A Failed Twist to an Old Problem

Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81 (2016)
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Abstract

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

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Rodrigo Borges
University of Florida

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