P, but you don’t know that P

Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “p, but you don’t know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion is not the initiating epistemic position of the speaker but the resulting epistemic position of the audience.

Author's Profile

Christopher Willard-Kyle
University of Kentucky

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-10-07

Downloads
585 (#37,912)

6 months
116 (#43,660)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?