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Belief Revision for Growing Awareness

Mind 130 (520):1207–1232 (2021)

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  1. Awareness Revision and Belief Extension.Joe Roussos - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    What norm governs how an agent should change their beliefs when they encounter a completely new possibility? Orthodox Bayesianism has no answer, as it takes all learning to involve updating prior beliefs. A partial proposal is Reverse Bayesianism, which mandates the preservation of ratios of prior probabilities, but it faces counterexamples introduced by Mahtani (2021). I propose to separate awareness growth into two stages: awareness revision and belief extension. I argue that Mahtani’s cases highlight that we need to theorize awareness (...)
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  • Awareness By Degree.Paul Silva Jr & Robert Weston Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...)
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  • The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.
    Awareness growth—coming to entertain propositions of which one was previously unaware—is a crucial aspect of epistemic thriving. And yet, it is widely believed that orthodox Bayesianism cannot accommodate this phenomenon, since that would require employing supposedly defective catch-all propositions. Orthodox Bayesianism, it is concluded, must be amended. In this paper, I show that this argument fails, and that, on the contrary, the orthodox version of Bayesianism is particularly well-suited to accommodate awareness growth. For it entails what I call the refinement (...)
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  • Transformative Experience, Awareness Growth, and the Limits of Rational Planning.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (5):939-948.
    Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience. We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth. You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformative option; you lack knowledge about what are the possible (...)
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  • Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities.Ignacio Ojea Quintana - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.
    This paper focuses on radical pooling, or the question of how to aggregate credences when there is a fundamental disagreement about which is the relevant logical space for inquiry. The solution advanced is based on the notion of consensus as common ground, where agents can find it by suspending judgment on logical possibilities. This is exemplified with cases of scientific revolution. On a formal level, the proposal uses algebraic joins and imprecise probabilities; which is shown to be compatible with the (...)
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  • Degrees of riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness: A neo-Popperian account applicable to probabilistic theories.Leander Vignero & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11729-11764.
    In this paper, we take a fresh look at three Popperian concepts: riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness of scientific hypotheses or theories. First, we make explicit the dimensions that underlie the notion of riskiness. Secondly, we examine if and how degrees of falsifiability can be defined, and how they are related to various dimensions of the concept of riskiness as well as the experimental context. Thirdly, we consider the relation of riskiness to truthlikeness. Throughout, we pay special attention to probabilistic theories (...)
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  • Expert deference as a belief revision schema.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):1-28.
    When an agent learns of an expert's credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts. In a Bayesian framework, it is often modelled by endowing the agent with a set of priors that achieves this result. But this model faces a number of challenges, especially when applied to non-ideal agents (who (...)
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  • Awareness growth and dispositional attitudes.Anna Mahtani - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8981-8997.
    Richard Bradley and others endorse Reverse Bayesianism as the way to model awareness growth. I raise a problem for Reverse Bayesianism—at least for the general version that Bradley endorses—and argue that there is no plausible way to restrict the principle that will give us the right results. To get the right results, we need to pay attention to the attitudes that agents have towards propositions of which they are unaware. This raises more general questions about how awareness growth should be (...)
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  • Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence (...)
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  • On Algebra Relativisation.Chloé de Canson - forthcoming - Mind.
    Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.
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  • Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals.Mario Günther & Borut Trpin - 2022 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):439-451.
    One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.
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  • Reasonable Doubt from Unconceived Alternatives.Hylke Jellema - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):971-996.
    In criminal trials, judges or jurors have to decide whether the facts described in the indictment are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, these decision-makers cannot always imagine every relevant sequence of events—there may be unconceived alternatives. The possibility of unconceived alternatives is an overlooked source of reasonable doubt. I argue that decision-makers should not consider the defendant’s guilt proven if they have good reasons to believe that plausible, unconceived scenarios exist. I explore this thesis through the lens of the (...)
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  • Attitudes, deliberation and decisions.Richard Bradley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
    In this paper I discuss the challenges of several authors to the claims I make in Decision Theory with a Human Face regarding the relation between preference and choice, the nature of conditional desire, the semantics of conditionals, attitudes to chances and their role in individuating prospects, belief change under growing awareness and choice under ambiguity.
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