What’s Wrong with Automated Influence

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):125-148 (2022)
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Abstract

Automated Influence is the use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate, and analyse people’s data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the interactional focus of “AI Ethics” in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of AI, we show that the real problem with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy that it precipitates.

Author Profiles

Claire Benn
Cambridge University
Seth Lazar
Australian National University

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