ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemden günümüz felsefesine kadar geniş bir zaman dilimine sahiptir. Zihin felsefesi akademik bir disiplin olarak adından 17. Yüzyıldan itibaren söz ettirmiş olmasına rağmen, bu alanda ele alınan konular Antik Yunan’dan beri tartışılagelmiştir. İnsan kendisi ve çevresindeki dünyanın gerçekliğini sorgulamaya başladığında zihin, bu gerçekliğe anlam kazandırmıştır. Özne ve nesnenin birbirine zıt ve ancak bir o kadar da birbiri için oluşu zihin-beden olgusu içinde düalist ve monist anlam barındırmaktadır. Monist düşüncede kendi içinde önemli görülen, eleyici (...) materyalizm öne çıkmaktadır. Zihnin bileşenlerinin, zihinsel yapının algı, duygu ve düşüncenin var olmadığını savunmaktadırlar. D. (shrink)

Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

Objective: During the pandemic, elective cases other than those requiring emergency thoracic surgery were postponed. Depending on the magnitude of the impact the pandemic posed on hospitals and clinics, there have been changes in the number and variety of cases of thoracic surgery. The intention behind conducting this study was to share the experiences gained by a thoracic surgery clinic during the pandemic period. Methods: Altogether, 214 patients were included in the study. Patient data that were recorded included those on (...) age, gender, lung pathology, duration of hospital stay, positivity for COVID-19, survival, and causes of death. Results: Of the 214 patients operated on, 12 died during the postoperative period. Eight of these patients died due to their primary disease and one died due to gastrointestinal bleeding, whereas the remaining three patients died due to COVID-19 infection. Conclusions: If opportunities and facilities favorable for the administration of surgical treatment are made available, surgical treatment services can be offered safely to all patients. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

Contract cheating, or students outsourcing their assignments to be completed by others, has emerged as a significant threat to academic integrity in higher education institutions around the world. During the COVID-19, when traditional face-to-face instruction became unsustainable, the number of contract cheating students increased dramatically. Through focus group interviews, this study sought the perspectives of 25 students enrolled in first year writing in a private higher education institution in Kuwait during the pandemic in 2020–2021, on their attitudes towards contract cheating. (...) MAXQDA 2020 was used to examine the data. The participants believe that the primary motivations for engaging in contract cheating are mainly the opportunities presented by online learning and the psychological and physical challenges they experienced during online learning. Those who did not cheat had some shared traits, such as a competitive spirit, confidence in their talents, and a strong desire to learn. Additionally, those with high moral values avoided cheating. To combat contract cheating, students believe that teaching and evaluation techniques should be drastically altered and that students should be educated about plagiarism, while institutions should impose tougher sanctions on repeat offenders. (shrink)

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

Deflationism, one of the influential philosophical doctrines of truth, holds that there is no property of truth, and that overt uses of the predicate "true" are redundant. However, the hypothetical examples used by theorists to exemplify deflationism are isolated sentences, offering little to examine what the predicate adds to meaning within context. We oppose the theory not on philosophical but on empirical grounds. We collect 7,610 occurrences of "it is true that" from 10 influential periodicals published in the United States. (...) We classify and annotate these with respect to the positions of coordinating and subordinating conjunctions that they contain. This way we investigate the contextual relationships between the proposition following "it is true that" with its surroundings. Overall, 34 different syntactical patterns are encountered. In some occurrences of "true", the predicate acts in the same manner as a performative verb does. These occurrences, having been observed in linguistically reliable media, constitute pragmatic counter-examples to deflationism. (shrink)

Change is omnipotent, differentialism is omnipresent. Philosophy rigorously interrogates perceived realities, employing a disciplined methodology to address the fundamental exis- tential questions: the essence of existence, its underlying reasons, and the processes that sustain it. This exploratory approach, a natural human tendency evident across life stages, has profoundly influenced the development of theories across various disciplines, reshaping our worldview and altering historical narratives. Yet, this iterative process of thought and cognition often culminates in deeply entrenched beliefs, accepted without critical scrutiny (...) and justified by ‘rational methodologies.’ Recognizing these biases, philosophers have histor- ically devised strategies to confront and mitigate such preconceptions. Despite these efforts, the discourse often remains anchored in a self-referential historical context, necessitating a paradigm shift to accommodate the accelerating pace of change. -/- This thesis employs descriptive and normative methods to scrutinize the rational processes of perception, cognition, and action. I introduce the differential framework, a robust construct that encapsulates this cyclical process of sense-making. This framework uses pre-existing understandings as a basis to articulate new perspectives on the evolving world. The dis- course is particularly relevant to the philosophy of mind, information, and ethics, especially as we confront the profound implications of AI and transhumanism. Rapid advancements in these fields challenge our traditional methods and demand adaptive responses, urging a reevaluation of our ethical frameworks and cognitive models in light of emerging realities. This work seeks to bridge the gap between classical philosophical inquiry and the urgent questions posed by the next steps in human evolution, emphasizing the necessity of inte- grating technology with humanity in a way that respects and enhances fundamental human values. (shrink)

The mind has always been a peculiar and elusive subject, sparking controversial theories throughout the history of philosophy. The initial theorization of the mind dates back to Orphism, which formulated a dualistic structure of soul and body (Johansen, 1999) [1], laying the foundation for Greek dualism, introspection, and the rise of metaphysical idealism. This ill-empirical stance, especially after Plato’s idea of forms, led to inaccessible theoretical concepts concerning the investigation of the relationship between body and mind. Although diverse theories provide (...) broader insights into such matters, they can also hinder progress if based on unsound methodological hypothesis. The present study aims to employ a rational reexamination of the potentiality of the concepts of mind, using abductive inspection to present a valid grasp through the lens of cognitive neuroscience, philosophy, and interdisciplinary fields. This paper speculates through empirical deduction by analyzing the literature and theories on the concept of mind and its possible implications for singularity via transhumanism. In the contemporary world, humankind is on the edge of singularity due to the exponential growth predicted by Moore’s law (Moore 1965) [2]. While many considered singularity an abstract akin to science fiction, significant projections indicate that the accelerationist change has already begun, irreversibly. This advancement occurs not only in the degree of semiconductors in electronics but also in the amplification of human cognition through external devices enabling compound information flow via the world wide web. However, the conjunction of robotics and AI may outdo humankind in the contest for sovereignty soon due to their advantageous architecture in process design, which increases the systemic risk of extinction for humankind. Achieving total control over AI is unrealistic, as it requires complete supervision over all computers and information processes across the world, rendering any regulatory efforts to foresee augmentation futile. Consequently, this paper proposes the adoption of a neuro-robotic approach, enriched with AI, and implementation through biomedical applications on the human body to augment human cognition and physicality. This study aims to raise awareness against existential risks, emphasizing that reliance solely on AI powered computers could lead to annihilation. It also aims to highlight that biological mind and body is lagging behind the modern science to compete against Artificial Intelligence. Moreover, the foundation of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is an epistemic foundation for cognitive machinery enhancement that cannot be reversed once it emergence become apparent, as with Pandora’s Box. Technological singularity (Shanahan, 2015) [3], the point where technology is intelligently engineered to engineer its own sets by compounding all possible implementations of practical and theoretical information, is appearing on the horizon. Even if there is no human agency left on the soil of Earth, there is still no turning back at that point. Humankind must actively hold the key to bend this alteration in a way that aligns with its desires. Therefore, we propose, future for humankind lies with transhumanism. (shrink)

Bu araştırmanın ilk amacı, sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının tartışmaya yönelik özyeterlikleri, bilimin doğası inanışları ve eleştirel düşünmeleri arasında sınıf düzeyine göre anlamlı bir fark olup olmadığını incelemektir. İkinci amacı ise, sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının tartışmaya yönelik öz-yeterlikleri, bilimin doğası inanışları ve eleştirel düşünmeleri arasındaki ilişkilerin yapısal eşitlik modeli ile incelenmesidir. Araştırmanın modeli ilişkisel tarama çalışmasıdır. Araştırmanın örneklemini Aydın Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Pamukkale Üniversitesi, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi ve Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Temel Eğitim Bölümü Sınıf Öğretmenliği programının birinci, ikinci, üçüncü (...) ve dördüncü sınıflarında öğrenim gören 858 öğretmen adayı oluşturmaktadır. Araştırmanın örneklemi seçilirken uygun örnekleme tekniği tercih edilmiştir. Veriler “Tartışmaya Yönelik Öz-yeterlik Ölçeği”, “Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği” ve “Eleştirel Düşünme Standartları Ölçeği ile toplanmıştır. Verilerinin analizinde SPSS 18, LISREL 8.80 ve MPLUS 7 programlarından faydalanılmıştır. Tartışmaya Yönelik Öz-Yeterlik Ölçeği, Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği ve Eleştirel Düşünme Standartları Ölçeği puanlarının anlamlı bir farklılık gösterip göstermediğini belirlemek için tek yönlü varyans analizi (ANOVA) kullanılmıştır. Argümantasyona dayalı öz-yeterliğin, bilimin doğasına yönelik inançları ve eleştirel düşünmeyi yordayıp yordamadığını belirlemek amacıyla kurulan model, yapısal eşitlik modeli ile test edilmiştir. (shrink)

In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the referential and the (...) attributive uses of definite descriptions; the _de re/de dicto_ distinction; and Kripke’s distinction between rigid and accidental designators. Continuing with a discussion of the conditions for curiosity and its satisfaction, Inan argues that the learning process—starting in curiosity and ending in knowledge—is always an effort to transform our inostensible terms into ostensible ones. A contextual account is adopted for the satisfaction of curiosity. It then discusses the conditions of successful reference to the object of curiosity and its presuppositions. The book concludes with a discussion on the limits of curiosity and its satisfaction. (shrink)

This essay addresses the attitude of some leading Neo-Kantian philosophers toward scientific psychology and psychophysics. Early influential figures like Friedrich A. Lange counted Gustav T. Fechner’s psychophysical law among their allies in the rehabilitation of the Kantian standpoint. Later on, however, Neo-Kantian philosophers firmly rejected psychological measurement as a whole and harshly criticized the methods adopted by several psychologists of their time. For example, the Marburg mathematician and philosopher August Stadler reduced the validity of Fechner’s law to the mere physiological (...) sphere, and Hermann Cohen conceived the application of mathematical integration to human sensations as an inane enterprise. (shrink)

“İntihar Üzerine” (Ek 1) ve “Ruhun Ölümsüzlüğü Üzerine” (Ek 2) denemeleri, David Hume’un din bağlamında dogmatik inanışları, uslamlamaları en keskin bir biçimde eleştirdiği yazılarıdır. Görgül felsefesinin temel doğruları ve izlediği kuşkucu yöntem uyarınca ortaya koyduğu sonuçlar, bu denemelerin hem yayınlandıkları dönemde hem de sonrasında pek çok olumsuz eleştiriyle karşılaşmasına yol açmıştır. İnsanın doğasına ilişkin her türlü konuyu soruşturma niyetliliği ile yola çıkan Hume, dogmatik dinin ve uygulamalarının köklendiği inanışları ve uslamlamalarını da aynı niyetle irdelemiştir. Özellikle döneminde yaşanan toplumsal sorunların bu (...) dogmalara duyulan kuşkusuz inançlardan köklendiğini göstermeye çalıştığı bu iki denemenin, yine aynı dogmalara dayanarak eleştirilmesi, basımının engellenmesi ve metinlere müdahale edilmesi ise ironiktir. Bu çalışmada, Hume’un her iki denemedeki savlarının bir çözümlemesi değil, denemelerde ele alınan sorunun ne kadar gerçek olduğu, bu iki denemenin yayınlanma süreci örnek gösterilerek incelenecektir. (shrink)

In this paper, I dwell on a particular distinction introduced by Ilhan Inan—the distinction between ostensible and inostensible use of our language. The distinction applies to singular terms, such as proper names and definite descriptions, or to general terms like concepts and to the ways in which we refer to objects in the world by using such terms. Inan introduces the distinction primarily as an epistemic one but in his earlier writings (1997: 49) he leaves some room for it to (...) have some semantic significance i.e., the view that in certain intensional de re contexts whether a term occurring in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible may have a bearing on the semantic content of the sentence. However, in his later writings e.g., The Philosophy of Curiosity, he appears to abandon his earlier thoughts regarding the semantic significance of his distinction. He says: “the ostensible/inostensible distinction is basically an epistemic one.... It is an epistemic distinction that has no semantic significance” (2012: 65). I argue that there are indeed such intensional contexts in which the distinction has some semantic significance, i.e., whether a term is ostensible or inostensible has in fact a bearing on what proposition is expressed by the sentence in which the term occurs. (shrink)

Dini çoğulculuk, dini dışlayıcılık ve kapsayıcılıktan farklı olarak, her dinsel inanış taraftarlarının kendi dinleri içinde kalarak ilahi selamete erişeceğini söyler. Temelde, teolojik ve felsefi boyutları olan dini çoğulculuk tartışmasının siyasete bakan bir yönü de vardır. İslam tarihinde Meşşâî felsefenin kurucusu ve mutluluk filozofu olarak bilinen Farabi, bir taraftan hakikate nasıl ulaşılacağı diğer taraftan ise “âlem” adını verdiği kozmopolitanizm nasıl inşa edileceği ile ilgilenmektedir. Siyasal toplumun amacının, insanların uygun ölçekte, en yüce iyi için yardımlaşmalarını sağlamak olduğunu savunan Farabi’ye göre, erdemli bir (...) yaşam kurulmasına imkan sağlayan üç örgütlenme biçimi vardır: Şehir, millet ve âlem. Platon ve Aristoteles gibi Antik düşünürlerden farklı olarak erdemli bir yaşamın sadece sitede kurulacağı düşüncesine karşı çıkan Farabi, sitenin yetkin bir yaşamın ilk basamağı olduğunu savunur. Ancak, erdemli yaşamı site ile sınırlamaz. Farabi’nin teorisinde, Antik düşünceyi aşan bir kozmopolitanizm söz konusudur. Bundan dolayı Farabi, farklı dinlerin varlığını, kendi siyasal düşüncesine uygun olarak meşru kabul eder. Eğer mutluluk için yardımlaşacaklarsa, insanların dinlerinin farklı olmasında bir beis görmez. Bu dini çoğulculuğun siyasal temelidir. Diğer taraftan Farabi, dinleri hakikatle eşitleyen anlayışa karşı çıkarak, farklı dinlerin hakikatin çeşitli imajlar, örnekler ve taklitler yolu ile halka benimsetilmesi olarak görülmesi gerektiğini savunur. Diğer bir ifade ile dinler, hakikatin kendisi değil, farklı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlarda oluşmuş sembolik ifadesidir. Bu bakımdan bütün dinler ile hakikat arasında bir mesafe bulunmaktadır ve hiçbir din hakikatin kendisi değildir. Buradan Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dinsel çoğulculuğunun sınırı olmadığı çıkmamalıdır. Farabi’ye göre din, felsefe yolu ile bulunan hakikatin ikna etme veya hayal ettirme yoluyla ya da her ikisiyle birden halka kabul ettirilmesidir. Ancak Farabi, hakiki felsefe ile sahte felsefe arasında bir ayrım yapar ve ancak hakiki felsefeyi takip eden dinlerin bir hakikat değeri olduğunu savunur. Hakiki felsefe ise evrenin bir ilk nedeni olduğunu ve ilk nedenin de nedensiz olduğunu söyler. Bu, evrenin tek bir yaratıcısı olduğu anlamına gelir ve çok tanrıcılığı dışlar. Bu bakımdan Farabi, sadece tek tanrılı dinleri çoğulculuk kapsamına alır. Bunun nedeni, tek tanrılı dinlerin hakikatle özdeş olmaları değil, hakiki felsefeyi takip etmeleridir. Çünkü felsefe dinden öncedir. Bu, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde çoğulculuğun sınırlarına işaret etmektedir. Farabi, dinleri hakikatle özdeş görmeyerek ve aynı hakikatin sembolik ifadeleri olduğunu söyleyerek çoğulculuğun yolunu açar. Buna karşın sahte felsefeyi takip eden dinler olduğu gerekçesiyle çok tanrılı dinleri dışarıda bırakarak sınırlarını çizer. Bu çalışma, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dini çoğulculuğun siyasal ve epistemolojik temellerini ve çoğulculuğun sınırlarını konu almaktadır. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to highlight the relevance of Lacanian psychoanaly-sis for an understanding of Islamism, unfolding its discursive-ideological complexity. Inan attempt to reply to Fethi Benslama’s recent exploration of the function of the fatherin Islam, I suggest that Benslama’s argument about the ‘delusional’ character of Islamismand the link he envisages between the emergence of Islamism and the crisis of ‘tradi-tional’ authoritative systems, should be further investigated so as to avoid potential risksof essentialism. A different reading of Islamism (...) is proposed, which valorizes ‘creative’attempts by Islamist groups to re-organize the social imaginary within the realm of a sym-bolic economy, thereby positivising the desedimenting effects of the real in different ways.Notions such as capitonage, fantasy, desire, and jouissance are essential for us to under-stand how Islamist trajectories diversify as distinct discursive formations, thereby reveal-ing the psychoanalytical significance of Islam as a master signifier. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive critique of the Heidegger problem and while putting forward a critique of Heidegger; it establishes the sanctity of Levinas. In the process of doing so; the reviewer touches on the problems of not considering Edith Stein in a book of this sort. When I got my tenure in India, one wisecrack on the board of interviewers asked me how Kit Marole influenced Shakespeare. I knew that he was just quoting Wayne C Booth's stuff on Macbeth. John (...) E Drabinski and Eric S Nelson are not those wisecrack sorts. They are serious scholars and this review gives them their due. They have shown the Janus nature of the Nazi, Heidegger who was instrumental in gassing Edith Stein, who needs to be known more throughout the academy, which COVID 19 has successfully destroyed. And we need Levinas and Stein to rebuild a world which will be mediated soon by drones and inane webinars and contactless nonsense. This reviewer suggests that we read this book with great care. And not participate in meaningless online events. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada öğrencilerin bilimle tanışmasında anahtar rol oynayan sınıf öğretmenlerinin ve geleceğin sınıf öğretmeni olan sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının bilimin doğasına yönelik görüşlerinin ve bilim-sözde bilim ayrımı inanışlarının incelenmesi ve değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Araştırmanın çalışma grubu Orta Karadeniz Bölgesi’nde yer alan bir ilin merkez ilçesinde yer alan 344 sınıf öğretmeni ve bu ilde sınıf öğretmenliği bölümünde öğrenim gören 240 öğrenci olarak belirlenmiş, gönüllülük esasına dayalı olarak 172 öğretmen ve 136 öğretmen adayından veri toplanmıştır. Bu araştırmada veriler ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ ve (...) ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ kullanılarak elde edilmiştir. Konunun farklı değişkenler açısından değerlendirilmesi amacıyla ölçekler dışında ‘Kişisel Bilgi Formu’ kullanılmıştır. Özcan ve Turgut (2014) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği’ 7 faktör ve 37 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçekle ilgili yapılan analizlerde ölçeğin güvenirlik katsayısı 0,70 olarak bulunmuştur. Ölçek yetişkin grubu için hazırlandığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmamıştır. Çetinkaya ve Taşar (2018) tarafından geliştirilen ‘Sözde-Bilim İnanış Ölçeği’ 3 faktör ve 21 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Ölçek ortaokul öğrencileri için hazırlandığından ve bu çalışmada da yetişkin grubu ile uygulama yapıldığından faktör analizi yeniden yapılmıştır. (shrink)