Os riscos de se tentar conferir plena cidadania teórica ao pensamento ético de Nietzsche: uma discussão de "Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics" de Simon Robertson

Estudos Nietzsche 13 (1):115-140 (2022)
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Abstract

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges.

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Rogerio Lopes
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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