Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition

Public Reason 13 (2):101-105 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment to the kind of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental idealism.

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Oliver Thomas Spinney
University College London

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