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  1. The Structure of Criminal Law.Re’em Segev - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (2):497-517.
    According to a common view, criminal law should be structured in a way that allocates the conditions of criminal liability to different types of legal rules, given the content of the condition and the nature of the rule. This view classifies some conditions as elements of offenses and others as (part of) justificatory defenses or of excusatory defenses. While this view is attractive, I argue that it should be rejected, since it is incompatible with two plausible propositions about legal rules. (...)
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  • Dominating Risk Impositions.Kritika Maheshwari & Sven Nyholm - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):613-637.
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  • Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm.Susanne Burri - 2020 - Law and Philosophy 39 (4):381-408.
    This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive harm by engaging in a morally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as foreseeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform it only if she abides by certain duties of care. Those who argue that engaging in such an activity can render an agent liable to defensive harm (...)
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  • Rights Against High-Level Risk Impositions.Fei Song - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):763-778.
    In this article, I argue for a distinct and novel right-based account of risks and I call it the Sophisticated High-risk Thesis. I argue that there is a distinction between rights-infringing risk impositions and no-rights-infringing risk impositions. An action imposing a high risk of harm infringes rights, whereas an act imposing a low risk of harm does not. I also suggest three principles that govern the permissibility of highly risky actions. If a highly risky action meets the conditions specified by (...)
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  • Temporal Horizons of Justice.Bruce Ackerman - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (6):299.
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  • Nonconsequentialist Precaution.Christopher Morgan-Knapp - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):785-797.
    How cautious should regulators be? A standard answer is consequentialist: regulators should be just cautious enough to maximize expected social value. This paper charts the prospects of a nonconsequentialist - and more precautionary - alternative. More specifically, it argues that a contractualism focused on ex ante consent can motivate the following regulatory criterion: regulators should permit a socially beneficial risky activity only if no one can be expected to be made worse off by it. Broadly speaking, there are two strategies (...)
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  • Perceived Reasonableness and Morals in Service Encounters.Nobuyuki Fukawa & Sunil Erevelles - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 125 (3):1-20.
    Companies have a moral responsibility to treat customers fairly. One way for companies to do so is to allow their employees to exercise reasonableness in their interactions with customers. We define reasonableness as a latitude or space that exists around expectations in the delivery of service. In this paper, we explore the concept of reasonableness from a customer’s perspective (i.e., perceived reasonableness) and the role that the morals of service personnel play in customers’ perceptions of reasonableness. First, through an open-ended (...)
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  • Is the role of tort to repair wrongful losses?Gregory C. Keating - 2011 - In Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson (eds.), Rights and private law. Portland, Oregon: Hart.
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  • Aristotle's Forms of Justice.Ernest J. Weinrib - 1989 - Ratio Juris 2 (3):211-226.
    . In Aristotle's account, corrective and distributive justice are not particular substantive ideals, but are rather the formal patterns that inhere in interactions and in the legal arrangements that regulate them. Corrective and distributive justice are the structures of ordering internal to transactions and distributions, respectively. The Aristotelian. forms of justice thus constitute the rationality immanent to the relation ships of mutually external beings. This article stresses Aristotle's formalism, contrasting it to modem instrumental conceptions of legal rationality, and defending it (...)
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  • Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation.Barbara H. Fried - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):39-66.
    This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (...)
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  • Is the Reasonable Person a Person of Virtue?Michele Mangini - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (2):157-179.
    The ‘reasonable person standard’ is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity derives from the controversial tasks that people place on it. Two dialectics require some clarification: the objective/subjective interpretation of the standard and the ideal/ordinary person controversy. I shall move through these dialectics from the standpoint of an EV approach, assuming that on this interpretation the RPS can perform most persuasively its tasks. The all-round (...)
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  • Poetic justice: Why sex-slaves should be allowed to Sue ignorant clients in conversion. [REVIEW]Tsachi Keren-Paz - 2010 - Law and Philosophy 29 (3):307-336.
    In this article I argue that clients who purchase commercial sex from forced prostitutes should be strictly liable in tort towards the sex-slaves. Such an approach is both normatively defensible and doctrinally feasible. As I have argued elsewhere, fairness and equality demand that clients compensate sex-slaves even if one refuses to acknowledge that fault is involved in purchasing sex from a prostitute who might be forced. In this article I argue that such strict liability could be grounded in the tort (...)
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  • Liability and Risk.David Mccarhty - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):238-262.
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  • A Primer on the distinction between justification and excuse.Andrew Botterell - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):172-196.
    This article is about the distinction between justification and excuse, a distinction which, while familiar, remains controversial. My discussion focuses on three questions. First, what is the distinction? Second, why is it important? And third, what are some areas of inquiry in which the distinction might be philosophically fruitful? I suggest that the distinction has practical and theoretical consequences, and is therefore worth taking seriously; I highlight two philosophical issues in which the distinction might play a useful role; but I (...)
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  • Why we ought to be (reasonable) subjectivists about justification.Andrew Botterell - 2007 - Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by Robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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