Against Emotions as Feelings: Towards an Attitudinal Profile of Emotion

Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):223-245 (2023)
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Abstract

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant to one's motivations.

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Rodrigo Díaz
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)

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