Reconciling semantic dispositionalism with semantic holism

Philosophia 38 (1):169-178 (2010)
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Abstract

Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.

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Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University

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