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  1. Terminalism and assisted suicide.Philip Reed - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):124-125.
    Four of the commentaries criticised my claim that assisted suicide for the terminally ill is discriminatory. 1 They were united in this judgement roughly because they insisted that assisted suicide is in fact a benefit and not a harm. I concede that if it is a benefit, then there is no way in which the terminally ill can be disadvantaged by it and hence no way it can be an instance of discrimination. I pointed out in the article that this (...)
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  • Is medical aid in dying discriminatory?Christopher A. Riddle - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):122-122.
    In _Discrimination Against the Dying_, Philip Reed argues, among other things, that ‘right to die laws (euthanasia and assisted suicide) also exhibit terminalism when they restrict eligibility to the terminally ill’. 1 Additionally, he suggests ‘the availability of the option of assisted death only for the terminally ill negatively influences the terminally ill who wish to live by causing them to doubt their choice’. 1 I argue that on scrutiny, neither of these two points hold. First, we routinely limit a (...)
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  • Assisted dying programmes are not discriminatory against the dying.Ben Sarbey - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):115-115.
    Some jurisdictions that allow assisted dying require participating patients to have a terminal illness. This includes all Australian and US states where assisted dying is allowed. 1 Philip Reed 2 argues that this requirement constitutes discrimination against the dying. As Reed 2 argues: ‘assisted death laws that limit their services to the dying discriminate against them because death is offered to them to solve their problems’. This discrimination could take two forms: (1) via harm to dying patients as a group (...)
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  • Giving the terminally ill access to euthanasia is not discriminatory: a response to Reed.Jordan MacKenzie - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):123-123.
    Philip Reed argues that laws that grant people access to euthanasia on the basis of terminal illness are discriminatory. In support of this claim, he offers an argument by analogy: it would be discriminatory to offer a person access to euthanasia because they are women or because they are disabled, as such restricted access would send the message ‘that life as a woman or as a disabled person is (very often) not worth living’.1 And so it must also be discriminatory (...)
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  • Terminalism and how dying patients are conditioned as docile bodies.John Han - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):116-117.
    Philip Reed (2023) argues that discrimination against (non-acutely) dying patients constitutes a unique kind—which he calls terminalism—because their status as persons with terminal illness marks them with a socially salient identity which, by means of direct and indirect discrimination, limits their sets of choices and resources, such as in hospice care or organ transplant policies. 1 Importantly, Reed also argues that while terminalism is an increasingly prevalent normative phenomenon, it has been overlooked in the literature, ‘hiding in plain sight’ as (...)
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  • But I accepted these disadvantages! Can you be discriminated against by holding a right?Alma K. Barner - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (2):120-121.
    To show that discrimination against the terminally ill is a real and worrisome phenomenon Reed presents four examples1. Here, I focus on the final two: right-to-try and right-to-die laws. I argue that they are not instances of discrimination, because they grant rights. Reed appears to have overlooked that rights differ from obligations in ways that leave his argumentation unsuccessful. According to the most prominent theory of rights, rights function to protect the personal interests of their holders.2 For that reason, strengthening (...)
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