Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry

Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1477-1485 (2024)
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Abstract

The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect to a question if the question is sound.

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Christopher Willard-Kyle
University of Kentucky

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