The extended mind thesis is about demarcation and use of words

Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi: Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences 2:335-348 (2018)
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Abstract

The «extended mind thesis» sounds like a substantive thesis, the truth of which we should investigate. But actually the thesis a) turns about to be just a statement on where the demarcations for the «mental» are to be set (internal, external,…), i.e. it is about the «mark of the mental»; and b) the choice about the mark of the mental is a verbal choice, not a matter of scientific discovery. So, the «extended mind thesis » is a remark on how its supporters or opponents want to use the word ‘mind’, not a thesis of cognitive science or philosophy. The upshot of the extended mind discussion should not be to draw the line further out, but to drop the demarcation project.

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Vincent C. Müller
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

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