Disclosure and rationality: Comparative risk information and decision-making about prevention

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):199-213 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

With the growing focus on prevention in medicine, studies of how to describe risk have become increasing important. Recently, some researchers have argued against giving patients “comparative risk information,” such as data about whether their baseline risk of developing a particular disease is above or below average. The concern is that giving patients this information will interfere with their consideration of more relevant data, such as the specific chance of getting the disease (the “personal risk”), the risk reduction the treatment provides, and any possible side effects. I explore this view and the theories of rationality that ground it, and I argue instead that comparative risk information can play a positive role in decision-making. The criticism of disclosing this sort of information to patients, I conclude, rests on a mistakenly narrow account of the goals of prevention and the nature of rational choice in medicine.

Author's Profile

Peter H. Schwartz
Indiana University School Of Medicine

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-06-27

Downloads
660 (#32,452)

6 months
103 (#52,937)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?