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  1. The sadistic trait predicts minimization of intention and causal responsibility in moral judgment.Bastien Trémolière & Hakim Djeriouat - 2016 - Cognition 146 (C):158-171.
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  • Empathy and Its Role in Morality.Meghan Masto - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):74-96.
    In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems (...)
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  • The mad, the bad, and the psychopath.Heidi L. Maibom - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
    It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...)
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  • The modulation of somatosensory resonance by psychopathic traits and empathy.Louis-Alexandre Marcoux, Pierre-Emmanuel Michon, Julien I. A. Voisin, Sophie Lemelin, Etienne Vachon-Presseau & Philip L. Jackson - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (2001) develops (...)
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  • What Experimental Evidence Shows Us about the Role of Emotions in Moral Judgement.Heidi Maibom - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):999-1012.
    In empirically minded research, it is widely agreed that emotions play an important, even essential, role in moral judgment. Experimental research on moral development, psychopathology, helping behavior, moral judgment, and moral justification has been used to support different new forms of sentimentalism. This article reviews this evidence critically and proposes that although it suggests that emotions play a role in moral judgment, it does so in a more limited way than is often assumed to be the case. Some evidence shows (...)
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  • Inter-individual Differences in Heart Rate Variability Are Associated with Inter-individual Differences in Empathy and Alexithymia.Alexander Lischke, Rike Pahnke, Anett Mau-Moeller, Martin Behrens, Hans J. Grabe, Harald J. Freyberger, Alfons O. Hamm & Matthias Weippert - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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