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  1. Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.
    Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well with (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
    While the causal contributions of so-called ‘automatic’ processes to behavior are now widely acknowledged, less attention has been given to their normative role in the guidance of action. We develop an account of the normativity of automaticity that responds to and builds upon Tamar Szabó Gendler's account of ‘alief’, an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents a promising tool for integrating psychological research on automaticity with philosophical work on mind and action, but Gendler errs in (...)
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  • Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
    People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right (...)
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  • Constitutivism, belief, and emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M, then S has M. Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, (...)
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  • Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.
    One response to the preface paradox—the paradox that arises when each claim in a book is justified for the author and yet in the preface the author avers that errors remain—counsels against the preface belief. It is this line of thought that poses a problem for any view that places a high value on intellectual humility. If we become suspicious of preface beliefs, it will be a challenge to explain how expressions of fallibility and intellectual humility are appropriate, whether voiced (...)
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  • Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).
    Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent’s thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a necessary (...)
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  • Book review : Objective Bayesianism defended? [REVIEW]Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2011 - Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
    Darrell P. Rowbottom reviews the book "In defense of objective Bayesianism" by Jon Williamson.
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  • Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.
    According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something or be ‘in-between believing’ it. In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other (...)
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  • On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.
    Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content.
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  • (1 other version)Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Normativity of Automaticity.Alex Madva Michael Brownstein - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
    While the causal contributions of so‐called ‘automatic’ processes to behavior are now widely acknowledged, less attention has been given to their normative role in the guidance of action. We develop an account of the normativity of automaticity that responds to and builds upon Tamar Szabó Gendler's account of ‘alief’, an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents a promising tool for integrating psychological research on automaticity with philosophical work on mind and action, but Gendler errs in (...)
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  • Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.
    This paper examines a class of beliefs that I propose to call ‘unendorsed beliefs’. Unendorsed beliefs are beliefs whose content is not endorsed by the believer although the believer herself acknowledges their presence in her psychology. Recent work in philosophy – e.g. the discussion of cases in which an individual's explicit and supported views conflict with her overall arc of instinctive and unguarded responses – has highlighted the occurrence of such beliefs. However, there are open questions about their central psychological (...)
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  • Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases.Cristina Borgoni - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.
    In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while his/her overall automatic behavior suggests that he/she believes that not-P. According to Schwitzgebel, this is a case of in-between believing. This article raises several concerns about Schwitzgebel's account and proposes an alternative view. I argue that the in-between approach yields incorrect results in belief self-ascriptions and does not capture the psychological conflict underlying the individual's dissonance. I advance the view that in relevant cases the dissonant individual (...)
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