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Carnapian frameworks

Synthese 199 (1-2):4097-4126 (2021)

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  1. Carnap, Language Pluralism, and Rationality.Matti Eklund - manuscript
    Forthcoming in Darren Bradley (ed.), Carnap and Contemporary Philosophy. -/- This paper is centered on Carnap’s views on rationality. More specifically, much of the focus is on a puzzle regarding Carnap’s view on rationality that Florian Steinberger has recently discussed. Not only is Steinberger’s discussion of significant intrinsic interest: his discussion also raises general questions about Carnap interpretation. As I have discussed in earlier work, there are two very different ways of interpreting Carnap’s talk of “frameworks” – and, relatedly, different (...)
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  • Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense.James Andrew Smith - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (10):1-28.
    I offer an interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s views on cognitive significance and insignificance. The basic idea behind their views is as follows: to judge an expression is insignificant is to recommend it not be used in or explicated into languages used to express truth-valued judgments in inquiry; to judge an expression is significant is to recommend it be used in or explicated into such languages. These judgments are pragmatic judgments, made in light of purposes for language use in inquiry. (...)
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  • Author’s response: Steven French: There are no such things as theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 288 pp, £55.00.Steven French - 2021 - Metascience 30 (1):23-29.
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  • Carnap as a Beall-style logical monist.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.
    There was a time when both Rudolf Carnap and Jc Beall were thought to be arch logical pluralists. Beall has since renounced his pluralistic views, but Carnap is still largely regarded as a pluralist. In this paper, I will show that there is good reason to think that Carnap is not a logical pluralist, at least in the way he is presented in the literature. Instead, I argue, he can be seen as a Beall-style logical monist at the meta-level, in (...)
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