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  1. Visual working memory capacity: from psychophysics and neurobiology to individual differences.Steven J. Luck & Edward K. Vogel - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (8):391-400.
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  • Object-based auditory and visual attention.Barbara G. Shinn-Cunningham - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (5):182.
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  • Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Betty Tärning, Sverker Sikström & Thérèse Deutgen - 2010 - Cognition 117 (1):54-61.
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  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Non-local Consciousness A Concept Based on Scientific Research on Near-Death Experiences During Cardiac Arrest.Pim van Lommel - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    In this article a concept of non-local consciousness will be described, based on recent scientific research on near-death experiences . Since the publication of several prospective studies on NDEs in survivors of cardiac arrest, with strikingly similar results and conclusions, the phenomenon of the NDE can no longer be scientifically ignored. In the last thirty years several theories have been proposed to explain an NDE. The challenge to find a common explanation for the cause and content of an NDE is (...)
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  • Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  • How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  • Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  • Implicit processing of tactile information: Evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
    People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was (...)
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  • Is a pre-change object representation weakened under correct detection of a change?☆.Yei-Yu Yeh & Cheng-Ta Yang - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):91-102.
    We investigated whether a pre-change representation is inhibited or weakened under correct change detection. Two arrays of six objects were rapidly presented for change detection in three experiments. After detection, the perceptual identification of degraded stimuli was tested in Experiments 1 and 2. The weakening of a pre-change representation was not observed under correct detection. The repetition priming effect was observed for a pre-change object and the magnitude was equivalent to the effect for a post-change object. Under change blindness, repetition (...)
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  • Implicit learning for probable changes in a visual change detection task.Melissa R. Beck, Bonnie L. Angelone, Daniel T. Levin, Matthew S. Peterson & D. Alexander Varakin - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1192-1208.
    Previous research demonstrates that implicitly learned probability information can guide visual attention. We examined whether the probability of an object changing can be implicitly learned and then used to improve change detection performance. In a series of six experiments, participants completed 120–130 training change detection trials. In four of the experiments the object that changed color was the same shape on every trial. Participants were not explicitly aware of this change probability manipulation and change detection performance was not improved for (...)
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  • On the applications of change blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Psychologia 51:100-106.
    An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
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  • Representing Metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?Marc Egeth - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.
    What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
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  • The Modeling and Control of Visual Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2007 - In Wayne D. Gray (ed.), Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-148.
    Recent developments in vision science have resulted in several major changes in our understanding of human visual perception. For example, attention no longer appears necessary for "visual intelligence"--a large amount of sophisticated processing can be done without it. Scene perception no longer appears to involve static, general-purpose descriptions, but instead may involve dynamic representations whose content depends on the individual and the task. And vision itself no longer appears to be limited to the production of a conscious "picture"--it may also (...)
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  • Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  • Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur.Michael E. Silverman & Arien Mack - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.
    In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness . Using 3 × 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report . In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether (...)
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  • Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
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  • Metacognitive errors in change detection: Missing the gap between lab and life.Daniel Smilek, John D. Eastwood, Michael G. Reynolds & Alan Kingstone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):52-57.
    Studies of change detection suggest that people tend to overestimate their ability to detect visual changes. In a recent laboratory study of change detection and human intention, Beck et al., found that individuals have an inadequate understanding that intention can improve change detection performance and that its importance increases with scene complexity. We note that these findings may be specific to unfamiliar situations such as those generated routinely in studies of change detection. In two questionnaire studies, we demonstrate that when (...)
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Concepts and definitions of consciousness.David Rosenthal - 2009 - In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness: A - L. Elsevier.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  • Making Up Our Minds: Imaginative Deconstruction in MathArt, 1920 – Present.Shanna Dobson & Chris Fields - manuscript
    The cognitive sciences tell us that the self is a construct. The visual arts illustrate this fact. Mathematics give it full expression, abstracting the self to a Grothendieck site. This self is a haecceity, an ephemeral this-ness and now-ness. We make up our minds and our histories. That our acts are public, that they communicate effectively, becomes a dialetheic paradox, a deep paradox for our times.
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  • Situating Mental Depth.Robert W. Clowes & Gloria Andrada - 2022 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 13 (1):1-30.
    Is the mind flat? Chater (2018) has recently argued that it is and that, contrary to traditional psychology and standard folk image, depth of mind is just an illusory confabulation. In this paper, we argue that while there is a kernel of something correct in Chater’s thesis, this does not in itself add up to a critique of mental depth per se. We use Chater’s ideas as a springboard for creating a new understanding of mental depth which builds upon findings (...)
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  • Neo-Ryleanism about self-understanding.Yair Levy - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):3328-3354.
    The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs ‘Self-understanding’ — i.e. (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has (...)
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  • Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness.Tomas Marvan & Michal Polák - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (2).
    The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The (...)
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  • The Pre-reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):623-637.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
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  • From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time.Ronald P. Gruber, Carlos Montemayor & Richard A. Block - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (4):927-954.
    There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic (...)
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  • Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.
    Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued (...)
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  • Twin Memory.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2016 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 7 (1-2):147-163.
    In this article, I examine a new concept of “Twin Memory’ which has emerged in memory classification research of conscious and unconscious memory representations. It is to analyse the presence of twin memory among the various memory systems, and also to provide a platform for the twin memory “anatomy” in the field of cognitive science, neuropsychology and neuroscience.
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  • Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not noticing the (...)
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  • A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture.David Pierre Leibovitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...)
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  • Explaining what?Elizabeth Irvine - unknown
    The Hard Problem is surrounded by a vast literature, to which it is increasingly hard to contribute to in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the strategy here is not to offer any new metaphysical or ‘in principle’ arguments in favour of the success of materialism, but to assume a Type Q(uinian) approach and look to contemporary consciousness science to see how the concept of consciousness fares there, and what kind of explanations we can hope to offer of it. It is suggested (...)
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  • Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an (...)
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  • Virtualist representation.Robert W. Clowes & Ron Chrisley - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):503-522.
    This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call “presentational virtualism”). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive (“enactive virtualism”). This paper (...)
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  • Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
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  • Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (...)
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  • Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses.Ryan B. Scott, Ludovico Minati, Zoltan Dienes, Hugo D. Critchley & Anil K. Seth - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):936-942.
    Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses . Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction , or while distracted (...)
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  • The experience of watching dance: phenomenological–neuroscience duets. [REVIEW]Corinne Jola, Shantel Ehrenberg & Dee Reynolds - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):17-37.
    This paper discusses possible correspondences between neuroscientific findings and phenomenologically informed methodologies in the investigation of kinesthetic empathy in watching dance. Interest in phenomenology has recently increased in cognitive science (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ) and dance scholars have recently contributed important new insights into the use of phenomenology in dance studies (e.g. Legrand and Ravn (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(3):389–408, 2009 ); Parviainen (Dance Research Journal 34(1):11–26, 2002 ); Rothfield (Topoi 24:43–53, 2005 )). In vision research, coherent neural (...)
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  • Action blindness in response to gradual changes.Bruno Berberian, Stephanie Chambaron-Ginhac & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):152-171.
    The goal of this study is to characterize observers’ abilities to detect gradual changes and to explore putative dissociations between conscious experience of change and behavioral adaptation to a changing stimulus. We developed a new experimental paradigm in which, on each trial, participants were shown a dot pattern on the screen. Next, the pattern disappeared and participants had to reproduce it. In some conditions, the target pattern was incrementally rotated over successive trials and participants were either informed or not of (...)
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  • Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
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  • Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory.Edmund T. Rolls - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:526178.
    Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers’s (2019) version that excludes conceptual (categorical or discrete) representations, and in which phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated. A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which (...)
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  • Body schema and body image - pros and cons.Frédérique De Vignemont - unknown
    There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to (...)
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  • Psychophysical “blinding” methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
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  • The thalamic dynamic core theory of conscious experience.Lawrence M. Ward - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):464-486.
    I propose that primary conscious awareness arises from synchronized activity in dendrites of neurons in dorsal thalamic nuclei, mediated particularly by inhibitory interactions with thalamic reticular neurons. In support, I offer four evidential pillars: consciousness is restricted to the results of cortical computations; thalamus is the common locus of action of brain injury in vegetative state and of general anesthetics; the anatomy and physiology of the thalamus imply a central role in consciousness; neural synchronization is a neural correlate of consciousness.
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  • Simulation theory and interpersonal utility comparisons reconsidered.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1185-1210.
    According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...)
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  • Measures of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):285-297.
    Consciousness is now a hot topic in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences, yet there is much controversy over how to measure it. First, it is not clear whether biased subjective reports should be taken as adequate for measuring consciousness, or if more objective measures are required. Ways to benefit from the advantages of both these measures in the form of ‘Type 2’ metacognitive measures are under development, but face criticism. Research into neurophysiological measures of consciousness is potentially very valuable, (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (...)
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  • Change blindness blindness: Beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection.Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie Angelone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
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  • Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness.Talis Bachmann & Jaan Aru - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 108 (C):103471.
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  • Process vs. Processor Accounts of Stage Models: A Cautionary Tale. Commentary: Seeing changes: How familiarity alters our perception of change.Luke Kersten - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    A commentary on: Seeing changes: How familiarity alters our perception of change by Tovey, M., and Herdman, C. (2014). Vis. Cogn. 22, 214–238 .
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  • Visual long-term memory and change blindness: Different effects of pre- and post-change information on one-shot change detection using meaningless geometric objects.Megumi Nishiyama & Jun Kawaguchi - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:105-117.
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