Grounding: it’s (probably) all in the head

Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3059-3081 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper we provide a psychological explanation for ‘grounding observations’—observations that are thought to provide evidence that there exists a relation of ground. Our explanation does not appeal to the presence of any such relation. Instead, it appeals to certain evolved cognitive mechanisms, along with the traditional modal relations of supervenience, necessitation and entailment. We then consider what, if any, metaphysical conclusions we can draw from the obtaining of such an explanation, and, in particular, if it tells us anything about whether we ought to posit a relation of ground.

Author Profiles

Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
James Norton
University of Tasmania

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