Der normative Minimalismus als die verteidigungsfähigste Version von Nietzsches Amoralismus

In Volker Caysa & Konstanze Schwarzwald (eds.), Nietzsche - macht - größe. Nietzsche - philosoph der größe der macht oder der macht der größe? deGruyter. pp. 131-144 (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper I intend to identify the kind of Amoralism Nietzsche is arguing for in his writings of the middle period. In the first part of the paper, I focus on the presuppositions as well as on the motivation underlying this version of the amoralist position. Nietzsche diagnoses a normative conflict between intellectual integrity and the metaphysical presuppositions of our moral vocabulary and practices. This diagnosis leads him to the conclusion that we should reform a substantive part of our moral intuitions. However, this first critique of morality, one that we could label an internal critique, is not all that Nietzsche has to say about normativity, even if we consider only the works of the middle period. According to my interpretation, Nietzsche is committed to a position that could be described as normative Minimalism. By developing this position, Nietzsche was clearly influenced by Montaigne´s reception of both Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism. The kind of human life Nietzsche associated with this position is identified by him with the life of the free spirits, conceived as both a genuine heir and an emulator of the ascetic types made possible by the Christian culture, paradigmatically exemplified by Pascal and the French Jansenists. In the second part of this paper, I contrast this kind of normative Minimalism with Nietzsche´s defence of Perfectionism in his later works. I conclude my paper by calling attention to some argumentative advantages of normative Minimalism and to some argumentative difficulties that Perfectionism cannot preclude (from a genuine Nietzschean perspective).

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Rogerio Lopes
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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