An objection of varying importance to epistemic utility theory

Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2919-2931 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others. Epistemic Utility Theory cannot accommodate this fact, at least not in any standard way. For EUT to be successful, legitimate measures of epistemic utility must be proper, i.e., every probability function must assign itself maximum expected utility. Once we vary the importance of propositions across worlds, however, normal measures of epistemic utility become improper. I argue there isn’t any good way out for EUT.

Author's Profile

Ben Levinstein
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-30

Downloads
515 (#44,079)

6 months
139 (#30,398)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?