(β) não dá Base ao Incompatibilismo entre Determinismo e Livre-Arbítrio

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (3):1951-1976 (2019)
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Abstract

Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.

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Domingos Faria
University of Porto

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