Too much substance, not enough cognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-80 (1998)
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Abstract

Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.

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Vincent C. Müller
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

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