How to Make Norms Clash

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):46-55 (2021)
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Abstract

In this comment on Katherine Dormandy's paper «True Faith», I point out that the clash she describes between epistemic norms and faith-based norms of belief needs to be supplemented with a clear understanding of the pertinent norms of belief. I argue that conceiving of them as evaluative fails to explain the clash, and that understanding them as prescriptive is no better. I suggest an understanding of these norms along the lines of Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, and show how this picture can make sense of the clash.

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Eva Schmidt
TU Dortmund

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