Naturalismus und Interpretationismus: Einige Bemerkungen zu Abels Interpretationsphilosophie

In Astrid Wagner & Ulrich Dirks (eds.), Abel Im Dialog: Perspektiven der Zeichen- Und Interpretationsphilosophie. De Gruyter. pp. 1219-1230 (2018)
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Abstract

This article aims to investigate the extent to which Abel’s insertion in the debate on scepticism and naturalism in the Anglophone philosophical tradition, especially in the historical Strawson-Stroud debate on the success of transcendental arguments in response to the sceptical challenge, allows the creation of a conceptual scheme which refuses both the conventionalist and the naturalist position in regard to our conceptual schemas, while at the same time seeking to differentiate itself from the apriorism of the Kantian tradition. Although I acknowledge that interpretationism offers a new solution to the issues involved in this debate, I argue that this solution is unable to deliver everything it promises. This new conceptual space is not determined enough to pacify scepticism. I conclude by suggesting that the attempt to reconcile Nietzsche and Wittgenstein introduces instability in Abel’s interpretation. The reformist impulse of Nietzsche’s philosophy rests on the results of a preliminary naturalistic stage (genealogical inquiry) which neither Wittgenstein nor Abel seems willing to incorporate into their philosophies.

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Rogerio Lopes
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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